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Master's Dissertation
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2020.tde-20042021-210713
Document
Author
Full name
João Lucas Pimenta da Silva Pinto
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2020
Supervisor
Committee
Moura, Alex de Campos (President)
Braida, Celso Reni
Ferraz, Marcus Sacrini Ayres
Teixeira Filho, Dario Alves
Title in Portuguese
Intencionalidade e existência: o paradoxo das representações sem objeto em Twardowski e Husserl
Keywords in Portuguese
Existência
Filosofia da mente
Husserl
Intencionalidade
Twardowski
Abstract in Portuguese
A dissertação tem o objetivo de reconstruir a controvérsia entre Kazimierz Twardowski e Edmund Husserl a respeito do chamado paradoxo das representações sem objeto: a conjunção das teses incompatíveis toda representação representa um objeto (oriunda da psicologia descritiva de Franz Brentano) e nem toda representação tem um objeto correspondente (oriunda da teoria da ciência de Bernard Bolzano). Se Husserl, em seu manuscrito de 1894 "Objetos intencionais", é quem se propõe expressamente a resolver o conflito entre as duas teses, uma tentativa de solucionar o mesmo problema pode ser depreendida do ensaio de Twardowski Sobre a doutrina do conteúdo e do objeto das representações, publicado meses antes. Argumentaremos, em primeiro lugar, que uma versão prévia do paradoxo pode ser identificada no problema dos juízos negativos verdadeiros que surge na obra de Brentano, e que o exame deste problema pode ajudar a iluminar o que está em jogo na controvérsia entre Twardowski e Husserl. Em seguida, mostraremos que Twardowski, motivado a evitar o impasse brentaniano, desenvolve uma concepção radicalmente abstrata de objeto que lhe permite rejeitar a tese de Bolzano e sustentar que mesmo as representações de objetos inexistentes têm, afinal, objetos correspondentes. Por fim, apresentaremos a crítica de Husserl à solução twardowskiana e sua solução alternativa, a qual reabilita a tese bolzaniana e reformula a tese brentaniana com apelo à ideia de que podemos nos referir a objetos inexistentes somente pelo uso de um discurso que opere sob a hipótese de que tais objetos existem.
Title in English
Intentionality and existence: the paradox of objectless presentations in Twardowski and Husserl
Keywords in English
Existence
Husserl
Intentionality
Philosophy of mind
Twardowski
Abstract in English
The dissertation aims to reconstruct the controversy between Kazimierz Twardowski and Edmund Husserl regarding the so-called paradox of objectless presentations: the conjunction of the incompatible theses every presentation presents an object (from Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology) and not every presentation has a corresponding object (from Bernard Bolzano's theory of science). If Husserl, in his 1894 manuscript "Intentional objects", is the one who expressly proposes to resolve the conflict between the two theses, an attempt to solve the same problem can be inferred from Twardowski's essay On the doctrine of the content and object of presentations, published months before. We will argue, first, that a previous version of the paradox can be identified in the problem of true negative judgments that arises in Brentano's work, and that examining this problem can help to illuminate what is at stake in the controversy between Twardowski and Husserl. Then, we will show that Twardowski, motivated to avoid the Brentanian impasse, develops a radically abstract conception of object which allows him to reject Bolzano's thesis and to maintain that even presentations of nonexistent objects, after all, have corresponding objects. Finally, we will present Husserl's criticism of the Twardowskian solution and his alternative solution, which rehabilitates the Bolzanian thesis and reformulates the Brentanian thesis with an appeal to the idea that we can refer to nonexistent objects only by using a discourse which operates under the hypothesis that such objects exist.
 
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Publishing Date
2021-04-20
 
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