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Master's Dissertation
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2019.tde-04122019-154008
Document
Author
Full name
Lucas Baccarat Silva Negrão de Campos
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2019
Supervisor
Committee
Plastino, Caetano Ernesto (President)
Dias, Diogo Henrique Bispo
Monticelli, Pedro
Porta, Mario Ariel Gonzalez
Title in Portuguese
Neurath e a concepção semântica de verdade
Keywords in Portuguese
Círculo de Viena
Neurath
Semântica
Tarski
Abstract in Portuguese
A concepção semântica de verdade elaborada por Tarski causou grande impacto sobre diversos membros do Círculo de Viena e, consequentemente, também alterou substancialmente os debates promovidos entre estes. No caso de Carnap, por exemplo, a definição tarskiana de verdade foi particularmente bem recebida e motivou uma guinada definitiva do filósofo alemão à semântica formal. Esta apreciação de Carnap, no entanto, não era compartilhada por todos os membros do grupo vienense. Neurath, por exemplo, criticou ferozmente a semântica tarskiana, desde o seu primeiro contato com mesma. De acordo com o autor, a definição de verdade reavivava a metafísica aristotélica nas discussões do Circulo de Viena e não poderia jamais ser conciliada com um empirismo legítimo. Com o passar do tempo prevaleceu o otimismo de Carnap quanto à semântica, sendo o criticismo de Neurath relegado à um segundo plano, tido como ou motivado por sua adesão a uma teoria coerencial da verdade ou como uma espécie de reação irracional de quem não compreendeu adequadamente o significado e as reais implicações da concepção semântica de verdade. Esse, no entanto, entendimento foi contestado por algumas leituras recentes: (a) uma delas defende que a crítica de Neurath era motivada por alguns pressupostos filosóficos muito fundamentais que guiavam sua concepção de linguagem e; (b) a outra defende que as críticas de Neurath devem ser vistas como parcialmente adequadas e parcialmente como um erro historicamente motivado. Ambas essas novas leituras rejeitam a ideia de que as críticas de Neurath à concepção semântica de verdade se fundamenta em uma teoria coerencial da verdade ou que esta se deva a uma reação emocional. Nesta dissertação, nós procuramos avaliar a questão e nos posicionar dentre as linhas de interpretação.
Title in English
Neurath and the semantic conception of Truth
Keywords in English
Neurath
Semantics
Tarski
Vienna Circle
Abstract in English
The semantic conception of truth elaborated by Tarski had a great impact on several members of the Vienna Circle and consequently also substantially altered the debates promoted between them. In the case of Carnap, for example, the Tarskian definition of truth was particularly well received and motivated a definite turn of the German philosopher into formal semantics. This appreciation of Carnap, however, was not shared by all members of the Viennese group. Neurath, for example, has fiercely criticized Tarskian semantics since his first contact with it. According to the author, the definition of truth revived Aristotelian metaphysics in the discussions of the Vienna Circle and could never be reconciled with a legitimate empiricism. Over time Carnapsoptimism about semantics prevailed, with Neurath's criticism being relegated to the background, taken either as motivated for its adherence to a coherent theory of truth or as a kind of irrational reaction of those who did not understand properly the meaning and the real implications of the semantic conception of truth. However, this interpretation has been challenged by some recent readings: (a) one of them argues that Neurath's critique was motivated by some very fundamental philosophical assumptions that guided his conception of language; (b) the other holds that Neurath's criticisms should be viewed both as partially adequate and partially as a historically motivated error. Both of these new readings reject the idea that Neurath's critique of the semantic conception of truth is based on a coherent theory of truth or that it is due to an emotional reaction. In this dissertation, we try to evaluate the question and position ourselves among the lines of interpretation.
 
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Publishing Date
2019-12-04
 
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