

A “Linguagem das Formas”.
Ensaio sobre o Estatuto do Belo na Filosofia de Shaftesbury.

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São Paulo, Outubro de 2002

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Transcrição, Revisão e Edição: Pedro Pimenta.

São Paulo, Outubro de 2002.

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Apresentação

Neste “Apêndice” encontra-se as transcrições de manuscritos dos principais textos de Shaftesbury que permaneceram como manuscritos após a morte do autor, e que fazem parte dos “Shaftesbury Papers”, depositados no Public Record Office (Londres, Reino Unido). O trabalho de transcrição integral desses textos foi realizado em dois estágios do bolsista na referida instituição (Maio a Setembro de 2000; Maio a Agosto de 2002), ambos como parte da bolsa de doutorado da FAPESP. As informações sobre cada texto e os procedimentos de transcrição adotados são apresentadas no início de cada um deles.

ΑΣΚΗΜΑΤΑ

PRO 30/24, 27/10

Procedimentos de transcrição.

1. O texto dos Askhmata (Exercícios) encontra-se em dois cadernos separados, reunidos no PRO sob o mesmo número de catálogo.
2. Os textos foram redigidos por Shaftesbury na Inglaterra e na Holanda, entre 1698 e 1706, e na Itália em 1712 (το καλον), como indica o índice, também composto ou complementado em 1712.
3. A presente transcrição respeita a divisão dos Exercícios em dois cadernos. Ao contrário de Laurent Jaffro, que traduziu o texto para o francês, não reproduzimos a ordem exata de apresentação dos textos, por acreditarmos que ela não corresponde, como quer Jaffro, à ordem de sua composição. Assim, apresentamos os textos em continuidade, segundo as mudanças de páginas indicadas por Shaftesbury.
4. A paginação dos manuscritos – numerados por Shaftesbury – encontra-se entre colchetes, em negrito.
5. Os textos redigidos em língua grega, ou citados de originais gregos, não foram, com raras exceções, transcritos, pois se encontram em Jaffro. Sua ocorrência é indicada pelo uso de * * *. O mesmo vale para os desenhos, cuja ocorrência é indicada por # # #.
6. As notas ao texto, todas redigidas por Shaftesbury, foram inseridas segundo o sistema de numeração, e não de símbolos, como no original.
7. As passagens e termos sublinhados, bem como palavras em negrito e em letras capitais reproduzem exatamente os mesmos recursos utilizados por Shaftesbury.
8. A pontuação do texto e a grafia das palavras reproduz o texto original, sem alterações.
9. Desprezou-se o uso de letras capitais para substantivos.

ΑΣΚΗΜΑΤΑ

[Notebook 1: pp. 0 – 201]

[0]

Holland {1698, 1699} England {1699, 1700} Holland {1703, 1704}

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ΑΣΚΗΜΑΤΑ

[1]

Arrian:

Therefore, remember ... Σεαυτω και μη τοιξ εξω. Manual, par. 70. And in the words following the passage before, of the commentaries. L. 3 C. 12.

And so in the following chapter, concluding: after those words, αλλ ουχι τω
φθισακω.

***¹. Thus alone, thus in company. Thus talking. Thus **writing**. And thus thou mayest hope.

Again L. 3 C. 16. After wax in the sun ***.

***.

And in the last chapter of B. 3 in the end ενταυδα νοδετωσαν οι λογοι παντεζ, τα

Ασκηματα.

See also the beginning of chapters 2nd and 3rd of B. 3.

[2] ***.

[3]

Appendix

Upon the whole: remember that of Ms. ***². And this ***³. Argument/Debate/Dispute/Exhortation. Praise.
Dispraise.

And remember that in any of these cases it is by far more difficult to correct than to present & anticipate: and that the chief thing is to keep right the *** & therefore that allay of temper that restrained and weaned affection which diminishes the objects & brings to view the viler but truer side of things⁴. And on this account remember ***: what follows, and all what is said of that sort of joy.

(1) And first as to COUNTENANCE: that this be suitable and remember how much depends on it; how instantly a change here is followed by an absolute change of the mind. And hence it is that mimicry and imitation in the speech is at all times so very dangerous: ***. How monstrous all this, how even the το φραιδον⁵ as yet befits tee not? See (instead of that) what countenance befits tee at present (inf. 170) and remember the sores and wounds, why *** and ***.

(2) In the second place, as to action and GESTURE, that this be in the same manner chaste, and leave that other open, loose, indecent, boisterous way. But then thou must also leave the same subjects, the same designs, the same ends; & be a new man, serious, slow, doubting, indecisive; neither a reformer nor an entertainer of the world. And both

¹Inf. p. 154.

²L..., § ...

³L 8 § 51.

⁴Infra 171.

⁵***, M. L. 10 § ...

with respect to gesture as to countenance this with M. L. 7 #60 * * * . And this not in converse only, but when alone, when silent in walk, exercise, &c: * * *⁶.

(3) And in the third place observe the tone of VOICE, pronunciation & accent: for this will be no little help. Remember HIM of whom it was said that he spake not any word higher than another. Remember therefore: neither the flashy, sudden, precipitant way: nor the animated: nor the loud: nor the emphatical: But the still quiet, backward, soft, deliberate: and so as to be rather remiss & lifeless than lively⁷ in that other manner.

Now remember SIMPLICITY⁸. No graces of speech: no repartees or sharpness of wit: no ralleries, ironies or mockeries: no narrations of a certain kind, story-telling [a story] & on this account⁹.

Again remember SIMPLICITY in that other sense, * * * ¹⁰: no adding, diminishing, palliate: alleviate: aggravate: exaggerate: flourish: embellish: & (as HE called it) paraphrasing. What is this but lying? Thus extolling, decry: urge: declaim: expatiating figures, metaphors &c.: How abhorrent from SIMPLICITY! How repugnant to thy rule, law, character!

Holland 1704

And remember the treacherous pleasure: reviving, clearing, entertaining, moving, affecting, imprinting: imitation of grandfather --- Pernicious! Ruinous! All this cut off. No pleasure in pleasing: none in being harkened to: none in amusing, astonishing: no, not profiting --- What profiting? (Wretch!) --- * * * &c¹¹: eternally this.

[4]

* * *

* * *

* * *¹².

[5]

* * *

[6]

* * *

Senate. Cabinet (as in resol. 2nd state) & the oracle (resolve ss ibidem) from the Porch & * * *. Field, nor civil nor military or either. No elections: no campaigns: enough.

(19) Assemblies &c.

* * *

[7] * * *

[8] * * *

[9] * * *

⁶In opposition to this, remember the Italian & French action, the shrugging and drawing down of the mouth, the air de mepris. & beware of what is this, or borders on it, how deformed!

⁷Infra, 83.

⁸Infra, 68.

⁹& of Self least, how abhorrent!

¹⁰Marcus, III, 12.

¹¹English.

¹²sic. Wolff: non * * *.

NATURAL AFFECTION.

[10] Holland. Rotterdam. August 1 1698.

* * * ¹³

To have natural affection: not that which is only towards relations: but towards all mankind. To be truly * * * . Neither to scoff, nor hate; not be angry; not be impatient with them; not abominate them; nor overlook them; and to pity in a manner, and love those that are the greatest miscreants; those that are most furious against thyself in particular, and at the time when they are most furious. How is it in a mother or a nurse towards sickly children? How often is this seen in children themselves, and in good-natured people towards other creatures? And how kindly are several species of creatures entertained by us, so as that to use any of these harshly and cruelly is ill looked upon, as on the contrary to be kind & favourable towards them is recommending? What is more amiable than such affection? And is it not most amiable towards men? When is it therefore, that thou shalt become as it were, a common father of mankind? So as to say, whatever wretch or whatever number of such thou seest (whether of the most prosperous or most dejected, whether of one country or another, whether of the simplest or of those that are thought wise) “these are they who thought they have no care of themselves, nor none amongst them truly affected or concerned for them; thought they are animated against one another and could least of all endure him that would take this care of them; yet these are they whom I make to be my care and charge; whom I foster, and do good to, against their wills, and shall ever do so, as long as they are men, and that I am of their kind”¹⁴ --- When shall this happy disposition be fixed, that I may feel it perpetually, as now but seldom? When shall I be entirely thus affected, and feel this as my part grown natural to me? --- It shall then be, when thou no longer seekest for anything they seek; when thou no longer rivallest them, or couldst partake of their goods; when thou no longer wantest any thing from them, or can't be wanted by anything that [11] may happen to thee from them. In short; it is only that thou canst truly love them when thou expectest neither thy good nor thy ill from them. For, whilst that is, we must of necessity be jealous of them & suspect them; flatter & court them; be one while in great familiarity with them, at another time in open enmity; today in favour, tomorrow in disgrace; this moment warm and affectionate, the next cold and indifferent; ashamed of what we just before were proud of; and sick of those we before so highly relished. Let this therefore be remembered: when we see the children play & contend; when they have their nuts and their apples to divide and are busy about their childish affairs; we look over them with pleasure, and are kind to them; ready to reprove what is amiss, to do justice amongst them, without anger, without concern, always benign, gentle and mild towards them, with sincere affection & love: nor are we provoked by them if forward or unruly towards us; but, doing what is necessary to amend the fault, we may pass it by; never imagining ourselves hurt, never meditating revenge against the child, thought he were ever so perverse; but thinking only how to cure and set him right. --- And by virtue of what is it that all this is performed? --- by this. Because the nuts and apples do not concern us: because those things which they esteem, as children; we despise, as men: and because it is never considered by us, what the children say of us amongst one another; whether they are angry or pleased; whether they thank us for our pains, or so much as think of us, or remember us; but whether this that we do be for the children's good be fit or not fit in their case; and whether this be done [12] with due skill of one who has the care and charge of children. But, if who has the charge should want to play himself: if he should fall in love with the apples and nuts and think it his good to have a name amongst the children; where would his authority be? And what else must follow, but that from the moment this begins, he must begin also to hate and torment the children, and no longer be their tutor, but their tyrant? Consider,

¹³Marcus, X, 1.¹⁴Homo sun: humani nihil a me alienum puto. Ters Heaut.

then, as to mankind. Thou wouldst LOVE MEN. But, which way is this possible? They love riches, they love pleasure, they love honour, preferments, power: therefore they will have it for themselves. Give it them. Be unconcerned: and thus thou mayst LOVE them, and take care of them. --- But thou wilt be concerned thyself. Thou must have thy share -- Go in, then, and fight for it. Make court: solicit, and lay way to digest repulses if thou canst. Bear with thy rivals and competitors: and be patient when others carry it from thee. But expect not any more to stand in that other station towards mankind. Think not anymore of loving these, as MEN. For, true affection cannot be, but where true liberty is.

To have natural affection is to affect according to nature, or the design and will of nature. For without respect to a design or will of nature nothing can be said to affect naturally, or have natural affection. It is natural for a parent to love the offspring, or for a creature of any kind to affect more particularly his own species or kind? If this be called natural, what else is understood but that the preservation and support of a [13] certain species is designed by nature, after this manner and by these means? So that this is the design and will of nature that by the natural and good affections of creatures towards their own species, the species should be preserved and be prosperous. Now either this design of nature is an excellent, wise and good design, and it is my good to follow it: or otherwise what to I have to do but to throw off this that is called natural affection, and live after some other rule? If there be a better rule; let us see what that is. Let us see how it is with men that loose these natural affections: how it is even with beasts & common creatures; which are the happiest, or in the best state; those that live orderly and obey these affections or those that are hardened against nature and have all of this kind unnatural & in disorder. Of this there has been enough said elsewhere. Nor is anything more evidently demonstrable than this; that the only means and rule of happiness (even amongst these other creatures, as far as they are capable of happiness) is to follow nature, and whether knowingly or unknowingly, to act in pursuance of this design, and under the power of such affections as these.

Thus much as to all human & other creatures, being either wholly irrational, or considered only in such a use of reason as is common, but not such as contemplates NATURE and considers the whole; what it is; how governed; by what laws; whether it be one and simple, fixed and constant, equal to itself, knowing wise and good. Let us consider therefore how the matter stands with a creature who is after this other manner, and in this higher degree rational.

Either these which we call natural affections and these that we have shown of the order of nature in this particular, is notwithstanding wholly and solely from chance, and is not properly design: or it is from an all-powerful, wise and perfect design. If the first or second be supposed; we must consider other [14] matters; and how either of these opinions can stand¹⁵. But if the latter be allowed; it will follow, that besides that relation to a species, there is a further relation which every creature has viz. to THE WHOLE OF THINGS as administered by that supreme will or law which regulates all things according to the highest good. If it be this, it follows, that a creature who is in that higher degree rational and can consider the good of the whole, and consider himself as related to the whole, must withal consider himself as under an obligation to the interest and good of the whole preferably to the interest of his private species: and this is the ground of a new and superior affection. Now if it has been made the good and happiness even of unknowing and irrational creatures to follow that private and inferior affection which is only towards a species and part of the whole; how can it but be much more the good of every knowing and rational creature, to live according to that affection which is the higher and most perfect? Nature has made this the reward of every creature even unknowingly and unconsciously pursuing her intention and design; that by this very pursue the creature preserves itself in its perfectest state: and shall the same nature and sovereign wisdom of the whole have made it less the happiness and good of a knowing and rational creature to have a right and deserving affection towards nature and the whole? What is it therefore

that we call a right and a deserving affection? Let us consider what this is; and to what this supposed relation, if it be true, obliges us.

If a father be in danger of his life; if his safety or interest call for it; we are to expose our selves willingly labour, pain & even death (if necessary) is to be suffered, without murmuring, without complaining, cheerfully, generously. This is according to nature. This is natural affection. This, if it be lost or wanting in any creature, the creature is vile, degenerate, imperfect, wretched.

If friends are in danger, and that their interest call for it; our part also is to expose our selves, freely, voluntarily: if our city our country; much more. These are the [15] relations: these the affections. Now, let us see this elsewhere & in another degree.

If there be a supreme parent, a common father of men and all other beings and if all things happen according to the will of this parent, it follows that everything is to be kindly & well accepted: no murmuring: no complaining. If all things in the universe are for the good of one another; all united & conspiring to one end; all alike subject to one wise & perfect rule, all alike produced from one original & fountain; it follows that I must in a certain manner be reconciled to all things, and absolutely hate or abhor nothing whatsoever that has being in the world. If the universe be as one city, & the laws of that city perfect & just; it follows that whatsoever happens according to the laws of that city must be accepted & esteemed. And since there is nothing but what is according to those laws, there is nothing that happens but what I ought highly to applaud, & to accompany with my mind & sincerest affection. And if I do otherwise I am impious, unjust, un-natural, ungrateful, an apostate from reason, and vicious in a higher order & degree.

Here then, is that new relation. Here it is that that other affection arises. And that is the NATURAL AFFECTION of a rational creature, capable of knowing nature, and of considering the good & interest of the whole.

Now, how is this affection preserved? How made consistent with those other affections, or (rather) those others with these? If every other affection of that lower order (however natural any such may be) be not entirely subordinate to this superior affection, this is wrong. If a relation be beloved; if a friend; if it be thy city, thy native country; if all this be not freely willingly readily resigned; what is this but disobedience? What else but this can be called apostasy? If there be any reluctance, any murmuring, or grieving, any abhorrence, any aversion, what is this but rebellion, impiety, resistance?

Thus are all other affections to be subdued. This is the new order, the new economy which belongs to another degree. This is the province of the truly wise man & who is conscious of things human & divine; how to submit all those his affections [inf.: 114] to the rule & government of the whole; how to accompany with his whole mind that supreme & perfect mind & reason of the universe? This is to live according to nature; to follow nature, and to own & obey deity. If I have friends; I act the part of a friend: if I am a father, the part of a father: if I have a city or country, I study its good & interest; I cherish it as I ought; I hazard myself for it, & do all that in me lies. If I must no longer be a father; if children or friends are taken from me; if He who gave me a country & a nation, take it back, & either by war or any other means cause it to cease or perish; all is well. I am free & unconcerned; so that I have done my part for my country; so that I have not been wanting to my friends; so that I have acted the part of a father. --- But, shall I not bemoan my child? Shall I be thus indifferent, & unconcerned? Shall I have no more natural affection? --- Wretch! Consider what it is thou callest natural affection. Which way canst thou have natural affection, whilst this thou callest so, is still retained? Which way freely & readily resign both children & family, when any higher duty calls, or thy country is to be served? Which way resign both country, children, mankind & all else in this world, when HE, who placed thee here, calls thee from hence? Which way canst thou accompany HIM, applaud all that HE does? How act or

¹⁵Infra, 16-17 ss.

suffer as becomes tee, as becomes a man, & one that is free, generous, disinterested? How can this be, whilst thou retainst this other sort of affection? Now, if it be thus even with respect to such subjects as these; what must it be towards those other matters, such as riches, honours & the rest? What must that degeneracy be, which detrains us by any affections towards things of such inferior kind? --- Be it so. But where is the good or happiness [115] of having this natural affection? Where the ill of having that which is falsely called so? --- This it s.

If thy affection be such either towards friends, relations, country-men, or whatever else is engaging & delightful; it must happen that when anything here succeeds amiss; thou must be at a loss & disturbed within thy self, wholly dissatisfied with providence & the order of things, impatient, angry, full of complaint, bitterness, vexation, discontent. Nor is this any more consistent with true affections than with happiness. For, which way can the affection of such a one be preserved in due order? Which way preserves a mind in the midst of such convulsion & disorder? And how maintain those subordinate affections in their several degrees, if this supreme affection be thus shaken & overturned? On the other side, if we stand affected towards these things as we ought; if our affections are such as can immediately give way, & without struggle or hindrance readily close with what happens ever so contrary; if our will be in conformity with the supreme will, & ready to receive whatever happens & is appointed; this only can afford us happiness & content; bestow peace, serenity, calm; make us so live in friendship with men, & with due acknowledgement, reverence & piety towards God. Nor can these several relations, offices, duties, parts be any otherwise preserved but after this manner. It is in vain to think of being virtuous, just or pious, but upon this foundation. It is on this that integrity, faith, honour, generosity, magnanimity, & everything of that kind depends.

Now, how is it that this is accomplished? Which way can we affect & disaffect as we ought to do, & according to nature? --- Of things that are; some are of our own power & jurisdiction: some not. * * *. --- This is all. This is the whole concern, and nothing but this. Here all depends. Here the labour, pains, employment: and this is the sum of all, * * *¹⁶. [116]

Remember, therefore, henceforward not to think anymore of natural affection in the imperfect & vulgar sense; but according to the just sense & meaning of the word, & what it imports.

Is my appetite, seeking, aversation, right & natural?¹⁷ Am I not frustrated? Am I not at a loss, hindered, disturbed? Do I affect safely, on sure ground, & with certainty of success? Is not merely chance that has made me hitherto prosperous in my desire, aim & wish? And is it not merely that, & nothing else, which is now at this time the occasion of my present ease & satisfaction? How is it that I am affected towards a change in any of these outward circumstances? How towards the conclusion of all, & the finishing my part? How towards the loss of friends, companions, relations, children, country? Is it here that I can prove my affection natural? Can nothing of this kind separate me from NATURE, and hinder me from joining with IT, & accompanying IT? Is it no longer in the power of any chance whatsoever to raise the power of any contrary affection, or to interrupt the course of that which carries me with the whole of things, & makes me to be unanimous with deity? If it be otherwise; it is vain to plead nature, & say: I lament & grieve: but I am natural: this is the part of a father. --- Wretch! Consider: what art thou thy less, & whence? Where dost thou inhabit? In whose city? Under what administration?¹⁸ Whence dost thou thy breath? And whose will, & by whose donation has thou received this being, & art now at this moment sustained? Dost thou not consider, that thus deserting him, by thus opposing & (as much as in tee lies) impugning & destroying his rule & administration, thou art not only far from being (as thou sayst) a father; but art thy self, an un-natural son, an ill subject, an ill creature? What

¹⁶C t L. 26.

¹⁷* * *

¹⁸Inf. 135.

has thou to do with nature? What pretence of being natural? What other relation, what part dost thou tell us of, after such a part as this? After having thrown off this relation, this highest duty & obligation, from whence the rest depends? --- But, all other creatures are thus [117] affected towards their young. --- And are all other creatures therefore, sensible of that other relation? Were they made to consider nature as thou dost? Were they brought into the world to contemplate the other of it, & recognise the author & supreme, join themselves to him, & assist in his administration & rule? Were they made free, unhinderable, invincible, irrefragable, as to that inward part? Had they any means or natural accommodations, instructions or faculties given them towards justice, faith, piety, magnanimity? If not; what should they follow but that other affection, which, with respect to them, is natural? But if thou also wouldst act thus, & still be natural; divest thy self, in the first place, of that other part; be no longer a man; and then we will allow it, that thou actst naturally, & according to thy constitution & end.

All affectation carries with it an inclining or declining. So that, if this inclining & declining be right & natural; the affection is right & natural: else not if all that nature produces be natural; i.e. orderly & good, then, to inline or decline contrary to nature, or to what nature produces (with respect to the particular mind), must be un-natural & ill; but, to repine, to grieve, to bemoan, or lament is to decline contrary to nature; and therefore is un-natural affection.

Every affection is natural which affects the preservation & good of that which nature has assigned to it. Thus the natural affection of a part or member is to work to the preservation of the body. Thus the natural affection of a father, is to love his children. Thus the natural affection of a citizen is to love whatsoever happens according to those laws by which the city is preserved. And thus the natural affection of a man, a rational creature, & citizen of the universe, is to love whatever happens according to those laws by which the universe is upheld. See how duly these parts are preserved. Does not the finger or hand, of its own accord, [*inf*: 136] carefully decline every touch that may be hurtful; but when the head is in danger, does it not as readily expose itself, of its own accord, & without waiting the order or dictate of the mind? Is not the care of the whole body & private person set aside, when the part or duty of a parent calls? Are not relations, children & all this forgot, when the part of a citizen comes on? How is it that we honour & praise the severity of those Romans, deaf to all entreaties, inflexible, immovable, & with an equal temper & unaltered countenance, performing the part of the magistrate in the sentence & execution of their beloved children?

And in this part thus readily found, & thus preserved & obeyed everywhere else in nature; and shall it only be wanting towards nature itself? If therefore the highest and most natural part be that which is towards nature; consider what it is to be wanting in due affection here; and for the sake of a member, a body, children, friends, city or anything of this kind, to be divided from nature, accuse nature & disaffect that which the supreme & sovereign will decree for the good and preservation of the whole.

Either nature which has given the several subjects of affection, is itself a subject of affection to a rational creature capable of considering nature; or it is not so. If this be so; we can no longer say we affect any duty or part because assigned us by nature; and thus nothing can be properly called natural. If, on the contrary, I adhere to that which is natural, & for that reason, because it is natural; then NATURE is to me, a subject of affection. If nature be at all a subject; what can it be, but the highest subject? If it be the highest subject; then, to be wanting in affection towards it, is to be most of all un-natural. Now every thing that happens is from the same nature (the nature of the whole); and therefore to be dissatisfied with what happens, is to be dissatisfied [137] with nature. Now to grieve, bemoan & repine is to be dissatisfied with what happens & throw off our affection to nature. Therefore, to affect anything, so as in the account of it, to grieve, bemoan or repine, must of necessity be wrong & unnatural affection.

To consider of natural affection, is to examine & measure due to every particular, as nature has appointed. What is the subject? Is it (for example) a finger, or a hand? Preserve it, cherish it, as a member: but if the whole body comes in question; expose it freely, slightly, abandon it, give it up: for, this is due to the interest of the whole. Thus, if I have friends, relations, children, city; I prize & cherish these --- as how? --- As given me by nature, thus to love & to take care of. But if the interest of nature call; I forsake every thing else, & follow nature without murmuring, without complaint. --- As how, therefore, shall I love my children or relations? --- As strongly & affectionated as it's possible for tee to love them: but so as that nature may not be ascended: so as that, whatever happens, I may still adhere to nature, and accept & embrace whatever nature sends. This is the foundation. This is all. Consider this: and it will be easy to find the true measure of all affection, and what discipline & rules must be followed to reduce our affection to nature, & affect as becomes a rational creature¹⁹.

A mind that refuses its consent to what is acted in the whole & for the good of the whole, is the same as a hand that should refuse to act for the body. What is a hand? --- A single part made for the use & convenience of the body --- What am I? --- a Man --- as how a man? As an Athenian? As a Roman? As a European? And is this [138] all? --- No: but as a citizen of the world. This is to be a man. This the nature of man signifies --- How is it then, that I preserve the part of a man? --- How am I a Roman? --- When I prefer the interest of Rome. --- How a man? --- When I prefer the interest of the world. Now which way preserve the interest of the world, and et be angry & dissatisfied at what happens in the world? Consider, therefore, what is it that makes me averse to anything of this kind? What is the occasion of reluctance? For, whatever affection this be; whether towards a body, or towards friends, or towards a son, towards a city; this is that which makes me be un-natural; this, in me, is the opposite to natural affection.

London, Jan. 16 1700/99

Love thy friends relations companions: but thy country better. Love thy country as thou art an Englishman, but thy country as a man much better. Who can be said to love his country, who grieves at what is for its good & what is necessary for its establishment & safety? Now consider. Has thou any country as a man or not?²⁰ Are the laws of that country wise & just? Is the public good & welfare aimed at, & successfully carried on? Is there order, rule, intelligence & a mind? If so; what is there that happens or can happen but according to that wise economy & perfect will? Now if that economy were changed or interrupted; if that will were controlled or disobeyed; all must perished, and that first & ancient commonwealth be overturned & destroyed. Therefore whatever happens in the economy of the whole is necessary for the happiness, perfection & establishment of [139] the whole, that it should have been²¹. And to have annulled this (if it had been possible) must have been to have annulled & made void that economy of the whole by which its happiness & perfection is maintained²². Now see of what a nature it is, to repine at anything that happens. What is the loss that thus affects? Is it a limb? Wilt not thou give it up * * * ? Is it of thy relations? Wilt not thou remember thy other relation? Os it of thy country? Wilt thou not remember another country, state, polity, government, law?

Therefore remember on any approaching misfortune or calamity to say, this is for the good of my country: this is according to the constitution, law, costume of my native country. If such a one be to dye; it is the laws of my country that decree it. If such a one fails and proves vitious; the same laws have ordered it so. If this which I commonly call my

¹⁹Sup. 115 ult.

²⁰Sup. 135.

²¹Inf: 152.

²²Inf 184.

country be sinking; what is this still but the law of my real country. See therefore how it is that thou cherishest, lovest, embracest those laws: and accordingly thou mayst say thou either hast or wantest natural affection.

Holland 1704.

* * *

DEITY

[16] Rotterdam: 1698

* * *

The elements are combined, united, and have a mutual dependence upon one another. All things in this world are united. For, as the branch is united, and is as one with the tree; so is the tree with the earth, air & water which feeds it, and with the flies, worms & insects which it feeds. For these are made to it. And as much as the mould is fitted to the tree, as much as the strong and upright trunk of the oak or elm is fitted to the twinning & clinging branches of the vine or ivy; so much are the leaves, the seeds, the fruits of these trees fitted to other animals, & they again to one another. Go farther: and view the system of the bigger world. See the mutual dependence, the relation of one thing to another; the sun to the earth, the earth & planets to the sun; the order, symmetry, regularity, union & coherence of the whole.

It follows, therefore, that as the plant or tree has a nature, the world or universe must have a nature, and here arises the question: what sort of a nature should this be? There are in this world three sorts: a vegetative, a sensitive & a rational. Should the nature of the universe, which contains & brings forth all other natures be it-self merely vegetative and plastic, like that of a tree or of a fetus? Or, should it be only a degree further, and be sensitive, as an animal? Or should it be yet further, and be rational, but imperfectly so, as a man. Or, if this seem still utterly mean & absurd; should not the nature of the universe which exhibits reason in all that we see; which practices reason by a consumable art & prudence in the organisation & [17] structure of things; and (what is more) which produces principles of reason & raises up intelligencies & perceptions of several degrees in the beings that are but of a moment duration, that start out of it as it were & sink into it immediately; should not this sovereign nature of the whole, be a principle itself of much greater understanding & capacity than any else? Should not the most extensive sight or knowledge which we are acquainted with, & the highest wisdom which we admire be as nothing in comparison to that from whence which all one is derived? And should not that affection which we see in all natures towards their offspring & productions, towards what is more remotely united to them, and what is chiefly any part of themselves, be much inferior to that affection of the supreme nature towards all, & to what is produced & administered by it, as every thing is? And what is this in one word, but that GOD is: that he is one and simple, infinitely wise & perfectly good?

Things are finite or infinite: if infinite, that which we call the whole is infinite; if finite, still that which exists is the whole. The next is: of what kind of nature is the whole? Is that like that of a stone or of scattered pieces of sand? Then that had remained forever its nature nor could ever have given rise to other natures or principles that can unite & conspire together, as plants, vegetable, animal-bodies & the like. Is it therefore only a vegetative nature? Then [18] that had remained its nature: it might have flourished, & grown, & thriven, as those other natures, & might have bore its fruit, & varied itself a thousand ways: but which way should such a nature have produced reason? Which way should it bring perception out of itself, if it were not in itself? Therefore, the nature of the universe is intelligent. --- Therefore (says one) there is indeed intelligence in things, or in the nature of things & as externally belonging to them. But the whole (says he) is not united as you suppose. So that there is not therefore one intelligence. --- Let us hear then. Are not the small fibres of this root conspiring together & united? --- They are. --- But, with what? --- With the plant. --- And the plant with what? --- With the earth & other plants. --- And the earth & other plants with what? With air, water, animals & other things around: the animals themselves with one another & with the elements in which they live & to which they are fitted; as either by wings for the air, by fins for the water, and other things of that kind. In short, all these conspire together, and so other things, whatever they be, in this world. And is it not the same with the world itself

in respect to the sun & planets? How then? Is there beyond this anything or nothing? If nothing; then this is the whole, and then the whole is as one, & has one nature. --- But there is more beyond this --- undoubtedly there is so. And shall that and this have no relation nor mutual dependence? Shall not the coherence and union be the same, so infinite? Or shall we come at last to something in the whole which has no relation to the rest of things, & independent? [19]

It remains, therefore; that all things cohere & conspire: all things are in one, and are comprehended in the nature of the universe²³. This nature is either merely vegetative, and then it could only have produced things of the same species: or if there be in the universe beings of another kind, that is to say, such as have perception & intelligence; by what should they be produced unless by a like nature? But there is no other nature to produce anything but the nature of the universe; therefore the nature of the universe is intelligent: and therefore there is a universal intelligent and provident principle.

If it be not yielded that the universe is one or has one nature, so as to conspire together and to one end; it will not be denied however that this is proper to the stalk of grass. If the stalk of grass has it, then (by what has been said before) the whole earth has it: and not only the earth; but the whole system of the bigger world, and as far as we know anything. Either, therefore, this system and all that exists besides, holds together, holds together, is still one whole and is united; or (which is strange to imagine) thought this system of things we see, be thus united; thought there be such perfect coherence in this apparent whole; yet there is incoherence in that GREAT WHOLE and what remains besides of things: and then either [20] there are no other such worlds; but what is besides, is disorder and confusion: or if there are such worlds, they are independent. If it be the first; it will still remain that this world is ONE and must (as has been shown) be intelligent. For, either it has its intelligence elsewhere (and then there is elsewhere in the universe a principle of intelligence on which this world depends) or, it had been from itself: and then it was eternally a principle of intelligence to itself; nothing being more certain than this, that what is intelligent cannot be produced out of what is not intelligent; and that what was never produced but was eternal must remain eternal. So that according to this it will still remain, as to this world, that in as far as it has a nature by which it is one and united as a plant or animal body (which nature being utterly different from disorder and confusion, it could not have had it thence, and therefore if not from a principle of that kind elsewhere, it must have had it ever in itself) and, in as far as it has sense, perception and intelligence (which if it had not received from a principle of that kind, it must be a principle of that kind to itself) so accordingly it must be said that it has a nature or soul not merely vegetative, but knowing and intelligent. So that there is in this respect a supreme eternal mind or intelligent principle belonging to this whole; and this is deity.

If there are more such worlds, and independent of one another; they are still so many intelligencies and must be eternal principles of that kind. But since it is unreasonable and unaccountable thus to multiply principles; as for instance to say that of the motion that is in the [21] world, there should not be one and the same principle, but several; so, with respect to what is intelligent, it must be unreasonable to think that there is any more than ONE common principle of intelligence; or that there should be intelligencies and thinking beings of several kinds produced anywhere by one such principle; but that there should not be one common one to all of that kind. Either the whole, therefore, is not united like this which we see; and then however there must be either one intelligent eternal principle, or several such: OR else the whole or infinite of things is united and is one. And then it follows that there is one common principle of intelligence and wisdom; one eternal and infinite mind.

²³Inf. 286.

Either this that we see is order, proportion, harmony, or it is not so: if this be not so; and that neither the frame of the heavens, nor the body of men demonstrate order; what else is ORDER? If it be order, and consequently of quite a different nature from disorder; then that which was of a quite different nature and is its contrary, how should it have produced it? If it never was produced by disorder; then it must be a principle in things, or be proper and natural to all things. [22] If it be natural to some things to correspond and unite, then surely to all things, or say, why natural to some things, if not as well to all?: if to all things, then all things are united and have one nature. If there be a nature of the whole, it must be a nature more perfect than that of particulars contained in the whole; if so, it is a wise and intelligent nature; if so, then it must order everything for its own good: and since that which is best for the universe is both the wisest and justest, it follows that the supreme nature is perfectly wise and just.

All things stand together or exist together by one necessity, one reason, one law: therefore there is one nature of all things, or common to all. Nothing is out of the whole, nor nothing happens but according to the laws of the whole. Now every particular nature certainly and constantly produces what is good to itself, unless something foreign molests and hinders it, either by over-powering and corrupting it within, or by violence from without. Thus nature in the patient struggles to the last, and strives to throw off the distemper. Thus even in plants and seeds every particular nature thrives and attains its perfection if nothing from without obstruct, and that nothing foreign to its nature has already impaired and wounded it: and even then it does its utmost to redeem itself. What are all wicknessess, distortions, sicknessess, imperfect births and seeming contradictions or grossnessess of nature but merely this? And how ignorant must he be of all [23] natural operations, who thinks that any of these things happen by a miscarriage of the particular nature and not by the force of some foreign nature that overpowers it? Thus therefore every nature is constantly and never failingly true to it self, and certain to produce only what is good to it self and to its own right state. And if every particular nature do this, shall not the nature of the whole do it? Or, shall that alone miscarry and fail? Or is there anything foreign that shall do violence upon it, or force it out of its way? If not; then all that it produces is to its own good, the good of all in general. And that which is for the good of all in general, is just and good. If so; then rest satisfied: and not only rest satisfied, but be pleased and rejoiced with what happens; knowing from hence it comes, and to what it contributes.

To sympathise, what is it? --- To feel together, to be united in one sense or feeling. --The fibers of the plant sympathise. The members of the animal sympathise. And do not the heavenly bodies sympathise? And why not? --- Because we are not conscious of this feeling. --- Nor more are we conscious of the feeling or sympathising of the plant: neither can we be conscious of any other in the world besides that of our own. If however, it be true that these others sympathise; when the world, and the heavenly bodies [24] (more united and more harmoniously conspiring together than either the plant or animal-body) must also sympathise. If there be a sympathising of the whole, there is one perception, one intelligence of the whole. If that, then all things are perceived by that intelligence. If so, then there is one all-knowing, and all-intelligent nature.

This we know: we our-selves have a mind; because we are conscious of it. But we can be conscious of no other mind besides; or that there is such thing as a mind besides our own. If therefore we will believe no other mind; there is an end; and we can go no further. If we presume or believe there is anywhere a mind out of our-selves; or that there are anywhere perceptions, intelligencies, or natures such as perceive and act; by what is it we are induced to believe this? Is it only because we speak and converse with such? If so; then we cannot speak or converse but with our own kind, nor believe any such thing but in our own kind: so, there is an end; and we can go no further. But if we can have cause to

believe it from any other grounds; then what is it that is sufficient to make us believe of anything that it perceives and acts²⁴? It must be this, or nothing: when there is a consent and harmony of parts; a regular conduct for the good of the whole; a steady management suitable to one end and design²⁵. [25] Now, here the question arises. The system of things we see, and with it the whole of things, is thus; or it is not thus. If it be thus; it bears the marks and has a mind. If it be not thus; show in what it is otherwise, and it will appear that the objection whatever it be, is either from gross inequality and partiality, by referring all things to our-selves, and to the good and interest of one small and inconsiderable part of things; or, that it is mere ignorance, the same as his who being ignorant in anatomy, would find fault with the glands, as useless and superfluous; or with the pores, an inconvenient and the occasion of receiving harm.

Where the principle or cause is CHANCE, the product and effect must be disorder and madness. Where the cause is design and a mind, the effects must be order and harmony --- Which of these is the case?

If there be an economy of the whole and a mind; is it such as that thou shouldst expect to see it, as thou seest a man, for example? --- Certainly not. --- What is it then that thou wouldst see, to satisfy thee of this mind? --- The effects of such a mind. --- And what those must be? What else but order, agreement, sympathy, unity, subserviency of inferior things to superior, proper affections of the subjects making them operate correspondently towards a general good, a conversion of everything in [26] to use, a renovation of all things by changes and subjections, nothing idle, nothing vacant, nothing superfluous, nothing abrupt. See therefore, if all be not thus; and whether if it be not ignorance and short-sightedness, or an ill temper and wrong affection which makes things to appear otherwise.

Yesterday thou wast entertained with the contemplation of several natural things. The order of the heavens was wise and wonderful; the anatomy of man most complete the perfect. It was a wonder with thee, how the orbs should be preserved and steadily hold those courses; or how the wisest providence could have contrived so well for the support of such a body as thy own. These were thy thoughts yesterday. Today it was an earthquake; or not so much; a storm only, that destroyed some corn; a slight infection of the air that hurt some cattle, and which affected thy-self. And what follows? Why, providence is arraigned. The world is become a new thing. All is wrong: all disorder. But was not this owed possible, even natural, but yesterday? --- it was --- Which is, then, that is wrong and disordered? The world, or thy-self? What is this but temper?

View the heavens. See the vast design, the mighty revolutions that are performed. Think, in the midst of this ocean of being, what the earth and a little part of its surface is; and what a few animals are, which there have being. [27] Embrace, as it were, with thy imagination, all those spacious orbs; and place thy-self in the midst of this divine architecture. Consider other orders of being, other schemes, other designs, other excursions, other faces of things, other respects, other proportions and anatomy. Be deep in this imagination and feeling; so as to enter into what is done; so as to admire that grace and majesty of things so great and noble; and so as to accompany with thy mind, that order, and those concurrent interests of things so glorious and immense. For here surely, if anywhere, there is majesty, beauty and glory. Bring thyself as often as thou can into this sense and apprehension: not like the children admiring only what belongs to their play: but considering and admiring what is chiefly beautiful, splendid and great in things. --- And, now,

²⁴Infra, 188.

²⁵Inf: [188].

in this disposition, and in this situation of mind, see if for a cut-finger, or what is all one, for the distempers and ails of a few animals, thou canst accuse the universe.

* * * [28]

That the deity is present with all things, knows all things and is provident after all; where is the difficulty of this? How is this hard of conception? Could a plant or tree reason, and were to answer to the question how it was possible for it to perceive the approach or neighbourhood of some other fellow-plant, it would answer, by the touch. But what if not touched, how then? It were impossible I should know anything. --- thus the plant, and thought I should again and again over that without touching the leaves or bows of another plant, it could have notice of their motions, and feel, as it were, when they were agitated, and how; this in all likelihood would be a paradox, till the sense of hearing were added. But this being added; let us again ask which way a grove being placed at a distance from it, should be in a new manner so felt or heard, that in one instance the number of trees should be perceived, their situation, distance from one another, different shapes, growths, and also their very healths, likeness, age and youth from another notion than that which arises from a perceptible alteration of figure. Would not this be a new and yet greater paradox? --- I perceived yonder afar off that the leaf of that tree is withering and in decay. --- Does it seem shattered or broken? --- No; but as to shape and faction, perfectly entire. --- What is it then that gives the intimation? --- Something from the surface. --- What something? Is it rough or smooth? Even or uneven? Does there anything grows upon the surface? Are they regular figures or irregular? Triangles, globules, lines? --- I know not? --- What are they then? --- Colours. [29] --- This to the plant must be unintelligible: and not only unintelligible; but (if the plant be not a wise plant) incredible. But how is it with thy-self? Wilt thou be as dull and stupid as that plant would be, and reason in the same manner? Is that nothing in the universe beyond hearing and sight, because thy wrecked body has nothing better than an ear and eye? But what need I mention the deity, who is infinite? Suppose merely that creature of his, the SUN, to be intelligent. To what distances does He convey himself? How noble a part of the universe receives influence from him? What are the earth and the other planets who perpetually receive from him both light and heat? Now what should the sense of such a creature be (if such a one I may call a creature) compared with this earthly kind? This that is confined to such wretched and perishing bodies? This that is admitted and supported by such poor organs in common to us with other fellow-animals? Yet this still supposes something exterior. Whereas, with respect to the DEITY, what is there or can there be exterior? Does not HE contain all within himself? Is there anything foreign to the universe? Anything beyond the extent of that minds which resides in it? Shall other things be thus disposed and governed by it: and shall that which is more immediately allied to it; that which is of the same nature and kind with it have no communication with it? Shall all other motion be subordinate; and shall the motions of minds, shall thoughts, sentiments, or whatever of that kind, be independent, separated and hid?

Remember therefore in what a presence thou actst. And instead of an assembly of men, instead of Greece, instead of Rome, instead of thy city friends, country, instead of a full concurs (if it were possible) both of moderns and ancients; remember THAT ONE, who is more than all: and contemplating **him**; how is it possible that thou shouldst either act or think anything mean, abject or servile? [Inf. 92]

Which is most shameful? To think of providence as those who count themselves naturalists; or thinking of providence as thou dost, to be no otherwise affected as thou art? Which of the two is the most absurd? To have the faith of Epicurus and believe in atoms; or, being conscious of deity, to be no otherwise moved by his presence, than if he

were not, or had no inspections of our thought or action? This is in the same manner, to live without deity. And perhaps this last may be esteemed the greater impiety.

Either atoms, or deity. If the latter; consider what is consequent; who it is that is present; how, and in what manner. Dost thou, like one of those visionaries, expect to see a throne, a shinning light, a court and attendance? Is this thy notion of a presence? And dost thou wait until then, to be struck and astonished as the vulgar are with such appearances and show? --- Wretched folly! --- But if without all this, **he be here**, actually present, a witness of all thou dost, a spectator of all thy actions, and privy to thy inmost thoughts; how comes it that thou livest not with him, at least but as with a friend? Who is there whom thou wouldst thus treat? Whose presence, whose testimony, whose opinion dost thou ever slight thus? Who is there that passes with thee for so little? What wretch ever so mean? Is this living so much as with a friend? Is this living with a benefactor? A father? A superior, who is more than magistrate, more than people, more than friends, relations, country, mankind, world? Is this thy conception and belief of a deity? Art thou still with thy self, as if alone? --- This is, in effect, to believe, and not to believe. [93]

The foundation of all those seeming strange things taught us by a certain philosophy is solely this: that there is a God²⁶. And, having once this notion, am I to rest here? --- Impossible. For, being concerned as I am in this general administration of things; it behoves me of necessity if I believe such a ruler, to inquiry what his rule and government is; what his laws; what his nature; what I myself am; how related to him. This the vulgar think they see: and on this account worship him, pray to him, and do whatever else they think is acceptable to him. --- Why? --- That they may receive good from him, avoid ill. --- What good? --- Life, health, estate, children, &c. --- What ill? --- Death, poverty, losses, disgrace. These are the pursuits and endeavours: these the aversions and declinings. If I cannot satisfy my lust, I grieve and repine. If I meet with evils and afflictions; I murmur and complain, if I dare do so, if I may have leave: if not; and that I am withheld by fear; what do I do still but murmur and repine? What is it that can make me praise and think well of the providence? A command? Impossible. Nor can anything else besides the reason of the thing, besides satisfaction, besides conviction. --- What conviction? --- That his administration is entirely just and good. --- Why, then, am I miserable? --- This is natural. This cannot be otherwise. Hence all those expostulations with providence, and sentiments which we endeavour to stifle but cannot. Thus the vulgar. [Inf. 98]

But He who has otherwise considered the nature of God; so as firmly to hold that opinion of Him and his administration as of what is most wise and perfect; such a one receding from the vulgar, has no longer the same notions of good and ill, happy and unhappy, amiable or detestable; but in all these things is utterly different --- men despise and contempt me --- has thou done anything unbecoming a man? Has thou violated any laws of the **Deity**? If not, which way can this be called disgrace? How is this shameful? On what is it that disgrace or honour depends? Is it on the opinion of the wise or ignorant? Of the vulgar, or those who have reason? Of the virtuous or vicious? Thus disgrace, infamy, contempt, is not an ill: for if real shame and disgrace depend on the judgement of the most considerable, and not of the most vile; then that which is disgrace with **Men**, but is honourable, right and becoming, with respect to God, is either not disgrace, or the Deity not Deity. --- But I suffer pain, I undergo fatigue, I am exposed to dangers and death --- Where is that soldier who thinks of these in the presence of his general? What wounds, what fatigues does he complain of? What life is he concerned for? And is not the cause much greater here?

Thus are outward things despised. Nor is this anything more than what is consequent from a real sense of deity. Now let me once but be convinced of this, that my good is elsewhere than in [99] outward things; let me exercise my self in this, so as to incline and decline aright; and see how firm and undisturbed I shall remain in my thoughts of

providence and deity! How satisfied with his administration! How clear of doubt and scruples! How far from any murmuring or repining, and in all respects how pious, religious, just and good! But otherwise than thus, this cannot be. Remember therefore how it is that this revolution is wrought; and how these things mutually operate in one another. For by conceiving highly of deity, we despise outward things; and by despising outward things we become strong and firm in the opinion and conception of deity. But as this opinion can never be made lasting, sound or just, while we retain those other false and unsound opinions; so it is here chiefly that we are to labour, and to expect the fruit of this when we are further advanced. And thus it is that the same philosophy recommends to us the use of the * * * and to suspend for a certain season the * * *. For how can we worthily contemplate God, how raise our thoughts to things of this kind, and look steadily on all those causes, revolutions and that order and economy of things in the universe; while at the same time the things that strike and astonish us are such as happen in that common course of the providence?

What is said here will appear with light enough, after reading C.3 of B.3 concerning solitude &c²⁷: how this may be bore; how nature contemplated; how the deity imitated; But this (says He) is not for beginners, for the weak and distempered; * * * (which words are omitted by the translator as being wholly at a loss) hence other cares and diet is recommended; and the * * * forbid. [100]

Consider also (besides what has been said) a further reason against the use of the * * * in this place. Consider the age: vulgar religion: how thou hast been bred: and what impressions yet remaining of that sordid, shameful, nauseous idea of Deity. Consider in the case of any good motions or affections that way; what affinity they have with vulgar prayer and addresses to the deity, and what a wretched affect this has within, when anything of this kind mixes, or while so much as the remembrance of those other feelings remain. Therefore if thou wouldst praise, magnify, worship and adore aright; wait until other habits are confirmed, and until ideas of a certain kind are wore off; as they will be when the whole scope of life is changed; aims, aversions, inclinings and declinings reversed, transferred; the whole thought, mind, purpose, will, differently modelled, new. Then it is that thou mayst soundly, unaffectedly and safely sing those hymns to God which the divine man mentions²⁸. But until such time, see how dangerous this is: and instead of being wholesome diet, how likely it is to give a surfeit and breed a sort of pall and aversion, which may be of ill consequence, and even fatal.

Consider from whence comes that weakness and irresolution in the opinion concerning man's being sociable by nature; and also as to that of other creatures being made serviceable to him and for his use²⁹. Whence comes this floating and hesitation, but from the inward jarring of those principles [101] as they touch and have affinity elsewhere; as they borrow, as it were, from another system and derive from another fountain of which they still retain something, and cannot flow wholly clear and pure? Otherwise; what could be more absurd?

Has the spider her web and art to no use? And are so many species of volatiles made and framed her proper prey, and as so many objects of her art and faculties; and shall the understanding, and reason and faculties of man, his tongue and hands and power of employing and managing these as he does be esteemed a lesser matter? An accident? A vagary? A escape and oversight of nature, foreign to her design and owing to blind and random chance? Then may the whole world be so, full as well. And let us hearken to Epicuru's atoms.

What shall we say, therefore, as to all these domestic animals which are those framed and fitted to us, some of which can scarce be imagined able to subsist without us? shall sheep and cattle, and the rest of that kind be only accidentally man's; but properly and naturally the lion's and the tiger's?

²⁶Inf. 150. * * *. L. 2 C. 14.

²⁷Inf 103.

²⁸B. 1 C. 16.

Are bees, ants and even all creatures that do but herd, allowed society; and man denied it? And this too, when he of all creatures is most impatient of solitude, most exposed in such a state, most indigent and helpless in maturity as well as infancy, and can no way subsist or be preserved without it; and neither subsist in winters without some artificial lodgement and provision of food, nor be protected against the creatures that can master and devour him? All this is senseless and absurd. And yet see what happens! Consider, therefore, how great must be the power of those former impressions to mar and corrupt? And how inveterate is this evil? Apply this, therefore, upon [102] all occasions to the idea and contemplation of God: and remember of preceding caution.

If the writer of the table described, after such a manner, imposture and her cup; if the draught was such in those days; what is it now? And how deeply have we drunk? Is it possible therefore that we should have stomachs to receive any strong or wholesome truth, until we have vomited up those dregs? Can we expect anything but qualms, nauseatings, crudities, indigestions? --- What must we do then? --- Be contented with slender diet: observe a regimen; and course: refrain. --- No. But I must follow my instinct and bent: I must eat stronger food: I must go out into the open air: I must exercise and use my limbs. --- Go then, and write and speak and think high things of Deity. Talk magnificently of virtue³⁰: exhort others. Imitate a man in health. Act a Cato, a Thræsea, a Hebridius, a Rufus: but expect to suffer for this. Remember what will be the event: since even within, in thy own breast, these things are cautiously to be approached.

If presently after what has been said; it be lawful to venture on a strong thought of Deity, and even renew withal one of those dangerous ideas, take this single reflection. Consider a paradise, an Eden (as in Milton) where that favourite of the almighty was placed: how privileged: how adorned: [103] fitted to view and contemplate the noble sense; and admitted even into a part of the administration: what sort of solitude he passed³¹; in what thoughts, what affections: after what manner he had communication with Deity, access, commerce, discourse, entertainment. This and more than this (for these are still low ideas) is verified in Him who having followed certain precepts, has accordingly framed himself a mind and will, and gained that situation, * * * . This those ancients (those only hero's) knew and were professed of. This the worshipper of the * * * had: this the explorator had: this the seeming wretch, who was * * * : and this HE, who could say * * * &c³².

Again.

Consider how it have been with thee in former days, if, according to the idea of then conceived of deity, a voice had been heard; an angel or messenger appeared. What an immediate change? How sudden a renouncing of all other things? And how strong an application to that one affair whatever it were that should be thus enjoined? Consider but how it is with those thorow enthusiasts who are actually persuaded of some such message or revelation? How resolute and bold in despising all other things? And how transported with this sole honour, this sole dignity? Now, is it not a thousand times more ridiculous than the merest enthusiasm of these people, to be convinced of a being infinitely more perfect than all that they conceive or think; and yet to be by so many degrees less affected than they are? Is it not a thing monstrously preposterous to be fully and [inf. 118] absolutely convinced that there is a deity and of the highest perfection; that He superintends all things, sees and knows al things and is present everywhere; and yet at the same time

²⁹Sup. 60.

³⁰Sup. 80. & see Ep. B. 3 Cap. 14 against the use of the * * * .

³¹See Ep. Cap. 14 of B. 3 as quoted above 99.

to be so little affected by such a presence as to have more regard even for the common human eye? What can be the meaning of this? Where does this mystery lie? Consider: and thou mayst soon find³³ --- The vulgar have an idea of God: they have ideas also of good, of excellent, of noble, admirable, sublime. Now, they for their part, unite these ideas and join those of this latter kind to their idea of their God. Therefore that which they count good they ascribe to him. Thus they give him a will such as their own; passions such as their-own; pleasure like that of their own; revenge, as delighting in revenge; praise, as loving praise: thus attendants and a court, external pomp, splendour, and whatever they themselves admire. Consider now thy own idea of God; and whether thou joynest to it the ideas that thou hast of good, glorious, amiable, excellent: otherwise, what can such an idea produce? Is arbitrariness or revenge at any time a good with thee? If so; ascribe it to God. Is pleasure such? Ascribe it to God. Is any outward thing such (as either applause and renoum, praise, servants, admirers, a throne, grandeur, pomp?), ascribe the same to God: imagine Him to be one that is always thus entertained, and that enjoys the highest advantages of this sort: and thus thou shalt admire him, imitate him, conceive the highest esteem and value for him. --- But this is absurd: this is despicable and mean. --- What is despicable? If the things themselves are such; why dost thou admire them? If they are of the nature of good; if they [119] are excellent and of worth; where should they be but with the deity? What will deity be, when deprived of these? What will there be left to admire or emulate? How praise or greatly esteem such a condition?

No wonder therefore if the vulgar surpass us in their opinion of deity. No wonder if the vulgar admire and adore theirs with more sincerity than the philosopher his; if all we mean by philosophy be this. How should it happen otherwise with those of this sort? What should they be else but in a certain manner atheists? They have discernment enough to find that such ideas as these agree not with the idea of God; but not discernment enough to find that they agree as little with the notion of good.

Now try to philosophise after this rate: and see what will happen. Correct the vulgar idea. Divest the deity of all which we esteem happiness and good: take from him what we reckon power, what we extol as great and mighty: and what remains? What must be the effect? Where can piety be? Where adoration, reverence or esteem? Which way can we admire, or respect such a being but so much as in comparison with some great prince or dignified man? --- Now, where is the remedy? What cure? --- Nothing but this. To consider what is excellent and good; what not. For, where we imagine this to be, thither our contempt. If that which vile and wicked men profess be excellent and good; we must admire vile and wicked men: there is no help for it. If pleasure be good; we must admire those who enjoy pleasure and have the means of [120] being voluptuous. If anything of those eternal things (anything besides which belongs to the perfection of a mind) be good; it follows that we must attribute either these things or something of the same kind with these things to deity: or otherwise we must think lowly and contemptibly of such a being. In short: if we were truly own or worship deity; if we would leave room for any true and sincere veneration, honour, admiration or esteem; we must either ascribe those things to **Him** which we admire as excellent and good: or we must no longer admire as excellent or good, those things which we cannot ascribe to him.

If what has been said above be just; consider what a wretched kind that is which we call free talking about matters of religion and established rites of worship: what the effect is, when we oppose or impugn such opinions as those; specially if it be done after a certain manner: that is to say, if it be not still with a certain economy and reserve: if it be vehemently; if it be acutely, and as showing wit; if it be ridiculing and with contempt.

³²M L. 4 § 23.

³³* * *. C. 38.

Consider first what the * * * is in this place: how this is preserved towards men, as they are men; towards the society in general and towards thy particular society or city, and the laws of it. Consider what the * * * are in this place: and that the vulgar cannot better apply them than that they do. So that to disturb them in this formed opinions, is to overthrow those very * * * , lead them into greater error and render them profane and impious.

They have now the right notion in general; that there is a supreme ruler, that He is powerful, that He is just: but they know not rightly what is power and what impotence; what is just, unjust, right or wrong. [121] How should they know? Where have they learnt to apply these notions right, and to accomodate them to their proper subjects? Wilt thou teach them? If not, what dost thou teach them in this other way, but impiety and atheism? How dost thou appear to them but as one sacrilegious and profane? And indeed thou art, on this very account. For what greater sacrilege is there, than that which removes the notions of deity out of the minds of men, and introduces atheism? Remember therefore to respect these rites, whatever they be, which others have within in their own minds erected to the deity, as well as those other rites which they have publicly erected, and in other outward temples.

If modern superstition disturb thee; be thankful that it is not Indian and barbarian; that they are not human sacrifices; that they are not druids. In the meantime, imitate the chastity, decency and sanctity of the Ancients. Remembering Xenophon: remembering Marcus: remembering Socrates and his last words: remembering Ep...s * * * (with what follows, * * *)³⁴ and what stands, at present, in the room of this.

All this preposterous conduct, this pressing and earnestness to correct those notions of theirs in their religion, is from an ignorance of the * * * ; how it is that they apply them; how far they can go, and no farther. For, build to whatever pitch if these be not rightly applied and plain truth spoke out, all will stumble, and will unravel again and be as before. how should this be any otherwise? Grant but this, that all vice is error; that all pursue their good and cannot but do so; that there is no good but a good mind, nor no ill but an ill one; immediately all is right: see how all the rest will follow; how smooth and easy the way is; how all those other matters come to nothing, offence, vengeance, anger, and those things which presuppose these, forgiveness, mercy, favour, placability. What placability? What forgiveness? Towards a mad man? Towards a poor distempered wretch? Who is ever offended at such a one? Where is the anger? What room for mercy? What is punishment? How is anyone hurt, and by what? But consider things in any other [inf. 150 way: suppose that a creature may do better than he does, and that he may follow something else than what appears to him, his good; suppose vice to be one thing, and ill another: suppose vice itself to be an ill in the whole; see what must necessarily follow. Must not deity be offended? Must not I be so, much more? Am not I hurt? Must not I complain? Must virtue be thus abandoned? Must the things of the world be thus unequally distributed? Go and say that these things are of no moment; that they are not really goods. Persuade them that to be affronted, to be despised, to be poor, or to smart, is not to suffer; that banishment and death are not ill; and that with respect to the whole these things are orderly, good and beautiful. Inculcate this. Make them understand it. But if this be ridiculous to think of, how much more ridiculous is it to endeavour to change their other opinions, or if they seem convinced of anything, to think that this should stand a moment, thus prompt, without that other foundation?

Why thus concerned particularly for their wrong opinion of deity? Could they understand this; then all those other paradoxes would be easy³⁵; then that also would be conceived (which is now so monstrous) that whatever happens in the world, and to me in particular, of whatever nature it be, this I should affect and love as natural, kind, sovereignly

³⁴C. 38

³⁵Sup. 93.

good and beneficial, as that which is nearly related to me, was designed me and fitted to me, and as that which is best both for the world in general and in particular for me. For, how is this any longer a paradox?

If there be an order and economy for the good of the whole³⁶; then nothing can happen to me but from that economy, which provided for me in particular the best that was possible, and had respect to my good. If I am convinced of this; I must naturally love whatever happens to me from that [151] economy. If I would have that not to happen which happens according to this economy; I destroy (as much as in me lies) this economy, which is for my good, and but for which, the universe must lie under perpetual ills, and myself be exposed to whatever may be imagined of ill. And of some such economy as this, even those are sensible, who least think of deity. For how is it that they say? Nature has done her part. Nature has been kind in this and that. In affording a passage out of life, in putting an end to misery. Nature has provided. Nature has taken care.

Therefore but for some nature or another (whatever that nature be) things have been worse, and my condition more miserable. Therefore thanks be to that nature. --- But nature might have done better still. --- Here is the question: upon this it turns. How is nature wise? How is nature thus universally good? How is nature the tender mother of all? For if this were true; who would not love nature? Who not embrace her dispensations? Who not adore providence and deity? Where, then, is the paradox, if deity (real deity) be believed? For, thus it will follow.

If there be deity; there is no chance or contrary ill design. If all be form one wise and good design, then all is to one and same end, and nothing is supernumerary or unnecessary. If so; then there is a concatenation and connection: all things are related to one another, depend on one another, and everything is necessary to every thing³⁷. If so; then if anyone cause be removed, or perish, all perishes; and I must trust to disorder and confusion.

If there be a supreme reason of the whole; then everything happens according to that reason. If anything happen contrary; the reason of the whole must cease and perish. If so; then there is nothing which can carry on the interest of the whole, or which can prevent any ill that may happen to the whole itself or parts of the whole. If so; then ill may be infinite, and my sufferance and misery infinite.

Thus does it come to be a necessary consequence from [152] the opinion of deity; that whatever happens in the world, or whatever is appointed to me in particular, should be kindly affected, esteemed and beloved by me: be it hardship, poverty, sickness, death. For, what else should I choose, or what else esteem and love but that which tends to the good and perfection of the whole in which I am included? Now, if the whole be perfect, everything that happens in the whole is such.

Either the whole is perfect or imperfect. If it be an imperfect whole; how can there be deity? If, therefore, it be a perfect whole; what is there in it besides what is just, equal, necessary, good?³⁸ How can anything be altered, and not the whole be rendered imperfect? See therefore, that neither on thy own, or any other account, thou desire ever to correct anything in the order of things. For, what is this but, as much as in thee lies, to destroy the perfection, happiness and security of the whole; and consequently also thy one?

London, January: 20. 1700/99.

³⁶Sup. 87 &c.

³⁷(Necessity) Sup. 87.

³⁸Sup. 138.

O, soul! Think how noble will be thy state, when in the manner that thou art taken with other beauties, other simplicities and graces³⁹, thou shalt proportionally contemplate and admire that chief original beauty, and that perfect simplicity and grace of which all other is the shadow reflection & resemblance⁴⁰. How well will it be with thee, when all those other inferior secondary **objects** are loved according to their order, never but last; and the **FIRST OBJECT**, first in its due place and rank⁴¹; antecedently to all; with an affection above all other affection besides; and according to just natural affection⁴², not that which is called towards a relation or friend. Now see how thou art moved at the present friendly object of this other kind. See the power of this [153] inferior love. How dear those features; sounds and external explications of the soul beloved. Now as the face of heavens outshines this other face; as the frame and structure of the celestial bodies surpass the goodliness and beauty of this other body; so is that soul more beautiful than this other soul; so is that love more beautiful than this other love. Why fear enthusiasm? Why shun the name? Where should I be ecstasied but here? Is my subject true, or is it fiction? If true, how can I forsake it? How be ashamed of it? How desert the artificer⁴³, the creator, parent, prince? Am I ashamed to desert a vulgar friend, or disown him because of his mean appearance (if by chance he be unfashionable, and in a despised garb); am I withheld from being discountenanced or suffering shame on his account, by another shame of a just kind; and shall nothing withhold me here? Shall I be ashamed of this other friend? Shall I be ashamed of this diviner **love**, and of an object of love so far excelling all those other objects in dignity, majesty, grace, beauty and amiableness? Is this enthusiasm? Be it: and so may I be ever an enthusiast. Happy me, if I can grow in this enthusiasm, so as to love all those enthusiasms of every other kind, , and be whole towards this. Shall other unwillingly be accounted enthusiastic and even affect this sort of passion as virtuoso's, men of wit, pleasure, politeness, each in their several ways, and for their several objects (a song, a picture, a pile of stones, a human body, a shape, a face)⁴⁴; and shalt thou be concerned at being found enthusiastic upon another subject, so far excelling in itself, and which is original to all the rest?

Who would loose a moments' solid good?⁴⁵ Who would willingly be separated from the highest enjoyment, and quit the amiable object that creates it? Or, is that beauty and amiableness but a chimera? Is the beatific vision enthusiasm? Or suppose it enthusiasm; is it not justifiable and of a right [**inf.**: 182] kind? What can be more highly reasonable? What greater folly, poorness and misery than to be without it? Is there a rational and admired enthusiasm that belongs to architecture, painting, music and not to this?⁴⁶ Who is there that is not seized with admiration at the view of any of those ancient edifices, where order and proportion apparent in all the parts, and resulting from the whole, forces in a manner its effect, and is visible and striking even to vulgar eyes? Who is there that is not struck by those plain and obvious graces, the natural beauty and simplicity of a work of Raphael? And who is there so little musical as to be unmoved by the voice of a Siphacio, or the hand of a Corelli?

Now join all this together. Remember the Pantheon, the wonderful fabric of St. Peter's, and (at once) the architecture of Michel Angelo, the sculpture and paintings of the masters, and the voice of the Eunuchs, with the symphonies. Does this raise an ecstasy and enthusiasm? And shall not a nobler architecture, nobler accords and a divine harmony be able to create it? Are there senses by which all those other graces and perfections are perceived? And is there no sense or faculty by which comprehend or feel this other perfection and grace, so as to bring that enthusiasm

³⁹Sup. 66.

⁴⁰Inf. 189. 329.

⁴¹Inf. 180.

⁴²Sup.

⁴³* * * L. 1 C. 6.

⁴⁴Sup. 47.

⁴⁵Inf. 80 & sup. 130.

⁴⁶Sup. 180.

hither and transfer it from those objects to these and to the ONE original and comprehensive object? Now observe how it is in all those other objects of art or science: what difficulty to be in any degree knowing; and how long ere a true taste is gained: how many things shocking, how many offensive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledged the highest beauties.

But it is not instantly that this sense is acquired, and these beauties discoverable. Labour and pains are required, and time to cultivate a natural genius tho ever so apt and forward. But who is there that so much as thinks of cultivating a genius this other way, or of improving the sense or faculty which nature has given of this kind? And is it a wonder we should be dull as we are, confounded and at a loss in these affairs, blind as to this higher scene, these nobler representations? Which way should we come to understand any better? Which way be knowing in these beauties? Is there [183] study, science and learning necessary to understand all beauties else? And for the sovereign beauty is there no skill or science required? Remember in painting the shades and masterly strokes⁴⁷: in architecture the rustic kind, and that which they call Ferino: in music, the chromatic and skilful mixture of dissonancies⁴⁸. And remember what there is that answers to this in the **WHOLE**.

[Go to second book, p. 244 --- and **inf.**: 188]

St. Giles's 1705.

... Animality what? And the tokens of it? (So above 24. How life? A soul? A mind?)⁴⁹ --- The system, parts, economy. --- Circulation of blood ... a liquid carrying globules round a centre. --- Thus the microcosm. Now in the real * * * , how? ... a centre (heart) sun; and round it the globes moving in ether. Same circulation: same economy, numbers, time: only, these regular, steady, permanent; the other irregular, variable, inconstant. In one the marks of wisdom determination: in the other whimsy conceit. In one judgement: in the other fancy. In one will: in the other caprice. In one truth, certainty, knowledge: in the other error, folly, madness.

And yet to be convinced that there is something above which thinks, we want these latter signs; as thinking there can be no thought but what is like our own. We sicken and grow weary with the orderly and regular course of things. Periods, and stated laws, and revolutions proportioned and unaccountable, work not upon us, nor win our admiration. A miracle is just contrary.

By harmony, order, concord, we are left atheists. By irregularity and discord we are to be convinced of deity.

The world is accident, if it proceeds in course: but wisdom, if it run mad.

⁴⁷Sup. 145.

⁴⁸Sup. 147.

⁴⁹Sup. p. 24.

THE END

[30] Rotterdam, 1698.

Either man is made with design, or without design; if without design, it must follow that there is no **END** either in the whole or any part of man; and then neither muscles, veins, arteries are designed, nor are they to any purpose, or can they be said to be to any said. If this be false, and that all these were made to an end; if they are all designed, and have each of them their end, then there must be somewhere a last and ultimate end in man. If so; then that which plainly is a means only to something else, cannot be itself that end. It cannot be said of an eye that it is its last end either to be of such a certain form, or to move after a certain manner, or to feel itself in any certain pleasant affection as when it has got out of darkness into the light, or out of too fierce a light into a softer and less dazzling one. Each of these are means: for both the shapes, the motions, the affections particular to it, are all towards one single end, which is that of sight. Neither is sight therefore the end of the man; since sight is in him only a means to other end. Thus the ear and hearing: thus the palate and tasting: and thus all the other senses as well as that which belongs to generation. For, if those parts themselves are a means to a further [31] end; then, the affection of those parts and that peculiar sense belonging to them is only a means still, and not an end. If neither the pleasure nor sense of tasting, nor that of ventry, nor any other be the end; then in general, pleasure is not the end. What is it then that we can call the end? To eat, drink, sleep, copulate, and the pleasures which belong to either eating, drinking, sleeping or copulating, are all of them but as means and refer to something further. If we can find nothing beyond; then all that we can say is the end of man, is to be in such a certain sound and perfect state of body only, and such as serves to generate other such bodies. But if besides what has been mentioned, there are any certain dispositions of mind such as plainly refer to a species and society and to the enjoyment of converse, mutual alliance and friendship; then is the end of man, society: and, therefore, to be as such as to serve to that end of society (which is, to be good or virtuous) is that to which everything in man is lastly referred, and which is properly his **END**. And where his end and perfection is, there certainly must be his good.

The end and design of nature in man is society. For, wherefore are the natural affections towards children, relations, fellowship and commerce but to that end? The perfection of human nature is in that which fits [32] and accommodates to society. For He who wants those natural affections which tend thither, is imperfect and monstrous. Now if the ultimate design and end of nature in the constitution of man be this; that he be framed and fitted for society; and if it be the perfection of human nature to be thus fitted; how should not this which is the end and perfection of human nature, be also the good of man?

If that to which man is carried by nature (as to society he is) be not his good; then his own private end and good is to go contrary to nature: so that his end in nature and his end in himself must be utterly contrary. Therefore if those natural affections are that which lead home from his own real good (as when they cause him to expose himself for others, to suffer pain, or labour or hardship for others) it must be in his end also to extinguish those natural affections; or else it must be said to be consistent with his end, not to follow, but forsake his good; which is absurd. If in order to his good he must extinguish those natural affections, then it must be his end to become savage, unnatural, horrid and inhuman. But if this can never be his good, but the contrary; then his end must be to follow nature and to attain the perfection of his kind.

If it be a detestable and miserable state to be wholly unnatural and void of humanity or human affection; then is it the good of man to be socially inclined [33] and affected: if so; it is his greater good still to act by a more clear and perfect affection of that kind: if so; then that affection which is wholly towards virtue is that in which he finds his greatest good: if so; then here is his end: nor is anything else his end but this; to affect as is natural to him and as becomes him; to will and incline as the nature of man requires; in short, to follow nature, or the order and appointment of supreme reason in his particular constitution and make.

Whatever is a man's end is that which he cannot quit or depart from, on the account of any other thing. Now pleasure of any kind, riches, honours, or life itself, is what any one may very well quit on any other accounts. But, it is impossible to do well or happily in quitting either integrity, justice, faith, or anything which is the part of a man, as he is a man. Therefore, this only is his **END**, and not the other.

He who follows pleasure as his **END** knows not what he follows; since contrary things procure it; and what pleases at one time, displeases at another: neither are the things on which it depends ever in his power. He who follows virtue as his end, knows what he follows, and can never be at a loss: neither are the goods he seeks ever of his power.

What hesitation, doubt, perplexity in Him who has not ever one and the same end! Who pursues that [34] at one time as good, which another time he despises! Who chooses at one time, what he rejects and is out of conceit with, at another! What constancy, stability and evenness in him who has one certain **end** to which he refers all his actions, and which is never out of his sight!

That is said to be the end of everything, to which the thing is ultimately referred. Thus the end of the watch is to show the hour of the day, and to move in such certain and proportionable degrees, for the service of him whose use it is made to. A person who has never seen anything of this kind, nor know the use of such investments as these, would however upon considering the watch be satisfied soon that its principal perfection was not in the case, which served to cover and defend it; and that its ultimate end or design was not merely to move; but to move after a certain manner and in certain due proportions to which the wheels were adapted. How then, as to man? Does it seem, that his perfection is in the case?⁵⁰ --- But the body perhaps is more than the case; and is as the wheels in the watch, which are principal and essential to its operation --- What is it then that we can understand to be the effects and operation of a man? Is it when he eats and drinks only and sleeps? Is it when the heart beats and keeps due time and the adjacent parts about it correspond? If so; then indeed is this all one with the watch. But what if the fancy and [35] imagination be wrong? What if the understanding be blind? What if the affections fight one with another? Is this a right effect? Is this a due operation? What therefore is the operation and effect of a man? What does the nature of man aspire to and terminate in? Is it not this? The use of reason? The exercise of understanding? A certain will and determination? Certain affections? What is there therefore that is able to hinder these operations and these effects? Or what is there in the sufferance or injury of that other part, which is able to hinder me from acting as a man? From being either just, pious, virtuous or good? From acting that which is before me with magnanimity and constancy? From acquiescing from what is present in the part assigned me and committed to me? From being benign and bountiful towards men, composed and easy towards events, and in unanimity with the whole? The is what the nature of man imports. Or is it rather in the contrary, to whine and to bemoan? To be peevish and malignant? to be effeminate and soft? Impotent towards pleasure, and impatient of

pain, labour or hardship? If manhood be the contrary to this; if it be in action an exercise, in reason and in a mind that this consists; then is it here that **the man** is either saved or lost. These are the springs and wheels which when impaired and hindered, the man ceases and is extinct. And as in the watch, a certain motion is the **end** to which all is referred; so also, here, it is a certain motion that is the **end**: and when this proceeds right, all is well, and nothing further is required. [infra 60]

We see in so many things that their end is in nature. More particularly thus in our own **bodies**. The end of the muscle is the attraction or the convenient motion of the part, such as the eye-lid or the eye itself. The end of the eye is sight. The end of sight, the preservation and protection of the animal; as the end of the seminal vessels and their proper affections, is the propagation and increase of the animals and the good of a whole species. The teeth, eyes, hands, and all other limbs and organs are made for one another and for the good of the whole body. The different sexes are made for one another and with respect of a kind or species. If so; then in the same manner as the several parts of the creature have their end, so the whole creature has his end in nature, and serves to something beyond himself. If it be to the good of his kind; it must be to the perfection of his kind. If the perfection of his kind be society; then his end also will be society. So that since the only perfection, the only tolerable state of mankind, and in which he can possibly endure or subsist, is society⁵¹; therefore is the end of man society. If it be not his good to follow his end; then has he some other end within himself which is contrary to that natural end [61] or end in nature. If, on the contrary, it be his chiefest good to follow that end of nature; then is his private end and the real and only end of man to live according to nature.

Now that which is called or private or particular end, that to which we ultimately refer or have respect must be that which can yield to nothing else: for, if it yield to anything; then that which is yielded to, will be the end and not that we just determined. If there be that which is preferable to everything else, and which can yield to nothing besides; this, if anything, must be called our end. Now, to live merely, cannot be our end: for, then that could not at anytime (as it may) be rightly preferred to it. What is there therefore that we can never (as they say) sacrifice to anything? Bodily ease, soundness of limbs, health and constitution are undoubtedly eligible and desirable. Are these therefore or is pleasure that which we may sacrifice everything else to? If so; then we may sacrifice our mind. Now it is certain that he who has a mind or what is worthy to be called so, will never think of parting with it, on any other account. If so; then that which last remains and is preferable to everything else, is a mind and resolution, will, or reason, becoming a man. If so; then this is our end: and our end in nature, and our private end will be the same. And thus our end is, to live according to nature.

⁵⁰* * *. L. 1 C. 20.

⁵¹Inf. 101.

GOOD & ILL.

[36] Rotterdam 1698.

---Nam quid sequat, aut quem?⁵²

Why should it disturb me that I am thought singular? And wherefore should I not persist in following what I think is good; after I have thought so long, and chosen on such good grounds? --- But this is odd. This is out of the way and against the general conceit. --- Whom then shall I follow? Whose judgement or opinion shall I take concerning what is **GOOD** and what is not?

One man affects the hero; esteems it the greatest master of life to have seen war, and to have been in action in the field: so that he looks upon those as wretches, and altogether contemptible who have never known anything of this kind. Another laughs at this man, counts this stupidity and dullness, prizes his own wit and prudence, and would think it a disgrace to him to be thought adventurous after that manner, or to have willingly at any time engaged in danger.

One person is assiduous and indefatigable in advancing himself to the character and repulse of a man of business and of the world. Another on the contrary thinks this impertinent, values not his fame or character in the world, and would willingly never come out of the stews or drinking-houses; where he best likes to be, and which he accounts the highest good.

One values wealth as a means only to serve his palate and to eat finely. Another loathes this, and aims at popularity. [37] One admires gardens, architectures and the pomps of buildings. Another has no relish this way: but thinks all those whom they call virtuoso's to be distracted.

One there is who thinks all expense to be madness; and thinks only wealth itself to be good. One plays: another dresses and studies an equipage: another is full of heraldry, a family and a blood. One recommends gallantry and intrigue: another riot and debauch: another buffoonery, satire and the common wit: another sports and the country: another a court: another travelling and the sight of foreign countries: another poetry and the fashionable literature. All these go different ways. All censure one another, and are despicable in one another's eyes. What is it, then, that I am concerned for? Whose censure do I fear? Or whom is it that I shall be guided by? If I ask are riches good when only heaped up and unemployed? One answers, they are. The rest deny --- How is it then that they are to be employed in order to be good? --- All disagree. All tell me different things. Since therefore riches are not of themselves good (as most of yee say) and that neither is there any agreement amongst ye which way they are made or become good; why may not I hold it for my opinion that they are neither of themselves good, nor anyway made good?

If there be those who despise fame; and that of those who covet it, he who desires fame for one thing despises it for another; he who seeks fame with one sort, despises it with another; why may not I say that neither do I know how any fame can be called a good?

If those who covet pleasure, they who admire it [38] of one kind, contempt it for another; why may not I say that neither do I know which of these pleasures, or how pleasure in general can be good?

If amongst those who covet life ever so earnestly, that life which to one is elligible and amiable, is to another dispisable and vile; why may not I say that neither do I know that life itself is necessarily good?

In the mean time, this I see and know certainly, that the necessary effect and consequence of loving and esteeming these things highly, and as essentially good, is to be envious; to repine and long; to be often disappointed and greeeded; to be bitter, anxious, malignant; suspicious and jealous of men, and fearful of events (all which is misery): and that on the other side, the effect of despising these, is liberty, generosity, magnanimity, self-approbation, consciousness of worth.

And are not these really good, but uncertainly so, as the other? A generous affection, an exercise of friendship uninterrupted, a constant kindness and benignity of disposition, a constant complacency, constant security, tranquillity, equanimity, are not these ever and at all times good? Is it then, of these that anyone can at any time nauseate and be weary? Are there any particular ages, seasons, places, circumstances that must accompany these to make them agreeable to us? are these variable and inconstant? Do these by being advently beloved or sought procure any disturbance or misery? Can these be at any time over-valued? If not; then where can my good be, but here? [39]

Wherefore is it that I act at any time? Why do I choose? Why prefer one thing to another? --- It is because I conceive and fancy good in it, or because I fancy it --- Am I therefore to follow every present fancy and imagination of good? If so; then I must follow that at one time which I do not at another; approve at one time what I disapprove at another, and be at perpetual variance within my self. But if I am not to follow all fancy alike; and that of fancies of this kind, some are true, some false; then I am to examine every fancy: and there is some rule or other by which to judge and determine. It was the fancy of one man to set fire to a beautiful temple in order to obtain immortal remembrance or fame. If this were a good to him, why do we wonder at him? If the fancy were wrong in what was it wrong? Or wherefore was not this his good as he fancied? Either, therefore, that is every man's good to which he fancies, and because he fancies it, and is not content without it: or otherwise there is that with which the nature of man is satisfied; and which alone must be his good. If that which the nature of man is satisfied and can rest contented in, be alone his good; then he is a fool who follows that as his good which a man can be without and yet be satisfied and contented; in the same manner as he is a fool who flies that which a man may endure and yet be satisfied. Now a man may possibly not have burnt a temple (as Erostratus) and yet may be contented. In the same manner, a man may not have conquered the world (as Alexander) and yet may be contented. In the same manner a man may be without either of those which are commonly called goods, and yet may be contented; as on the contrary he may possess them all and still be discontented, and not at all happier than before. If so; then happiness is in a certain temper and disposition; in a certain mind and will; if so; why do I not seek it there? [*infra* 44]

Whatever is **GOOD** must be alike good to all: whatever is ill, alike ill to all. Thus sorrow, trouble, dejection, horror, anxiety, fear, are alike ill to all, and therefore always ill. And thus tranquillity, satisfaction, content, freedom of mind, good dispositions, good affections, and whatever creates and establishes these is alike good to all, and therefore is of the nature of **GOOD**. If virtue be not necessary to produce satisfaction and content, but that content may be as well without as with it; then is not this our good; if necessary this is our good. So that whatever is indifferent towards the procuring content; is indifferent itself. Now, if this that my fancy presents to me, be necessary to content; it must be necessary towards every man's content. Is it fame that my fancy represents to me as necessary? But this is not necessary to every man's content (for there are those who can live as well satisfied without it). Therefore, is not necessary to my content; nor is my good. Is it honour or power? The same. Is it riches? The same. Neither do any or all of these certainly procure satisfaction; since the mind may be as unquiet in the midst of these as at any other time. Now if that alone be good which is necessary to every man's content that it should be present⁵³; then that alone is ill which is necessary to every man's content that it should be absent. Now, that a man should be sure of living twenty years, or one year, or one hour, is not necessary to his content. [45] Neither is it necessary to his content that he should not believe or know that he is to die the next year or next hour. Therefore, to be sure of dying the next year or next hour is indifferent: and therefore death not an ill. If pain be ill it must be alike ill to all men (for so is sorrow, affliction, horror, despair, anxiety and all of this sort). But if there be a certain temper or resolution which can cause it to be slighted; then it is not an ill to

⁵²Hor. Lib. 1 Ep. 1.

⁵³Inf. 46.

him who has that temper and resolution, but to him that wants it, and therefore not constantly, and in itself an ill. If pain however be said to be ill, yet all pain is not so; since that which to an effeminate person is insufferable pain and trouble is to a man of laborious or warlike a subject of delight and enjoyment. What else is that delight of sports-men, or of those who love adventures, and to engage in things hazardous and not accomplished but with pain and difficulty? What is the difference between one that is robust and manly and one that is weak and tender, but only this; that what afflicts the one is of no concern to the other? Therefore, if to some the greatest pains can be tolerable; and that to others the slightest pains are intolerable; then is not the greatest pain itself to be so much considered as that is to be considered which makes pain either well or ill supported, and to be tolerable or intolerable. Thus, therefore, neither is pain, nor death, nor poverty, nor obscurity, considerable as ill. Nor, on the other hand, is pleasure, riches, honour or fame of any consideration as to our happiness or good. But by fearing any of this first as ill, or [46] pursuing and following these latter as good, there must of necessity be disturbance, disappoint, anxiety, jealousy, envy, animosity (which are and ever must be eternally miserable) as on the contrary side, by a liberty from these, there must be serenity of mind, tranquillity, security and undisturbed enjoyment of all social affection, and an exercise of all virtue; which is and must be eternally good and happy.

He that affects what is not in his power, or disaffects in the same manner what he cannot hope to avoid, cannot be said to have content⁵⁴. He therefore who pursues a right affection, pursues his happiness, content and good. He who despises this, or says he can be content without it, contradicts himself, and may be as well say he can be content without content.

London. January 26. 99/1700.

The good of life is either in the sensations of the body; or in the motions and affections of the soul, or in the action of the mind in thought and contemplation: or if it be not in one of these separately, it must be in some mixture of these one with the other. If it be in sensuality alone, then it is in brutes that **good** is compleatest and perfectest: they being more capacited for this, as more exempt from the other.

If it be in a soul and mind, but in subservience to sense, this is still the same: since if the highest good (supposed in the sense) [47] be attained, the other is slighted: and thus still the bestial state is perfectest. If it be in a soul and mind eminently and principally, so the body is to be subservient; then it is to be considered how far this subservience is to go. Now it is evident that as the activity of the mind are the causes that sensual pleasures are less felt, and are therefore the diminution of that other sort of good; so on the other side is sensuality the obstruction of this good which is in a mind. Such is the opposition and fight of these two principles. Therefore if the highest degree of this sort of good (viz. of a mind) be not attainable but by the loss of the other; then that other, as the meaner good, must be sacrificed to this greater: and the only true and real good is the enjoyment of a mind freed from the incitements, commotions and disorders of sense.

Now if the chiefest good be in this of a soul and mind, and their operations; then consider how it is that thou exertest them; what thou makest to be the objects of their pursuit and intention. How dost thou employ them, and upon what? How is it that thy soul loves, esteems, admires, rejoices? What is it that thy mind contemplates with delight? And what are the thoughts it loves to be entertained with? See what the subjects are. For as the worth is of these, so is thy worth⁵⁵. As the greatest and fullness is of these, so is that of the good thou enjoyest. See therefore where fullness is, and

⁵⁴Sup. 44.

⁵⁵Mar: L: ...

where emptiness. See in what subject resides the chiefest excellence and beauty, and where it is entire, perfect, absolute; where broken, imperfect, short. View these celestial beauties, and whatever has the appearance of excellence, and is able to attract. See that which either really is, or but stands as in the room of fair, beautiful and good⁵⁶: a mass of mettle: a tract of land: a number of slaves: a pile of stones: a human body of such certain lineaments and proportions⁵⁷. But, go to what is yet more specious: a friend: a set or society of friends: a family: and that larger family, a city, commonwealth, and native country. Is this the highest of the kind? Is this of the first order, the first degree of beauty? May each of [**inf.** **180** these be beautiful by themselves, without a beautiful world? Can beauty and perfection be there and not here? Or if here, can it be in a less degree than there? If beauty be at all in this * * * (the original and container of all other beauties) can it be less perfect in the whole than in the parts? Or, on the contrary, is it not impossible but that it should be imperfect in the parts, and only perfect in the whole? Where all the pieces are (in the artist's phrase) rapportés, matched, adjusted; where all is joined and united; and in which all number * * *, measure and proportion is summed⁵⁸. See in painting, see in architecture, where it is that beauty lies. Is it in every single stroke or stone which united composed the whole design? Is it in any separate narrow part, or in the whole taken together? Is it (suppose) in the foot-square of the building, or the inch-square of the painting? Or is it not evident that if the eye were confined to this, the chief and sovereign beauty would be lost, whatever slender graces might appear in those imperfect fragments? [Now consider, and apply this. Consider painting and architecture it self⁵⁹. Consider music and harmony, a voice, a face. "To what does this refer? How stands it in the larger piece? How in the whole? What part is it? Of what is this the image, reflection, shadow?⁶⁰ Where is the sovereign beauty? Where the sovereign **GOOD**?"

See therefore what is amiable in the first, and what but in the second and lower degree. Go to the **FIRST OBJECT**⁶¹. Go to the source, origin and principle of excellence and beauty. See where perfect beauty is: for where that is, that alone can be perfect enjoyment, there alone the **highest good**⁶².

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⁵⁷ Inf. 153.

⁵⁸* * *, Mar. L. 5 § ...

⁵⁹ Inf. 182.

⁶⁰ Sup. 152.

⁶¹ Sup. 152. 329.

SHAME

[40] Rotterdam 1698.

(1.) They laugh at the habit, the posture, place, countenance. Should this disturb? But, were it in another case (a loss of fortune, of friends; a melancholy or concern about a dying relation or a sinking public) this would then be otherwise; there would be little regard to this or to anything they could say, though ever so full of mockery or satire. --- And why this? --- Because thou wouldst be otherwise taken up, and in a greater concern; to which the rest would be as nothing. -- - And is this, therefore, a slighter case? Are those other things of more concern then that without which there is no being a friend, no possibility of being truly a fellow-citizen, or fellow-creature, an owner of deity or lover of men? Without which I must lie, dissemble, flatter; tremble, and be a coward; soften in pleasure, and be voluptuous and effeminate; hate and be an enemy; be unreconciled to providence, and be impious; in short, without which my whole life must be absurdity and contradiction.

(2.) Again. --- Either this is a true shame (and then it is for something vicious) or if it be for nothing in itself ill; the shame is ill. --- But, which way to bear the reproach of a whole [41] people? --- How do robbers, debauchers, and the common women? --- But, these are not ashamed of ill actions. --- And, shall they be unhurt by the report of others, that are virtuous; while thou art inferior to the reproaches of those who are ignorant and vicious? They are not ashamed (thou sayest) of what is base. Wherefore? --- Because they think it not base. --- But, if they thought it base; and they be otherwise than ashamed? --- No. --- Then, wherefore is thy shame? See what thou art forced to confess. In short, it is impossible we should be ashamed for anything but because we think it base. So that either thou art troubled because thou thinkst fame to be a good, or every virtuous action as not honourable.

(3.) Again. If a number of children derided thee, wouldst thou be concerned? --- No. --- If of idiots? --- The same. --- If of mechanics and the lowest of the vulgar? --- Still the same. --- But perhaps those whom thou fearest are judges of vice and virtue, and know what is good what ill. --- Not so. --- Then who are these but children, idiots and mechanics, or all one with these? And what have we to do with their judgements? If they are wise; instead of condemning, they will praise the action. If they condemn, they are the same vulgar whom thou despisest, and who know neither thee, nor themselves. Thus as to the great people. Thus as to kings and their court. [42] thus as to the formal part of the world and those who are called learned.

(4.) Again. To remember also that of Marcus, to look down as from on high &c⁶³: --- A city; a rumour of people; --- A nest of mites; the swarming of insects --- How, when the tree is shaken? How many cities swallowed in one earthquake? And how soon must all be swallowed by death, and the whole surface of the earth changed and new? Not anything extant that now is. What if the clony were sudden and before their eyes; how would they look? Where are the solemn brows, the important reproofs, the anger or mirth? --- They make themselves diversion with me; they please themselves --- Be it so --- But who can bear contempt? --- Anyone may, that knows himself, what is it that he condemns, and why; what is contemptible and what not. See * * * .

⁶²Sup. p. 153.

⁶³B ... § ...

(5.) Again. These by their contempt disturb me⁶⁴. But if greater and better than these were present and applauded me, I should bear up, and should condemn them wholly and what they thought or said --- Why, man! Is there not a greater presence than all this? Is there no intelligence, no consciousness in the whole? Or is all there blindness, ignorance and impotence? Or is that being a more inconsiderable spectator and less worthy thy concern? Or, if thy action be just, and thy affection right; is not [43] this that which he approves? And what more? Wouldst thou that this approbation should be signified to thee? Wouldst thou hear a certain sound⁶⁵ as from men? Or wouldst thou that they also should hear that thou art approved? --- What folly!

Consider, therefore, these five. (1) an ordinary calamity (2) robbers and the common women (3) children and idiots commending (4) the world and its inhabitants (5) God.

--- Pudor (inquit) te malus urget. Hor. Sat.3, L.2.

This is that which forceth thee to confess thy meanness, lowness and imbecility. This is what makes thee unequal in every strife, unable to stand a moment in behalf of thy self and inward character, or so much as to expostulate or partly with those antagonist-appearances, those species, marks, spectres, phantoms, which carry all before them and make what ravage they please. This is that which, in company, moulds and twines thee after any manner; forces thee to speak where thou shouldst be silent, be silent where thou shouldst speak; makes thee to have whatever sort of countenance is commanded; to smile, frown, pity, applaud, as is prescribed; and to be in short whatever the company around thee is. For, should I not do thus; what would they think of me? What would they say? --- Why, man! What is it to thee what they think or say? Is not this their concern? Are not they to look to this? Is it not at their own peril? What hast thou to do with their miseries and woes? With their wrong opinions, ill judgements and errors? See that thy own opinion be right, and in particular that this opinion be so which thou conceivest concerning their praise or dispraise.

What is it all this stooping and slavery? And hence but from that wretched opinion and dogma still remaining, that another's praise and commendation is my good? Consider the sum of this. [inf. 108] What if all these and all besides that are upon earth should conceive the highest opinion of thee; what good would this be to thee? Or if they all thought ill; what ill? --- I should be useless in the world --- Retire then. Where is the harm? What sorrow, what ill does this portend? What else is it but death? In the meantime, what is it to me, where my task is appointed to me, where my service is, how far it extends, how near ceasing and coming to that period which of its own accord and by the course of nature in a few years it will come to? Am I unserviceable now? If not now; I must be so however, within a little; if I stay but until age, and infirmity do their part⁶⁶. What signifies it whether it be one cause or another that sends me out of the world? If I have still a part in it; I act: if not; I bid farewell. Where is the ground for this anxiety? What is this stir about an outward character? Either it can be kept, or not be kept: if not; either I have a part still, or no part. If none; it is well. I am discharged. As how? As complaining that it should be thus soon? That I had not a longer time given me to act? That I had no better nor more considerable a part?⁶⁷ Think what it is thou callest considerable. As how? With respect to what? Is it with respect to Him who distributes the parts? Are not all alike considerable in this respect? --- But with respect to men. --- What are men? What are their interests, what is society or community but with respect to this superior and his appointment?⁶⁸ If I have no concern for them; what is it to me what my part has been amongst them? If I have concern, and am desirous of a part; it is [109] because of nature. And what part would I have, for nature's sake,

⁶⁴Inf. 98.

⁶⁵Inf. 111.

⁶⁶Inf. 126.

⁶⁷Sup. 81 & Inf. 127.

⁶⁸* * *. M. L. 3 § 13.

other than what nature has appointed me? What service would I render to the whole, but what **the whole** has willed? What approbation is there, what glory or honour with respect to deity, besides in following and obeying?

Remember therefore to run still to the utmost: and not stick half way. Think always of the worst. --- They despise me. --- Who? --- These few, these two or three. --- Let it be the whole world. And what then? See. What is it that I fear? Is it my body that will suffer? This is not the question here. What is it then? Is it my mind? How? Which way, unless I will my self? What is fame? Which way does it hurt? Which way advantage? What good does it do me at best? What ill at worst? Where does the good and ill lie? --- In the opinion. --- Set that right therefore: and all else will be right.

See Δοξαγιτον inf. 192]

Mankind, and HUMAN AFFAIRS.

[48] Rotterdam: 1698.

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Consider the several ages of mankind; the revolutions of the world; the rise, descension and extinction of nations, one after another; after what manner the earth is peopled; sometimes in one part, and then in another: first desert; then cultivated; and then desert again. From woods and wilderness; to cities and culture: and from cities and culture; again into woods. One while barbarous; then civilised; and then barbarous again. After darkness and ignorance; arts and sciences: and then again darkness and ignorance as before.

Now, therefore, remember this: whenever thou art intent and earnest on any action that seems highly important to the world; whenever it seems that great things are in hand; remember to call this to mind: that all is but of a movement: all must again decline. What though it were now an age like one of those ancient? What though it were **Rome** again? What though it were **Greece**? How long should it last? Must not there be again an age of darkness? Again Goths? And shortly, neither shall so much as the name of Goths be remembered: but the modern as well as ancient * * * s and Italians be equally forgot.

Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, Achaians. The innumerable cities of the continent and islands. The European and Asiatic * * * s. The commonwealth of Rome, and in Africa Carthage &c.: what were these once! And now, what! The morea, Turkey, the holy patrimony and the land of priests! Nations fighting for [49] Mahomet: civilians of different sects warring one with another: doctrines, heresies, creeds, councils, synods, persecutions. What a different face of things! A little while hence, and this too will be changed; and so that; and so the next: and after many revolutions, the same over again. Nothing is new or strange. That now is, after it has ceased, shall one time or other be again: and that that is now, shall one time be as it was before. Vast and spreading commonwealths; as these of ancient Greece, Italy and through all the western world. Vas and spreading tyrannies of long duration as those of Persia, India and the eastern world. Rude and illiterate commonwealths as those of Gaul, Germany, the Scythians, vandals, Goths. Polite and learned commonwealths as those of Greece and Rome. Harmless rites and ceremonies of religion: barbarous and obscene rites. Peaccable and corresponding religions, uniting and reconciling the world: dark and horrid superstitions covering the face of the world, causing wars and confusion --- such is the state of mankind. These are the revolutions. The tree sprouts out of the ground; then grows; then flourishes a while: at last decays and sinks, that others may come up. Thus men succeed in one another. Thus names and families die: and thus nations and cities. What are all these changes and successions? What is there here besides what is natural, and familiar, and orderly and conducing to the **whole**? [50] Where is the tragedy? Where the surprise or astonishment? Are not these the leaves of the wood carried off with the winter-blast, that new ones may in the spring succeed? Is not the whole surface of the earth thus? Is it not in these very changes that all those beauties consist which are so admired in nature and which all but the grosser sort of mankind are so sensibly moved by? --- The sum of all this, is: that, be this what season so ever of the world; be it the very winter that thou livest in; or be it in the spring; all is alike. Had it been in the full growth of letters, science, arts, liberty, or what other perfection human nature in its best state is capable of; or had it been in the autumn and decline of all this that thou hadest lived; it amounts but to the same⁶⁹. Were Rome or Sparta thy country; or hadest thou been thy self Licurgus or Valerius and founded those governments; what then? What was all this but in order to their corruption? What is 4 or 5 hundreds years duration more than 40 or 20? Or, what would a thousand or tem thousand be, supposing that things could last so long? Is there anything in this that can satisfy? --- What remains, then, but that the thing that is just,

sociable and in appearance tending to the good of mankind; that, and that alone, thou shouldst intend and that perform as far as lies in thee, without regard to what is time past, or to what shall be in time to come, or to what is now [51] present in this age; which if thou couldst now at this present set aright and in that order which thou desirest, it could not possibly continue or be fixed anyway, but must soon decline and have its period as those things which have been before. All this is endless and an abyss. to labour therefore and toil with anxiety and regret about these matters; to wish that thy country were forever prosperous and flourishing and immortal; and this is stupid, and is the proper affection of one who either is a stranger in the world, and is ignorant of its revolutions and vicissitudes; or who knowing this, repines and thinks them hard, and would correct the order of providence. and what is such affection as this, as impiety?

To pursue or follow anything, as greatly concerned for the success; to promise our selves great things; to rejoice of the progress of affairs as going well, and then be troubled and cast down when either they stop, or go back again: to build with great joy and delight while the work succeeds; and when anything happens ill, to be in affliction and trouble for it: to lay schemes, and designs, and projects of things to come; of reformations, changes, establishments, in a family, amongst friends, in a public or amongst mankind: what is all this but as the children making their houses of cards⁷⁰ which they know very well cannot hold out beyond the second or third storey, and yet when the structure perishes and the work fails under their hand, they cry; and afterwards begin anew --- But the comparison seems too [52] ridiculous perhaps and is disliked. --- Begin then in the just place with thy body and constitution. Of what nature is this? What kind of work is it, to defend and rear, and nourish, and prop this⁷¹? Dost thou promise to thy self always to keep this sound and whole? Will any art keep this from being bruised, and maimed, and distempered and perpetually under some ail and accident or another? Always wanting to have something, or be rid of something: always in indigence; always in distress, and under repair. If there be no end of this; nor no security ever to be obtained; where is the rest or happiness of this? What is this but toil and labour in vain? Consider next as to a family⁷². Shall all here be at one time or another prosperous? Shall children, brothers, sisters, domestics, friends, be all virtuous and act as they should do? How long shall this continue? Or how long is it that thou expectest to have them with thee in the world; or to have them thus orderly and virtuous, if they are thus already? Consider as to the public the same. What reformations dost thou expect? How far to extend? For how long time to last⁷³? And how long will it be ere that time comes when not so much as the name of this people shall remain?

If all this be loating, fond, and foolish; and that all things are in a constant flux and alteration; always perishing and renewing, always passing, and nothing fixed, or at a stay; if the success of what thou art so earnestly doing either for the health and support of thy body, or about a family and in the public be all uncertain; but that the revolution, change [53] and death of each of these be certain and inevitable if all this that we strive about, be that which can never be accomplished, never brought to perfection, never kept at a stay; but be vile, rotten and of no duration; inconsiderable for time, for substance, for place; what, then, is all this but the houses of cards, and the passion and ardour of the children busying themselves? --- Is nothing therefore to be minded? Is there nothing that is important? --- This certainly is; and this only; here, in the midst of all this, to preserve a sound and steady mind, a just and right affection; how to have a uniform and suitable will; how to approve and disapprove, choose and reject according to reason; how to act as becomes a man, as a creature and fellow-creature, sociably, justly, piously, and in this to acquiesce, and be contented.

⁶⁹Inf. 147.

⁷⁰237.

⁷¹Inf: 172.

⁷²172.

⁷³Sup. 50.

Either that which thou art concerned for, and so much troubled and disturbed about, is merely what relates to thy body, and the satisfaction of those desires which have nothing in common with virtue; or else it is what is of a generous kind and relates to virtue and common good. If there be anything in this that thy concern which relates to a body, life, a family, an estate, a name, a voluptuous course of loving; and that these are what thou regardest; then is thy interest and that of the public very opposite and thou art yet far off from virtue which leads thee; then surely thou hast considered of virtue [54] what it is, and therefore thou pursuest it as good. If thou hast considered of virtue and the good for it: thou must have learnt this; that it is in a certain disposition, affection or will. If so; then that which is not a loss, hindrance or prejudice of this disposition, affection or will, is not a loss of that good which arises from virtue. now, if anything happen ill in human affairs; or that it be ill with mankind; this does not alter thy disposition, affection, or will; therefore neither does it diminish thy good or happiness.

That another person's mind should be in health, is no more necessary to my own mind, than it is necessary to my body, that any other should have his body in the same disposition. If I am dissatisfied and troubled that any part of the world is virtuous, I may as well be dissatisfied that any one person in the whole world be so. In short. Either my good is in certain outward circumstances; or in a mind and affection. If I grieve that any of those around me are not as I would have them to be; then my good is in outward circumstances: if so; how is this virtue? Or which way shall **virtue** be a good? Or if not a good, how followed or pursued?

To have a right affection and will, is either a good or not so: if not so; then virtue is not a good nor to be followed: if virtue and right affection be a good; then that only is necessary to the good of virtue which is necessary to the support of that good and right affection. [55] Now, that one world be either more or less vicious is nothing to my affection or will, and therefore nothing to my good. And how therefore is this that has happened an ill? It is not so, in the sense of the body: for those who regard the body are least of all concerned for this. Neither is it an ill to mind, as placing its good in virtue and right affection. --- But I cannot be satisfied unless men act thus. --- If such be thy affection, it is not what virtue in any manner requires or has need of; nor is it of any good either to thy self or others. If not that; then what is this but fancy and wilfulness? For, what else is wilfulness, but to will positively and without reason, or (as say) to will because we will?

Observe this temper and affection: I must needs have such an state: I must needs have such a house: I must needs have such and such to be about me, and attend me. What is the difference between this and that other, I must needs have every one to be good and virtuous? Why may I not as well say, I must needs have every one live as long as I live, I must needs have mankind immortal? All this is of the same kind; far out of true affection, far wide of nature and the right structure of a will; and is only wilfulness, and a bent of mind not governed by reason, nor capable of any measure or rule. For, if I would be towards mankind, as I ought to be, towards nature and the whole, as I ought to be; it is enough that I will and affect rightly myself: and in this should be all [56] my care and concern. But if this do not satisfy me; and that this be not my end; what is the difference of being bent on a certain constitution or structure of mankind; or on a certain building like that of woods or stones? What is the difference between the fancy of constituting a family or commonwealth; or that of modelling and disciplining an army? What is the difference between aiming at the having a fine and splendid country, or a fine and splendid house?

If to affect the public good be virtue; and that the consequence of affecting thus, be to be disturbed and afflicted in ill success; then is virtue its own torment, and not its own reward. If it be true that virtue is its own reward, and that all that virtue seeks, is to be virtue; what would I have more than this, that my affection be as it ought to be?

If knowing that my country is at a thousand year end to be extinct, I refuse on that account to act for it, through discontent; I am mad and extravagant. If I can notwithstanding act with content, knowing that it shall not last beyond a thousand year; why not as well, though it be to last but for a hundred? And why not the same, though but until next year?

What though the age be illiterate or superstitious, or like to grow so more and more; how long was the last in that condition? And how [57] many such ages must again and again pass in a few periods, and in a small and inconsiderable position of the revolutions of the world? What though the next age recover from superstition; what if virtue prevail; and that again there appear **MEN**, such as may be truly called so; how soon must this decline again, and superstition and barbarity arise as before⁷⁴?

Therefore when either thou art setting thy self in any work that seems considerable in the public or to the promotion of virtue; and whenever thou sittest down to read anything ancient, specially what has relation to philosophy; remember this. All was darkness but a while since. Now, there is a little glimmering of light. And whether this proceed or no; in a little while all will be again dark. What though the philosophers be oddly represented, and their history imperfect, mixed and corrupted; ill written, and worse understood? What though Laelius, Cato, Thrasea, Helvidius, Agrippinus and such as these be unknown? What though Socrates and Diogenes be forgot, or most ridiculously represented? These were such as were not concerned for this themselves. Why art thou concerned? Hercules, Theseus, Cadmus, were long since become fables; though they perhaps were excellent men in their age. And now many things which in those days were also grown fabulous are at length grown wholly out of memory, and are lost. So also in what relates to those others mentioned. Their [58] affairs are now in a manner grown fabulous and obsolete. And in a little time neither shall the name of Socrates, or Epictetus, or Marcus, remain. Again barbarity, again Goths.

Go then: and in this disposition have recourse to the ancients and what remains of them: and make use of this gift of providence, gratefully, thankfully and contentedly; as having received the rules, and obtained those precepts, by which without more ado thou mayst be happy. If either these things or these men be unknown, or undervalued, or decried; if either now, or a while hence, or sooner, or later, there be ignorance and barbarity; all this is the same: all must revolve in this manner: and, at what revolutions of the world thou art present, how long the spaces shall be, how soon either such or such things shall again return and prevail; all this is indifferent. And now, if thou canst stand thus affected towards these matters; if thou apprehendest the thing never otherwise than thus; then neither shalt thou be disturbed or shocked when anything in the public succeeds not; or when philosophy is traduced, or slighted by those that are ignorant.

Remember that as men are constituted; they cannot stand otherwise towards virtue and philosophy than as they do: that is to say, they of necessity must [59] both curse it and praise it. Be not, therefore, lightly and foolish raised by the praises of those that at another time must curse. Neither be concerned at the curses of those who, by the same necessity, must praise again, and admire, at some other time. [infra 86.]

⁷⁴Inf. 89.

If anything now acting or formerly acted in the world, grieve and disturb thee (as the ruin of Greece, a Lisander, an Alcibiades, a Demades, a Philip, a Caesar; Pharsalia, Philippi, Praetorian band, Goths, Superstitions) and if thy passion and bent be, to remedy and correct what is of this kind; remember,

(1) How vain and ridiculous the thing in it self; considering the vastness of time and substance. ---the abyss before and after⁷⁵ --- the fleeting generations of men and other beings --- Waves of the sea: leaves: grass: --- the perpetual chance and conversion of things one into another.

(2) That this was necessary, from causes necessary: and (whether providence or atoms) could be thus only, and could not have been otherwise.

(Necessity)

(3) That this is not only what was necessary; but what was best: since the mind and reason of the universe cannot act nothing against it self: and what is best for it self, it self surely best knows. What I know and am assured of is, that if it be best for the whole, it is what should have been, and is perfect, just and good ---- But this is not best for men --- how knowst thou this? Knowst thou all former ages of men, and all to come? The connection of causes, and how they operate? The relations of these to those? The dependence and consequences? How it shall be with mankind at one time, and how at another? But, what if it were ill for mankind; is it therefore ill for the whole? [87] Or ought the interest and good of the whole to give way, be set aside, or postponed, for such a creature as man, and his affairs? Are the laws of the universe on this account to be annulled, the government of the universe subverted, and the constitution destroyed? For thus it must be, if any one cause be removed: and thus the WHOLE (which is one concatenation)⁷⁶ must necessarily be rendered imperfect, and hence totally perish.

What if a Solon or Licurgus had said be it thus; wouldst thou have resisted his will? Wouldst thou have withstood the legislator? Wouldst thou have broken his model, for the sake of some one thing that thou perhaps mightest fancy better? Or, wouldst thou, as a citizen, have presumed to have stopped, so much as for one moment, the promulgation and sanction of those laws on which the welfare of Athens or Sparta did depend?

But, what is Athens, or Sparta, compared to this other city? What is a Solon or a Licurgus in respect of that other law-giver? And darest thou yet murmur? Darest thou yet repine?

Quicquid corrigere est nefas⁷⁷.

And, knowing this, wilt thou still meditate remedies, and correct what is passed? Now, instead of this, see what thy part is: and remember the precept given⁷⁸. For, were we to go back so as to act over again that which is passed, being conscious, as we now are, of what the ruler has willed; our part would be to will the very same, and to co-operate even towards those very things which at present are against nature, and which it is our part to strive against. If I were conscious (says Ep---s⁷⁹) of what was decreed me; and could be certain of what were to happen before it happened, I would will that, and that only: suppose it sickness: suppose it infamy: suppose it death. At present, since I know not the utmost will of nature; I pursue [88] the design and invention of it, as in my particular nature is shown me: I repel injury: I decline sickness: I decline untimely and violent death. But if I knew how this was to be controlled; if I knew what else was appointed; I would turn to this; and this should be the object of my aim; this I would affect and nothing but this⁸⁰ -- - But (says one) it may happen thus that I may also will that I be wicked --- Not, if there were a possibility left of this

⁷⁵ 175.

⁷⁶ Inf. 150 &c.

⁷⁷ Hor. L. 1 Od. 24.

⁷⁸ Ep. Lib. 2 Cap. 6 & Lib. 2 Cap. 10.

⁷⁹ In the words of Chrysippus. See B. 2 Cap. 6.

⁸⁰ Inf. 150 &c.

being otherwise: but if no possibility, I will however be pious and good (that is to say I will be happy) as long as is allowed me, as long as I possibly can be so. If I cannot be so the moment that follows; at least I will remain so to this present moment that precedes; and will join my applause to what God has for the best decreed. For, to will against that which is best, and to will what is impossible, what else were this but to be wicked and miserable? Now that every creature should seek its good and not its misery, is necessary in it self: nor can it be supposed the will of God that a creature should do otherwise than thus: for this is contradictory, and consequently impossible even with God.

* * *⁸¹

So that my will towards is irrefragable and immutable: but towards life, death, poverty, riches and all other exterior things it is variable upon occasion; and I am ready to will either of these, not merely when necessary and unavoidable; but when it depends still upon my own will whether it shall be thus or not --- [89] Where therefore is it I place the good of man? --- Where else but in his will? Which if it be so constituted as to receive whatever is sent; all is well: if it resist; there it is that calamity arises. And thus wickedness and misery have the same foundation. But, if I separate these, and think virtue one thing and vice another; if I think piety and virtue may lie one way and happiness another; if I suppose either pleasure, or riches, or life, or any outward thing to be my good; and find my self deprived of these, disappointed, urged, constrained; where will be my piety? Which way can I acquiesce in that which is my will? Which way can I ill against my good?

And thus, it is most true * * *⁸²

He that is impatient and cannot bear with the world, such as it is, does not consider how often he himself is intolerable, and that if the world were to be reformed and become as perfect as he requires it to be, it were not fit that such a creature as he should live in it.

If thou art thy self such as thou shouldst be; what need is there of more? If thou art weak and unable to bear with things; why not reform thy self rather than the world: since the one is practicable; the other, mere extravagance?

Remember what has been said above concerning the folly and stupidity of those reasonings about the duration of things⁸³. What is it to tee, whether the ancients be remembered or not? Whether their manners and government, whether liberty, generous sentiments, or philosophy be restored for a while, and flourish for one age or two, an then? Is it to last forever? Must not other things prevail, and have their course? [140. Must not superstition, tyranny, barbarity, darkness and night succeed again in their turns? Is not this the **order** of things? Is not this the chorus, the seasons, the summer and winter, day and night?⁸⁴ --- But I would have no winter here, no night. --- See the stupidity of this. But, if there must be winter; if there must be night; what is it to me, when, or for how long? And what should I do but commit this to Him, who has appointed the seasons of the world, as the most conducing, and as was necessary for the safety, happiness and prosperity of the WHOLE?

After this manner, this one *δογμα* is sufficient (and remember to have it in readiness): either the race of mankind is eternal or not eternal. If eternal; what to the intervals, instead of one age, were a thousand? If not eternal;

⁸¹Ench. 78.

⁸²Ench. Cap. 38.

⁸³Sup. 57.

⁸⁴Inf. 148.

what signifies it how soon any one thing ceases, since all of this kind must cease within a little? --- Either periods (and then that which is not now, will be, at some other time; and so again and again, after many changes and revolutions; and thus to perpetuity). Or else one period that puts an end to all. And if so; where is the harm? What is there more in the death of a whole race, than of one single animal? Fear not. The whole is not likely to suffer. Nor canst thou suffer, if thou art towards the whole as thou oughtst to be. What is there, then, to fear? And for whom?

Whenever the fancy is strongly at work about the ancients and reviving something or other of that kind; remember that these things are already come to their period: the day is spent: and only a twilight remains. Something else may arise in after ages: but that must be a new thing, and from new seeds. This stock that thou wouldst graft upon, is decayed and sunk. Are not the laws, manners, costumes, rites abolished and sunk? Are not the languages dead? Or how preserved? In what books? What fragments? [141] how corrupted, and every day growing more so? And what if the books remain a while longer; who are the readers? What has been the reason that either of the languages have been thus long preserved? And what is now become of the first and noblest? --- Therefore, all those other thoughts are senseless --- Romans! * * * s! --- Fables: tales: obsolete stories. Tell us of some late war: the history of our kings: matches between crowns: titles, pretensions, nobility, barons, counts, dukes, palatines: church affairs, reformations, protestant and Papist, Turk and Christian.

This is our present foundation. These are the affairs that concern the world. But as for * * * s and Romans, what are they? And how do these names sound? Remember this as often as thou appliest to any thing of the ancients and their story. And see that thou art not elevated; nor by yielding at first, be afterwards transported and hurried away. For what is this but building a foundation for disturbance, regret and accusation of providence?

If I am contented that the ancients should have been, but are not; if I am contented that the ancients should have been ancients, and the moderns, moderns; if it be indifferent to me when these remaining books perish, which must perish within a very little time; if it be enough to me, that I have that which serves to guide and conduct me in life: knowing that all depends upon my self; in this disposition I may safely read. Otherwise, I may perchance learn other matters, and improve in other ways: but (what is most absurd and ridiculous) I shall unlearn that for the sake of which I read, and for which alone I have recourse to the ancients.

If it be a sort of pleasure that engages and ties thee to the ancients; set aside the library: for it is plain, this is little better than romances (for these too are read for pleasure and serve for discourse and entertainment).

If it be for the benefit of thy mind, and the sake of a certain philosophy; remember what that philosophy taught and what those persons themselves said of this matter; and what they would say (if now present) to one thus anxious, and thus [inf. 144] concerned for their memory and fame. --- Man! What is this to thee? Either thou knowst those principles to be true, and art satisfied in thy own reason concerning them, or not. If not satisfied, what is it thou admirest and seekest? If satisfied; let us hear, concerning what? --- That the universe is justly administered; that the things belonging to me, are in my own power; the rest nothing. --- As how therefore are these ancients a concern? --- They are extinct. --- Let them be so. Were they not to die at some time or another? Was it not necessary that they themselves should die and shortly after their memories? Or, what if their memory die not as yet; must it not die at another time? What difference whether now, or then? Where is the harm of this, or of any of those other deaths or changes? Whose opinion shall we take, as to this matter? Theirs, or the vulgars? What is fame, therefore, in their opinion? What are changes and successions, the decay and perishing of man and memories of men?

Remember that of Marcus, applied in another way: * * * &c⁸⁵: in one respect nothing can be more near to me than men (as specially these men) But, in another respect (viz.: as they are all mortal; as they must yield to time; as they must give place to others that arise; as they must accomplish destiny, and make good the laws of the universe) they are no more to me than is the sun or air; no more than are any of those things that are every day converted and changed by the sun, or air, which at some another time may also themselves be converted and changed, when so the universe requires. And what else do I require? What other economy do I favour? What interest [145] should prevail besides the interest of the whole? Such therefore are the laws of the whole: such the establishment: such the order. Would I invade or overturn this? --- God forbid.

Also that of Marcus. * * *⁸⁶. Is not this the same with respect to memories of men, as well as with respect to the men themselves, and the times then in being?

What is it thou art thus eager after? Let us see how wouldst thou order things, if the world were at thy disposal, and to be governed by thy fancy? Wouldst thou have the same age continue, and not give place to other ages? Wouldst thou that the same men should always live, or that in their room such others should always arise? What others? --- Such as Socrates and those. --- What as Socrates? Wherein the greatness of his character? --- He obeyed the voice of the deity; adhered to reason alone; rejected the vulgar opinions; and thought the midst of ignorance and error discovered the truth. --- But, what if there had been no such preceding ignorance; where had been the greatness of the discovery? How had he been the light of the age? What if there had been no vulgar opinions; no sophists; no vicious or corrupt Athenians; no tyrannical oligarchy nor gentious democracy; no Anetus nor Melitus; no prison, or poison, or death? Make us another history. Show us a Socrates without these. See, what picture thou wouldst make. --- But why, those shades?⁸⁷ --- Remove the shades then. Remove the darker colours. See how it will be. Consider how, in that other picture. How is it then, that thou wouldst have changed this? What wouldst thou have amended of what then was? --- But this is gone and past. --- Right. How should it be otherwise? Wouldst thou have the same to happen over again? Must the same piece be acted again, to give thee satisfaction, and so the same things be produced again and again? See what the world would be, at this rate? [146] where would be the changes, succession, order? Who can endure so much as in a play, that the same scene should come again and again, or the same parts remain? What would that theatre be, which could afford but one piece, and represented still the same? Consider, then, what is magnanimity, and what is that which occasions it, proves it, and raises it? What is it that shows the force of reason? What is the exercise and trial of a mind? What else but circumstances, these very circumstances, vice, ignorance, false opinions?⁸⁸ What is it that makes the hero? And how was Hercules great but for the hydras, monsters, tyrannies he had to deal with? As how therefore should there be a Socrates, but no Anetus? How a Hercules, but no Hydra?⁸⁹ --- But, I would have all men to be alike and to resemble these generous, these leaders, these of a distinguished make and mould: I would have all like these, and the whole herd be such: not merely a single man: a few only at one season: not so as to appear a while, and then disappear again. --- What is this but to say at the silly sort of people? I would have it to be always spring: no autumn: no winter.

⁸⁵B. 5 § ...

⁸⁶L. 6 § ...

⁸⁷Inf. 183.

⁸⁸* * *. Arr. L. 1 c. 24 & c. 29.

⁸⁹Arr. L 1 C...

Go into a wood, and when thou hast singled out some tall and stately tree, the chief beauty and ornament of the grove; say I would have no shrubs nor brambles. How then should this be a wood? Which way preserve that beauty which is proper to a wood? Where would be that grace and comeliness of the whole? Where the comeliness and majesty of the principal tree? How therefore wouldst thou order this in that greater **whole**? How dispose the several ranks and degrees? Should all be vegetable? No sand? No stone? --- But vegetables excel mere stone and other such matter. --- right. Therefore let us throw these out of the picture. Let all be roses, flowers and verdure. No rock, or sand or moss; no ancient trunk; no decayed or rotten bows. Well: but are not sensible creatures above vegetables? --- They are. --- How then? Should all therefore, be sensible creatures? No vegetables? No forest? [147] Or should all be rational creatures, and no herd? Or, amongst rational creatures; should all be rational in the degree of Socrates, and no vulgar, no herd?

All this is stupid and senseless. But suppose now that that one age was as it should be; must every age be alike, and produce a Socrates, or such as those who succeeded him? Must not seasons also differ from one another? Must there be nothing more eminent at one time than another? Must the grove have still one and the same face? Must there be no periods, no revolutions, no autumn, no winter? --- But the winter landscape is not so beautiful. --- to tee, perhaps not; but in some other respect, is it not equally so? Is it not equally good and beautiful on the **whole**? What if it be the winter of arts and sciences?⁹⁰ What if even the winter and decay of mankind? Is it ever winter in the **WHOLE**? Is not the universe always new, and entire, and flourishing? Does not all tend to the prosperity and welfare of that? And is not everything suitable to the perfection of that mind which presides and governs in it? --- But these changes and vicissitudes do not please me; nor can I find the beauty of them. --- See then, what idea or apprehension thou hast of beauty and agreeableness of beauty in other things; and whether the chiefest beauties, the chiefest graces arise not from change and vicissitude. What is music? What is one note prolonged? Nothing more dissonant and odious. But, seek the changes and vicissitudes, and those too the most odd and various ones; and here it is where harmony arises. Mix even a dissonance after a certain manner, and the music is still more excellent: and on the management of these dissonances is the sublime of the art⁹¹. What is dance but a like succession of motions diversified, of which not one single one would continue graceful if viewed by itself, and out of this change; but which taken as they are sound together and depending on one another, form the highest grace imaginable. [148] Such therefore is that other chorus and harmony: such is the dance (like what the poets feign) of the hours and days⁹². Such are the seasons, ages, revolutions of the world; the flourishing and decline of mankind; the nations that arise and sink; the inventions, languages, letters, arts, sciences, rites, mysteries, manners, costumes, laws, governments: and in the midst of this various oar, sometimes a vein of purer kind: sometimes a season of more than ordinary knowledge and light: sometimes a more than common production; an effort of nature (as we may properly speak with relation to any particular nature) carrying things to the highest pitch, and producing as sometimes a body of more than ordinary stature and perfection (as suppose that of a Milo) so at other times a mind such as the mind of Socrates and those that derived from him⁹³. Why is it more unnatural that this should decline again; than that the breed or race of bodies should decline? If it be ridiculous, considering the body and make of man, to wonder that all men should not be as Milo and not rather that any one of such strength as Milo should have been known; how much more ridiculous is it, considering such an animal as man, and what he holds of the brute, to wonder that he should find out his other relation and be a God? (for what else is he who being conscious of the divine government, accompanies it and joins himself to it?)⁹⁴. how ridiculous is it considering man such as he truly is, to

⁹⁰Sup. 50.

⁹¹Inf. 183.

⁹²Sup. 140.

⁹³Inf. 167.

⁹⁴Inf. 162.

wonder that such and so many parts of the earth should be barbarian and savage; and not rather that there should have been other nations so wise, knowing and polite? Why wonder at the huts and cabans of Indians; and not rather at the cities, manners and governments of other nations? Why at the government more imperfect; and not rather at the perfection of such a one as Sparta?

Consider, therefore. For what is all this concern? Is it for the world, or for thy self? If for the world; fear not: the world will be governed as it should be; nor can any thing there go amiss. If it be for thy self; this is thy own work and thy own power: nor can any thing here go amiss, if thou [149] thy self pleasest. See, therefore, that thy affection be but right; and all is right. But, if thou either wishest for times, and seasons, or places; if thou wouldst correct the order of the world, and have things to be other than they are; thy affection is wrong; and in the midst of all this reading and this pursuit of philosophy, thou art thy self no better than an idiot.

Beware never to compound with any of those thoughts concerning human affairs; as if likely to be more prosperous; as if the age were to be restored, antiquity again acted, other Dion's, other Fociu's, other Cato's, other academies, other porch, or whatever dreams of this kind thou art used to fall into, on reading anything ancient. instead of this; suppose a very thing the most contrary. Take always the reverse. Nations such as the Goths. Monarchies such as the Persian and other Eastern ones. Superstitions such as Egyptian &c.: consider all of that other kind as extinct, and so ever to remain. For if once the * * * be towards reviving any thing of this kind; if once thou beginst building and laying foundations, there is no end: and if it happen thou art encouraged by some imaginary success, the thing grows worse; the right and steady views are more and more lost: and the affairs of the world not answering these other narrow fond and mistaken views, nature is sure to be accused; many things complained of; may lamented; the world pitied, mankind pitied, thou thy self pitied: all is full of calamity: all wretched, poor, disastrous, ruinous: for so in reality all is, with respect to thy self, while thy mind is in this state, and thy thoughts such as these, which way can this be otherwise, while thou affectest that which is out of thy power and not belonging to thee? While thou affects otherwise than as nature affects? While thou thinkst any thing excellent but what the mind and wisdom of the whole judges to be so? If the wisdom of the whole would have thus; I also would have it thus and no otherwise: if otherwise; I am no longer free: I am [inf: 160 no longer that generous and exalted mind which aims at that which is excellent, and that which is best; which aims so as not to be frustrated, but always successful, prosperous; never forced or constrained; never unwillingly submitting to deity; nor merely submitting, but accompanying, applauding. But how accompain or how applaud that which I am not perfectly reconciled to? That which I think sad and dismal, severe or hard? How is it therefore, when I esteem any of these changes severe or hard? How is it when either plagues or earthquakes, or any of those other things ruinous to mankind appear thus? How if the loss of letters or sciences be feared, or any thing of this kind which may happen in the world, be looked upon as sad and grievous; where will my freedom be? Where my applause? How shall I be pious? How generous? How happy? Or if I am miserable and tremble, or am dejected; what signifies it what the subject is? Am I less a slave? Am I less mean?

Resolve, therefore, never to allow anything to such thoughts as these: but introduce always their contraries. Consider the fall, death, extinction of the ancients: themselves long since, and now their memories: or if of this kind something still remain, it is about to perish; oblivion is at hand. Why not now, as well as a little later? --- But must there nothing of this kind arise again, in time? --- Perhaps never. Or, if ever; not until after many changes and revolutions. Perhaps millions of ages ere the same again. First Greece, as before Socrates: then Socrates and followers. How many ages ere such a nation, such a language be formed as that of Greece? And afterwards how long amidst phisiologers and sophists? how many ages ere a certain superstition sink? What if the age remain still as it is? What

though it be yet worse, and that hereafter all be barbarous, as in those other nations? What though even this remain not; but that the whole earth be depopulated? --- But must the world, then, perish thus? --- What [161] world? --- Mankind. -- So that the world, then, is this one kind or species. If this kind be lost, the world is lost. If this animal lose it intelligence, there will be no more intelligence in the universe. As how? Will there be no nature, no elements, no conversion, change or renewal of things, no new or different forms arising, nothing remaining of what was before? No sun, no planets, no heavenly bodies? Or, though these remain, shall we say however that there are no intelligencies nor minds remaining? Are human bodies of such kind, that intelligence is confined to these, and can nowhere lodge besides? What if a worm should happen to have intelligence, would he not reason better? --- But I know men: and other intelligencies I know nothing of. --- So, hadst thou been a worm; thou hadst know only worms; thou hadst conferred only with worms. Must it have followed, that there were no wiser beings, no men, no deities, no supreme deity? If it be true that there is such a supreme and sovereign mind, and that all is according to that mind; then all is right. Why talk to us of other minds? What matter is it where they reside, and how the sovereign mind has disposed them; whether in these bodies, or in the others; whether at one time rather than at another? If thou hast a mind thy self; be thankfully that it has fallen to thee: make the use of it that thou shouldst do: and this is enough. What is it to thee that other portions of matter of the same form, have it, or have it not? That of the many other thou knowst, only one particular species has it? Or that amongst these, only a few have it, and this only at certain times and in certain periods? Why not lament the beasts, that they are sensible only and not rational? Why not the plants, that they are only [162] vegetative, and neither sensible nor rational? Why not this as well as to lament that man is no otherwise rational than as nature has made him to be; and that this species seldom can afford a mind?⁹⁵ Is it not much it ever should afford one? Is it not much that such a body, with such senses, such engagements to a low and brutal part, there should be a way left to liberty, magnanimity, and a mind, such as can know its origin, and be one with the supreme mind of the whole?

Therefore remember the privilege and advantage: what it is to have a mind: and that as for all those thoughts, concerning what shall become of the world or of the age, all this is senseless: and to think after this manner is in reality to be without a mind.

This when in Holland, 1698 and 99. From July to April.

[163] St. Giles's. December: 1699.

See of what a nature those impressions are that are made from outward things and the circumstances of the world! But a little while since when thou wast retired to thy studies, and thy thoughts employed on these latter ages, the people and men of those times, and on the affairs of mankind and of the world in general, then thou hadst little or no concern (more than what was right) for those poorer and more inconsiderable interests of home-occasion, household and family-business, town and country affairs, no not even of that which is called thy country in the largest vulgar sense: so little was all this, and even the whole estate of Europe and of the world as now it stands in respect of what it once was when learning, virtue, philosophy flourished, and liberty was known and enjoyed. It was with respect to those more glorious times that all the regret and trouble arose. It was here the shocks were strongest. It was philosophy, liberty, ancients⁹⁶.

Of late it has happened that reading has been set aside: other duties called: the care of a father: brother: sister: a family, servants. Now it is here again that disturbance arises: here are the present hindrances, the crosses, disappoints, revolts: and those of the sort thou art free from. [164] now what can be more mean and poor? That thou shouldst thus be

⁹⁵Sup. 148. * * *. Ep. L. 1 C. 4.

⁹⁶Sup. 149.

cured of one of these dispositions by the other and yet not by reason! Dost thou not see that thou art not only a slave to the present, but a slave in the reserve too to those other things, by that time thou hast broken again from these present masters, to return to those?⁹⁷ How comes it that all is not at present as it was but some months since with relation to these affairs? Hadst thou not a family then as now? The same friends, relations, country as now? And was not the care and concern the same? But it was not an anxious care. It was then as it ought to be. Those things were little, narrow, poor, vile and perishing. And are they changed since then? Is it not still barbarity, Goths?⁹⁸ Or what thinkest thou now at this present of titles, nobility, barons, counts; now that thou art placed amongst them?⁹⁹ Are they become new things? Are the ancients out of date? Are these the only times, the only men? In lineage or family a concern? Is the state a concern? Was it to have been so, though thou hadst lived even then, and in those governments? How therefore even now and in these? But wilt thou not set aside the thoughts both of those and of these? Wilt thou not remember another family in which thou art included? Another state and magistracy, an other economy, other laws, another birth and derivation, what thou art worthy of and what are the things beneath thee?¹⁰⁰

If these things sink away in thy memory; and the impressions of those other prevail; if thou canst not be present at once with these things and with those; [165] it remains then; that either thou shouldst wholly retire¹⁰¹; or (in the phrase of a pious writer) be present, as though not present; act, as though not acting; use, as though not using; but as one concerned about another use¹⁰²: the attention being still elsewhere and to other things: firmly fixed, never suspended, never interrupted by any attention to ought else. And if other matters cannot be carried on upon these terms; if this lower degree of attention will not serve for outward things; if on this account there be less ability, less dexterity, less management (as needs must, where there is less presence of mind)¹⁰³; be it so. Thou canst do no better and this is as it should be. For it is not thy design to quit thy chief part for any other; or for the esteem of such as these, to lose all esteem with God and with thy self.

Observe how that no sooner does the mind set itself to reform or bring anything in order in outward affairs (a house, family, public, relation, friend, servant) but straight an earnestness and hope arises; and a certain perfection in the thing managed (not the management) is that which is aimed at and becomes the end¹⁰⁴.

This is the * * * . Here it perpetually grows. Hence frustration, loss, disturbance. And how should it be otherwise while this perfection is dreamt of and the bent is hitherward? Is this the perfection to be sought after? Are these the subjects of such a bent and application? Is not all this ruinous, and never to be made otherwise?¹⁰⁵ Yet see what fancy makes of it, when once thou settest about any of these things with any earnestness or remarkable instruction? What perfections! What [166] projects for duration and stability! What proposals! What ends!

How therefore trust thy self? How venture out to reformations, settlements, economies? See the danger of this. See what every moment occurs, in the least things.

⁹⁷Sup. 160.

⁹⁸Sup. 48.

⁹⁹Sup. 141.

¹⁰⁰Sup. 135.

¹⁰¹* * * or * * * L. 12 § 8. Inf. 177.

¹⁰²* * *

¹⁰³* * * C. 18 Ench.

¹⁰⁴Inf 167.

¹⁰⁵Sup. 152 Inf. 172.

Therefore begin (as ordered¹⁰⁶) at the least things. Is it a plant thou cherishest? Remember it a plant. The seasons must injury t. it must wither. It must die. Is it another plant? (a human one?) a servant, child? Is it not the same? Must not the seasons have power over it? The age, costumes, manners, opinions? Must it not partake of the common distempers? Or, wouldst thou * * * ?¹⁰⁷ If not; then what are these but * * * ?¹⁰⁸ What are thou rectifying? Opinions? --- No. For they will still retain their own. --- How then should they act but according to these? What fruit should they bear but according to their stock? Is it not ridiculous to look for other? Change the stock. Engraft other opinions. --- I cannot. --- Then, suffer the plant to beware as is natural to it: and be not angry that the bramble should be the bramble and not the rose.

--- But why are there no more roses? --- this is not the season. Let that content thee. When it is good for the universe, the universe will in due season produce them again. In the mean while, be thou the rose. And instead of murmuring, admire that at such a season of the world, any sound opinions should have fallen to thy share, and that it should have been in thy power to produce any fruit of that kind. * * * .

Remember the aloes-plant (which thou sawest in Holland) of which not one in a hundred makes a shoot; nor that one perhaps in a hundred or at least in many years. But then, how vast, how [167] mighty a plant! Remember this when thou thinkest of Socrates or any such. And say not of the age why does it not produce oftener? For this is being angry at the aloes. Fool! Dost thou understand the nature of the aloes? Or (what is far more) dost thou understand the nature of the **WHOLE**?

* * *

London January: 14. 99/1700.

Again see the course of this, and how it proceeds¹⁰⁹: how from the suspending the attention of one sort, the other attention prevails, so as to cut off the retreat to that first. From a small attention at first, to an earnest application with hope and desire: from thence, to a general scheme and plan of affairs¹¹⁰; contriving, building, setting out: and from hence an idea of symmetry, order, perfection. In what? * * * &c¹¹¹? what is the symmetry, order or proportion that can be given to things of this kind? How can they take this from which thou wouldst have them take? To seek for order or settlement here, is it not to break (as far as in tee lies) the symmetry, order and disposition of the whole? "What an imperfection, what a deformity, what a ruin (oh, profane and impious man!) wouldst thou be author of, shouldst thou be able to bring to pass that other imaginary perfection, and draw the whole of things to thy model and design?"

Why fearful of this event? If it be not according to the laws of thy first and greatest country; and if it be not to the good of the whole and according to the economy and order of the whole; be sure it will never happen: if it be; what else wouldst thou have happened?

See what &c: [inf. 184

¹⁰⁶C. 8 * * * & C. 17 * * * .

¹⁰⁷C. 19 Inf. 177

¹⁰⁸L. 3 C. 22.

¹⁰⁹Sup. 84 & 165 (Attention).

¹¹⁰Inf. 184.

¹¹¹Mar. L. 5 § ...

Chelsea. February: 14. 1700/1699.

See what it is to wish earnestly against anything that is like to happen, whatever it be (as either loss of fame, friends, family or country). For suppose that according to the course of things, it be to happen contrary to such thy wish (the scheme of nature and the universal design¹¹² being, perhaps, contrary to thy own scheme and particular design); wouldst thou undo this, if in thy power?¹¹³ Wouldst thou wish it should otherwise happen than as a supreme goodness has ordered it? Or, is not supreme goodness that orders? Ask thy self but this question, and see how thou canst go on with such a head-strong desire and propensity, such an * * * , or * * * as this. For, either thus must determine against goodness in the whole; or be an enemy to that goodness and to the prosperity of the whole, as well as to thy own prosperity, by being like one of those slavish people that refuse liberty when offered them. But, be thou as un-like as is possible. * * * .

Consider whether in a wise and just commonwealth, thou hast at any time abhorred sedition, faction, tumult, disobedience to the laws and contempt of the law-giver and founder: whether thou hast at any time detested insolent and rude behaviour towards a magistracy, sullen and stubborn behaviour towards parents: consider if there be in nature any impiety, any sacrilege: and then think of what a nature it is, to murmur and repine at what happens in the universe; or (which is the same) to be concerned and tremble for what is likely to happen, and seems stated and determined already in the order of things.

What is there that will move thee (Oh, hard-hearted man!) if this will not? Viz.: what is done * * * .

¹¹²Sup. 167.

¹¹³* * * . L. 2 C. 7.

[59] * * *

How unaccountable is it to live so as always to reprove one self for the same things? How senseless and unreasonable always to want to be set right? How ridiculous is it to loose the way that lies before one¹¹⁴, and ever and anon, as if in a strange world, to ask where am I?

Resolve therefore never to forget thy self. How long is it that thou wilt continue thus to act two different parts, and be two different persons? Call to mind what thou art; what thou has resolved and entered upon. Recollect thy self wholly within thy self. Be **one** entire and self-same man: and wander not abroad, so as to lose sight of the end; but keep that constantly in view both in the least concerns, and in the greatest; in diversions, in serious affairs; in company and alone; in the day time, and at night. Let neither ceremony, nor entertainment in discourse, nor pleasantry, nor mirth amongst friends, nor anything of this kind, be the occasion of quitting that remembrance, or of loosing that fixed attention --- But what will my carriage be [**inf. 62**] in company? How shall I appear in conversation? --- Dangerous consequences! But, of what kind? --- Least I be called Ill-bread; least I be thought dull, and deserve not be called a good companion. But is it not better I should deserve the name of friend? Is it not a better thing to be just, to have integrity, faith, innocence, to be a man, and a lover of men¹¹⁵? And on what this depends thou well knowst. --- But if I suffer not my self to be at all transported; how shall I act with forwardness and concern in the public or for a friend¹¹⁶? --- If it be a part not consistent with the preservation of a character¹¹⁷; it is never to be undertaken: if it be consistent, but with another person and not with tee, because thou hast less strength; why undertake a part beyond thy reach?¹¹⁸ For, first, thou art sure to act ungracefully, nauseously, affectedly, and so as to spoil what thou undertakest: and, in the next place, this is certain, that if thou forgetst thy self; thou will forget thy duty; and instead of acting for virtue, act for something else very different; as following thy own passion and irrational bent.

--- But this continual application is tedious and burdensome. Must there be no moments of rest¹¹⁹? No indulgence? No intervals, nor any relaxation? [**63**] --- It is here that thou mayest truly cry out, * * * ¹²⁰. It is here that thou mayst justly say, thou knowst not how to love thy self nor thy own good. What else is there in the world that can give content but this? What else can save from misery? And to neglect this; to be faint, to be remiss, or to give over here; what else is it than to be cruel towards thy self?

See how it is with others who place their interest and good in other things. See the covetous, the vain, the ambitious, the effeminate. Which of these is thus negligent and forgetful of him self? When is it that the one is weary of thinking of his wealth, the other of his credit and esteem, the other of his power and grandeur, the other of his person and what belongs to it? Take any of these in any circumstances, in any company, engaged in any affairs; it is still easy to observe that they are not so taken out of themselves, but that they still look towards their end. They join with others, they interest themselves and enter into other's concerns: but still there is a reserve: another thing is at the bottom: and the respect is elsewhere. Their manners show it; their action, gesture, their tone of voice, even where they most desire to hide it¹²¹. Nothing is more apparent to one who narrowly observes. How true and just a pattern is this, and how

¹¹⁴Mar. L. 4, § 46.

¹¹⁵See Natural affect., 10.

¹¹⁶Inf. 177.

¹¹⁷Inward; inf. 134.

¹¹⁸* * *, C. 59.

¹¹⁹Infra, 130.

¹²⁰Mar. B. 5. Sec. I.

¹²¹Inf. 321.

deserving of imitation, in another way? Shall those objects, such as they are, be able thus to allure and attract, and shall not virtue be as prevalent? Are sociable actions, and a life according to nature, less to be esteemed? Or are they things less beautiful in themselves? Shall He that is a virtuoso, a statuary, a painter, a musician, an architect, or any one that truly loves art or science, be wholly taken [64] up with this? Be wholly this and nothing else; and shall virtue alone be that which fails its student? Shall He that follows this, be the least zealous? And shall his art be of less moment with him, less attractive, less enchanting? Yet, what numbers, what proportions, what harmony symmetry or order is equal to that which is here!

Know therefore, what thy art is, and how it is to be adhered to: and remember that every action even the slightest, which is not done according to it, is both wrong, and tending to the destruction of the art it self.

How long wilt thou continue thus to abuse thy self? Remember that thou hast now no longer any time given thee but that if hereafter thou shalt again relapse; the thing cannot but prove fatal. Thou hast given way. Thou hast felt and repented. How often has this been! And yet still thou hast engaged, still sallied out, and lived abroad, still prostituted thy self and committed thy mind to chance and the next comer¹²², so as to be treated at pleasure by every one, to receive impressions from everything, and machine-like to be moved and wrought upon, wound up and governed exteriorly, as if there were nothing that ruled within, or had the least control. At length thou hast retired. Thou art again in possession of thy self and mayest keep so; being to come as it were, into a new world free of former engagements unless of thy own accord, voluntarily and officiously thou renewst them, and art willing to begin where thou leftst off. Know therefore that when thou returnest to the same objects; if presently thou art seized after a certain manner; if thou [65] admit the least degree of that former commotion and art tempted into the least feeling of that sort; all is lost thou art overpowered and can't no longer command thy self.

Remember what thou carriest in thy breast: remember those former inflammations and how suddenly all takes fire again, when once a spark is got in. Remember the fuel within, and those unextinguished passions which lie but as in the embers. Think of that impetuous, furious, impotent temper, and what trust is to be given to it. This too remember, that as in certain machines that are fastened by many wedges¹²³, tho they be made ever so compact and firm by this means, yet if the one wedge be loosened, the whole frame shakes; so, with respect to the mind, it is not merely in one passion that the mischief is received, but in all: it is not one string that loses its accord, but all. (1) --- Thus warned and in this different situation of mind approach those things a new, and beware least thou tread array: * * *¹²⁴. --- But, what will my friends say? How will they find me towards them? How shall I bear their altered countenances and their dislike of me? --- Go then and be again a jester, tell stories, act, and be industriously ridiculous. For what is that thou callest wit and humour? What is the whole of that sort of conversation? Is this thy service with thy friends? Is it thus thou wouldst be felt? (2) --- But what if I enter not affectionately and with warmth into their concerns; if I feel not, so as to be in some degree animated; with what effect can I spread or act? Which way assist them, by admonition, by reproof, by commendation and exhorting? For, without being touched and moved in a certain degree, nothing of this can be gracefully practised, nor is it to be undertaken. --- True. Neither is this the time. Leave that for hereafter; when matters within shall be better established, and right habits confirmed. The question at the present is not, whether they shall be

¹²²* * *. Cap. 34 Ench.

¹²³Inf. 74 [nota].

¹²⁴C. 60.

good; but whether thou thy self shalt be of any worth or no. (3) [inf. 70] --- But how shall I advantage others? Of what use shall I be? --- Oh, folly! As if it were not apparent that if thou but continuest thus, and art able to persevere, thy example alone (when thou least regardst it) will be of more service than all that thou canst do while thou retainst thy selfishness, thy meanness and subjection, which thou canst no otherwise shake off but by this course. Thou wouldst serve thy country right. But consider withal and ask thy self, wouldst thou willingly be perjured, wouldst thou be false, wouldst thou lie, flatter, be debauched and dissolute, to serve it? Certainly I would not. But if I think to serve it as I am now bid, all this will necessarily follow. For I must prostitute my mind: I must grow corrupt, interested, false. And where will then be the service I shall render to my country? (4) --- But if I have no sympathy with my friends¹²⁵; how shall I be sensible towards society, or feel any such thing as friendship? --- Stay therefore, until thou canst feel this in another way. For, this is not a genuine social- feeling, this is not friendship¹²⁶: the same temper which warms so much at present being that which must cool again soon after, and which as it rises, must sink. Such is the vicissitude of that sort of passion: and this thou well knowst. But there is a constant fixed and regular joy which carries tranquillity along with it and which has no revolt: and this thou knowst too¹²⁷. Wait therefore until this appear. For of this, one single moment is better than a life passed in that other tumultuous joy.

Enough has been said. Long since has thou been convinced, and oft have these things be repeated. Remember now to keep firm and to **adhere**. And remember that the combat is in the smallest things and what seems to be of little moment. If thou art conqueror here, thou art safe. If in these beginnings thou failest, thou art undone, and all is given up. See therefore in what a little compass [71] this lies, and in what may be called slight things¹²⁸: but which with respect to thee and to thy progress, instead of being slight, are in reality the only things that are important. All that is serious and solemn lies here. All other things are to be esteemed as trifles, however grave or pompous. It is this alone that leads to true religion. On this piety, sanctity, life, duty, happiness depends. To violate ought here is the highest impiety, the highest sacrilege. Begin therefore; and, as a legislator of thy self, establishing that economy or commonwealth within, according to those law which thou knowst to be just; swear never to transgress what thou hast solemnly decreed, and hast appointed to thy self. * * * ¹²⁹. Above. Page 2.

Remember the Isthmian and Olympic exercises and what resembles this within. * * *¹³⁰. Not merely upon great occasions that come seldom; but here, immediately, in that which every minute offers, and gives opportunity. Eating, talk, story, argument, the common entertainment, mirth and laughing, voice, gesture, action, countenance. In all this the trial is the same and at hand. Seek the occasion, tempt, provoke. Every victory here is great and considerable. Let not foolish fancy diminish this, and make it seem little and ridiculous. But remember the end, and to what it tends.

Grant it be hard to deny what seems so natural, so inviting and allowing: but remember how much more solidly pleasing, the conscious of such a victory. * * * &c¹³¹: and not only this: but remember withal the agreeableness of the very exercise it self after a certain way, when once a strong habit is established and the mind in a good station, a good bent. Nor is this only proper to philosophy: but amongst the other sorts of mankind those who adventurously command

¹²⁵Inf. 177.

¹²⁶Inf. 176.

¹²⁷Inf. 74 &c.

¹²⁸viz. 1. * * * C. 41 2. * * * C. 43.

¹²⁹C. 40.

¹³⁰C. 75.

¹³¹C. 56.

themselves in any particular, or are used to hardness and labour, take not a little delight in this sort of exercise, [inf. 78] and love to try their strength. How much more **He** who knows his good, and pursues a right a end? [79]

It is ridiculous to admire a generous behaviour, incorruptibleness, magnanimity; and at the same time admire any of those outward things from the contempt of which these first are framed and have being.

Therefore, either these internal mattes, the * * * of virtue¹³², and the sacred recesses of the mind¹³³, are worthy of admiration, or they are not. If they are not; then cease to admire in this way. If they are; then cease to admire in that other. A celebrated beauty! A palace! Seat! Gardens! Pictures! Italy! A feast! A carnival!¹³⁴ What does this concern tee? If thou admirest any of these, as being taken with them, and wishing for them; what is become of temperance, continence, and those other virtues? And where is that honesty, faith, justice, magnanimity, grounded on them? If thou art sound and free; and that the charm and allurements of these exterior things reach tee not; why then dost thou make thy self one of the admirers, and imitate what thou disapprovest? Is it for company? Is it in complaisance? Is it that thou mayst be admired as a judge? --- All this is monstrous. Forbear therefore wholly this kind of way. For there is neither modesty, decency or simplicity in any degree, where this is. Nor can the mind be long safe, in such a way.

Remember that it is impossible to admire with others, and to admire at the same time what thou desirest should be the chief object of thy veneration and esteem. If those things are magnified; these presently seem little. If the affairs abroad grow engage and considerable; the affairs at home grow awkward and wearysome. If others are courted and cultivated; self is forgot. [80]

How noble, magnificent, great! --- When any of those outward things are thus extolled; think with thy self what those inward things are of which these carry a resemblance, and of which it may be so much more deservingly said, how amiable! How great! But above all take care not to fall into those exclamations, thy self; neither those of one kind, or of the other: not of the first kind; for, that were to give up all, and wholly to quit the station of a proficient: and not of the second kind; for, that not only is beside the character of a proficient, but as the world now stands, would be unbecoming even a philosopher himself, if such a one now lived.

Let others speak magnificently of virtue¹³⁵: not thou. It is enough if thou act thy part silently and quietly: keeping thy rules and principles to thy self; and not hoping ever to make these understood by others. What could So---s or Ep---s themselves do, if now alive? And wouldst thou therefore imitate them? Thou, who art so little fit? And this too before such a world as this, when thou art convinced that they themselves would act a different part, according to the difference of times? For, supposed they had lived with children only, and not with men: what if with moors or barbarians? What if with Goths, or a nation of Turks? ... Consider where we now are: amongst whom: what opinions: what lives: and where those are whom we can call men.

What need of all this reasoning against magnificent talk or declaiming in behalf of virtue?¹³⁶

Stay but still thou hast exhorted thy self sufficiently: and it will be then time enough to consider who else thou shouldst exhort, and after what manner. [81]

¹³²M. B. 3 L.

¹³³Sanctus recessus mentis. Pers.

¹³⁴Convers inf. 85 & 316.

¹³⁵354.

¹³⁶Infra 102.

While I find it to be my part in the world, to live as now, a more retired sort of life; to learn withal what I can from the ancients; I will continue in this, cheerfully and contentedly. If * * * be a help; I study * * * : and this though I were now but beginning, and at the age of the first Cato. If any better part be given me, I accept it. If all books are taken from me, I accept that too, and am contented. If He who placed me here removed me elsewhere (let the scene change to Asia, Africa, Constantinople or Algiers) I am contented. If there remain, there, any part form me to act, that I can act decently and as a man, it is well: if there be none such given; I know my summons; and leaving all retreat: and this, thankfully and joyfully. --- This is the true disposition. These are the thoughts that should be retained, and perpetually brought to mind. But, in a little while some new matter will appear; something striking, astonishing, overpowering, from family and relations, from a set of friends, from the state, or some new national revolutions; immediately as na enthusiast immediately thou art wracked away: duty is alleged, and morality pleaded. Then hindrances come, and ill success, disappointings, disturbances. The mind is at a loss: providence is accused: and all within disordered. Where is now that former disposition? Where is that benignity towards mankind, and that generous affection towards the ruler and sovereign? After this, when thou returnest again to thy former part; it appears poor and mean. Is this all? Must I have nothing better to act?¹³⁷ And thus thou becomest one of those seditious and quarrelsome actors that mutiny against the master of the stage. For, it is plain, while thou art thus affected, thy regard is towards spectators, not towards Him whose approbation alone thou hast need of; since in this respect, every part is equally great and worthy, if duly accepted, and cheerfully, benignly, manfully discharged. Remember Him who said, * * * . [inf. 84]

Let experience at least teach tee what is it to wander abroad, and to suspend for ever so short a time the superintendence and care of self. * * * &c¹³⁸: whether it be to please or gratify others; to gain or to retain others; to reform or to restrain others: whether it be through any of these thoughts * * * ¹³⁹, or that other * * * ¹⁴⁰.

See the effect of this, and how the thing proceeds¹⁴¹. In the first place, attention (that fixed attention towards the scope and end) immediately is lost. The good habits which were incumbent on the mind, and which as fateful guards watch over it, are taken off. The good affections, inclinations and declensions¹⁴² are by this use relaxed, and their vigour transferred to a contrary kind. The sentiments, thoughts, motions, feelings, meditations, reasonings, reflections, * * * , the right modification of appearances, and the use and management of objects; all this, and whatever else is proper to a state of health, is by this suspension lost, or becomes heavy, languid, dull and spiritless. Solitude is a burden; and the power of self-entertainment is come to nothing. Hence a greater propensity than before to amusements and wrong exercise: and the next engagement is stronger and more intense than the first; and so onward, until all be lost; and that that which was a relaxation only, become at length a total dissolution.

What folly rashness and madness is it, to attend to other things in such a manner as to loose attention to that which is principal¹⁴³; and for the sake of outward economy, to quit that which is inward? How wrong and injudicious it is to be drawn from this, on the account of that which we call doing good? How wrecked and mean, to faint in this work and to seek for relaxation? This is a plain betraying of the whole, and is the part of an apostate and deserter. [85]

* * * ¹⁴⁴. --- But reason is to be defended, the right, the truth --- * * * , the concern of others, the fault theirs, the mischief theirs¹⁴⁵. My own concern is for truth, reason, and right within my self: and how maintain this? Not while

¹³⁷Inf. 108.

¹³⁸C. 30.

¹³⁹C. 16

¹⁴⁰C. 31.

¹⁴¹Inf. 167.

¹⁴²* * *

¹⁴³See C. 12 of B. 4 * * * .

¹⁴⁴M. L. 4 § 3.

the aim and * * * is towards another truth, and the establishment of reason abroad: not while reformations are dreamt of, new people, and a new world. Hence presently impatience, heat, eagerness, debate: shall I let this pass? Shall I see truth betrayed? --- What truth? Consider, where is now simplicity? Where is patience, meekness, benignity, tranquillity? Where is that right affection of complacency towards men and resignation to Deity? This is truth: this is the great, the only concern: and when this is yielded, or given up; then it is that truth is betrayed.

To δοξασιον

Wilt thou never have done with that fancy of a name and character in the world? Pleasing thy self in this? Referring still to this? What is this more than a face or dress? What is this but another sort of effeminacy? A Barrus¹⁴⁶, one that wishes to be called a beauty, a judge in clothes, a dancer, a shape. Thou fearest an ill report. Thy character will suffer. So will thy face; if thou exposest it to sun or wind. --- What must I do then? --- Stay within doors and be careful of thy self, a the women are. For, what should such a one do in a camp but be ridiculous?

How impossible is it to preserve any real character; while that other fancy is in being, concerning a character in the world?¹⁴⁷ [inf. 94]

Consider (whenever at any time thou comest to thy work heavily and with regret, as hardly parting with other matters and quitting with other pursuits) which one thing of all those in life thou hast not often in some disposition or another been superior to, and a conqueror of --- Is it ventry and amours with women? How often hast thou detested this, even in those former times, so as to wish firmly that thou hadst no appetite that way, nor nothing of that kind, to give disturbance? --- Is it a house and seat, buildings and work of that kind? How often hast thou sickened of it? And in those days too. What disquiets? What disgust? --- Or is it, last of all (for here I reckon the chief thing lies) the plays, diversions, talks, story-tellings, secrets, or whatever else makes up that sort of converse which thou art so fond of, with a certain set of friends?¹⁴⁸ Remember, here, how often thou hast been ready to renounce this for good and all, and to break off even this correspondence and way of life; when circumstances seemed to require it, family-affairs, public, envy of certain persons, apostasy and corruption, tyranny in thinking to force a dependence, in thinking to have where withal to grieve and punish by separation? --- Now, if melancholy, if anger and disgust, if satiety, weariness, and other such passions as these, were able to make tee despise these matters of outward dependence, so as to set tee free; if other disposition could cause this; how much more ought a right disposition and consciousness do the same?

How shameful is it to be so laborious active and indefatigable in other employments of several kinds; and here alone to faint, where the concern is highest, nobler and most generous? If thy country [95] were in war, and the charge of an army conferred on tee by the people; what labour wouldst thou not undergo? If a magistracy, the same: what application, what pains to acquit thy self in it? What bent and continual attention of the mind? How wouldst thou be animated, how affected? Yet, notwithstanding this; see how thou behavest elsewhere! And in the highest concern of all, how weakly, how miserably affected! But what charge, what counselship is equal to that charge thou hast in hand? What is the commonwealth, the senate or people in respect of that authority which has enjoyed this duty, and given tee this trust to discharge? And the meanwhile, how are those other trusts to be discharged? How be a friend, a brother, or

¹⁴⁵Convers sup. 79 inf. 166.

¹⁴⁶Hor. Sat. 6.

¹⁴⁷Inf. 134.

¹⁴⁸Inf. 176.

any of those other relations, faithfully, entirely, incorruptely? What is fidelity? What is constancy, integrity, incorruption? And on what do these depend?

What miserable subjects are those in which thou hast been so long busied and taken up, and which have left such impressions behind? A meat house: garden: seat: apartment: pictures: trees: fabrics: models: design and ordering. Remember to distinguish. Is it to please thy self stand by, alone, look upon this and admire it? Or is it that others may? What others? Consider only who; are they the common people, who repine at it, and justly? Are they the rich, who are rivals in these matters, and see with envy and detraction? Are they men of business and employment? They have no relish for things of this kind, and admire something else, which is in their own way, and what they are used to. Are they therefore a few friends for whom all this is reserved? Oh folly! Is this the way of serving them? Are these the studies in their behalf? [inf. 104] Remember also this: that by so much as they are better people, so much less have they any admiration of these matters. So that the preparation must be for the worst sort, or for none at all.

But what if all the world were to admire? What if all of this kind were in the highest perfection with thee? Is there not cause of shame? --- "Behold! See these additional ornaments which are mine, and belong to me! See these rewards of virtue! These marks of justice, integrity, honesty and a good mind! Who are they that can show such? With whom are these to be found? Add also: who are the fittest to procure the most of these? What are the fittest measures both to obtain and to preserve these? And who are the most able and most deserving in this way? What is the neglect and contempt of these a sign of? And what does the love or liking of these prognosticate?" --- If such be the case; why admit this cheat and delusion? Why introduce it under specious names? A private retreat: a study: gardening: planting¹⁴⁹ --- But this is philosophical. --- So is anatomy, botany, chemistry. But what sort of men are those that excel in this? What are those anatomists, physicians, chemists and in a word all those other naturalists, that converse with nature (as they say) and study it? What are their thoughts of nature? What minds have they? Are they not rather the very worst, and the furthest off from any true sense and feeling? What was Epicurus with his garden? And who was ever more taken with this, than he? --- All this is hollow, unsound, rotten, corrupt. He who truly studies nature, and lives with nature needs not either a garden, or wood, or sea, or rocks to contemplate and admire. A dunghill or heap of any seeming vile and horrid matter, is equally nay superior to any of those pretended orderly structures of things forced [105] out of their natural state. He that sees not the beauty of corruption; can see nothing in generation or growth: and he who has not always before him, and can kindly and benignly view the incessant and eternal change and conversion of things one into another, will in the midst of his gardens and other artifices, oftener arraign and disparage nature, than applaud and accompany her. Therefore impose no longer on thy self. These may be good employments for others. They are better than cards or dice; better than the common pass- times, better than the common useless conversations, and what they call company. Therefore if thy choice be amongst these; take this which is rather the best of the sort. But if thou hast other employment for thy mind; if thou hast other subjects of thy affection, bent, endeavour¹⁵⁰; and that thy application, intention, will, and the whole force of it, is required elsewhere and all but little enough; be not rash and foolish, so as to spend that force on other subjects, and loose thy nerve, finesse and spirit where they are so much required.

¹⁴⁹ 314 &c.

¹⁵⁰ * * *

To watch strictly when the fancy runs out upon any notable design or outward piece of work hoc erat in votis, modus agri &c¹⁵¹: and paulum silvae and thus concha salis puri¹⁵². --- How rotten is all this? And yet, how covered over? How speciously clothed and lurking under a certain mask? How hard still to detect it upon every occasion? But endeavour notwithstanding to bring it forth into the light. Examine the idea. Bring it to the test. See how it will bear. Is it virtue, or has it anything in common with virtue? Does it come under the will, or is it foreign and of another province? Is it my good as a rational creature, as a man, as a student and one that [106] seeks to improve in a certain course? Is it a help or advancement in this sense, or is it a remora?

What is it that I am studying thus to bring into order? What am I embellishing? Dirt: matter: dregs¹⁵³. Is it this I would adorn? Is it this I would beautify?

Hear another person on this subject. As one (says He) delights in embellishing this thing or the other; so I, in making my self still better, and finding that I grow so.

Remember the rival beauties, and how the internal sort is acquired. * * * . (Pla: Phaedr: in fine).

Remember how often thou hast proved¹⁵⁴, and by what repeated experience, that the beginning of all miscarriage, the chief and in a manner the only cause of failure is that which happens in conversation and company contrary to the precept, and to what is so positively enjoyed in the rules belonging to this place.

For, thus it is. The mind which at first seemed to be provided and on his guard, strong, resolute, and able to hold out; notwithstanding this, after some time passed, and a certain attention given to those other subjects, is at last by some seeming fair occasion, tempted to make a small step outwards; supposing this as but for once on this single occasion, and thinking to retreat again safely within it self --- If I say but this word, I shall set the matter right. If I allow my self but this small complaisance, I shall keep my self yet well in his opinion. If I indulge in but this one thing it is enough, I shall be thought passable, and not altogether morose and changed from what I was. Now I am saluted and congratulated. Now I am self. [107] --- Here is the corruption. Here the breaking in. But remember: whatever causes joy and satisfaction being present, causes grief and disturbance when absent. Whatever is the subject of joy or sorrow with respect to the present, must be the subject of appetite and aversion with respect to the future¹⁵⁵. Hast thou, then, forgot these rules? If not; consider what must necessarily follow. The mind being elevated ever so little by this success, is instantly drawn into a new desire, a new appetite. The * * * grows: and a contrary * * * and declining is immediately in that instant produced, begot¹⁵⁶. The ground thus gained (as being now become a matter of consideration) is to be kept: and this with no small earnestness and concern. Nor can the matter rest here: but more must be added: more must be grasped at: more procured, to make this good and to secure and fortify what is acquired. Hence further excursions: other sallies: other attempts: until at last we come again into the same field, fighting, as before, with the same arms and for the same things as when we were in the depth of idiotism.

Thus we leave our harbour and put to sea again. So that in a few moments we lose sight of land: or if we turn our eyes back to view anything in that region which we have quitted; everything appears so faint and dim, everything of that sort is contracted in to so narrow a size, that it is scarce discernible or knowable.

¹⁵¹Hor. L. 2 5.6.

¹⁵²Sat. 3.

¹⁵³* * *. Ep. L. 1. C. 1.

¹⁵⁴(Attention). Sup. 84.

¹⁵⁵(Attention). * * *. 3.26.

¹⁵⁶M. L. 7 § 27 &c. E. L. 4 C. 4. * * * &c. p. 399.

Endeavour now at this season, and in the midst of this, to recall any of those principal rules, anything that relates to human kind and the condition of life, anything of Deity, and anything belonging to the virtues: apply that sovereign * * * of what is ours; what not. See how this is looked upon. Mind how it affects: and whether it be not merely as a dream or some antiquated story. What to do in this miserable state? How move [inf. 122 or turn ourselves? Wilt thou never remember of what nature this is, and how this is brought about? Art thou not henceforward at the mercy of the winds and weather? Art thou not delivered up to another train and set of fancies? And then when retired again and with thy self alone, how dost thou find matters? What reception at that home? How are the fancies and imaginations disposed, and in what order, what course? How do they run, how lead, introduce and follow one another? What method, use, management, correction, regulation? Is it not all hurry, chance, confusion, anarchy? Do they not range high and low, carry all before them and with them, elevate, transport, depress, deject? Here hope: there doubt and consternation: and here hope again --- Was not that well managed? Was not that turn dextrous? No. But that other thing was unfortunate: that lost me. What will they say, or think? How shall I get out of that affair? What apology? What excuse? --- Is it come to this then at last? Are these the thoughts? This what we aspire to, and affect? The sum of all our wishes? Our highest ambition and hope?

Remember this; and how certain and inevitable these consequences are. And that in this state and while this habit, and constitution lasts, the only safety is in **retirement** from all this sort of converse: and if at any time unhappily unwarely engaged in it, to see that it continue not long¹⁵⁷; that it do not grow customarily, and that it do not gain and be familiarised. For, even where a guard is kept, and the particular rules observed; yet by a long continued attention (though ever so reserved) towards the matters of discourse, towards the common reasoning and ideas, it must necessarily follow [123] (in such a mind as thine) that that other attention must of course be lost: and if complaisance, imitation and flattery be added; if smiles, countenance and approbation be joined; and an outward sort of harmony be kept; things will be yet worse, and thou wilt soon find that thou beginst to harmonise within¹⁵⁸. at least all harmony of another sort will be lost; the other measures and numbers broken and disordered. Touch any string whatever: and mind, what sound! Is not all dead? Is there any more use or virtue in the instrument? How recall this? Which way renew it? How take it up again? The work itself feels heavy and tedious: all within is become unapt: and the disposition turned another way. See, what a crowd of other ideas! Impertinent, idle, monstrous imaginations and wild fancies rushing in, making havoc, uproar, confusion; rejoicing, as it were, at their new admittance, and revenging their former exclusion. These are the hurricanes and tempests. Such is the ravage they commit --- et terras turbine perflant? When are we to expect a calm again? When return again to our harbour? When are those halcyon days to be restored? Is it not more likely to be chaos and night? Whether does this tend? What does it bode? Remember what E says B. 4 C. 3, and how little is wanting to over set the bark.

All depends on a certain succession, series, or train of fancies, and on that faculty or power which controls, manages and uses them. If this be once interrupted; it is chance that governs. So that it is a chance whether reason be ever regained. [124]

If there be no end, no measure, no rule; all is madness. If there be; then whatever is acted without it, must be madness.

If I throw away my rule; if I lose my end; what power, what faculty can I reserve whereby to be sure of resuming this again when I think fit? If this be impossible, then at any time when I act thus, and have consented to suspend attention; I do not suspend, but in effect renounce it wholly: since no longer depends on me to renew what I

¹⁵⁷* * *. Mar. L. 6 § ...

¹⁵⁸Inf. 177.

have broken off. If so; then this is not temporarily and voluntary madness; but real and absolute: since I my self know not certainly when it shall cease; or whether ever it shall cease at all¹⁵⁹.

(Familiarity)

What would I have? Why seek familiarity with these? Can I make my self what they are? Can I reconcile my opinions to theirs? If not; why do I affect this intimacy? Their principles and mine are opposite as the antipodes; I have the utmost contempt for theirs: and they for mine; as far as they know anything concerning them. What correspondence can there be between such? What kind of alliance is this? Must not I council and hide my self? must not I (if this familiarity be aimed at) prostitute my self in the strangest manner, and be a hypocrite in the horridest degree? Why do I affect to be beloved? Why lay this stress on their good opinion and esteem? Is it because they commend one they do not know, and that that which they praise is nothing of thy character? [125] Show but thy self for what thou art: profess thy principles, and let them see thy real self: and what will happen? Where will be their praise? What will their thought be of tee? How will their affections be towards tee?

Consider this well: and see, if anything can be more ridiculous. Remember what they are; and what thou art. Thy firm and stated principle, thy cool thoughts and reasoning are to them mere madness. If in reality they are not madness, but true sense; it follows of necessity that they who take these things for madness, are mad themselves, and at the bottom differ not from the most childish and ignorant.

But, thou hast long ago pronounced them mad, as following no certain opinion, having no rule of action, nor no guide, but unexamined and unsettled fancy. However it be; this is evident: either the one or other must be mad.

Now consider this breach. Consider the natural secretion. And if nothing else, let modesty at least prevail. Think what it is, being such a one as thou art, to join thy self in this manner with them, as if thou wert in union and harmony with them, and of their principles¹⁶⁰. Is not this an intruding? Is not this imposition? Is it not in some manner an abuse and indignity? What is an abstemious man amongst drinkers? What is a plain man in company with such as dress? What is an unbelieving man amongst those that are celebrating superstitious rites? What has such a one to do there? Why appear beyond what is required and necessary? Why mix and associate? Why affect forwardness in these concerns, assume, and act, as willing to be thought somebody and of some moment? Am not I a monster, with respect to them? Am not I of another make and form? Am not I forced to hide my shape, lest I appear horrid and affrighting? What must I do then?

Correct this shape. Be a human creature, and of their species. Conform to their principles and manners. Otherwise [inf. 132 withdraw: and (as becomes tee) withdraw heartily and willingly; or, if thou canst not thus; withdraw then as one that pities and bemoans himself, or as one deformed, and that had some natural defect would lament his own infirmity. However it be, I say withdraw. For it is insufferable to stand so towards them as thou dost, and to affect that amongst them which thou affectest.

Remember still what thou art to them; and they to tee: and how it must be when any occasion shall chance to show this opposition. How would they like to be thus thought of? How treat the person who has these thoughts? What is this but natural enmity covered over? What are their friendships for one another? Consider what they are capable of: and what a little time is sure to bring about. If thy friendship which thou maintainest with them be proof to all this; it is genuine and right. If at the time when their opinions work in their natural way and produce those natural effects;

¹⁵⁹Inf. 130.

¹⁶⁰Inf. 133.

nothing that happens be surprise; it is well. But if it be otherwise; it is plain, thy affection is more absurd and ridiculous than theirs. For, they think of themselves that they have faith, sincerity, justice, friendship; and when anything contrary shows itself in a companion or acquaintance; they think the person changed, or that they were mistaken in him (as indeed they were): but thou, for thy part, canst not be mistaken: thou knowst their * * * and opinions; and that to expect what else from hence, is monstrous, absurdity. How comes it then that thou art moved? Why pleased, or displeased? Why this affection, zeal and concern? What else is this, but to will (as Epic---s says) that vice should not be vice?¹⁶¹ [133]

Whenever a certain fondness comes upon thee, such as invites and draws towards familiarity and intimacy; remember what has been said above. Remember the natural secretion¹⁶²; the fight, enmity and opposition of principles; what is it that is placed as a gulf between us. Remember hypocrisy, imposture, imposition, intruding¹⁶³: who they are; and what I my self am. That we now talk to one another masked, and in disguise. Take I take not him for him; nor he me for me. He pleases himself with a spectre; and I, my self, with another spectre. We are nothing less than what we appear to one another. There can be nothing less either the one or other's character than what we thus love and praise in one another. Strip us; set us naked before one another; and see how each will stare, and be amazed. See how we shall then view one another. How will he bear the sight of my opinions? Or how I his, when I see then bare-faced and natural? How does he appear to me in his anger, in his pleasure, in his lust? How in a title, with an estate, in reputation or disgrace, in prosperity or adversity? How amongst his domestics? How in ordinary provocations? How in sickness? How in any cross or disappointment? How many ways intolerable? And I more tolerable, as I stand with him? Can my opinions, or such affection as mine, be bore with? Am not I a monster to him? What though he be one of the better sort, that seem to philosophise? What if he be a believer in a certain way? What if he be an atheist? Yet these, as different as they are amongst themselves, are yet in harmony and agreement with one another, in respect of what they are towards me. Where then is my modesty?¹⁶⁴ What decorum, or decency, is there in such a carriage? How becoming for me to insinuate my self and court their favour! Consider, that if there be [134] any such thing as nauseous affectation; if it be nauseous in one of a dull and heavy genius, to affect the conversation of men of wit; or one of mean education, to affect the manners and company of the polite sort; or in one deformed, to affect amours and the effeminate ways of lovers; all of this kind, and whatever else may be added, will still be found not near so nauseous as is in thee, that affectation of a certain intimacy in others¹⁶⁵.

* * *

(Character. Sup. 85 Inf. 197.)

All turns upon that of a character: and according to what the fancy makes of this, so in general, the conduct will prove; and so matters in conversation succeed one way or another: for this is always what occurs at those times. What is the character I am to maintain? How shall I act according to my character? Who am I? --- Such a one; the son of such a one; of such a family, such a country; of such an estate; with such a title --- What am I worthy of, as such a one? --- An equipage, a certain dress, ceremonies, place. --- What are the things beneath me? --- An ordinary habit, a mean appearance, obscurity, contempt. Thus, when at any time in company with foreigners, presently this occurs. I am

¹⁶¹Ench. 19 & inf. 177.

¹⁶²Sup. 125 & inf. 177.

¹⁶³Sup. 125.

¹⁶⁴Sup. 125.

¹⁶⁵Sup. 73.

na Englishman. How preserve my character? How gain esteem to England? --- Man! What is England to tee? Why reckon from hence? Why not the parish? Why not Europe? But, be it so. I am a native of those islands; or of one of those islands; or of a part of one of those islands, as being the same government, and under the same laws. I disdain to call my self of such a parish or town which is but a part of that greater government. And is there no other government or city of which this is still [135] but a part, and in respect of which, this is no more than a caban or hut? What are the laws of that city in respect of these other laws? Which of those administrations is justest? Which of these laws ancientest, wisest, perfectest, most durable, most inviolable? Which inferior and subservient? By which laws, and for the sake of which city was it that I was brought into being, created a man? From hence did I receive my organs of sense, my faculties, my understanding, my reason? Where, then, is my native country? Where is that government or city, from hence I can properly name my self, and which is not as a province or district of some other? begin Now: and consider anew. Who am I? --- Such a one, the son of such a one, of such a name? --- No. --- But what? Who?¹⁶⁶

--- A man; a rational creature: of such a descent: of such a habitation. What am I worthy of as such a one? What are the things beneath me? -----

But this is imaginary. --- How imaginary? Was it my native country (as I call it) that gave me my being?¹⁶⁷ Did the commonwealth decree my birth? Were my parents the artificers of my frame? Or were they anything more than instruments? To what do i belong therefore? And to whom? Who is the author of my being? What has He made to be my excellence and highest perfection? Consider. Thou art **a man**. Does this signify anything or nothing? If nothing; what besides is it that thou callest honourable? Why, all this conceit and valuing thy self? why offended if at any time thou art meanly thought of, and passest for a brute? Where is the difference? Dost thou not say that is none? Is it not enough that thou hast meat, and drink, and whatever else thou desirest of that kind? Why, then, dost thou aim at anything further? Why value thy self on the qualities of a man: if there be no particular character nor dignity of a man? if There be; where is it? Where but in that by which he differs from a brute? What is a brute? --- Stupidity, gluttony, lechery, savageness, inhumanity. --- What therefore is man but reason and humanity, faith, friendship, justice, integrity? Now consider. How is this character saved, how lost? When is it [**inf. 142** that I act according to my make? When do I preserve the dignity of my station and birth? What am I worthy of? And what are the things beneath me? Is it not beneath me to dissemble, or flatter or court? Is it not beneath me to stoop, to applause, and solicit grace and favour? Am not I worthy of liberty, generosity, constancy, magnanimity? Why then do I talk of anything else as beneath me? Why consider what else I am worthy of? --- But is beneath me to be seen in such a habit. --- Procure a rich one, and wear it: for thou art worthy such a habit: thou art worthy an estate, a couch, an equipage. What shouldst thou do with poverty and hardship, or how manage any such circumstance; thou who wert never born to liberty, generosity or greatness; or if born to it, hast renounced thy right and made thy self a slave? What shouldst thou do but tremble when any thing of this kind threatens? What shouldst thou do but fawn and stoop, where there is hope of riches or renoum, or honours or advancement? For, what dost thou know that is better or higher? Remember, therefore: either thou art above these things, or not above them. If not above them; dissemble, flatter, court. But if these be beneath tee; how can disgrace or poverty be beneath tee? How can that be beneath me, in which I can most of all show my self to be **a man**? How can that be unworthy of me which is my noblest task and performance?

What is it, then, that thou art worthy of? Resolve either the one or the other. Either thou art worth of constancy and magnanimity; or of that which is contrary to it, pusillanimity and meanness. Either thy worth and character is in a

¹⁶⁶* * *. Arr. L. 2 C. 10. Inf. 197.

¹⁶⁷Sup. 116. Inf. 138.

title, name, estate; and then liberty, constancy, magnanimity is nothing: or if thy worth and character in this; then the rest is nothing.

And remember, * * * .

St. Giles's
December 1699.

Behold another age! (for so it may be called). Another face of things, another scene, another period of thy life. Go back to what it was lately, a year or less than a year since. Are not all the views changed? Family, friends, father, brother, sisters. Some already gone out of life, removed, changed: others in another manner changed, and in a way still of further change. New ages, new seasons of life, new companies, new opinions, new pursuits, new passions. All is under change. All is change¹⁶⁸. What is the substance and matter of our bodies? What the matter (if I may so speak) of our minds? What is opinion? How should it be but changeable, and most of any thing changeable, while mere opinion? And what is theirs but opinion? What is thine? Is it not opinion also? Or if not opinion, but science; how should this have varied? How shouldst thou have given away? How doubted of thy rules? How been where thou now art?

Consider how it now is: how since thou saidst how long wilt thou abuse thy self?¹⁶⁹ since thou bidst remember the fuel within, the impetuous, furious, impotent temper, the machine, wedges &c¹⁷⁰:

See whither the same impetuous, impotent temper has led thee! Was it for this thou retiredst? Is it this thou hast brought home? * * *¹⁷¹. Is it not of thee that this is said?

* * * . Begin now. Consider thy shameful fall. * * * . See what **[inf. 176]** is absolutely necessary in the case: what with these wounds, these sores¹⁷². See as to the * * * the * * * what is enjoined¹⁷³. Consider all this, and come with a new resolution, * * *¹⁷⁴. Bear with the regimen, the prescription, the operation¹⁷⁵. Bear with dejection, mortification, weaning¹⁷⁶ (how else the * * *?).

Remember the exchange * * * L. 2 C. 10¹⁷⁷. Remember former furies: what a creature! And that God should have called thee out to this, how wonderful! Enough though but for a moment, and so to die: vastly enough: and praise him. Give thanks * * * &c¹⁷⁸: and as thus * * *¹⁷⁹. Or if thou wilt live; begin then and remember as how; after what manner; sworn to what laws; proselite to what; dedicated to whom. Remember the two precepts * * * . Cut off joy¹⁸⁰. Cut of tenderness¹⁸¹ of a certain kind. Cut of familiarity¹⁸², inwardness, and that sympathy¹⁸³ of a wrong kind. Learn to

¹⁶⁸* * * . M. L. 8 § ... & inf. 172.

¹⁶⁹Sup. 64.

¹⁷⁰Sup. 65.

¹⁷¹L. 1 C. 4.

¹⁷²Sup. 168.

¹⁷³Sup. 171.

¹⁷⁴C. 2.

¹⁷⁵Sup. 168.

¹⁷⁶Sup. 171.

¹⁷⁷Sup. 128.

¹⁷⁸Sup. 174.

¹⁷⁹Sup. 83.

¹⁸⁰Sup. 74. 1. En. 1. 41.

¹⁸¹Sup. 124. 2. En 43 & sup. 2.4.

¹⁸²Sup. 70.

be with self; to talk with self. commune with thy own heart. Be that thy companion. For what other is there? See what thou has got by seeking others. Is this society? Is it genuine and of a right kind, when it is that fond desire of company, that seeking of companionship, and want of talk and story?¹⁸⁴ Is this that which prompts thee in the case? Is this the affection that draws thee to sociable acts and commerce with mankind? What is this but sickness, and of a dangerous kind? In such a case, stir not out: * * * (§ 30) move not a foot abroad: nor open thy mouth to say one pleasing thing. For what a disposition, what a temper is this! Mistake not. Friendship has nothing to do here. See with whom this is common. See the nation and people that are most insatiable in this way, and hunt after conversations, parties, engagements, secrecies, confidences and friendships of this kind, with the greatest eagerness, admiration, fondness. And see in what place this reigns the most. The court, and places near the court: the polite world: the great-ones. Of what character, life, manners are commonly that sort who can never rest out of company, and want ever to be communicating their secrets? Call this to mind: and remember that real friendship is not founded on such a need. Friends are not friends if thus wanted. This is imbecility, impotency, effeminacy: and such is all that ardour and vehemence in behalf of others. [177] How is this being a friend? How possible on these terms to be a friend and lover of mankind? How be a brother? How a father, and that common father of men?¹⁸⁵ How the tutor and not tormentor and tirant of the children?

But, be this so no more. And that thou mayest not return ever anymore to those ardours and vehemencies; know the condition and law, however terrible it appear:

To take pleasure in nothing.

To do nothing with affection.

To promise well of nothing.

To engage for nothing¹⁸⁶. Remembering * * * (§ 25).

Begin therefore from this moment and see how thou canst hold against those other sort of reasonings, those compoundings, externations, excuses, self-flatteries, self-bemoanings. Shall I abandon all my friends? --- See first if thou canst be **A FRIEND** or no. Remember what it is to be * * * : and then talk of friendship; not until then. --- Shall I have no more natural affection? --- Shall I ever have any? Shall I not be cruel? Or say what is cruelty?¹⁸⁷ * * * is not this cruelty? Or how not be cruel, if angry? How not be angry with them (that vice should not be vice §19)¹⁸⁸ if sympathising with them¹⁸⁹, and harmonising in a wrong way¹⁹⁰; if joining in the play¹⁹¹, and relishing the play things, in short: thinking of them, loving them, conversing or being with them any otherwise than as that natural SECRETION (above-mentioned)¹⁹² allows.

Remember of thy self, that thou art (what another said) as one born out of season¹⁹³; an untimely plant; in a wrong climate, a wrong season of the year. 'Tis winter and there is nothing besides of this kind extant; nothing to grow up with; no shelter or support¹⁹⁴. How then? If I can bear my fruit well and good: if not; why do I cumber the ground?

¹⁸³Sup. 97. 110. 112.

¹⁸⁴Sup. 70.

¹⁸⁵Sup. 10. 11. 12.

¹⁸⁶165.

¹⁸⁷* * * &c. Mar. L. 6 § ...

¹⁸⁸Sup. 166. 132.

¹⁸⁹Sup. 123.

¹⁹⁰Sup. 70.

¹⁹¹Sup. 11.

¹⁹²133.

¹⁹³Inf. 392.

¹⁹⁴Sup. 50.

Why live below my order and species, degenerate, worthless, productive of [178] nothing good, disagreeing with the rest of the field and grove, a briar and worse then a briar, a fungus, an excrescence, a disease of the earth? Telluris inutile pondus. For what else is * * * ?¹⁹⁵ And * * * ?¹⁹⁶ But if thou canst grow out these distempers, so as to answer thy stock and not to be that other bastard-growth; then wait the season out: stay out thy time and to just maturity, until thou fall as that olive, * * *¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁵L. 4 C. 2.

¹⁹⁶L. 2 C. 18. Inf. 385.

¹⁹⁷Mar. L. 4 § 48.

[66] Rotterdam: 1698.

SIMPLICITY * * * . M. 2.5. * * * . 3.4. .

The senseless part of mankind admire gaudiness: the better sort and those who are good judges admire simplicity. Thus in painting, architecture and other such things, the greatest beauties are what the vulgar despise: and thus even in furniture, habits, instruments and arms, plainness and simplicity are the most becoming, and are the greatest perfection. For, where proportion and exactness is wanting; there it is that there is need of those additional ornaments: but, where order is preserved, and the perfection of art attained, the rest only does prejudice and is an eyesore. --- All this is right. But take care least thou admirest simplicity of this sort, thou forget another simplicity infinitely more beautiful and of more importance. Remember, therefore, what the perfection of man is; and that beyond this, to seek for anything, or aim at any other ornaments, is to loose simplicity, and become that grandy piece of painting or architecture which he that is knowing despises.

Whenever there appears anything which for its beauty and simplicity is charming to the sight; though it be one of those ordinary things, such as a vessel, or urn; a sword, or any other arm; a habit or a dress; remember still what it is in life that resembles this; and that simplicity in this place does not only imply unity of design, so as to exclude hipocrisy, falseness, [67] subtlety; but that this extends itself to carriage and behaviour, countenance, voice, gesture. What are all those forms and manners which come under the notion of good-breeding? The affected smiles, the fashionable bows, the tone of voice and all those supple, caressing and ingratiating ways? What is this else but embroidery, guilding, colouring, daubing?

The perfection of carriage and manner is between the ruggedness of one who cares not how he gives offence, and the suppleness of one who only studies how to please. And this is simplicity. For, affectation is as well on the one side as on the other.

What care, what art, what labour, to attain the true simplicity of an action! But, when maintained, how pleasing and beautiful! Nor is any pains so well bestowed. For, what is there that has a worse feeling than affectation? Who would not willingly be rid of it? For, in the same manner as in the carriage and behaviour, nothing is easy but what is natural; so in the practice of the world, in conversation and life, all is uneasiness and constraint where simplicity is wanting. But, to affect this easy or freedom where it is not, is to be most of all constrained and natural.

Those that speak knowingly in matters of behaviour and carriage, talk of nothing but ease, freedom, liberty, unconcernedness; but confess at the same time that there is nothing harder than this to attain. And so for certain the thing is. What can be an easier happier part than to live disinterested and unconcerned, as being loose from all those ties and little mean regards which make us to depend so much on others? What can be more generous and of a better feeling, than to go through companies, conversations, and affairs in [68] this security and simplicity of mind? But this happens not until the thing it self, after a certain way, comes not to be thought of, and that the standers by are no longer considerable nor awful. For in the same manner as in a court, He who has formed himself and knows his own faculty, carries with him an assurance of not failing in anything, and is therefore free and easy in what relates to carriage, ceremony and all those other affairs; so, in the whole of life, He who is secure as to the great events, and is concerned but for one thing (which, if he will himself, he will not miss) He, and He alone, is truly free; and with respect to things within, is graceful, becoming, beautiful; has everything orderly still, quiet; nothing boisterous, nothing disturbed; but

every motion, action and expression decent, and such as is becoming that more noble and far superior character * * *¹⁹⁸ of one who in another sense is called well-breed, with respect to a different discipline and breeding.

Imitation, gesture and action in discourse; different tones of voice; alternations of countenance; odd and humorous turns of speech; phrases and expressions; --- and this is agreeable in company, and may set off a story, help in an argument, or make anything to be felt which one would desire should be so. But all this is utterly wrong, harsh, dissonant; out of measure and tone. All that is vehement, impetuous, turbulent must needs be so: as well as that which in any degree borders on mimicry, buffoonery, drollery¹⁹⁹. Consider what a mean and contemptible state, the mind is in, at that instant when it goes about anything of this kind: what it aims at: what its end and scope [69] is: how it looks upon it self when it fails and is disappointed²⁰⁰: what kind of joy it has, when it succeeds: and what sort of minds these are which partake with it in this way, and are the ablest in this art: what morals, manners, life it brings along with it. But suppose now (what is far contrary) that by quitting this, we were likely to lose the esteem of friends; is it not better to be dull, silent, unentertaining, but so as to the same time to be sincere, just, modest and duly reserved? Is it not better to be truly sociable, retaining true simplicity and gravity, than by being what the world calls sociable, to give up these, and live a stranger to social affection?

Never fancy that thou hast acted a small or inconsiderable part in company, however small thy part has been in the discourse; if all the while thou hast preserved that temper which was due; if thou hast neither been earnest, nor eager, nor over-concerned, nor over-joyed, if thou hast neither studied to show thy self, nor hast contented, nor reproved, nor flattered, after the ordinary way; in short, if thou art come out of the conversation **free**, undisturbed, unlesened and without prejudice to simplicity, integrity or ingenuity. And, on the other side, where there has been any prejudice to these, or that the least foot step here has been awry; think not on any account that matters have gone well; nor be contented, though the success in discourse appear ever so happy, or to have been of ever so good consequence.

Remember the modern Theophraste, who calls politeness a more refined sort of flattery. Examine therefore what politeness is consistent with simplicity and what not. [inf. 72].

Remember that sort of dissimulation which is consistent with true simplicity: and besides the innocent and excellent dissimulation of the kind which Socrates used, remember that other sort (not less his) which hides what passes within, and accommodates our manners to those of our friends and people around us, as far as this with safety can be allowed²⁰¹. Remember therefore what countenance is to be shown even then when all is grave and solemn within. So far be thou from any industrious affectation of gravity, and from seeming, in the midst of company, to meditate things of a high nature, and to despise what thou art about. But see that this be sincere, and not so as that the struggle may appear: for, this would be a worst sort of affectation and more intolerable than the first. And if so, what must that sort be, where without any real ground for any such struggle, the appearance of it is yet affected? How nauseous is this! And how amiable the contrary carriage! --- The first degree therefore is to need this dissimulation, and to be really grave and inwardly intent on other things. The next is, to be willing to dissemble this, and to be satisfied without making our selves either the burden or the admiration of others. And last of all, our business is, to see that we be always sincere in this, and to take care that we do not ill dissemble. For, it is then that this becomes what we properly call dissimulation: nor can anything be farther from the simplicity and ingenuity.

¹⁹⁸C. 10.

¹⁹⁹Inf. 82.

²⁰⁰inf. 82.

* * * ²⁰², ... O, wretched blindness, not to see and admire this beauty of all beauties! Oh, mean and despicable condition, to see this such as it is, and not enjoy it!

* * * ²⁰³. [73]

(Curiosity)

How many disturbances and torments do we endure, for want of that true simplicity? What jealousies! What discontents and private envyings! Yet these pass generally unnoticed. And though there cannot be more uneasy moments than those we feel on this account; yet we never reckon these, nor cast these into the scale, when we weigh the good and ill of life. And not to mention other passions, how much do we suffer in this way merely from curiosity? And indeed how is it otherwise possible? For, which way can we concern our selves in outward affairs, as matters of consequence, in which we place our good and ill; and at the same time not to be solicitous to hear? Or not come off dissatisfied and mortified, when we are denied hearing, and are excluded out of the concern?

Remember that true simplicity must ever be accompanied with true gravity and a certain becoming reservedness: otherwise simplicity perishes. And as for that opposite character, that familiarity, inwardness, freedom and openness of a certain kind, which thou termest simplicity; this is not simplicity; but affectation, and nauseous affectation. such is all that intemperate lavish talking, and of self particularly. --- I have such and such faults --- Keep them to thy self: make the rise use of them: mend them; not multiply them; not draw vanity from them, and a new ground of conceit, new matter for idleness, trifling, impertinence, looseness of tongue and ungrateful ill feeling, familiarity and intimacy²⁰⁴,. 134. which is out of all harmony, time, concord, measure. --- But, thou wouldst willingly declare thy faults and show simplicity. --- Wait a moment; and there will be occasion given. Stay until thou art reproached for something. Stay until somebody say he knows nothing: he is ignorant: he is little worth. Show this to be **true**. Show in what, and why. Help the person that thus blames: and if he blames maliciously, and thinking that he has no reason; show him that **[inf. 154]** he has reason, and that he blames not without cause. Here is the occasion to speak thy faults (if thou wilt needs speak them). Here it is, that simplicity may be shown. * * * &c²⁰⁵: but thou art far from this simplicity: and therefore what is all that other, but affectation?

To discourse with others about the work of self-improvement; about what passes within; what vices remain, what remedies and application; and like that sort of pedantry which tells of distempers and physic, what water has been made, what stools. Man! What have we to do with this? Take thy physic, purge, vomit, that thou mayest be well and come abroad: but what have we to do with stools? Why talk to us of flegme²⁰⁶? Form a good constitution: be healthy and sound: appear without ulcers, without scabs or scurf: show the effect of the physic; but not the drugs and operation.

²⁰¹* * *

²⁰²M. L. 10 § 1.

²⁰³M. L. 4 § ult.

²⁰⁴Inf 134.

²⁰⁵Ench. 48.

²⁰⁶Arr. B. 3 Cap. 13 in the end. Transcribed above page 5.

[74] Rotterdam. 1698.

PASSIONS

Quâ data porta ruunt²⁰⁷ --- The same as to the passions. Think often of this picture. For though poetical, what can be more exact? --- Eurus, notus, boreus --- Thus anger, ambition, desires, loves --- eager and tumultuous joys, wishes, hopes, transporting fancies, extravagant mirth, airiness, humour, fantasticalness, buffoonery, drollery. When once any of these are let loose, when once they have broke their boundaries and forced a passage, what ravage and destruction is sure to follow? And what must it cost ere all be calm again within?

Remember the wedges in the machine²⁰⁸; and how it is when but one of these by chance is loosened.

(Joy)

There is one sort of joy which is fierce, eager, boisterous, impetuous, restless; which carries with it a sort of insaciableness, rage, madness, sting; and which afterwards is followed by dis-gust and discontent. There is another sort of joy²⁰⁹ which is soft, still, peaceable, serene; which has no mixture or alloy; of which there is no excess; and which, the more it is felt, the more perfect and refined it grows and spreads more content and satisfaction through the whole of life. To the first of these, a thousand things are necessary, a thousand outward and casual circumstances concurring, the least of which being removed, or ceasing, this also must cease. To the second there is nothing necessary but what depends upon ourselves.

Consider now, withal, which of these we should rather endeavour to give our selves: whether that sort, in the midst of which, if any sudden chance invade us, we are instantly abasted, terrified, confounded, sunk; [75] or, whether we should choose to be in that sort of disposition in which whatever happens that is either disgraceful, calamitous, or tragic, we are not on this account the least dejected or dismayed; we are not ashamed of ourselves, contracted, shrunk, nor feel any of these gripes or knowings of discontent an bitter sadness; but can look up, and set our face against the weather, preserve a steady countenance, and meet our fate not only undauntely but cheerfully?

How miserable a joy is that which is founded in ignorance? And how ridiculous to see that person this moment thus transported, who if he had heard the news would instantly be struck dead?

The test of a true joy is certain news: which if it can bear, it is sincere, lawful, sound; if otherwise, treacherous, corrupt, false. --- News is come that your state is seized; that the enemy is master of it. --- You are condemned to banishment. You are condemned to death. --- How is it now? How is this received within? if calmly; all is well: the joy was genuine, legitimate, fit to be indulged, and of the right sort. But if thou satndest as one who is thunder-struck; if it be as thus; oh, wretch! What have I been doing? No more, now, of these fooleries; then is this true indeed that these were fooleries and nothing else; then is this that thou mayest truly despise both thy self and thy former joys. For they were only fit for one who was wholly ignorant, vulgar, and conscious of nothing noble, excellent, or truly rejoicing.

How long wilt thou continue to admit that unsociable, indecent, petulant, impotent, childish joy; and abandon that which is sober, grave, modest, fixed, constant, equal; which has no [inf. 82] reverse or vicissitude; which has no alliance with shame; which is a stranger to remorse and repentance; which is human, sociable, of all hours and fitted to all human events. Remember that these are perfect enemies to each other, and at constant defiance. Whatever thou givest to one, is lost from the other; and not merely that, but employed and vigorously made use of against the other.

²⁰⁷Virg. Aen. L. 3.

²⁰⁸Sup. 65 [nota]

²⁰⁹Sup. 70.

The wrack and ruin of all strict inward economy, and the rock on which it must necessarily split, is that light, airy, transported temper and elevated joy, which raises high and aloft those ideas of the pleasures, diversions, serious affairs and business of the world²¹⁰. And tho' laughter be a pleasure that may be employed sometimes against this very evil, and against the pomp and ridiculous solemnity of human affairs; yet is there nothing more unsafe, and more difficult of management. This was well perhaps heretofore, and might suit with one who was yet unfixed, and only in way towards improvement: but it must become a very different kind, ere it be suitable with one who understands himself: and it is enough to say, that it is wholly unmanageable while any of that impotent sort remains, or that anything of this kind is in the least degree involuntary in the temper, and not in the perfect command²¹¹: and what strength of mind, constancy and firmness this implies, is easy to understand.

Remember if at any time the general fancy or idea of life be high, florid, luxuriant (which is the dissolution of all right discipline, conduct and economy) that this is owing to that elevated temper and to the seeds of that intoxicating passion. And not only this²¹²: but when the mind is dejected, clouded and in that other extreme, so as to relish nothing, and to be unapt towards the greater and worthier things; [83] remember that this also is owing to nothing else than that sort of passion which before had raised it, which is now the occasion of this fall.

See what a kind of temper that is, in which it is commonly said he's glad he's alive; and how the vulgar can take notice of this, and in a manner, see the thing. What can be more ridiculous?

What it is that those French people call eveille²¹³. And whether such a one be most awake, or asleep. In a dream we are then nearest awake when we perceive that it is a dream. What is life else but a dream? Apparitions, vision, fancy. Think of this often, and that thou art but as in a second sort of dream.

Better, much better to dream (as they say); than to be in that other manner awake and sprightly.

What remedy is there against that fervour, eagerness, vehemence, but in the contrary behaviour, which will be called dullness and stupidity?

If at any time it be said, he is changed: he is grown dull: he has lost what he had either of wit or humour; * * * . All is well: and thou mayst rejoice, as over a good sign: for such it is.

St. Giles. December 1699.

How happy had it been with thee, hadst thou kept to these rules! Now see! Whither a certain lightness and transport has led thee! And what passions are grown from those wrong indulgences in friendship! Wretch! * * * ²¹⁴.

Consider, * * * . (L. 2 C.18).

If thou canst not think of these as sores; all is corruption and sore to the bottom of thy mind. do therefore as becomes thee, * * * ²¹⁵. But it is in thy power to think of these as sores, and treat them as such. Therefore remember after any weak seasons, as after dreams or fancies of the night or after [inf. 168] any overpowering encounters, any of those high florid luxuriant thoughts²¹⁶, any of that treacherous joy²¹⁷, any of those desires, loves, impotent wishes,

²¹⁰Sup. 68.

²¹¹375.

²¹²Inf. 386.

²¹³Sup. 3.

²¹⁴* * * . Ep. L. 2 C. 18.

²¹⁵Plat: *ibid*.

²¹⁶Sup. 82.

²¹⁷Sup. 75 & 74.

hopes, discourses, ravings; remember how this running ulcer is to be treated. Remember how it is that the purulent matter²¹⁸ gathers, that the part inflames, that the fungus's²¹⁹ and the proud flesh arise, and that at least the part mortifies and grows insensible. Is the feeling in the meanwhile to be indulged on this occasion? Is the itch to be satisfied, or the patient allowed to appease the eagerness of it by scratching, or by tempering or feeling? Is not the part to be bound up close, and kept from the air? And when it is opened to dress, are not incisions, cauteries and other things to be used, and all of this patiently and even cheerfully endured through hope of the cure? How then? Wilt thou tamper with thy self? wilt thou indulge? Wilt thou spare thy flesh and fly from the fire, the steel, the operations and sharper remedies? Or are the other wounds something, but these nothing? Is it no matter how it is within, or whether thou livest always with a macerated corrupted mind? Wouldst thou willingly go out of the world because of such a body that is incurable; and most because of such a mind?

Either, therefore, thou art curable, or not. But if curable; remember in what way, and what belongs to one who is a **patient**, and under cure.

The same as in na amputation. Either (says He) you must part with this limb, or die. --- I part with it. --- Then bear the operation --- But it will cost me pain. --- Then die. For, what is there else? How deal with such a passion as this? If it stays; must it not be a worse gangrenous than that other? If it goes; can it go without pain? Be patient therefore, and endure what is necessary. For thou must either bear the remedy or the disease, or death. But the disease here is intolerable: therefore choose of the other two, and say which. [169]

* * * &c²²⁰.

Well may the * * * be so compared with the surgeon's instruments. For consider the wounds which they are to cure. Consider how it is whenever the instruments are ever so little disused. What inflammation, soreness, putrefaction? And when the part is benumbed and without feeling, how much worse is the symptom? How much more desperate the case? What incisions ere the sound flesh is come at, and the wound again lay open, as it should be? Remember therefore to search the wound, and that here it is necessary to probe often.

Remember to inquiry within; how is the sore?²²¹ How does it heal, or change? How was it in bed? In the night? as I slept? As I lay awake? How this morning? How at meals? how after exercise, going abroad, business, application, pleasure? --- Is it not thus with one who has but a common sore? And for fear of what? For fear of being lame; for fear of a deformity of person; for fear of being offensive by an ill smell. What solitude! What anxious care! What concern and thoughtfulness! Who can tell me anything that is good for me? Where can I have the best advice? Talk to me of this. For, what else can I hear of? What can I mind else in my condition?²²² --- Is it not thus that they go from one company to another, inquiring, searching, reasoning and all with relation to this dreaded distemper? But what is this distemper in comparison with another? Is this the only proper distemper? Are other sores less felt within? is there not a worse lameness, a worse deformity and filth? How then? Is there to be less solicitude here? Is there good reason to look up, and go about unconcerned as one that had no **WOUND**, no ail within? Is that wretch excusable who wanders about [170] melancholy, disconsolate and pining, as carrying that within his body which consumes him: and shall he only not be concerned who carries the same in amore inward breast, and is prayed upon, and daily devoured within? or are the **PASSIONS** nothing? Is the other distemper real, and this imaginary? If so; have done: go to the remedies no more: no

²¹⁸Sup. 78.

²¹⁹Sup. 65.

²²⁰M. L. 3 § ...

²²¹* * * L. 2 C. 18.

²²²* * * L. 3 C. 24.

more as he that has sore eyes to the spung and water²²³: no more as to the surgeon's shop²²⁴. But if it be not so; but contrary-wise; if there be no real distemper of A MAN but the distemper of his mind; if neither lameness, nor sore, nor any other distemper, nor death it self be anything to him with whom opinion is not distempered; then remember that this is the only distemper, the only sore, which thou now labourest under. And remember that it is not thy business to show a cheerful face²²⁵ and walk abroad as one healthy and of a good constitution: but that thy proper carriage (if in a way of cure) is as thus; * * * &c. C. 52.

Fear not. That which is now, diet, confinement, physic and the surgeon's instruments²²⁶, will in a little time be wholesome food, liberty, **open air**, exercise of limbs, and a nobler use of instruments the * * * according to nature; providing that thou continuest in this method, invariably, immovably: remembering the two assistants: * * * ²²⁷.

And this: * * * . M L. 10 § 8²²⁸. [171]

Remember that the sovereign precept, to cut off the * * *, and to use strongly the * * * is in a real sense dejection, mortification and nothing less: the depressing, extinguishing, killing that wrong sort of joy and enlivened temper²²⁹: the starving supplanting that exuberant luxuriant fancy (the sapping and undermining of the passions, cutting the grass under their feet, drying up the sources that feed, cutting the fibres of the root to intercept nourishment): and the introducing a contrary disposition, viz. the weaned, allay, low, sunk; that which creates a mean and low opinion of outward things, diminishes the objects, and brings to view the viler but truer side of things²³⁰.

When this works strongly; the * * * works as it should do. It is well. Be of good hope. When the other disposition has any footing, or creeps upon the mind, secretly, imperceptibly, in any form or specious shape (as of friendliness, humanity, amiable pleasures, social joys, sympathy, natural affection, endearment, tenderness, love) remember here is the poison, here the corruption, the dissolution of all. Here the * * * ranges and has free liberty. Is this not for thy state? Knowst thou yet how to use these affections? Is it for tee to take up the * * *, and manage it as he that has nerves?²³¹ Are thou past the first degree? Art thou no longer frustrated or hindered? Hast thou no more to do but to seek the * * *, being sure to act as thou pleasest and as thou decreest? Are thou at leisure to polish? If far from this; if far from being conqueror of the first; if every day foiled and beaten; if the sores are still fresh and bleeding; what shouldst thou do but treat thy self as belongs to thy state? Not allowing stronger food: not aiming at robustness while in a languishing state: not venturing to add spirits to the fever, nor nerves to the convulsions²³². Or is it the same as if all were well? Is there not most reason for dejection when the distemper is thus forgot? How when the relapses are repeated, and that there is every hour some breaking out? what looks, what countenance, befits such a one? But stay until I am confirmed: and then see²³³. In the mean while let it be * * * : and rejoice that it is so. [inf. 186

Chelsea may 12: 1700.

²²³Mar. L. 5 § 9.

²²⁴Ep. L... C ...

²²⁵* * * L. 2 C. 8.

²²⁶Sup. 169.

²²⁷* * *

²²⁸viz. * * *.

²²⁹Sup. 78.

²³⁰Sup. 3.

²³¹L. 2 C. 8.

²³²L. 2 C. 15.

²³³L. 2. C. 8.

Agreeably to what has been said above concerning the cure of the sores, the * * * &c.: by the suspension of the * * * and vigorous use of the * * * ; remember the Platonist in his oration²³⁴. * * * . And remember that these are the only stripes that can drive out those other spoken of above²³⁵. * * * .

Remember what the mystics call dryness: and stick to this. See the effect and what good will come of it. Do not faint, nor give up²³⁶. * * * . Ep. L. 2 C. 18.

²³⁴Max. Tyr. Dis. 9 in fine.

²³⁵Sup. 83.

²³⁶M. L. 5 § 9.

[76] Rotterdam 1698.

LIFE

* * * . --- From one pulsation (as in a water-engine) to another: from one draught and remission of air, to another: from repletion to exoneration, and from exoneration to repletion: from toil and labour, to rest; and from dreams of one sort, to dreams and delusions of another. --- This is life²³⁷. --- Recruiting, repairing, feeding, covering, cleasing, purging. --- Aliments, reggs, excrements, dregs. --- Which of all these sensations is it for which life is eligible? Where is the day or hour in which we can say we live upon the present, and that our happiness is not still future and in promise? Which part of our past life would we desire to live over again? For the sake of what? For the plays and pastimes of childhood? Or for the diversions of that age which next succeeded? If for neither; what is it then that we call sweet in life? When can any future pleasures or joys (if it is by these that we reckon) equal the vigour and liveliness of those past, and of an age when the sensations of that kind are exquisitest? Where, therefore, lies the charm and templatation? The past, and present, are nothing; and the future is all. Now, what can this produce? Everything wastes and is perishing: everything hastens to its dissolution: already thou thy self art come to a perfect growth; and now thy body is in decline and faster and faster must corrupt: mortalities must every day be expected: friends dropping off: accidents and calamities impending: diseases, lameness, deafness, loss of sight, of memory, of parts: [77] few persons in the world growing better: and many growing worse every day, so as to loose the natural good disposition they once had --- all is misery, disappointment and regret. In vain we endeavour to drive away these thoughts. In vain we strive by humour and diversion, to raise our selves: which is but in order to fall the lower. He, and He only is in any degree happy, who can confront these things; who can steadily look on them, without turning away his sight; and who, knowing the sum and conclusion of all, waits for the finishing of his part: his only care, in the meanwhile, being to act that part as becomes him, and to preserve his mind entire and sound; unshaken and uncorrupted; in friendship with mankind, and in unity with that original mind in respect to which nothing either does or can happen but what is most agreeable and conducing, and what is of universal good.

Consider the number of animals that live and draw their breath; and although whom belong that which we call life, for which we are so much concerned: beasts: insects: the swarm of mankind sticking to this earth: the number of males and females in copulation: the number of females in delivery: and the number of both sexes in this one and same instant expiring, and at their last gasp: the skreeks, cries, voices of pleasure, shoutings, groans; and the mixed noise of all this together. Think of the number of those that died before thou wert, and since: how many of those that came into the world at the same time and since: and of those now alive, what alteration. Consider the faces of those of thy acquaintance, as thou sawst them some years since: how changed since then! How macerated and decayed! All is corruption and rottenness: nothing at a stay; but continued changes and successions renew the face of the world.

* * * . [inf. 172

St. Giles Dec. 31 1699

Wish for noon; then for evening; then for tomorrow; then for a new day. A week hence and I shall receive such a letter. In a fortnight afterwards I shall be satisfied about such an affair. Next month I shall see the end of this and what the issue will be of the other. One year more and I shall see how this matter in the public is like to go: and how that other in my own family. And when all this is come about, what then? Will things be all settled and fixed when they are

²³⁷* * * &c. L. 1 C. 9.

come thither? Will the sun and moon stop their course?²³⁸ Or, which is all one, will those changes, successions, or revolutions of things be stopped, or but suspended or stayed? Must not corruptions, decays and deaths carry on the course of the world? Are not particular men and societies of men, families and nations included in this great circulation? Are not relation, friends, thy country and self included? And are not all things continually changing state? What state of affairs therefore is it that thou waitest for? What wouldst thou see brought about in thy family or country?

Are they flourishing or but in a tolerable way now at this present? Wait but a little, and thou shall see it otherwise. Mortalities will come: corruptions public and private: friends falling off by degrees, and carried away; some by death; others before death: a new face of things: new revolutions²³⁹. Or wouldst thou live and grow older and yet expect to see no deaths, no changes, no disorders, no decays? If this be senseless; what is it to wait for events, to look out for new settlements and regulations, to build and rear and prop that which can never stand and is still mouldering away faster and faster?²⁴⁰ Why look beyond this day? Why live still for tomorrow, and not the present? --- But when I have seen an end of this; this shall be the last time. --- And so every time. How long has it been thus? How often thus deceived? To what an age art thou now come [173] since this was determined? And see where thou findest thy self? is it not at the same place? Meditating the same things, and in the same manner? * * * ²⁴¹;

When therefore wilt thou begin **TO LIVE**? How long shall thy life be this imperfect and broken? How long ere thou rememberest that thou art not to live tomorrow; but to day? And that thou dost not live today, unless tomorrow be as it were set out, and appointed for death?

As oft as thou sayest tomorrow, remember that tomorrow is for death and not for life: otherwise thou art dead already; and dead still in a worse sense, if what is said here be not thoroughly felt.

Remember that **LIFE** is this present moment and that it is ridiculous to live ill now, in order to live well at any time hence. And yet, how oft is this the case?

Remember that the best preparation against the future, is to mind the present.

One tem year more: and then another tem: and then even in a VULGAR way, death is to be thought on, and the thoughts turned that way. Who shall succeed? Who inherit? And is it not truly VULGAR to stay until then? And either now, or then, to be concerned for more than to this present?

Will it be any otherwise than it has been? Was it not to day, as it was yesterday? And yesterday as the day before? Think what yesterday was, and how far thou wouldst esteem it an advantage to live it over again, and so again and again? Who would bear it? Yet what is LIFE else? Why need another yesterday? How often wouldst thou live it over again? [174] To what further time wouldst thou live? Hast thou not seen enough? is not once seeing enough? how often wouldst thou be spectator? How long a guest?²⁴² Where is the modesty of this? Where the respect, observance, duty, gratitude towards the master of the feast?²⁴³ How is this * * * (§ 58)? Enough then²⁴⁴. Rise, and give thanks. * * *

²³⁸Sup. 52.

²³⁹Sup. 143.

²⁴⁰Sup. 52 & 165.

²⁴¹M. L. 6 § ... Sup. 107.

²⁴²Sup. 127.

²⁴³C. 21 ... & * * * C. 12 * * * C. 23.

M. L. 6 § ... And remember the lying in state: and how it is in shows of that kind --- pass on move. You have seen. Let others see.

At night always this. I have been admitted to the spectacle: I have seen, I have applauded. It is enough. Thanks to Him who introduced me, who gave me this privilege, this advantage.

In the morning. Am I to see anew? Am I to be present yet longer? Content. I am not weary, nor even can be of such a spectacle, such a theatre, such a presence; nor of acting whatever part such a master assigns me²⁴⁵. Be it ever so long; I stay; and am willing to see on; while my sight continues sound; while I can be a spectator such as I ought to be; while I can see reverently, justly, with understanding and applause: and when I can no more; I retire; not disdainfully; but in reverence to the spectacle and MASTER. Giving thanks * * * ²⁴⁶. L. 2 C. 2.

Life, what? To whom in common? Volatiles, reptiles, aquatics, and anfibious kind, flocks, herds, and the herd of mankind. What is it in a fectus? What in a worm? What in the vegetables? Filii terra emancipati²⁴⁷. Those with their mouth upwards, catching their nourishment here and there: these with their mouths downwards, [175] fixed to a place, and sucking their nourishment from the earth. What difference in anatomy? Where is there some art and curiosity in the one, more than in the other? Pipes and juices: and in that other sort, a more subtle juice; spirits that agitate to and fro, and move the strings and wires that move the engine.

* * * &c²⁴⁸. And so this:

* * *²⁴⁹. And this.

* * * &c²⁵⁰:

* * *²⁵¹.

* * *²⁵².

* * *²⁵³.

* * *. M. L. 4 § penult²⁵⁴.

²⁴⁴Inf. 176.

²⁴⁵C. 23.

²⁴⁶Inf. 176.

²⁴⁷[em branco]

²⁴⁸Mar. L. 4 § 32.

²⁴⁹M. L. 7 § 3.

²⁵⁰M. L. 5 § 33.

²⁵¹M. L. 9 § ...

²⁵²M. L. 10.

²⁵³M. L. 12 § ...

²⁵⁴Sup. 86.

[90] Rotterdam 1698.

PHILOSOPHY

What specious exercise is found in those which are called philosophical speculations! --- The formation of ideas! Their compositions, comparisons, agreement, disagreement! What is thus the purpose? Let me look within my self. Let me observe there, whether or no there be connection and consistency; agreement or disagreement: whether that which I approve this hour I do not disapprove the next: but keep my opinion liking and esteem of things the same. If otherwise; to what purpose is all this reasoning and acuteness? To day things have succeeded well with me; consequently my hopes and opinions are raised: it is a fine world! All is glorious! Mankind, conversation, company, society, what can be more desirable? Tomorrow comes disappointments, crosses, disgrace. And what follows? "Oh, miserable mankind! Wretched state! Who would live out of solitude? Who would engage in the public and serve mankind?" Philosopher! Where are thy ideas? Where is truth, certainty, evidence so much talked of? It is here that they are to be maintained, if anywhere. Again. What are my ideas of the world, of pleasures, riches, fame, life? What judgement am I to make of mankind and human affairs? What sentiments am I to frame? What opinions? Or maxims? If none at all; why do I concern my self for anything or study anything with such nicety of distinction? Is it to me, for instance, to know what kind of idea I can have of space? The 3 angles of a triangle are equal to two right. Of this I have clear ideas: this I can be certain of. What is this to me? What am I the wiser or better? Let me hear concerning what is of some use to me. [91] Let me hear (for instance) concerning life what the right notion is, and what I am to stand to: that I may not, when the spleen comes, cry vanity! And at the same time complain that life is short and passing. For why so short; if not found sweet? Why do I complain both ways? Is vanity, mere vanity, a happiness? Or can misery pass away too soon? This is of moment to me to examine. This is what is worth my while. If I cannot find the agreement or disagreement of my ideas in this place; if I can come to nothing certain here; what is all the rest to me? What signifies it how I come by my ideas, or how I compound them; which are simple, and which complex? If I have a right idea of life now at this moment, that I think slightly of it and resolve with my self that it may easily be laid down; teach me how I shall remain in this opinion; what is it that changes it; and how this disturbance happens: by what innovation, what composition, what intervention of other ideas. If this be the subject of the philosophical art; I readily apply to it, and study it. If there be nothing of this in the case, I have no occasion for this sort of learning, and am no more desirous at knowing how I form and compound those ideas which are distinguished by words than I am of knowing how, and by what motions of my mouth I form those articulate sounds, which I can full as well pronounce and use, without any such science or speculation.

Either that which I call philosophy I name so from the subtlety and niceness of the speculation (and then mathematics, physics and all that kind is philosophy) or, from its being the superior and judge of all the other, that which teaches happiness and gives the rule of life. Again. If the study of happiness be philosophy, and that happiness be in outward things; then the study of those outward things in which happiness consists, and how to attain those outward things, is philosophy. And therefore policy, the study of wealth, preferment, or some other such thing, must be that which we call philosophy. Whereas, if happiness be not in outward things but in a mind; [inf. 156 then the way to happiness must be to correct and amend those opinions which we commonly have of outward things: and thus the work of philosophy is to fortify a mind, to learn how to be secure against avarice, ambition, intemperance; how to throw off cowardice and effeminacy; how to cure disquiet, restlessness, anxiety and to find that which may satisfy and content; since riches, honour, &c.: neither can; nor if they could, are such as to be counted on, as durable or certain. Here therefore lies philosophy (if philosophy be anything) and this everyone sees is a matter of practice. What have I to do therefore with those speculations which relate not to my own amendment? --- But it is necessary I should examine my

ideas. --- What ideas? The ideas of space, extension, solidity? What is it to me whether a vacuum or no vacuum? Whether matter be divisible in infinitum, or not divisible? What have I to do with the examination of those ideas which I may be the best versed in, of any man in the world, and yet of all men be the farthest from tranquillity?

Why wonder at philosophy? If philosophy be (as defined) the study of happiness; what does every one but in some manner or another, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophise? For, either happiness is in outward things; or from self and outward things together; or from self alone and not from outward things. If from outward things alone; then show us that all men are equally happy according to these, and that no one is ever miserable by his own fault. But this nobody pretends to show, but all confess the contrary. It remains therefore that happiness is either from self alone; or from outward things and self. if from self alone; what should I do, but study self. if partly [157] from outward things, partly from self; then the one and the other must be considered, and some price or other set to those matters of an inward kind and that depend on self. if so; and that I consider in what and how these are to be preferred, how they are to take place and how yield; what is this but to philosophise? For, what must I do in this case; since something there is which depends on my self? how is that self to be governed? How far, and in what am I to be concerned? If anyway at all, it must be thus: how to free my self from those contradictory pursuits and opposite passions which make me inconsistent with my self and own relations; how to extinguish that which is the occasion of repentance; how to calm my anger; how to quell resentment and revenge; how to contain in matters of venery, so as not to fall into extravagant loves, or be entangled in any passion of that sort from whence I may not easily get free; how to keep out luxury, and hinder effeminacy, laziness, and those other sorts of passions from gaining ground; how to stand out against ambition, prevent avarice and immoderate appetites; how to bear with accidents and support the common chances of the world. --- but if I study this, and turn philosopher after this manner; I shall be of no consideration in the world: I shall loose other advantages. --- right. And therefore this still is philosophy: this is the thing it self: to inquiry where and in what we are losers: which are the greatest gains: whether I shall find my account in letting these inward matters run as they please: or whether I shall be better secure against fortune, by settling matters within; than by acquiring first one great friend, and then another; or by adding still more and more to my state or quality. Begin then; and set the bounds. Let us hear: how far are we to go, and no further? What is a moderate fortune, a competency and those other degrees commonly talked of? Where [158] is my anger to stop? Or how high to rise? How far engage in amours and love? How far allow of ambition? How far of other appetites? Or, am I to set all loose? Are all these passions to take their swing, and no application to be given to these; but all to the outward things they aim at? Or if any application; say, how much to the one, and how much to the other? How far are the appetites to be minded, and how far outward things? Give us the measure and rule. See whether this be not to philosophise: and whether willingly or unwillingly every one does not do as much. --- Where then is the difference? Who is it that philosophises well, and who ill? --- Weigh and consider. --- But the examination is troublesome, and I had better be without it. --- Who says this --- Reason --- How thou therefore polished thy reason, bestowed pains upon it, and exercised it in this subject? Or, is it likely to pronounce as well altogether when unexercised as when exercised? Whose reason is truer in mathematics, His whose is exercised, or whose is unexercised? Whose in policy and civil affairs? Whose in physic, or any other subject whatever? How comes morality and life to be excepted?

Thus is philosophy established. For, as every one reasons, and cannot but of necessity reason concerning his own happiness, concerning what is his good, what his ill; so the question here is only who reasons best. For even He who rejects this reasoning or deliberating part, does it from a certain reason, and from a persuasion that this is best.

[159]

[Go to 2nd book p. 36 and inf. p. 190]

* * * (L. 1. C. 25). The cataract in the eye and the many other cures in physic. In mathematics how? In astronomy? The world moving: sun standing still. Say this to the vulgar, and hear what they will reply. Thus even in trade and politics (subjects vulgar enough; and such as interest makes to be well examined) consider the two proposition. An ounce of silver worth an ounce of silver. Dominion founded in property. Easy maxims, plain, certain. Yet how hard! What a mystery and how unintelligible with the greater part even of professors in this kind!

Consider now the * * * : how easy! The * * * , and * * * . The * * * and * * * . How easy? And yet...

IDEAS. VISA. ---.

* * *

See above in page 78 what should have been placed here.

[78] [See below *Ideas* &c p. 96 &c. where this should be placed]

* * *²⁵⁵.

Of these fancies remember four sorts.

The 1st such as are absolutely virtuous, and require expiation: which remember religiously to perform²⁵⁶.

The 2nd of a mixed kind, and flattering by what they borrow from virtue. Against these, fight, as against chimeras, centaurs, monsters.

The 3d sort; such as are necessary, as concerning relations, family, friends, public. Let these be sparingly admitted, and never but in a certain disposition; i.e., when they strike not deep, nor closely affect: but when the temper is allayed, and the * * * rightly set.

4. As for the last sort, viz.: those unnecessary, wandering, uncertain ones, that haunt the mind and busy it as in dreams; these, as no other than the excrecenses and funguses of the mind, endeavour to cut wholly off, much rather than the wants or corns off thy body: and not merely as lumber and weight; but because the fancies of this kind like suckers draw from the good nourishment of the mind, and spend its strength. This is that matter which serves to fancy a strong and luxuriant fancy, wit, and sets off conversation²⁵⁷. Perhaps, too, this is what may prepare for action, and produce capacity and ability in affairs, by creating readiness of mind, where so many things are thought of, and such a multitude of cases presupposed. But it is not thy aim either to be a noted wit, or one of those busy engagers in the world. [79] If so; lay aside those other aims which are towards tranquillity and the possession of a mind. for, those things are no ways mutually reconcilable. [inf. 96]

Upon what does all depend? Where is there ground of hopes? Where the refuge, safety and security, but in the aptness, readiness, vigour and piercingness of the right images, appearances, rules, and in the habit of the mind this way?²⁵⁸ Now, how should this be vigorous, prompt, offering themselves and crowding in upon occasion, where there is need of defence? How should these be rendered thus familiar, native, genuine, but by being engrafted, rooted, or (if I may say so) incorporated with the mind? and how should this be, while the mind vacates to other and contrary ideas? While it lives and inhabits among those, and only visits these? --- Remember therefore this * * * , and to have it present in all trifling, fond, dallying, wandering, floating seasons. Remember that all this while, I am tempering, sharpening, pointing, the wrong and destructive visa: while for want of use, the others lose their edge, grow dull, unweildy, and unmanageable.

When any idea of pleasure strikes; reason thus --- Before I had this idea, before I was thus struck, was it ill with me? --- No. --- Therefore remove the idea, and I am well. --- But having this idea such as I have, I cannot want the thing without regret. --- See therefore which is best: either to suffer under this want, till the idea be removed; or by

²⁵⁵M. L. 8 Sec. ...

²⁵⁶Inf. 83. 312. 241.

²⁵⁷Inf. 171. 342.

²⁵⁸* * *. L. 5 C. 27.

satisfying this want, confirm not only this idea, but all of the same stamp? What is this but to nourish impotence, and lay a lasting groundwork of distress, misery, and growing want? [97]

To resist the assault of any one idea, is to raise a siege. To yield, is to suffer a breach for all to enter and take possession. What contest, what combat can equal this, which is for no less a matter than piety, friendship, fidelity, probity, magnanimity, peace and tranquillity? In which deity, religion, laws, country are included? What are those other laurels? The naval and civic crowns? What are those other victories and triumphs to this? And yet, what remiseness, what deadness here?

See whenever any melancholy fancy occurs, not compound with it²⁵⁹ (as God forbid --- No. But not quite so bad. Or, it may mend, or non si male nunc, et obim sic erit)²⁶⁰: but run straight to what is furthest and suppose the worst: suppose all to have already happen that can happen. If it be health that is threatened; suppose disease and death: if reputation; suppose infamy and utter disgrace: if it be an ill in family affairs or in the public, suppose both the one and the other entirely ruined and already extinct. Thus all low and mean thoughts will be removed; all earnest engagements, pursuits, endeavours laid side; * * * ²⁶¹.

There is nothing more useful in the management of the visa, or that helps to fight more strongly against the striking imaginations, than to learn a sort of costume of putting them into words, making them speak out and explain themselves as it were vivâ voce, and not tacitly and murmuring²⁶²; not by a whisper and indirect insinuation, imperfectly, indistinctly and confusedly, as their common way is. For instance. I hear of a great, a prodigious State. I find, I admire. What [inf. 110 is it I say to my self? what is it the imagination tells me? --- Happy is he that can keep so many horses, so many coaches, such a table! For, what else is it that makes an State be admired? Take away the dishes, the sweryes, the furniture, pictures, brick, stone, grass-plots, gravel and the rest; and what is there left even for the vulgar to admire?

Again, I hear, on the other side, of some loss of fortune and estate. I am moved. The fancy prevails. What is it I can say to my self? --- If this go on, I must sell all, and live privately. --- Do so then, and live privately. I shall not a have a servant left. --- right. Then begin and serve thy self. --- But, I shall want bread. And what of that? I shall die. Is there anything more? Where is the harm? Why not die thus as well as any other way? As well as of fever, of gout, or stone, or (but a few years hence if I live until then) of age?²⁶³ --- But this is shameful. --- For whom? For others perhaps it may be shameful, that an honest man starves: but which way can it be shameful for Him, him self? which way can it be his shame, if not his fault? Can a man on any other occasion die, as becomes a man, die generously and nobly; and cannot He, in the same manner, starve as generously and nobly, as with as good a heart? What is there that should hinder? Say. What is generosity? What, magnanimity? And where else can these be showed, where practised besides, if not here?

These are the dialogues that are to be studied and dwelt upon, written, meditated, revolved. These are the discourses we should be versed in, instead of those which we affect so much with other people, to convince other of their duty, and of what is fitting and just. What have I to do with others? Let me first convince my self. let me learn to reason and discourse thus with my own mind: that I may be no longer inconsistent with my self and my own reason,

²⁵⁹ Inf. 109.

²⁶⁰ Hor. Od. 10 L. 2.

²⁶¹ Cap. 28.

²⁶² * * *. L. 2 C. 16.

²⁶³ * * *. L. 1 C. 9.

[111] and live in perpetual disorder and perplexity. Let me examine my ideas, challenge and talk with them thus before they be admitted to pass²⁶⁴. Idea! Wait a little, stay for me, until I am ready: until I have recollected my self: come on. Let us see. What art thou? And from hence?²⁶⁵

What is the subject? Is it riches? Or at title? Is it a female? Is it renown and credit? --- My name will be famous! --- Amongst whom? In what place? For how long? What if it were to reach to Asia? What if to continue a thousand years, or more? Erostratus has a name. Alexander has a name. What is this to them, now at this time? What was it them, during their life? What is **fame**?²⁶⁶ --- A certain sound²⁶⁷. --- Of which kind? Of trumpets, timbrels, drums? --- No. But of tongues. --- Of what tongues? Of such as are governed by reason, or that have any regular and steady motion, or that are consonant to themselves? --- No: but on the contrary, that are irrationally governed, wild, inherent, inconsonant. --- What, therefore, is FAME? --- What is the rustling of the wind amongst the trees? --- Is this all? --- Say, then; what is there else? What is it that praise can confer? What is there that is made better by it? What is it to the diamond, or the purple? What to a generous and worthy mind? what is it to the sun whether it be magnified or disparaged? Whether He be thought intelligent, or unintelligent? Whether He be thought to move about the earth; or the earth and all the other planets to move about him, and to attend Him? Consider yet further. What is it to deity it self whether praised or dispraised; acknowledged or disowned? Where is the hurt? Can deity suffer? Is it His ill? How can this be? Yet see! Are there not those who blaspheme, revile and disparage? What do even those do, who think they praise? Now if deity admit this; if deity suffer not; what else can suffer? What other perfection be impaired? How canst thou be worsted, or injured? --- [112] But others will suffer: others will be deceived. --- What is that to tee? What hast thou to do with their calamity, their will? Why concerned for this error of theirs more than for any other? If they disparage virtue, if they revile goodness; what matter is it in what subject, and who the person is? Whether it be in thy person, or in that of Socrates or Diogenes? Where then lies the ill of obloquy, unjust censure and reproach? --- Where else but in the minds of those who carry it and are the authors of it? --- But in my own mind, how is it an ill, and when? --- When opinion makes it so.

This is the right use of ideas and appearances. This is treating them as is fitting. This is the art and method to be learnt: how to put them into words; so as to reason with them; force them to speak; hear their language and return them their answer. This is the rhetoric eloquence and wit which we should affect²⁶⁸. Here it is we should be dextrous, expert and ready. This are the turns, and this the presence of mind which we should admire and be emulators of. And if we improved once in this way; we should see the effect; and how well would all be WITHIN.

Remember that in the * * * , one of the chief parts is the inversion, change and transforming²⁶⁹ of the fancies or appearances, and the wresting of them from their natural and vulgar scene into a meaning truly natural and free of all delusion and imposture. I am told I shall be honoured. --- right. For, I may indicate to my self the highest dignity. --- I shall be enriched. --- right. For, I may roll (as they say) in riches, if I mistake not what riches are, so as to take shells, minerals and stones for such: if I mistake not about the place of riches, [113] and instead of a mind, suppose a trunk: if I take not ought what else for riches but what makes rich and satisfies; brings plenty, affluence, ease, prosperity; renders

²⁶⁴l. 2 C. 18.

²⁶⁵L. 3 C. 13.

²⁶⁶Sup. 109.

²⁶⁷Sup. 45.

²⁶⁸* * * . M. L. 10 § ult.

²⁶⁹333. 354.

fully contented, so as to desire nothing beyond, and fully secure, so as to fear no change. In short I may have of wealth all that I can think of, all that I can bear or carry; if I esteem him rich only, who is wise²⁷⁰.

Thus as to the incident fancies that come in the way, and offer from abroad. Consider now, how to raise and excite other such, draw them out and exercise them; that so the superior part which disciplines, instructs, and manages these subjects, may not loose its authority and command, may not be idle; but still at work amending, framing, polishing, transforming, so as to give everything an edge this way, and have wherewithal to render every appearance or idea instrumental and serviceable. If I am heavy and dull, unwilling to awake and rise; consider what it is that would soon awaken and raise tee up. --- The enemy is near, and now entering. --- And is it not so? What do we call na enemy? What makes an enemy dreadful? What are the consequences feared? Captivity, slavery, misery. --- And is not this the question here? Is not the contest concerning liberty? Is it not concerning happiness and misery? Whether there shall be enemies innumerable, and such as must often slave and conquer; and whether there shall be no enemy, but all safe, secure, undisturbed and happy? How comes it therefor e I am not alarmed? Where should I be alarmed but here? If matters be right here, I may sleep sound and secure; whatever enemies or weapons stand at the door. If y sleep be of another kind; if laziness, torpor and indolence have got hold of me, and that I no longer sleep because it is what my body wants, and what I therefore think fit to allow to it; if such be the case; up! Rise! The enemy is at the door, and a dangerous, a dreadful enemy not like [inf. 126 that other which can touch nothing that is thine, nothing that thou art concerned for. Here is the enemy to be feared, and that has admittance where the things of only importance are kept. Here is the enemy that is to be opposed with all might and strength. And here if thou wilt thyself thou mayst be sure of conquest.

Again. Turn it another way. Take it from any other side. --- I am called --- art thou not called? Is it because thou hearst no voice? --- I am commanded. --- art thou not commanded? Is it not a command of a higher nature? From a higher person? Of higher importance? Is not the duty, a much greater duty? The law, a greater law?

These are the **inversions**. This is the right modelling or moulding of the visa. Such is that good fire²⁷¹ or stomach²⁷² that can overpower and rightly convert whatever is known into it; and can turn the same into its use and advantage. --- I am undeservingly reproached and for acting well. --- Be it so; then I am still be more deserving; if I act on. --- But I lose applause with men. --- Therefore I have higher applause elsewhere. --- I am thrown into solitude. --- Therefore I am left with better company. I am not obliged to mind trifles: I am not diverted or called away from another presence and contemplation. I am all my own, and entire towards deity and that genius and companion which He has given me, and which governs for Him, and only waits His pleasure. --- But I am no longer useful in the world. --- Neither can I be so, more than for a certain time. Is it age, that puts the period?²⁷³ It is [127] well. Is it anything before age? Then here is that that is instead of it. What would I have? Have I not seen enough? Is not the last act finished?²⁷⁴ Is not the piece complete? The curtain falls: and I go out. would I begin anew and see the same over again, or stay after the spectacle is ceased, and nothing but the place remains? If neither of these; what have I to do but to retire cheerfully, contentedly and thankfully? Could it be said even in an Epicurean manner --- edisti satis atque bebistti: and in the same manner --- exact contentus tempore vitae, recedat ut conciva satur --- and shall not another say ipse Deus simul atque volam, me sobret --- Is not His dismissal enough? what do I stay for, more? --- These are the considerations of moment. Thus are the appearances disposed and modelled. On this architecture all depends.

²⁷⁰ Plat. in Phaedr.

²⁷¹ Mar. L. 4 § 1.

²⁷² l. 10 § 31-35.

²⁷³ Sup. 108.

²⁷⁴ Mar. Last section.

Remember that it is the same here as in an army. If the soldiers are often reviewed, disciplined, and kept in exercise and obedience; all will be orderly and well: if left to themselves; disorder, mutiny and confusion will follow; much mischief, but no good, no soccur or defence.

Thus if the principal and commanding part²⁷⁵ keep its command, and preserve its subjects (the visa and appearances) in right discipline and exercise; all will be well, and every engagement and action successful and of advantage. [128]

To the same art (viz. the inversion of appearances) all those passages in Marcus are belonging. As book 4 section 29 [Gat]: a stranger²⁷⁶. A deserter²⁷⁷ or renegade. A beggar. An excrescence, wrat or wen. Blindness. Lameness. Amputation: an arm or leg²⁷⁸ divided from the body. A branch²⁷⁹ lapt off. A gardener²⁸⁰ and engaging. Thus book 3 section 15 [Gat]. To rob (not with hands: but with another part: not as vindicating to our selves what the law has made anothers; but what a superior law has decreeding not belonging to us and of another jurisdicion, * * *). Seed (not that which is thrown into the earth or matrix²⁸¹). A sale, bargain, exchange (nothing gratis²⁸². Lettices Ench. C. 32). Quiet, ease, a sweet repose, happy retirement, tranquillity (not that which outward things establish²⁸³; not that which must be owing to others; not a sea shore, not rocks, not woods, or caves²⁸⁴). To see²⁸⁵, to feel things (not with the eye or by a touch; but in another manner). And as in Marcus: so elsewhere.

[Rotterdam An. D. 1704.

A court, a parliament, na exchange, theatre, public, spectacle, market, fair (the greatest FAIR, and * * * to the divine man's to * * * . L. 2. C. 15. The * * * , what the * * * , fodder: and who the laughers at those to look on?).

War, heroism, campaign, prince Eugene &c.: (Hercules, Theseus, * * * L. 2 C. 16).

A tempest, storm (* * *)²⁸⁶.]²⁸⁷

Thus, at last, hardly can any appearance arise, hardly can there be any object so remote and foreign but what the mind will accommodate to itself, and turn to its own use. Let the fancy come in whatever the shape; it immediately receives a different form, and its forced is turned another way. This is just the reverse of what happens [129] to those who are grown into the thorow-buffooning habit. Everything that they see, be it ever so grave or serious, has a ridiculous appearance, and whether they will or no, becomes burlesque: everything is travested so as to make diversion out of it: and whatever be the face that offers, there are glasses ready that make it to be seen after a thousand ridiculous ways, and that instead of that one real face, present a thousand masks of a grotesque and fantastic kind. So, in the other

²⁷⁵* * *

²⁷⁶Ep. B. 2 C. 3.

²⁷⁷See also B. 10 C. 25.

²⁷⁸Book 8 Sect 34.

²⁷⁹B. 55 § 8.

²⁸⁰B. 10. Sec. 10 & 13.

²⁸¹B. 4 Sec. 36 & B. 10. 26.

²⁸²Ep. L.2 C. 10.

²⁸³B. 3 Sec. 5 & B. 4 Sec. 3.

²⁸⁴B. 10 § 15, 22, 23 & B. 5 § 29.

²⁸⁵B 10 § 26 & 3.15.

²⁸⁶Arr. L. 2 C. 18.

²⁸⁷See Suppliment below ...

way, everything light, airy or fantastic, everything that raises any curiosity, or that employs or busies mankind, be the object what it will, it takes a new face, and become serious.

The difference here, is, that as that other glass crooks and distorts the objects; so this continually straightens and redresses what is amiss, and sets everything in its due light, so as to hinder all confusion.

In the same manner as one of those studiers of wit is rejoiced on the account of some lucky word or expression that he has invented; as a poet is rejoiced when he had lucky versified; as a mathematician when he had made a discovery about lines and circles; as an architect when he has raised some artful pile; o a general some artful stratagem; when, according to thy own art which thou hast learnet, it has happened to tee skilfully and like a master, to have modelled or well fabricated some one appearance or idea²⁸⁸.

If thou hast succeeded well here; then say to thy self, I had rather this, than the Cubilo of Michael Angelo: I had rather this, than the Philipics of Demosthenes or Cicero: rather than to have wrote like Homer, or fought like Alexander. [130] If thou dost not see why this is greater and more glorious than all that other; thou art so far yet from being a proficient, that thou knowst not what thy art is; what it promises; or to what it tends.

All other arts²⁸⁹ stand in need of something exterior, as materials, spectators, auditors: so architecture, rhetoric, music and the rest. This art alone carries its materials with it (for it is its own subject²⁹⁰) and not only its materials, but spectators: for, itself contemplates itself; nor does it seeks other witnesses than such as are always present; viz., deity, and that inward genius.

All other arts are incomplete and aim at something beyond (for, which of this arts is for its own sake?). this art is complete in it self: for, this being attained, nothing further is required: since this it self is happiness and prosperity.

All other arts require some relaxation and diversion²⁹¹, and are more vigorously prosecuted after such relief; this art alone admits not of any interval, and is the worse for every relaxation. How unaccountable is it to ask to be relieved of happiness, and to require a suspension of good?²⁹² Where is it then? Where dost thou seek or expect it? If anywhere from abroad; see, what danger thou art still in, and how little any relaxation can be bore with. Remember this on every occasion of this kind. I seek relief or respite. From what? From my good?²⁹³ --- Impossible. --- From that which is not my good? --- Then see, in what thou placest thy good! Where are thy opinions? Where is philosophy? What hast thou been doing? Is conviction anything or nothing? Is all that is pleased, to go for nothing? Where wilt thou rest then? [131] To what adhere? --- Thus all is given up. For, there is no acting here by half. There is no middle way, no capitulation or compounding in the affairs of this kind. Either all is maintained, or all surrendered: every suspension is a total dismission: every receding, a betraying of the whole²⁹⁴.

²⁸⁸* * * M. L. 7.54.

²⁸⁹Sup. 64.

²⁹⁰* * * L. 3.3.

²⁹¹Sup. (Attention) pag. 84, 124 & p. 106 & 122 &c. & so p. 62, Relaxation.

²⁹²Inf. 153.

²⁹³Inf. 190.

[192] St. Giles: 1706.

Δοξαριον.

Besides many better and weightier reasons for a good man's disregard of esteem and fame, even with those who are called the better sort, there is this good warrant on his side; that in reality a true character was never well relished and understood by the critics and nice judges of the world: no, not so much as in ancient times. Socrates and Diogenes appeared as buffoons, and the first a dangerous one.

As shinning as was Marcus' character and station, He was enough censured and undervalued by the refined people. An Augustus and a court like his was more after their taste. Cato was not so amiable with this sort. A Cicero, an elder Cato, a Fabius agreed better: and to them a Pericles or Themistocles was beyond an Arsitides or a Focion. Was these two letter as well as Socrates suffered was was from the faction of these great ones, even such as pretended to be for liberty. The people of themselves were well inclined towards them and could not but live well with men whose manners were so simple and popular. The mere people, despicable as they are, have in truth the better insight and judgement in the matter. It is here, as in the virtuoso-world. The half-witted, and half-learned, who have only a smattering of the arts, are pragmatcal, conceited and only ingenious in choosing constantly amiss. A Le Brun, a Vender Werf, a French or Flemish hand is charming: a titian, or a Carache, are too masterly, and rather fright them. [193]

They can see nothing natural in that which is so very near nature. Yet often a very child or peasant shall find and bear testimony to nature, where these pretended artists are at a stand. Few indeed (as the satirist says) are so detestable as to prefer Nero to Seneca: but how many would prefer Seneca to Rufus? For see how even Tacitus himself treats this latter!

[194] St. Giles 1707/8

CITATIONS

Virgil.

Ergo agite et divum ducunt Qua jussa sequamur. Lib. 3. And soon after, when disappointed. Cedamus Phaebo, et monitumeliorasequamur.

And Lib. 5. Again this divine following.

²⁹⁴Sup. 124.

--- superat quoniam fortuna sequamur

Quoque vacat, veramus item ---

--- Quo fata trahunt retrauntque, sequamur.

Quidquid erit, superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.

The errors and wandering of an Eneas: yet sever out of his way, following, and obeying. Hence the ghot of his father in a dream:

--- Nate, iliacis exercites fatis! Ibid:

Where is there a better fate? What else is life? And which way happy or tolerable but with one thus exercised, thus broken, beaten, mured, reasoned to all the fatalities of it? * * * .

Relaxation. joy.

And as for relaxation in this case, remember what fatality! Thus Virgil: --- blanda vicissim gaudia pertentant mentem --- and what followed hence. The fate of the pilot, although the prince escapes. For thus the siren rest --- datur hora quiet pone caput, fessosque oculos furare labori.

Remember therefore how to send back this charmer, with better success. And thus in [195] answer to the * * * .

Mene salis placidi vultum fluctusque quietos

Ignorare jubes? Mene huic considerare monstro?

--- Quid enim? fallacibus Austris

Et caelli toties deceptus fraude sereni? Lib. 5. (Inf. 2nd 311).

For remember what followed. O nimium caelo & pelago confise sereno &c.

And for the other fancy (* * * &c.) as the Sybil to Eneas,

Fu ne cede malis sed contra audentior ito

Quam tua te fortuna sinet.

Turn over. [196]

English Poets.

Had he been tampted so, so had he fallen:

And so had I been favoured, had I stood.

Had I been born with his indulgent stars,

My fortune had been his, and his mine.

Dryden, Sebastian.

Reverse this: and when angry at the failings of others or the apostacy of a friend, say:

Had I been tempted so, so had I fallen

And so had He been favoured, he had stood.

(Self) For, taking the the whole birth, education and circumstances, is not tis true? Say. Let the fault be great as is will; remember only what thou hadst been, without such a godfather to lay the foundation of thy education? Without such times as made tee awake, and early sensible of public good? Without such troubles after thy godfather's decease and thy falling into other hands? Without the kindness of thy father's friends yet living in those times and encouraging and exalting tee? Without the happy acquaintance of thy good friend and ruler of thy youth in the wildest and most voluptuous days? Without thy happy breaking from courts, by being broken first with the court in Holland,

and afterwards King William's and the court-Whigs? In fine, without thy second retreat and study in Holland and all the providential deliverances inward and outward? Early family troubles and later; which with those in the public, however injurious to outward health, good for inward. [197]

Now taking (I say) all this together, see whether the reverse be not right; and whether thou mayst not add the other complete reverse too. Viz.:

Had he been born with my indulgent stars

His fortune had been mine, and mine be his.

Correct that of his hero in another place which is so specious and moving. Viz.:

My shameful death will be divulged alone,

The worth and honour of my soul unknown...

Turn over. [198]

Scripture.

***. [200]

From 2nd Ασκηματα p. 329.]

Το καλον.

Naples, April 1712.

Ο τι καλον γιδον δει. Eurip....

Cited by Junius de Pict. Ver., p. 40. [201]

P. 90 line 4 end ... Disagreement! What can have a better appearance? What can bid fairer for genuine & true philosophy? 'Tis well. But let me look a while within my self &c.

Οικονομ.

M. L. 1 § 14.

Well governed. – So of a family. --- But the image, idea only, not the prospect.

Anew. Aim only, not attainment: not as expecting the effect, projection. --- Why aim then? Or for what? For aiming's sake. Is not this enough? If not, ... go then & be an undertaker.

To manage: to undertake ... what is it?

[202] – [277].

ΑΣΚΗΜΑΤΑ

[Notebook 2: pp. 187 – 383]

[187]

Second Recess. Holland. 1703.

Quod felix faustumque sit.

* * * (III, 16).

St. Giles. 1707/8.

* * * (I, 1).

* * * (III, 24).

* * * (III, 26).

[188] Holland 1703. 1704.

Προκοπη.

* * *²⁹⁵.

Remember therefore * * *²⁹⁶; * * *²⁹⁷, the Ασκηματα²⁹⁸. To what end? And for what, all this? * * *²⁹⁹ ... and now, what? * * *³⁰⁰. Be it so then, in very deed, εργα. Nothing less: nothing more. Not a word not a syllable besides: but all within thy self, and to thy self alone. And this be as sacred with tee: never to be transgressed (as b. of law 1). But * * *. Otherwise what but * * *³⁰¹

Ever remembering this, premising this, carrying this still along with tee at all times, hereafter, now, this moment, in what thou art now doing, writing, exercising, studying; that it may be real studying, real exercise; not a cheat to abuse thy self: not a show: not fine thoughts to improve in conversation: nor the wretched pomp and fucus of meditations, even with thy self; much less for others or with a thought towards others, as seeking a discharge, evacuation, vent... what a distemper is this? What a habit? ...Vile! Vile! ... This would be to degenerate again as a while ago. For then was this truly that vile thing, that bile, crudity, vomit, flegme. Take care [189] thou return no more to this vomit, this odious habit of mind. the animal impurity is not half so vile.

Remember then: and good reason: for, what are these but memorandums? What is this but to be thy own rememberancer? ... Conviction past: demonstrations sound: rules expeditious³⁰². The application is all. All is but remember.

Memorandums³⁰³ --- for what? About what? --- A small concern, perhaps, a trifle. For what else can it be? Neither state, nor money-matters, nor policy, nor history, nor learning, nor private affairs, nor public. These are great things. In these are great improvements, how many memorandums, how many common-place books about these! Who would think of any other memorandums? Would one dream of making any for life? Would one think that this were a business to improve in? What if this should be the thing of all others chosen out for a pocket-book and memorandums? -- But so it is. Remember then the memorandums as truly such, and for such use, as memorandums only, to this purpose, this end.

Improvement. Advancement. --- In what? Whither? As how? Is there such a thing belonging to this place? Is there study or art here? Be-think thy self. Is there then really such a science? And is the faculty, mystery, skill, real? If so; where is it in other arts, where improvement is looked for, advancement aimed at? How if a mathematician? How if an accountant? How if a student in language in rhetoric, aiming at mastery in writing or in [190] speaking: a manner: a style? And is this style? Are these words or letters merely? Is the IMPROVEMENT here? The advancement hitherwards? --- Away!

* * *³⁰⁴. This is the subject: and according in this must be the IMPROVEMENT. Begin therefore and work up on this subject. Collect. Digest. Methodise. Abstract. How many codes, how many volumes, lexicons, how much labour

²⁹⁵L. 1 C. 4.

²⁹⁶Ibid.

²⁹⁷Ibid.

²⁹⁸L. 3 C. ult. in fine.

²⁹⁹L. 4 C. 4.

³⁰⁰En. C. 69.

³⁰¹L. 3 C. 21.

³⁰² 354.

³⁰³ * * * &c.: C 3, 4 &c.

³⁰⁴L. 1 C. 15.

and what compiling in the study of other laws? But in the laws of life, how? ... Think therefore at what time of day. Think how late thou beganst. How many times left off. And how this last time, after such an advance. How long renewing with what pain. And how any other work would be that had been so learnt, so followed; supinely, heavily, neglectfully, wretchedly. Or is this easier learnt and retained? A matter of less trouble and thought? Of less moment and concern? ---

Begin then. Not (as before) to leave off again anon, beg pardon for a while, lie down and rest...from what, thou wretch? From good? From REST it self³⁰⁵? wouldst thou be restored in peace to those innocent calm gentle passions that will be sure to give thee rest: having given it thee so long; as thou last (it seems) but too cheaply experienced? Or is it that thou art already perfect, or like to be so very soon, in this way? Or if so; may this art like other arts [191] and trades be intermitted without prejudice? Or be quitted wholly, when something offers better to live upon? ... What better? What to succeed? And what to do? ... What are other trades for? And what this? Is it one and the same? And will this like others, bear a relaxation³⁰⁶, or but a respite? How is it with other arts when out of use? And what art shall bring this into use again when once out?

Now, therefore, begin anew: truly anew: and not as before: not * * *³⁰⁷. Not * * *³⁰⁸. Know thy work. Know thy subject, matter, instruments, rules. Has the carpenter so many, the architect, statuary, mathematician so many? Is there so much closet-work, paper-work, so much study, writing, figuring, practicing there; and not in the same manner here? Why writing? Why this flourishing, drawing, figuring, over and over the same still? What for? --- What but for the art? Not for show: but for exercise, practice, IMPROVEMENT. ... Writing: and then burning. Drawing and rubbing out. Chalk, a wall, board, anything that comes to hand. ... Mind then: see how it is with these practitioners. Or shall thy industry come behind? Thy attention, application, fervour be less? ... Apply therefore. Exercise. Write. Compose. Cast the sumens. Chalk out the design, lineaments, proportions. Scan. Practice. Prove. Be always on some rule, some demonstration, some draught, some scheme or another: and let other schemes alone. Be sharpening, steeling and pointing the counter-visa: hardening, moulding, casting and polishing the $\Delta\omicron\xi\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ and right images. Have the $\sigma\iota\delta\epsilon\rho\iota\alpha$, $\omicron\rho\gamma\alpha\nu\alpha$, $\epsilon\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\rho\iota\delta\iota\alpha$ ready³⁰⁹: the instruments, weapons, arms, according to art and discipline. Redress. Convert. Invert³¹⁰. Provoke (for trial and practice) [192] challenging, incite... This by such and such a rule: from such theorem, problem. This by such a demonstration, axiom, postulatam. This by the golden rule: not that of arithmetic. This by the third, fourth, first proposition; not of that Euclid, but of this other: the teacher not of those lines and figures but of these other lines, the figures, proportion and symmetry of life: without which science, all is confusion. Appetitions aversations frustrated: moral relations broken: fancy wild... madness and distraction all.

Go on then. Exercise and write. But remember, * * *³¹¹; and * * *³¹². Else * * *³¹³. Let the rules look as odd or ridiculous as they will. What is that to thee, whose business is only to improve by these, not publish them, profess or teach them? What are the rules in mathematics, grammar or music to the vulgar and those unversed? What but sport? And are these specious countenances any other than vulgar, commonalty, people and mere people and, if nearly looked

³⁰⁵Sup 130.

³⁰⁶130. 382.

³⁰⁷C. 4.

³⁰⁸L... C...

³⁰⁹M. 3.13.

³¹⁰112.

³¹¹L... C...

³¹²C. LXX & 3. C. 12.

³¹³L. 2.18.

into, the very dregs too of the people however they may appear outwardly? For how are they as to life? They who seek nor any rule here, nor think there is any rule, what are they better than vulgar? Unless perhaps they are the mightier, and more to be admired, for sporting with the things and despising what they understand not: while others understanding themselves as little, are less persuaded of their understanding. [193] What therefore can they make of this but sport? What is the divine man to his commentator of this age? What is his follower to both his? And if not constantly; yet by starts and fits; when frightened by too home-truth a plain word, or a strong light. Yet these the most favourable of moderns. To the rest sport or pity. For, what else? What better to be expected? Take care however not by thy own fault to give occasion to this pity or this sport by exposing anything (as it must be exposed, if discovered and directly owned). For this indeed would be ridiculous, harsh, odious, pitiful.

Enough then. Remember law 1 #6 * * * &c.: and what resembles this in discourse about morals, philosophy, nowadays, when it so happens. Here double the watch. Strengthen the guard. Be alarmed, awake, doubly strict to the law, for double reason ... silence! For thy own sake: for the thing's sake. And detest this prostitution.

SELF. Economical:

From 178] [194]

Φευ, Φευ

***** The chasm! ... View the past. # # #

#.

... Dreams. Dreams ... a dark night. Dead sleep. Starts. Disturbing visions. Faint endeavours to awake ... a sick reason. Labyrinth. Wood. Sea ... Waves tossing. Surge. The driving of the wreck ... Giddy whirlwinds. Eddies, and the overwhelming gulf.

How emerge? When gain the port, the station, promontory? ... * * * ³¹⁴.

Awake. Rouse. Shake off the fetters of the enchantress. Begin.

Again retired. See, what providence bestowed on thee! Once more in thy power to be saved; to redeem thy self; to raise thy self from this sink, these dregs, this guise of a world, to manliness, to reason and a natural life; to come on again on the stage as an actor, not as a machine: but as knowing the author of the piece, as conscious of the design, to join in the performance the disposition and government: to be a spectator, a guest, a friend; and with the same friendliness to [195] retire and thank the inviter ... But oh, these dreams! This sleep! ... No more. Die altogether thou wretch: not thus ... In the other death there is no harm. But how many deaths in such a life as this? What else but this is deadly? What else should terrify or concern?³¹⁵

* * * ³¹⁶.

A little more, and these, not those had been the dreams: the mere dreams had got the better: and thou hadst wake no more: for see! How hard to get out of this sleep! How long and deep a one it has been! How has it robed thee of thy truest and clearest waking thoughts! How have its cheating visions, enthusiasms and false images supplanted those true ones, and deprived thee of those blessed views, that happy vision and enthusiasm without deceit!

Turn thy eyes inward. See there how things are left. How poor within! how ramshacked, spoiled! ... How bare has this winter left thee! These blighting seasons, these intemperate climes, for which thou were persuaded to quit those other happy ones, that healing sun and that eternal spring, those islands³¹⁷ and that fortress³¹⁸!

What is become of thee now that thou hast put to sea again and left thy harbour? How is it that the land appears?³¹⁹ If as yet thou canst make land. How faint and dim is all! What supply of ideas, [196] on any occasion? What pilot, steerage, compass? What ξρησιξ φαντασιων³²⁰, inversion, art or power? How destitute! How helpless!

Thou art returned, it is true, to the same country, to the same distance and retreat. But is it the same country, the same field and in the same condition as before? Have not the tempests shaken and ravaged more than before? Have not the seasons and time done more? Is not everything more to disadvantage, everything more in the way, more cloudy, dark and retarding long the appearances of those Halcyon-days?³²¹

³¹⁴M 4:49.

³¹⁵Inf. 225.

³¹⁶M. 6.31.

³¹⁷M 10:8.

³¹⁸M 8:44.

³¹⁹Sup. 107.

³²⁰112.

³²¹123.

Thou art returned, it is true, to exercise, to arm again and fight once more. * * *³²²... The Αλτηρεξ are here at hand³²³. But where are the nerves and muscles. The arm has been disused: the limb has been bound up and is strunk. No force this way at all. No spirits, life or motion: but benumbed, withered, dead. Meanwhile how is it with the enemy? How have the contrary visa profited and made their advantage of this cessation? How robust, firm, vigorous, keen! How polished and specious those images! How lively those ideas! What number! What discipline! And with what art they defend themselves and succour one another!

Remember therefore how fallen ... Compassion. Sympathy. Relation. Family. Public ... (what family? What public?) ... K: of S. Death. Europe. Civil commotions. France. Universal monarchy. A war. Parliament. Elections. Parties. Engagements. Contests ... how truly prophesied above (81)? [197] in a little while some new matter appearing &c.: straight as an enthusiastic &c.: where is now thy former disposition? &c. ... See this treachery. Think of the sore³²⁴, inflammation³²⁵, fuel, **et ignes suppositos cineri doloso**.

Wilt thou venture again once more in thy life and try this experiment anew? Now too after 33 (the 10th at least since conviction) and with such impaired constitution, plain decline, and probably short remaining time!

--- If such be the case; why admit this cheat and delusion? --- But thou hast admitted it. It crept on by degrees and under specious images of nature, virtue, public, friends, and what not?³²⁶ Then rural makers. Recommendation of country life. Agreeableness of a place. Sact. Alterations. Gardens. Groves. Painting. Thus the villa foreigners: envoys. Court. Ladies. Satisfaction of the great. Imitation of the great, in little. A circumstance, report, character³²⁷. Such a one: of such a nation: family: house: garden: retreats: way of swing³²⁸. So to the K. So T---d to the Q. of P. and so now again lately from H: D. and Sr. R. G. at Han. The El.s and Q. of P. and ce conte de Sh--- * * * ... * * *.

Now see, what thou hast got by thy success in this way. # # # ... Hoc erat in votis. And so now, auchius atque, De meluis fecere. Bene est. And is it so? Propria haec nihi munera³²⁹ Are these propria³³⁰ Are they thine? Honestly **thine**? Thy own very true and certain possessions, properly belongings to tee and naturally thine? ... Call an imposture so, a Goiter, a Polypus, or any worse [198] excrescence. These if thou hadst them would be **thine** too; but such as thou shouldst be glad of parting with. And are not those others impostures? And of the mind, which is far worse? Are they not sufficient weights, incumbencies and growths such as eat out the best nourishment of the soil? Think now how these sit, and are still like to sit, since thou has taken such care to raise and implant them to make them thus, as it were, parts of thy self, and sticking to tee: wretched things, such as they are; ασθενη, δουλα, κωλυτα, αλλοτρια: to which whoever is so joined, may be truly said caudam trahere ... handles for every ones insult: scope for everything of malice and stroke of fortune ... How notably hast thou provided for thy self? how adorned and set thy self out! Not δια των αποβαινοντων³³¹. ... Behold! Thou art become an appendix to a grange! An appurtenance to a estate and title! --- Ho! Friend! To whom dost thou belong? --- Should a stranger upon the road accost tee thus, peradventure thou wouldst be angry. But should one who was no stranger in this universe, thus meet, and question tee, couldst thou better

³²²M. 3.4.

³²³188.

³²⁴83.

³²⁵65.

³²⁶352.

³²⁷350.

³²⁸135.

³²⁹Hor., Sat. 6 L. 2.

³³⁰Hear the same poet in a better mood. Si proprium est quad quis libra mercatus et cere est. And, --- tanquam sit proprium quidquam puncto quod mobilis horce, nunc prece, nunc precio, nunc vi, nunc sorte suporema permulet dominos et cedat in altara jura. Epistles, 3, lib 2.

³³¹A. 1.7.

answer than by pointing to the things and people, see there to what and to whom? Or couldst thou with an honest heart point to heavens and say “to that only: to the universe and Him that gave me my part and station in it? See if I am belonging to anything besides. See if I own any other superior, or am false to my origin and pedigree. Take that other pedigree and name. Seize any of those things that hang about me. See if I am concerned: see whether I am less my-self: whether I am their appurtenance, or they mine” ... But [199] if it be Alas, my poor estate! My family! The grange! Alas, the island!³³² The hut! The how! Then see, under what subjection thou art brought: and whether it be not true, that the better thou hast succeeded in these things, the more ingenious thou hast been to thy own misery ... The shaking of earth. A little fire. A pulse of wind. The tumbling or perishing of a pile of timber brick or stone. The defacing of this or that structure or of the imaginary and full as perishing structure of a character in the world, with country, kindred, friends. A breath of wind blasting the fruit corn or grass: and that other blast, as variable and uncertain, the rumour of people, the motion and sound of tongues ... Under how many cases bowed? At how many accidents trembling? How many things and persons anxiously provided for? Over how many tyrannise, and by how many tyrannised? ... Thank thy self ... It was otherwise at a certain time. But thou be thoughtst thy self, and for fear of going too fast, wentest aside out of the road; secure of finding it again at pleasure. Oh wonderful wisdom that thus deliberated! Oh, the goodness that produced this compassion, sympathy, and what followed! (!) # # #.

As those were sharp and piercing sores by which fungus's that remain now that the other are closed up³³³.

Remember this. # # # & # # #. The greater and less excrescence. The warts, wens. How they were formed, how they grew from a little. To what seize! [200]

Thus cautioned, begin: take up the chew. Continue the thread. And see that it break off no more. No more unravling: but wind thy self up. Collect thy self with all thy might within thy self. See first the NATURAL, then the artificial ECONOMICAL SELF. The $\sigma\zeta\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\zeta$, symmetry, correspondence, harmony. Nor harmonising in that other way. Not sympathising anymore, and applauding thy self for this: covering it with those names of natural affection, tenderness &c.: ... economical. As how? From what economy? From this below? Is there not a higher? Wilt thou not reckon thence? Or must it be as before? Such a one, the son or grandson of such a one. Such a name &c³³⁴.

No more. Farewell such computations ... Begin then, and take it better. $\tau\iota\zeta\ \omicron\omega\nu$ ³³⁵.

WHAT AM I? WHO? WHENCE? WHOSE? ... To what or whom belonging? With what or whom belonging to me, about me, under me? ... Quality, rank, birth, of what sort? What character, what dignity, and what born to? --- An estate, title, name, figure. --- With whom the figure? Where? In country? In town? --- No, but in the nation, in the world. --- Excellent. But how? Is it magnitude, or curiosity only? Is it a figure according to art, and masterly skilled? Where are the judges, the masters in this kind? Or is it a figure as in a sum? ... What sum? The great sum? The whole? ... Which is the greater figure and which the less in this sum? What is a little figure? How little or great? Or what although great? What although the biggest unite? How long before a blank, a cypher only? Or although still a figure, what difference from a cypher? In these sums what are cyphers set either before or after? Which way increase the figure, how add or multiply in these numbers? Consider then, [201] what are the right numbers, proportions and arithmetic. What really makes a figure. What figure is: and what a cypher only ... Again then.

What am I? ... Simple or compound? If I can find nothing of the first kind, see at least what of the second ... a compound, a system of what? Of land? --- No. --- Of titles, honour, privileges? --- No. --- Of bones, flesh and limbs ...

³³² 135.

³³³ 78.

³³⁴ 135. 197.

³³⁵ 287.

How when I chance to lose any of these, is the system of self destroyed? Or is it divided or parted? --- No. --- Seek them elsewhere still for this system. Where seek it but in that which bids seek, which now seeks, which determines, pronounces, judges of all, makes use of all, governs all? ... What is it that now examines about this of SELF? ... According to this then, what am I? --- * * *. A mind. A judgement. --- And according to this, what is my GOOD? * * *, a certain mind and judgement in a certain state and condition. --- and what if these are in ever so good a condition, and the other in bad? What if these are in ever so bad a condition, so the other be but in good? ...

Man! See but this. Look a little this way. See thy SELF. Be thy self. Carry thy SELF along with thee in thy deliberations, thy comparisons. With what dost thou compare thy self? What art thou worthy of? And what are the things beneath thee?³³⁶ * * *,³³⁷.

First then, as WHO? --- A MAN: not (as they say) a mere earthling. Not a worldling [202] but of the true world. --- A man of quality. --- What quality? The herald-quality? Patent quality? Or from progenitors courtiers? (worthy men!). Progenetresses of the court? (worthy women!). ... Noble pedigree! Unquestionable pedigree! Noble thoughts, life, manners, employments of time! Happy great ones! Noble and highly privileged great ones! See to what privileged, to what entitled! ... This is quality! And is there no better? Is this the denotation; and is there no better? Is this the breeding, education, instruction; and is there no better, no higher? ... Consider then what quality? ... What which is measured from intellect and mind; or from matter and dregs? From the author and known father of minds and from his laws and constitution; or from the laws and constitutions of inferior minds such as these? ... To whom then is the relation? Quality in what? By what measured? From what? In what? Lord of what? ... "Lord of the region of the mind and will, understanding and judgement: of thoughts, affections, appetites, opinions, councils. King, prince, and of the council of that greatest highest prince: willing as He wills: assisting in his administration: ever-present with Him. ... Whose am I then but his? Whence am I but thence? To what or whom belonging? Or with what belonging to me? --- Slaves, household, acres ... the Lord. English Lord. European. Britain. Saxon, west, or east --- What is all this? When wilt thou cease to reckon from hence? Or if it be not that thou reckonest from hence; why astonished? As how ashamed or dashed? Why struck at any time? Why galled or pinched by these matters? ... But, it is [203] plain, thou reckonest still from hence as merely one of these: as their appurtenance, their purchase: claimed, owned, acknowledged theirs. Or, if not theirs; as whose? As God's? as manumitted by Him, and made thy own? Art thou then God's? ... Oh wretch! Canst thou say that word? Is there indeed such a sovereign, such a country? Say the: let us hear for goodness sake, what is the worth of such a country? Or what is He worth who governs it? What may his utmost value be? And as how far may he in truth be worth considering or taking notice of? --- I am alone and by my self. Nobody sees me. --- Yes, somebody. --- Who? Nobody but God. But stay. Here are other eyes. Let me have a care: for what will they think of me? My dignity! My character! ... Now the coaches, the benches, the robes, the dishes and services... What birth? What country? What quality considered?

This it is. Where is the MAN now placed? Where now the real country, nativity, pedigree? Where the Lordship? And in what things? Lord of what? In what region? Over what concerns? How goes it within? how are the provinces there? In what state or condition? Is it there my Lord! Sir! Prince! Your Lordship! Honour! Excellence! Is there due acknowledgement of the superior?³³⁸ Is the governing part owned, respected, obeyed? Is there command, mastery rule or disposition there? Is there power? Is liberty there? Is there that thing? Or art thou there no better than a slave? A servile slooping creeping slave? For how else should it be, when for thy own part being otherwise born

³³⁶ 142.

³³⁷ L. 2. C. 21.

³³⁸ * * *

privileged and set free by the eternal laws if the eternal, thou hast voluntarily submitted and subdued thy self to these temporarily feeble laws, naturalised thy self in this lower world, and circumscribed thy self, thy nobility, character, state and goods within the verge of parchment, of a hedge, a ditch, or of that other ditch encompassing the piece of land, a piece of which (it seems) thou chooseth to call thy COUNTRY: denominating thy self from hence; and accordingly rating thy self by the nature and worth of such things as these. [inf. 216]

Consider of those appellations, and better titles: a creature, subject, citizen. Art thou such? Are they any such * * *? Think of them what they import: and be them, in a better sense than that other mean inferior one. Or shall it be only the honest citizen and burgess? The islander, a British dweller, a subject of the crown? A creature of the great man's, or of the creatures of the great man's? for what signifies it when once thou art a creature and thus dependent, whose creature thou art? See! Look but into the world; how the little ones and great ones of it move together, depend on one another, govern and influence by turns; and then choose where thou wilt, and see if thou art not still a creature's creature of more than two or three removes?

A devoted and most obedient humble servant --- To whom? To the great man, or great woman. --- And to GOD what? --- An undevoted, disobedient, and most insolent one. A complaining, murmuring, discontented, rebellious one. How else devoted, as thou art there? How there and here both? How here, if there? ... Vile slave! Thus to devote thy self to any service but that which were it understood to be found truly to be perfect freedom, not such as these slaves make of it when they turn this way ... But what should slaves be but slave, wherever they turn? for until set at liberty from these sordid matters, what can we be even in religion too, but slaves? Here therefore learn to be indulgent, here above all κατ'οικονομιαν but to thy self no indulgence: no hanging on these affairs: miscalling or disparaging heaven's distributions: [217] no nick naming of providence --- hard providences. Dark providences. Afflictions. Tribulations. Calamities. Crosses. What crosses to one who stands not cross to providence? What affliction to one who wills only as that wills? What calamity to one who knows neither good nor ill in outward things whichever way dispensed, but rejoices in the dispensation?

This is the generous devotion. This is to be the devoted servant of a right person. This is to be indeed and in earnest devote, pious, and withal free, divinely free: for how otherwise devout? If otherwise; cry, whine, expostulate and wring hands. Deprecate: and at last submit, as they say. But see what submission, what kind of resignation this is likely to prove. Praise outwardly, flatter, magnify, extol: but see if nature and thy own heart give thee not inwardly the lie.

Thus it is. Again remember this, and be indulgent to others. For how can this be otherwise? Is this to be told them? See that thou art not thy self a fool, and vainly impious ... forbear!

* * * [204]

See Νομ γ. inf. P. 378.

* * *³³⁹.* * *³⁴⁰.

Is this right? Is this really so? Or had it best be again a relaxation? Another trial? ... What has come of it? How relaxation? It is not relaxation here as in other things (unbending a strengthening) not as the common misapplied verse -- Neq; semper arcum tendit Apollo. In this place the bow is the worse, and returns worse to its bent. Every moment an injury, a weakening; with danger too of breaking, if it stay long. Nor is this all. For in the use of the other bow, the objects (such as the mark bull, target or whatever else) remain the same: being passive and as fair for exercise when the bow is resumed as when it was laid down. But here far otherwise. The objects indeed in a strict sense are as passive as those others. Τα Πυαγματα εξω λυγων ετηεν³⁴¹.

But there are other bows that are bending all the while that this is unbent. Counter-machines raising. The BALISTAE TORMENTA and all the engines of a certain kind, playing from another side with new force and as it were from a higher [205] ground. But when on this side things stand fixed, and bent; the other fall off course, without battery, without pain or labour: and the combat is little or nothing. No struggle: no force: all is easy, smooth, manageable without difficulty: so that one would wonder and say where was this mighty enemy? What was this we feared so much?³⁴² But in the other way how soon will those contrary voices be heard Alas! Where are the helps? Where are now the rules? And what do these avail? Τι μοι ευκαιξεισ ο and αγρει εμοι.³⁴³

Therefore, no flattery of this kind. Never unbent. For when unbent, know what is then on the contrary bent, strenuous, vigorous. Deceive not thy self. there is no relaxation, no remission, no unbending, no free leaving, resting, recreating, reposing. Deceitful names! Proper indeed as to other works and labours: but which have no place as to the work within; which will ever be carrying on either in the right or wrong way, ever advancing, and pressing on, even when most unseen: growing imperceptibly, ripening and coming to a head, either as good fruit or as the fungus's³⁴⁴. for neither is the natural plant ever at a stand: nor is this plant. The workman may lie down and rest, but never nature until at last once and for all the work of the heart and this other work will keep pace. The * * * will be, while the * * * and * * * is. As in one engine so in the other. Blood good or bad: appearances good or bad. Motion, use exercise regular or irregular, equal or unequal, in measure or out of measure; it must go on still. Something still must be doing and strongly doing. Some pulse or another. Some energy or another. Either with nature, or [206] against nature. Either a struggle, or a free course. Either convulsion, fervour, hurry, uproar, chaos; or natural motion, order, uniformity and design ... What is relaxation then? How relax? How rest? Bid the heart rest. Bid the heart relax, the lungs take a remission. And shall I say a joy more reasonably to that other part, take thy easy and be relaxed. --- "Mind! be contented. Let the visa alone: or leave them to themselves. Use none: or mind not how thou usest them" --- What is this to say but "Mind! be contented: and be no mind? mind! be nothing or worse than nothing: a mad-man's-mind?". Learn therefore to speak properly: and when thou sayst to thy self release: take thy easy explain and say, "mind, and governing part! Have done: and let the

³³⁹A. 4.12.³⁴⁰L. 4. C. 3.³⁴¹M. 9.15.³⁴²L. 1 C. ult.³⁴³A. 2.19.³⁴⁴78.

ungoverned take their turn. let the fancies ungovernable amongst themselves govern tee. Be thou their subject: not they thine. Let them model tee: not thou them. Let the ground thou hast gained on them be gained now again upon tee. As the work was strong that way; so let it be now as strong this way” ... For so it must be. This is the nature of the thing. This is the only relaxation. Change from one work to another: from this thou hast taken up with, as the only happiness and good, to that which is directly contrary; the cause of all misery and ill: from this withal, [207] healing restoring operation, to that deadly fatal destructive one.

This is the relaxation. This the unbending ... unbent, that another bent may be the stronger. Relaxed, that something else may become the more intense.

What palls, heaviness, lassitude from want, disuse, or but remission of the * * *! This being what Marcus speaks of, when the application to outward things and attention that way is beyond a certain, proportionable time and degree so that this necessarily follows ...

... But this not the worst yet. What impossibility of taking it up again with pleasure! Therefore not lost only for the present: but lost absolutely and depending on chance and circumstances for recovery. What is this but madness?³⁴⁵ ... This wretched state of disability, helplessness, how often experienced? In voyages, journeys, intervals in business and affairs breaking off, lazy hours, garden. And how much worse still in any time of pain, sickness or the like? --- But how? If the contrary attention must therefore so rigidly be kept how deal with the world? How engage? How company? --- Go to what was said long since ... Go to ...

... Remember that this is for One who is yet more than * * *: not one who is less and in such circumstances (...) such an age of mankind (...) such sores (p. 168 &c:....).

But being truly * * *, how possible, powerful, eloquent³⁴⁶ apt both here and there? How watch the enemy, and this enemy? (C 72) How learn this fight and discipline³⁴⁷ and that other with crafty men, a caliber scrate or a field? How this stratagem, this art, this multiplicity of invention, this readiness of mind, turn of thought, wit, capacity, ingenuity and withal that other?³⁴⁸ **[inf. 384**

St. Giles's March 1706.

* * *³⁴⁹

³⁴⁵ 124.

³⁴⁶ 112.

³⁴⁷ 127.

³⁴⁸ 78.129.

³⁴⁹ Mar. L. 55 in fine. viz. Epict: as in B. 3 C. 12 at page 273. Also C. 8.

LIFE [from 175 [208]

* * *

If LIFE be anything better than this work, this architecture, this fabrication of the VISA; if this imagery-work and statuary art of moulding, casting, recasting, framing, shaping, proportioning, modelling, polishing, with the rest of this kind displease, quit it: or see what is better. Throw the hammers and tools away. See what will come of it: and whether this work will stand still or no. But if not; if it be still imagery-work only of a worse kind; if the tools thus flung away should be taken up against thy self and thou shouldst thy self begin to be hammered in thy turn; if such be the nature of the thing, that no sooner one work is left off that the other begins; then methinks it were better to lay these matters anew upon the anvil, go again to the forge, set the images and statues upon their pedestals and to work again [209] with the same tools, rather than that thou shouldst mount the pedestal thy self, be wrought upon and become the handy-work of these unhandy masters.

That which is within must be, either * * *³⁵⁰ an Esculapius, a Hermes, a Mulciber; or wretched matter, clay, mettle, doughs in the hands of wretched chemists, or merciless Cyclops.

Consider of true life and of false. A false vegetable life: as when the root is cut. A false animal-life: as in a syncope or when the nerve is cut. A false rational life: as when something else is cut. That is to say with the vulgar, or when only the * * * or simply * * * is cut: but with the truly knowing when the real * * * suffers or is lost: when the * * * is cut off: when this course is interrupted, this energy creates, and that * * * is made which is spoken of L. 1:5.

True life is when that which should be active is active, that which should be passive, passive only. True animal life is when the animal spirits with all under them are subject to will as mere will, or fancy. True rational life (which with man is only true life) is when the will as mere will or fancy is subject to reason. In the two contraries it is contrary. In the first of which (viz. in the animal-false) the spirits obey not, but act themselves and cause involuntary motion in the second (viz. the rational-false). [210]. The appearances and fancies in the same manner, lead and govern; are not led and governed. Thus uppermost is undermost: active, passive: passive active: inversion, crossing and confusion.

The Δαμῶν and το Δαμῶνιον. The το Ηγμονικον and το Θειον. Copy and original. The same here in the microcosm, as in the το Παν. Either atoms or deity. No medium. That multiplicity, or this simplicity. No compromise. Anarchy, or monarchy.

That which is governed is here wholly for the sake of that which is governs: is that which governs is of a different species far nobler than that which is governed. And this is according to order.

Upon the whole. Remember what is true life and what false. And that as all life is fancy, or a certain motion, course and process of fancies, the business is to know what kind of course, what kind of exercise this is. Whether a regular march and orderly procedure in tune, and measure and proportion, as when the fancies are led, and governed by a rule: or whether it be a jumble, hubbub, tintamar; as when the fancies lead and govern, without rule

... A mind and will making these to be its subjects: or these a mind and will ...

... A man governing fancies or fancies a man. [211]

³⁵⁰M. 3.5. 3.7.

One of these two necessary: either that a man exercise these; or these him. Either the mind working upon the fancies or the fancies giving work to the mind, and (as people say) making work with it.

Strenua nos exercet inercia ---³⁵¹

Invidia vel Amore vigil torquebere ---³⁵²

--- Intus et jecore aegro

Naleuntur domini ---³⁵³

[inf. 218

If life be no such precious thing; if every life be not indeed worth living; not even in the most vulgar opinion (since even the vulgar can despise it, on certain terms) . if only then, such a certain life be to a man eligible worth living, worth preserving and cherishing with that necessary pain and labour that life requires; then consider on every comparison of thy own with other lives that thou seest are lived, whether by men or beasts, or men-beasts, that **that which is no way valuable by parts can no way be so in the whole**. What is this therefore that we call **pleasure** for which we would live?

The pleasures of the debauched. Amours with women. * * *. The basking of a fowl in a dunghill. The crowing and victory of the cocks. The state-victories. The campaign victories. * * *³⁵⁴. And the like ... Would I live this life? Would I live a dog? Would I be a wolf, a sheep, a goat? ... Then say at such and such a time, am I not this or that creature? ... Eating (as loving eating) venery (as taken with venery) playing (as minding play, delighted in play) ... What is all this? What is play? What is jest and then earnest? * * *³⁵⁵ ... * * *³⁵⁶. Have I known anything better? Have I been a man? If so is not this a real metamorphosis, transformation? And is not this always made and in being in every part of life that is not led after a certain rule and with a certain consciousness? * * *³⁵⁷. [219]

Life is as as those are that live it. What are those? What are we?

Nos numeros sumus, et fruges consumere nati³⁵⁸.

----- hoe est

Ut vitale putes. -----³⁵⁹

Tolerable carrying: fit to be let live. Honest poor rascals: not so bad as when they say scarce worth the hanging. Life worthy persons. Of a cave liveable life. --- But say, what are we? What do we make of our selves? How esteemed our selves? ... * * *³⁶⁰ and * * *³⁶¹ ... Guts. Tails. Palats. Warm flesh with feelings, itches, aches, appetites. The puppet-play of fancies ... Oh, the solemn, the grave, the ponderous business! ... Complex ideas. Simple ideas. Dreams. Hobby-horses. Houses of cards. Steeples and cubilo's. ... The serious play of life. ... the kitching pomp: the copulating pomp: the carcass pomp³⁶². Shows: spectacles: rites: formalities: processions. Children playing at buglars frightening one another through masks. The herald, preist, crier. The trump of fame: the squeaking trumpet and cat-call... the gorons!

³⁵¹Hor. ...

³⁵²...

³⁵³Pers. S. ...

³⁵⁴M. 10.110.

³⁵⁵M. 7.3.

³⁵⁶5.33.

³⁵⁷M. 12.19.

³⁵⁸Hor. Ep. 2.

³⁵⁹L. 2 Sat. 7.

³⁶⁰A 1.3.

³⁶¹1.9.

³⁶²278.

Habits! Robes! ... How underneath? How in the night-caps, between the curtains and sheets? How anon in the family with wife, servants, children or where even none of these must see? Private pleasures, other privacies? The closet, back room and bed chamber? Parlours, dining rooms, dressing rooms, and other rooms? In sickness, in lazy, in wine, in leachery? Taking in; letting out? ... Oh, the august assembly! Each of you such as you are a part!

Come on then. Again, what are we? --- Minds --- What are minds? --- Inteligencies. Reasons [220] --- Yes. To what purpose? What good for? What use? --- To get states: make fortunes. --- What are estates? What are fortunes? --- Coaches. Dishes. Wines. Leachery. Toys. --- Say then rightly what it is we are. For those minds we talk of are but appurtenances or means. These are the real things: * * *, in another sense. What have we our minds for? For these. Where are our interests? In these. Where our thoughts and employments? In these.

In short, where lies the whole of the matter, happiness, life, misery? In these. These are our concerns. From hence we have our characters. And here we have our very true and genuine SELVES. Why therefore should we not denominate our selves from these? So Lords from their land. This is their name. Are they not proud of it?

A **man** --- Who? --- One belonging to such a piece of ground ... So here. A **man**. --- Who? What creature? What thing? --- A mind. --- How so? By what title? How is a mind belonging to him, or he to a mind? --- What shall we say then? Who? What? --- A human figure and voice. One belonging to a line-body: to a piece of flesh of such a feeling, to certain guts, members and senses. For, what is principal? What guides? Which is the rudder?³⁶³

This is that HE, that reason, mind, or rather thinking-appurtenance... understanding? Intelligence? As how? What? ... A little craft, an animal-power or use of fancy, with the help of a cunninger sort of language, articulate sounds and the imagery of fancy and is this all? Notable compound! Pretty device to cater (as a good man says³⁶⁴) for the body! A good convenient mind and serviceable reason: the humble hand-made, servant, drudge, or (to speak broader) the bawd and pimp [221] to these principal parts and specialities of life.

Cibus. Somnus. Libido. Per hunc circulum curritur³⁶⁵. Consider the excellency of this work! What life is: and how to be praised, while it is thus. And know withal that if it be in earnest prised; it is because it is thus, and no better. For when it ceases to be thus, and becomes and honest, generous good life, it will no longer be praised at this rate, but perfectly indifferent, readily resigned, and of the two rather more freely parted with than kept.

The more worth the less valued; the more valued the less worth: and this with justice: for what is this worth valuing in life besides the actions that depend on this very indifference? For, as for the other actions, what are they?

... The Englishman's (the old acquaintance's) scurrilous jest on the name of the Italian painter. What are we all but Bombelli's.

... The buffoon on the stage. We are all but spans, and candle-ends. --- But this is a jest³⁶⁶. --- Is it so? Bring me a Caligula: it will be quickly earnest. The comedy of the Gallo-Greeks. Excellent play! Admirable comedian! Nothing more instructive. Who could better make this out? who ever saw this ridiculed better, or showed perfecter? --- But this was horrid. --- Was it so? Then, the jest is turned it seems. It is earnest: and not to be laughed at. --- Temponbus divis --- Words! Words! How is it in a sickness-time? A fire, an earth-quake? Are not these the same as the tyrant? Do they not do more work? What is nature doing every day? (Where is the tyranny? Where the tragedy? Why tragedise?)³⁶⁷ [222]

³⁶³ As the vicious Lord R---r has it.

³⁶⁴ Dr. W---t.

³⁶⁵ Sen. Ep. 77.

³⁶⁶ 372.

³⁶⁷ A 4.7.

does not this make out the spans? Or what are we? Forsooth, ells, fathoms: not spans. Long, lasting tapers: not snuffs and candle-ends.

If every life be liveable; then in a dog's or (what is worse) a cunning flattering man's. What is a silly bird's? A bee's? A cricket's? a merry one (as they say)? A simple innocent one? A busy one? A famous and (as they count) an important one? What are all these? ... But dost thou remember what LIFE and what the law of life is. * * * and * * *. And therefore, as is shown here, * * *. Otherwise the life not liveable: and being below thy species and what thou wert born to, is better and more generously quitted. * * *. Either one or the other. See which: and do honestly, as is best.

To die the death ... of what? Of a dog? A hog or sheep? ... No: but of a man. How go to slaughter like a man? -- To slaughter! --- Yes, to slaughter. What is slaughter (see the buglar word!)? what is a fever? The stone? The gaut? Is not this slaughter? What tyrant? What Caligula? What steel or knives? Are these not knives? Or is a sword or axe anything more? Does it make longer work? Is it not a human loft, a common exit, and as incident to an honest man as any other by way? As the falling of a house, and the falling off from a horse, or the falling into a ditch? --- Die in a ditch! --- No by no means: but in a feather-bed: which is much softer; and to be choked by a quinsy or impostume far better than by so much puddle ... or is the bed of honour yet better? ... There it is. Now again the ditch-water may serve. [223] Provided it be the town-ditch, when the place is stormed. Or if the battle be at some canal and muddy ford ... Excellent! Noble! For this surely is a manly work. This a human and generous death: to die pursuing, wounding, killing not wild beasts, foxes or hares, but **men**, of the same blood and kind with us ... To be buried by a mine: to be blown up, or drowned. Be it earth, air, water, or anything, any place, any manner, it is one and the same, alike honourable, indifferent; so it be but in the field: so it be the general's command. --- Wretch! What general? What field? Who gives the command? Under whom art thou listed? Who brought thee into this field of action? What is action? What is honour? What value, fortitude, magnanimity? Is there a cause? Is there a leader? If none, what are those other causes and this ado about a public and the world? But if there be a real cause; what is it but that supreme one and that which He commands? And then what death is there that should concern us? ... What but that one sort? Viz. that it be a ready one, a free one, a noble one. Why talk to us of a ditch or knife? Why of a scaffold?³⁶⁸ If it be His command it is honourable: and the less it seems so others, the more honourable still in it self: the more desinterested the part: the more generously hard and soldier-like. For how is it that the good soldier is tried? And what is it they call the past of honour? And for whom? What part would the women in all likelihood have assigned them, were women also to be in the fight? who Are they that in a sea-engagement are sent down into hold? Wouldst thou be thus taken care of? Wouldst thou be insured from fire, water and a ditch, that thou shouldst not die by any of these, although by chance thou dropst into them, [224] nor by the iron, nor the cord (if occasion were) nor after any of these ways which they call sad ends ... How sad? Is it necessary thou shouldst be sad? Why not as well merry? Why not as merry then, as before a journey or fight? Why not as well an instant or an hour before death, as twenty hours or a hundred times twenty (for some certain number thou must count)? Why not as well before this sort of death (suppose) now coming, as any other sort of death by and by to come? --- But this is an ignominious one. This is shameful. --- In respect of what? Of whom? Of the laws of the universe? Or of these idle tales, the play and talk of children? Say truth then: and confess thy self one of these children. Confess that thou either knowst no such universe nor laws nor Chief: or that such as He is, thou art ashamed of him; as being ashamed of his administration and providence.

To die any death is natural. For one door is the same as another. The natural or unnatural is the going out: how this is done: with what mind. for if with a right mind, this is all that the nature of a rational creature requires or needs. He has all he wants. It is a consummation. All the numbers are full: the measure perfect: the harmony complete.

To die, when over, is to do nothing when not over it is to live. It is in life therefore, or nowhere, that death is. It is death indeed to fear death. It is death to live and dream. [225] See that thou dost not truly live this death: and it is no matter what death thou diest.

... How many deaths in such a life as this?³⁶⁹ ... What else is deadly? What hideous? What ghastly but this alone? What skeleton or corpse but this? What spectre beside these sad spectres, heavy dreams and haunting visions? ... Here may I well say * * * and with the Platonist * * *³⁷⁰ &c.: the nightmare, agony, endeavours and efforts to awake ... Ac veluti in somnis --- & vox faucibus haesit.

To go to death! --- Right. Whether else wouldst thou go? Or how go? Wouldst thou be carried perhaps or drawn? Is this the right way of going? Wouldst thou thus go? Or not go at all? ... What is life but going? What is passing away time, diverting, sleeping, playing, planting, building, dinning, supping and to bed but going? What is this that thou art at present doing, but going? For even improving (if happily this be so) what is it else but going and learning to go?

To draw to an end! --- Right. What wouldst thou draw to else? Wouldst thou draw to thy beginning, and be so nearer to thy birthday? If not; then thy death-day. So take it and be contented. What else wert thou born for? What did birth signify? What betoken or portend? Immutability? Duration? Perpetuity? ... * * *³⁷¹.

To go to death --- Dost thou not go every night? or are dreams life? Such dreams [226] as are thine as get? Often impure: seldom composed: seldom restraint, correction or redress. How when making? What if little better then? ... is this life? Are these the dreams so heavily parted with? Is this the thing to die?

To go to death. --- To go from life. To go from eating, drinking, to bed and close stool. Dost thou not go from them, rise from them every day? --- But I would go again. I have not gone often enough. --- How many times more? ... Away man! Rise. Wipe thy mouth: throw up thy napkin and be done. A belly full (they say) is as good as a feast. Enough of these fillings and emptyings. Up, once for all: and make not such a business of meals and stools, or those other easings of the body which are just as satisfactory when over and the sooner over (except to a hog, and a worse creature than a hog) the better.

Death (they say) is a debt to nature. Why not rather life that debt? And this happily over, the debt payed, and the account discharged?

Nature debtor to life. Life the credit side of the account. Death the balance due. Always ready. Does the trade displease? Take the balance. And the account. Or why complain? Either trade honesty: or leave off. But make not these

³⁶⁸357.

³⁶⁹Sup. 19.

³⁷⁰M. Tyr. Diss. 12 in fine.

wrong charges and ridiculous articles. What does it signify? Who will be cheated by it? On whom is the house like to fall?

If life be indeed such a gain, such a prize as made of; then have I indeed a debt to pay. But if otherwise, I am now paying: and being come to die it is I that am payed. It is I that have been creditor: and nature justly and kindly gives me back my debt. [227]

It is but for once. Comfort thy self --- for what? For death? --- No but for life. For this is taking the thing much righter. It is but for once ... Right ... Once only such a body: such senses: such offices about a body and matters belonging. A moment or two: and all will be well. And why not well even this moment, if all within be well, as it should be?

By virtue all is made well: for now if for no only: for hereafter, if for hereafter.

If more life after this; will it not be the better still for what I am now doing? If no more; is it not still best that I do as I do?

All who have denied order and a God have denied a future state. For we never heard yet of a future state and no God, although of a God and no future state. If therefore there be a future state how can all be but well? If nothing future this is all the ill. And why ill? Why not all well? If so, why not stay? If otherwise, go. Who hinders? ... Is not this well? [292

The several stages: and the last stage. ... The travelling by the messenger in France, the Prochaio in Italy ... After a long journey many evels, many hardships, many escapes: at last welcome to Florence, Rome, Naples, or the place desired: the harbour: the end of the voyage. ... So of life. The end. The upshot. Harbour. Part. All was but to get well hither. All but to this end. What fatigues by the way? What hazards? In what company?

Wherein the satisfaction in travelling for travelling's sake? ... But art thou come safe? Hast thou brought a safe mind? is all well and sound? Then welcome! And why not as well when sooner as when later? Why not the rather when sooner? But be it sooner or later, it well deserves the welcome, and usual compliment of the Prochacio.

The same in any disturbance of life. Remember the usual comfort upon the road. It will be soon over. We shall soon be at the place.

Why make a business of so little? The play is short. Be not morose: but sit it out. two acts are already over, there is no fear of a fourth or fifth, and in all likelihood thou shall be acquitted for less than even the second which is yet unspent. [293]

From that fancy above whether the rub be in the passage, or thy self³⁷¹ ... Where, indeed, but in thy self? for what passage in nature is gentler, smoother, easier? Unless perhaps thou art frightened at the convulsions, and pulling off the strings, when even sense is in a manner gone. Does pain increase as senses or the senses decrease? Are these the agonies? Is this the passing? The hard thing? Is it not easier still, the nearer it approaches? Is it not (as the buffoon said) all down at hill? What road is plainer or better beaten? What path more flowery, if rightly taken? Where is the gulph (as they say) to be shot? ... Shooting at the gulph! ... Is not this story and that other of the vulgar much alike?

What passage, or thorow-fare, transmission or change more natural than the passing of this animation, breathe or spirit from this channel or rivulet into that other? As that common description of the poets: a river disemboguing itself into the sea: at first perhaps from racks and through sleep countries ...

³⁷¹ A. 3.26.

³⁷² 271.

... --- **Non sine montium**

Clamore, vicineque silvae³⁷³

But at last, gliding with gentleness into the bosom of a Thetis.

Cum pace delabentis etruscum in mare. [294]

What is life to the very vulgar in a certain aspect? ... How at those seasons, and on those occasions when they consider life as mere life: the same in one creature as in another? Hogs, dogs, worms, insects. ... * * *³⁷⁴ ... Dray-hors ... the shambles and slaughter-houses ... the common soldiery ...

Death.

... This is that thing so sad to part with: so precious to retain! This is that catastrophe! The bottom of the tragedy, and of all tragedy! Is not this all?

Do not the vulgar see this? Why else is that of the tragedian harkened to, and received so well? ... To be, or not to be. &c.: ... A consummation, devotedly to be wished...

... “Majores nosti preterierunt: Nos alimus: Posterii sequentur. Quid istuc quaeso, quid istuc est? Nihil ita crebro ut mortem vident: nihil ita obliscuntur ut mortem” (as a wild modern scholastic has it) ... Or as a late preacher “Our very graves were once living. We dig through our forefathers to bury our friends: and shall soon become earth ourselves to bury our posterity ---“, Oh, the buscle! The do! ... A day or year more or less. What a business! --- Usque adeone ...?³⁷⁵ [295]

St. Giles's May 1705.

Death.

Consider, that even with the truly wise, the truly happy man, life still is but indifferent. How, therefore, with tee? ... Can it be so much as indifferent? If there no gain; here what loss! And how does may it cost yet ere it is over?

On one side, sure of no harm: on the other side, sure of no good: but perhaps harm. How is this condition equal? ... See then what thou fearest, when thou fearest death.

³⁷³Hor. 3.29.

³⁷⁴M. 10.8.

³⁷⁵367.

Φαντασται

Ξησις φαντ

[supra 131 [212]

Again, thy ART. * * *. Now make it good. Now to be firm. Now adhere.

Nunc animis opus est ... nunc pectore frimo. No receding. No retreat. But being now returned; now once for all: for good and all: nay must be: for, what left afterwards but to retire indeed and go out?

To thy work then, thy ART, thy life. The sole business. The main concern. Life it self and all that there is in the matter of living. The only real living (as the voluptuous men say of theirs) the only worthy, the only natural. According to nature by the art nature has given us, the power of mind and of right reason...make it right then, here as it is there. Make things here accord with things there. Correct the lower by the higher. Answer the one by the other: mere imaginations by proved ones: uncertain dictates, by stated decrees: secret suggestions and whispers by plain utterance. Let us hear again those voices high up, distinct, aloud. Idea! Wait a little! And so the rest. The discipline, the inversions as before. Thus manage thus deal with fancy. [213] Or must we spare her indulge her a little by whiles and upon occasion? Shall the judgement be less to her? Of what? Wherein? And who shall judge? For if she for her self, then is she judge of everything: if not for her self, then of nothing, in nothing...Nothing therefore, or everything. For if anything; as well everything; if this be all because of fancy.

--- The house turns round. --- No: but my heads turns. That's all. What is reason but a power of judging the fancies? Is everything as it is fancied? Are all fancies right? Then the house turns when I am giddy. But no. I know the fancy to be wrong...Am I not out of order? Do I not dream? ... Who says this or can say this besides man or a creature rational like man? For if a rational creature be moved by any such fancy, he follows it without more ado. For what has he better, to correct it, set him right or tell him that he dreams? And what is pleasure, what is conceit, what is a life of fancy but dreaming? Where is that that puts the difference?

This is that power, that faculty, ART * * *³⁷⁶, * * *³⁷⁷ and if I am without this, am I not distracted? He who imagines principles before him cries out for help, says there are mountains in his way when he walks on even ground; and when all is well, quiet and still, cries fire! Deluge! Earthquake! Thunder! Does he not rave? But one whose eyes strike fine or whose head is only giddy from a ship, or who from a distemper in his ear hears many sorts of noises; although all these fancies in being with him are the same and as strong [214] as at other times when occasioned by outward things; yet he being in a way of resisting, judging, correcting these fancies, he is in his senses (as they say) still. Or is he out of him self, although his senses are out.

How is it therefore as to other fancies? --- A King appears. --- And what then? So in a play a King appears also, guards, courtiers, Lords, attendants. --- But this is but a play --- And what is this other? When the tragedy chances to be over moving, and the **fiction** strikes us, do not we say to ourselves instantly, this is but a play? Is not this the correcting redress retifying part? And how does this part carry it self in that other play the serious one of life? How does it manage in this scene? Is it here still the same ruling, leading, commanding part? The * * *? ... A king a real King appears. Right it is a real thing: and not a player: not one of those Kings of the stage. So far I am right. So far the correcting and conforming part goes along with me. So much it allows good. But what else do I see besides a king? What do I add to the idea or fancy of a king? Here comes the trial. What is a king? --- A man. --- Right. --- A man in power. --- Right still: but in what power. --- In a power by which he is happy and blessed. --- Hold! Here is a new

³⁷⁶A. 1.20.

matter. --- In a power by which he can make others happy and blessed. --- Hold! For here is another new matter. All this and what follows upon this is new. --- I am astonished. --- Why? --- I admire, applaud, envy, wish. --- My head turns round. --- No but I am right. I cannot but believe my self it must be thus. --- Am I not mad? For were I giddy only, I should know it, and saying to my self that I was giddy, immediately be unconcerned. [215] --- The order is sent for my imprisonment, banishment, death. --- Right. But what is imprisonment? Staying within. what is banishment? Removal from one place to another. Death? An end of breathing, struggling for life and against vice and corruption. What loss? What is death? --- Misery! Misery! --- How? Where? Which way? Dost thou not know before hand, art thou not sure, most undeniably sure (or what else canst thou ever be sure of?) that misery is nowhere in these things; nowhere from without; but together with happiness, from **within**, only from **within**? so that in this place when my fancy and I are all one, am I then my self? when the senses are by themselves and there is no supreme sense above them, am I then in my senses? When they report, and nothing better than they takes the report, have I my reason? Or if I say I have my reason, but at the same time judge by fancy, and not by reason, am I sound in my reason? Or am I master of reason any sooner for this?

How is it then, after I have judged of death, disgrace, poverty, riches, honours as I have done, sedately done, maturely, deliberately; that I should come (see!) of an instant to change thus and believe the contrary? For if I believed not, neither should I be moved. How is it that I assent? How is it that I join voices with the fancies and cry out misery! Misery! ... Happiness! Misery! Is not this the same as above? Fire! Earthquake! Thunder! ... Seas of milk and ships of amber!

When certain inflammations, soft lambent flames, or playing sparks arise, which seem so innocent and gentle at first (as in the * * * and other affections) then the leading part may in its turn cry fire! Fire! Bring the engines * * * &c³⁷⁸.

* * * ... * * *³⁷⁹ ... Shadows indeed. And to be thus afraid is to be afraid of one's own shadow. But on the contrary hear! * * * --- is there nothing then to be feared? No report to make? --- There is, and a showed one. Enemies with a witness. * * *³⁸⁰. Fly! Save thy self. These are no shadows. [Inf. 274

Fancy has spoke. It is now my turn. "... Good! Is this all? Have you any more to say? Let us hear all out; and then answer. But, speak out: speak plain, high up, aloud: no muttering: no half-words: no whispering, dumb signs, nodding, winking and those other mysterious sly ways. Away with this. It is not to be endured. ... if thou hast ought to say (fancy!) say it: let us hear patiently. But if from one thing to another, I interrupt: to the point (fancy!) to the pint! Is not this what you advanced just now; although you have since passed to other things, and so to other, leaping, mixing, confounding? But to bring things to an issue; that we may fix somewhere; let us take it up here: let us hear distinctly. Wasn't this the suggestion? These the words? And thus, or thus? ... said tee so, or so? ... These were **the words** ... Repeat them. ... Once again ... Again a third time --- It is well. By your leave then; a word ere you depart. I must talk a little in my turn, and be familiar, very familiar: as well I may. For thy turn (fancy!) has been long enough. Oh he, jam satis est!"³⁸¹

³⁷⁷1.5.

³⁷⁸A. 1.25.

³⁷⁹A. 1.25.

³⁸⁰3.16.

³⁸¹313.

* * *³⁸²,. Thus must the persuader, the deceiver, the fair impostress, enchantress, be talked to. Sometimes fairly: sometimes (as they say) roundly. Or if thou talkst not thus with her; expect that she should talk with thee, on a high tone, put thee to silence, and manage thee as she pleases.

One of these two must ever be: viz. that a man has his fancies in right discipline; turning, leading and commanding them; or they him. [275] Either they must deal with him, take him upshort (as they say) teach him manners and make him know whom he belongs to: or this will be **his part** to teach the impostress fancy and her train; show **her** what she is herself and whom she has to deal with.

That is to be a man.

By while this question. Am I talked with? Or do I talk? For something still there is that talks within and leads that very discourse which leads in action and is what we call conduct ... Whence, then, the conduct? What leading? What control? Who governs, or what? ... Thus in a family. Who rules in this house? Who's master? --- Learn by the voices. Who speaks with a high tone? Who decides and gives judgement? Who has the talk? The last word? Is it the servants? ... Then the servants are masters ... And dost thou blush at this? ... How is this, man! What! Jealous for thy authority in thy mansion house and outward family, but not in the least for thy authority within, in thy chiefest mansion, thy principal economy? Are the servants here to talk high and in what tone they please? Must theirs be the last word, their dictates the rules of action? Oh slave of slaves!

How necessary this counter discourse with the presenting fancies, and how real it is or ought to be, learn by the too long experience of the other of the wrong kind. What ability, promptitude, dexterity in those? As particularly in the cases of the * * *, what they now say of me: what they will say anon ... * * * ... Extraordinary! Wonderful! Nobody like him! ... And after whole panegirics, devised thus and repeated extempore for other people and put into their mouths; teaching them what to say, and ridiculously saying for them. This [276] chiefly after any little success in the world, in business, company: and as fancying to have left some mighty impressions behind ... Rare ingenuity! ... And hast thou so long endured this, knowst thou the way so well hast thou been so long good at this, able and so expert at this invention to find talk and discourse within; so much entertainment with self and about self (although indeed a wrong self); and canst thou now at last be wanting in the same way, now that thou hast a better self to talk with and be concerned for; now that things go better far, and turn upon another hinge? Or went it better the other way? Was it better? Ah! Then; viz. what will they say of me? What does such a one think? Or as now; what do I say of my self? what does a higher one think?

And as to the other great one or whom the little ones call great one and who is great from thence only, * * * &c: L. 4 C. 12.

³⁸²M. 7.17. 309.

SELF. Nat[ural]. [228]

* * *. Know but this **self** only and what self is indeed: and then fear not being too selfish: fear not to say * * * (L. 3 C. 4). And * * * (...). For this is the only piety, the only friendship. Take it the other way: and good by all. For with the first weary fit (if there be nothing else in the case) it will be "stuff, all. For what care I? And let it go as it will". Thus stretching, yawning, common weariness or heaviness and before so much as a sight comes. But if something harder than usual come across; then (with sighs) "why was I born? What is this life? These mortals! This world, and all this ado! What the good of all? What justice or wisdom? Why was I made thus? Why made at all? Why anything made? How? Or by whom? For what necessity? What end? ... Oh cymmerian darkness! Fatal overcoming blindness! Epidemical contagion! Universal and incurable! Not to be sensible in this chief part of sense: not to see this clear apparent first fundamental truth. Not to see that thing which sees, which judges, which pronounces, and which only is! For where could any selfishness remain, where any ill interest, disorder, murmur, complaint or quarrel either with earth or heaven, were this but seen, and nothing else were seen for self but were truly so? * * *. [229]

* * * (L. 3 C. 24) ...

How many are there that place this self, and root it as it were so deeply in a body, that they cannot but persuade themselves that they have something to do with that body of theirs, some concern, some interest in it even when dead? ... The ancients and their sit tibi terra levis ... Burning wholly left off among the Christians. And nowadays aversion of being opened. Care of coffin, grave and resting (as they call it) there. How to lie. In what manner and where. My burial. My grave. I would lie here. I would lie there. Everywhere, **me** and **I**. a property still kept in this body. A **self** still. An imaginary I. a secret link, union, sympathy. And what a horror (I warrant) what a heavy disturbance and sad becoming within, were it but foreseen that dogs were in a little to eat the carcass, although no one knew of it, or were to have the least offence by it! Now if we stick thus to a decayed carcass, and that this be truly so much our-self with us; what must the living one be? How dear and precious? How wholly and solely us, our selves, very real true and natural selves? No self to be heard of else: no persuading us (as they say) out of our selves. And yet who is there that can be persuaded into himself, or of himself! Even thou thy self how hard to be persuaded!³⁸³

A wretched foolish and selfish human creature thinks he has to do with his body, and that it is still some part of himself, and belonging to him, even after he is out of it. [230] A wiser mortal thinks his body no part of himself, nor belonging to it when out of it. But a truly wise man thinks his body no part of himself nor belonging to him even while in it. Only he takes care of it as of a lodging, na inn, a passage-boat or ship, a post-hors. For all these are his, while he uses them: and as a good man he will find himself obliged to take care of them, and keep them the best he can, as long as they are in his possession and lent him.

Why this hankering after flesh? This clinging, this cleaving to a body? What art thou afraid should be taken from thee? What art thou afraid of losing? Thy self? ... What is lost? A tooth? Wilt thou go out for a tooth? --- Go then. -- a hand, a leg. --- a whole body: and what more? Is not this the furthest? And is not this in reality less still than the tooth? Or say: has thou thus lost anything that thou wilt want? For, supposing this to be thy self, wilt thou miss thy self when thou art thus lost? How many thousand years wert thou thus lost, before thou wert born? And yet, no harm. But there is a real losing of self. there is that which if lost will be missed, and sighed for. Take thou care of that loss.

³⁸³ Inf. p. 278.

If it must needs be me and I (as they speak) whatever happens to this wretched body; let it be I then in this sense who spoke so generously to the tyrant ... “Thou shalt be thrown into prison --- Then I go live in prison. --- Thou shalt be put to death. --- Then I’ll die. --- Thou shalt be denied burial. --- Then I’ll stink”. What is the I imprisoned, or the I killed, more than the I that stinks? What is imprisoned? My mind? [231] My will? Although willingly there? Although contentedly? Although taken up with my own thought and proper exercise? Deep in the order of things and accompanying the administration? ... What is killed? My resolution? My integrity? My principle that tells me death is nothing? --- But I will put an end to that thought, destroy that principle. --- In whom? In what? in nature? In the universe? In its original? Root and branch (as they say)? --- This would be killing indeed. But at this rate thou shalt kill nature, truth, reason, God ... what folly! ... where then wilt thou do this murder? Where then wilt thou kill this reason, and in what? In nature? --- No: but in tee. --- What tee? Where is the tee that thou wouldst thus deprive? Deprive what? Who? A carcass? Ridiculous. The real tee thou canst not deprive. For either it is not at all, and so wants not anything, nor can be deprived of anything: or it is out of thy reach and pretension.

* * *; L. 3. C. 22. ... To be dispatched, made away with, sent out of the world --- Terrible! But whither? Where there is world still, or no world? For, if there be any; it is the same still or better. If there be none; it is no harm, and so no fear.

Vir bonus et sapiens audebit dicere Pentheu

Rector Thelantarum, quid me perseve patique,

Indignum coges? &c.: kill what? the thought? --- No tee. --- Man! --- I am that thought! If thou [232] killst not that, thou canst kill me. --- But it shall be no longer with tee. --- Again with who? With the carcass? ... Who cares? --- But thou thy self then, where? --- With nature, God; where I should be, and would wish to be. How many thousand ages has my being been already his, with him, in his power, and at his dispose? The question here is about a few days only (for die I must, a little latter, if not now) and shall I be concerned to trust him for such a time as this, or any time to come? Was I not from eternity thus exposed (if this be exposing)? And is the exposing greater for time to come? ... How exposed? To whom? By whom? ... Nature exposing her own works! God his creatures! ... Principle of ill: exterior; where? Interior: how? ... How anything a principle of ill to itself? How many things beyond or besides nature? How any thing against God, or God against anything? Anti-God! God against himself! ... Folly! Weakness! Wretchedness all! ...

Charios est illis homo quam sibi (Juvenal, Satire 10). Do thou thy self but love thy self as thou shouldst do: and trust them for their love. Know, own, assert, be thy self; and there is no fear.

Count not such a certain figure thy self: (for thou mayest lose that figure) nor such certain senses thy self (for thou mayest lose one or more of those senses) but such certain **judgements** such certain **opinions**; and only such certain ones. For if they are not those thou hast approved and confirmed, [233] it is a wrong SELF, a nothing, non-entity, lie.

Remember then. While I am my self, I cannot be hurt. When I think I am hurt by any of these accidents that happen to a carcass, or to any thing without my mind and real self, I am then out of my **reason**, and am not my self.

Fear nothing but losing thy self in this manner. Fear not what may happen to thy self otherwise than thus, in being not thy self. And this thou needest not fear neither. For it is in thy choice.

The metaphysicians and notable reasoners about the nice matters of identity, allow that if memory be taken away the self is lost. And what matter for memory? What have to do with the past? If while I am I am but as I should be, what do I care more? And thus let me lose self every hour, and be twenty successive selves, or new selves, it is all one to me: so I lose not my opinion. If I carry that with me it is I: all is well. If that go; memory must go too. For how one without the other?

If thou preservest this time opinion of self (as not body) even while in a body; it will not be surely less confirmed to thee when thou shalt find thy self (if such be the case) even out of a body. If the **NOW** do not belie thee, the **HEREAFTER** cannot. If the present state allow it, the future must demonstrate it. And the better surely for thee that thou cast thus thought and begun thus with thy self while here. --- But why these ifs? Why this conditioning? Wouldst thou bargain then, as others do? ... What views! What fancies? ... The now. The now. Mind this. In this is all. **Inf.284]**

SELF; simple? Or a system?³⁸⁴ ... If simple; not body: or if body; an atom (unintelligible body). But if a system; how is body a part? How does it enter into the system? Can that enter into a system, of which any portion being lost, the system nevertheless remains the same? Or is the system of **self** not the same, and changed for a leg or arm lost? Is the man a quarter less himself? A fifth, a sixth or a bit less himself than before?

A man in armour... Off with the armour. Is it not a man still? Is it less a man? ... A man in clothes. Off with the clothes. Does not the man remain? ... But a limb! Let it be a limb. Off with it. Is not the man the same? The self the same, self-same? Or so much lost? So much remaining? A pound? An ounce? An inch? An ell? ... Is it thus that self is measured, and weighed out? ... Where is this **SELF** then? Where lies the man? --- But the whole body? --- Be it then, the whole body. And what is the body (pray) when no mind acts upon it? When there is a mind, give me any shape, any figure, body, or parts whatsoever, whole or not whole: and I will show you the person, the man whole still and entire.

What have we to do then with body? Why this concern about a body? Or what regard to this more than to the armour? For if a cuirassier, and upon duty, I am bound to this, and must keep it as tight [283] about me, as sound, nay and as bright and fine too as the thing will bear, as becomes armour and a soldier no otherwise.

What am I? --- A particular mind. An acting principle. --- Over what? --- Over a particular body, senses, &c.: --
 - To what end? --- To that which the general mind has appointed: and for so long as it has appointed that I should use such a body and such senses. --- But they may be taken from thee. --- Let them be so. --- But thou art lost then thy self. --
 - As how lost? For having no longer a body and senses to take care of? If I have nothing to take care of; what is any thing to **me**? If there be any thing afterwards; I shall be concerned then as now: and all will be well. If there be nothing; all is well still: this is all. I am discharged. It is well ... With the universe, I know, all is, and will be well. And with my self the same; while I think as I do at the present of that universe, know the order, and serve the **orderer**.

If those thoughts and that purpose is taken from me, and the **I** remain; then may I indeed be said to be lost, or to have lost my self.

But the order of the universe is to proportionable just and consequent, to admit that this should ever happen, but by consequence from my own present thought, and action: that is to say; that I should ever become wicked, but by my own fault.

A MIND is something that acts upon a body; and not on a body only, but on the senses of a body, the appearances, fancies and imaginations by [284] correcting, working, modelling these, and building out of these. Such is a **mind**. such a thing I know there is in the world, somewhere. Such a mind I am sure of. Let Pyrro by the help of such a mind contradict this if he please. He and I have each of us our several understandings. He understands for himself and I for my self ... Who for the world? Nobody? Nothing? ... How possible? What is the world? --- A body. --- What are bodies of men? --- Bodies in this body. --- Fancies of men? --- Fancies of men? --- Fancies in this body. --- and is there no mind that governs in this body, or acts upon the fancies in this body? Has the goodly bulk, so prolific, so kind and yielding for all others, nothing less than for itself? Unhappily giving all away? ... By what chance, what rule, and how? Whence such a distribution? --- NATURE (say you) --- And what is nature? Understanding? Or not understanding? Who understands for her? --- No one. Every one for himself. --- Right. And is not NATURE a SELF? or how are you your self? --- By a principle uniting certain parts, and that thinks and acts for these parts. --- And what is your **whole** a part of? Or is it no part but a whole by itself, independent and unrelated to anything besides? ... If on the contrary it be related; to what but to the **whole** and to **nature**? If so; what are you your self but a part of nature and united to nature by other parts to which by birth and many other ways you have relation? Is there then a uniting principle in nature? If so; how are you then a SELF, and nature not so? How have you something to understand and act for you; and nature (who gave this understanding) nothing to understand for her, act for Her or help her out (poor being!). Whatever need there may be? Is such her ill fortune amongst all others? Are there so any uniting, governing, understanding principles, in all, and nothing that unites, thinks, acts, understands for all? [287] Nothing that distributes for all, or looks after all? --- NO (says a modern) for it was never more nor is more than what you see. ... No. (says an Epicurean) for it was once yet less than what you see: chaos and a play of atoms. --- Believe it who can. For my own share, I have a MIND, which serves, such as it is to keep my body and the affections of it, my appetites, imaginations, fancies, and the rest in tolerable order. But the order of the universe, I am sure, is yet a much better order. Let Epicurus think his own the better, or, if he please, the only order; and give account how he came by it; how atoms came to be wise.

But setting atoms aside, to come to earnest. A body of the **whole** there is: and to this body, an order: and to this order, a mind. A general mind of this general body. --- And the particular mind, what? --- Part of this general mind: of a piece with it: of like substance (as much as we understand of substance): alike active upon body: original to motion and order: alike simple, uncompounded, one, individual: of like energy, effect and operation: and more like still, more resembling, more the same, if it co-operate (as it may and ought) with the general mind.

Consider then: what am I? what is this SELF? A part of this general mind, governing a part of this general body, itself and body both, governed by the universal governing mind: which if it willingly be, it is the same as to govern with it. It is one with it, partakes of it, and is in the highest sense related to it.

Tιξ ων; --- Wonderful word! Powerful question! If but rightly applied, and used not only in the first and leading sense, the **natural self**, but in the economical parts and in every relation, station, and circumstance of life³⁸⁵. Thus in the great chapter³⁸⁶, accusing providence, hard fate! hard case! --- Tιξ ων; and in the royal chapter³⁸⁷, page 338, wishing to return from abroad and see again native country, with other imaginary happinesses. Tιξ ων; as who? And why are you the better? What good to such a one? So, * * * (L. 2. C. 17. in fine) ironically.

³⁸⁴282.

³⁸⁵200.

³⁸⁶26th of 3 8th of 2nd p. 371 also.

³⁸⁷24 of 3.

HUMAN AFFAIRS

[Supra 184 [234]

See Πολιτικά.

See, how true a prophet to my-self! That thou wert as at that present a slave in reverse too, to those other things, by that time &c.: supra p. 164. Go now therefore to the same thoughts as before (supra p. 89). The folly, stupidity of those reasonings about the duration of things ... Ancients. Governments. Empires. Summer. Winter. P. 140 &c.

How ridiculous to wish, hope, apprehend, forebode, decline, incline, variously and anxiously in these affairs! When at the same time so far from knowing what is BEST. I mean not what is universally best (for as to that there is nothing to doubt) but what is particularly so, for this or that part of things which thou art so particularly concerned for. First then; what a shame to wish against the whole and against that general good and universal highest greatest noblest interest! And what folly too! Since this interest must and will prevail, whether thou art willing or not willing, pleased or not pleased.

In the next place, what shame and folly to wish this way and that way, for and against things as turning and guiding them to and again, when thou knowst not what would be the consequence; or if thou knowst that such [235] or such an end would be compassed, thou knowst not them which way to turn, nor after all couldst answer thy self that one poor question and what then? For let us take it as in the case of that conqueror who was thus asked, let us suppose that even those conquerors themselves were conquered and the world subdued, by virtuous arms; should it be the arms of a people, as of Athens or Rome? Or of a Senate, as Cartage? Or of a single man, a Hercules, Cyrus, Trajan? And what then? What would this empire produce? Or if not one empire, but a balance; what would even this produce? What did the balance of Greece when evenest, what did an Athens or Sparta produce? Or will a people be ever better? Shall we have a juster and more virtuous than the one, a politer, more civilised than other? Can there come an empire of greater power than that of Rome? Or emperors better than some of those who governed successively for a certain time? And yet how was it even at that time? And what followed afterwards? ... See Capitolinus Erodian ... Senate what? Pretorian band. Empire by auction. Destruction, prey, ravage arts, letters, sciences, perishing. Misery. Superstition. Barbarity. Goths. ... see on the other side Thucidides and his state of Greece and yet what better? What more to be expressed and hoped than what he represents? What better state of liberty, of letters, arts, sciences, philosophy and virtue than in that and the next succeeding age? --- But be it so. I would have this age again; this situation of affairs; this face of things. --- And how knowst thou what that is which may soonest bring it on? Or bring on what is best or likest to this state, the best thou knowst? How knowst thou whether the present hastily growth of the power thou fearest, as universal monarchy coming on, may not be the best means of breaking it? And whether a present [236] check may not perhaps give it a stranger although slower growth over mankind? Or that this attempt so easily crushed may not give greater caution to a new attempter, and a better occasion of oppressing the world less apprehensive of such a power and thinking it time enough to confederate when it is too late?

What of such a prince as the present Swedish had he known a Xenophon, or had been bred as Alexander, or Cesar? What a use of modern religion, did a leader know the use of it, free and unentangled by it? What a foundation for military virtue and an Empire; were discipline known? How much mischief from the best causes? A virtuous prince. A hero...what dangers! What uncertainties! What operations of causes! What contrariety of effects! ... How wish? How hope? How prescribe or dictate to providence? what present state? What future? What change in governments? What in religion? What as to these Gothic models in either? ... how knowst thou how the rise or fall of a certain superstition may

operate? Whether it be best it should fall or not fall? In part, or altogether? Whether it can stand in part, if not altogether? ... The * * * language how preserved hitherto, and to what it must still be owing ... destruction of letters by the ottomans. Mahomet. Believers. What from that seed scattered? What from that military and spiritual joint-power, if once a great prince or two, successively? What of the Jews, if again collected? ... The power of such a mark as circumcision. Their numbers. Other nations circumcised. A messiah conqueror. A new Cyrus, Christian or Jewish. A Tamerlain ... On the one side hierarchy, modern religion, letters: on the other, Scythians, Goths, barbarity, no letters ... From superstition, atheism: from atheism, superstition. A wilderness, abyss. Darkness, perplexity, loss. ... And what is all this to tee? Why [237] darkness? Why perplexity, or loss, but because thou wilt thy self? what is these here but natural, good, sovereignly good, and best? ---

Enough, enough. commit this to the mind that governs and knows to govern in this other world: and govern thou thy own. Govern what is committed to tee: what concerns tee: and what thou art capable of. Wouldst thou be a Phaeton and take the Reins (suppose) but for a day or two? Or thinkst thou, that thou shouldst make better work, if this government were laid upon thy shoulders? ... Oh, the Atlas! The Hercules! What a world should we have of thy managing, wert thou to manage or bear it for a while? And wilt thou manage it? Wilt thou, then, be setting thy shoulders to it, and heaving? --- Bravely done. To it again. Another lift, and it will do. Now the age! Lean to this side, and now to that. Bring it to the rights. Now it runs right. Rub! Fly! Anon the game will be up. --- Right. For so it will be. It is almost up already. The business of life is well nigh over: and thou art still at rub! And fly! ... Man! What is all this? ... away! ... Come to thy self and be in earnest. Be once a man yet before thou diest.

Pyrrhus's non plus. And what then? So the reply to that other conqueror. --- Shall I rebuild thy city, Thebes? --- Yes, for another Alexander to destroy again.

The houses of cards³⁸⁸. The stork's nests³⁸⁹. * * *³⁹⁰. [238]

O, the world! The world! What will become of the world! Sad world! And was there ever such a world? --- Fool! Was there ever any other world? Was it ever other than it is? --- Where is the world going?³⁹¹ --- Nowhere but where it has gone a thousand and a thousand times ... The earth around the sun; or the sun around the earth. Annual: diurnal: eternal. Hither and thither; and hither again. Dark and then light. Winter and then summer; and then winter again ... Is not this right? Please ye it should be otherwise? --- Nay: but for the world's sake. --- What world? Saturn, Jupiter, the planets and their circles? Fear not: they will go as they should. And if these greater and including circles hold but their order; I warrant tee (man!) these inward ones (the circles and revolutions of this planet of thy own) will go well enough, and as they should go, both for the planet's sake and for the rest of the system.

Fear then for thy own sake if thou pleasest. But for the world, there is care taken. The administration is good. Do not thou father thy own wretched fears on it, and place thy selfishness and low spiritdness to so wrong an account.

The universal monarchy coming! --- Must it never come? Has it not come already more than once or twice in a few ages? A Cesar, Alexander, Cyrus. And how many before Cyrus? How many Alexanders forgot long since? How many Cesars are past? And how many more yet to come, within the same periods of time? --- But (alas!) in my time! --- Man! What is thy time? Why not in thy time? Will it be worse for the world in thy time than [239] in any other? --- But

³⁸⁸Sup. 51.

³⁸⁹L. 1 C. 28.

³⁹⁰M. 10.34.

I must do my endeavour. I would stop it. --- So would I a plague or earthquake, if I knew how. Tell me how I should stop it: and I'll stop it: but not by any means: not at any rate: not by any loss of my integrity, my sincerity, truth, modesty; my good will towards men and my obedience to deity. For, let this other matter happen as it will; or let it come when it will; I am resolved to be as well satisfied with providence then, as I am now. But which way this satisfaction is brought about; which way such a mind is acquired, and how preserved; by what discipline and regimen; what studies, what order of life, what rules; this thou well knowst. ... And wouldst thou break these rules? --- Right: and for honesty's sake, be a villain! For what is it to be a villain? What is it to have neither faith nor conscience? (* * *) A mind to which there is no trust? A will to which the supreme will is no rule? To have men, and murmur providence?

What wouldst thou? --- That which is for the good of the world. --- Who knows what is good, what is best for it? Who should know but the providence that looks after it? And what is it this providence would have me do? Fight against it self? oppose and thwart? --- No, but accompany and applaud. --- Why act then why do anything against the course of things? --- Because I know not as yet the course of things. Because providence has not declared: for, when that has declared, I declared with it, and am of it side. Thus I would have it to be, and no otherwise. [240]

Ruin is coming! --- What ruin? Of the world? The real world? The whole universal world? --- No, but of my part of the world, and that which to me is the whole world. --- Be it so. But is thy world a world by it self, or is it dependant on the other world? --- Dependant. --- And by what order does this ruin come? By what other than that which governs the world, and is its support and safety? Let it come then. For if it did not, what would become of the world indeed?

Universal monarchy! --- Remember the real universal monarchy, the good, the wise, the just, the excellent, the divine. What monarchy but this? What is there that can happen out of this? Contrary to this? Or otherwise than by the universally advantageous salutary laws of this at once both absolute monarchy and absolute equal and most perfect commonwealth?

Thou wishest well to the world (thou sayst) --- Why sigh then? Why groan, repine and mourn? Is it for something out of the world. --- No. But for something in the world which I would have to be otherwise as it is in the world, otherwise than as happens according to the laws, interest and government of the world. --- This is wishing ill not well to the world.

Thou wishest well to the world³⁹². --- Come on then. Let us see and trial. Is it a tooth? An eye? A leg or an arm? Give it to the world. [241] Surrender it with a good heart. Resign it * * * in favour of the constitution and laws that establish it. Is it a relation, brother, friend? An estate, a country? Let us see what country thou art of; and what thy world is. Whether thou art truly an inhabitant, a citizen of the world; or, as they say, a mere worldling? Tied to a place, a corner, carcass and things belonging?

³⁹¹307.

³⁹²260

The apparitions, spectres, compound-visa³⁹³, monsters of monstrous copulation, species mixed. Dragons, mules. Public and private: the horse and ass. Amphibious animals: dubious ones: bats: centaurs: chimeras: sphinxes. ... How long deluded? How long imposed on by these forms? Go to the anatomy³⁹⁴. Dissect: separate according to the art and the instruments that are given. Divorce the unnatural pair. Divide the monster. ---

What is it? --- A station in the public. --- Good. --- But it goes ill with it. --- With what? with the public where thou hast no part in it? (What hast thou to do then?) Or where thou hast a part? (What hast thou to do then but mind that part?) --- But the part suffers. --- As how? --- A name, a reputation, an interest lost. --- So are other names lost, other interests. How many good men defamed! How many reputations injured? Memories abused? --- But this is **mine**. --- How **thine**? ... Say then, thou wretch: say the truth; that it is because [242] (as thou sayst) THINE. This is thy problem. This is thy concern. For as to the public it is the same as to thy part the same still. For if it be to bear ignomy and reproach for the public, this is a PART still: and one of the noblest of parts. * * *. (Marcus, VII, 37).

What disturbs? --- The public interest. --- How can the public (the real public) suffer? --- But my private interest. --- Right. But how comes it that a name or na opinion (viz. another's opinion, not thy own) should be thy interest? Man! Trouble not thy head. In the higher public all is well (if not; why toil in this lower wretched one?) all is according to the interest it ought to be. And as for thy own interest; if thou wilt; it may be the same, and in the same prosperous condition: if not; see who is in fault.

A reputation is lost. --- And what then? --- My service in the public. And what then? --- "Oh, that the public should have such a loss in me! --- Admirable! But say it righter. Oh, that this should happen which for the good of the real public is best should happen! Oh that I should lose and be a sufferer where there is no loss or sufferance; but where (if I please) I may profit and make advantage". [243]

* * *³⁹⁵; and not only such as shone like them, but many who being as great as they, were yet never known so much as beyond their own city, or hardly perhaps in that? How many hid even in Athens? How many that got their living by labour as Cleanthes? How many in Sparta, where they could not shine and be distinguished, all being in one and the same discipline, same stile; eloquence and writing being not in use? Where had been even the philosophy in Athens but for the muses of the pen of Xenophon and Plato? What had Socrates been (as to memory) but for these two? And even by these had he ever been celebrated or mentioned but for the accident of the death which gave such lustre? A death which being forbidden to be spoke of was so artfully represented and with such effect by the tragedian, so finely touched in the same way by Xenophon in his Cyrop: and so adorned and rendered so illustrious a tragedy in Phaedo. Thence the real history, memoirs, defence: the * * *. Wonder, appeal, apology. All from this death so much lamented from which providence has been so often questioned: for which thou thy self so often hast been disturbed. Had it not been for this, whither be either the first or second memoirs? Where had been the subject, or where the spirit of his historian, or poet? the hero-author, or poet-philosopher? The chastity, simplicity, politeness, justness of the one, or the divine enthusiasm of the other?

³⁹³78. 312.

³⁹⁴355.

³⁹⁵M 7.19.

Consider also amongst the Socratics how many unknown besides Aeschylus (of whom in the * * *) and how many of the same besides contemporaries or otherwise at Thebes, Megara, Syracuse, in Sicily, Rhodes and the innumerable islands and commonwealths as well as the other * * * colonies in Asia. Also how many truly great from the age of Marcus and in the decline of things: all swallowed in dark oblivion.

DEITY

From 183] --- See Providence. Human affairs. [244]

That the WHOLE is harmony: the numbers entire: the music perfect: with waht else of this kind has been so well proved, so often said ... But why, in effect, un say this again so often? Why make my self the hindrance? Why break the order, interrupt the music and destroy (as much as in me lies) this harmony and concord by repining, striving, resisting? Why not adhere to this? Why not always find this harmony, enjoy this harmony? What can be the cause? ... What, but the want of harmony WITHIN? and how attain this harmony, how tune my self to this? How consonant and of accord with DEITY? --- Hearken. Begin. (Wouldst thou be a musician? Hast thou patience to earn the gamut, rudiments and grammar of this music?). take up the lute. Touch the strings and tune them. Hearken. Begin. ... * * * ... Say. How does it sound? Ill? Harsh? Hollow? Anything, or as good as nothing, nothing at all? --- Hold! Lay down the lute. No more. Have done with philosophy, [245], contemplation, thought, virtue, DEITY. Go to common talk, common rules. Be every thing, nothing. Or rather, be **nothing** indeed: truly **nothing**. Go to atoms (if it be atoms): for that is better than a life where there is no better or more certain opinion of things than superstition or atoms.

Happy He! Whose faith in deity, satisfaction, assurance, acquiescing, rejoyce in the providence and in the universal administration and order of things depends not on any history or tale or tradition or wonder amongst men; nor on man himself or any set of men; nor on any particular schemes or systems, or solutions of the ill phenomena of the world; no nor even on that great solution by a futurity: but leaving present things to be as they are, and future ones to be as they are to be, commuting all this to providence to be or not to be, as to that seems best, knows, feels and is satisfied that all things are for the best: nothing ill made: nothing ill-governed: nothing but what contributes to the perfection of the WHOLE and to the felicity of HIM who is the whole in the whole...

But how should this be? How is this brought about? How believe that all is good and nothing ill? How not be disturbed, nor shaken, nor in doubt? How not be afflicted, repine or grieve? How no ill providence, dark providence, hard fate? no words, no secret thoughts nor inward murmurs of this kind? --- No way but this (which thou knowst too well enough) if * * * (C 38) ... If not; the rest is idle, senseless, poor. Flattering God as a tyrant, not loving, following, obeying as [246] a father or good prince³⁹⁶. --- "Dread sovereign! Thou art all powerful! --- And what then? --- Therefore thou art all good ... I am in thy hands, mighty Lord! --- And what then? --- Therefore I complain not. I ask not why I was thus made; or why made at all if to be miserable; if to have been in fault and been a wretch. No: I am contented to be miserable. I say not so much as within my self that my lot is hard. I say not thou art unjust, arbitrary, cruel; or that thy order is ill or amiss"³⁹⁷. --- Wretch! Dost thou not say it? Is not this saying it? How canst thou help it, poor wretch, such as thou art? How can almightyess it self help it? Or how make this otherwise, that He that sees not goodness, should believe goodness? That he who feels misery should not complain, even although He vows most holyly that he complains not nor ever will complain?

(1.) Faith in deity: not faith in men. This not previous nor fundamental to that. For, what a foundation! ... Men witnessing for God! ... And who for men? ... Who for powers above men? Who for miracles ever so great? What security against demons? What proof against magic? What trust to anything above or below if first not satisfied of deity: i.e. GOODNESS, order, justice in the whole? And how assured? By what but reason? What but philosophy?

³⁹⁶* * * &c. L. 2 C. 7 in fine.

³⁹⁷Confer the Enquiry p. ... and Dr. Tilloison p. 118.

(2.) Faith in deity³⁹⁸. That other: and this. A faith which depends on a philosophy proved by record. And a faith which depends on a philosophy that has neither education nor the weaknesses of nature on [247] its side: sprung from strong conviction, without melancholy: even in youth and pleasure: in the midst of the world, and in an age going just contrary: all things fighting against it, superstition, libertinism, the fashionable learning and the philosophy in vogue...

Imagine these two, not as separate, but going together: as this latter as a confirmation of the former. And take notice to bring the same diligence and care hither. A certain enemy of religion, defining what he understood by faith, called it a premeditated and stubborn resolution of giving reason the lie. There is indeed a faith which carries with it a sort of resolution, and stubborn resolution (for so it must do if it would hold out, and be truly faith): but this it is: a premeditated and stubborn resolution to give everything the lie besides reason only.

The stubbornness of this faith is such as to contradict the very senses, the imagination, the habitual and almost natural opinions of mankind, the report of men, the received notions of the world, the plausible and in all appearances most innocent thoughts, unexceptionable judgements and warrantable fancies; as of what is good, what ill: what eligible, what uneligible: what indifferent and what of concern. If by reason be understood the reason of the world; this is indeed giving reason and (if you will too) common sense, the lie ... * * * ... Is not this equally faith? Is not this equally mystery?

Remember then³⁹⁹: and respect those other mysteries. For, all is FAITH: and without faith all must be atheism.
[248]

What is that which at present they call deism? The belief of a God? What God? A mind? a real mind? Universally governing, presiding, acting? Present everywhere? Conscious of every thing? Even of secret thought and every intelligent act, as being infinitely intelligent, and the principle of all intelligence? Is it this they understand? Is it of such a providence as this that they are persuaded in themselves? ... Be it so. It is well. But if it be anything less than this; if this be too high a key; if the heart (that must pledge of thought) discover plainly a sense and apprehension of things far short of this, far wide of such a system, far beneath so higher and exalted an idea; then let us hear what this idea is. What deism? What deity? Of what is it they talk to us? what nature? (what is nature?) what virtues or powers do they tell us of? What magic charm or spell? What coherence of things? Or what jumble? How hanging together, put together, standing together? By what power, energy, force? For from one sort of men we have an account, such as it is; a blind account, be it; but still it is an account and in this they are fair. Atoms and void, a plain negative to deity. Fair and honest. To deism, still no pretence. So the sceptic. Perhaps so: perhaps not so. But to deism still no pretence.

From whence then this other pretence? Who are these deists? How assume this name? By what title or pretence? ... The world; the world? Say what? How? A modified lump? Matter, motion? [249] ... What is all this? Substance what? Who knows? Why this evasions? Subterfuges of words? Definitions of things never to be defined? Structures on no foundations. Come to what is plain. Be plain: for the idea it self is plain: the question plain: and such as everyone has inwardly some answer to, which is decisive. ... MIND? or not mind? if mind; a providence: the idea perfect: a God. If not mind; what in the place? For whatever it be, it cannot without absurdity be called God or Deity; nor the opinion without absurdity be called deism.

For what is a mind in the infinite but an infinite mind? And how this, without infinite wisdom? And how this without infinite goodness, infinite power? And how this without a providence, consciousness, care, rule, order, such as

³⁹⁸ Inf. 250.

³⁹⁹ Inf. 250.

has been mentioned? And what less than this is God? What opinion of a God, but this opinion? What else can be called deity, or denominated a deist?

What is this deism they talk of? What difference from mere atheism? Is it some secret virtue (like magic) which they assign to things? Is it the plastic nature? Or Epicurus' atoms? --- But Epicurus was more sincere. For his is only a God for the vulgar ad populum phaleras. But he pretends not to bring this into philosophy nor resolve anything in nature by this, or any such like principle. Neither does anyone call the Atomists deists ... Of what system then are these deists? Of Democritus's or Epicureans' they are not; Peripatetics, Platonists, Pythagoreans, Pyrronists? What? [250]

(3.) Faith in deity⁴⁰⁰: and justly so called. For is it not indeed faith? Implicit belief? ... For how always explicit? ... Sudden shocks, disturbances, foreign ideas, sophistry of wit, commotion in the affections. What in these cases, but faith? For the reason being not present at these moments, nor ready at call, must we not rely on those decrees and resolutions which reason, at cool seasons and fit times of deliberation, has so often confirmed and rendered peremptory? How else adhere to anything? How constant, stable, self-consistent, but by this faith? Strive however to need it the least that is possible: preserving the chain of thought and affections uninterrupted; that so it may be still the same reason, the same comprehension, conviction and clear sight. For, what hinders that this should always be explicit? What but wrong opinions, wrong assent? What therefore allow of such? Why these beginnings? (for who knows the consequence?) Why any suspension, relaxation, wrong attention but for a moment? For, to what does this tend but to the loss not of reason only, but faith itself, the reserved powers of reason, the recourse, refuge, citadel, strength? [251]

PROVIDENCE.

See Deity. Human affairs. [252]

Nothing can be wiser than that order of providence: that the same things that has placed out of our power, it should also have placed out of our knowledge which way or how they are to happen. For how else would there be room for the natural affections? What measure of affection inclining or declining in outward things, the good or ill of native country, friends, body, health? What medium but either perfect indifference towards these, or perfect rebellion, perfect contempt and resistance of the divine will? But as things are ordered by that divine will in making plain what is of real concern to me, and hiding what is not; how can I be wanting in due and natural affection? How can I be indifferent or without due concern in every relation? I know how providence bids me to affect and act: but I am ignorant what will be the effect of my action. If I were not ignorant, I must affect the event which might perhaps be contrary to that which is my present endeavour and action. So that I must either not act at all, or act without affection, or with my affection contrary to my action. For if I affect the end, how can I but affect in some manner and love the means? And if the means; how unnatural would this be? For in this manner I must [253] often times affect (as would seem most preposterous) my country's ruin, children's death, my own sickness and the like: all absurdity and confusion⁴⁰¹. But in the other and as it is regulated, how natural and easy is all! For, how is it that I affect the prosperity of my little family? --- As it stands in the great. If the great calls, farewell the little one. I give it up. --- To what? --- To my country. --- And my country to what? --- To any first and greatest country. But what the good of that is I know not until my action is over. Therefore I cease not to act still and affect according to nature; always satisfied with my having so affected, as well as with the contrary effect, if it happen to prove contrary. And thus I affect both according to nature and with nature. According to nature, as willing the good of my relations and country, primarily, chiefly and as most eligible; but not absolutely: with nature, as yielding to providence and accompanying providence when its will is declared: having before hand willed with this exception and reserve. * * * and * * *. Not * * * as c. 7 of book 4, and so in the great chapter, viz. 24 of book 3... No wonder if the commentators understand not the language, nor what this is not to will or aim * * *. Thus the words of Chrysipus, chap. 6 book 2, * * * and again chapter 10 of the same (see notes) * * *.

This was eligible just now, before the thing was over: now it is over; it is no more so, but contrarywise. What is yet to come may be eligible or ineligible, because not yet come. --- But it is certainly to come. --- How know I certainly? --- If certainly must I not wish it so, whichever way it be? What deliberation? What room for choice or preference? Where would the eligible be, or ineligible? [254] What priority or precedence of things? What regard or deference for anything? Friends, relation, country? Why more affect their good than their ill? Why not equally their ill, when providence would have it their ill, when thou knowst that it is their ill and not their good that is to happen? ... but this thou knowst not, nor canst ever know until it be happened: and when happened, then affect, then choose. The one was eligible before; but now the other. Thus before the event affection and disaffection, approbation and disapprobation, inclining and declining had place: but now after the event, no place. All is affection: no disapprobation: no disaffection: nothing ineligible. The past is ever eligible, and the BEST. * * *. L. 4 c. 7.

Such is the harmony of providence with one who has harmony in himself, and knows wherein providence has placed his good and ill; wherein not. --- Providence dispenses things unequally --- What things? The things that are not my good. But the things that are my good, how? ... Are they not in my own power? ... How blame the dispensation?

⁴⁰⁰Sup. 217.

⁴⁰¹* * *. L. 2.6.

--- Providence dispenses without regard, promiscuously and indifferently ... What? --- Indifferent things. But good and ill how? ... To the good and to the ill, distinctly and not promiscuously. Be thou therefore one of the good, and take of good what thou pleasest: reject the ill. But if anything stick; if there be any good of thine that lies out of the reach, any ill which thou canst not remove; for this still thank thy self. for, why is such as this, either thy good or ill? [255]

The good of my country: the good of mankind. ... As how my good? --- As wishing it. --- But happening contrary? --- My good still (the world's good). --- But thy wish is lost. --- What wish? Against the world? Was this my wish? Was this my good? Fool! The wish it self was my good. In this lay all. My wish was right: my aim, endeavour, action right. --- But the event wrong. --- How wrong? Through me? --- No. --- Through whom then? Through providence? ... And was that wrong? Has that failed? ... If then neither providence be wrong nor I wrong; what wrong is there? Where is there any wrong remaining? Is that wrong which for the universe is right and just and necessary? --- But I know not what is so. --- And what need that thou shouldst know before hand? Know this only for certain; that THAT and only that has happen, or can ever happen. --- As how then can I wish? As how wish well to anything? How hope? Or how affect? --- How but with exception? Not * * *, but reserve for this my ultimate final wish and desire in which I never can be frustrated. And thus I may safely and without disturbance wish well to things, my country, mankind, or any part of things. Wishing still better to the whole of things, the general interest and common weal as administered by that common mind, intelligence and wisdom which is unerring.

This is that which saves from all solicitude and anxiety. For in this manner there needs no search, no divining, no penetrating in what will be as it is to be * * * (Great chapter: towards the end). The good of this country this world is always ready found and at hand. Do not torment thy self therefore about the good of [256] that other world, that other country. Only love it and do thy part for it, and for those in it. --- But how love it? --- As loving this other world, relation and country much better: as always preferring the prosperity and interest of this, to any prosperity or interest besides.

One thing there is impossible for me to affect (were it in providence) and only one thing: what is my own real ill. If that be in providence I cannot affect with it: for providence it self has made it impossible for me so to do. But withal providence has made an impossible case, that I should have any contest with it about my real good or that there should be anything in the whole course of nature to oppose my good. There is not nor can be any such thing in providence. for what is really my good, providence has placed within my powers to obtain: what is ill, to avoid. So that where can my difference be with providence? why not allow providence to be free, since I am free?

Providence has given me means (* * *) to know both it and my self, and to be conscious for what and to what I was born. If I use these, I am a man; and as such providence will use me. If I use them not, I am a mere animal (lest my shape be ever so much of a man) and as an animal providence will use me. Even as we man use other animals, making them willingly or unwillingly serve our purposes.

What is it that is dragged and forced? What goes to death unwillingly? --- An animal. --- But a human creature. --- An animal still (if it be thus) a mere animal. For [257] if it knows no better what life is; it is still but the animal. The man knows better: and will go to death like a man: not as to slaughter ... what slaughter? Is God the butcher? Man! Dost thou know God that thou thinkst thus of him and no better? Can he kill otherwise than kindly, fatherly, for the good of everything, and as the preserver of the whole? Is there any harm? ... not if thou art a man; thou canst not think so. For where is the harm of death? And if none here what other harm? Where can there be any? But if thou art na animal only,

there is harm: in this only; that what might have been a man remains still na animal and no more. This is thy harm. But that there should be animals is no harm in the whole. When thou ceasest to be one (this is to say: when thou becomest a man) neither will there be any harm to tee. So if thou complainst any more; complain (if thou wilt) of the hard case of animals: but not of men: for being once a man thou wilt know there is no cause.

If I know providence, I know my good and can follow it: so, no complaint. If I know not any good, I do not in reality know providence. so if I complain; I complain of a spectre, not of deity: I complain as an animal not as a man. For, wherein lies the animal? Where the distinction? Go then and complain for the sake of animals and for thy self as being but an animal when yet it lies in tee to be otherwise if thou pleasest. See, what a complaint! [258]

So ignorant people sitting by a painter, will needs be giving him instructions, guiding his hand, and teaching him his art. This colour is harsh, this disagreeable and sad. Here the paint lies too thin, and hardly covers the cloth: here thick, uneven, rough --- Come, take the pencil. Let us see thy own performance: what ordering, what work thou art like to make. --- But is this the case here? --- Man! Is it not much more the case? Canst thou judge of this in the piece? Seest thou the real piece? Or a part only? Is it the whole breadth of the cloth? Or only a thread or two? Art thou in aright light and at the due distance, to view this in the full breadth of time, the circle of generations, the compass of worlds and in the infinite extent of this design? Hast thou so much as thought of this ordering? Art thou a **virtuoso** here? Hast thou any masterly knowledge or judgement? Let us see it. Give us the proof. Let us hear how thou camest by it. Where didst thou study for it, and how? Or will the taste and knowledge of this kind come of itself? Or come easier and with less study than that other taste? Is the high virtuous part more easy than the virtuoso's? how know a hand? How judge the master of the art? How comprehend so much as one rule? --- But why should there be tyrannies? Why chasms and wilderness in the map? Why these dank sides upon the globe? I would have no shade, no roughness, but all smooth: no sad colours but all gay and light --- Pretty amusement! Ladies talk! Wantonness of children! But is this for men too? Is this to study nature? Is this [259] an understanding of beauty? A knowledge of proportion, symmetry or rule? ... Where is the great original? If none; from whence these copies? This derivation?

What is there in the world that has more of beauty, or that gives the idea of the *το καλον* more perfect and sensible than the view of an equal commonwealth or city, founded on good laws? A well built constitution, fenced against exterior and interior force? A legislature and a militia? A senate propounding, debating, counselling; a people resolving, electing; a magistracy executing, and in rotation? ... And for what all this? Against what, this precaution? Hence this so fair, so comely and admirable a structure? How if no tyranny, no ambition, no passions and appetites of men? ...

This is that chrysiptian paradox inveighed against by so many. Thus honest Plutarch ... But how can this (even this too) be otherwise or better? How more orderly and beautiful than as it is? Or, say, where would the prodigy of a Chrysippus be, his dialect, his astonishing force, if not liable, withal, to be thus taken by many and thus divided and inveighed against? For how explain these things to the vulgar? And what to say to those vulgar philosophers who thus set out providence? Who need a demon to solve the ill phenomena, and who make thus a mere baby of the world, to dress and dandle? --- How? --- As being babies themselves; and having baby-Δογματα: which until we have quitted and exchanged for better, this must be still a baby-world with us, and baby-like be dressed thus and undressed, taken [260] to pieces and put together, according to what our fancy tells us in pretty or not-pretty ... Oh, pretty play! But

which costs many a sigh and groan. ... Leave the play then: and be in earnest. Be no more the child, and there will be no need to cry or lament. All is well. Excellent well: and thou mayst play too, and play safely, and in another far better manner, if thou understandst that divine play (II, 5 and IV, 7). For it is that alone that can make piety, religion or virtue earnest; providence, in earnest providence; that is to say, in earnest a government and good government; in earnest wisdom, perfect wisdom, perfect goodness, than which nothing better can be thought or wished. For else this is not earnest; and what we praise, we lie and flatter.

In Parliament, the contents and non contents. In providence, whichever way the question go; always a content. And therefore here also, after the vote, always a content⁴⁰²: although in voting a non content perhaps, and of the losing side. In this council the question may be often carried for the worst side: in the other, never but for the best. Which of these interests wilt thou favour? To which art thou a well wisher?⁴⁰³

It is long since (remember) that thou saidst “when open thy eyes, to see that thou seekst other times than these other subject than this, all is wrong? When come thither, afraid to fall from thence. Therefore even then (supposing the then) still wrong: and anxiety still continued ...”⁴⁰⁴. But the then will not be the case. Therefore what is this but to court disappointment and love trouble for trouble’s sake? For it is not required of thee to be troubled for a world which is already taken care of, unless perhaps thou art of opinion that it might be governed much better yet than God governs it.

[261]

St. Giles’s 1704/1705.

Particular providence in respect to general providence is as a shallow cause and narrow means in the room of a deep and eternal cause with extensive and infinite means. [From table-book some years since, in discourse with Elpin].

* * * (C. XXXIII). In whatever we accuse providence, we contradict our selves: so cannot without absurdity accuse. Sickness, diseases, deaths, in vegetables, animals, systems, worlds, remote and at a distance from our selves, are natural; the answer is ready * * *. But bring it a little nearer, and presently. * * *. No one is so vulgar as not in some measure to contemplate the revolutions of things and see at least the spring and fall with many other generations and corruptions of nature as really beautiful and pleasing. The same of nations and even worlds where self can but be abstracted. Animals may sicken and die: no harm still: it is natural. Men (foreign men) may die: it is natural. Even our neighbour next door: it is natural still. * * * --- But in my own house? In my own family? --- There it is. And thus we stand not to our own judgements. We accuse our selves, deny, contradict our selves, when we accuse providence: for were we all of us, in spite to make a charge against it, we could not anyway agree one with another, nor any one of us with our selves.

Again. * * *. To know nature, feel a providence, acknowledge its ways, own its course: the secret is only this; to be the same in cases that are the same * * *. It is self only alters the case and will ever alter it, until self be right placed.

⁴⁰²337

⁴⁰³240

⁴⁰⁴From scrap of the date viz. Holland 1698. See below page 356.

NATURE [262]

* * *. L. 1 C. 16.

So has nature ordered for the other creatures. Such is their hardness, strength, robustness, readiness. --- But why not the same for man? --- Say as well: why not wings for man? Why not nature itself for man, not man for nature? ... But if it be not nature for man, but man for nature; then must man, by his good slave, submit to the elements of nature and not the elements to him. If in air; he falls: for wings were not given him to fly in air. If in water; he sinks: for he has not what is necessary for water. If in fire; he consumes. But upon earth he can do well. Although not within the earth neither: not in every part of earth: but on the surface of the earth only; and of such and such earth; not over moist, as a marass; nor over-dried, as sandy deserts; nor over hard or steep, as rocky mountains. For these places may be for other creatures: but not for him. So little even of this element of earth is after this manner HIS.

But let us suppose wings for him, to fit him for the air, if we could imagine anything for him to do there; [263] how must his make be changed? See in a bird. Is not the whole structure made subservient to that almost single end? Is it not in a manner all wing? Two vast muscles that exhaust the strength of all the others, engross the economy and swallow up the frame. How else could they perform a motion so vastly disproportionable to the other motions, if not made in this disproportion superior to the rest, and starving the other parts. And in man (according to his present model) were the flying engines and members of this kind to be added; must not the other members and parts be starved, to feed these new ones? Or can the same matter serve for one and for the other? In mechanics, the same engines for equal force in one thing as another, in one part as in another, to twenty different purposes at a time, as well as to one single one? ... What absurdity! ... Where then should this new anatomy be found? What new muscling for these parts? And withal equally for those? Where the animal spirits, and blood, humours, juices for these and for those? If this be certainly absurd, where is the absurdity in saying the robed parts must starve? For, can the same spirit feed equally, nourish, supply equally, when saved as when consumed? Or is there no certain stock or proportion of spirits? Must the animal spirits in every creature be ad infinitum, and not in any certain proportion as the creature is bigger or less, on the organs fitted to prepare more or less? ... If this be absurd; what can be more reasonable than, in the case supposed, to say the spirits cannot be both here and there, nor diverted from their parts or members, yet equally feeding their parts or members? For in this high-flying man will there not be parts that must suffer for the ambition of their fellows: and while these [264] new associates are supplied, must not the feet, hands, stomach it self starve? And how, pray, as to the brain? Must not the brain also starve? See how it is in man even as he now is, without any such notable addition of the new parts. How is it in the first place with the stomach when the brain is over much employed? Especially after eating. And how is it in the same case with the pores? Are those doors kept as well when forsaken by the spirits as when guarded by them? How is it when a mathematician or other student thinks too intensely? Does not the brain itself then starve the body and parts? And when the contrary when the body and parts are chiefly minded, nourished, exercised; as in a wrestler, racer, rider, fencer, dancer, have not the parts their reprisals? Does the brain find itself well in this liberal dispensation to other parts, as when the spirits are used to flow a little more plentiful into their channels there, and are not drawn off so much another way? And if it be thus between man and man; how between the body of a man and of one of those creatures? If the balance be so just and even here; if so nicely held by nature that the least thing breaks it, in creatures of the same frame and order; what would it be to change the order quite, and make some essential alteration in the frame? ... What would it be indeed but monstrous? For, what else is a monster? Or what else are our imaginations of this kind but monsters?

In this view, then, consider this that the divine man says here, and see how ridiculous the complaint is, which he so well exposes ... “why was I not made strong as a horse, or hardy and robust as this on that creature; or nimble and sprightly as the other?” ... And yet when uncommon strength of body and great things are added of that kind even in our own species; see the consequence what happens! Therefore it were better and more modest for a person so much in love with an athletic Milo-like constitution not to ask why was I not made strong as [265] horse? But why was I not made a horse? For that would be more suitable.

Being convinced of these follies and of the poorness of these objections; go to those simple but divine operations, those simplicities of nature which for want of simplicity are so little felt. See the divine and care so obvious and therefore for that very reason so unminded and disregarded, because so obvious. See these beauties which in certain intervals the vulgar see, poetas and painters declare, and the very luxurious themselves confess --- Naturam expellas and upon what occasion that is said. Grottos, cascades, groves, &c.: ... See then where the thing lies. See nature and in that plain view as thought in the elder commentaries (2nd dialogue with ???) * * *. So as to say still, as may be rightly said on each particular, * * *. For here too (as to animals and all of that kind) all is said that can or need be. Only a right disposition is wanting, and simplicity to judge of these simplicities, these only beauties, truths, excellencies. What is the rest but grotesque? What is atheism but nature’s grotesque? Nature seen thus in masquerade, disfigured, charged, as they say in painting, and after a kind of caricatura? And how this grotesque without? How but from the grotesque-work within? see the effect of those masks, the buffoonery, drollery and burlesque. ... Beware! ... Or wilt thou go again into those views? Shall it be nature travesty? For how is it that this happens? How preserve the right views? How lose them? ... No more! Remember then ... And now pursue. [266]

Such is the admirable distribution of nature, its adapting and adjusting not only of the stuff or matter to the shape and form, and of the shape and form to the circumstance, place and region; but also of the affections, appetites, sensations, instincts, passions, mutually to each other as well as to the matter, form, action and all besides. All managed for the best, with the perfectest frugality and just reserve. With perfect liberality too, and utmost bounty. For how bountiful, if profuse? How a just economy if employing in anyone thing more than enough, which force might have been reserved for something else? Now, what a reserve of this sort may we observe in the making of all creatures in general? Nothing superfluous in all their structure. What a reserve in the particular creatures for their chief function, whatever that be? So in the instances just above, what reserve for those creatures of the air, to add force to the chief part of their mechanism, and to lighten and ease the rest? What reserve in creatures made for swiftness, either to prey, or saving themselves from those of prey, by running only? What a reserve and management for everything that is principal in every creature? And should there be none for the brain of man? Or is not his thoughts and reason the thing principal in him, and for which there should be reserve? Would he have his vigour to be spent rather another way? Would he have no saving for this part of the engine? Or would he have the same stuff or matter, the same instruments, organs serve alike and full as well for different purposes and an ounce (as they say) go as far as a pound? It cannot be. What would he have then of a few ounces of blood in such a little vessel fitted for so little a part of nature? Will he not praise nature, will [267] he not adore the artificer who has thus managed his portion for him with this happy reserve? (happy indeed for him, if he knows and uses it) by which he has so much a better use of organs than any other creature, by which he holds his reason is a man and not a beast. --- But beasts have instincts which he has not. --- Right. They have perceptions, sensations and pre-sensations (if I may use the term) which man, for his part, has not. And can anything more commend the order of nature than this very thing? Is not this according to that admirable economy that wise equal and just reserve, which we have spoken of just now? The females of all creatures, although young and having never as

yet bore young have a perfect pre-sensation of their state to come, know what to provide and how, in what manner and what time; the season of the year, country, climate; the choice of place, aspect, situation, the basis of their building, materials, architecture, the method and treatment of their young; in short, the whole economy of their nursery: and all this as perfectly at first and when inexperienced as the last time of their lives. --- And why not this, in human kind? --- Nay: but on the contrary, why this? Where was the use? Where the necessity? Why the sagacity for them? Have they not, for their part, sagacity of another kind? Have they not reason and discourse? Does not this teach them? What need them of the other? Where would be the prudent management at this rate? Where the reserve? --- The young of most other kinds are instantly helpful to themselves, sensible, vigorous, know to shun danger and seek their good. A human infant is of all the most helpless, senseless and longest continues so. --- And wherefore should it not have been thus? Where is the loss by it, in the midst of such supplies? [268] Does not this refer man yet more strongly to society, and force him to own what he is purposely (not by accident) made rational and sociable and can no otherwise increase or subsist but in, and by SOCIETY? Is not conjugal affection, natural affection to parents, duty to the magistrates, love of a common city, community or country, with the other duties and social parts of life, deduced from hence and founded here? What can be happier than such a deficiency that is the occasion of so much good? What better than a want so abundantly made up, and answered by so many enjoyments? Now if there are still to be found amongst mankind such as even in the midst of these wants, are not ashamed to deny themselves by nature sociable; where would their shame have been, had nature otherwise supplied these wants? What duty had been ever thought of? What respect or reverence of parents, magistrates, their country, or their kind? Would their full and self-sufficient state have better inclined them, the sooner to have acknowledged nature, the sooner to have owned and revered a **God**? [269]

PLEASURE AND PAIN [270]

... * * *. L. 2 C. 1.

* * *. L. 1 C. 2.

Pleasure.

* * *; ...

* * *; ... L. 2 ss.

----- Miseri quibus

Intentata nites! -----⁴⁰⁵.

Pain.

What disturbs? ... Pain? The paradox? Cry of the world? --- Come on. How as to pleasure? Riches, riot, fame? ... The proofs in these cases ... What of death? Of injury? Of harm? ... Are not all paradoxes, equal paradoxes? --- This the hardest. --- Postpone then. Settle but the others which are so plain and have been so certainly proved: and see how easy this will be. [271] And remember still that those who object against these are the same that object against the other: the same persons: the same reason. But in the other they move tee not. Thou art certain. Thou knowst. Therefore wait a little: and thou mayst also say in this, I know.

As for pleasure; experience ... As for PAIN; take it thus. What is it but loss of mind?⁴⁰⁶ For as long as the Δογματα are present, the consequent affections of the soul will be present also. And when they are incumbent what is it that the soul can feel?⁴⁰⁷ And why are they not incumbent? Why do they fail upon occasion? ... See, why!⁴⁰⁸

Again. As long as there is presence of mind i.e. as long as the mind is present to itself, and in the use of its right Δογματα; as long as it has these at command; it has its bent at command. And when it is bent what is it can resist it? For how it is even with the common villains, where it is bent, mere will, resoluteness or resolution from one single Δογμα, a opinion, and that too imperfect, and ill-grounded? A false species of the decorum pulchrum το καλον? And what, therefore, should the true species cause?

Again. * * *. What needs more? Or if it be shut for a moment or two, bend but the whole force of mind hither ward and see who can shut it, and for how long ... * * *, and * * * (IV, 12) in the same sense. ... Thank nature that has opened: and laugh at him who would shut: but if the passage itself be unpleasant; if neither of the two can please; if it be hard both staying in, and going out; it is sad indeed⁴⁰⁹. But see what is in the way and whether the rub be in the passage or in thy-self⁴¹⁰. [272]

Now at last consider from hence and make this sad too sad reflection (for such it is if thou wilt not wholly conform to thy known laws and rule of life). If this be the consequence of loss of mind of such a time; if such misery be

⁴⁰⁵Hor. Od. 5.

⁴⁰⁶M. L. ... §. ...

⁴⁰⁷357.

⁴⁰⁸* * *. L. 1 C. 6.

⁴⁰⁹355.

⁴¹⁰393.

from the absence of the right Δογματα at serious hours; what is it then in wantonness and gaiety to allow this loss of mind, and at free and easy seasons to destroy this use, this vigour and ready presence of the Δογματα by relaxation and loss of remission of the Προκοχη?

Coward-flesh! --- Why so? Why blame the flesh? Is not all human flesh the same? The hard villain's, the true brave man's, the effeminate voluptuous man's? Is not the gout, the stone, the fire and the iron the same to one as the other? Is not the sensations and feeling the same? Where then is the difference? Is it not in another sort of feeling? And what is this sort of feeling but OPINION? ... Say not therefore coward-flesh! But coward-opinion!

Such a one bears: but I cannot. --- Why? What is it makes him bear? --- Sturdiness, anger. --- (Opinion!) --- Bravado. --- (Opinion!) --- Hope, expectation. --- (Opinion!) --- Fanaticism, enthusiasm. --- Opinion. All opinion! ... See then what thou hast within thy own discipline to answer this opinion with opinion: and thou wilt find thou hast more than barely enough to answer it. Thou canst exceed it all: the thing is more accountable. Every object is better: every reason surer: every thought juster: every affection, bent, possession, righter. But thou must see then to be truly possessed. And in order to be truly possessed with these things and to have them for opinions (real opinions), thou must be first dispossessed [273] of those other opinions, those prepossessions and prejudices which have gone before ... To work then. Throw out the deceit of luxury. Throw out pleasure. Out with all of this kind. But if all be not out yet; wonder not if pain be such a business, and all that kind so terrible, and hard to bear.

Pleasure.

It is plain, then, that an army ever so brave, and formed on right discipline of soldiery is presently corrupted by pleasure? Was it thus at Capua? Is every soldier less a soldier for having taken of it, or yielded to it ever so like? For having fallen in love, caressed a mistress or a boy with fondness, for having eat or lain or done those other things with too much delicacy? For having only had too pleasant quarters, enjoyed but for a while the pleasantness of a climate, breathed the soft air, and sucked in the corrupting sweets? Is the seaman less a seaman, the huntsman less a huntsman, and so in every manly exercise or function, are the brave less brave, the generous less generous? And is it not in honesty and life the same? ... Who then would bear with this? Who that is * * *? ... Oh pleasure! Who would endure tee?

Σωματιον. [278]

Being once persuaded, the self lies not here; that the I and Me are something else⁴¹¹; and that thou art by no means this, but distinct and different from this. Beginning by what is easiest (although to the vulgar not so easy) taking it first in that total separation (and as thus to the dunghill with it; to kites, vultures, wolves, dogs or whatever else, as well as to fire, worms or to a descent grave as they say). Then in the union: considering it abstractedly as first from what even the vulgar can abstract as from hair, nails, excrements, or the things which by transpiration and change of substance are in this instant becoming excrements; thus from the parts and members of the body; and thus from the whole body it-self an excrement in seed, and already half in being, half putrefaction, half corruption; being persuaded, I say, of this; that I (the real I) am not a certain figure, nor mass, nor hair, nor nails, nor flesh, nor limbs, nor corpse; but **mind, thought, intellect, reason**; what remains but that I should say to this corpse and all the pompous funeral, nuptial, festival (or whatever other) rites, attending it, "this is corpse. These are of the corpse only. The corpse gives life to them, exalts them, magnifies them, gives them their vigour, force, power and very being".

What is the tyrants court? Who gives it force? The **corpse**. Withdraw the corpse; kill that once; let it be truly corpse (thy self living) and see what tyrant, sword or axes are [279] in the way? --- But change the scene. Let it be another court that has nothing terrible and only what charms. --- Again. What are charms? Is not this **corpse**? ... Titillation, luxury, effeminacy, flattery, ceremony, show. Where is MIND in the midst of all this? Is it not more stifled here than anywhere? More effectually dispatched, made away with, hilled, sunk and burned under all this? Is it not the corpse that lives and flourishes? Is it not the more corpse-like? The more truly corpse? What else is it that is thus applied to, thus improved and made much of? What is it that with all this ceremony is dressed, walked and aired, and drawn about and shown? Is it not so much the more a helpless weak impotent thing, full of wants, ails, necessities, cravings? And when all is not as full and fortunate as this state requires; is it not presently all calamity? Is there any state or relief from those other makers? The apartments, the attendants, amusements, the shows? Can these fomentations help? ... What is all this pomp then? Why thus disguise the thing? Why thus embellish the poor corpse and exalt the carcass so much the more, by endeavouring wrongly to suppress it? For, how suppress it? How truly overcoming, and all the maladies arising from it? How cleanse this sink? How make this stable, pure? ... By hands? ... A Hercules cannot do it. ... By linen, silks, powder, perfumes? ... "In vain, oh ye nice sweet effeminate ones! Nature will belly your labours. You are not roses, nor your bodies amber. The vulgar labouring bodies which ye despise are healthier and sweeter far".

By what then is the carcass subdued? ... By what, but by coming out of it? By not being it; but in it: and only so far in it and joined to it as nature has made me: giving me withal my reason and those suitable faculties by which I can abstract my self, find out and know my self; by which I can separate from this mere matter, and redeem myself from the carcass. [280] For how else redeem my self? whether turn me? What respite? What relief? What quarter? How from death? How as to pain? How sickness? How losses? How shun all these? How deal with these? Or will they be better for not thinking of them? Will they come gentler by these means? Will they be put off thus, by being put off in thought, and never reflected on? Is this the way to lighten them? Heal the stings, abate the paroxysms, and cure the distemper by the root? ... * * * &c. L. 1.24.

Now therefore the Δογμα upon the whole. Nature has joined tee to such a body, such as it is. The supreme mind would have it that this should be trial and exercise of inferior minds. It has given tee thine; not just a hand, or as when they say into one's mouth. Not just in the way so as to be stumbled on by good luck: not so easily neither: but so

⁴¹¹Sup. p. 229.

as thou mayst reach it; so as within thy power, within command. See! Here are the incumbencies. This is the condition, the bargain, terms. Is the price worth contending for? Or what will become of me if I do not contend? How if the stream carries me down? How if wholly plunged in this gulf? What will be my condition then? What, if given up to body? When all body, and not a notion, not a thought, not one generous consideration or sentiment besides? ... must it not come to this? And soon too, very soon; if this be indulged ... Such then is the condition of minds. So are they lodged, so matched, so proved and exercised. The high architect of minds has thus built, equipped and launched thee, not into a smooth lake or river, but a rough ocean, and filled thee to bear out the storm. --- Am I then thus set adrift? Thus plunged --- Plunged: but thou mayst emerge. Buried: but thou mayst rise from this grave. Beset: but thou mayst break through. ... "Man! Use thy arms, thy instruments, hands, [281] members, natural arms and limbs. What hinders thee? Fight it out, buffet the billows. Countermine. Work thy self out of earth: and stand above ground, if thou canst"... Is there any other way? Can I do better? How deal else with carcass? Whither fly? What machination? What invention? How redeem my self? How be my self? * * * &c⁴¹²: these are the powerful words. This is the charm. Up! Rouse then. For here it is. No remission. No sparing. No quarter to this death: for it is death, true death. The other is nothing.

Remember this, then. In the morning chiefly, when rising to action heavily or remissly ... the gulf river grave ... carcass ... How redeem my self? what way but this? Or is there any better? Any other?

Body-coach. Body-guards. Ushers of the body. --- Sensible expression! For what is there in the thing, but body? --- The royal thing! --- A body. --- Majesty! --- A body. --- The impression it makes, the fear, wonder, admiration! --- Body, body still. For what else but a vile servitude, a base homage and worship of this home-body is the occasion of such a prostitution to the body or bodies abroad?

In bodily fear. --- Right. For, what fear but for the body! ... Or how shall we say? In mindly fear? Alas my poor mind! ... What will they do to it? Murder this also? Destroy this? Wound this? If not, how me? ... And yet there are murderers: there are the spare not [282] here neither (for so thou art pleased to suffer it) that torment the murder ... What murderers, of time, thought, resolution, and everything good! ... Yet these are friends. No fear of these. Oh wretch! When wilt thou have true fear. When fear for thy mind? for this fear is to purpose. It will bring security: all will be well, and all fear at an end.

It is the costume of our language to say this body or that body for this or that man. Is a body then one and the same when dead as when alive? How alive? Is it the warmth that makes a difference? Is it the moving of the blood? How if the body were to live always in a sound; would this be any-body? Would this be a real person? Or the same person? ... What is the same person then? Or what is the person, the self, but the self-knowing, the self-remembering, the self-determining part? And what is this but a mind? what has the body to do, but as by accident? Why this body and that body, and not this mind and the other mind? for it is of a system of fancies, perceptions, thought, that we are speaking: not of a figure in flesh or wax: not of a statue, a piece of clock-work, a set of strings or wires⁴¹³.

Remember then: where the system is, there the person and being: there the death: there the improvement and ruin: there the good and ill.

He therefore who is wholly turned towards this; who is all this; who is himself, and nothing besides himself, has nothing to fear (for all is in his power): but he who has placed himself in that other system finds the contrary, and

⁴¹²355.

⁴¹³284.

may by way of excellence (if he pleases) call himself Some Body; as making nothing of one who would be No Body, and who thinks as No Body. [283]

That other property of our language happens to be indeed absurd. But hear how admirably our law speaks --- Bring the body of such a man ... an assault on the body of such a man. --- This is right and true. For, what else can be imprisoned or sent to death but the body? What else is assaulted but the body? Who assaults the mind, but the mind itself?

Xenophon's nature * * *: as cited by the divine man. With the rest of this in the fragment ... Picking teeth, wiping, cleansing, scowring. How if another's body thus? How if but for a day or two? Who would endure? ...

In the great chapter, the mule, or ass, with the baggage &c.: * * * ... How when the priest comes? How in the time of plunder? In war, out of war, how many presses.

PASSIONS [288]

from 186] --- See Νοσημαλα.

... To compassionate i.e.: to join with in passion, or be passionate with ... To commiserate i.e. to join with in misery, or be miserable with.

This in one order of life is right and good. Nothing more harmonious. And to be without this, or not to feel this, is unnatural, horrid, inhumane. How else would the machine perform? For this is meant still of the machine, or what is all one, the mind, nature or temper, as it is when acting like a machine, in the common way of life, in animals and men-animals; where there is no better rule than the speciousness of the object; nor other force to act by but the force of the Παλη raised from thence: where the only energy is from pain and pleasure, sorrow and transport; and where men being light and heavy, airy and clouded, always under the power of passion, always passionate, always miserable in their own cases, and about their own affairs. It would be unequal, unjust, unsociable and hard, not to be so, in the affairs of others, and the wretched too for company.

This as to one order of life, where this fellow-wretchedness agrees admirably, makes so great a part in the order of things, and shows us so fair a side of nature. Hence the union of several species, their mutual relation, sympathy, life. [289]

But in another order of life, in another species, and in respect of another (higher) relation; nothing can be more dissonant than this: nothing more inconsistent with all true affection and with that high and principal natural affection, which in a mind soundly rational is, as it were, in the place of all. To act by temper simply is, in such a one, the greatest degeneracy; a sinking down into a lower species of nature; a betraying of that higher one, and of that relation into which He is assumed. To act by temper simply (although ever so good a temper) is, in such a one, a loss even of simplicity, a quitting of that uniform, self-same, divine and simple principle for a various manifold compound and changeable one. A composition, mere composition. For what else does the word temper signify? ... Let tempers, then, be as they will. Happy they who by chance have a good temper and by chance keep it: who by chance are good as that is good; ill as is ill. In temper; out of temper: as fortune pleases; as the scene without changes so this scene within. excellent happiness! Yet this is all. This is their happiness. And to be miserable also, to be wretch by whiles; this also is their dignity; their happiness. Were it otherwise; they would be miserable indeed: miserable in a worse degree; perfectly miserable and unnatural. ... Be it so then. Let them who com-miserate themselves, commiserate others in things in which, according to them, misery lies. Let them condole, let them congratulate in this manner⁴¹⁴. But do thou, for thy part, remember that * * *⁴¹⁵ ... and in this manner only to congratulate and condole: as the precept * * * &c.: (22). But neither way to sympathise, or feel as they feel, when they take either this or the other (whichever is * * *) for good or ill. * * * (L. 3 C. 24). Be true, then, to thy self. [290]

Joy.

What is that sort of joy, humour, airiness, but the mother of base opinion? And are not mother and brat the same? Is not the first, opinion also? --- As how? --- As over some great matter: or as in good and happy circumstances. -- And when these circumstances change; how then? --- * * * ...

⁴¹⁴301.

⁴¹⁵Arr. 134.

In everything therefore that is in this manner agreeable and steals upon the soul; in every still peaceful moment not rightly accounted for, not well derived; inquiry, listen and hear what is said within. Be it in conversation, among friends or with books, nor in ever so seemingly good situation or plausible a circumstance ... Is there not a voice that speaks within, and begins to order and prescribe? Is there not a subaltern power that says to the Lord and master-mind, master! It is good for us to be here. Let us to work and build ... Visions! Visions indeed! Mere visions! How long wilt thou thus build and delight in these buildings?

Know the bastard joy from the legitimate. ... How is it? --- Alive and well. --- What is well? --- My body, state. --- Bastard! --- My relations, friends, reputation, fame --- Bastard! --- My country --- Bastard still, illegitimate, spurious, false! ... but let us hear again, what other joy. What is well? A body? --- No: but a mind, which has set me more at ease as to what relates to a body. --- Rejoice then. This is [291] legitimate. --- I can be poor and merry. --- Legitimate! --- Dying and merry. --- Legitimate! --- Ill spoken of and merry --- Legitimate! --- I can play the cards with indifference, and be cheerful: play or leave of, and be cheerful --- Legitimate! Legitimate! ...

Malignity hid under humanity. ...

--- Nigrae succus logilinis ---

--- Aerugo mera. ---

Of this kind all that sort of false pity caprice for faults of others; affected sorrow; anger on the public account and for mankind; the quarrels engaged in for the commonwealth ... Remember that whole season from the first apostacy of a certain set of men to thy retirement hither to Holland the first time. See therefore! Whether does this false humanity lead? Wilt thou have more of it?

Remember of old, and lately just before this thy second retreat, how the passions stood, and how that certain involuntary motion towards bed-time and in bed, dreams, waking, sudden starts, revolts, pangs, eagerness, agony ... How near to real madness! And not so much by the violence of the immediate passion, as by reflection, repetition, revolving, searching, renewing, undoing, remedying, regretting, re-instating, re-waking: in vain all, yet without intermission to loss of mind.

Thus before first retreat hither. Speech in the other senate. ... And on return Theod: and blood-letting. ... Sirens and their victory. ...

And after new perfections aimed at and affairs restored, then public again and state economy. # # # and that affair which held even until now, the other day. See Almanac 1703, November 6. Also before this second retreat # # # and the rest.

Thus frequently in other losses of mind not knowing which way to turn, when beset, when urged, when divided in opinion on family and public emergencies: and in reality distracted thus. Restless nights. Throws. Labours. Groans. ... From how much would a little simplicity have saved? ... * * *: and presently how soon all is still! * * *.

Φίλοι [296]

Why silent? Why thus reserved and deeply thoughtful? Why these looks, this cloud? --- Why not? --- It is rigid: it is severe. --- Am severe? Nay: but to your self. --- Is it then that you pity me? Know ye my case so well? ...

Or, say: why is it you pity? Why am I thus far a concern for you? Why thus prefer my friendship? --- For virtue. --- Know ye then how this matter stands with me, or how I came by such a thing (if such a thing I have)? Or what terms, and by what tenure I hold this character and quality by which, it seems, I hold your friendship?

Or if honesty be not indeed a quality of such great worth or rarity, why esteem me for this alone? --- But we would not have it to be alone. We would have other qualities besides. --- As what, for instance? As if a jester, fiddler, dancer? --- No. But of a good companion. [297] Who are better companions than these? Who are those they call good companions? And of what character? Are they indeed friends? Or of a friendly character? How reconcile this? How is it that these qualities shall be made to agree? ---

But it is sad to see this countenance thoughtfulness, reserve. --- Say then. Suppose it were indeed a fiddler, but of the better sort: a Corelli perhaps, or some other master in that way or in sculpture or in painting. Or what if instead of a fiddler, a philosopher (as was once the way) were kept in the great family as an appurtenance, a historiographer, mathematician, rhetorician, linguist; would you expect this service from him? This entertainment? Would you expect that such a one should be company? Or would you be angry and think it strange that such a one should muse, or plod, or for the most part keep silence?

No, but on the contrary; were such a one ever so backward in company, dull, heavy, stupid (if you will) without attention to the ordinary discourse, his eyes ever and anon fixed, and his whole figure then like one half awake or in a dream, would not this be far from strange or ill taken? But rather looked on as natural, no way disagreeable; but the contrary, and in truth agreeable to such a character? How else can you expect the genius in whatever kind? How else the music? The good composition? The ordering? The design and masterly hand?

So here in another science and mastership: how else the music? The good ordering? The life? The friend? [298] Or is this nothing? No art? No science at all? An accident? A thing of course? A hit of temper, education, birth? A matter of no concern, no care? ... "Forgive me (my good friends) I love you too well to hearken to you. And although but for your own sakes alone, shall take better care. * * * (III.24 towards the middle). And what follows: * * * &c.

--- But my friends! What will my friends think? ... This is below him: below his quality: not as becomes him: not as the world expected from him. What quality? What is the thing becoming? What is the world? --- But they will think this poor and mean-spirited, sad. They will sigh for me, be ashamed for me. --- Ashamed, with reason? How so? Be ashamed then for thy self, whether they be ashamed or no. For their shame is not the business. It is thy own business now; a very just and real one; if there be any shame, if there be really that which is shameful: --- Nay, but they are unjust in their shame, they are ashamed for no reason. --- Whose is the shame then? Is it not first their shame and a very great one thus to be ashamed of an honest man their friend? Thus to abandon virtue, and think it mean? Thus to submit and yield to the scoffs of villainy and vice, to the corruptions of riches and honours bestowed on villainy and vice, and to do withal utmost their endeavour to make their friend yield also, and sink under the same corruption? Is this good and worthy in them? Is this kind? Is this fair or handsome? ... Whose is the shame then? ... and art thou, for thy part, ashamed? For what? if for any thing, for they and their case. Shame for them who can esteem and think so basely: but for thy self; [299] if it be possible thou canst be ashamed on thy own account, for anything happened to thee as to an honest man, acting honestly and as becomes him; see what shame! See if thou art not thy self returning vile and

shameful! --- But how relieve my friends? How save them this shame of theirs? --- Man, let them look to it themselves. Teach them virtue if thou canst. Make them wise: and they will no longer be in pain for tee. --- But here, in the meantime. --- How indeed? What remedy? For besides this, there is only one way that I know; which is to set the thoughts of virtue aside and do as they would have tee. And yet even this way it will not be long that thou wilt please them either: nor will they be all of one mind, and all pleased alike. There will be the same shame then too, as now: and thou wilt prove thy self at last a notable gainer by the bargain... "Thus friends are ashamed of tee (thou sayst). Pity them, it is hard not to take them out of pain. --- Are they ashamed then aright? --- No. But they love me however, and it is for me they are ashamed. --- Go then, and act shamefully, that they may not be ashamed".

To be ashamed for another cannot well and properly be said (for how is one man shame another's?) but to be ashamed of another: that is to say being sorry for and pitying in a certain manner another's misbehaviour, and discountenancing it, in as far as one has to do with the person.

But to be ashamed for another's no shame this is doubly false and monstrous as it is corrupt and prodigious. Witness that shame thou once observest of the highest esteemed patriot, a man of virtue of the times, when in gay company be shrunk from [300] one of the best men living and his good friend because of the mean habit he saw him in. So Socrates', his friends, when he came abroad in the habit Marcus speaks of.

Remember that same man's behaviour once at an inn out of town, in company of another man of the same rank with thy self. What example! What precepts of virtue, countenance, temperance! And the passion he fell into seeing us so reserved and backward ...

Now go to the harangues and treatises. Tell me of liberty, country, mankind, schemes, models. Write, speak, exhort. These are the declaimers. Wilt thou not hearken and admire, concur and be led?

Thus also the gentleman (not now living) of the same character and equal renown talking of love affairs at the table of Atticus (the Atticus of this last age) and how well reprov'd and ridiculed by a Lucullus and another great one of the same character that sat by.

How much better these? Although these professed Epicureans and in the secret of the sect, one of them with exquisite learning, as well as wit.

What are all these and all else then, but the * * *⁴¹⁶ And what other conversations dost thou seek?⁴¹⁷ What other discourses hope for? What other friends expect? What friends proofed against these tables and table-talks? And is it this that moves tee? Do these move tee who are themselves moved by this and such as this is? ... Try then: be once again [301] the table-talk: make it when absent, keep it up and reign in it when present. Approve thy-self anew to these table-judges, and before these great tribunals that decide characters; distribute fame, praise, reputation, honour and dishonour. Be well with these: that thy friends may hear well of tee, and not be ashamed anymore on thy account, as one given over, censured or slighted. Go in again as formerly amongst these: and hear the noble and wished for sound of * * * ... O cepidum caput!⁴¹⁸

What! Lose thy friends? --- What friends? Art thou to thy self a friend yet? If not; what other friends dost thou expect? Or what friend art thou like to prove to others; if not so to thy self?

⁴¹⁶M. 9.29.

⁴¹⁷304.

⁴¹⁸L. 4.2.

All alone! --- As ye see: for want of better company. I have a part, it is true, that is fit to come into company, knows company, and is known: but another part that is not so. I have a laughing talking entertaining part that does all with others, that admires and is ravished, wonders, praises, censures, rejoices, grieves and takes on (as they say) with others: and I have a still quiet although not less active part, that does none of all this; neither admires nor loves nor pursues with others; is never pleased as others are pleased; is never angry but with itself and for what itself can remedy; bemoans nothing; condoles with nobody; nor has with whom to congratulate. The first of this part is a faithless, corrupt, perfidious, mutinous, sacrilegious part. The second is an honest, friendly, just pious part; in charity with men, and never at odds with deity; never of [302] different interests with the one, or different will with the other. For the first of these parts, viz. the familiar, conversible, sociable part (for so it will be called) I can find companions enough, a large society: but for this latter, truly sociable, where shall I find a companion, helper or associate?

Hitherto thou hast loved because thou wert courted, sought to. Those qualities are now gone (let them go) that drew thee this esteem. Come on: let us see how if thou canst love desinterestedly, according to the * * *.

“Thanks my good kinsman (brother, sister, friend) for giving me so generous a part; that I can love, although not be loved”.

“Oh apostate friend! How kind art thou in teaching me this lesson. I cannot indeed love thee the more for this: but having once loved thee and made thee my associate, my friend; I never will take back my friendship, nor withdraw my love; but cherish that affection which naturally and of itself inclines me to love with the same tenderness, and hold thy interest and concern as dear as ever”.

Remember; as nothing is more reviving in melancholy or sadness (when the temper inclines that way) than the rule * * *⁴¹⁹; so remember too in the contrary disposition (for here is thy danger) that all that is rejoicing in this kind, all the winning inviting charms, are but * * *⁴²⁰ ... Therefore, beware. Remember the secretion, mask ... reserve⁴²¹ (63). [303].

Πολιτικά.

Πολις Παταιξ. See Human affairs. [304]

⁴¹⁹M. 6.48.

⁴²⁰ibid.

⁴²¹125. 133. 177.

* * *;

* * * &c. M. 9.29⁴²².

Remember the politic admired novelist and esteemed patriot of former times⁴²³: on every piece of news, a great thing! And how ridiculous at last, this came to be: how it appeared to thy self, even at that early time⁴²⁴. How therefore should it appear now? --- Priamus and his kingdom destroyed. --- A great thing! --- The city consumed, the storks, nests burned. --- A great thing! --- Achilles is angry, a prince has left the confederacy. Patroclus is dead, and now Achilles. --- Great things! ... But remember where indeed the great thing lies; [305] and what is truly a GREAT THING.

See in chapter 28 of book 1, * * *. But laugh at these and laugh safely. Still * * *.

To the great legislators, orators, authors, advisers and politic dealers, Aristotelians, Machiavelians, memoir readers or writers, gothic or ancient modellers, or collectors; with all that dinn of state dogmatists, prescribers, moralisers, exhorters, praisers, censurers, such as the D---t's, the Fl---r's, M---th's, I L---s' &c.: remember * * * (L. 2 C. 1) and add to this fancy such an accosting as this, in imagination. "Most noble physician of the state and inward man! Great judge of morals! Dispenser of happiness, wisdom and sovereign health to mankind! Your hand, I entreat you: that I may once feel your pulse. For with you doubtless all is sound and well. At least you your self know whatever is otherwise, and can straight apply the remedy".

... "How now, doctor! What have we here? ... A fever! Convulsions! And you your self ignorant of this? ... A hectic! A catarrh! An ulcer! Scalbs and running! And all this overlooked? Is this (oh noble physician!) thy own bodily state? Is thus under thy gown? Within doors thus? Thus with tee in the family? Thus, with domestics? Pelle decorus?⁴²⁵ And dost thou come abroad, thus adorned, thus specious and imposing on us, and on thy self? for in thy own domestics thy slaves, those who know tee intus & in cute⁴²⁶ thou canst not impose ... Physician, cure thy self; or let us see, at least, such prescriptions as thou followst thy self. let us see the use of these, the effect of these in thy self: and then talk to us: then prescribe. Otherwise Dî te, Damasippe, Deaenque verum ob consitium donent tonsore. --- [306] Remembering that I, for my part, have a better than Damascippus to go to. But that in this age lives not so much as a Damascippus, a quack or empiric in this method, or of this regimen. Therefore the more need of strictness.

See by experience the excellency of that rule in * * *⁴²⁷. And so * * *⁴²⁸. For remember in Lord P---s case (Almanac, February 19, 1704). A great man! (as just above a great thing!⁴²⁹) As how? In what? --- Brave. --- Yes furious, foaming at mouth. A wild boar. --- Wise, learned. --- Astrology, legends and superstition beyond modern ... How is the nurse? How with servants? Women? Wife? Children? ... How formerly at a court? How many ways hast then happen to see in this very person what this greatness is thou so much admirest by whiles? --- But this is for the sake of virtue and my country. --- See therefore what thou makest of thy self while acting thus (as thou sayest) for virtue

⁴²²300.

⁴²³307.

⁴²⁴306.

⁴²⁵Pers. S. ...

⁴²⁶Pers. S. ...

⁴²⁷C. 41.

⁴²⁸C. 72.

⁴²⁹P. 304.

and thy country? How subjected? How depressed? How made a slave? An admirer of men and things: things outward: play things: no things ... is this virtue? Is this thy service? ... But enough.

Be this so no more. Be but thou virtuous thy self, and go the way towards it, that is shown thee. Let others go theirs: thou thy own. Let others praise the virtuous, that can praise, and dispraise, so cheaply, and at their ease. But for thy own part, be contented not to praise so much as virtue it self: and * * *. Be not afraid that by this thou shalt betray virtue, or seem the less a virtue or honest man, if need be ... Although what need? What besides being so? What is seeming in the case? [307]

Remember the same busy actor in politics (above 304) at everything well!⁴³⁰ Where are we? So for many years. At last how nauseous? So at this hour that many more years are past were he to be heard, would it not be the same still? Where are we? With what pleasure is this said by all those lovers of novelty, revolutions, changes, politics, schemes, and state transactions? --- "Come, let us sit down (now that we are by ourselves) and consider how things stand, and where about we are". --- how ell would this be in another way? In a way not thought of, although much truer? How well would it be if we brought this delight, this curiosity this inquiry homewards, and to a place more nearly touching us than either our country, or town, or family? --- No. But how goes the world?⁴³¹ --- Ridiculous! How should it go? How, but as it has ever gone and ever will? Just the same, the very same. ... But what of that? What although it went otherwise? Art thou the leader of it? Art thou responsible? Is it thy charge? Assigned to thee? Thine, and at thy peril? --- How goes the world? --- No matter. But how go I? This is a matter, and the only matter. This is of concern. This mine, and at my peril. --- How do I govern the world? --- No. But how do I govern my self? --- How do matters stand with me? --- No. But How do I stand with matters? Are matters burdensome? ... Thank my self. they needed not to have been so. Does the world go cross? ... How cross? Should the world follow me, or I the world? Is it the world that is wrong, or am I wrong? ... See which! [infra 380

St. Giles's 1704/5.

Whither away? Hello! Lo! ... What chase is this? What a pursuit again, engaged in? ... What madness! ... is this sport? Is it the play? The game and management only? The chess-men, cards? * * * (L. 2 C. 5)⁴³². Why then these pangs, these reachings? ... is not this EARNEST?⁴³³

Hast thou forgot * * *? (L. 3 C. 10 in fine). Stop therefore in this carrier.

Be not afraid (man!) of the Epicurean sense, or what sense so ever it be said in: but say thou in a right one.

Non res romance, pericturaque, regna ---⁴³⁴

What are these to thee? ... Go on then. --- neque Ille aut dobuisset miserans inopem, aut invidit habentis.

Wonder not at the saying: but say often with thy self, and render it familiar; that in all this, **an honest man should be as free and easy as a knave.**

Allow it otherwise: and see how long the honest man will hold honest. For what is knavery but narrowness? My self, that is to say my purse against the public purse. My family against the public family. And what difference between this, and my nation or commonwealth against the world? My country-laws against the universal laws? My

⁴³⁰304.

⁴³¹238.

⁴³²& what follows * * *.

⁴³³368.

⁴³⁴Virg. G. 8 L. 2.

fancy against the divine decree? Remember how many have been and are every day knaves for their country: some of whom nothing else perhaps would have made knaves. Themistocles against an Aristides, against a Phocion. Even a Phocion himself perhaps in some degree against the grave and good Xenocrates, his [381] fellow-ambassador. The elder Cato as in opposition to the younger⁴³⁵. In these latter days the De Witts, the disposition of a Mr. F...r thy old acquaintance. The Dutch patriot, the English patriot, the Scotch. The contests about trade, precedency, honour, the flag. England mistress of the world! Giving laws to the world! And such like speeches ... Go now and tell us of justice, faith, honesty, the public! ... Excellent public! ... Noble public spirits! And remember what Socrates says in Plato of such as these, how pleasant a mockery and how handsomely called knaves, * * *. Meno, latter end.

Also the words of Socrates in the Apology, * * * &c.: ... * * * &c.: which may be the reason for Marcus' caution (according to precept) speaking concerning Phocion (II, 13). For, what a prodigy, that a man so honest should have been let live so long!

⁴³⁵Also. Query: what Cato would have done in the case of Brutus? Or what Socrates in the case of Dion? Whether the * * * was not wrong, considered in the highest character? And if those dying words true of the former, then plainly wrong and the token plain.

Συγκαταδεσειξ

Φαντασιαι πιδαναξ. [308]

* * * ...⁴³⁶ Oh, that it were here! Here altogether, and that is only stuck here! ...

Yet, as it is, it must be here however in some degree. For how the first place without some help from this? ... But keep the order. And remember ... the * * *⁴³⁷: first, chiefest. And this last (whatever is borrowed of it) only for the first.

... * * *⁴³⁸ .

Oh sophistry! Artifice, and deep layed design! So artful as to appear all simplicity: so natural as to seem almost nature itself. * * * ... Oh imposture! Powerful, charming, persuasive dame * * *. What an offspring? What a brood engendered? What machines, hosts, giants! ... Loves. Appetites. Desires. [309] ... Opinion, fancy, all. All from this sophistry. ... “Irresistible powers! Gigantic forms! Whence al your strength, dimensions, weapons and arrays? The pointed steel, the viper teeth, the scorpion stings ... What sting? And whence? ... Opinion, fancy ... * * *. Thine is the sting. Thine al the force. Thine the dominion, power. From tee this empire, without tee all faints, languishes and dies. Loves, appetites, desires, all live in tee.

To tee I come then. With tee is my concern, tee alone. It is thou must form me, or I tee ... wild loves, disordered appetites, inflamed desires, fears, horrors, anguishes and all ye hosts of passions; stand by: [retire] and wait aloof the issue of this conflict. If I am overcome, the field, the place is yours: sack, pillage, plunder, ravage. But if I prevail; retire forever: ye are nothing, nor have no pretence”.

Responsare cupidinibus ---⁴³⁹ No such thing. But visas, φαντασιαιν. This is the thing. And thus it is right said. Here the resistance. ... The father (opinion) subdued; the children fall of course ... Sampson’s Locke. Achilles’ heel ... Here strike. No dealing but this. This way only vincible, penetrable, fractable. This way and in this sense, responsare cupidinibus. To bear up. To be a match for them. Give them (as they say) their own and send they back as they came.

Therefore again, * * *⁴⁴⁰. Go on God’s name, as thou camest⁴⁴¹.

In this manner to the fancies of the first and second sort⁴⁴². (1) The absolutely vicious (2) the mixed. And so the rest as they present, and in their several shapes. With language suitable, and real discourse. Not making light of this. But remembering it as a thing essential. The chief discourse. The life of all. ... Thus then. [310] When in the worst shape ----- “Traitor-thought. Viper. False and inhuman dogma. * * * ...⁴⁴³ Enormous; monstrous; and inhuman; be gone ... Down rebel, impostor, corrupter ... Avant! Aloof! ... Expect no quarter here: no refuge, sanctuary nor entertainment in this breast; thou sacrilegious wight; thou vislater of all inward peace, and harmony, all human laws and all divine.

⁴³⁶L. 3 C. 2.

⁴³⁷Ibid.

⁴³⁸M. 8.26 Ibid. 7.54.

⁴³⁹Hor. L. 2 Sat. 7.

⁴⁴⁰M. 7.17.

⁴⁴¹274. 315.

⁴⁴²78.

⁴⁴³L. 2.22.

Sink hideous spectre. Vanish. Back to chaos. Down in the womb of night, where thou wert bred. Down spurious thought; blind progeny of night. down. --- And thou fair offspring of eternal truth. Arise, and usher day --- Phosphore, redde diem".

In another shape ---

"Insinuating sly, busy fancy! Off! ... to your distance I beseech you. Not so familiar neither. ... No whispering nor buzzing in the ear. No hugging (good vagabond dame)! Know your betters, and who is mistress within ... Here is nothing for you (believe me) ask ever so long, or say what you please. Go to others that know you less and believe your stories. Go to your companions, your equals, your inferiors, whom you need not beg of, but may govern with a word, and make of what you please".

In another shape ---

"Thou dear delicate creature! Sweet gentle, loving, fond *idea*! ... Thou witty, pretty, fair one! What [311] wouldst thou have? To whom art thou solicitress? And to what? whom is it that thou courts? For whom these flatteries and caresses? Why are this charms thus lost? Thus ill bestowed, and in vain? ... It will not be. Go to, go to thou wanton! Wait not until thou art frightened hence. Here are things within will make thy poor weak nature shiver, and strike thee dead with fear ... But be advised. Retire in time". --- **Abi quo blandae juvenum te revocant preces**⁴⁴⁴.

--- **Miseri quibus intentata nites**⁴⁴⁵.

--- **Sirenum voces, et circes pocula nosti**⁴⁴⁶.

Me ne salis placidi vultum, fluctusque quietos

Ignorare jubes? Mene huic confidere monstro?⁴⁴⁷

In another shape.

"Enchanting wondrous form! Misterious, dubious! ... How shall I know thee? How discover thee? ... Shrink not at my approach, nor think that I will fly thee. Know thee I must, and question thee. Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell: thou comest in such a questionable shape; that I must call thee ---". Hold! For as yet thy name is wanting: which when thy nature is known, shall frankly and without flattery or fear be given thee. ... Oh, easy decision! Short question! Ready resolution! (What tragedy? What solemnity? What emphasis needs there for this?). * * *⁴⁴⁸ ... Away ghost! Phantom! Air! ... It is over. This is the charm. These are the words. Pronounce them, say them but right, and with a good heart; and there is nothing to stand it: nothing that can perplex. Nothing that can haunt, astonish, terrify. It is done. All is at an end. [312]

Again to the four sorts (as above p. 78)⁴⁴⁹.

1. The wild beasts, bores, tigers, lions, that tare, devour, and lay all waist.
2. The chimeras, sphinxes, centaurs, that haunt, delude, perplex, amaze and distract⁴⁵⁰.

⁴⁴⁴Hor. Od. 1 L. 4.

⁴⁴⁵Od. 5 L. 1.

⁴⁴⁶Epis. 2.

⁴⁴⁷Virg. L. 5. See Ασκηματα p. 194 &c.

⁴⁴⁸C. 5.

⁴⁴⁹78.

⁴⁵⁰241.

3. The sheep, oxen, swine, and necessary cattle, that soil, beaten and make a stable of the mind.
4. And last of all, the playsome kind, for entertainment, the parrots, apes, monkeys and the viler sort. These the worst of all and most to be feared. * * *⁴⁵¹ and hence that likeness spoken of ... Out with this vermin. Choose a nobler combat, a better chase.

--- Aprum alt fulvium descendere monte leonem.

Death: banishment: ignominy. * * *. These are subjects: and in this manner * * *⁴⁵².

To the 1st sort, the ravagers (nor is that the worst idea) eating canker-worms, knavers, comrades, vipers, creepers and crawlers, and that truly cause are the occasion of creeping and crawling, and of every base prostitution, pollution, villainy. ... "Oh, cockatrices!" [313]

To the 2nd sort; creatures of two parts; monsters preposterously composed ... Go to the anatomy, dissect, separate with the instruments that are given. Divorce the unnatural pair. Divide the monster &c. ...⁴⁵³

To the 3d sort.

To the 4th sort.

Conclusion. To all in general. Again, the same still⁴⁵⁴, * * *; # # #.

"Perverse, obstinate Δογμα. Thou hadst as good be gone be times, and for once bidding. thou hadst as good retire as be turned out by force. It is time thou camst naturally: that is to say the usual way and according to the liberty that is given tee, or that thou takest with everybody. It is well⁴⁵⁵. Thou hast had thy time. But things are altered. Times are not now, as then. Be advised and retire: if not; thou shalt have a wretched life, a sad time of it; no ease; no indulgence; no rest: damned eternally, reprimanded, lectured, schooled ... Who would endure this? And to what purpose? For advance thou never shalt, never prevail. Therefore good Dogma, in charity let me entreat and conjure tee; be gone. Torment not: nor be tormented".

⁴⁵¹L. 1 C. 3.

⁴⁵²C. 28.

⁴⁵³241.

⁴⁵⁴309.

Κτησεδιον.

Οικαριον.

Δυλαγιον. [314]

Diminutives indeed! ... But why not felt so? Is it enough that they are in a certain degree diminished? That they are not superlatives? Shall it rest here? ... Wretched objects! Wretched tee, who knows them such, yet honourest them as thou dost! Others know them not for such, and therefore honour them. Nor is the honour so preposterous? But in tee, what? ...

Obstinate evils! ... How covered over? How disguised? What masks? ...

Mask of the first (viz. Κτη.) DUSTY: a PART. A CHARACTER (as above 135 & 197).

Mask of the second (viz. Οικ.) philosophical. A way of living. Neatness. Nature. Husbandry. Garden (as above 104). Hoc evat in votis, modus agri &c⁴⁵⁶: and concha salispuri⁴⁵⁷ --- purum et sine labe salinum⁴⁵⁸ ... OFF, OFF with these masks.

Oh subtle enemies! More dangerous than all open ones. Oh close supplanters! Specious assassins! Bosom snakes! Whose sting goes deepest, and is never [315] felt. Felt only in remote effects; a lingering sickness, preying disease, long operating but more sure and fatal poison.

... Recover. Resist. Repel. Strive. Arm. War! War! Or otherwise, what peace?

The το καλον where? ... Not there, if here ... Rival beauties. Antagonist ideas. Order against order. Opposition. If this a * * *⁴⁵⁹, what chaos: and vice versâ.

Enough. have done. Go to the country, state. View that. Remember * * *, twice chapter 16 and 18. * * *. Come and welcome. No tragedy in the case. ... Let it to ruin. To pieces with it. Wind, weather elements. A prey to fortune. All at once and piece meal. Indifferent how. A spectacle, sport, humour, play. For what else but play? Where is the earnest? ... see Almanac 1704, January, 3d leaf and the end of the Almanac.

* * *. And * * * (so gardens, grang, villa, even study and books). * * *⁴⁶⁰. Or should it be a library in form? A fopp of that sort?

That which in idea was reproved (when last returned, p. 104)⁴⁶¹. Now see! In reality and effect. ... What hast thou done, oh wretch? For what all this? For whom? What time? What labour? What culture? And on what? on what bestowed? --- But the pretext, a study, a retreat, &c: ... Had it not been better to have been building this while after another manner? Better, sure, to have built a mind on this idea, proof against fire, firm against [316] storms and earthquakes; always temperate; excluding the sharp colds and scorching heats; harbouring the foulness, no entrance nor place for vermin. Clear, clean, sound and compact as a rock. These had been the arches! These the stone from cement! This the architecture that would have held and answered, had been durable, practicable, accountable. This is safety,

⁴⁵⁵274.

⁴⁵⁶Hor. Sat. 6.

⁴⁵⁷Hor. Sat. 3.

⁴⁵⁸Pers. S. 3.

⁴⁵⁹L. 1 C. 1.

⁴⁶⁰L. 3. C. 1.

⁴⁶¹# # #.

security: not that. These are proportions and numbers: not those. For what are those and all of that kind? What proportion between those and a right mind? What between the things there and the condition of human life?

Imitation! Imitation! See hence these wretched follies; and the disease whence caught; and how. See below (το καλον) p. 321, 327, 328.

Sight: commendation: affection: affectation and imitation: ... How can this be otherwise? How avoid admiration, if forced to praise, or but to view in company, and with a certain and outward satisfaction and seeming delight, * * *? ...

Therefore what need of care and strict watch? Else what follows. See! --- Quadrata rotundis. Diruit, aedificat⁴⁶² --- And longos imitaris⁴⁶³ ---

Commendation therefore and praise and all accommodation of thy self to others in this way, whether over by own fabric and wretched possessions of this kind, or over others by relation, story, description; all equally dangerous. For see above what said to the self long since (p. 79) of this admiration and praise. To this therefore apply principally that powerful chapter (the lesser warmer) viz. 2 Of 4 * * *. See Almanac 1704, July 17.

What a noble praise, that of the Roman, that He never built! For so was it said of Scipio, and esteemed and esteemed as a continence equal to that other famous part in story. [317]

Whenever these outward managements go heavy, and thou art ready to bemoan thy self, that it is not with thee as with others; that the things do not prosper, nor flourish as with others; that thy family suffer, thy relations suffer, thy friends, clients, dependents, suffer thorough thy unaptness, unachiviness and insufficiency in these matters; imagine that thou thus spokest to them (and so speak indeed: but within thy self and in thy hearing only):

“My good friends! I do for ye as I can, and all I can; and would satisfy ye all, if so I could. I mind these concerns for you, this estate for you, and do the best I can for you and for my country. But if minding indeed an estate such as you would have me mind, and together with it something besides which you mind not; it happens that I succeed not so well in an estate, as you who mind an estate only, and nothing else; this you must not wonder at, nor blame me for ---“

But let them wonder and blame on. It is natural. They must do so. For as to the things beside an estate, it is what they know nothing of: nor is it to be told them.

As one delights in a horse, a dog, a bird ... add a house, a garden, plantation, field and see that this be said as heartily.

----- Rem, facias rem.

Si possis recte, si non quocunque modo rem.

And the condition --- nempe ruberes.

Viveret in terris te si quis avarior uno⁴⁶⁴.

⁴⁶²Ep. 1.

⁴⁶³L. 2 Sat. 3.

⁴⁶⁴Ep. 1.

But on the other side; this condition failing, "Your servant! Good friends! People! Gentry! Nobility! High and low!

Olim quod vulpes agrote cauta leoni.

And, bellula unitorum es capitum⁴⁶⁵ ---.

To καλον [318]

In things animate, inanimate, mixed. In animate. Beginning from those figures with which children are delighted, to the proportions of architecture. ... The same in sounds.

Animate. From animals (and their several natures) to men: and from single persons of men, their humours, dispositions, characters, manners; to communities, societies, commonwealths.

Mixed, as in a single person (a body and mind): love ... And thus in communities; a territory, land, culture, structures and the ornaments of a city, mixed and making up (in conjunction) that idea of a native country. Patria, and the love of that sort. Dulce & decorum est pro patria mori⁴⁶⁶. Nom ille pro caris amicis, aut patriâ timidus perire⁴⁶⁷.

In things inanimate, nature before the arts. And thus from stones, diamonds, rock, minerals; to vegetables, woods, agreeable parts of the [319] world, as sea, rivers, hills, vales. The globe. Celestial bodies and their order: the great architecture of nature. **Nature** itself.

In things animate. From flocks, herds, to men and other orders of intelligencies, to the supreme intelligence, **GOD**.

* * *. L. 3 § 2.

Decorum. Honestum. Pulchrum.

Le beau, le grand, le majestaux, le je ne sais quoi.

The goodly, fair, becoming, handsome, noble.

In person. In manners.

Carriage, inward, outward. The coming into a room, saluting, looking round, viewing, accosting. ... A generous part in company, in a family, in the public, upon a journey with strangers. Civility, courtesy, affability, good breeding. What gracefulness! What winningness! And this too even with the vulgar. For to what do we with more emphasis apply the [320] word HANDSOME?

What search, what running after, what pursuit of these appearances in all subjects, except the true! What study, application, charm! See with what spirits, ardour and vehemence the young man forgetting his own species seeks this in those objects of his love, a horse, a hound! What loating on these beauties! What admiration of the kind itself! And of the particular, what care, idolatry, consacration, when the beast beloved is (as often happens) set apart, even from use, and only kept to gaze on!

See in another youth not so forgetful of his species; but remembering it in a wrong way. A * * *⁴⁶⁸ of another kind. Xenophon's brave friend Episthenes⁴⁶⁹. A Chorea: elegans formarum spectator⁴⁷⁰.

See as to music, how. See poetry, rhetoric and the numbers of this sort. What study and politeness!

⁴⁶⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶Od. 2 L. 3.

⁴⁶⁷Od. 4 L. 9.

⁴⁶⁸372.

⁴⁶⁹Arr. C. L. 7.

⁴⁷⁰Ter. Eu. Act 3 Scene 5.

See as to other beauties where there is no possession, no enjoyment or reward but seeing and admiring only. Pictures and designing. Statues, architecture. The rapture and enthusiasm of the lovers of this kind. The beauty of gardens, the inward ornaments of the houses, apartments, furniture, the ranging, order and disposition of these matters. What pains! What study! Judgement! Science!

See yet in persons of a different kind who go not so far out of themselves to seek this universally attractive species; but having unhappily feigned to themselves a wrong self, bestow their pains and culture in a body and its ornaments. And [321] here, what study of gracefulness and the decorum!⁴⁷¹ What care of every motion, station, attitude? Voice: gesture: looks: apparel. See the effeminate, the affected and their character distinct from the sordidly sensual and mere voluptuous.

... The tendency and aim of all this. ... Aspirings, sighings, faint, imperfect endeavours and impotent reaches after the *το καλον*.

Ch. 1 of B. 3: * * *.

The transition easy. So Ch. 9 of B. 4: * * *. Oh that this were known! Oh, that thou thy self wouldst but know (truly know) this!

The disposition and order of one of their finer sort of gardens, or villas. The kind of harmony to the eye from the various shapes and colours agreeably mixed and ranged in lines intercrossing without confusion and fortunately coincident. A parterre, cypresses, grove, wilderness, walks, statues here and there of virtue, fortitude, temperance, hero's, busts, philosopher's heads with architecture mottos and inscriptions of this kind. Solemn representation of things deeply natural; as grottos, urns, obeliscs in retired places and at certain distances and points of sight, with all those symmetries that silently express such order, peace and sweetness.

But what is there like to these in the minds of those who walk here, and are the possessors of all this⁴⁷²? What peace? What harmony? --- None. --- [322] For if there were, there would be no need of this exterior sort: no administration: no search of order here: no passion towards this beauty, or any beauty of this sort.

Therefore, remember ever, the garden and groves within. there build; there erect what statues, what virtues, what ornaments or orders of architecture thou thinkst noblest. There walk at leisure and in peace; contemplate, regulate, dispose. And for this, a bare field and common walk will serve full as well; and, to say truth, much better. ... The * * * of virtue (M 3:7) and these inward walks and avenues ...

Compositum jus tasque animo, sanctisque recessus mentis ----⁴⁷³

* * * &c. L. 2:18.

This are the models, platforms, plans. This is that order, and striking beauty, faintly shadowed out in those shapes and rangings of things which strike the sense, and are the entertainment of the vulgar-great.

Remember withal the gardens and ordering of another kind⁴⁷⁴. Grotesque, antics, goats, bacchinals, priapus-rites. The measures, proportions, music, dance, &c.: that matches this. Such is thy mind in a certain state, when certain

⁴⁷¹372. 63.

⁴⁷²The same of other orders of *το καλον*: as in music, painting, and what else of this kind is celebrated among the great and creates the passion of the virtuoso's: but they themselves who? What? ... Such are their works: such the composition: such the pieces they admire. But what is there like to this in the mind of these (musicians, painters, lovers of the arts)? &c:

⁴⁷³Pers. S. 2.

⁴⁷⁴* * *. Plin. See little common-place book.

thoughts are not incumbent, certain views not present: in short, whenever for the sake of these other beauties, beauty it self, the το καλον, το θειον, σψ Δαμπεγν Πλατ Αλκ. α is lost, out of sight or faintly appearing. Such is perpetually their minds (and such are the gardens that befit them) who seeming to have a different gusto, a fancy more refined, make for themselves those other better proportioned [323] works, seats, gardens and all those other charming romantic places: but which suit them not one bit: there being nothing but what is gothic or grotesque within.

On one side gothic architecture, Dutch pictures, Italian farce, ρυπαρογραπτοι, as above, Indian music. On the other side, attic numbers, ionic and Corinthian orders and the * * * models in every kind. ... Phidias, Apelles, Homer. And Hemskerk, Scarron, Tom. Durfy. ...

Compare with the two orders of life. The rakehelly, vicious. The orderly and good. Or are there no measures, no numbers or proportion here? Nothing like this in life?

Harmony. Melody. Symmetry. ... the music of the eye: the pleasant matching of colours. The agreeable mixture and ranging of parts, figures, lines. Striking proportions, degrees, forms, attitudes. Beauty and grace. ... What is all this? And whence? Whither? ... With what does it suit and match? What manners, temper, affection and order of life best correspond pair and go in tune with this?

Take the finest descriptions of vice. Take a Petronius⁴⁷⁵. Try. Is this it? Does this do? Is it the life of an Encolpius or an Aeschyltus? Is it the ship of a Tryphena? ... See but how this is, in the most debauched authors that copy after nature, that write naturally and ingeniously. Away with those other romances, the women-authors, French gallantry and armours, the modern plays and novels; where there is neither nature nor anything natural so much as lewdness: as those who are wittily lewd see well enough. For polite as they are (even [324] in this way of politeness) they secretly laugh at all this, and stick to nature: as much as there is or can be of nature in vice. But for the very real true nature, and what is according to that nature truly graceful, proportionable, harmonious and of the higher virtuoso-kind; what can it be but virtue it self?

Or can riot, corruption and prejudiciousness suit with this idea? And what is vice but corruption and perfidiousness? ... Strange! That there should be such skill, such art and nicety in judging of these other beauties and so little or none at all in this which is the chief of beauty, the root and ground too of all that other beauty! For if thou wantest to be convinced of this; consider but of those lines and features of a face together with the whole person and outward carriage of one of those finer beauties that are most taking with the polite sort of lovers and that are aptest to create a notable passion of that kind. See whether this be not all of it, although in different ways, one and the same expression or delimitation of an ingenious mind, sweet temper, good soul, generous passions and affections; in short of virtue it self? and whether those attitudes and motions which have such an astonishing effect, mean anything in the world less, or suit less to anything, than to that work and those postures which follow when an other passion has got ground, and leads where it lists?

A palace and buildings. A theatre and lodges. Fine shows. Wit, humour, and that which is taking of this kind. -- - Sweet, pretty, delicate! ... Or wonderful! Mighty! Prodigious! --- What are [325] these and such like extollings? And of what? ... Why allow thy self anything of this kind, or that so much as borders upon this, unless thy wouldst betray thy self wholly, forsake the standard of truth, excellence, real beauty, and go over, as a deserter, to other colours? ...

⁴⁷⁵Quam male est extra legem vicentubus!

... Do so then. * * * (IV, 2). ... A virtuoso to purpose. Poetry, music, dance, picture, architecture, garden and so on: extol, commend, be in raptures. ... A female, or other beauty? Follow the passion, love, enjoy, make songs, extol the fair one, the object of thy love. If this be beauty; if this be thy virtuosship; follow this: admire, commend.

Si mimermus uti censet, sine amore jocisque

Nil est jucundum, vivas in amore jocisque.⁴⁷⁶

But if thou refusest this; and wilt have to do with another kind of beauty; what is all this gazing, looking and wondering abroad at this time of day? What are thy praises, commendations, likings, but vile awkward fulsome things? What is thy euge! And belle! ... Sweet! Pretty! Delicate! ... In whose mouth does this sound well? What is sweet? What pretty? And as how? For whom? For tee (if this thy business)? For such as tee? Such a lost buried thing? ... Pedant! Philosopher! Moralist! Corrupter of pleasure! Intruder! ... Thou animal of another species! Thing out of season! Instrument out of tune! ... Amphibious creature! Esop's bat: nor bird, nor beast: and the consequence? What but to be odious both ways, to others and to thy self? Unfortunate both ways, contemptible, miserable? ... * * *⁴⁷⁷ and * * *⁴⁷⁸ ... * * *⁴⁷⁹. And * * *⁴⁸⁰. [326]

If the *το καλον* therefore be here where they lead; it cannot be where those of another kind lead.

If there are heroes; those were puny wretches. But if there be a cause such as thou hast imagined; if that be indeed a right cause; then is this but imposture and deceit. Declare for one or another.

The question. Vote. --- But I have voted. --- And art thou still at oh, pretty! ... Sweet, pretty, delicate ... Is not this voting and unvoting?

Why give a hearing to this things? Why so much as an ear? Much less a heart or tongue?

But if even an ear be allowed; if the least incautious attention or seeming assent be given; (see!) the heart straight will follow. Hast thou not tried this? ... Enough. ---

Eye-traps. Pretty inventions! ... A visto in a garden. ... A machine in a play ... A lady in a new dress --- Is it not charming? --- Rare! Excellent! Who would not willingly be thus wrapped?

--- But what is the visto or perspective?,--- A few sticks a dambled wall, a cheat. --- What is the machine? --- Cords, and sweaty porters pulling at them. --- And the lady? --- See: if thou hast eyes. If not; follow example, commend everything, swear it is all heavenly.

If that be beauty which is pointed to, which every finger can show and every eye can see; why this inward search of things invisible? ... Man! Use thy legs. Travel up and down, use the ball, run the play houses, the churches, parks: [327] run whole countries and over seas, and all to see sights. ... See! See! ... this is all. And in a child, what else? Is it not the same passion? Novelty, surprise, colours. Squares, rounds, triangles. The bussle of children and the business about these things⁴⁸¹. Their architecture. Their models and buildings. And their pleasure of showing this to others. See! See! ---

If this then be the thing, be thou also one of the children: take the materials, the bricks, the mortar, and the earth: make terraces, great houses and little houses, grassplots, knotts and all the other delightful ingenious things: and cry see! But if the thing be not here nor anywhere hereabouts, no nor anywhere abroad or without; but within, within

⁴⁷⁶Epist 7.

⁴⁷⁷L. 4.2.

⁴⁷⁸2.18.

⁴⁷⁹4.12.

⁴⁸⁰C. 4 of Ench.

⁴⁸¹328.

only; then what is this see! See! Hast thou not said this and heard it said enough? Hast thou not shown enough and seen enough? Enough and but too much? --- Enough then⁴⁸². And neither show anymore, nor mind when these things are shown: else there is an end of other sight and of that beauty thou hast hopes of knowing⁴⁸³.

* * * &c⁴⁸⁴.

And * * * ...⁴⁸⁵.

Look! See! --- What? Where? ... I can look into my mind and see finer things by much. But if these outward things are fine with me, the others will be lost that are truly fine, and that make me so, in the better sense. Or will a fine suit, a fine garden or house make tee fine? ... A fine man indeed! ... Thus while I am in search of finesse, hunting beauty and adding (as I imagine) great beauty to my self in these ways; I really and in effect grow deformed and monstrous; sacrificing [328] all internal proportions, all intrinsic real beauty and worth for the sake of these things which are neither the world's beauty, nor the public's or society's, nor my own in particular, nor anybody's besides. What beauty then? Or how beauty? How ornaments? And of what? what is it I would beautify and adorn?

A sight! --- What sight? ... Abroad, out of my self? In things outward? In matter, paste or dough? --- (No. But in gravel, cockle shell) --- In dirt, or clay? --- (No. But in brick and stone) --- What are gardens, what are houses of show?⁴⁸⁶ ... What are those the children make? What are dirt-pies? Or where lies the difference? In the matter or in the minds thus employed? Is it not the same ardour and passion? The same eagerness and concern? The same falling out, and in? Angry, and friends again. In humour, and out of humour. Crying to get: then weary: and then crying again, when the same thing is parted with, or the time comes to leave the play. --- But those are but rattles, and little play-things --- Right: and these are great ones. What is a rattle? ... A figure, colours and colours? A coach? Liverys? Parterre and knots? Cascades, jette d'eau? ... How many rattles? ...

What is the whole circumstance put together? The pedigree, coronet, seat, garden, name, title? What is it but as they say themselves (jestingly, but with a pleasure which they plainly enough capress) to make a rattle? In earnest what else?

Again, the, a sight! --- What sight? --- ... Anything that is truly a sight and worth contemplating? Such a one indeed there is: and such thou art admitted to (thanks to the author and introducer), such thou mayest perfectly enjoy: nor art thou ever sate of the spectacle.

But as for these pretty sights and fancies; these baby-structures, house-ornaments, or ornaments of an estate, or of a family, a name, a character in the world, or [329] whichever of the subjects where thou hast a fancy to build and do great matters; wait but a moment or two, and see how it will be. Come but a small change in inward or outward disposition; and immediately Oh wretched! What is all this? --- What indeed? ... But, had this never been but what it should be; had these things passed for what they ought to pass; it would not now have been oh wretched! Had neither these nor other of the false slights taken place, amused and thus infatuated; no change in outwards, no variation abroad, had made any variation, any revolution or concussion here: but the inward disposition had been right and well.

⁴⁸²Euge summum & belle! Pers. Sat. 1.

⁴⁸³180. 153. &c.

⁴⁸⁴Pl. Phaid.

⁴⁸⁵M. Tyr. Dis. 12.

⁴⁸⁶327.

How these sights, and withal vacate to another spectacle? And not only how vacate? But how apt? How fitted? How a right disposition? How peace? How simplicity, for that view, that object which is of all the simplest, the divinest, only divine?⁴⁸⁷

Remember: * * *. M. Tyr. Dis. 1.

See first book of ASKHMATA, p. 200.

* * *. See Ονοματα. [330]

* * * C. 22 of B. 1.

Το καλον. το Πρεγον. ...

Το Αιγρον. L. 3 C. 26 (towards the beginning) * * *⁴⁸⁸.

Shameful ... Are not you ashamed? ... And Oh shame! Shame! --- What? Where? Is there such a thing then? Is it the number, quality, power of those that cry shame that can make it where it is not? Is it made or unmade by peoples' voices? Or is there that which is shameful in it self, let who will say otherwise, or although it be thought ever so honourable?

To flatter the tyrant is at court no shame. And what if the world were a court, or thought as they think at court; would flattery be no shame? --- No. For what is virtue or honour but opinion? What is vice and shame but opinion? ... Go on and say, what is parricide, ingratitude, treachery but opinion? --- And hast thou no shame that sayst this? --- And yet see! There are those who very philosophically and religiously (as they think) say this, and establishing morality make virtue and vice, shame and honour to be nothing but as costume and opinion make them. Oh excellent religion! Admirable philosophy! [391]

Low, pitiful, sneaking. What matter, so is it be not known? So it be in the dark (as they say) so that the thing be gained which was aimed at. What matter for the means? What is sneaking? What is cringing? ... Smiling, bowing low, stooping and (if occasion be) creeping, kissing hand, feet, or anything else ... Where is the harm? How does this hurt? Does it ache? Or smart? Or pain anyway? Does it pain to take up a handkerchief, a buckle or a shoe? Why not stoop as well here? --- Hang it; I can't stoop. I hate sneaking; I can't sneak. ---

Is sneaking really ill then? --- Miserable, detestable. --- Really so. --- Really. --- Come on then: never fear, man. Thou mayst be wholly good and virtuous nay thou must be so. It will follow of it self. for I'll pawn my life of it, all vice is but sneaking; and that except in vice there is not so much as a ground for such a thing. Fear but sneaking; and thou canst fear nothing else. Love but generosity and I'll engage thou shalt all thy life have subject enough for good action and all that can be called generous and noble. Matter shall never be wanting, nor ways nor means. Thou shalt not be less generous for want of an estate. Thou shalt not be less heroic for want of armies to conquer with or worlds to conquer. An Alexander may well sneak: for he served women, wine, fame, his own slaves. Even an Hercules may well

⁴⁸⁷180. 152.

⁴⁸⁸350.

sit down and bemoan himself that he has no feats to do, no boars nor monsters the clear the world of. But a true Hercules need not fear this. And it is in everyone's power to be this Hercules; that is to say; to be even as generous, great and heroic as he pleases. For in [392] true heroism there is no reckoning by the scene. It is not greater or the less scene. It is not as the decorations or ornaments are. It is not in the part, but in the action that all lies. The theatre is the same. The scenes all alike. The presence the same and as for those we call spectators and observe so much; it is rather an advance of character to have them absent; or if present, disapproving, reviling, reproaching. For this is not only heroic, princely, royal; but God-like, divine. (* * *) for how is it even with the divinity it self?

Foul, sordid, vile, stinking. --- What stinks? Smell the metal (as a sordid prince said) does this stink? Are the courts of tyrants, or the chambers of their mistresses, stinking? Is anything politer, sweeter, fairer? Although whence all this, and how it is here, thou art very certain. Does the minion, the favourite, the delator, the betrayer of this country, the bought patriot, the minister, or so much as any under-engine of this sweet place, stink? Is anything neater, sleeper, sprucer than one of these? ... Meanwhile look yonder, on the honest man how he goes! How it is with him! Is he as sweet? Has he where withal to keep himself thus neat? --- But the minion's part was foul. The tyrant is monster. The whore vile. --- Is there then inward vileness? May action possibly stink? And is there, on the contrary, sweet carriage, sweet action and behaviour? And what is sweet action? A sweet soul? ... See then which of the stinks, which of the sweetnesses are truest. If the honest man's be sweetness then count these (as they are) stinkards, and no better.

Corruption. Corrupt. --- As how?⁴⁸⁹ Does his breath smell ill? Is not his skin whole, smooth like and thriving? -- But he is a villain: rotten within: [333] hollow: unsound: tainted --- How? With what? is he not heart-whole? Does his pulse bear ill? Is not his blood well-coloured, well sustained, fair and pure? ... Where then, is this poison? And why is not his heart as good as any heart? Is there such a thing then as a sound heart⁴⁹⁰ in that other sense, wholesome, true, stanch, not to be made lead, not running riot, not taken off of its game? Has an honest heart such a game? Is there any such pursuit or chase? Is there anything in this huntsmanship? Is there this discipline, this regimen, cure, faculty, art? Let us hear then what it is: on what it stands: and how brought about. Let us hear the method and rules. How shall it be trusty, faithful, stanch? How sound, entire and uncorrupt? What are the things that corrupt, and what those to be opposed to them? ... And what name to give to this science, this study?

[Observe here that inversion (in the sense used above p. 112)⁴⁹¹ is in truth nothing else but the reducing the * * * from their contradictory use, misapplication and inverted state, to their real and proper subjects * * *⁴⁹². So that it was act unhappily that thou camest to use that term, which may serve as a good and proper one of art⁴⁹³. For in common view this work must seem to be inverting, perverting, and a mere abuse of words and notions.]

Come on. Let us hear how it is said. ... Ridiculous! --- What? ... Every thing? ... Or nothing? ... Ridiculous indeed! ... But something therefore: something certain: something in nature so: and which being wrong applied, is in it self ridiculous. [334]

⁴⁸⁹339.

⁴⁹⁰338.

⁴⁹¹112.

⁴⁹²L. 2 C. 55.

⁴⁹³354.

Childish. Womanish. Bestial. Brutal. Words! Words! Or are they anything more? As how then not a child? How least like woman? How far from beast? How removed and at a distance from anything of this kind? How properly a man?

* * * (II, 10) ... A man and not a woman; effeminate, soft, delicate, supine: impotent in pleasure, in anger talk: pusillanimous, light, changeable &c.: but the contrary to this in each particular ... A man and not a beast: not gluttonous as a hog: not lecherous as a goat: not savage as a lion: but sociable as the creatures that live in society and have a public ... A man and not a child: not taken with trifles, nor admiring shows: not playing, crying, taking on: angry, and pleased again: froward, pettish: in humour, out of humour: wanton and cross: stomach: the belly and play-thing: mama: nurse. ... The countries. Manhood. Manliness. Humanity ... Manly. Human. Masculine. ...

Cowardly. --- As how? Why not all fear alike reasonable and commendable? If not; what fear is clameable? And why? ... The degree? How far and no further? For what is fearful in and ought to be feared? (Else what is rashness, madness?) Learn therefore what is and what is not fearful: and how a man may attend intrepidity and be justly said to be no more fearful.

Revengeful. ... Revenged? --- Of what? of a stone, or madman? Who is so mad? ... For a chance-hurt; against thought or intention? Who is so unjust? Therefore there is JUST and UNJUST. For why anger? [335]

... Base. Mean. --- Why not? --- But others will hate me. --- Do others then hate what is base and mean; and dost thou not hate thy self?

Why are men proud? --- It is natural. --- Why poor and proud? --- It is natural. --- Why ugly and proud? Even ignorant and proud? --- Natural still. --- Does he then who is so destitute yet proud, think himself base and mean (and of what is contrary) natural? Can one be without the other?

What is pride then? --- What but the wrong application of this * * *?

A brute, a dog. ... And what then? Why is this thought so offensive? Why taken ill by those who would have no difference to be in nature between just and unjust, right and wrong? Are we not all dogs, wolves? ... Home homni lupus ... What difference then? Wherein lies the dog which everyone so much detests? --- Flattery, fawning, envying, biting, this is doggish. How many dogs?

Honest. --- Are you honest? ... Why angry if but so much as asked?

The beauté de l'ame and beauté du coeur of the french libertine-authors, of the very courtesans, ladies of intrigue. --- Is it so then? Is there such a thing indeed? ... As how then? A Messalina? An Agrippina the younger? No, but an Agrippina [336] the elder, a Livia, and so to a Cornelia, a Porcina, an Arria. Or amongst the courtesans themselves, a Thais of Terence, the Bacchis of Hecyra, from the better sort of these creatures to modest wife and matron. From the real Thais or Phryne to an Aspatia, so to a Hypparchia.

Tranquillity, serenity. Inf. P. 338.

Retreat, peacefulness, silence, order, beauty, majesty, and the rest that is found in nature at those times when the temper leads that way, and seeks the romantic places, the racks and sea-shores, woods, caverns, &c.: so M 4:3 ... See at what this aims ... They aim indeed, but not right⁴⁹⁴.

Happiness. Satisfaction. Content⁴⁹⁵ :

... Can there be any happiness without content? Any beyond content? Is there happiness and not content? Or content and not happiness? ... But what content? Not without feeling, sense, perception: else we might say a stone's content. Not without understanding, thought and reason: else we might say a beasts', a hog's content, which is as if we said a belly's or any other member's content: not a heart's or a mind's content. There is required therefore a rational content and not merely a rational (as preceding from reason good or bad) but a reasonable content: as preceding from certain and true reason. Now where is this reasonable content? Is it a reasonable one and on reasonable ground that has its foundation on circumstances that change every minute that satisfy one minute and not the next? That are every way unstable, inconstant, capricious, never to be depended on [337] never what we can call our own? ... What is this content? Is it the wealth of the Indies? Is it a fine wench a boy? Is it a seraglio? Is it all those things put together of which our poetess could say

That were our estate as we would choose it,

It would be destroyed for fear to lose it?

Must everyone then that is happy be a coward? On the contrary: whoever is a coward must and ever will be miserable. ... How not be a coward then? How not be afraid, nor shrink, nor tremble, either at the approach of death or retreat of fortune, when she is upon the wing? --- **Si celeres quatit perinas, resigno quae dedit** ---⁴⁹⁶

This is content indeed. This is a foundation. --- Does she stay? **Laudo manentem**. Content! --- Does she flutter sound with her wings, mount and away? --- **Resigno quae declit**⁴⁹⁷. Content! What should hinder the saying content? Why not content thus, to all things? To all but that which thou canst make sure of? ... "a long life? --- Content. --- A short one? --- Content. --- A name? --- Content. --- No name? --- Content. --- A fortune, estate? --- Content. --- Poverty? --- Content. --- Death? --- Content". ... Is there anything more? If not; and that this can be truly said; is it not well? What would I more? What would I be, more than content? What is happiness, felicity, summum bonum, but merely this, and this alone? ... See therefore how this is acquired; on what it depends; and what precepts, what rule of life, what knowledge of affairs thou hast need of, in the midst of this whole administration never to be a mal-content. For such a one must needs be (as he deserves) miserable⁴⁹⁸.

⁴⁹⁴338.

⁴⁹⁵39. 44 &c. 338.

⁴⁹⁶Hor. L. 3 Od. 29.

⁴⁹⁷Ibid.

Όνοματα. See * * *. [338]

* * *

* * *. M 10:8.

Integrity. Entire. --- In limbs? --- No. --- Skin? --- No. But affections? --- Affections towards what? Whom? Towards a kindred and not a country? A country and not a world, universe? ... And how is this affection broken? How entire? * * *, and what follows⁴⁹⁹. Is this preserving it? Is this integrity? Therefore how not this? ... The way. * * *.

Heartiness. Heart-whole. ... How a heart?

Content ... And what beyond? What more? ... But not a hog's content ... A man's content, then. What? And how?⁵⁰⁰

Tranquillity. Serenity. Where? Within? Or without? --- Sweet retreat! Whither? Out of self? into another world? --- No. But out of this. --- This what? this air, soil, circuit of the world? --- No, but out of the affairs of it. --- Let the affairs alone then: and thou art out of it. Or to say better; what hinders but thou shouldst act in necessary affairs and yet allow them to go as they will when thou hast done what belongs to thee? Is not this letting them alone? Is not this the same retreat? What else is tranquillity, serenity, peace? And where is this truly and only to be had? ... M 4. § 3⁵⁰¹. [339]

On the other side (of vices).

Corrupt. See in the * * * above, 332⁵⁰².

Dissolute ... Dissolution. Of what? Some tie, bond, viz. modesty, pudor, respect, reverence of a fellow-species, of relations and the rules, laws, orders, necessary to the preservation of these relations and of this species ... And how far these laws? If any at all; what? And which? How far do they extend? If any relaxation; where stop? If any restraint; where stop? And whether will this restraint carry us? ... * * * ... Nothing less. When any thing less; tone relaxed; nerves, lineas, tendons, fibers strained, bust, forced, broken. Solutio continui. Even when attention, the * * *, strict attention is but suspended, what else is it? What but dissolution? ... See the effects too ... all dissolution ...

Instrument down, unstrung ...

-- Dissolution of liquors, of the blood ...

Dissolved in effeminacy.

Differe luxu, voluptatibus, otio.

⁴⁹⁸260.

⁴⁹⁹Viz. * * *.

⁵⁰⁰336.

⁵⁰¹336.

Every loss of attention, every relaxation, every time of the * * * of any kind, false joy, indulgence, humour, spring of mirth, fancy, ebullition, wit, story, jest, * * * M 8. 51. Leaping of the heart. Sympathising⁵⁰³. Fellow-feeling in a certain way. The wrong * * * ...

All this, dissolution.

Νοσηματα.

Φαντασαι τραξ. See passions. * * *. [340]

* * *. II, 14 in fine.

* * *. I, 27.

* * *. 2:18. [341]

Si vulnus tibi monstratâ radice vel herbâ

Non fieret levius, fugeres radice vel herbâ

Proficiente nihil curarier. -----⁵⁰⁴

The prescriptions of the vulgar-wise like those of the empirics. They know only the symptom: apply only to the symptom ... Man! Go to the cause. Cure in the blood. Or what if the humour be checked in this part? What if the breaking out, the heat, the swelling be struck in; goes it not to another part?

----- ut solet, in cor

Trajecto lateris miseri captisque dolore:

Ut lethargicus hic cum fit pugil, & medicum urget⁵⁰⁵.

--- But a small matter will satisfy. A pretty circumstance (as they say) to make him easy ... Thus a wench; a handsome wife; a table; a coach and horses. A fine house. A garden. --- Excellent prescriptions! ... And how then? ... Presently nauseate. --- No. But I enjoy it still the same. --- Worse and worse. See what will come of it: how inveterate the disease is growing: what effeminacy, tenderness, niceness ... How as to fortune? How shocks in the world? How ordinary human enfermities and casualties? How sickness, age? ... **Natales grati mimaras?**⁵⁰⁶ ... How temper? ... Spoiling. Spoilt ... The child, brat, woman ... the man where? How? [342]

Rule...

To starve the preying fancies that starve the principal part (as above 78)⁵⁰⁷. The same as in a stomach spoiled by variety, high food repletion⁵⁰⁸ ... Retrench: abstain: and thus hope a recovery. Cut off the sallying, roving, towering, high-flying, ranging fancies, the ill paired⁵⁰⁹; the monstrously, copulating and engendering ones: centaurs, chimeras, cockatrices and the spaiion of this kind.

This is the beginning. First purge (as the physicians say). Evacuations: then restorations.

Now remark. See if these be but retrenched whether the mind will not turn it self a right way, find it self a better work and the * * * as honestly and roundly about its business. Take it once but from ill employment: and see if it get not good. Spare its labour force and ingenuity in wrong matter: and see if it becomes not * * * and ingenious in

⁵⁰³289.

⁵⁰⁴Hor. Epist. Ult.

⁵⁰⁵Sat. 3 L. 2.

⁵⁰⁶Espist. Ult.

⁵⁰⁷78.

⁵⁰⁸340.

⁵⁰⁹241. 312.

right. ... But practice a while. It is dull and heavy as yet. So it is with the ruined stomach. But let it be pinched a little: allow it but to be empty: it will come to itself. Or if in the real stomach (that of the body) it be not so, depend on it that in this other the thing cannot fail. The rule is infallible here: the regimen certain: and the medicine a specific. * * * &c.
L. 2 C. 2 in the end. [343].

Δοξάριον. [344]

Why able to slight it easily in the whole, yet not by parts? Why so often at defiance, yet reconciled? Free, unconcerned, disinterested, yet drawn in again and engaged? ... New views. A better world (as they say). Hopes of the world. A part in that world. A character. ... Here the deceit and folly. Here the treachery. The * * * forgot: the state of men and of their minds who know not what are * * *, what not, this and all of this kind forgot. The game turned. A new game. A character. A circumstance. The thing played for: not the play. A play in earnest. A game begun, not so easily left off: not a loser contentedly. So bowls, tables and other games, when made a business of. Remember why these games forlorn formerly. And why not this game forlorn therefore now? Since playing at this game thou canst less command thy self than thou couldst at those others ... But try. Let it be a game merely. Let it be play, real play, skill, exercise only: not gain or victory. For what gain here but the action? What victory but the action? What played for, but good play only? And can the play be good that aims [345] in earnest at the praises of those who understand it not? Does it belong anymore to this play to frame men's voices than to a gamster to make bowls or paint the cards? Must not each take them as he finds them? But if that be the business to gain voices; it is another art and has a different name. This is not playing the cards or bowls: this is not play or exercise or skill: but a poor ordinary mean craft, a servile trade. The turner and the toy shop. Or is **AMBITION** anything more? Is it the business here, to make voices?

What is at stake? --- A fortune, reputation, FAME. --- Is this then what is played for? --- No: but honesty and virtue. --- Play away then. For those other are the cards and not the stake.

The dice run wrong. --- Let them run. Is it my fault? Or shall I go to a conjurers for better fortune? If play I must; what have I to do but play well? Or would you have me cheat? --- But you will be ruined. --- Man! How ruined? What is played for? ... Nothing but the play. Thou forgetst thy self: for here is no ruin in the case. No loss at this game but in the game or play only. The things thou thoughtst of are the card, the dice, wood, horn, pasteboard, stuff. What are their opinions? Their voices? What is all this to the game? If they rail, and I do well, is it not I that beat, and they that are the losers?

All is lost. --- As how? --- Reputation, name, esteem. --- Who plays for these? Who made this to be the play? -- - But there is no play without them. --- The game then is up. --- But thou must have the play. --- Right. For why did I begin? --- But there's and end then. --- And must there never [346] be an end? ... But where is the loss all this while? Have I not my stake? Have I not got what I played for? Or had I any design upon the cards? Should I pocket up the dice, and carry these off with me? What have I to do with these? Or what care I who has them?

* * *. I, 24.

Remember therefore (as in the following chapter) * * * and * * *.

Again then ... What was opinion and fame in those early days, when, honesty not succeeding with relations, or the party, thou gavest that matter up and turning Epicurean (with Horace and his Odes) followest pleasure, wit, air, mirth, humour? What was a humour or a censure at that time? What was a grave judgement passed on thee by any of the solemn ones of lofty brows? What if some such account had been brought thee, when dancing (suppose) or in any other of those entertainments? ... A sport, mere sport: and nothing else ... And shall the course thou art now engaged in, the entertainments of these latter days, and the order of life now taken up with, be yet not so powerful, or of so much virtue as the fiddles? Shall that philosophy be more prevalent than this? Shall the vulgar as then considered, be more despised then as now? Shall the chief good as then admired, be more attractive then as now, at present, with what thou hast now experienced, seest and knowst?

* * *⁵¹⁰. ... Today a prodigy: tomorrow an ass ... So it will be ... Oh, admirable thing, renown! Wonderful reputation! Mighty fame! ... Say then. How is it now? --- An ass. --- Tomorrow then a prodigy. --- A prodigy! --- Tomorrow then an ass: and so on: [347] an unaccountable wretch, a mad-man ...

But who is a mad-man? Art not thou one indeed? If thou thinkst to be unaccountable or live unaccountably to such as can give no account of themselves, their lives, or manners, their end or scope; what they pursue or fly; what they love or hate, approve or disapprove; or by what rule they judge either of life or anything in life? Fr, as for those wise ones the highest esteemed of our days, do they not at times appear also as mad one to another? And wouldst thou appear better than the rest, thou whose madness (if it be so) is so unlike the common and more passable sort? ... But be not concerned. Go on in the use of the rules: persist: and all will be tolerably well, in all likelihood, even here too. Thou wilt have admirers enough and more than enough perhaps; * * *. But if otherwise; * * *. C. 29.

Remember the other day walking out and reading a letter just received in which the Δοξαριον was threatened (sad speeches abroad! Sad censures past! Sad noises and reports!): just at that instant the chimes went ... And what are chimes? What are noises, rumours of tongues? ... Dull sorry things God knows: equally musical: equally consonant. ... Wires, hammers, bells struck, moved just alike; from as intelligent, rational causes, as certain and as regular: and in comparison, this latter rather the more regular of the two. Is this the tune that should move thus? Is this the harmony that should drawn tee, affect tee, sink and raise tee? ... Sad soul indeed, if this be so! Sad harmony within! but listen inwards: turn thy ear thither: and thou [348] wilt hear better sounds --- It is so. Thank heaven that thou findest it thus. Improve this ear. Learn to have a good one in tis kind, and (fear not) true harmony will follow and come on a peace.

Again these chimes ... How? What? is it a musician that strikes these notes? Are they from immediate skill, masterly, knowledge? --- No: but from an engine, a piece, a clock-work. --- what wonder then if out of tune and dissonant? Wilt thou admire this music, as the common people? what if that other music? Wilt thou also hearken and stand in admiration with the same common people? ... Do so then. But imagine that, if a master or real judge of music stood by, he would despise tee for this attention; as justly he might. Hearken then to such as thou knowst masters. Hearken to the great master and organist, and to those that immediately derive from him. For as for these others what are they themselves but mere organs, chimes, set a going of themselves without any inherent principal of true music, or any other than a poor wretched imitation?

“The world says thus. The world expects. The world talks”--- Who is the world? Who is it when the gossips say the world? The throw-ladies, the parish-wives, the servants talking of one another and their masters, the neighbourhood in the country, the farmers at the next fair or market; which of these uses not the word, and with the same emphasis? The world! ... Where then is this emphatical world? What is it? Who? ... is it the beau-monde? Is it the court and drawing-room? Is it the chocolate- [349] house-world? The coffee-house-world? The quality-world? Or the common-people-world? The scholar-world? The virtuoso-world? Or the politic, negotiating, managing, busying world? The foreign, or the home-world? ... Far (see!). What passes as a great story, a mighty affair in one of these worlds is just nothing in another. Who of these then, or which am I to consider? Whom or which of these will I make the world? Shall it be the greater number, the mere people --- See who there is that has best served or best deserved of them either now, or anciently: and see if a good rope-dancer or prize-player be not of the two, more talked of, not to say more loved. ---

⁵¹⁰M. L. 4.16.

But the managers: the men of business who govern the multitude; not the multitude themselves. --- See then, these managers, the politicians and known actors in the stake. The old stagers (as they call them) those who are at the helm and have long dealt in state-affairs. See this race: and say who are honestest: the governors, or those governed? Are not these by some degrees worse yet? Are the courts or even the senates, parliaments, and public stations the passages to virtue and true honour, as well as to fame, fortune and honour of another kind? --- Vestigia nulla retrorsum.

If they once went in honest, how are they come out? Where are the footsteps? What are they changed to, soon when there? --- Is this then, the world? Are these such as thou wouldst approve thy self to? Reckon them up by name, take out of them those who mind chiefly their pleasures, or the advancing themselves; those that act corrupt and profligate together with the bigoted and superstitious: and see how many will be left. Consider their lives and manners, their pursuits and aims, their real worth and wisdom in themselves: and see whether this time world or that plain world be most considerable and fittest to carry that name the world? [350]

At a country meeting, a fair or bull-baiting there is a greater world then here where the word astonishes when I hear it pronounced (the world!). There are more eyes, more looking, more talk, more people to talk --- But what people? --- Right. Compare, and see what difference.

Ashamed. --- At what? Is it a shame then? Is it a shame, or not shame? What is shame or shameful? Hast thou not learnt? * * * (L. 3 C. 26, towards the beginning)⁵¹¹.

Remember too what follows a page or two after, * * *⁵¹².

The fable of the old man, boy and ass⁵¹³. The censures of the passengers: and what this came to.

Man! Keep on thy way. Do what is best for tee thy boy and ass. Mind the road and whether thou art going; to what place and on what business. Let the others mind the passengers that are idle or that travel only for diversion. Thou hast something else to mind. follow those that can teach tee and that know this road: not those that neither know the road nor themselves, nor have any certain guide or rule for either.

Deceit of that word example ... Be an example (family, economy, regulation or a private life, a character, a circumstance. Sup. 197) --- Wretch! What example? * * * 3:14 end. [351]

Applause of virtue in the world accidental ... admiring not as admirable, but as admired --- Such a one is commended. But see for what. is the thing it self commended which is commendable? Is this esteemed? Is this beloved? If not; what is this but chance and accident? And does not time and a small change of circumstance show this to be accident, and depend on fortune merely? "Oh wondrous reputation! Rare thing renown! Who would not purchase tee! Who would not venture hard for tee!" ... And in truth is it not venturing hard to do anything for this, to bid for this, to step out of the road for this (* * *) or anything of this kind? Is it a small matter that is thus ventured every time? And hast thou not thy self made thy adventure at cost enough?

Inward repetitions, and fictions of praises, self-encomiums, panegyrics (* * * extraordinary! Wonderful! Nobody like him!)⁵¹⁴ ... The ridiculousness of this. The shame of this ... See above p. 275.

⁵¹¹330.

⁵¹²353.

⁵¹³353.

Apologues.

Examples. [352]

- (1) The wolf admiring the sleekness and good case of the dog, before he saw the marks on his neck and knew the cause.
- (2) The country and city-mouse (as M 12:22) --- si quis laudat arelli, Sollicitas ignarum opes ---⁵¹⁵ and the only way to get rid of this sollicitude.
- (3) The many stratagems of the fox and the single one of the cat which send her much better.

Therefore, even in the use of Δογματα, remember to reduce all as much as is possible to that one the first, the chief and main one: * * *. With this, laugh⁵¹⁶ (what should hinder? If only inwardly) on the dismal occasions: as when beset; driven (as should seem) to a non-plus. But see! I have a trick (as they say) worth twenty.

- (4) The swallows advised the other birds to pick up the hemp when in seed: but it grew and the nets were made ... See above p. 197 ... Perillus' brazen bull ... Such was this ingenuity of time. ... Now lay tee own and roar (as in the play) --- Quae beluo ruptis, Cum semel effugit, reddit se prava catenis?⁵¹⁷ [353]

- (1) The old man, his boy and ass (fear of censure: willingness to please everybody)⁵¹⁸. His riding first himself; then the boy; the neither; then both: and the last expedient, carrying ... Worse and worse. This last the heaviest. And the rallery still heavier and heavier ... A heavy task indeed, to please everybody.

Whenever therefore thou art inclined to turn out of thy way on this account: whenever the passengers disturb; remember this: and that (with tee) most certainly the last will be the heaviest. * * *. C. 29.

- (2) The dog and river. Shadow for substance ... applied to the * * *. Not contented with * * *: but grasping at something more ... Patience, man! * * *

The same applied to inward and outward character inf. P. 391.

- (3) Water and sun-beans ... (See the divine man l. 3 c. 3 in the end) ...

- (4)

⁵¹⁴275.

⁵¹⁵S. 7 L. 2.

⁵¹⁶Inf. p. 387 in fine. 375.

⁵¹⁷Hor. Sat. 7 L. 6.

Δογματα. [354]

* * *⁵¹⁹.

In this place the * * * stand as Δογματα: above (330 &c) as * * *. Here therefore short, concise, pointed, keen. Demonstration, conviction, not being the case here; but action ... time of action⁵²⁰; and these fitted for that time.

* * *. M. 3.13.

Viz. for conversation ... 1st countenance. 2nd gesture. 3rd voice (as in appendix to Νομ α) add to this 4th matter, how reduced, retrenched, epitomised, when all these are away, viz.: gall and venom: vapour, bubble, froth: vomit, chill, crudity, phlegm⁵²¹ ... And to be ready with the right instruments to reduce presently the excursive matters to their proper heads, principles. To bring it to head, as the surgeons say: but in a quicker way by precipitation, more like chemistry than surgery.

In what appearance in what colour did it break out? --- Generosity: magnanimity: magnificent talk for virtue and right⁵²². --- Away! Gall, venom⁵²³. --- But, simplicity, openness. Away! Froth, bubble⁵²⁴. --- Doctrine, instruction. -- - Vomit, phlegm⁵²⁵. ... This is that reducing: and as the work above and styled inversion⁵²⁶, so may this be, in terms of art, reduction⁵²⁷.

Remember therefore this plan and groundwork for Δογματα. [355]

In weariness lassitude, torpor, and the dissatisfied, dejected state of mind, this⁵²⁸: "how redeem my self?"⁵²⁹ Whither fly? ... Out of nature? How possible? If not; bear with nature. And how bear? How but by these rules? How (otherwise) life tolerable? Death tolerable? And if neither; what a hard case!"⁵³⁰.

Again same weariness. * * *. M. 5.9.

And that (of old)⁵³¹ "the husband man ... What toil and pain! What nights and days! How cheerfully! And for what? what hope? ... And wilt not thou as much for thine? But (good heaven!) what fruit! What hope! How great! How excellent! How happy! ... But as in a ground that is cultivated; the first thing, kill the weed that choakst over-runs. The till: then manure: then expect". But all this not without sweat and weariness, pangs, growns.

⁵¹⁸358.

⁵¹⁹L. 1 27.

⁵²⁰189.

⁵²¹370.

⁵²²80.

⁵²³[sem texto]

⁵²⁴[sem texto]

⁵²⁵154.

⁵²⁶112.

⁵²⁷333.

⁵²⁸280.

⁵²⁹Arr. 270.

⁵³⁰271.

⁵³¹From old foul papers remaining since last retreat 1698: so the lines just preceding. See the same p. 260 and page just following.

* * *. [356]

* * *. M. L. 12 § 22 & 26.

* * *. C. 1.

* * *. M. 8.2.

* * *. L. 1 C. 11.

How long since is it that thou sawst the necessity of going deep into this! How long since, that thou bidst, “say not in such or such a disposition: but such or such a fancy, such or such an opinion, and use thy self to this ... to satisfy thy self about opinion, see what those seasons of the mind are which thou art used to express by the name of feelings, dispositions, moods; in which virtue, deity and such objects are faint and weak. What mood, what temper can be the occasion of this? What is this but OPINION, and a certain secret disturbance in the opining part, moved by dispositions, places, objects, images, joined before to like opinions and now bringing back those false ones with whom they have held so ancient strong and almost natural alliance?”⁵³²

Therefore remember * * *. [357]

See the thing! ... A sword, a pistol not terrible, but a precipice! ... Drowning it self the ocean waves not terrible, but drowning in the cabin! ... Thus with thy self: but with a silly woman a sword terrible: yet a precipice not. She chooses this death. The effeminate lover, the melancholy and naturally timerous tender man. The barbarian-Indian. Xenophon’s account of a whole people and particularly of a youth⁵³³. To how many is this easy, and to demonstration is it not the easiest death that can be? But it likes tee not, it seems. Excellent fancy! Incomparable opinion! It were pity but thou shouldst have thy will, and be indulged. Where go the women and timerous people in a storm when the ship is near sinking? What say they? I’ll go into the cabin and there die. And what of tee? No. But I can’t bear the cabin. --- Coward! But why not the cabin? --- I cannot bear the water come into me there and choak me. I’ll into the deck and open sea --- And what is the sea to tee, whether into the cabin or out of the cabin? What difference? What is the business? A pail of water, or less; a gallon or two perhaps. This is all my share. For I shall neither drink a cabin-full or sea-full ... Will anyone tell me this is not fancy? Shall fancy tell me so? No. Reason and truth show me otherwise⁵³⁴. No rest until this in conquered. Then judge of the rest. Then of torture the scaffold, giblet, executioner and all that din and pomp about a matter which comes not near the colic or the stone⁵³⁵. Even that very pomp a help rather (as animating exciting by other objects and keeping the bent of the mind)⁵³⁶ when once the first fancy and opinion is cured. For, what a help is it to those hardly villains (being bred to out-brave it) whom it ought rather to confound, as exposing their guilt and shame before men? ... But how, where there is no guilt but then at that time and on that very occasion most of all deserving? Can this be frightful? [358]

A scaffold!⁵³⁷ --- Right. What is a scaffold? ... A place built for great sights and to show things to a crowd. ... A coronation. A king and queen. A mountebank. A festival. ...

⁵³²This in loose papers omitted from the * * * of Holland 1698, at first coming over: so above p. 260 and page just preceding.

⁵³³Arr. C... L...

⁵³⁴L. 2 C. 16.

⁵³⁵223.

⁵³⁶271.

⁵³⁷223.

And why not this as well a festival in honour of the great master, in testimony of his truth, a witness to him, to his laws, to his privilege given to man? Can there be a nobler stage erected? Can there be a worthier greater spectacle shown to man? [359].

PHILOSOPHY. From 158. First B] [360]

To solve the **phenomena** in a true sense: not the phenomena of the skies of meteors; not those in mathematics, mechanics, physics; not those which by solving or unfolding ever so skilfully one is neither better, nor happier, nor wiser, nor more a man of sense and worth, of a more open free understanding, liberal disposition, a more enlarged mind or a more generous heart; but those which being not unfolded, nor well resolved, contract and narrow a man's genius, cause a real poorness in the understanding, disturb, distract, amaze, confound, perplex, lead away like those dancing-fires of the ignis fatuus, plunge into abysses; and cast into endless labyrinths.

Who would not be learned and expert in this art? And yet who is? ... But, be thou: since so thou mayest be. For, what is there easier? Or what costs less? Hast thou not tried? ---

Enough then. * * *⁵³⁸. Let this be thy philosophy. And leave the other phenomena to others. [361].

⁵³⁸C. V.

* * *. See Νομ β. Inf. 372 &c. [362]

If the first of the three great-ones (who had the preparatory part 3: 22) involved himself as he did, and in those times; how much more thou? And in these? If the age then bore not a declaration; how much less now? ... Then not ripe: now rotten.

Remember therefore, in manner and degree, the same involution, shadow, curtain. The same soft irony. And to find out a character in this kind according to proportion, both in respect of self and times. To find out such a tenor as this, such a key, tone, voice, consistent with true gravity and simplicity, although accompanied with humour and a kind of raillery agreeable to that divine pleasantry mentioned elsewhere⁵³⁹ ... This is a harmony indeed! What can be sweeter, gentler, milder, more sociable or more human?

Away, then, with that other sociableness: that inwardness, intimacy, openness. How false! How unsound! How harsh in reality and unfitted for what it is designed! How unfitted for their good whom it is meant to serve, and for thine, in [363] of thy own character, conviction, improvement? Indeed the very reverse of all.

... But truth? Truth? --- Remember that truth is best preserved when those thou conversed with are made to think the truest of tee: which will least be, when thou speakst the truest or simplest in this way, or wouldst correct, rebuke or teach with the same simplicity. Seek then, the true simplicity: for this thou usest with them is not so. And, for gravity, so used in their concerns, as hoping or expecting better of them; this is in good earnest ridiculous: and not only that, but in another respect tyrannical and barbarous.

Form: steady: even: upright, in these contrary blasts: efforts of humour, temper: sallies of disposition: the gay, light winged Zephir's, and the ruffling Barcas's or the heavy Notus ... Colossus'-like fixed, poised, with equal footing and foundation on each side. ... A promontory parting two seas ... These and more images, examples, models, taken from the highest things to illustrate this simple and (in appearance) humble, mean, cold, insipid character: this middle genius, partaking neither of hearty mirth nor seriousness.

For what to do with such a one? How bore with? ... Nevertheless: to persist herein: to stand firm: to keep this station, tenor, harmony; which as difficult as it may seem, yet by attention and hearty application may most easily be preserved: if on the one hand thou strenuously resist what is offered from the vulgar side and that facetious comic kind whatever it be of wit, jest, story and the like: and if on the other hand thou strenuously resist and abstain from that as ridiculous seriousness and solemnity in these affairs, eager contention and striving in the concerns of others and for the reformation and conviction of others. ... Notable reformation without conviction! Notable conviction, as things stand with them and with thy self! ... Away then. No more.

Firm: steady &c. ... Equal between these two extremes of different brows. Both mixed in a manner; convertible, communicable, by an easy change from [364] one into another: not starting, not abhorring from one another: not constituting two different souls, two different man differently known, differently accessible, differently treated, spoke with. Ridiculous! In humour: out of humour. Now no jest: now no earnest. Now play odious: now seriousness more odious. All joy (good news!) all sorrow (bad news again!). All this, or all that. And when one meets

⁵³⁹[sem texto]

together a jarring, a harshness, a frightfulness. Stay a little until I am in tune. Oh excellent harmony! Oh life! ... Shall it be still thus? Wilt thou never think of any other character? ...

No more then. Have done with this game. No more of this parts to act. No tragedy. No comedy (mere comedy). No dismal! Nor deplorable. No dainty! Delicate! Pretty! Sweet! Be this liked or not liked; be it dull, be it insipid, what it will. Yet be thou constant to it, such as it is; constant in this **medium**, this certain third thing; neither solemnity nor drollery; neither seriousness nor jest.

Nor jest: nor earnest. For what jest with one who considers vicissitudes, periods, the immediate changes and incessant eternal conversions, revolutions of the world? Again: what earnest with one who considers but the same?

Earnest: but not in earnest. Jest but not really jest. For where is jest? And where earnest? In the things **within**, is earnest indeed, deep earnest. In the things **without**, what is all but jest? Now the first are never meant: the latter everywhere. How talk then of the first? How be earnest, or in earnest, if thou wouldst ever so faint?

But if the talk be never of the first but of the latter only; how talk of these and be serious? ... [365] See then if the greatest seriousness be not a very jest. Therefore, be it jest or earnest with others; it can be neither to thy self. their jest, their earnest: both in a manner a jest. But the use of this jest, a serious matter; and far from jest. See then to use it right within: and for without remember the **medium**: and find the balance as becomes tee.

Never to leave until this balance be brought right, or pretty near to an evenness: although the way to this be through such frequent changes and unevenness for so it must be to a beginner ... "This was too light. This too heavy. Here feathers. There lead"... Why this sad tone? Why dismal? Why the tragedy? And anon again the comedy. All joy. From whence? For what? in what world? What circumstances? Art thou ready for a change? Will the reverse not be unseasonable? ... Good then. Be it so. There let it stand. The balance is right. But if the balance be not there, nor near there: bring it more even. Weigh, ponderate, redress: from one scale to the other: and go on thus removing, taking out and putting in, by this measure, this **examen**. ... "If pleasantry; as how pleasant? And what room for seriousness? If seriousness; as how serious? And what room for pleasantry of a certain kind? What are the kinds of each? How will they stand together? How break in easily and kindly without violence on one another? How mix without constraint? Pair, without being monstrous?" ...

Such must be the freedom, such the easiness of this communication and transition in a free mind: free to either circumstance, either freedom, either way: equal as to what offers in either kind --- totus teres --- no hanging, clinging, sticking. No wish, nor choice, nor [366] disruption to one more than to another: not whining, and then simpering: now this uppermost, now that.

Nothing of all this. No delay or hindrance from temper. Not a government of humour. Not the ascendent mood, or prevalent fancy. Elevation and depression: rise and fall. ... Good news; bad news; all alike ... Is it news indeed? News to ME? What news? ... Is it a concern to ME? What concern? ... Away! ---

Such then must be the test of this earnest jest; gravity, mirth; sorrow, joy; or whatever be still much and the same: no mighty difference.

A mirth not out of the reach of what is gravest. A gravity not abhorrent from the use of that other mirth⁵⁴⁰. In this balance seek a character, a personage, manner, genius, style, voice, action. Here the decency, proportion and grace of all. This the study, performance and music of life. Nor can this ever be obtained without a perfect and absolute check

of that which now prevails and has prevailed so long; carrying tee as with the stream; beginning indeed in jest, but ending in earnest ... Miserable sympathy!

See then. The best practice and exercise is to go by contraries, just in the teeth of temper, just opposite to humour ... Am I disposed to laugh? --- How disposed? What senseless disposition is this? Now check. Now give the turn. now learn the true authority, command and how to make temper obey. ... Or am I disposed to lament? --- Lament what? thy self? Or the poor world?⁵⁴¹ --- But others are melancholy. Others mourn. Do thou morn then, be in black: forbear eating, speaking, or whatever else, for company, and as accommodating thy self. But why mourn within? --- Nay but they are now changed. They are gay again. It is a holiday, a birthday. --- Put on the birthday suit, the holiday suit. But what holiday within? What revel [367] wouldst thou keep there? ... Beware then: and for safety's sake, apply contraries (for here is the danger): turn the edge the other way: present the point: and keep temper aloof. Thwart, cross, perplex and break it thus, until it becomes manageable, and the impetuous steed be softer mouth, easily guided, as with a thread and governed not by his own head but by the master's hand ... Be it so. Mind but this exercise: and fear not, thou wilt soon have a good seat and appear in it as easy to others, as thou wilt be really easy and unconstrained thy self.

Again.

Jest? --- Earnest. --- Earnest? --- Jest. ... Where is the earnest? The jest where? --- But see! The earnest. --- What? --- Death! ---

Is this the earnest?⁵⁴² *Usque adeoni more miserum est?*⁵⁴³ --- But infamy! --- What? With whom? For how long? ... The town! The world!⁵⁴⁴ ... Oh, jest! --- Country ruined! --- The storks nests⁵⁴⁵. Jest still. Jest all. ---

But is there not something which may make this to be earnest: and does make so, commonly, whether we will or no? --- Right. This is earnest. This is the thing. This (and this alone) is no jest: viz.: when that which should be jest, is earnest with us. But why whether we will or no? What hinders but it should be jest with us, as in it self it is? What but wrong jest? It is this that is in the way: jest in wrong places, mere jest, foolery, trifle: the ordinary common pleasantry. For if it be jest there; it will be earnest, sad earnest here.

No more of that which if received as jest, will make philosophy, religion, virtue, honesty a jest or which being fame, the possession or loss of this to be earnest. [368]

No more then. If there be however a facetiousness, a humour a pleasantry of a right kind, proportionable and always in season, even, and spread alike to a whole character and life, sweet, gentle, mild, and withal constant, irrefragable; never inwardly disturbed, whatever outward economy may require; if there be this thing, this true innocent excellent jest and pleasantry; let this be the care, how to preserve the jest and be the same: how never to be false to it: never to betray it, sacrifice it, prostitute it, nor basely yield it up to that other vile and scurrilous jest, most incompatible with it, its bane, destruction and extinction. No raillery of that sort: no drollery, buffoonery or anything that but borders on it: not if a thousand Ad---'s, a thousand A---nes', a thousand companions, friends cry out, or wonder or are

⁵⁴⁰364.

⁵⁴¹[sem texto]

⁵⁴²244.

⁵⁴³Virg. L. 12.

⁵⁴⁴348.

⁵⁴⁵L. 1 C. 28.

displeased: not for a thousand bribes of one way, a thousand admirations, exclamations, * * *⁵⁴⁶ and the rest. Not for a thousand of those contrary invectives, slights, pittyings, and the quantum mutatus ab illo!

Remember another character: another dignity: another humour, pleasantry ... The Socratic genius. This mirth. These sales. These turns: and this simplicity. The chaster of the Roman comic poets and what he borrowed hence, and from his Socratic masters. But for Aristophanes, a Plautus, a modern play, modern wit, raillery, humour; away! This is earnest: Petronius, earnest. Jocus risus et cupido: the muses, and the graces of this sort: earnest sad earnest.

St. Giles's. February, 1704/5.

And is this earnest still? --- How with the company? With relation? The table-talk, disputes, debates, news, the public, the world!⁵⁴⁷ --- Think if a Lesbius stood by, and asked the question, is not this earnest? --- Something like it, indeed. Too, too like it.

Instead of Lesbius, then do thou thy self remember thus to ask thy self; in domestic politics, at table, at play (whatever play) is not this earnest? Or what is it? [369]

St. Giles's. January 1706/7. See Almanach.

Since recovered from thy long distemper and now likely to live for sometime, and as far as a broken constitution will permit, to be active again in affairs of the public and friends; remembering the first and early cautions (more necessary and incumbent now, in this state). The laws as in Parchm. &c.: with which thou must now again take up; begin as formerly (for there is need enough after regret, and so much time given to bodily affairs and weaknesses), begin as above p. 124 &c: upon familiarity, character &c: remembering the natural secretion. Remembering modesty, the decorum, and the deformity and nauseasness there spoken of (p. 134) as belonging to a certain openness and affection of intimacy. For now these things are growing again, and by a prosperous state of public and friends, and a less difficult one of family and fortune, they lay hold, and bring back to the same follies and now more than ever inexcusable manners and character.

Begin then.

Consider some late warm sallies and excursions in relation to the public, as well as family and friends. Whence this loss of character? ... First inward, then outward: for the latter must soon follow. Yet put a stop here if possible, that the former may recover. Allow a breathing time. But if the first, coming to sink, the latter be flung away after it, as in a kind of despair; this is desperate indeed, and will bring on a real desperate game.

Be more composed: and weigh this well. Let not the speciousness of simplicity and an open part deceive thee. The best simplicity is to go on in mending faults, not staying to tell and explain them. See then where the fault lies. [inf. 386

The overthrown of all character is from an over-promising, or desponding view of affairs administered. Although originally is from the first that all ill arises⁵⁴⁸.

The first leads to a sort of undertaking; the other to a resigning: both equally wrong. Matters having a little succeeded, self-applause arises, and hence engagement and forwardness, beyond the measure and true tone of life.

⁵⁴⁶L. 4 C. 2.

⁵⁴⁷L. 3 C. 20.

⁵⁴⁸Sup. 82.

On the other side, matters growing ill, or succeeding a little worse than ordinary, self-disparagement arises, and thence aversion to all business, love of privacy and violent affectation of retreat and obscurity ... Mere pusillanimity! As the other was rashness and mere madness.

Hence on one side those indecent boasts * * * &c. C. 16 L. 2. And hence on the other side that nauseous openness and seeming simplicity towards friends; as in chapter of friendship, viz. last of last book. But remember, * * * &c. *ibid.*⁵⁴⁹.

In the former of these cases, certain schemes and plans are formed, Platonic commonwealths, reformations of state, family, private persons, thy own labours made known, what progresses already made, what more expected ... excellent explanations! And to whom all this? To the wise? Would they not divide thee? Or to the vulgar? And dost thou not divide thyself?

In the other case, account is to be given (forsooth!) why this affairs have succeeded thus ill: by what hindrance from thy self, from others, from the age, from the nature of things ... again excellent explanations! And to whom all this? Where is the harmony of such a conduct? Where the proportion of character?

Strive therefore against this, by all ways and means possible. And what other way, than by that rule above (p. 366) to go by contraries, just opposite to humour, just in the teeth of temper ... Do things succeed well? --- Wonderful! Who would have thought it? Now [387] therefore, be different: now forebode: expect all ill. Think of what lies at the bottom, et ignos supposito cineri doloso. * * * &c. L. 4 C. 5.

But on the other side; do things go ill? --- What wonder? What else did I expect? Were not these the terms? Now therefore be bold: now lively: now confide. Not as the poet's hero, spem vultu simulans, but heroically indeed, and at heart; without deceit, suppressing grief, and exalting the mind, so as to have it full of hope, yet without dependence, as at a game. And thus inward simplicity and outward economy may be reconciled. For, what if first motion be dejecting, it is resisted, conquered, despised. The second is the true. Let that be seen, so much of it as is proper, and at a proper season, when secured thy self and returned again to thy own right mind, and real self. Or wouldst thou discover a disordered false self, make others to take notice of the strife within, and call them to be witnesses to this thy regimen and treatment, in thy sick state? Oh, wretched simplicity indeed! Oh, beggarly humility! Is this for pity that these ulcers are uncovered? Or want they to be scratched? Is not this (as above p. 73, 154) calling the others to see, hanging about the flegme and stools? If this so pitiful and mournful way delights thee; say then (in a yet lower character) * * * (Cap. 3). For this is better than to disgrace the art which should make thee happy and show thee so to others.

Away therefore, with this fulsome openness and deceitful simplicity. If things go wrong⁵⁵⁰, rejoice with an innocent sort of malice and sportiveness; as at those plays of cards or dice, where a more than ordinary run of fortune, although against our selves, is taken [388] pleasantly, as comical and entertaining to our selves and others. Not so, I confess, when any great matter is at stake. But, what matter here? What besides the play itself? Is it anymore than play, mere play? --- But it is part of the play, to seem in earnest. ---Right. And therefore do thou seem in earnest, and as one who in good earnest hopes and confides: for so thou dost: although not as they perhaps may understand it. But they can understand no better. Do thou therefore accommodate thy self to their understanding: and do not perplex and confound them with certain views which thou wouldst never think of communicating with them, if thou wert not thy self already in confusion and hurry of mind. So much more monstrous is it, at this season above all, to be open and familiar in a certain way. Here therefore, resist equally as in the other case of success: but hide the resistance. For, to show the struggle in this case, is abject and mean, like one that cries for help: and to show it in the other, is ostentation and

⁵⁴⁹* * *, not * * *; for so a few lines before, * * *.

⁵⁵⁰Sup. p. 352 * * *.

insolence, like one who would show his strength, such a strength truly as nobody cares for. Who are they that can relish such severity? Where are the friends who will not complain of philosophy in this case?

Let temper therefore, rather than principle, bear the charge. Be severe over thy self: but appear so as little as may be, with safety (for this is the main). And if joy and alacrity in one case, and concern and care in the other be thought wanting, it is better to bear the censure than to relax or apologise: better pass as extravagantly light, sullen or mysterious for the time, than by a dangerous accommodation, * * *, give way to the wrong affection, or by a foolish openness expose mysteries which will create greater mysteriousness and misunderstanding than before. But a sincere carriage without affectation may bear tee easily through al this. Nor is inward severity (in the thwarting either of joy or grief) so very hard to be hid, if honestly meant. But suffer it once to aim at appearance, [389] let it but seem to want witnesses, and see presently how nauseous and offensive! What a character!

Therefore consider of this ever in this double respect. remember both the first and second resistance. At first, how pernicious the not relishing inwardly, in both the fortunes: and in the next place although this first resistance be shortly made in both, yet how wrong, not to resist also in that other sense of outward explanation. Here therefore, as elsewhere, apply the rule, * * *.

As the loss of inward character draws on the loss of outward, so the loss of outward helps forward that other loss. Save, therefore, what thou canst. And make not things worse by endeavouring to mend them. If at any time the inward character suffer, keep at least the outward. Keep it within reach and recovery. Do not sign and seal to that folly. If to publish thy wisdom and strength in the preservation of inward character be in truth but folly, and the very overthrowing of that character thou wouldst preserve; what must it be, to proclaim folly itself, expose thy loss of character and show thy own weakness, whether as sparing or condemning it? For this is all one. Condemning in this place is but sparing. It is pitting, bemoaning, flattering. Didst thou go roundly to work, and take thy self to talk in good earnest, there would be none of all this, no room, no leisure for such fine speeches, such appeals, such exclamations before such people. what have we to do with such confidents? Is it health and strength thou feelst? Why boast of it? Why show the * * * ... To what judges? What masters of fence? Or, are they weaknesses and relapses that sit heavy? Be it so. Which way shall we lighten them? To what physicians commit them? To what surgeons shall we lay open such sores as these? In what company unbind such wounds? Or must it be as a spectacle, or [390] beggar-like, to move pity? Beggarly indeed, and abject. If anything in the world can be so. Yet is this abjectness inseparable from that other insolence. The same indulgence of grief, the same admittance of humiliation so seemingly modest and which passes for such an expression of social feeling and humanity, the same is the actual cause and nourishment of that contrary impotence of temper in joy and exultation; when a small alteration happens ins affairs, and elevates just so much more as the preceding state of affairs had power to depress. So effectually these opposite dispositions co-operate, and help forward one another.

What scene of affairs? What management? --- Successful, prosperous! * * * &c. C. 16 L. 2. Did not I tell you how I should manage?⁵⁵¹ --- What? --- A family, a state, or, if occasion were, an army. --- Wretch! Manage thy self. learn there to be a rider and to have a seat and hand. For if thou hadst one there, it would not be talked of here, but shown without talking. But if thou wantst a hand even there, how much more here? What wonder if thou art flung off, or trampled on? Where are now thy vaunts? --- But mankind is unruly: the beast is head-strong. --- Why now, more than before? Wretch! Wilt not thou hear thy fall patiently, take the just reproof, put up the affront, and learn to be wiser the

next time? Who did tee go these airs? What need of setting out in this career? Why the great saddle and the trappings? Go: take thy pad once again, thy plain homely beast, thy mule or ass. Manage what thou art fit for, and hast strength to manage: and mount not where thou art so soon liable to be thrown, and made contemptible both to others and thy self. For, were thy seat as it should be, no fall would even be such as to cause disgrace: all being done that art with strength [391] proportionable could perform. Beware therefore of high-mounting. Or if forgetful of this, thou art soon again dismounted; bear with it, swallow it, as they say; keep it to thy self. No excuses, or bemoanings. It is thy self thou accusest; and before thy self. it is thy self thou hast injured: nor art thou to make others amends but thy self only. Why, therefore, trouble others? This is pleading for outward character; not labouring for that within. And as just providence will have it we lose even our outward character by this sacrifice. Nothing strikes as if more directly. No quicker way to lose the shadow, even although the substance could remain with tee while thus greedy, and dog-like, as in the fable⁵⁵². For what can lessen tee more with others, than to see tee dejected on the account of outward things, as they will always esteem it, although thy trouble be indeed of a better sort? But if thou art concerned of their thinking thus of thy concern, what is thy concern then in reality but for outward things? Nor is it any wonder, if this dejection be of fore-runner of a new presumption? For the same sovereign opinions differently operating according to the event or success of outward things, must of necessity alike produce both that false simplicity, shameful nakedness, dejecting humility, and temerity. And what harmony of character these two make together, is easy to see.

“Alas! What am I? An inform creature, of body and mind; out of world and practice; yet not in philosophy, and the possession of virtue. Half knowing, half learned: * * * &c: --- If this be inwardly spoken and not aloud; if this be in the closet or study; ir retiring time, and not in time of action; if this be rather in success and after elevation (as in the use of the cold regimen, as in Parihm. page 11, no. 2 and 5) it is excellent, and to be promoted, encouraged, aggravated: [392] say not only * * * in the vulgar but deepest sense: say (as above p. 177) one born out of season, the sores, the wounds &c ... But if this contraction of thy self, this humiliation be the contrary way, and at another season, consider how abject, vile, and how contrary in effect, even to that which it pretends, viz.: modesty and the τὸ αἰδημον. For, how soon again will the note be changed? How soon a contrary tone? Not Alas! What am I?, but Behold! What a proficient I am! How strong and firm in mind! and if by nature and accident not altogether so in body; yet by art, and care, how well! In circumstances how well! In character, fame, philosophy, economy, management --- Excellent! Noble!” ...

These are the tides (a spring-tide indeed!) the ebbings and the flowings: all from the same cause. And wilt thou were be thus stranded; left dry ashore, exposed thus pitfully, and almost fatally; not knowing which way to get off the sholes, or clear of these quick-sands? Whence all this, but from the bold lauching out, the trust to the sky, the high top-gallant sails, the negligent palate and merry crew?

Rectius vives licini, neq altum

Semper urgend &c: (Horace Od. 10 Lib. 2).

Turn that sense hither ward: and despise the cautious horror, and tempting betraying shore.

----- neque dum procellas

Cautus horesis, minimum premedo

Litus iniquum.

Timidity here proves rashness. The same rash opinion creates the evil, as the good; where in reality there is neither. To sneak, is but to prepare for boasting and vain conceit. As this is poor, senseless, contemptible (for why boast? And of

⁵⁵¹386.

what?) so is that ridiculous to be sported at. For, why dejected? And for what? why tell thy tale, why sing thy ditty (wretch!) thus mournfully? Why tragedy? [393] Why a stage? Why witnesses? What is this unbosoming? Wouldst thou have no bosom? No reserve? No heart for thy self? or what heart, if thus bestowed, thus prostituted and made common? Or will this commonness not hurt it, not pollute it? Will it be more truly that common public honest heart for being in this sense made common and laid open? ... Away with this simplicity; if this may be so called. No more of this false humanity, sociableness, humility. No more shrinking thus (poor snail!) into thy shell: a notable refuge and security! --- Hold up thy head, man! And if thou hast been a fool, see it; and be wise at last: but be not yet a greater fool in seeking the applause of those whom instead of winning, thou wilt by this mean render less tractable, and make both to despise thee more and use thee worse. And where at this rate will be thy PART so much insisted on? Where thy influence or service which thou pretendest to? Will not all CHARACTER both inward and outward be thus overthrown?

Sed versque numerosque modosque ediscere vite⁵⁵³. This is CHARACTER. But if for outwards ears only and the judgements abroad; what difference between this labour and that other --- Verba sequa vidit modolanda latinis?⁵⁵⁴ Continue therefore and keep the harmony if possible uninterrupted: if not, restore it again as soon as possible.: and dwell not on miscarriage. No echoings: no repeatings: no running over again what is past. If anything slipt in the music; if a finger went wrong, a false string struck, a time missed; pass it over and go on undisturbed: for this is the next perfection of art; not to interrupt, not break the symphony, not let the music sink, nor the ear dwell upon what was wrong, but drown it by better play, overcome it by an easy transition and agreableness of what succeeds --- But no. I have failed in the rule of art: I must stay, and show me the error: this stop was wrong, this key, tone, measure. --- Oh pedantry! And how in [394] life? Must the gammut there, in the midst of play, be conned over? Must it be sol, la, mi, fa? Dost thou not know that even at the best, those rules are burdensome and irksome to those who are not of the art? Was this so hardly seasonable in the very school, and in those days too? And wilt thou nevertheless, abroad and in such days as these, come out with such things, suspend performance to make demonstrations, and by these excuses teach thy art? ... Rare pedagogue!

Mind but a certain physician of thy acquaintance, one sufficiently knowing in his art (simply understood) and see how a certain method and behaviour of his, somewhat like this last spoken of, has succeeded with him. As first, how the thing appears in it self; with what kind of grace and recommendation: how it renders him to others whom he strives so much to instruct and convince: how towards his patients themselves: and last of all, how towards himself, and in his own temper and character. With other physicians it is generally far otherwise. Be ashamed therefore, that such as these, in the use of common policy, and for the interest of their art, should observe so much a better economy and CHARACTER, than thou (wretch!) in thy own-case, and in behalf of thy art, and practice, so superior to all other.

How long, since all this was seen and noted! How long, since another character was sworn to! ... See Parchment, page 1 and 4 as transcribed from old papers. No apologising: no show of inward work: no hint: no glance --- The purple only. No earnest, clearings, &c: --- Ceres: mystery. The honest irony. Jest. Ibid. page 4:3.

Return therefore again as above p. 362. And remember the involution, shadow, veil. Curtain.

⁵⁵²343.

⁵⁵³Hor. Ep. 2 L. 2.

⁵⁵⁴Ibid.

To the false character here treated of (the impotence of a certain kind) apply that of Marcus 10:33 --- * * *: and in the strength of this, and the chief Δογματα⁵⁵⁵; that of Homer, used by M 11:31. --- * * *⁵⁵⁶. [395]

And of the Roman Homer. Old Ennius⁵⁵⁷.

--- Mores vetereque novosque tenentem,
Multorum veterum leges; divumque hominumque
Prudentem; qui multa loquiue facereue posset⁵⁵⁸.

So our Scripture (applying it to what has been heard and learned in a better way than common conversation)

If thou hast heard a word let it die with thee:

And be bold, it will not burst thee. Ecclesiastes, C 19, V 10.

Take therefore the word in a higher sense, and as used in scripture for discipline, knowledge, message. * * * but not to be preached, as that other.

So again in the same book C. 21 V. 26. The heart of fools is in their mouth: but the mouth of the wise is in their heart. And soon after, the prayer; which begins at the last verse of the chapter 22 (where the chapter is absurdly cut off from the dependant sense which follows) who shall set a watch before my mouth, and a seal of wisdom on my lips? &c:

⁵⁵⁵Sup. p. 352 (3).

⁵⁵⁶Od. V.413 Sup. 375.

⁵⁵⁷A: Gell. 12. C. 4.

Νομ α.

Και ΣΙΩΠΗ. [370]

Τα αναγκαία: and no more. For if more; still more and more. An itching raised. New fancies starving, bubbling. ... Froth, vapour, scum, wit, story. ... A laugh raised. * * *. One foolery drawing on another: one levity making way for another: the mind apter: matter readied: guest companions more prepared and excited; expecting and in a manner claiming. For, having shown this excellent qualification, why not proceed? If a taste given; why not a whole entertainment out? where stop? Or when? ...

Character (viz. inward) the * * * when again to be resumed? ... How as to outward character and the remission here? Is it not harder to resume? Harder now than before? And so for every time that this happens. ... Yet still venturing out! ... and the poor mind * * *. Is not this spraining the foot with a witness? (C. 60) And what must come of this, if often repeated; since already so often?

The itch (as thy friend once called it) from sore lungs. Something provoking within. ... The scab of wit. ... puticulum insulsum ... [371] φλναγία. The French flu de bouche, mouth-flux, upper looseness, want of retention ...

Cure this in the first place and above all. Stop this salivation, dissentry, rhume: and in this sense * * *.

... * * *. Silence about the * * * and the belonging. ... If then; how much more now? Now that the whole is a mystery and unknown? A madness, a mere blasphemy ... And would not this indeed be madness and blasphemy, thus to expose what is thus sacred? ... How sacred should this reserve and silence be, above all other, not to expose, reveal, betray ... The mysteries of Ceres. (L. 3 C. 21) ... Detestable prostitution!

St Giles's. 1705.

And this (in the exchange, or 3rd warner) * * *⁵⁵⁹. Remember this * * *.

⁵⁵⁸Not Dicta as Lipsius, who draws this down to the vulgar sense by this amendment, contrary to the old editions.

⁵⁵⁹L. 4 C. 3.

* * *

* * *. [372]

See * * * and in Passions (joy) sup. P. 82.

Consider the thing it self: in the bottom, what? ... * * *. Nothing else. ... Gall, venom; but of a different kind, more hid. That anger: this, contempt. That, reproof: this reproach. See which is best bore with. Which is easiest forgiven. And by this judge how sociable a thing, how human; notwithstanding what they say of it only belonging to man.

See it in excess, see it when given way to, and soundly followed. The characters it forms. The tempers, humours, morals of such as these.

How in politeness? ... the well bread people, those of a finer make, better taste and raised above the vulgar: and the mere vulgar; porters, carmen, clowns. And to which of these most belongs the hearty laugh? ... How seldom this with any of the former? What a sense of the real nature of the thing? What but a plain perception of the decorum? How perfectly abhorrent (in every kind) to the το καλον? And when others leave it on this account; wilt thou have to do with it? Where is there one of those φιλοκαλοζ that will endure it? and wilt thou endure it?⁵⁶⁰ [373]

Savageness. Barbarity. Inhumanity. ... Brutality. Tyranny. ...

Caligula, whose whole character was of this sort: a play, sport: a mockery of mankind: a playing with their passions, concerns, hopes, fears; their fortunes, possessions, serious business, and solemnities of life. A scramble. The joy of the gainers and sorry faces of the losers. Baulks. Snubbs. Ill come-offs. Strippings. Whippings. Executions, and all this with humour, raillery, wit. A comedy.

So Domitian and his dark rooms.

Phalaris' bull and other sports of the same nature. For what is sport? ... Why faces, shruggs, with a little pain for those that are little used, and have improved this pleasure by custom, and the frequent repetition of such spectacles and recreation.

Go to a prison and see the thing there. Who merrier (as they say) than those jail-birds? See Newgate and the sort of mirth there. That which is described so naturally by the Spanish Petronius: the character of the gally slaves and common rogues. The humour of the soldiery, when most of all cruel, and in the very actions of cruelly sack of the town, plunder, rapine, violence, death and torments. Who merrier? Where is drollery, buffoonery, jest more perfect, more throughout? Where is the laugh hearthier, sounder? Who have more of it? Deeper of it? Who have it in more perfection, more bona fide, and (as they say) from the very heart?

Poor mad people and naturals, how treated? The laugh in this case, what? and of what kind? ... The diversion of seeing Bedlam ... The usual entertainment of princes and such as those: the court-fool, the dwarf, man-monkey, or any such mockery of human kind ... How human! ... Yet what is better received than these jests? What a better laugh! ... See the malignity of this, and by this judge of every other laugh⁵⁶¹. [374]

⁵⁶⁰372.

How happy would it be therefore to exchange this vulgar, sordid, profuse, horrid laughter for that more reserved gentle kind, which hardly is to be called laughter, or which at least is of another species? How happy to exchange this mischievous, insulting, petulant species for that benign, courteous and kind? This rustic, barbarous, inhuman; for that civil, polite, human? ... The noisy, boisterous, turbulent, loud³⁶²: for the still, peaceful, severe, mild ...

Think of a Xenophon; his own character and that which he has made of his * * *, or the real one of his friend Agisilaus, or any other genius raised ever so little above the vulgar.

Whether better to laugh with Xenophon and the * * * muses, or with a Michael de Cervantes and the modern wits? Whether with Socrates and the wits of that order, the Socratics, and those that followed the Socratic way, down to the Roman Menander; or with or with whom the moderns most resemble, and Aristophanes and such as those?

Remember Socrates' laugh with Apolodrus in the prison⁵⁶³ ... That of Demonas' which even Lucian sees; and Diogenes', which no one now sees, or understands. With the rest of that sweet kind which is * * *. And remember what a happiness, advantage, improvement, enjoyment, to reserve all that is humorous and pleasant in the temper for such genius' as those and for that divine facetiousness (if so I may call it) of the divine man's. As * * *; for so I take this, viz. ironically. ...

And so his pictures of the mind, and discoveries of it, where it would most of all hide it self as L... C... * * *. And of affectation after Socrates' way in the * * * L... So here in these latter Απομ: l. 4 C. 6. * * *. [375] And in the great chapter (viz. 26 of 3 towards the end) * * *. And his other journeys: as * * *. ...

Therefore remember this reserve this saving, sparing, laying up, treasuring, enriching and as by another sort of frugality an estate is gained, an interest, reputation or good name; so do thou accordingly; and by this example remember to be vir frugi.

That not only the thing it self should be of the reserved kind (* * *) but in the management of it, reserved, husbanded, and kept only for places, persons and things such as these: and think but how vastly this must promote strength! How much vigour, what force, blood, spirits, virtue is wretchedly spent another way! How much lavished every day and miserably bestowed! How much spilt and thrown away! ... Nor is this all. For this is not only lost nut turns to poison.

How laugh when death? ... When news?⁵⁶⁴ ... When storm? (swallow the main!)⁵⁶⁵ ... When earthquake (bear the whole town!) ...

These are the right kind. But expect not to laugh both here and there. * * *⁵⁶⁶. As above p. 352⁵⁶⁷.

Here therefore the reverse of * * * and this experienced first. Jan. 16. 1704 (See Almanac). This is thus Soliloquy ... Thus laugh alone, and even at serious times. Or rather then most of all. For what trust to that other season? Choose it therefore, at contrary times, and excite to it rather than be carried to it by temper. * * *, even with self. a precipice, brink, diluity⁵⁶⁸.

And remember long ago what observed of that wrong and involuntary kind. Sup. p. 82⁵⁶⁹.

⁵⁶¹376.

⁵⁶²368.

⁵⁶³And with Crito (see Plato) * * * L. 1 C. 27.

⁵⁶⁴Sup. 83 & 352.

⁵⁶⁵L. 2 C. 16.

⁵⁶⁶Hom. Odi. V.413.

⁵⁶⁷394.

⁵⁶⁸C. 54.

⁵⁶⁹82.

Rule in the use of this ... To avoid these two: viz. drollery, obscenity. ... For, pursuing the sense of the word closely, it is evident that to these two heads all the ill sort is reducible. This in all things relating to # # #; remember X (!) ω. ... Then solemn. Then severe. Then * * *. And whence the reasonableness of that strict carriage and excess of [376] modesty in these cases, which was what once thou couldst not understand, but thought amiss of, choosing frankness rather, and the open way: by the pattern of the satirists and their genius. But since that time thou hast known better. For see! How thou hast been thought not by precept only but sad example and experience: therefore now and at this time of day remember a reverse of character. Enter again into true nature (for such is that nice and even bashful modesty) and embrace also that better part of this * * *.

* * * joined L 3 C 16 in the latter end. Grief for another's good⁵⁷⁰. Joy for another's ill⁵⁷¹. ... See how related; and whether one does not imply the other.

St. Giles's. January 1706/7.

See what thou wrotest thy self the other day, in thy short but very advantageous retirement at north-Holland viz.: the patologia, at the end ..."Jocositas verus sive risus magnus, effusus, non cohibilis, letitia est de turpi externo et alieno, tanquam bono nobis. Gaudio aenim sive laetitia nisi de bono pulchurore vero vel opinato non est. Et quia risus talis non appetitio est, non aversatio, non dolor, sed gaudium sive laetitia, sequitur necessario ut objectum ejus (viz. ridicullum illud et malum alienum) quasi bonum vel pulchrum nostrum spectetur. Ex invidentia ergo & odis profescitur risus talis; & est malitiae seu malignitatis species".

The Hebrew philosopher Eccles. 21 vers. 20 A fool lifteth up his voice with laughter: but a wise man doth scarce smile a little.

See what was written so long since on the same subject in first book of Ασκηματα sup. p. 74 &c. on joy. The same here, as to mirth, laughter. The test, news (p. 75) How if ill news in the midst? How surprised! How sillily look (as they say) How mute! Wouldst thou not have wished thy self to have been otherwise taken? Go not therefore out of the true measure and tone of character: and then thou canst never be wrong taken, or at unawares. This is security, peace, constancy, magnanimity: the other cowardice, falsehood, treachery. [377].

⁵⁷⁰372.

⁵⁷¹373.

Νομ γ. [378]

... * * *. Which answers to M: * * *. C. X L. V.

Pierce into the bottom-work of their minds; the dark chambers and corners of their hearts; their principles of judgement; their decisive determining thoughts and rules of action; their spring, source origin of affection, hatreds, loves, appetitions, aversions; their genuine fancies, imaginations, opinions, Δογματα, decrees, judgements; not those they set out to show, before others. To [379] penetrate, to dive and search into their ways, moods, dispositions, humours, feelings: a work just contrary to that diving, sifting, fishing (as they call it) and mysterious searches into their affairs and circumstances, and on this account divining, guessing (if possible) their thoughts, and studying to prevent by humouring, pleasing, lifting their fancies: endeavouring thus to make one's self acceptable, a mighty one among them, and capable of managing them thus in an outward way ... Nothing of all this. Nothing to do with secrets, their family or state secrets, their secret tales, projects, interests, amours or any other secrecies: but to disclose by their good leave (or whether they give leave or no) the secret and hidden mystery of all their life and action: the springs and wheels of the machine and see into their breasts laid open, to be able to reveal the mystery of mysteries, and see how poor, how low, how shallow; whence these other mysteries not worth of looking into; the bottom of all this, the motive, end; where the finis bonorum & malorum, the * * *. ... * * *.

Be these thy entertainments and discourses with thy self (although in company): these thy tables; when needs there must be tables, and discourse of that kind: this thy table-talk within, with thy self⁹⁷². and let alone that other, no matter how it succeeds, or what it is. Lead it, look after it who will: be it kept up, or let it fall. Thou canst not err in having no part in it: for there is no necessity thou shouldst have any. But if thou hast any part in the discourse of that kind; and this discourse and reason go not along with it and strictly accompany it; thou shalt be sure to err and to repent.

St. Giles's 1704/5.

ΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ. [382]

* * *. C. LXX.

* * *. L. 1 C. 24.

Thus the old poet --- the flinty couch of war, my thrice driven bed down.

And in this field, why not the same? Is the thing itself less generous, less great, less triumphant? If there be any real triumph: if there be anything magnanimous, anything heroic, any virtue, any praise.

Away with these other fields, laurels, trophies: the Alexander's, the Cesar's, the modern fighters, the Badens', the Eugens'. What are these? And what, * * *?⁵⁷³

Think of thy own work, thy own conquests: * * *⁵⁷⁴.

Awake! Up! Rise! Or art thou weary of this work? Is it ever to cease? Is it ever to relax?⁵⁷⁵ Why shrink then? Why draw back? What effeminacy is this!

... * * *. C. 12 L. 3. [383].

⁵⁷²309.

⁵⁷³M. 8.3.

⁵⁷⁴L. 2 C. 16 in fine.

⁵⁷⁵191.

The Virtuoso Copybook

PRO 30/24/26/1

Procedimentos de transcrição.

1. O Virtuoso Copy-Book traz os textos de *A letter concerning design* e *A notion of the historical draught or tablature of the judgement of Hercules*, redigidos em Nápoles, Itália, em 1712.
2. A paginação do caderno é indicada por números entre colchetes.
3. As palavras em itálico indicam aquelas que no original são sublinhadas; as palavras em negrito, as que são suplamente sublinhadas.
4. A transcrição reproduz exatamente a pontuação do texto a grafia das palavras.
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10. A primeira versão de *A notion*, redigida por Shaftesbury em francês, pode ser consultada na transcrição de Larthomas (*De Shaftesbury a Kant*, vol. 2).

[Treatise I.

viz.]

A letter [from Italy] concerning the ART, or SCIENCE of DEISGN:

written from Italy

(on the occasion of some *designs* in painting).

To my Lord * * * *

[*Docti Rationem Artis intelligunt, Indocti Voluptatem.*

Quintili: IX. 4.]

----- *Ante omnia Musae.*

Virg. Georg. Li. ii

[1] [Treatise I.

viz.]

A letter from Italy &c.

March 6. (S.N.)

1712.

My Lord,

this letter comes to your lordship, accompanied with a small writing entitled a **Notion**. For such alone can that piece deservingly be called, which aspires no higher than to the forming of a *project*, and that too in so vulgar a science as *painting*. But whatever the subject be; if it can [but] prove anyway entertaining to you, it will sufficiently answer my design. And should it possibly have that good success, I should have no ordinary opinion of my project: since I know how hard it would be for anyone to give your Lordship a real entertainment of anything which [*that*] was not in some respect worthy and useful. [2]

On this account I must, by way of prevention, inform your Lordship, that after I have conceived my **Notion** such as you see it upon paper, I was not contented with this, but fell immediately to work, and by the hand of a master-painter brought it [my *Notion*] into *practice*, and formed a real *design*. This was not enough. I resolved afterwards to see what effect it would have, when taken out of mere black-and-white, into colours: and thus a *sketch* was afterwards drawn. This pleased so well; that being encouraged by the *virtuosi*, who are so eminent in this part of the world, I resolved at last to engage my painter in the great work. Immediately a cloth was bespoke of a suitable dimension, and the figures taken as big or bigger than the common life; the subject being of the heroic kind, and requiring rather such figures as should appear above ordinary human stature.

Thus my **Notion** as light as it may prove in the *treatise*, is become very substantial in the *workmanship*. The piece is still in hand; and like to continue so, for some time. Otherwise the first draught or design should have accompanied the treatise; as the treatise does this letter. But the *design* having grown thus into a *sketch*, and the sketch afterwards into a *picture*; I thought it fit your Lordship should either see the several pieces together, or be troubled only

with that which is best; as undoubtedly the great one must prove, if the master I employ sinks not very much below himself, in this performance. [3]

Far surely should I be, my Lord, in conceiving any pride in amusements of such an inferior kind as these; especially were they such as they may naturally at first sight appear. I pretend not here [indeed] to apologise either for *them*, or for *my-self*. Your Lordship however knows I have naturally ambition enough to make me desirous of employing my-self in business of a higher order: since it has been my fortune in public affairs to act often in concert with you, and in the same views on the interest of *Europe* and mankind. There was a time, and that a very early one in my life, when I was not wanting to my country, in this respect. But after some years of hearty labour and pains in this kind of workmanship, an unhappy breach in my health drove me not only from the seat of business, but forced me to seek this foreign climates; where, as mild as *winters*⁵⁷⁶ generally are, I have with much ado lived out this *latter-one* [*latter-season*]; and am now, as your Lordship finds, employing *my-self* in such easy studies as are most suitable to my state of health, and to the genius of the country where I am confined.

This in the mean time I can with some assurance say to your Lordship, in a kind of spirit of prophecy, from what I have observed of the rising genius of our nation; [4] that if we live to see a peace any way answerable to that generous spirit with which this war was begun, and carried on, for our *own* liberty and that of **Europe**; the figure we are like to make abroad, and the increase of knowledge, industry and sense at home, will render *united Britain* the principal seat of arts; and by her politeness and advantages in this kind, will show evidently, how much she has been owing to those councils, which thought her to exert her-self so resolutely on behalf of the *common cause*, and that of her own *liberty*, and happy *constitution*, necessarily included.

I can *my-self* remember the time when, in respect of **musick**, our reigning taste was in many degrees inferior to the *French*. The long reign of luxury and pleasure under king **Charles the Second**, and the foreign helps and studied advantages given to *musick* in a following reign, could not raise our genius the least in this respect. But when the spirit of the nation was grown more *free*; though engaged at that time in the fiercest war, and with the most doubtful success, we no sooner began to turn our-selves towards *musick* and enquire what **Italy** in particular produced, than in an instant we outstripped our neighbours the **French**, entered into a genius far beyond theirs, and raised ourselves an *ear*, and *judgement* not inferior to the best now in the world.

In the same manner, as to **painting**. Though we have as yet nothing of our own native grow in this kind worthy of being mentioned; [5] yet since the public has of late begun to express a relish for engravings, drawings, copyings, and for the original paintings of the chief *Italian* schools (so contrary to the modern *French*) [*relish*], I doubt not, that [*but*] in very few years, we shall but make an equal progress in this other science. And when our humour turns us to cultivate these designing arts: our genius, I am persuaded, will naturally carry us over the slighter amusements, and carry us over to that higher, more serious, and nobler part of *imitation*, which relates to *history*, *human nature*, and the *chief degree or order of beauty*; I mean that of the *rational* life; distinct from the merely *vegetable* and *sensible*; as in animals, or plants: according to those several degrees or orders of painting, which your Lordship will find suggested in this extemporary *Notion* I have sent you.

As for **architecture**, it is no wonder if no many noble designs of this kind have miscarried amongst us; since the genius of our nation has hitherto been so little turned this way, that through several reigns we have patiently seen the noblest public buildings perish (if I may say so) under the hand of one single court-architect; who if he had been able to profit by experience, [6] would have long since at our expense have proved the greatest master in the world. But I

⁵⁷⁶[Sem texto].

question whether our patience is like to hold so much longer. The devastation so long committed in this kind, has made us begin to grow rude and clamorous at the hearing of a new palace spoilt, or a new design committed to so harsh or impotent pretender.

'Tis the good fortune of our nation in this particular, that there remains yet two of the noblest subjects for architecture; our Princes *palace* and our *House of Parliament*. For I cannot but fancy that when *Whitehall* is thought of, the neighbouring *Lords* and *Commons* will at the same time be placed in better chambers and apartments, than at the present; were it only for majesty's sake and as magnificence becoming the person of the Prince; who here appears in full solemnity. Nor do I fear that when these new subjects are attempted, we should miscarry as grossly as we have done in others before. Our *State* in this respect, may prove perhaps more fortunate than our *Church*; in having waited till a national taste was formed, before these edifices were [have been] undertaken. But the zeal of the nation could not, it seems, admit so long a delay in their ecclesiastical structures; particularly their *metropolitan*. And since the zeal of this sort has been newly kindled amongst us, we may see actually from afar the many spires rising in our great City, with such a hasty [7] and sudden growth as may be the occasion perhaps that our immediate relish may be hereafter censured as retaining much of what artists call the *gothick* kind.

Hardly, indeed, as the public now stands, should we bear to see a *Whitehall* treated like a *Hampton-Court*, or even a new cathedral like *St. Paul's*. Almost every one now becomes concerned, and interests himself in such public structures. Even those pieces too are brought under common censure, which though raised by private man, are of such a grandeur and magnificence, as to become national ornaments. This ordinary man may build his cottage, or the plain gentleman his country-house according as he fancies: but when a great man builds, he will find little quarter from the public, if instead of a beautiful pile, he raises, at a vast expense, such a false and counterfeit piece of magnificence, as can be justly arraigned from its deformity by so many knowing men in art, and by the whole *people*; who, in such a conjecture, readily follow their opinion.

In reality *the people* are no small parties in this *cause*. Nothing moves successfully without them. There can be no **public**, but where they are included. And without a *public voice*, knowingly guided and directed, there is nothing which can raise a true ambition in the artist; nothing which can exalt the genius [8] of the workman; or make him emulous of after-fame, and of the approbation of his *country*, and of *posterity*. For with *these* he naturally, as a *free-man*, must take part: in *these* he has a passionate concern and interest, raised in him by the same genius of *liberty*, the same *laws* and *government* by which his property and the rewards of his pains and industry are secured to him, and to his generation after him.

Everything co-operates, in such a *State*, towards the improvement of *art* and *science*. And for the *designing arts* in particular, such as *architecture painting* and *statuary*, they are in a manner linked together. The taste of one kind brings necessarily that of the others along with it. When the *free* spirit of a nation turns it-self this way; judgements are formed; critics arise; the public eye and ear improves; a right taste prevails, and in a manner forces its way. Nothing so improving, nothing so natural, so *con-genial* to the liberal arts, as that reigning liberty and high spirit of a people, which from the habit of judging in the highest Matters for themselves, makes them freely judge of other subjects, and enter thoroughly into the characters as well as of *men* and *manners*, as of the *products* or *works* of men, in art and science. So much, my Lord, are we owing to the excellence of our national constitution, and legal monarchy; happily fitted to us; and which alone could hold together so mighty a people; all sharers (though at so far a distance from each other) in the government of *themselves*; and meeting under *one* head in *one* vast *metropolis*; whose enormous growth, however censurable in other respects, is actually a cause that workmanship and arts of so many kinds arise to such perfection. [9]

What encouragement our higher powers may think fit to give these growing arts, I will not pretend to guess. This I only know; that it is so much for their advantage and interest to make themselves the chief parties in the cause, that I wish no other court or ministry besides a truly virtuous and wise one, may ever concern themselves in the affair. For should they do so: they would in reality do more harm than good: since it is not the nature of a court (such as courts generally are) to improve, but rather corrupt *a taste*. And what is in the beginning set wrong by their example, is hardly ever afterwards recoverable in the genius of a nation.

Content therefore I am, my Lord, that **Britain** stands in this respect as she now does. Nor can one, methinks, with just reason regret her having hitherto made no greater advancement in these affairs of art. As her *constitution* has grown, and been established, she has in proportion fitted her-self for other improvements. There has been no anticipation in the case. And in this surely she must be esteemed wise, as well as happy; that ere she attempted to rise her-self any other taste or relish, she secured her-self a right one in *government*. She has now the advantage of beginning in other matters, on a new foot. She has her *models* yet to seek her *scale* and *standard* to form with deliberation, and good choice. Able enough [10] she is at present to shift for herself; however abandoned or helpless she has been left by those whom it became to assist her. Hardly, indeed, could she procure a single *academy* for the training of her youth in exercises. As good soldiers as we are, and as good horses as our climate affords, our Princes rather than spend their treasure this way, has suffered our youth to pass into a foreign nation, to learn to ride. As for other *academies* such as those for painting, sculpture, or architecture, we have not so much as heard of the proposal; whilst the Prince of our rival nation raises academies, breeds youth, and sends rewards and pensions into foreign countries, to advance the interest and credit of his own. Now if notwithstanding the industry and pains of this foreign court, and the supine unconcernedness of our own; the national taste however raises, and already shows it-self in many respects beyond that of our so highly assisted neighbours; what greater proof can there be, of the superiority of genius in one of these nations, above the other?

'Tis but this moment that I chance to read in an article of one of the gazettes from **Paris**, that it is resolved at court to establish a new *academy* for political affairs. "In it the present chief minister is to preside: having under him six academists, *douëz des talens nécessaires*. --- No person to be received under the age of twenty-five. A thousand livres pension for each scholar. --- Able masters to be appointed for teaching them [11] the necessary sciences, and instructing them in the Treatises of Peace and Alliances, which have been formerly made. --- The members to assemble three times a week --- *C'est de cet seminaire* (says the writer) *qu'on tirera les secretaires d'Ambassade; Qui par degrez pourront monter à de plus hauts emplois*".

I must confess, my Lord, as great an admirer as I am of these regular institutions, I cannot but look upon *an academy for ministers* as a very extraordinary establishment; especially in such a monarchy as **France**, and at such a conjecture as the present. It looks as if the ministers of that court had discovered lately some new methods of negotiation, such as their predecessors **Richelieu** and **Manzarin** never thought of: or that, on the contrary, they have found themselves so declined, and at such a loss in the management of this present treaty, as to be forced to take their lesson from some of those ministers with whom they treat: a reproach of which, no doubt, they must be highly sensible. [12]

But 'tis not my design here, to entertain your Lordship with any reflections upon politics, or the methods which the **French** may take to raise themselves *new* ministers, or *new* generals; who may prove a better match for us than hitherto, whilst we held our *old*. I will only say to your Lordship on this subject of *academies*; that indeed I have less concern for the deficiency of such a one as this, than any other which [besides that] could be thought of, for **England**; and that as for the seminary of *statesmen*, I doubt not but, without this extraordinary help, we shall be able, out of our

old stock, and the common course of business, constantly to furnish a sufficient number of able-headed duly qualified persons to serve upon occasion, either at home, or in our foreign treaties; as often as such persons accordingly qualified shall duly, honestly and *bonâ fide* be required to serve.

I return therefore to my *virtuoso*-science; which being my chief amusement in this place and circumstance, your Lordship has by it a fresh instance that I can never employ my thoughts with satisfaction on any subject, without making you a party. For even this very **notion** had its rise chiefly from the conversation of a certain day which I had the happiness to pass a [13] few years since, in the country, with your Lordship. 'Twas there [, at which time/] you showed me some engravings which had been sent you from **Italy**. And one in particular, I well remember; of which the subject was the very same with that of my written **notion** enclosed. But by what hand it was done, or after what master, or how executed, I have quite forgot. It was the summer season, when you had recess from business. And I have accordingly calculated this *epistle* and *project* for the same recess and leisure. For by the time this can reach **England**, the spring will be far advanced, and the national affairs in a manner over, with those who are not in *the immediate administration*.

Were *that* indeed your Lordship's lot, at present; I know not whether in regard to my country I should dare throw such amusements as these in your way. Yet even in this case, I would venture to say however, in defence of my project, and of the *cause of painting*; that could my young hero come to your Lordship as [but so] well represented as he might have been, either by the hand of a **Marat**⁵⁷⁷ or a **Jordano** (the masters who were still in being, and in repute, when I first travelled here in **Italy**) the *picture* it-self, whatever the *treatise* proved, would certainly have been worth notice, and might have become a present worthy of our court and Prince's *palace*; especially were it so blessed as to lodge within it a royal issue of her Majesty's. Such a piece of furniture might well fit the gallery, [14] or hall of exercises, where our young Princes should learn their usual lessons. And to see **virtue** in this garb and action, might perhaps be no slight memorandum hereafter to *a royal youth*, who should one day come to undergo this trial himself; on which his own happiness, as well as the fate of **Europe** and of the world would in so great a measure depend.

This, my Lord, is making (as you see) the most I can of my *project*, and setting off my amusements with the best colour I am able; that I may be the more excusable in communicating them to your Lordship, and expressing thus, with what zeal I am,

my Lord,
your Lordship's
most faithful
humble servant.

P.S. – Your Lordship, I know, will have the goodness to excuse my having used another's hand in this long letter.

⁵⁷⁷*Carlo Marat* was yet alive at the time when this letter was written; but had long been superannuated, and incapable of any considerable performance.

[15] [Treatise II.
viz.]

A NOTION of the historical draught or tablature, of the Judgement of **Hercules**; According to
Prodicus.

Lib. II. Xen. De Mem. Soc.

[*sudavit et alsit. Horat. de Ars Poet.*]

----- Potiores

Herculis aerumnas credat, saevosque labores,
Et venere, et coenis, et pluma **Sardanapali**.

Juvenal., Sat. 10

[16]

[17] Introduction.

(1) Before we enter on the examination of our historical sketch, it may be proper to remark, that by the word *tablature* (for which we have yet no name in *English*, besides the general one of *picture*) we denote, according to the original word **tabula**, a work not only distinct from a mere *portraiture*, but from all those wilder sorts of painting which are in a manner absolute, and independent; such as paintings *in fresco*, upon the walls, the ceilings, the staircases, the cupola's and other remarkable places either of churches or palaces.

(2) Accordingly we are to understand, that it is not merely the shape or dimension of a cloth, or board, which denominates the *piece*, or *tablature*; since a work of this kind may be composed of any substance, as it may of any form; whether square, oval or round. But it is then that in painting we may give to any particular work the name of *tablature*, when the work is in reality "a *single piece*, [18] comprehended in *one* view, and formed according to *one single* intelligence, meaning, or design; which constitutes a *real* whole, by a mutual and necessary relation of its parts, the same as of the members in a natural body". So that one may say of a picture composed of any number of figures differently ranged, and without any regard to this correspondency or union described, that it is no more a *real piece* or *tablature* than a picture would be a *man's picture* or proper *portraiture*, which represented on the same cloth, in different places, the legs, arms, nose and eyes of such a person, without adjusting them according to the true proportion, air and character which belonged to him.

(3) This regulation has place even in the inferior degrees of painting; since the mere flower-painter is, we see, obliged to study the form of *festons* and to make use of a peculiar order, or architecture of *vases, jars, canisters, pedestals*, and other inventions, which serve as *machines*, to frame a certain proportionate assemblage, or united mass, according to the rules of perspective; and with regard as well to the different shapes and sizes of his several flowers, as to the harmony of colours resulting from the whole: this being the only thing capable of rendering his work worthy the name of a *composition*, or real piece. [19]

(4) So much the more, therefore, is this regulation applicable to *history-painting*, where not only *men*, but *manners*, and human passions are represented. Here *the unity of design* must with more particular exactness be preserved, according to the just rules of poetic art; that in the representation of any event, or remarkable fact, the *probability*, or *seeming truth* (which is the *real truth* of art) may with the highest advantage be supported and advanced:

as we shall better understand in the argument which follows on the historical *tablature* of *the Judgement of Hercules*; who, being young, and retired to a solitary place in order to deliberate on the choice he was to make of the different ways of life, was accosted (as our historian relates) by the two goddesses, VIRTUE and PLEASURE. It is on this issue of the controversy between these *two*, that the character of Hercules depends. So that we may naturally give to this piece and history, as well the title of *The education*, as the *Choice*, or *Judgement of Hercules*.

[20] Chapter I

Of the general constitution or ordinance of the tablature.

(1) This fable or history may be variously represented, according to the order of time:

Either in the instant when the two goddesses (Virtue and Pleasure) accost **Hercules**;

Or when they are entered into dispute;

Or when their dispute is already far advanced, and **Virtue** seems to gain her cause.

(2) According to the *first* notion, **Hercules** must of necessity seem surprised on the first appearance of such miraculous forms. He admires, he contemplates; but is not yet engaged or interested. According to the *second* notion, he is interested, divided, and in doubt. According to the *third*, he is wrought, agitated, and torn by contrary passions. It is the last effort of the virtuous-one, striving for possession over him. He agonises, and with all of his strength of reason endeavours to overcome him-self:

Et premitur ratione animus, vincique laborat.

(3) Of these different periods of time, the latter has been chosen; as being the only one of the three, which can well serve to express *the grand event*, or consequent *resolution* of **Hercules**, and the *choice* he actually made [21] of a life full of toil and hardship, under the conduct of **Virtue**, for the deliverance of mankind from tyranny and oppression. and it is to such a *piece*, or *tablature*, as represents this issue of the balance, in our pondering hero, that we may justly give the title of *the Decision*, or *Judgement of Hercules*.

(4) The same history may be represented yet according to a *fourth* date or period: as at the time when **Hercules** is entirely won by **Virtue**. But then the signs of this resolute determination reigning absolutely in the attitude, and air of our young hero; there would be no room left to represent his agony, or inward conflict, which indeed makes the principal action here; as it would do in a *poem*, were this subject to be treated by a good poet. Nor would there be any more room left in this case, either for the persuasive rhetoric of **Virtue** (who must have already ended her discourse) or for the insinuating address of **Pleasure**, who having lost her cause, must necessarily appear displeased, or out of humour: a circumstance which no way would suit her character.

(5) In the original story or fable of this adventure of our young **Hercules**, it is particularly noted, that **Pleasure** advancing hastily before Virtue; began her plea, and was heard with prevention; as being first in turn. And as this fable is wholly *philosophical* and *moral*, this circumstance in particular is to be considered as essential. [22]

(6) In this *third* period therefore of our story (dividing it, as we have done, into *four* successive dates or points of time) **Hercules** being auditor, and attentive, speaks not. **Pleasure** has spoken. **Virtue** is still speaking. She is about the middle or towards the end of her discourse; in the place where, according to just rhetoric, the highest tone of voice and strongest action are employed.

(7) It is evident, that every master in painting, when he has made choice of the determinate date or point of time, according to which he would represent his story, is afterwards debarred the taking advantage from any other action than what is immediately present, and belonging to that single instant he describes. For if he passes the present only for a moment, he may as well pass it for many years. And by this reckoning he may with as good right repeat the

figure several times over, and in one and the same picture represent **Hercules** in his cradle, struggling with the serpents; and the same **Hercules** of full age, fighting with the *Hydra*, with *Anteus*, and with the *Cerberus*: which would prove a mere confused heap, or knot of pieces, and not a single entire *piece*, or *tablature*, of the historical kind.

(8) It may however be allowable, on some occasions, to make use of some *enigmatical* or *emblematical* devices, to represent a future time: as when **Hercules**, yet a mere boy, is seen holding a small club, or wearing the skin of a young lion. For so we often find him in the best *antiques*. And though history has never related of **Hercules**, that being yet very young, he killed a lion with [23] his own hand; this representation of him would nevertheless be entirely conformable to *poetick truth*; which not only admits, but necessarily presupposes *prophecy* and *prognostication*, with regard to the actions, and lives of heroes and great men. Besides that as to our subject, in particular, the natural genius of **Hercules**, even in his tenderest youth, might alone answer for his handling such arms as these, and bearing, as it were in play, these early tokens of the future hero.

(9) To preserve therefore a just conformity with *historical truth*, and with the *unity of time* and *action*, there remains no other way by which we can possibly give a hint of any thing future, or call to mind any thing past, than by setting in view such passages or events as have actually subsisted, or according to nature might well subsist, or happen together in *one and the same* instant. And this is what we may properly call *the rule of consistency*.

(10) How is it therefore possible (says one) to express a change of passion in any subject, since this change is made by succession; and that in this case the passion which is understood as present, will require a disposition of body and features wholly different from the passion which is over, and past? To this we answer, That notwithstanding the ascendancy or reign of the principal and immediate passion, the artist has power to leave still in his subjects the tracks or [24] footsteps or footprints of its predecessor: so as to let us behold not only a rising passion together with a declining one; but, what is more, a strong and determinate passion, with its contrary already discharged and banished. As for instance, when the plain tracks of tears new fallen, with other fresh tokens of mourning and dejection, remain still in a person newly transported with joy at the sight of a relation or friend, who the moment before had been lamented as one deceased or lost.

(11) Again, by the same means which are employed to call to mind *the past*, we may anticipate *the future*: as would be seen in the case of an able painter, who should undertake to paint this history of **Hercules** according to the third date or period of time proposed for our historical *tablature*. For in this momentary turn of action, **Hercules** remaining still in a situation expressive of suspense and doubt, would discover nevertheless that the strength of this inward conflict was over, and that victory began now to declare herself in favour of *Virtue*. This transition, which seems at first so mysterious a performance, will be easily comprehended, if one considers, that the body, which moves much slower than the mind, is easily outstripped by this latter; and that the mind on a sudden turning itself some new way, the nearer situated and more sprightly parts of the body (such as the eyes and muscles about the mind and forehead) taking the alarm and moving in an instant, may leave the heavier and more distant parts to adjust themselves, and change their attitude some moments after. [25]

(12) This different operation may be distinguished by the names of *anticipation* and *repeal*.

(13) If by any other method an artist should pretend to introduce in this piece any portion of time future or past, he must either sin directly against the law of *truth* and *credibility*, in representing things contrary and incompatible; or against that law of *unity* and *simplicity of design*, which constitutes the very being of his work. This particularly shows itself in a picture, when one is necessarily left in doubt, and unable to determine readily, *which* of the distinct successive parts of the history or action is that *very-one* represented in the design. For even here the case is the same as in the other

circumstances of poetry and painting: “that what is principal or chief, should immediately show itself, without leaving the mind in any uncertainty”.

(14) According to this rule of the *unity of time*, if one should ask an artist who had painted this story of *the Judgement of Hercules*, “which of these four periods or dates of time above proposed he intended in his picture to represent”⁵⁷⁸; and it should happen that he could not readily answer, “‘twas this, or that”; it would appear he had never formed a *real notion* of his workmanship, or of the history he intended to represent. So that when he had executed even to a miracle all those other beauties requisite in a *piece*, and had failed in this single one he would from hence alone be proved to be in truth no *history-painter* or artist in the kind, who understood not so much as how to form the real design of a *historical piece*.

[26] Chapter II

Of the first or principal figure.

(1) To apply therefore what has been said above to our immediate design or *tablature* in hand; we may observe in the first place with regard to Hercules (the *first or principal figure* of our piece) that being placed in the middle, between the two goddesses, he should by a skilful master be so drawn, as even setting aside the air and features of the face, it should appear by the very turn or position of the body alone, that this young hero had not wholly quitted the balancing or pondering part. For in the manner of his turn towards the worthier of these goddesses, he should by no means appear so averse or separate from the other, as not to suffer it to be conceived of him, that he had ever any inclination for her, or had ever hearkened to her voice. On the contrary. There had to be some hopes yet remaining on the part for this latter goddess Pleasure, and some regret apparent in **Hercules**. Otherwise we should pass immediately from the *third* to the *fourth* period; or at least confound one with the other.

(2) **Hercules**, in this agony described, may appear either sitting, or standing: though it be more according to probability for him to appear standing, in regard to the presence of the two goddesses, and by reason the case is far [27] from being the same *here* as in *the Judgement of Paris*; where the interested goddesses plead their cause before their judge. Here the interest of **Hercules** himself is at stake. It is *his own* cause which is trying. He is in this respect not so much *the judge*, as he is in reality *the party judged*.

(3) The superior and commanding passion of **Hercules** may be expressed either by *a strong admiration*, or by an admiration which holds chiefly to *love*:

--- *Ingenti percussus amore!*

(4) If the latter be used, then the reluctant passion, which is not yet wholly overcome, may show itself in pity and tenderness, moved in our hero by the thought of those pleasures and companions of his youth, which he is going forever to abandon. And in this sense **Hercules** may look either on the one or the other of the goddesses, with this

⁵⁷⁸If the same question concerning the *instantaneous* action, or present moment of time, were applied to many famous historical paintings much admired in the world, they would be found very defective: as we may learn from the instance of that single subject of Acteon, one of the commonest in painting. Hardly is there anywhere seen a design of this poetical history, without a ridiculous anticipation of the *metamorphosis*. The horns of **Acteon** which are the effect of the charm, should naturally wait the execution of that act in which the charm consists. Till the goddess therefore has thrown her cast, the hero's person suffers not any change. Even while the water flies, his forehead is still found. But in the usual design we see it otherwise. The horns are already *sprouted*, if not full grown: and the goddess is seen watering the *sprouts*.

difference; that if he looks on *Pleasure* it should be faintly and as turning his eyes back with pity; having still his action and gesture turned the other way towards *Virtue*: if, on the contrary, he looks on *Virtue*; it ought to be earnestly, and with extreme attention, having some part of the action his body inclining still towards *Pleasure*, and discovering by certain features [28] of concern and pity, intermixed with the commanding or conquering passion, that the decision he is about to make in favour of *Virtue*, costs him not a little.

(5) If it be thought fit rather to make use of admiration, merely to express the *commanding* passion of **Hercules**: the *reluctant-one* may discover him self in a kind of horror, at the thought of the toil and labour, to be sustained in the rough rocky way apparent on the side of *Virtue*.

(6) Again **Hercules** may be represented as looking neither towards **Virtue** nor **Pleasure**, but as turning his eyes either towards the mountainous rocky way pointed out to him by **Virtue**, or towards the flowery way of the vale and meadows, recommended to him by **Pleasure**. And to these different attitudes for the expression of the *turn*, or *balance of judgement* in our pensive hero.

(7) Whatever may be the manner chosen for the designing of this figure of **Hercules**, according to that part of the history in which we have taken him; it is certain he should be so drawn as neither [29] by the opening of his mouth, or by any other sign, to leave it in the least dubious whether he is speaking or silent. For it is absolutely requisite that *silence* should be distinctly characterised in **Hercules**, not only as the natural effect of his strict attention, and the little leisure he has from what passes at this time within his breast; but in order withal to give that appearance of majesty and superiority becoming the person and character of pleading **Virtue**; who by her eloquence and other charms has ere this made herself mistress of the heart of our enamoured hero:

--- *Pendetque iterum narrantis ab ore.*

This image of *the sublime* in the discourse and manner of **Virtue** would be utterly destroyed if in the instant that she employed the greatest force of action she should appear to be interrupted by the ill-timed speech, reply, or utterance of her auditor. Such a design or representation as this, would prove contrary to order, contrary to the history, and to the *decorum* or decency of manners. Nor can one well avoid taking notice here of that general absurdity committed by many of the esteemed great masters in painting; who in one and the same company, or assembly of persons jointly employed, and united according to the history, in one single or common action, represent to us not only *two* or *three*, but *several*, and sometimes *all* speaking at once: which must naturally have the same effect on the eye, as such a conversation would have upon the ear were we in reality to hear it.

[30] Chapter III

Of the second figure.

(1) After what has been said on the subject of **Hercules**, it appears plainly what the *attitude* must be of our second figure, **Virtue**; who as we have taken her in this particular period of our history, must of necessity be *speaking* with all the force of action, such as would appear in an excellent orator when at the height and most affecting part of his discourse.

(2) She ought therefore to be drawn *standing*; since it is contrary to all probable appearance, and even to nature itself, that in the very heat and highest transport of speech, the speaker should be seen sitting, or in any posture which might express repose.

(3) She may be *habited* either as an **Amazon**, with the helmet, lance, and in the robe or vest of Pallas; or as any other of the *virtues*, *goddesses*, or *heroines*, with the plain original crown, without rays, according to genuine antiquity. Our history makes no mention of a helmet, or any other armour of *Virtue*. It gives us only to understand that she was

dressed neither negligently, nor with much study or ornament. If we follow this latter method, we need give her only in her hand the imperial or magisterial sword⁵⁷⁹; which is her true characteristic mark, [31] and would sufficiently distinguish her, without the helmet, lance, or other military habit. And in this manner the opposition between herself and her rival would be still more beautiful and regular. --- “But this beauty”, says one, “would be discoverable only by the learned”. --- Perhaps so. But then again there would be no loss for others: since no one would find this piece less intelligible on the account of this regulation. On the contrary, one who chanced to know little of antiquity in general, or of this story in particular, would be still further to seek, if upon seeing an armed woman in the piece, he should represent to himself either a **Pallas**, a **Belona**, or any other warlike form, or deity of the female kind.

(4) As for the *shape, countenance, or person* of **Virtue**; that which is usually given to **Pallas** may fitly serve as a model for this dame; as on the other side, that which is given to **Venus** may serve in the same manner for her rival. The historian whom we follow, represents **Virtue** to us as a lady of a goodly form, tall and majestic. And by what relates of her, he gives us sufficiently to understand, that though she was neither lean nor of a tanned complexion, she must have discovered however, by the substance and colour of her flesh, that she was sufficiently accustomed to exercise. **Pleasure**, on the other hand, by an exact opposition, is represented in better case and of a softness of complexion which speaks her manners, and gives her a middle character between the person of a **Venus** and that of a **Bacchinal Nymph**.

(5) As for the *position, or attitude* of **Virtue**; though in a historical piece, such as ours is designed, ‘twould on no account be proper to have immediate recourse to the way of *emblem*; one might, [32] on this occasion, endeavour nevertheless, by some artifice, to give our figure, as much as possible, the resemblance of the dame *goddess*, as she is seen on medals, and other ancient *emblematick* pieces of like nature. In this view, she would be so designed as to stand firm with her full poise upon one foot, having the other a little advanced and raised on a broken piece of ground rock, instead of the helmet or little globe on which we see her usually setting her foot, as triumphant, in those pieces of the *emblematic* kind. A particular advantage of this attitude, so judiciously assigned to **Virtue** by ancient masters, is; that it expresses as well her aspiring effort, or ascent towards the stars and heaven, as her victory and superiority over fortune and the world. For so the poets have of old described her:

— *Negata tentat iter via*⁵⁸⁰.

*Virtutisque viam deserit arduae*⁵⁸¹.

And in our piece particularly, where the *arduous* and *rocky way* of **Virtue** requires to be emphatically represented; the ascending posture of this figure, with one foot advanced, in a sort of climbing action, over the rough and thorny ground, must of necessity, if well executed, create a due effect, and add to the sublime of this ancient *poetic work* [truly *antique* and genuine *poetick work*]⁵⁸².

(6) As for the *hand* or *arms*, which in real oratory, and during the strength of elocution, must of necessity be active; it is plain in respect of our goddess, that the arm in particular that she has free to herself, and is neither encumbered with lance or sword, should be employed another way, and come in, to second the discourse, and accompany it, with just emphasis and action. Accordingly **Virtue** would then be seen with this hand, turned either

⁵⁷⁹Parazonium.

⁵⁸⁰Horat. lib. 3, Od. 2.

⁵⁸¹*Idem ibid.* Od. 24.

⁵⁸²As ancient as the poet **Hesiod**, which appears by the following verses, cited by our historian, as the foundation, or first draught of this **Herculean tablature**, ... * * * .

upwards to the rocky way marked out by her with approbation; or to the sky, or stars, in the same sublime sense; or *downwards* to the flowery way or vale, as in a detesting manner, and with abhorrence of what passes there; or last of all (in a disdainful sense, and with the same appearance of detestation) against **Pleasure** herself. Each manner would have its peculiar advantage. And the best profit should be made of this arm and hand at liberty to express either the *disapprobation* or the *applause* proposed. It might prove, however, a considerable advantage, to our figure of **Virtue**, if holding the lance, or imperial sword, slightly, with one of her hands stretched downwards, she could, by that very hand and action, be made to express the *latter* meaning; opening for that purpose some of the lower fingers of this hand, in a refusing or repelling manner; whilst with [33] the other arm and hand at liberty, she should express as well the *former* meaning, and point out to **Hercules** the way which leads to honour, and the just glory of heroic actions.

[That neither this last paragraph 7 of chapter III nor that part marked with guillemets in paragraph 9 of chapter V below were in the original French written for Paolo de Mattheis and were sent afterwards to Monsieur Coste with letter to him of the 29th of March N. S. 1712. N. B.]

(7) From all these circumstances of history, and action, accompanying this important figure, the difficulty of the design will sufficiently appear, to those who carry the judgement beyond the *mere form*, and are able to consider the character of the *passion* to which it is subjected. For where a real character is marked, and *the inward form* peculiarly described, it is necessary *the outward* should give place. Whoever should expect to see our figure of **Virtue**, in the exact mien of a fine talker, curious in her choice of action, and forming it according to the usual decorum, and regular movements of one of the fair ladies of our age, would certainly be far wide of the thought and genius of this piece. Such studied action and artificial gesture may be allowed to the actors and actresses of the stage. But the good painter must come a little nearer to truth [*nature*], and take care that his action be not *theatrical*, or at second hand; but *original* and drawn from **nature** her-self. Now although in the ordinary tenor of discourse, the action of the party might be allowed to appear so far governed and composed by art as to retain that regular *contrast* and nice balance of movement which painters are apt to admire as the chief grace of figures; yet in this particular case, where the natural eagerness of debate, supported by a thorough antipathy and animosity, is joined to a sort of *enthusiastic agitation* incident to our prophetic dame, there can be little of that fashionable mien, or genteel air admitted. The painter who, in such a piece as we describe, is bound to preserve the heroic style, will doubtless beware of representing his heroine as a mere *scold*. Yet this is certain, that it were better for him to expose himself to the meanness of such a fancy, and paint his lady in a high *rant*, according to the common weakness of the sex, than to engage in the embellishment of the *mere form*, and forgetting the *character* of severity and reprimand belonging to our illustrious rival, present her to us a fair specious personage, free of emotion, and without the least bent of movement which should express the real *pathetic* of the kind.

[34] Chapter IV

Of the third figure.

(1) Concerning **Pleasure**, there needs little to be said, after what has been already remarked in relation to the two preceding figures. The truth of *appearance*, that of *history*, and even the *decorum* itself (according to what has been explained above) require evidently, that in this period or instant described, **Pleasure** should be found silent. She can have no other language allowed her than that merely of *the eyes*. And it would be a happy management for her in the design, if in turning her eyes to meet those of **Hercules**, she should find his head and face already turned so much on the contrary side, as to show as impossible to her as yet to discover the growing passion of this hero in favour of her rival. By this means she might still with good right retain her fond airs of dalliance and courtship; as having yet discovered no reason she has to be dissatisfied.

(2) She may be drawn either *standing, leaning, sitting, or lying*; without a crown, or crowned either with roses, or with myrtle; according to the painter's fancy. And since in this *third* figure the painter has so a great a liberty left him, he may make good advantage of it for the other *two*, to which this *latter* may be subjected, and the last in order, and of least consequence.

(3) That which makes the greatest difficulty in the disposition or ordinance of this figure **Pleasure**, is, that notwithstanding the supine air and character of ease and indolence, which should be given her, she must retain still so much life and action, as is sufficient to express her *persuasive* [35] *effort*, and manner of *indication* towards her proper paths; those of the flowery kind, or of the vale below; whither she would willingly guide our hero's steps. Now should this *effort* be over-strongly expressed; not only the supine character and air of indolence would be lost in this figure of **Pleasure**; but, what is worse, the figure would seem to speak, or at least appear so, as to create a double meaning, or *equivocal sense* in painting; which would destroy what we have established as fundamental, concerning the absolute reign of *silence* throughout the rest of the piece, in favour of **Virtue**, the sole speaking party at this instant, or third period of our history.

(4) According to a computation, which in this way of reasoning might be made, of the whole *motion* or *action* to be given to our figure of **Pleasure**; she should scarce have *one-fifth* reserved for that which we may properly call *active* in her, and have already termed her *persuasive* or *indicative effort*. All besides should be employed to express (if one may say so) her *inaction*, her *supineness*, *effeminacy*, and *indulgent ease*. The head and the body might entirely favour this passion. One hand might be absolutely resigned to it; serving only to support, with much ado, the lolling lazy body. And if the other hand be required to express some kind of gesture or action towards the road of pleasure recommended by this dame; the gesture ought however to be slight and negligent, in the manner of one who has given over speaking, and appears weary and spent.

(5) For the *shape*, the *person*, the *complexion*, and what else may be further remarked as to the *air* and *manner* of **Pleasure**; all this is naturally comprehended in the opposition, as above stated, between *herself* and **Virtue**.

[36] Chapter V

Of the ornaments of the piece; and chiefly of the draperies, and perspective.

(1) 'Tis sufficiently known, how great a liberty painters are used to take, in the colouring of their habits, and of other draperies belonging to their historical pieces. If they are to paint a *Roman* people, they represent them in different dresses; though it be certain the common people among them were habited very near alike, and much after the same colour. In like manner, the *Egyptian*, *Jews*, and other ancient nations, as we may well suppose, bore in this particular their respective likeness or resemblance one to another, as at present the *Spaniards*, *Italians*, and several other people of *Europe*. But such a resemblance as this would, in the way of painting, produce a very untoward effect; as may easily be conceived. For this reason the painter makes no scruple to introduce *philosophers*, and even *apostles*, in various colours, after a very extraordinary manner. It is here that the *historical truth* must of necessity indeed give way to that which we call *poetical*, as being governed not so much by *reality*, as by *probability*, or *plausible appearance*. So that a painter, who uses this privilege or prerogative in this respect, ought however to do it cautiously, and with discretion. And when occasion requires that he should present us his *philosophers* or *apostles* thus variously coloured, he must take care at least so to mortify his colours, that these plain poor men may not appear, in his piece, adorned like so many lords or princes of the modern garb.

(2) If, on the other hand, the painter should happen to take for his subject some solemn entry or triumph, where, according to the truth of *fact*, all manner of magnificence had without doubt been [37] actually displayed, and all

sorts of bright and dazzling colours heaped together and advanced, in emulation, one against another; he ought on this occasion, in breach of the *historical truth*, or truth of *fact*, to do his utmost to diminish and reduce the excessive gaiety and splendour of those objects, which would otherwise raise such a confusion, oppugnancy, and riot of colours, as would to any judicious eye appear absolutely intolerable.

(3) It becomes therefore an able painter in this, as well as in the other parts of his workmanship, to have regard principally, and above all, to the agreement or correspondence of things. And to that end it is necessary he should form in his mind a certain note or character of *unity*, which being happily taken, would, out of the many colours of his piece, produce (if one may say so) a *particular distinct species* of an original kind: like those compositions in music, where among the different airs (such as *sonatas*, *entries*, or *sarabands*) there are different and distinct species; of which we may say in particular, of each, “that it has its own proper character or genius, peculiar to itself”.

(4) Thus the *harmony* of painting requires, “that in whatever *key* the painter begins his piece, he should finish it in the same”.

(5) This regulation turns on the *principal figure*, or on the two or three which are *eminent*, in a tablature composed of many. For if the painter happens to give a certain height or richness of colouring to his principal figure; the rest must in proportion necessarily partake this genius. But if, on the contrary, the painter should have chanced to give a softer air, with more gentleness and simplicity of colouring, to his principal figure; the rest must bear a character proportionable, and appear in an extraordinary simplicity; that one and the same spirit may, without contest, reign through the whole of his design. [38]

(6) Our historical draught of **Hercules** will afford us a very clear example in the case. For considering that the hero is to appear on this occasion retired and gloomy; being withal in a manner naked, and without any other covering than a lion’s skin, which is itself of a yellow and dusky colour; it would be really impracticable for a painter to represent this principal figure in any extraordinary brightness or lustre. From whence it follows, that in the other inferior figures or subordinate parts of the work, the painter must necessarily make use of such still quiet colours, as may give to the whole piece a character of solemnity and simplicity, agreeable with itself. Now should our painter honestly go about to follow his historian, according to the literal sense of the history, which represents **Virtue** to us in a resplendent robe⁵⁸³ of the purest and most glossy white, it is evident he must after this manner destroy his piece. The *good painter* in this, as well in all other occasions of like nature, must do as the *good poet*; who, undertaking to treat some common and known subject, refuses however to follow strictly, like a mere copyist or translator, any preceding poet or historian; but so orders it, that his work in itself becomes really new and original.

Publica materies privati juris erit, si

Nec circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem;

Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus

*Interpres ----**

(7) As for what relates to the *perspective* or *scene* of our historical piece, it ought so present itself, as to make us instantly [39] conceive that it is in the country, and in a place of retirement, near some wood or forest, that this whole action passes. For it would be impertinent to bring *architecture* or buildings of whatever kind in view, as tokens of company, diversion, or affairs, in a place purposely chosen to denote solitude, thoughtfulness, and premeditated retreat. Besides, that according to the poets (our guides and masters in this art) neither the goddesses, nor other divine forms of

⁵⁸³Sem texto.

*[Horace, *de Arte Poetica*, II, 131-4. Rand.]

whatever kind, cared ever to present themselves to human sight, elsewhere than in these deep recesses. And it is worth observing here, how particularly our philosophical historian affects to speak, by way of prevention, of the solitary place where Hercules was retired, and of his thoughtfulness preceding this apparition: which from these circumstances may be construed henceforward as a *mere dream*; but as such, a truly rational, and *divine-one*.

(8) As to the *fortress, temple, or palace of Virtue*, situated on a mountain, after the emblematical way, as we see represented in some pieces formed upon this subject; there is nothing of this kind expressed by our historian. And should this or any thing of a like nature present itself in our design, it would fill the mind with foreign fancies, and mysterious views, no way agreeable to the taste and genius of this piece. Nor is there any thing, at the same time, on *Pleasure's* side, to answer, by way of opposition, to this *palace of Virtue*; which, if expressed, would on this account destroy the just simplicity and correspondence of our work. [40]

(9) Another reason against the *perspective* part, the architecture, or other studied ornaments of the *landscape*-kind, in this particular piece of ours, is; that in reality there being no occasion for these appearances, they would prove a mere incumbrance to the eye, and would of necessity disturb the sight, by diverting it from that which is principal, the *history* and *fact*. [Now, the more the history or theory of our piece retains of the *emblematic* kind; the less can we allow such a diversion from the historical part; which here more particularly commands the thought, and fixes our view with strikest attention on the *attitude* and *action* of the figures]. Whatsoever appears in a historical design, which is not essential to the action, serves only to confound the representation, and perplex the mind: more particularly, if these *episodic* parts are so lively wrought, as to vie with the principal subject, and contend for precedence with the *figures* and *human life*. A just design, or tablature, should, at first view, discover, what *nature* it is designed to imitate; what *life*, whether of the higher or lower kind, it aims chiefly to represent. The piece must by no means be equivocal or dubious; but must with ease distinguish itself, either as *historical* and *moral*, or as *perspective* and merely *natural*. If it be *the latter* of these beauties, which we desire to see delineated according to its perfection, then *the former* must give place*. The *higher* life must be allayed, and in manner discountenanced and obscured; whilst the *lower* displays it-self, and is exhibited as principal. Even that which according to a term of art we call *still-life*, and is in reality of the last and lowest degree of painting, must have its superiority and just preference in a tablature of its own species. It is the same in *animal-pieces*; where beasts or fowls are represented. In *landscape*, inanimates are principal: it is the earth, the water, the stones and rocks which live. All other life becomes subordinate. Humanity, sense, manners, must in this place yield, and become inferior. It would be a fault even to aim at the expression of any [41] real beauty in this kind, or go about to animate or heighten in any considerable degree the accompanying figures of men, or deities which are accidentally introduced, as appendices, or ornaments, in such a piece. But if, on the contrary, the *human species* be that which first presents it-self in a picture; if it be the *intelligent life*, which is set to view; it is the *other species*, the *other life*, which must then surrender and become subservient. The merely *natural* must pay homage to the *historical* or *moral*. Every beauty, every grace must be sacrificed to the *real beauty of first and highest order*. For nothing can be more deformed than a confusion of many beauties: and the confusion becomes inevitable, where the subjection is not complete.

(10) By the word *moral* is understood, in this place, all sort of judicious representations of the human passions; as we see even in *battle-pieces*; excepting those of distant figures, and the diminutive kind; which may rather be considered as a sort of *landscape*. In all other martial pieces, we see expressed in lively action, the several degrees of valour, magnanimity, cowardice, terror, anger, according to the several characters of nations, and particular men. It is

*[Concerning the latter lines of this page, marked with guillemets, see above page 33. The same as for what is added in the margin].

here that we may see *heroes* and *chiefs* (such as the **Alexanders** or **Constantines**) appear, even in the hottest of the action, with a tranquillity and sedateness of mind peculiar to themselves: which is, indeed, in a direct and proper sense, profoundly *moral*.

(11) But as the *moral* part is differently treated in a *poem*, from what it is in *history*, or in a *philosophical* work; so must it, of right, in painting be far differently treated, from what it naturally is, either in the *history*, or *poem*. For want of a right understanding of this maxim, it often happens that by endeavouring to render a piece highly *moral* and *learned*, it becomes thoroughly ridiculous and impertinent. [42]

(12) For the ordinary works of **sculpture**, such as the *low-reliefs*, and ornaments of *columns* and *edifices*, great allowance is made. The very rules of perspective are here wholly reserved, as necessity requires, and are accommodated to the circumstance and genius of the place or building, according to a certain oeconomy or order of a particular and distinct kind; as will easily be observed by those who have thoroughly studied the **Trajan** and **Antoninus-pillars**, and other *relief*-works of the ancients. In the same manner, as to pieces of engraved work, medals, or whatever shows itself in one substance (as brass or stone), or only by shade and light (as in ordinary drawings, or stamps), much also is allowed, and many things admitted, of the *fantastic*, *miraculous*, or *hyperbolic* kind. It is here that we have free scope, withal, for whatever is *learned*, *emblematical*, or *enigmatic*. But for the completely imitative and illusive art of **painting**, whose character it is to employ in her works the united force of different colours; and, who surpassing by so many degrees, and in so many privileges, all other human fiction, or imitative art, aspires in a direct manner towards deceit, and command over our very sense; she must of necessity abandon whatever is *over-learned*, *humorous*, or *witty*; to maintain her-self in what is *natural*, *credible*, and *winning of our assent*: that she may thus acquit her-self of what is her chief province, *the specious appearance of the object she represents*. Otherwise we shall naturally bring against her the just criticism of **Horace** on the scenical representation so nearly allied to her,

Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.

(13) We are therefore to consider this as a sure maxim or observation in painting, “that a *historical* and *moral* piece must of necessity lose much of its natural simplicity and grace, if any thing of the *emblematical* or *enigmatic* kind be visibly and directly intermixed”. As if, for instance, the circle of the *Zodiac*⁵⁸⁴, with its twelfth signs, were introduced. Now this being an appearance which carries not any matter of similitude or colourable resemblance to any thing extant in real nature; it cannot possibly pretend to win the sense, or gain belief, by the help of any *poetical enthusiasm*, *religious history*, [43] or *faith*. For by means of these, indeed, we are easily induced to contemplate as realities those divine personages and miraculous forms, which the leading painters, ancient and moderns, have speciously designed, according to the particular doctrine or theology of their several religious and national beliefs. But for our tablature in particular, it carries nothing with it of the mere *emblematical* or *enigmatic* kind: since for what relates to the double way of the vale and mountain, this may naturally and with colourable appearance be represented at the mountain’s foot. But if on the summit or highest point of it, we should place the fortress, or palace of *Virtue*, rising above the clouds, this would immediately give the enigmatical mysterious air to our *picture*, and of necessity destroy its persuasive simplicity, and natural appearance.

(14) In short, we are to carry this remembrance still along with us, “that the fewer the objects are, besides those which are absolutely necessary in a piece, the easier it is for the eye, by one simple act and in one simple view, to

⁵⁸⁴This is what **Raphael** himself has done, in his famous design of *The judgement of Paris*. But this piece having never been painted, but designed only for *Marc Antonio*’s engraving, it comes not within our censure; as appears by what is said in the paragraph just preceding.

comprehend the *sum* or *whole*". The multiplication of subjects, though subaltern, renders the subordination more difficult to execute in the ordinance or composition of a work. And if the *subordination* be not perfect, the *order* (which makes the beauty) remains imperfect. Now the *subordination* can never be perfect, except "when the ordinance is such, that the eye not only runs over with ease the several parts of the design (reducing still its view each moment on the principal object on which all turns), but when the same eye, without the least detainment in any of the particular parts, and resting, as it were, immovable in the middle, or centre of the tablature, may see at once, in an agreeable and perfect correspondence, all which is there exhibited to the sight"⁵⁸⁵.

[44] Chapter VI

Of the casual or independent ornaments.

(1) There remains for us now to consider only of the separate ornaments, independent both of figures and perspective; such as the *machine-work*⁵⁸⁶, or divinities in the sky, the winds, cupids, birds, animals, dogs, or other loose pictures which are introduced without any absolute necessity, and in a way of humour. But as these belong chiefly to the *ordinary life*, and to the *comic* or *mixed* kind; our tablature, which on the contrary is wholly *epic*, *heroic* and in the *tragic* style, would not so easily admit of anything in this light way.

(2) We may besides consider, that whereas the mind is naturally led to fancy mystery in a work of such a genius or style of painting as ours, and to confound with each other the two distinct kinds of the *emblematic* and merely *historical* or *poetic*; we should take care not to afford it this occasion of error and deviation, by introducing into a piece of so uniform a design, such appendices, or supplementary parts, as, under pretext of giving light to the history, or characterising the figures, should serve only to distract or dissipate the sight, and confound the judgement of the more intelligent spectators.

(3) "Will it then (says one) be possible to make out the story of these two *dames* in company with **Hercules**, without otherwise distinguish them than as above described?" – We answer, it is possible; and not that only, but certain and infallible, in the case of one who has the least genius, or has ever heard in general concerning Hercules, without so much as having ever heard this history in particular. But if notwithstanding this, we would needs add some exterior marks, more declaratory and determinative [45] of these two personages, **Virtue** and **Pleasure**; it may be performed, however, without any necessary recourse to what is absolutely of the *emblem-kind*. The manner of this may be explained as follows.

(4) The energy or natural force of Virtue, according to the moral philosophy of the highest note among the ancients, was expressed in the double effect of *forbearance* and *endurance*⁵⁸⁷, or what we may otherwise call *refrainment* and *support*. For the former, *the bit* or *bridle*, placed somewhere on the side of Virtue, may serve as emblem sufficient; and for the second, *the helmet* may serve in the same manner; especially since they are each of them appurtenances essential to *heroes* (who, in the quality of warriors, were also subduers or managers of horses⁵⁸⁸) and that

⁵⁸⁵This is what the *Grecian* masters so happily expressed, by the single word * * * [**eusonopton**]. See *Characteristics*, pp. 143, &c.

⁵⁸⁶This is understood of the *machine-work*, when it is merely ornamental, and not essential in the piece; by making part of the history, or fable itself.

⁵⁸⁷* * *: They were described as sisters in the emblematic moral philosophy of the ancients. Whence that known precept, * * *, SUSTINE et ABSTINE.

⁵⁸⁸*Castor*, *Pollux*; all the heroes of *Homer*; *Alexander* the Great, &c.

at the same time these are really portable instruments, such as the martial dame; who represents *Virtue*, may be well supposed to have brought along with her.

(5) On the side of Pleasure, certain *vases*, and other pieces of embossed plate, wrought in the figures of *satyrs*, *fauns*, and *bacchanals*, may serve to express the debauches of the table-kind. And certain draperies thrown carelessly on the ground, and hung upon a neighbouring tree, forming a kind of bower and couch for this luxurious dame, may serve sufficiently to suggest the thought of other indulgences, and to support the image of the effeminate, indolent, and amorous passions. Besides that for this latter kind, we may rest satisfied, it is what the painter will hardly fail of representing to the full. The fear is, lest he should overdo this part, and express the affection too much to the life. The appearances will, no doubt, be strongly wrought in all the features and proportions of this *third figure*; which is of a relish far more popular, and vulgarly engaging, than that *other* opposed to it, in our historical design.

[46] Conclusion

(1) We may conclude this argument with a general reflection, which seems to arise naturally from what has been said on this subject in particular: “that in a real *history-painter*, the same knowledge, the same study, and views, are required, as in a real *poet*”. Never can the *poet* (whilst he justly holds that name) become a *relater*, or *historian* at large. He is allowed only to describe a single action; not the actions of a single man, or people. The *painter* is a historian at the same rate, but still more narrowly confined, as in fact appears; since it would certainly prove a more ridiculous attempt to comprehend two or three distinct actions or parts of history in *one* picture, than to comprehend ten times the number in *one* and the *same* poem.

(2) It is well known, that to each species of poetry, there are natural proportions and limits assigned. And it would be a gross absurdity indeed to imagine, that in a poem there was nothing which we could call *measure* or *number*, except merely in the verse. An elegy, and an epigram have each of them their measure, and proportion, as well as a tragedy, or epic poem. In the same manner, as to painting, sculpture, or statuary, there are particular measures which form what we call *a piece*: as for instance, in mere portraiture, *a head*, or *bust*: the former of which must always retain the whole, or at least a certain part of the neck; as the latter the shoulders, and a certain part of the breast. If any thing be added or retrenched, the *piece* is destroyed. It is then a [47] mangled trunk, or dismembered body, which presents itself to our imagination; and this too not through use merely, or on the account of custom, but of necessity, and by the nature of the appearance: since there are such and such parts of the human body, which are naturally matched, and must appear in company; the section, if unskillfully made, being in reality horrid, and representing rather an *amputation* in surgery, than a seemly *division* or *separation* according to *art*. And thus it is, that in general, through all the plastic arts, or works of imitation, “whatsoever is drawn from nature, with the intention of raising in us the imagination of a natural species or object, according to real *beauty* and *truth*, should be comprised in certain complete portions, or districts, which represent the correspondence or union of each part of nature with *entire nature her-self*”. And it is this natural apprehension, or anticipating sense of *unity*, which makes us give even to the works of our inferior artisans, the name of *pieces* by way of excellence, and as denoting the *justness* and *truth* of the work.

(3) In order therefore to succeed rightly in the formation of any thing truly beautiful in this order of design^{*}; it were to be wished that the artist, who had understanding enough to comprehend what *a real piece* or *tablature*

^{*} “[Compare with *Characteristics*, v. III, p. 259, 260, 261, 262. Which passage relating to poetry the author appears in this place to have purposely imitated, on account of the natural resemblance between the rules and maxims of that art and this of painting”].

imported, and who, in order to this, had acquired the knowledge of *a whole* and parts, would afterwards apply himself to the study of *moral* and *poetic truth*: that by this means the thoughts, sentiments, or *manners*, which hold the first rank in his historical work, might appear suitable to the higher and nobler species of humanity in which he practised, to the genius of the age he described, and to the principal or main action which he [48] chose to represent. He would then naturally learn to reject those false ornaments of *affected graces*, *exaggerated passions*, *hyperbolic* and *prodigious forms*; which equally with the mere *capricious* and *grotesque*, destroy the just *simplicity* and *unity*, essential in a piece. And for his *colouring*; he would then soon find how much it became him to be reserved, severe, and chaste, in this particular of his art; where luxury and libertinism are, by the power of fashion and the modern taste, become so universally established.

(4) It is evident however from reason itself, as well as from history⁵⁸⁹ and experience, that nothing is more fatal, either to the painting, architecture, or the other arts, than this *false relish*, which is governed rather by what immediately strikes the sense, than by what consequentially and by reflection pleases the mind, and satisfies thought and reason. So that whilst we look on *painting* with the same eye as we view commonly the rich stuffs, and coloured silks worn by our ladies, and admired in dress, equipage, or furniture; we must of necessity be effeminate in our taste, and utterly set wrong as to all judgement and knowledge in the kind. For of this *imitative art* we may justly say; “that though it borrows help indeed from colours, and uses them as means, to execute its designs; it has nothing, however, more wide of its real aim, or more remote from its intention, than to make a *show* of colours, or from their mixture, to raise a *separate*⁵⁹⁰ and *flattering* pleasure to the sense”.

⁵⁸⁹See **Vitruvius** and **Pliny**.

⁵⁹⁰The pleasure is plainly foreign and *separate*; as having no concern or share in the proper delight or entertainment which naturally arises from the subject, and workmanship itself. For the subject, in respect of pleasure, as well as science, is absolutely completed, when the design is executed, and the proposed imitation once accomplished. And thus it always is the best, when the colours are most subdued, and made subservient.

Notebook on art, painters and painting.

PRO 30/24, 27/15.

Procedimentos de transcrição.

1. O Notebook on art, painters and painting, redigido em Nápoles, Itália, entre 1712 e 1713, traz a única versão existente do texto de *Plastics*, além de anotações para o prefácio das *Second Characters, or the language of forms*.
2. A transcrição do texto segue a ordem dos capítulos sugerida no índice, que consta no início do manuscrito. A transcrição do índice é seguida de uma ordenação segundo as instruções de Shaftesbury. É a partir da numeração resultante dessa ordenação que apresentamos a transcrição do manuscrito.
3. Os títulos dos capítulos, sugeridos em cada página por Shaftesbury, são apresentados integralmente, numerados, entre colchetes e em negrito, segundo as indicações do índice.
4. As subdivisões de capítulos são indicadas por títulos entre colchetes em negrito.
5. A paginação do manuscrito, incluindo saltos e passagens indicadas por Shaftesbury, encontra-se entre colchetes em negrito.
6. Os itálicos correspondem às palavras sublinhadas no manuscrito; os negritos, ao duplo sublinhamento; letras capitais, a letras capitais.
7. As notas numeradas indicam as notas indicadas no manuscrito por símbolos; as notas assinaladas por * indicam aquelas indicadas por Shaftesbury por esse símbolo.
8. Textos entre colchetes em negrito correspondem a passagens riscadas no manuscrito.
9. Desprezou-se o uso de letras capitais para substantivos.
10. Os textos gregos foram transcritos sem acentuação. Para sua acentuação, ver a edição de *Standard Works*.
11. As remissões de Shaftesbury às *Características* referem-se à primeira edição de 1711.
12. Observe-se, por fim, que, se nossa interpretação procede, o item 1 (*Title and idea of the work*) refere-se ao projeto de *Second Characters, or the language of forms*, volume que seria composto por quatro textos: *A letter concerning design*, *A notion of the judgement of Hercules*, *The picture of Cebes* e *Plastics, or concerning the original, power, and progress of the designatory art*; os itens seguintes, por sua vez, se referem exclusivamente ao material deste último texto.
13. Esta transcrição aspira a uma precisão filológica que não se encontra na edição de Benjamin Rand (Bristol, 1995), e, ao mesmo tempo, pretende-se como material acessível ao estudante de filosofia cuja preocupação primeira é o conceito, e não a filologia. Para uma reprodução exata do manuscrito, o leitor pode consultar a *Standard Edition*, em preparação.

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H

Homer. 75.102 (blank). 97 (blank).

Horse. 75.

Horace. 16. 99. 58. 94. 96. 43. 71. 96, 97. 56. 63.

Hyperbole. 70.99.101.

J

Jordano. 56. 69.

Juveanl. 65 (marg. end) 94

K

το καλον. 44 (2)

⁵⁹¹No veins. Transfiguration. Glorified bodies. Spiritual. – Same body – Locke and Stillingfleet.

Kircher. Egyptn. Antiq. 31.

Kreller (Sr God.)....100.

L

Line (out-). 71.99.

Lock (Mr.) 99

M

Mines. Mimichry. 32. Bottom.

N

Nature (celebrate) 73.

Nero 99 marg.

O

P

Persius. 45.94.93.

Perspective. 73.

Pietro di Cortone. 70.64. 91.

Plato. 97 bot.

Poetry & paint. 38.71.

Poets (modern) 72.

Portraiture... 66.74... (see the head) 101.

Poussin. 29. 16. 52.53.54.64 & marg. (see Gaspar).

91.63 (blank p.).101.

Priests. 58 bott. 93.

Prevention (see Anticip.). 19.

Q

Quixot. (don). 65.

R

Raphael. 16.33.57.68.....his letter. 22:ult. Pity of

him. 23:1,2. Cartoons tapestry. *ibid.* 89.

transfig. Piece 42, 23. Divine. 54.70.

Rubens. 42.64.

S

Salvator Rosa. 54.70.64.

Socrat: 44.49.72.

Spanioles.69.

Statuaries. 49.27.

Symmetry. 101.

T

Titian. 57.

U

V

Vandike 74.100.

Virgil. 44.100.102.

X

Xenophon. 94.97.

Y

Z

[1]

Naples, April 28 1712.

[1. Title, and Idea of the Work] (See also *inf.* 72 N. B.)

Title

SECOND CHARACTERS (*infra* p. 96) see 3.

PREFACE & NOTE below 96.

[96] [PREFACE]

Of the accidental origins & successional growth of the following tracts, as well as of their corresponding with the general title which is given them, the reader will be soon resolved, & best informed, as he proceeds. If our author who tracted formerly of Characters, in a higher sense, should by this latter manner appear to have lost somewhat of the rank he had amidst the order of writers, will be of small concern to him. It is (he thinks) sufficiently a honour if by these Second Characters, or under-parts, he can be able in the least degree to support those higher which he once sustained, in behalf of the chief concerns & interests of mankind. The subjects which he here treats, are presumed (he knows) to relate no further than the ordinary pleasures & diversions of the fashionable world. But however they may have been rated; if our author should, by good fortune, have been able to render them more speculative, or in reality more suitable to a taste & judgement than as they have hitherto passed in the world; he may have reason perhaps to be satisfied with his attempt. He may count his happiness that whilst even he afforded himself these entertainments for his own sake, he would even in a retirement find means to share them still with others, & serve the polite world & better sort in those pleasures & diversions which they are something at a loss how to defend against the formal censors of the age⁵⁹².

Then follows on the next page (just answerable to preface & note in Characteristics vol. I).

[Note]

“That the writings to which the author refers are perfect or (as they ought to be) correct &...., is what he no-way pretends. But that he has endeavoured to make them such by elaborate care & study, he readily professes: far contrary to that humour so generally affected of writing negligently & in such a manner as might easily admit of alteration & improvement by the same hand. And this profession (*it's plain*) gives him (a modern) the same right as ancient poets & authors⁵⁹³ had of saying the very *same* thing over (when occasion offered) in the *self-same* words”.

Now remember this viz.. Resolved that it would be better (after this early apology in the preface) on no account (except necessary illustration) to refer by figures or numbers to the passages of Characteristics rehearsed. The italic characters or guillemets will be sufficient distinction.

Amongst other reasons for this so particular & emphatical apology: consider only what must needs be cited & recited of that one passage in *Inquiry* p. 104, 105 as hinted above p. 44. [1]

⁵⁹²“No Greek or puzzling reading but in the notes &c.” (this for the ladies &c.). Citations & references to the *Characteristics* obliquely; covering it with the advertisement of an explanation of the marks, numbers, etc. which are to stand at the end of the volume before the index. See above p. 1 & the other places relating with the *apology & self-citation*.

⁵⁹³Such as HOMER and XENOPHON.

[Further explanation in advertisement preface or something preliminary to the *Letter from Italy*: which Letter must stand as the first piece & as *dedicatory* to my Lord **** (as *Letter concerning enthusiasm* in Characteristics)*]⁵⁹⁵.

1. Of this explanation of *second characters* and reasons at large see below, p. 3 in *Characters &c.*
2. Also **apology**⁵⁹⁶ for references so frequent to Characteristics: light & instruction being aimed at; and shortness works the best. The best too for inculcating the great maxims, as from certain *postulata*, axioms, &c⁵⁹⁷.
3. Motto or device [*of last Treatise*⁵⁹⁸: Ο τι καλον φιλον αει. Euripides.
4. An advertisement at the beginning of all; writing the reader (if he would read in *earnest*) to observe reference-marks⁵⁹⁹; as Tr. (for Treatise), Ch. (for Chapter) or P (for Paragraph). The capital figures after Tr.; small-ones after C. and P. and for the notes of the chapter or paragraph the Greek characters α β γ δ.

In this advertisement also warning of words, phrases (see Dictionary infra 78) and references to the index and explanatory at the end of the work.

5. Running titles viz.. *Letter concerning design*, *The Hercules of Prodicus*. --- Emblem of *Cebes*⁶⁰⁰. And for the 4th and last work (viz. this great one). Let it be perhaps after the idea of *Notes afficie*, *evening conversations*, *hours*, *virtuoso-amusements*, *Public-entertainment*, *Delicie Elegantice Artis*. (See below 96).
6. The print (when all the 4 together) to be the same, but letters set a little closer than in Characteristics, for room (much wanting) as well as beauty, if they will be exact in setting. The *text-margin* to have only *hands & references*. And the margin of the notes, to have note upon note. Citations only. Notes infra 26. [2]

* Again before the great Treatise (viz. ...) remember a like small *preface** or *preliminary lines* of introduction *To my Lord *****⁵⁹⁴: that excuse may be renewed, the ridicule again anticipated: the *moralist* or grave author vindicated and the reader prepossessed: and that the address afterwards may be the more general nor always particular to that Lord: the piece being too large and formal for a *Letter*. Accordingly, begin thus (from the first words of the *Letter of Design*): "You may remember, my Lord, I began this research by calling **painting** a *vulgar science*. Now I see I come so far and I have so deeply engaged that I am about to show this to be far from a *vulgar* or *low science*".

*See Prefatory Anticipatory infra 63.

Upon mature thought (from the consideration of the necessary repetition of the **ego*** [1] in cases of master's hands seen & observed in *Italy* as also of the easy & pleasant narrative manner) resolved to address wholly, or at least principally & in a continued strain at the head of each division to the friend-Lord, my Lord**** as *Letter of enthusiasm* & that of *Design* (the leading treatise of this work). And thus every new *part* or *chapter* will have a kind of preface, or renewal of the address & epistolary style (*my Lord &c.*)**. And therefore the treatise itself should be entitled *epistolary*, as giving warning of this mixed manner viz.. half-general address, but (begging publics' pardon) more than ½ to the friend, the Lord &c. [2] Accordingly, it will be a new and not odd or unseen way to begin each great division as *book* or *part* (but rather **part** indeed, since **books** would be too formal to divide into, & contrary to the *epistolary* idea) to begin, I say, each PART with the title *my Lord*, set (as at the beginning of the letter of Enthusiasm & every other letter) a little way below the contents. And for the subdivision & mere chapters or *sections*, these may begin not directly with the title; but taking it in (as the newer & more fashionable way is, in familiar letters) indirectly & cursorily, in the first sentence or period, a word or two (as *would one imagine my D &c.****. And thus the division & subdivision will be agreeable distinguished, and in the composition of the writing & style, I shall myself be thus forced to observe a right rule, viz.. "to begin each **part** with a deeper breath, distinctly from the sub-altern rallies or *excursions* in the mere *sections* into which the main PARTS are divided". *inf. 26 margin. **See below p. 96. 26. ***or "it may perhaps be objected, *my Lord*, by certain &c.". See such an objection as this, fit for the beginning of a pretty easy subdivision, inf.64.

⁵⁹⁵See Prefatory Anticipatory. Inf. 63.

⁵⁹⁶Inf. 71. 43 (3). 63 (4) (5).

⁵⁹⁷Apology for self citation infra. 94.43;71;43,3;63,4-5.

⁵⁹⁸See below 96.

⁵⁹⁹Also *hands*: as below, 2 (3).

⁶⁰⁰Viz. *Appendix*.

Remember still: this is the idea of the work, viz. *quasi* the vehicle of other problems, i.e., the precepts, demonstrations &c of real ethics. But this hid: not to be said except tastely or pleasantly with raillery upon self, or some such indirect way as in *miscellany*...

Of this deviation, transfer, transition or translation of το καλον of the chief piece see example below, page 8, near the end “thus the proficient &c...”.

Memd. Continuance of manner & stile of Miscellany, Anticipation, Raillery &c. See below p.38 par.2. And since dialogue-manner (whether direct or recitation) too poulderance and vast; endeavour although in the letter-style & particular private address (as *O Teophilus!*, *my L!*, or *Reader!*) to introduce scenes and machines of this sort, short, in many a chapter and everywhere in general, as much as possible in the way of *apostrophes* and *prosopope* (See how this is determined above, item 3).

Memd.

- (1) After *finis*, an index; with this previous N.B. viz. “That the words marked with an asterisk are such as have a further explanation in the volumes entitled *Characteristics*, and may be sought in the index belonging to those volumes”
- (2) After this and the index, a column with this title, viz., “Places of the volumes entitled *Characteristics* explained or defended in this volume of *Second Characters*”
- (3) After this again, in small print, & in course, according to the pages of the book, page after page, comprise all the translations of Greek, Latin, French and Italian with prefatory excuse in a word or two; “as serving for such artists that in the *modern* way as are not scholarly in the *ancient*, or for such scholarly in the learned ancient way as are not acquainted with the foreign modern tongues, viz.. Italian or French”.
- (4) Memd. To have several indicatory small pointing hands both on the left and on the right margins (besides asterisks, daggers, &c.) wrought & cast by a good workman: that both for left & right margin there may be room to serve for the maxims of the art which alone are to be thus marked: as must be explained to the reader in the advertisement already mentioned above 1 (4).
- (5) Also a kind of prefatory *Dictionary*⁶⁰¹ of terms of art or new coined (with apology) after the manner of Monsieur Freart de Chambray but in the reverse of his insolent way.

An index of the names of the authors cited and their edition, year &c. E.g.: *Junius*, that in the body of the treatises and even in the mere notes or margin of the notes (according to Mr. Bayle’s re-iterate citations) there may be no need of mark that the word *Junius*. [inf. 26 [26]

1. [Notes below: the asterisks and daggers still going on (as in *Characteristics*) on *ordinary* occasions, these being only extraordinary and with relation to the mysteries of *art & portic*, or deep ancient learning, of the best kind, and therefore].
2. A rule viz.. *Nothing in the text but what shall be of easy smooth & polite reading; without seeming difficulty or hard study: so as that the better & gentiler rank of painters & artists, the ladies, beaux, courtly gentlemen & more

⁶⁰¹Infra p. 78.

* Observe in the notes under the text to speak always (without once failing) in the stile of *we, us & our* for *I, me, mine*. Also *the author & the author’s* keeping the *I & me* for the text; which the epistolary address may excuse; as above p.1, blank page at the bottom.

Yet even here remember to use it as little as possible; and to substitute in its room, the fashionable *one*: from the French *on*, viz. *on souhaite, on voudroit, on est bien aise*. The free use of the *ego* or *I* will be best near the beginning of each head, division, part or chapter, where the epistolary address is renewed, & fresh in the ear. Observe also that if

refined sort of country & town wits, & notable talkers, may comprehend, or be persuaded that they comprehend what is there written, *in the text*: All besides (viz.. the Greek, Latin, Italian & French; forms of art, criticism, & more learned remarks or clearings on history, nature, philosophy & the deep places of Characteristics) to be reserved for *notes* of which the *easiest* may be distinguished from the rest (as Mr. Coste has done the *hardest* in his translated *Hiero*) by a particular kind of character or form: the notes which are to have the *hand* (as in paragraph 1 just above this page & overleaf) being to pass as among the harder sort; it is only for the critic, the real virtuoso, or philosopher.

3. In the 4th and great piece (viz. after *Letter of design, The Hercules of Prodicus* and the Appendix, or *Emblem of Cebes*) remember somewhere in the beginning of some chapter near the beginning of the treatise to prepare & give notice of the frequent references to the *Notion* &c. That being *practical*: this *speculative*. That *proof & fact*: this *descant & remark*. So reference & recourse thither, by citation, or to *axioms*, or *postulata, demonstrations, &c.*
4. Citations of friends, moderns. See below, 72. [72] N.B. This should stand in *Title and Idea*.

This work *quatenus* poetical (as *plastical, pictorical*) may take in, especially in the notes, many of our best English poets in citations, the moderns who are friends & for liberty, as *Row, Congreve* (although the latter too immoral in his comedy) & *Dryden* (with the same rebuke) for equity, and on account of his assisted translation by my old friend *Moyle* &c. (whom the name is in his preface) of *Virgil's two philosophical-theistical-hypothesis passages* viz. his bees in the georgics *Esse apibus partem, divinae particulam aurae* &c.: and his 6th Aeneid *Spiritus intus alit* &c. To which if as well done by thus translates add (for equity's sake also on the atheist's side) the song of *Sylenus of Atoms*.

Search Mr. Raws *Tamerlain* for any good moral lines.

Also *Philip's *Cyder*, the praises of honesty &c. "Whom we would name with praise but for his sottish life, gloss flattery to his patrons & slavish principles *consequent*".

Also Lord Landsdown (when Mr. Granvill) not naming: his ecstasy on honesty --- one of Jacob Tomson's miscellany poems --- "*and what then? --- Take a place at court* betray country be a French-man, any-thing" --- This last abated, no personal inventive.

Also a rule in the same place. Not cite a prose-author. "Else, why not *Preface to author of Denmark* & other friends?". [26] [inf. 43 [43]

1. Memorandum. Not too frequent in the division of heads. E.g. The *Five parts in general*, and the *five particular* to be in one chapter together with anticipation-article & ridicule of usual parallels run between the two arts (both page 38 above, viz. par. 2 & 3). Division: All this in one head-chapter.

See this how settled above, p.1. margin bottom and over leaf in the next blank page and in the margin viz. of p.2.

2. *To *twist*, as it were, & *interweave* morality with plastics, that supreme beauty, with this subaltern, those high & severe maxims with these curious & *severe* also in their kind.

the *Letter* and *Notion* be first printed (as the case was with *Characteristics*) and afterwards the whole together under the answerable title of *2d Characters*; in this case for better proportion's sake & uniformity of the print, many more notes may be taken into the *Letter, Notion & Emblem*, & such thrown off from the last treatise (*Plastics*) as may best ease that full page; which will be still the one eased in double & triple proportion, by referring from thence hither; according to the privilege asserted & excused below, 94 & just below, at the bottom of this immediate page before us [i.e. 26]

*The new Mr. Philips, author of the pretty lines in the *Tatler*, of the *Frost*, from *Copenhagen*, & since author of a tragedy *Andromache* (also of the pastorals, whence called *the swain*; the tragedy of *Andromache* is entitled *The destroyed mother*). And who seemed taken with *Characteristics* in letters from *Lisb. N.* to my W--- of 21 march 1712.

Thus the *Notion & Prodicus*' piece, in the same original view as recited by *Socrates &* recorded by *Xenophon* (no ill grounded design or abuse, but the same stratagem & original) by the absolute opposition of pleasure to virtue, & the secret *anti-Epicurean* view running through the whole.

Hence *maxims & citations*⁶⁰² to be employed according to the.....&.....Head, viz.. the next following page 44, also 53 & 57.

3. In this view examine & recollect something in seriousness *Ασκηματα old & new* (with the chapters of the devise mean &c.) particularly what is said in the *old* about the *τελοζ, end*, and in the *new* on *το καλον*. Also **Sensus Communis*, p. 137, effect of *poetic (& so plastic)* art: viz. "in vocal measures of syllables & forms to express the harmony & numbers of *an inward* kind &c.". And follows next page viz.. "that what we most admired even in the turn of outward features was but a mysterious expression of something *inward* &c.". Also a little below again viz.. page 142 of the same treatise, line 6: "For all beauty is truth &c.". The *το ευσυνοξλον* *ibid.* with all that follows in this remarkable virtuoso-place, copied & commented at large in *2nd Characters*, showing the dependency of the 1st and 2nd, i.e.: of *Characteristics* on this new treatise, & *vice-versa*.
4. Liberty of **self-citation*. See below p.94, margin bottom. The use of the *ego* banished in all but the epistolary kind (viz.. in the *Inquiry & in Hercules & Cebes*). For *"*Who am I?*" And even the *we, us, our* &c., never used but in a sense: as it were taking in the reader, co-operating with the writer & discovering, investigating as a party, himself⁶⁰³.

This may (in one of the after-appendixes, Advertisements, *Index* &c mentioned above, p. 2 towards the end) be invented as a remark on style, together with the other laws of correctness imposed by the author on himself. [inf. 96 [96]

General Title

Second Characters or *the language of forms*. In four treatises. Viz.

I.A *letter* concerning **Design**.

II.A *Notion* of the Historical Draught of **Hercules**.

III. *Appendix* concerning the Emblem of **Cebes**.

IV. **Plastics**, or the Original, Progress, & Power of Designatory Art.

General motto and devise same as formerly in *Characteristics*

*Note. This may be said *introductorily*, in the beginning of some chapter, & confessed pleasantly with raillery. Although with this artifice, that in this very chapter where warning is given, there should be less *doctrine* & depth of manner or learning discovered; only a small show or pattern of it: which the reader with little study may discover & applaud himself for it; delivering that easily, so that is in the next following that the maxims or deep precepts *theorems* &c may be concealed & so delivered that what surpasses the ignorant reader may pass him by, without reproaching him his defect or frightening him with the supposed profoundness of the sense or reading.

⁶⁰²Citations, see rule 57 in margin 1.

*These passages therefore of *Characteristics* & this *self-quotation* to be preliminarily & *introductorily* excused* as prescribed in note just above. * Sup. 1.

*So in particular and principally (in respect to this new volume of 2nd Characters) see *Characteristics*, vol.1, p.333, in *Soliloquy*: "*Apology for frequent recourse to the rules of artists, statuaries, &c. the best masters &c.*".

*For, "Who am I?" ---- i.e.: *forsooth* referring to the authors name, title (reverend, honourable &c.) & picture in the front & title page, with the testimonial ecominus, verses, prefacings, self-adornments & dressings. "This mentioned for the sake of other future authors who may write in other kinds & grater compositions (poem & discourse) improving still over language & raising our ear, taste, consciousness &c. This author serving as the *spur vice copy* &c."

⁶⁰³"Otherwise the repeated use of *we* marks the selfishness more ridiculously as may be easily observed (in *D. Davenant*) and exalts the author to the style & personage of royalty".

Running Titles

Letter Concerning design

The Hercules of Prodicus

Emblem of Cebes

Plastic Art .

And the particular title of this last treatise to read thus, PLASTICS. An Epistolary⁶⁰⁴ Excursion on the Original, Progress, and Power of Designatory Art.

The particular title (with their plates⁶⁰⁵, if thought fit) to stand just answerably to *Characteristics* instead of *volume-titles*, these being single only for the *treatises*.

MOTTOS & Devices. *The old round device to the Παν/αΨκοδψφξ.

(α) ME REBUS *sequentem ducunt nolentem trahunt*. (With the 3 parcae, as in margin).

(β) With the single figure and bivium by Mr. Frei in a long oval.

(γ) ἀνελεῖν τι ἀπελεῖν With the single figure of Virtue (from the best medals) answering to the little round oval above

(δ) Ο τι καλον φιλον αει (with the 3 graces). Because naked: no harm, when in little & well ordered. [97]

1. To preserve such a mixture of style, matters &c. , in the first five or six chapters or divisions of the work may invite & engage the several readers; that there may be subject & pleasure for the wit & man of ingenuity (with & without letters) separated from the virtuoso & mere lover of the art, and so for the latter *vice versa*. And in the progress of the work every chapter to be so writ as on the whole (hard parts being short and their *hardness* concealed or carried off with an air &c) to make it a *pleasant reading*, and so far independent as to be liked, wherever the lazy reader may chance to deep. The notes will also help to this, like dictionary or *fragmented-reading*: the **hard** or whichever stops the convent of easy-reading, being flung of hither, viz. into the *notes*. [96]
2. (α) Memd. This motto of *ME REBUS may stand in the front of this treatise notwithstanding any explanation of it in the notes of the real treatise (viz.. *Cebes*) following after, especially since the other motto of *volentem ducunt: nolentem trahunt* is to stand round the figure in the plate. ---- But see! Finally resolved. Behind in the margin.
(β) For 1st treatise viz.. Letter of design in an oval lengthwise (because of the design so requiring) ME REBUS and *sequentem ducunt nolentem trahunt*. This in respect of my sickness, retreat, banishment & *secondary employment* & study in *Second characters*: according to the tone of the *Letter of design*, par. 4 & 10. A chariot and the three parcae, & one riding, spinning; two drawing with circular snare & scythe in their hands; a ragged slave chained behind &c. On the right hand of the chariot, as it runs from left to right (of the reader) a forward figure (viz.. the *volens subjungens*) accompanying.

⁶⁰⁴See the reason above, p. 1, margin at the bottom.

⁶⁰⁵I.e.: in a 2nd edition, not the first; where (according to the precedent of *Characteristics*) only one plate, viz.. the round one, for a beginning & experiment.

*Memd. The frontispiece-device & motto to the self-same plate as *Characteristics*. This absolutely determined; because of internal resemblance (viz. *Characteristics* & *Second Characters*). So, no need of By the author &c.

* Finally resolved: "To seek a new *moral* & personally applicable motto to this leading epistle: since both the ME REBUS and the *Volentem ducunt* must serve as support & explanatory to one another in the devise of the plate itself: the one round the edge circular-wise, the other straight in length at the bottom, under the seeing of figures. Here it is!
_____ *ante omnia Musae*. Virg. Georg. Lib. 2.

And remember if this succeed & be approved with the rest (viz.. the nine new plates in the 2nd edition of *Characteristics*) them, should I live so long, I might, in a 2nd edition of this *Second Characters* at the end subjoin (according to a previous advertisement additional in the forepart) in explanation of this and of its fellow, viz. παντα υποληπιζ in *Characteristics*. Beginning in English but going off into Latin: when arrived at the *authorities & citations* the sense of this new motto ME REBUS: according (I may say) to which I find written in the margin of my Horace, when I first came to read him as a man & a scholar, knowing in some measure in philosophy & in Horace originals, the *Socratic & succeeding Socratic philosophy*, Horace's first and last school. And hereupon introduce (in the smallest print) the Latin *pathologia* (upon Horace), or scheme of the passions in Latin still, because not capable to reduce the words, & besides (as the citations) intelligible only to scholars. This *pathologia* will be also principally grounded & supported in the explanation of the emblem treatise of *Cebes*, and his *stoical*, truly Socratic δοχουα. •Refer to *Characteristics*, vol. iii p.202.248 &c., & ii.224. Horace's period's &c [97]

(γ)_____potiores

Herculis aerumans credat, saevosque labores

Et Venere, et coenis, et pluma Sardaanpali. Juv. Sat. 10.

*****In the mean time, as to this first edition of 2nd *Characters*, the explanation of ME REBUS may naturally come in a note on *Cebes* after the moral parties explained introducing this passage towards the end of the treatise by this corollary in Simplicius's words. Ευνεκλικον Λε εσι τωτο καοησ εναψοψασ, το συντατ ειν &c. And Monsieur Coste's edition, prove being (modestly) made the foundation, "as a thing already ushered into the world else should fear to produce is as so many judgements of commentators & false citations of so many learned.

And thus hereafter (viz.. every next edition) a foundation (if the world showed desire & curiosity) for the letters to Monsieur Coste, if recoverable and if not imitated by best recollection; the way suiting best the age, the thing itself being a truth not a fiction, so as to take the more with the humour of the age, engaged thus by *personal* matters, especially where a title-name &c and "Was this? Did he do this? Was this really written? Was there such a correspondence? Where was *he* at that time? Where was the other? What kind of a man? &c. ----- Impertinence! ----- But this is in secretly governs. This view must *publish*. This alone⁶⁰⁶ makes *numbers*. This *sells* -----

Also an equal foundation carried for *pathologia* upon *Horace* & other works, as collections from old-paper books, as in particular on the το Δεμονιον (σο φαιρ οχχασιον βεινγ γιωεν ιν Χεβεσ) τηε Πεισπαλελικοι, the anachronism about Plato &c & the corruption of (by marginal insertions especially) of the best books. Also room here for criticism on Plato's character. Good & bad Dion. Halicarn: on his emulation acknowledged. Xenophon's severe glance of foreign philosophy acknowledged, but censure again of Athenian's in the other extreme, & his palpable error & many others shown from the memorables by the honourable mention of Plato --- Socrates' love for Glauco, for his sake.

⁶⁰⁶Viz. Copies for the bookseller.

[63]

[2. Prefatory & anticipatory thoughts; several & belonging for each head or chapter]

1. Upon this head, see what is writ already up. P. 1. 24 (2) (3). 25.

In one of the *exordiums*, *preface* or *addresses* (to my Lord****) of the earliest chapters, must be represented by way of apology (as being led hither insensibly by *his Lordship's desire* the time (the *times*⁶⁰⁷) place, conversation, circumstance of health & the amusement of *Hercules, Cebes &c.* in pains (& thence *Letter, Notion &c.* so on) "that having formerly & at first applied only as others by *mere taste*, not *judgement* or *speculation*, resolved (being invited to the exercise) to *dissect* the *je ne sais quoi &c.* (although I was conscious still of something better).

2. "He, & he only" [upon the tone of *Moralists* near the end]⁶⁰⁸, the *undique fatus* and *recalcitator*; "he only can ridicule" & without ridicule greater on himself [as in *Essay on raillery* p...] can despise & rally virtuosos, who in himself the *great virtuoso*, sage, philosopher, self-measurer, self-examiner, critic, student and pursuer of beauty, architect [as in *Moralists* *ibidem*] plastic, ianmorato &c [as in *Moralists* not so near the end viz.. Enthusiasm vindicated] of the highest order & in the first species & primary characters. None presumed to laugh at 2nd *characters*, being not master in *first*. This in answer to the pretended moralist, philosopher, grave censurer & affected ignorant despiser of these studies.
3. He who studies & creates thought the shell must see some way into the kernel. Other rules of physiognomy *false*: but motion of the passions⁶⁰⁹ & traces which they make & leave, this *true*. And hence the solution of the truth, whatever there is in physiognomy, except mere imbecility, idiotime, deformed organs & consequent of imitations &c.
4. Remember somewhere early in the Explanatory Parts to apologise for using painter's vulgar terms, although curstly & improperly: but to this Horace's *usus*. Temper this with par. 7 just below.
5. And that as to painters, although not so absolutely the chief artists nor raised above statuaries (were truly any worth of that name in this age or since the Ancients) yet their name always for shortness & cleanness made use of for all plastic artists & their art for all plastic art & architecture itself, as far as architecture relates to drawing & design on which indeed it fundamentally relies.
6. Also at the very entrance, apology to my Lord**** for the poetic stile, alluding to what is said to him in the correspondent *Letter of enthusiasm*, at the beginning.
7. Also early, or at least in some of the first heads, declaration & raillery against affected French and Italian terms⁶¹⁰; as far as possible without affectation or the other side against what is established & has already gained. See Dictionary, inf. 78.
8. Also a kind of playing on the word *second characters*, as 2nd parts in drama, secondary under-parts --- the author reduced to this, excluded the higher: content in lower, always something towards &c. καλον φιλον αει. This according to the tone of *Letter of Design*, par. 3 or 4. [63] [página esquerda]

⁶⁰⁷Viz.. scandalous to Englishmen abroad. *Secoueril France &c.*

⁶⁰⁸N.B. These square parentheses [] least the same ideas should cause the same expressions & prove mere repetition. For this must not be when by chance (this marks sterility) but when on purpose, *the same* thing required to be said, not a *like* thing. For when there is reason to diversify concerning the repetition, when on purpose, see 26. 94.

⁶⁰⁹Muscle anatomy. 2nd & 4th part in painting.

⁶¹⁰Also the painter's terms answerable to Monsieur Freart.

In some of the early ⁶¹¹divisions (whether the beginning or middle of the part or chapter) raise the objection of luxury & expense encouraged in the great, and consequently too in the little according to *Esope* & Horace's frog: so undo themselves. --- But first a compromise, a compounding *a less for a greater & worse*. A taking off from play, equisage, riot & *feast*. Any even from building it in the next place when the extravagance is committed, & the *res* the patrimony hurt (of which speak seriously as the way to knavery, court-dependence &c. in the gentleman) all may be reviewd & upon a new turn of business, with a good air disposed of, and with good advantage & increase of the principal if such rules as these are followed & not fancy.

For this is worthy mention that although the source for a man whose fancy agrees with another in the many hands & paintings; yet in general when the *cabal* is over for this must be excepted (as in Poussin's case in France & Domenichino's in Naples) the public always judges right and the piece esteemed or disesteemed after a time & a course of some years are always exactly esteemed according to their proportion of worth *by these rules & studies*. So that the gentleman who follows his caprice may undo himself. But he who either fixes his taste or buys according to the universal judgement & public taste & confession of painters in works of deceased will never be abused or come off a sufferer when he parts with his *effects*⁶¹².

Also secret apology (in passing, not as with set design for purchasing of pictures: because of necessity of purchasing as a virtuoso for commerce & acquaintance in Italy. This to be thrown in raillery & humour upon my Lord*** &c. and addressing to him a the cause of drawing me in & there being necessity withal of speaking of self (another kind of *self-citation*) because of these purchases. See above 33. [64]

Premise, & distinguishing between the worthy to be criticised, & the worthy to be named. Of the former sort (among *authors*) Fontanel⁶¹³ (among painters) **Rubens, Le Brun**, scarce a French painter besides; not reckoning **Poussin*, a naturalised Roman, really naturalised after being set up there, & being invited back to France & *caballed against* fled to Rome with detestation of his country, what made him & *Salvator Rosa* (as I have been assured by the old virtuosos & painters *there*) so good friends: the latter being a male-content Napolitan dissatisfied with his country-men as his satyrs show. Both these by the way were honest moral men, the latter over-soured & mortal enemy of the priests⁶¹⁴ who had nothing to take advantage of against him besides the supposed familiarity he had with his woman-servant, on which account he married her.

Also *Pietro de Cortona*⁶¹⁵, *Jordano, Spaniolel*⁶¹⁶ (hardly a villain, & like his work, ill usage of poor *Domenichino*).

Remember as a principal & pretty early apology⁶¹⁷ this viz. objection against a *great man's*, or a *philosopher's* writing upon such subjects as statues, pictures &c. "For no such precedents of old" ---- Answer, "although Plutarch &

⁶¹¹Viz. as above over leaf (1).

⁶¹²See, & in the notes refer to Freart & Bossu about this Cabal against *Poussin*.

⁶¹³Sup. 71.

*Such is the excellent Nicolas *Poussin* in both parts of history & perspective, and such, in the latter, is his Italian brother-in-law & disciple *Gaspar*, who borrowed of him his first name, that they are harder to be censured in their BOIL WORKS than even a *Raphael*, a *Titian* or a *Carache*. And had the times of his own nation given encouragement to *Nicolo* to pursue the great full & true manner (not the little & *false*, for cabinets, & to please the delicate) he had been perhaps the greatest of moderns by far.

⁶¹⁴And not profanely as *Caravaggio* [This in the head of modern masters &c. p. 52].

⁶¹⁵56.

⁶¹⁶69.

⁶¹⁷Sup. 2 margin of margin.

not directly; or although Pliny & Pausanias &c. who have indirect; were to pass as nothing; let this be considered that the great artists (like the great generals Xenophon & Cesar) could write & did so **for themselves* (so *Euphranon* concerning symmetry &c.) and so needed not that other philosophers or wits should take the province”.

[98] [Of truth (plastic)]

Remember what argued with Mr. Trench about my *design* of the good & evil conscience (two boys) for the flourish-plate of treatise III of *Characteristics*. The harpies and evil dreams in volatile shapes, being first proposed to be made bigger than the life in respect of the boys, that their action & accompaniments might be seen the plainer. But this was found wrought & *false*. Afterwards having reduced them to as big as life, but having chosen rather the eagle & vulture-proportion as the largest; this still was found *false*. For as this made the haggard-forms instead of buffering & frightening the children might be supposed big enough to fly away with them as they prey.

The next size therefore was chosen viz.. that of the raven, the kite &c.-----

This merely is *grotesque-work* & the *emblematic*; where all is false and everything so wildly & extravagantly *fastidious*, with such variety of *Proteus*-forms and different species conjoined: yet not preposterously absurdly or without intelligence, speculation; & *a truth!*

----- Non ut placidis coeant immitia &c. Horace *Ars Poetica* v. 12.

How great a testimony to *truth*, & support of the early maxim in *Characteristics*, p.4, “*the truth is the most powerful thing in the world*” – so again in p.142, 146 of *Sensus Communis*.

And here by the way take notice in relation to Horace’s verse just cited, that the harpy-form is no objection to him, since the fair lady was joined to the vulture beneath, this was the more moral & instructive case the other form of the given kind to show the speciousness of vice & that in such characters the best countenance & face of sweetness & beauty way like the greatest cruelty underneath & rejoined to the most savage disposition.

[99] [Of freedom or the free-manner]

1. Remember Mgr. Heer Vander Werf (the exact contrary) his Abraham, Sarah & Hagar introduced. All false, bound up, glued, clung, candied, baked And withal minute, contracted, diminished, miniaturised, particularised, detailed, little parts expressed, nails, hair &c. (as ridiculed by Horace in the *Emilian faber*. See *Characteristics* ...). No sacrifice of under-parts, no subjection of taints, beauty down the ambition colours (see in *Colours* sup. 89 margin bottom), no introduction of the mortifying kind (*amortir* in French), no abatement degradation (consequently no elevation, exaltation, or sublime, no hyperbole⁶¹⁸, majesty &c.). No..... And *lastly* no **ellipsis* or right reduction in the out-line⁶¹⁹.

⁶¹⁸“*For themselves*”. But now, on the contrary, illiterate, vulgar, scarce sobe & in their wits. No liberal education, philosophy or learning. Mere mechanics. If his right, by example, by *rote*: no reason to give for it. . Hear their common talk! “Give me nature”, says one “Nothing like nature. Then porters & *whores*, called to sit as wives (as Rubens’s) painted over and over, duly & insipidly. Here, the academy-genius, & were *academists* as now called according to modern institution. At this the ablest & nobler genius of a painter laughs, or spurns: and justly. But what lays he for himself? --- Nature must be mended”. Nature is poor, imperfect, short”. And what says the *pedant* author (Fréart) & the other writer *Bossu* &c.? --- forsooth! “We must not design in perspective as we see things: but as we ought to see them”. This a weak aim at good sense; but by them made mere nonsense.

⁶¹⁹Supra 70.

*Compare the *ellipsis* in the outline of painting to the superficialities of large or colourful statuary work or relief-work set at a distance. For here roughness helps remarkable lineaments & no more. Not the *Emilian Faber*. Not the hairees. But by this rule “that whatever is hid by the due distance whether in painting or statuary, is not only superfluous, but injurious & detracting”. Remember the ephesian Calopus (of which Slavatore Rosa speaks in his satyr on painting) which being

2. *Freedom! Free- manner! --- What? --- As how? --- Why not explain? This said by every-one. But let us hear, what account? Few except the painter can give any. And the painter mute in this respect viz.. that he has neither language or pen by which to explain himself plainly to those who are not of the mystery & trade (not so the ancient painters who wrote & philosophised on their art). Thus certain philosophers, coifed up in their artificial terms of ideas complex, reflex &c are angry when they can't explain their mind to one without the pale [see the parallel place in the divine man, chap...of book...].*
3. Concerning *freedom*, see a moral explanation sup.55, margin superior [55]
The same doctrine & explanation of liberty & freedom in the moral philosophy and in painting. Viz.. “that the truly *austere, severe, self-severe, regular, restraintive* character and regimen, corresponds (not fights or thwarts) with the *free, the easy, the secure, the bold* το θαρσαλεον (See Arrian chap. ... of book ...) “Not libertinism for liberty”. No *libertinage, dissoluteness*, but the only ελευθερια *sibi imperiorus* (as Horace), so *Characteristics* (Miscellany) p.311 &c & other passages. [99]
4. Memd. In life of Titian, what he said upon his loose wild stroke over the hair & complexion of a portraiture nicely painted. Viz.. as he did the *por comprire la faticaa*, to *cover the fatigue* or *bury the pains*.

[100] [Of Portraiture.] [Sup. 74

From whatever was set fall above as send of page 66.....”*Even an indifferent person who* neither in mein nor habit conveys any similitude to any known rank, species or class (as neither senator, or judge, soldier, scholar or philosopher, saint, *monk or priest, good fellow, rake squander, wild youth, juriato, courtier or *cook, country-squire.....) yet being known particularly & very *remarkable, citable*, much talked of, much praised, much ridiculed, or *bantered* by his club, cabal, set of friends, or known in such & such walks, in Coffee-houses, in the side-boxes at St. James’s or Hyde Park *Mr. Such a one, Mr. D’y call, Mr. Thingum....* This personage this versed phyzz (as they say) is, for the time he is known & remembered & whilst the humour lasts a pleasing invitation, & makes the artist by chance & unknowingly “a *poet-painter for the time being*”. Even this a *character*⁶²⁰ & the work *characteristical*: an imitation raises delight, causes comparison, instructs (“How like! Just he for all the world!”). But the humour over once, the jest st spent and where is the sense, the thought? The piece sinks again into its *nothing*, is *no character*: it dies & becomes thoughtless, void of meaning: and all the art in the world is thrown away. It is an abuse of real art which should (is, and will) be revived for a better purpose: for if the painter deigns to hold to this work – his art & genius will not deign to attend him thus employed. He may excel in this and (as Van Dike) sacrifice his ability in all else.

This remark as to the *epic*-artist when he becomes face-painter or worker in portraiture; viz.. “that besides the subjecting of his genius, narrowing of his thought, contraction of his idea, deadening of his fancy, constraining of his

admired before erected was afterwards forced to loose much, instead of gaining as was believed. Also Pliny’s story of Nero’s passion for a statue which he first gilded (by which he gave dazzling lights & odd reflections to the before quiet passive & sober rock) then unquiet; by scrapping off, whence besides a small discrimination of each part of the superficies (& not in proportion neither) he made all smooth & could as possibly without new imperfection & abstraction restore to its original roughness and masculine touch & complexion.

⁶¹⁹Supra 71.

*Remember Van Dike’s Friar, which so *Bradford* had of *clergymen*. An imitation of an imitation (of a hypocrite, not really Mor-worshipped, but how refined! How awful & near nature in the original, viz.. the actor, the priest himself!), a fiction after a fiction. Yet even thus *characteristical, a character!* With his death’s head and seemingly mortifying face. Not so on the stage. See Dryden’s Spanish Friar. Even this *characteristical* & though *reiterable* still playing.

*A cook. And so down through all the order of *ryparography* (as above, 74, 75).

⁶²⁰See above in Characters p. 65.

**Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora perclat.* Eneid, lib. 3.

hand, desaccosting him in the freedom of his pencil, tying him down to copying *translating*⁶²¹ servilely submitting him to the Lords & Ladies &c., his originals, besides all this, I say, he loses his *time & fame*. These works buried: those *immortal*. These scarce one in twenty work purchasing by a stranger. Those the lasting to all people & all nations. And as he proceeds, he improves. He gains not only in his experience, but by the spreading of his works around, which spreads his name, bring custom to him whilst living, & honour both whilst living, and (which is the generous artist's great spur as is the hero's) after lie both in his own country & fancy nation.

[102] [Of the *decorum*.]

See above p.79 (3) (4) (5)

1. This the place for censure the censurer of Raphael Monsieur Freart (as above 68). But then by way of excuse for him (*he being a sound defender of the ancients*) observe "that this is in common to him with all other *papist virtuosi*, accustomed to cruel & indecent spectacles painting, wholly opposite to the DECORUM viz.. *crucifixion*, martyrdom, wheels, gibbets, torments, to be ranked, indeed, in *ryparography*.

A painter therefore must incite the *dramatic & scenical*, not the merely *epic & recitative* poet. These two works are *real spectacles*, not *recitals* of spectacles; where the mind takes in, greedily & without distinction what the eye cannot **investigate or endure*.

Thus Medea, whether in the *scene*, or in the chaste comic *tablature*, must not stab her children (*coram populo*) but the combat of the passion must be seen & represented according to supine art, not the butchery & scene event & fact.

Thus even in battles (heroic & of good masters) rarely a spear shaking in a body & then to not in a principal or near figure. Never a head divided like that by Junius in the Eneid. No arms, limbs, &c. chopped after dying by as by this Monsieur Freart prescribed in his censure.

⁶²¹Note the force of that word & make the comparison run with authors.

*[1] See Homer's description of Achille's shield. Iliad χ.

Τοισιν δ' εν μεσσοισι παισ φορμιχχι λιχειν

Ιμεροεν κιθαπιξε, λινον δ' υπο καλον αιιδεν

Λεπταλη φωνη τοι δε ρησσοντεξ αμαρτη

Μολπη τ' ιυχμω τε ποσι σκαιροντεξ εποντο.

Hos vero inter medios, puer cithara sonora

Suaviter citharizabat, chorda autem belle resoanbat

Tenella voce: hivoero pulsantes ferram simul

Cantuque sibiloque predibus tripudiantes sequebnatur.

And so again Virgil's description of Eneas's shield the wolf-nurse (lib. 8 in fine)

---- *Illam teresi cervice reflexam / Mulcere alternos* ---- / *Nec non tarquinium esechit porsean imbebat / Accipere* ---- /

Aeneada in fermum pro libertate vuelant. Here we have the tyranny & liberty painted but without marks or signatur &

so *huzzas!* and the noise of multitudes. --- *Ludisque vice plausunq fremibant*. And even variety of knowledge --- *victal bongo ordines gentis / Quem varie linguis, habitu fam vestis & armis* ---- AQ. Fin in poetical heat.

[2] ---- *Arge illi partibus ignis*

Hue caputati illue, humano ex utrog pependit. Lib. 9 in fine. And just before:

Et mediam farro genian inter tempora frontem

Dividit, impubesq immane dulcere malas. And below again:

Cum Galea longe jacuit caput ----.

Such are the pictures which the (reciting epic) poet draws. But of which the first sort (marked I) are unexhaustable: the second indecent, against the DECORUM in painting and *unimitable* on stage. And for the former see again what a designing Virgil makes for a shield, in the same place (viz.. lib 8). But which neither *basso relevio, claro oscuro* nor colours can excuse. "Fleets (with their offices aboard appearing distinct) *nations & gods* drawn on to battle. *Generals & particulars*. Aggregate & separate. Near & distant. Little & great.....seas, sea-monsters &c.

Inveigh here (but with modesty & Socratic irony) against High-Church & popish toleration & inquisition of that horrid representation (viz. *crucifixion*) & other saints adored in those agonies & made altar-pieces, church-ornaments & for books &c. Not one part here to censure (like true protestants & zealous) the idolatrous part. On the contrary should we speak our thoughts we might incite some displeasure perhaps for diminishing the force of that terrible word *idolatry* (which we might copy perhaps to the *material virtue* the *religious-worship* only, indulging all else for vulgar's sake who will always frame the idol & wished better would've one framed beautiful to hand). But as to humanity & manners, sure I am, that this is all ill, injurious & *imbuing* young minds in smelly, cold-blood massacres &c. And here take occasion to recommend the genius of our attention against keeping anything in pain & putting out of pain. Although otherwise so greedy of fighting spectacles, but not cold blood. Above all, praise of our laws, for *rack* abolished no *wheel* "spectacle corrupts more than the example mends or terrifies".

[78] [Memd. concerning words & phrases in the work]

In case of the word *ordinance* (necessary to be used, as before in **Letter & Notion**) remember to put sometimes the word economy.

In case of the word *group* or *groop* (in the same manner) the word *mass*, "*the groups masses*".

And in case of *plastic*, the word *graphic* (as in *Sensus Communis* P.146) especially when with a glance to *gravery* – *geo-graph*. *Ars-graphica* Viz. Fresnoy, Dryden.

DICTIONARY. Also these words (some *made*, others already *of art*)

Ryparography/Ryparographers – Pliny.

Accompaniments

Colourists. Viz. of venetian school, the best.

Mannerists.

*Epic*⁶²²: painting & painter.

*Composition of teints*⁶²³.

The **Plastic*.

**Pictoresque*, grotesque, arabesque (distinction & etymology of these two).

Contraste.

Taint (for *teintre*). Inf. 90.

Machinery⁶²⁴.

High, low/Life.

Vegetable, still, sensible, quick, real, natural, animal/Life.

heroic, epic, *tragic*, *poetic*, masculine/Life.

Romanic, fantastic, feigned, devotional, ecstatic, seraphic, mystic/Life.

Grotesque, barbarous, savage, monstrous/Life.

⁶²²Next page.

⁶²³P. Belloni's Raphael p.38.

*Viz.. *the generous plastic: the noble plastic* &c. (the artist) as just above. The *epic master*, heroic painter &c. The maker ποιητης &c. as in Miscellany &c.

*But, whereas the terminations in *esque* (as burlesque, romanesque &c) are all buffooning; remember never to use the word *pictoresque* by way of honour (as all common painters in their* cant). But *rally this* & use instead of it, *painter-like*, *plastical*, *graphical*, *poetical* ... *So *raphaelesque*, *salvatoresque*.

Fruitage.

Drapery.

Groop or masses.

Ordinance.

Fore-shortening, high-low-side-short.

Killing, killed. Deadened, mortified, broke.

Tablature.

Relief-work. Inwroughts.

Out-line.

Signature/Designation.

Figurative as in title, 96.

Freedom & free-manners. Inf. 99.

Style.

Design (not with respect to any thing *future* or *intended*. This sense to be banished of mind).

Cover the fatigue. See below 99 (4).

1. What to join in with the word *epique* (for *tragic*) instead of **comic & satiric*?

The *Epique*-painter can be said with dignity. But what for a *Paul Veronese* an ordinary scripture-painter of Christs, apostles, virgins &c? --- Martyrdoms! Indeed are tragic in form, & epique because equally intermixed with heathen grandeur, pomp & magistrate, with the sublime of Christian machine, cherub & seraphin in the first &c.

2. Venture the word, and call the *tablature* sometimes *the poem* after P. Belloni's example: page 36 line 8 of his Pictures of Raphael in the Vatican: *L'unitá de questo suo poema &c.*
3. The epitle, *decorouse* and *the decorouse* instead of the *pulclinum* το καλον. As in sounds the *sonorouse*.
4. The *virtual* for the *virtuouse*; which last cannot be used for the *energic* in the good sense. But *withal* may be introduced with *practical*. Also apply to mute things, painting &c. For so already in our language *the virtue of a medicine &c.* Hence the *virtualist* to come in ease (& with diversion) of *virtuoso*.
5. In the same manner the *numerous* (sense of numbers). *The decorous, the numerous* (use them together) *the true*. The *verum atque daecens* of Horace. See above p.65 (3).

⁶²⁴Used by the Spectator of January 5th 1712.

*The word not yet found. But remember the word *ethic* in ease of *moral & manners*. Thus "ethic & moral" --- "ethic & heroic" --- "Ethic artist, painter" --- "Ethic & poetic".

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V

Voiture 65.

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[31] [3. Characters, 1st, 2nd, 3rd]

*Distinction of Characters. Viz.. *First: Second: Third* viz.. the middle or the mixed.

1. *First. Notes. Marks* of sounds, syllables, words, speech and of sentiments, senses, meanings by that medium viz. the sounds & speech. Thus Cyphars, short hand, *Cicero's* invention. See...
2. *Second. Signs.* SIGNA, SIGILLA, imitation of real forms & natural beings *plastically* (convex, or concave) or *lirically & graphically*, by lines & colours, from the superficies & extremities of the bodies; according to optics.
3. *Third & a middle sort, emblematic.* As when the latter SIGNA are used as mediums (speech being passed over) to convey sentiments, senses, meanings &c. (but not sentences, diction, &c.). For when the figure of an animal stands as a mark (arbitrarily and without relation to his form, nature, passion, history) then is this no more than an ordinary first character (as α , β , χ). But if real: history, passion, habit, form be taken in ; than ought this to be fine & beautiful & just: else it is lame, & imperfect in its kind.

Of this latter sort *the true* therefore, is emblematic, & graceful, without mixture: *the false* enigmatic merely, mixed & barbarous; as the Egyptian hieroglyphics (of which the cause see above 27, 28). Nor can the mixture of middle characters with first as in the Egyptian way of obelisks, be any other than monstrous upon examination; as it appears *primâ facie* to the slightest examiner or novice: however this hieroglyphic way may have been extolled by travelling philosophers & admirers of the wonders of Egypt.

Thus our particular science, therefore, of [32] *design or signature* may *emerge* from this *chaos* of barbarity; we distinguish from *first characters* from barbarous forms conjoined with those *first* (as in *Egyptian hieroglyphics⁶²⁵) leaving only the beautiful anaglyphics (*relief-works & in-wroughts* of the polite ancients) as a true species of art & workmanship, in the emblematic way. But this also being slightly touched & explained; we pass over to the unmixed,

*In the notes *below* for memories sake, & order (all being smooth & polite *above*) place this table [Inserir a tábua que consta em Rand, p. 91].

I make no scruple to place the *emblematic & enigmatic* kind as the third or *last* in order, even in respect of time, history & progress of arts. Since hardly will any one imagine (by reason & experience of all other nations, barbarous & gothic as well as Greek) but that letters next follow upon speech, and the copy of forms afterwards; as a work of leisure. This second way of description or characters may indeed whilst yet rude & unimproved have been employed to the use of first characters & barbarously mixed with those: as by the Egyptians: But scarcely without design of mystery, a princehood & [32] (as is notorious in that case) magic &c. And even by the hieroglyphics themselves it appears in their mixture with other notes & characters (which are of no imitation after life or natural shapes, but purely characters of this kind as Arabic, Chinese, &c.) that the way of first characters was known to them & that this other so much boasted-way was but an abridgement or concealment of those; an art *super-induced*, & afterwards regulated, perceived & maintained mystically, conventionally, rationally, orthodoxly & specifically as said above, p.27 latter part.

*After the middle or third sort of characters & hieroglyphics thus fully discussed (which account, in passing, of Egyptian priesthood mystery &c.: as here over leaf just behind, & before, p. 27, 28) subjoin *Oxford Almanac* (as among examples) "which for ugliness of figures &c., might pass as truly mystic priestly & hieroglyphic; but otherwise emblematic, or at least so aimed, & the *third* or *middle* order intended".

Appellation viz.. "Those formous academical anaglyphics, of annual edition --- emblematic *Nostradamus's* of the age, (of Christian-Church) renowned for prophecys in Church & State.

So, many pretty cuts of *mice & molet* handed about, penny-books together with almanac & prayer-books cried in the street by the fat man with strutting belly & big voice.

Orthodox forms (as the Egyptian above, over leaf, & before viz. p. 27, 28) so these *Oxford-awkward* figures, so the originals viz.. Doctors, College-man &c. --- Raillery ---

⁶²⁵Sup. 27.

simple & pure viz.. “*Design*. Plastic art. Second poetry, imagery. *Iconography*. *Typography* (improperly applied to printing characters) by *type*, *prototype* & *ectype* and the just imitation of nature according to natural history and the ideas or species of several forms animal and vegetable, to some END, and with some INTENT”. E.g. In a single figure of a human body. A man. --- “Why? --- What man?” --- Answer, “a strong man”. Therefore here something learnt! --- “*a beautiful, well made man*”--- Again something learnt. “An ugly cruel dangerous man” Therefore caution, discernment⁶²⁶, thought: the mind profited, advanced, and fancy, judgement, improved, knowledge of the species, of our own species, of *our-selves*; the best chief knowledge, a step hither. So all imitation of natural things according to the great master in his poetics (.....) Nothing being more pleasant to human nature from the beginning as this *learning* viz.. “*This is this*”. Distinguishing into species & classes (to way to record, remember, lay up, draw consequences) and helping society & communion of thought & sense, information natural, delightful. Mimicry of the better sort. All men *mimics*, else no speech, no manners. And hence the Egyptians made a monkey the hieroglyphic of [33] learning: & modern painters use it for *universities* (see *Iconologia di Cesare Ripa* upon the words *Academia* at the beginning & *end of the article).

[All this *premised*, that the following *chapters*, phrases, terms &c. may be easy. Viz. *Second Characters*, *signature*, *designation*, *in-wroughts*, *typography* &c. the fixed and settled terms or expressions for notions as just above. “*So much, therefore, as to this. Now to proceed* &c.]

*Again, “What is we see? --- *a boy* --- Therefore sweet, pretty, innocent --- But a *cupid* --- a new case. A boy & beautiful boy, the most that is possible: but not innocent, not harmless, not wholly sweet gentle loving: but mischievous, treacherous, mocking, subtle, an urchin, half-evil-demon, cruel, sprightly, proud, disdainful, tyrannical, capricious, impercuous (compare places with *Characteristics*, vol.3, p. 309,310). Here a new story, a new *lesson* an *instruction*⁶²⁷. Something learnt. For *wretched* would be that painter who being to paint a cupid or several cupids, should loose this essential mortal part. No history, no true form, no *cupid*, if this be lost; if this visibly appear not, & the *manners* character preserved according to the poetic idea & hypothesis. This is *poetic truth*. And thus on *Aschanius* (when truly *Aschanius*) very different from a *cupid* when in the habit & form of *Aschanius* but carrying his *true manners* & *character*, with would be anxious in an able painter to preserve in this history, if it were to be represented by a great hand. Quite otherwise as to cupid when he is out of his natural character & form as in the story of *Psyche* where not

⁶²⁶*Physiognomy* & penetration into tempers, manners, designs (*the dark cabinet*) as far as natural & true in learnt also by this art from the ideas of the great masters. See below p. 65.

**Hic ille est*, ο αυτων, Demostenes. *Digito monsharier & diciet Hic est* (Pers.). Who is the *ille*? --- Some pre-science else nothing learnt. Thus in the imitative poetic part of painting & plastic art, reference (in the higher sense) to the in-ante idea of forms, as explained above viz. and (in the lower sense) to the early learnt species or general classes, the natural sort, into which nature has actually & necessarily cast, as into moulds, the severally organised creatures & their generations successive. As “*This is a hors!*” (how like!). “*This is a dog!*” a water-dog! A land-spaniel! A hound! &c.”: so a child delighted (according to Aristotle-poet). Something learnt. (Remember Bussy-rabutin’s pictures. “Nose, eye, mouth, so & so. --- Why?”).

**Il cinocefalo, overo Babuino lo facciamo assistente dell’Academia, per essene egli stato tenuto da gli Egitii ieroglifico de le Lettere, e pero lo consecrauano, a Mercurio riputato inventore, e autore di tutte le Lettere, si come riferisce*. Piero Valeriano, Lib.6.

*N.B. At this place, under the black line, begins the division of this head (occasioned by the equivocal word *characters*) viz. into *Characters*, 1st, 2nd, 3^d (as hitherto, above, ever since page 3) and into *characters* of life & imitation manners &c. which begins at this paragraph drawn from what preceded.

⁶²⁷So again p. 65.

*Memd. Here, in Porchiano’s collection at Naples, his two cupids & one of *Jacinti Brandi* the other Paulo’s. The first good stile: character lost. The latter, French stile & air: but character kept. The former, however, preferred, if bought, because of the practice &c.

only his size is manly & form different but history & manners altered, character changed. A party & connected himself. A sufferer under his other self. A patient, an *actor* not a god or demon or genius in the machine part & superior *role* of deity, invested in his proper powers & habits, arts, practices, &c. ---- See Raphael (so judicious!) on this subject, in the Vatican (if not there, on the walls). [Infra 65 or rather 66].

[66]

Something therefore there is in every design, or designatory work of imitation, & copy after nature, (be it even in animals, fruits, a flower-piece) which answers to the history in a truly epic or poetic work. This is in truth & strictly *historical, moral, characteristic*. The note or character of nature, the form, the natural habit, constitution, reason of the thing, its energy, operation, place, use or effect in nature; if ill & mischievous to us, that we may record & avoid, if salutary record & improve. This is the moral, the intelligence of the fable. "Such a one he is! You see him in his true colours! This is the man! Such he is --- *Sic, crito, est hic!*, as in the roman comic poet go in the animal beast or foul⁶²⁸. "This is the creature! Such he is!" --- Be it a *lion*. "See how like! Such is he easy march, unconcernedness, his want of fear, his consciousness of mastery superiority & his contempt of other creatures, such his slowness & laziness, though ready for activity & agility when roused by any assault or called by hunger his prey" --- Is it a bull? "See the same grim indifference, sullen security & ease, trust in his strength, the jealousy of his eye over his family on the approach of anything injurious to them or any rivalry from his own kind" --- Is it a bird? A same one merely of the household-kind? --- *a cock?* "See his *walk*, his *demarche*, his carriage amongst his *ladies*: his generosity even to the starving himself & neglect of his own sustenance!

The courage of all these creatures; their ready exposing of their lives in the defence of their kind! The tractableness & tameness of these! The *unsubordable, indomable* fierceness & innocence of some! The savageness & cruelty of others! --- The characteristic still, the truth, the historic is all in all, & the το φησικον, the το... the thing *imitated*, the thing *specified* (reduced to its *true form & species*) is all in all, the whole delight, pleasure of the work, , the secret charm of the spectacle. This accomplished & all is done. *Instruction, moral, description, truth*.

The meaning, the intelligence. Humour-thought. *A scene. A thought*. Even in portraiture: as a statue of a senator (nature concurring, & the person being in shape & feature adapted). This is a *sense*, a *thought*. So a promising youth, hero, prince, &c. --- *quantum instar in ipso est!*. Eneid. L. 6. "Even an indifferent person &c. See in *Portraiture*, inf. 100. [...

[3] [Characters, Personages]

Second Characters (viz.. with regard to the title as above p.1) are *moral personal/ personages*⁶²⁹.

See the chief verse and *hinge* of Horace, poetic Art vers.86, & my note in margin. *Descriptas*⁶³⁰ *servare vices*⁶³¹ *Operumq Colores*.

Again verse 101:

⁶²⁸Andrea Act. 5 Sec. 4 sup. 32.

⁶²⁹See Prefatory thoughts infra 63.

⁶³⁰I.e. Χασακτηξαζ et Mores in Dramatico. Sic Socrates ad Dem: Χασπακτηξα τοις εχχοιζ εαβαλλειν.Et Demosth: ει δε ταισ αμιλιαιξ ο τησ φυχηζ

βλεπετα. Sic Nursus infra de Comaedia vers 155: *Aetatis cujusque: Mobilibusque Decor Naturis*. Vide et Sat 10 vers 1-2: *Defendetem vicem modo Rhetoris atque poetae*. Et infra vers 193: *Officiumque virile defendat. Partes defendere*, idem quod hic *Servare Vices*. Sic. Epis. I Lib.2 vers. 171: *Partes fueri*.

⁶³¹I.e. Actionum, affectum, humanorum in Scenis ubi *Res agitur* (ut. Inf. V. 179) in Satyra refertur tantum quane sup. Sat. 2:2 vers. 60 *Quisquis erit vitae scribam color*.

Ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adsunt

Humani vultus _____
_____ male si mandata Loqueris,
Aut dormitabo, aut ridebo. Cristia moestum
Vultum verba decent _____
Format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
Fortuanrum habitum _____
Si dicentis erunt fortunis absoan dicta,
Romani tollenti equites peditesque cachinnum.

The same ridicule as when even a *Guido* makes his advancement dance (Lord Devon's Picture) [4] although chained and in sight of a monster.

The truth of affections.

Aetatis cujusque notandi sunt tibi mores
Mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis (156)
Imberbis juvenis (162)
Semper in adjunctis, evoque morabimur aptis (178)

Thus also the painter's science a weirdsome knowledge of men & things, moral characters &c.

_____ Ille profecto
Reddere persoane scit convenientia cuique.
Respicere⁶³² exemplar vitae morumque jubebo.
Doctum imitationem et⁶³³ VERAS inc duces voces
_____ morataque recte fabula. Vers 319.

Ficta Volupttatis causa sint proxima VERIS.
Necquodcunque valet poscat sibi fabula crede. Vers. 338.

Which is the same as the *incredulus odi* v.1888, cited already in the *Notion*. (Reference to the *Characteristics*, vol.3 p.181, note: Vitruvius).

Hence metamorphosis dangerous [5] subjects, although so common with moderns.

Question: whether any such subjects & how managed by the ancients such as painters?

Answer *

----- *Sibi convenientia finge.*

The *characters* which in poetry are included in the 5th and last part⁶³⁴ (according to Horace in his concealed division in his *Ars Poetica*) answer, in painting, to the symmetry & proportion of the figures: because, suppose a *hand* or *head* given; the rest of the figures must answer to this *species*. For there are *such and such*: and these the painter

⁶³²See Monsieur Dacier.

⁶³³Quod in Socraticis Chartis habet (ut sup. 310) ubi Persoane Characteres, mores minimum quim dialogi erant. Vide Aristoteles Poet. Cap.1 et Atheneum lib. 11

* Remember: in this place, *dialogue* – writing, imitative, poetical dramatic active. Drawing and design – as in “Moralists”, p.187: “to say colours &c.” & *moral painting* (all time painting being moral) in the following page, viz. 188. Also is the said about dialogue-drawing and design &c., in *Soliloquy* and *Miscellany* &c. See the index theme and particularly vol. I, p. 201,202. As cited below, page 66, margin-side.

must investigate from observation and just instinct. A moor, an east and a west Indian nor only differ in colour, hair, feature, but the whole proportion. And even among Europeans: a Swede, Dane, Briton: how different even from Flemish and high-German! Much more from the Spaniard, Gascon or south-Frenchman! The Huns (gothic invaders) from the east and north-east parts of Europe are described resembling the Tartarus short-necked squab square and something peculiar about the head and the nose (.....)

Thus particular symmetry (viz. of figure and forms) are in painting the *characters*: since these in [6] poetry are included in the moral part, or manners. For manners are here properly exhibited by characters only, their opposition, contrast, force, operation: whence the *purgation* spoke of by Aristotle and explained in *Characteristics* (vol.3, p.262, notes, line 17).

The didactic or preceptive way being unartificial, unmasterly and unpoetic: not *Homeric*, although *Virgilian*. This the province of the philosopher, the rhetor, the historian: not the bard, the *vates*, the enthusiast. Thus *Sofocles* more poetical than even *Euripides*, although the latter refined beyond him, and excelled in style and other parts: particularly in scanty: in which this moral irregularity encroaches on the philosopher or rhetoric part so much the better afforded him scope.

Corollary. This particular division of the five in painting called *symmetry* (viz. of the figures with respect to themselves) is separate and abstract from *the moral part* and *manners*; which in poetry includes characters and mental forms. On the other hand, the moral part in painting lies *but little* in the forms (for *Socrates*, a *Silenus*, whom he resembled, a *Tribon*, the centaur *Chiron* or any other specious form corporeal may be principally moral). But is expressed in the air, feature, attitude, action, motion; and is therefore wholly lodged in those parts of painting called the *movements*, where action, passion and the attention are shown. Thus Characters which in painting are mere *forms* are not moral; although in poetry always moral and belonging to ethics in that definition. [**Infra 33 middle**]

[Characters Personages from 6 [inf. 66 From 33 middle. [65, na verdade] 65]

Explanation as above (p.6, latter part) viz.. “the 5th part in painting called *symmetry* is abstract from the moral part, which lies chiefly *in the air, feature &c and in the movements*⁶³⁵ (where action, passion & the affections)” --- Add “in some measure also in the *custumi*⁶³⁶, habit, dress, helping the air & describing the manners”.

And here insert “the different scribes (poets & painters) of the better & worse humanity, according to Aristotle’s *Poetics* (.....) where such & such a one (viz.) described men better: such & such a one (viz.) worse.

And here, dividing & distinguishing between the *heroic* & lower or *comic* 3rd (to which the *ryparographers* answer) a word or two of these latter in as far only as they are *characteristical*, & therefore pleasing, by a *je ne sais quoi* which is easily explained; as among *other instances, remember the modern common author our guest honourable Snr. Evermont one of the best things (*slighting the rest*) is his exact copy after the life of the old French Marshall de ... and the Jesuits. So an Italian or Spaniard an odd figure wrapped in a ragged cloak but with formal mean, the shrugg or shrut. So a country-peasant or bore. A Jew. One of Salvator Rosa’s cut-throat figures, shaberoons, ragamuffins, moss-

⁶³⁴Viz. *mores*. In French *moeurs portiques*, according to *Bossu*.

⁶³⁵Viz. the 4th part.

⁶³⁶Viz. the 1st part.

**La Bruiere* (after Theophraste) the chief. And here remember not only to cite & comment a few principle characters, but (in the notes still) transcribe his whole passage of ancient & modern manners, in his preface. And remember his French-court at mass “their backs to *the god they worship* (their altar & *God-wafer*) and faces to the tribunal, i.e., the king. Long perukes, &c.”

See also what may be inserted here in the text it-self (without scruple of self-citation as resolved below page 97 at the bottom) concerning *Characteristics* from vol. I p.201 &c. viz.. “such or such a face &c every face must be a certain man’s”.

troopers, knights of the port, jilts, drabs, ever-droppers, gainesters, sharks, players, musicians, mountebanks, quack-doctors, sharpers. *Ambulalarum Collegia*&c.

All these, the more pleasing, as more secret, mysterious, *difficult & with all *instinctive* in manners⁶³⁷ & of real use in life, & towards the knowledge of mankind & of the world.

Remember also our Shakespeare's Jack Falstaff, a *character*. And here indeed the form itself helps in the manners. But overdone & spoilt both by poet & players. The painter (a *Salvator Rosa* & tolerably good satirist in poetry) would not hyperbolise so⁶³⁸: but moderate de *hyperbole* & strike the imagination far better – of the *hyperbole* see above p.54.

Remember also Voiture's delights in his letters from Spain of the scene's of *Don Quixote* when he was travelling. Strange impression of *Character*!

*And upon this found this maxim rule, viz.. "That in all such satirical characteristics, as the finer & better subjects of imitation, are the more concealed & not the obvious staring notorious faults in manners; so the fine & more delicate imitation is the most tender, & by nicest slightest touches in poetry as in painting and not by exaggeration, amplification, swaining heightening over-changing" (*caricatura*, burlesque in one kind, bombast & gigantic• in the other). On which the very thing depends the difference between *Horace* & *Juvenal* --- *Sordidus & lusco Qui possit dicere lusce!*. So a sordid painter first chooses a mean blemish and not a true-one in manners: and then withal exaggerates. A blind fiddler instead of a *Tigellus*, a king's chapel..., debaucher of youth, rake, dissolute: & *gamester* &c. •As even the great *Michael Angelo*. But *Raphael*, how just!

⁶³⁷See above p. 32.

[10] [4. Instinct. Natural Ideas]

Those philosophers *(modern) the poorest & most shifting, for the sake of a system, hypothesis, who, surpassing all *ancient* conceits and extravagancies of the kind deny ideas, sense, perception (i.e. life) to animals. But those yet poorer & more shifting, who impugned natural ideas & ridicule *instinct* & *innate ideas* because perhaps abused, misapplied, carried too far by some modern preceding writers or by *Plato*.

Memd. Room here for demonstration of the young *swallow*. First flight precipitated from a rock over sea, or an eminence over a paved court or place fatal to fall. Yet the equilibrium instantly forced & the art *known* not *learnt*. Strength only failing when supported by the old ones not art wanting. So the bird's nest as well or better, move exact, the first time that afterwards, as in *Characteristics*, vol. II, p.307, 411, 12 &c. [11]

The *Rictus* & gaping of noxious creatures (bears, lions, wolves, crocodiles, *Dracones*, even small serpents as vipers & insects) imprinted by innate characters, moulds, sockets to speak by analogy (as in no other way in cases of sensation, intelligence, perception, egoity not confined to place or determined by it).

So on the other hand who can doubt the contrary's with beatous faces (especially in the same kind) to be equally imprinted by innate character, manners, preparatory sockets for reception & recognition of such joyous forms, as in the passion between the sexes.

Who would change human nature with this dullness & so readily clear & celestial ? Unless perhaps the senseless modern philosophy & fool hypothesis of insensibility be growing in play for Cavil's sake (as just above over leaf).

What more certain than that the poorer ignorant of our species, being kept from seeing anything but old males & clothed bodies (as in a monkish cloister or garden-house heritage) would, in a clear light when brought to see nudity, distinguish between the true & natural, & the unnatural deformed kind.

⁶³⁸Not in his little perspective figures, although in heroic often guilty & even in perspective for horror's sake: of which see above 54.

*The same philosophers would confound the very notion of species, specific ideas (sad virtuosos!) (see My Lord Book chapter...). But had not the creatrix or sovereign plastic nature set the boundaries, the caprice (i.e. the wantonness and bestiality) of corrupt man would long since have gone beyond of the worst painters, grotesque *ρνπαροχραθοι* &c., as well beyond any of the poets in composing new complicated forms of satyrs, centaurs into which the breed would have run out and been lost. But now even in the inward several species (within the genus) all in foul & eggs which breed with one another a natural propensity for the joining with like; so the breed when mixed & blended; this time and after several consequent generations, displays & opens it-self, & the orders return to their first natural secretions, purity & simplicity of form.

An ingenious author & notable metaphysician (*the same as above*) about 20 years ago took such an advantage from the affected fulsome & common use of instinct and innate ideas, of being extremely well received & learned on account of his excellent genius & capacity in other writings. These words grew so out of fashion that a man of sense durst hardly use them on the properly & most obvious occasions. And it was safer for a gentlemen who was a lover of sports to say seriously upon the subject of this case, that his dog *Jowler* or *Tomboy* *reasoned*, or *meditated*, than that he had *natural sagacity* or *instincts*. We were allowed [11] indeed to say that the poor turner's pot had *sense & feeling* above *iron-Jack* which supplied his room (for Cartesianism was not admitted in its strict sense). But it is dangerous to talk of breed either the dogs or Horsey, least we should betray our ignorance in imagining according to vulgar errors, that passion, affection, instincts, inclinations, impressions, impulses, ideas, imaginations & previous recognition (ready for the object when presented & even raising or calling up a feign & false object when the reason & ripeness came) should possibly be delivered down, in descent & extract to particular *species*. Any even the *species* themselves were called in question, hastily denied.

And thus poor *Horace* & other even in their *Epicurean* & *least theological fist* were very credulous & superstitious, & foolish even when they so for instance
Est in juvenis patrum virtus

Thus the species of horses & other animals of the kind being once seen & nature helped (tho not seen in perfection but form of) the idea of beauty & perfection is raised, & when reduced to this idea of instinct by the able artist; recognised pleasantly by the good eye of every spectator.

If a female of our own species (to possibly the love of babies & that showed propensity) should after a great belly go she scarce knew how, not find her self inclined to pick straws or make a nest; no wonder, because of *the 2d string to the bow* (reason, discourse, community) the *reserve* (as in *Moralists* page.....) [307 - **Rand**]. Nor is it a wonder anymore that coming to loose the same great belly & the season at hand for suckling &c that she has not the *conatus* or *effort* that she called not again for the babies newly left oft, nor does what is answerable to the hen, hussling about, swelling her wings, checking, hovering, stretching her legs, poking & scrapping like a thing mad & in fury.....

[15] [5. Taste. Relish. Eye. Judgement. Criticism]

1. Pedantry⁶³⁹ in painting; as in scholarship – mere scholar: mere painter – colleges of scholars: academies of painters. Seldom a thorough practising colouring scholar, not a pedant. Seldom an orator, a poet: but seldomer, hardly ever, a painter. Yes, sometimes a *Homer* (if we may judge by acquiesce) sometimes a *Horace*, a *Xenophon*, a *Demostenes*, a *Socrates*, an *Apelles*, a *Raphael*.
2. First corruption of taste. See above, p.12 par. 4.
 Second corruption. Haste hurry – Therefore arts contemplatory receive *odium*⁶⁴⁰: Thrive only (as letters & philosophy) where much of this recess from public; yet a public & activity i.e. action carrying on, debates, freedom, liberty &c. *Soliloquy* necessary here as in philosophy⁶⁴¹.
 Third corruption. Vice corruption itself. Prostitution worst form of *ρνπαροχραθοι* viz.: obscene acts, very deformity, *effeminacy* (as expressed in the last paragraph of the *Notion*) the licked manner *leché* in French: the lamelled, the very paint (as Flemish phrase) *just as is if it were painted!* ____ [16]

⁶³⁹Sup. P. 12, lin. ult.

⁶⁴⁰Just below viz. p.17-18. See *Soliloquy* in Characteristics.

⁶⁴¹[17] Second Corruption. See Junius, Lib. 1, C.5, p.35. (in pursuance of *Soliloquy* referred to) viz.: “Nihil est curiosius otiofis, Plin. Junior Lib. IX, epist.32. *Frequentia et obnublato hominum conturbat et infirmat imaginum notas: solitudo conservat integras simulachrorum figuras*”. Cornificius Lib.III, Rhet. Ad Herenn. *Quamobrem etiam recte Plinius, agens de ea tranquillitate anime et securitate ofii quae debetur harum artium considerationi, Magni officiorum negotiurumque acervi inquit, abducunt omnes a contemplatione falium; quoniam otiosorum et in magno loci silentio apta admiratis falis elt. In promptu est ratio: phantasiam enim, cujus in Diligenti Artis inspectione precipiae partes sunt, vacuus animus et sola tacentiaque loca mirifice excitant atave alunt. Ivunque perfectum accuratunque Picturarum admiratorem veras omnium verum species anima concipere, conceptasque ad examiannda pulcherince artis experimenta advocare aparteat, manifestum etiam est neutrum, horum sine virtute imagiantiva effici polse; ac ne ipsam quodrem imaginum conformationem, quotidiani negotiis et discurrentium tumultu interpellatam, bene procedere. Videas itaque cultores artis minime vanos, si forte aliquando liberiores et magis vacuos ad interventoribus dies ancti sunt, nunquam non per otium adsuefacere animas absolutissimis gribusque rerum imaginibus colligendis atque in animum congerendis. Atque hoc est illud quod ait Apollonius apud Philostratum Li. II, Cap. 10: Τουσ ορωνταζ τα τηξ χραπηικησ ερχα, μιμητικηζ δεισθαι ου χαρ να επαινεσειε τιξ τον χεχραμμενον ιππον η τυρον, μη το ζωον ενθυμηωεισ, ω εικασται. Eos, Qui pictoriae artis opera inspiciunt, indigere imagiantiva facultate. Nemo enim recte laudaverit pictum acqum, nisi Qui animal illud anima concipiat, cujus similitudinem pictura exprimit; vide locum, Inspice quoque [18] Platonem lib.II de Legibus. Quamus autem ratio hoc, quam atallimus, solitudinem satis commendet artificium opera adjudicaturis; presto tamen est et alla non minus pregnans, Qua idem suardet. Quemadmodum enim medicis nom apparentia modo vitia notanda sunt, verum etanm invenienda que latent; scepe ipsis, qui saanndi sunt, ea occultentibus: ita ad inspiciendas picturas admissus, plura, quam prima facie ostendi videntur, rimabitus, cujus rei in solitudine certius iudicium; quod in turba spectantibus frequenter aut suus cuique favor, aut ille laudantium clamor extorquet. Pudet enim dissentive, et velut facita quadam verecundia inhibemus, plus nobis credere; cum interim et vitiosa pluribus placeant, et ab adulantibus laudentur etiam quae non placent; cum denique optime pictis gratiam prava iudicia non referent.*

Quot quot igitur huic cune sedulo incumbere in animum inducunt, de industria quandoque sumunt certas quasdam imagines, quas quam numerosissime vedent, velut cadem cera alie atque alie forma duci solent. Plasta certe atque ii qui coloribus utuntur, ex ipsis rebus capessunt notiones quibus lineamenta, lucem, umbram, eminentias, recessus iminentur. In singulis corporibus prestantissimas quasque vene pulchritudinis notas observant, easque in unum aliquod opus conferunt; ut nom fam didicisse a Natura quam cum ea centasse aut potius illi. Legem dedisse videnatur. Quis enim pulet ullam anquam talem fuisse foemiane cujusquam put chritudinem, in qua nihil desiderant non vulgaris judca. Anm tamessi in ipsis naturae normis atque dimensionibus universa perfectio est; tamen utriusque parentis mistio tempus, caelum, locus, improvisus aliquis casus, et vaga quodis cogitatio [19] naturali formae non nihil possunt detrabere. *Similitudinum quidem in mente reputatio est inquit Plinius, et in Qua crednatur multa fortuita pollen; vissus, auditus, memoria, hausteque, imagines sub ipso concepto &c.*

And this were time in nature (as I would not give credit; because of founding no argument on hypothetical or dubious foundation, and on false & truth) here would be a high commendation indeed of ideas, imagery &c., & the force of the *φαντασται* fleeting forms &c. (as above p. 9). Not only our painters, and our women stand through imagery &c. [Treat this in raillery] for fear of the breed.

Fourth corruption (or rather precaution, deprivation). Want of *nudity, statuary* &c. Distortion of bodies, see below p. 21, 22.

Painter's taste, like dancing-masters⁶⁴² in carriages. All towards the affectation. Quite contrary to the ancient. All modern. No ancient (nor of the worst work-man) guilty of this, because of so many models extant which although ill copied. Yes no new deceived after the *affected* way (the sweet⁶⁴³ as they will in).

Raphael never guilty of this, nor Poussin although a French-man.

Query. About Raphael's admission figure of the sitting woman (justice) & the ostridge? Esteemed the finest (by painters) to me seems the most modern & ergo.....

[Criticism. How necessary, here; as in other arts (according to *Characteristics*).

Horace's reason (*Ars poetica* Vers 36 &c.).

Ut pictura poesis. Eris quae, &c. [according to our Oxford edition right punctuation after *Marcus, Lambin, H. Stephens & Jan. Faber*] -----volet acer publicae videri

Judicius arguntum quae non forcidat aumen

Haec placid lemal; Haec decies repetita placebit.] [19]

Caution against prejudice, prevention, prepossession from *artificial & half-taste* gathered from painters or *imperial & practical* science (the worst imaginable) in gentlemen⁶⁴⁴.

As thus. A parallel (since such are fashionable) between painting & eloquence rhetoric &c. (as often between that & poetry). ----

--- "O puleram *Prosopopiam!*" (as in Petronius) ---

so here --- "O the *fine fore-shortening!*" ----

Thus in pulpit-rhetoric & priest oratory, at a country-church specially, or in a College amongst *headed-boys* & pedants. "O the excellent true application of the Greek sentence! O the division! Quotation! Reciting!". So in French (Molière's comedy): "*si bien que j'entendais goutte*".

[More of this below. Viz.. "*Reasons why &c*". p. 46]

[46] Reasons why a gentleman's taste if *practical & empirical*, necessarily false.

First Reason

Becomes interested, makes himself a party, espouses a *manner*, style, *mannerist* in the lowest degree and below the painter by trade and profession. ____ Also judge and party in the cause: unfair. So *Nero's* voice and acting (remember *Agripinus* &c in the *Divine Man* chap....of book..... and so again the governor of the Grecian province & of the people differing about the actor or actress, chap.....of book.....).

Dilemma. Either has an idea or not. If an idea; a hand to come up with it or not. If a hand obedient and answering, then a painter *omnibus numeris*, if a hand inferior and unanswering, then being not [47] obliged to pursue as a professor for maintenance but wholly voluntarily and for pleasure only, must lose his end and hate his products. For if he loves, and pleasure comes by degrees through self-love, conceit or flattery; then here comes the corruption, here the

⁶⁴²Infra 30.

⁶⁴³See *Notion* chap. 3, part 7.

⁶⁴⁴More of this on p.46 below, viz., "*Reasons why a gentleman's taste, if practical & empirical, necessarily false*".

* So also the good emperor *Adrian* his great weakness & blemis: only cause & subject of tyranny in him.

taste inevitably miscarries, grows anvy, warps, turns crooked, perverse. Carry this reasoning into *music* and see below p. 72.

Second Reason

Extravagant fondness for *one* master. *One* particular hand. *One* piece (a hundred to one if a good one). Besides that no one master yet of the moderns after *Raphael* has deserved anything like this and even as to *Raphael*, see reasons...

So Nero's gilt-statue. See Pliny...

The great business in this (as in our life, or in the whole of life) is "to correct our taste" (for whiter will not *taste*⁶⁴⁵ lead us). ἀπεχειν, arrest, suspend, defer, delay, proceed gradually, wait, expect, improve.....Else we are runaway with. The man upon the run-away horse in Luciano's cynic (if so good a piece as that to be Lucian's): "whiter away? Whiter *this* pleases" viz.. *his horse* pointing to it. Therefore, stop it in its full career; cross it; turn it; and sometimes, when lazy, even give it the spur: just as in horsemanship as in breaking the colt.

_____ *Animum rege: Qui nisi paret,*

Imperat: hunc fraenis, hunc tu compesce catean.

Horat. Lib. I Ep. 2.

From hence it follows "that pleasure (in order to reap true pleasure) not to be indulged". Ask inquire of self "what sort of pleasure have I? What would I have? Quære, if the true? If *truth*? To what end? What [48] do I contemplate? What inspect? What to understand, reap, learn?" (as above 32).

Is it to see *flesh* painted as *flesh*? ___ No. This *artificial*, *empirical*, the artisan and even least part of the artisan? ___ Is it drapery? _____ No. This of the same kind . _____ Is it *fore-shortenings*, academy postures &c.? ___ No. This still empirical. _____ Is it fine forms in a virtuous sense? This false and more so, than even the *ryparographics*: since this deforms the beautiful nature: whereas the *cacatorio*, a boor or soldier under a hedge or on a dunghill, more suitable and less nauseating. Exciting appetite a horrid reason. Who dares give this for a reason? If so; paint lauces and dishes for the table, smoking dishes the thought never as yet better pursued (I think) any more than cursting ladies or loving beaus except in French court-pictures of the pretty princes and princesses and court airs, as hung in toy-shops.

Observe the difference of a *right* and *liberal* eye from a *mechanic* *false*: the same in painting and figures &c. as in real life and *persons*. What person, what form, character, species of a man do we see? Who was whom we saw in such a company, in such an action, circumstance, reading, writing, talking, hearkening, musing, exercising?" If it be a tailor who is asked; he answers (according to his eye): "a gentleman in such a coloured stuff in such a cut". If it be a dancing-master he answers according to his eye: "a *gentleman* with such a gaze or tread, his legs turned so or so". If it be a fop, he answers (according to his eye still, and as uniting the two latter tastes) "a gentleman so or so dressed, coming into a room with such or such an air & such coloured lips, such teeth".

But if a man of sense, with an eagle's eye; he answers from his memory & *resolution* (for so he gathers *collects* imprints: & such is his *imagery*, *history*, *invention*) "a gentleman of such a behaviour, speech, action, such an address, such manners, aspect & seeming note or character of sense & understanding, temper, mind, soul & inward complexion".

⁶⁴⁵Supra p. 12 το δοκειν.

Third Reason (see below 76) [76]

That if our gentleman, besides his superior knowledge, learning, education & converse, has not withal a particular genius, idea & hand superior to the trading artist & of a degree distinguishable from the common road & style of painting; he must naturally by his study & practice be brought upon a level & much familiarised with the set of painters of his time; & and he is subject to their flatteries, & emulous of their praise, be brought into a society & sympathy with this race, so as to be in a manner *one of them*, & of their club or fraternity: a circumstance which will prove as little advantageous to his fame & reputation as to his manners, his interest, family & estate. The case being not the same with this company as with that of players, musicians, song-minstrels, dancers & the rest of those trades & that *conspiring crew*: all holding together (as said above, p. 72. *Ambularium Collegiae*-----).

Exception for *Fabius Pictor* &c., as above p.46. And the *whole man*, as above 72. Definition of a *pedant* & how formed in painting &c as other science.

Adrian – emperor as above, 46. [77]

The artificial, witty, far-fetched, refined, hyper-critical taste (which is apt to be considered as ingenious & nicely speculative) is the worst in the world, being *half-way* and like *half-thinkers* (in *Characteristics*, vol. III, p.302). The same in fencing, racing, dancing. The *natural* best, till well & truly formed (see again *Characteristics*, I, 190) & the original first rude taste corrected by rule, & reduced to a yet more simple & natural measure. Otherwise an innocent child's eye (of the good parts, and not spoilt already by pictures of the common sort) always found the best, as I have found experimentally in such a one not of the higher gentry but liberal, & out of the way of prints & rich costly playthings & imagery &c. The same experienced as to likeness in portraiture.

Ergo. Better *mere nature*, than half-way, illiterate and full, merely critical judgement; as it were in wantonness, *gaieté de coeur*, with indifference, superficialness, neglect, escort, as can be seen even in the manners, & in the way of self-censuring by these false censurers, *pseudo-critiques*, unanswerable to the French *pretieuses* &c.

Better the mere *je ne sais quoi* of the French: although this not in our language: nor I hope even with. But for us (I hope) something better measured.

“Ducti Rationem artis intelligent, indocit voluptatem, Quintil: IX.4, cited by Junig de Pictura Vetenum, page 38. [20]

[On the subject of false wonder and astonishment] after p. 44 at the end, and this mark. [44]

1. Maxim. Viz.. Ruinous in religious & moral sense *to wonder or admire wrong*.

Superstition hence. So barbarity (that of tyrants) from delight in blood, pain, torture. First a horror: the by degrees a delight. At last horror removed, delight remains & επιχαυρεκακία. [This maxim may be placed in the head of *taste*]. See in *Taste viz.* p. 20.

2. Thus in painting wonderment, astonishment at bold & great things apt to beget the taste of savage & monstrous in design & colouring. And the same wonderment & rapture at the sight of pretty & genteel things apt to beget the *little taste* or relish of toys, baby relish. [20]

*Womanish, as in Camilla's in Virgil Lib. 11.

--- *Tum croceam chlamydemq, sinusq crepanteis*

Carbas eos faluo in nodum collegerat auro.

Pictus aem Tunicas, & barbara teqmna crurum.

Which was what Virgil here calls *womanish* in Camilla's taste & which he marks to be her loss & ruin & of the whole cause the army entrusted with her. Noble just heroic fable of the same sense & moral as that of Esop's kind of the *bride & mouse*: “not even of natural beings worthy of wonder, or admiration, but as &c.” (Go back to page 20 +++)

Nothing even of natural beings worthy of wonder or admiration but as they show nature's real & highest *art*, best *hand*, supreme *touches*, nature's *magnificence*, symmetry, proportions, highest orders, supreme *order* (beyond Doric or Ionic, beyond Christian. For what are all these but imitations?) or as in united & conspiring forms, of actual *unity* & concurrence in one, means to an end, harmony, agreement.

Ergo a tree or even a leaf beautiful, not as *green*, not as regularly shape. For then a mere turf or cut bush would equal & surpass an old oak or cedar or pine. But a rough bit of rock more beautiful in reality than a pearl or diamond. No bribe to make these relishing, yet relished by almost all & casting by relished the other but for a moment, as a rarity or as set off itself or helping to set off other forms in dress, equipage &c. of the lowest human caprice & misconception of beauty. Thus grottos, caves &c the finest imitations of finest gardening. For this is *truth*: the rest *false*.

Thus even in nature the rainbow a mere Jewel an accidental species *refraction* &c. no real *unite*: no being, form, design, end, concurrence. Ergo, a *nothing*, a *non entity*, in *virtuosoship*. A mere miracle or prodigy (without *moral*, or *doctrine*) a nothing. A juggle the passion of those who run after monsters in fancies, & the θανματοτοιοι, prestigiators.

Therefore the same here as in life & true wisdom (in order to avoid deceit & imposture).

[21] [6. Discouragements viz. in art & in this discourse a promotion of art.]

1. Compare moderns with ancients. Consider the latter, their care & culture of bodies, which shows by exercises the Greek discipline wrestling $\omega\omega\nu$ of the wrestlers in state (remember Pericles in Plutarch) so a *Scipio* when first Rome took the polite way (see the passage of Livy when the comisioners from the seante were sent inquisitors with his *athletic* & other Greek manners).

Consider after the Lacedemonian, Athenian, roman, the very gothic stile & tournament.

Consider after the bodies & forms which shows the opportunity of viewing these forms of the finer sort (not porters or beggars) in nudity & in every familiar as well as cerimonious exercising action. For so in a hot country. So in quotidian *baths*. In private families, wives, children. Whereas now none but painters (as Albano) &c used to such views & these constrain & awkward as being lucrative only, necessitous, mercenary & reproach & shame in the passive parties.

Also distortions by dress. Unnatural bandages & ligatures; as cravats, garterings: women's bodies & contractions of waste, pressure of hips, [22] swellings & unnatural desfigurations of necks, breasts, paps. Borings and lugging down of ears by Jewels (well that it is not nostrils as with the other barbarians), perukes, cravates.

Also props or stilts under the heel & kind part of the fool, relaxing the *hinder* tendon & muscles; and extending, stretching unnaturally those of the fore-part and instep, setting as young a tiptoe. So women's figures of back & legs wholly destroyed in China by small shoes, till they are unable to stand our case even among the lower sort very near the same: a barrel or two only removed from the same barbarian.

Hence no modern figure (of the noble kind) now extant in the world which can be seen standing naturally on the ground.

Idea therefore must be taken from nature & drawn (as said supra...) from plastic, & what is innate; or from the ancient trunks & broken remains.

What little help from academy in this respect! viz. of nudity, i.e., naked porters or privately from diseased courtesans. Whereas those who know nature understand well which difference debauch soon makes in the youngest female, & how deflouring is soon *de-flowering* in this sense also: the *flos* instantly vanishing (Remember Raphael's commonplace in his letter...). [23]

Remember also what pity. Raphael forced to paint walls⁶⁴⁶, cartoons for tapestry (an under-workman, for false work!), altar-pieces and of priests commanded, popes enjoined (witness the transfiguration piece called master-picture of the world) saints with lights about their heads: sometimes gold & silver! (rave work in art!). Q. Whether no instance of this in Raphael? Where? Or with other masters beside?

Answer *.....

⁶⁴⁶Inf. 89.

* This transfiguration piece would've made an excellent marble, or piece of relief-work (and such Raphael always carried in his head: those of the ancients in default of pictures having been his great school & lesson). But as it is, in the illusive art, it is so far from that sweet persuasivines & illusion (sweet as it is in other respects) that it not only breaks all rule of perspective; but every thing in the general order, position or collocation. The mountain a mole-hill, at most a mount-grandes' slage. Those figures below which should be seen at the upper-parts (supposing the point of sight to be above the flat of the mountain, as it must be for the sake of the lying figures there) are as not at all carried on this account, anymore than the figures in the air. Every figure a point of sight by it-self, may be cut out of the cloth, or stick on any other cloth, anywhere as well as where they are. No-one principal, no subjection, subordination, unity or integrity. No piece: no whole. All disposition & order sacrificed in this transfiguration-work, as all colouring & cartoons. (This not to be placed here in the head of *Discouragements*, but in.....)

**False criticism* another discouragement in art. Up-start affected critics, why this? Why thus? General topics which they think mightily ingenious as, **lights whence? How here & yet there? ----* Answer flying clouds, a thunder-storm covering one spot, sun shinning the stronger and brighter on another. A reflection from the rocks unseen. Other objects out of the picture in the very place of the spectator, whence various mixed *tecnic*s⁶⁴⁷ of which nothing appears but the effect in the picture it-self.

But without all this apology & defence. The *poem & fiction* is answer sufficient. The *hyperbole & invention* essential. The *probable, plausible*, the poetic truth. Where else would be every line in epic exaggerated continually beyond all possibility of narrowly searched. And see most particularly (what is of infinite curiosity & of subtlest speculation in this research of painting) the Homeric & Virgilian descriptions of the *shields*, where the figures as cast insensibly begin to stir & move & do however is absurd & impossible to imagine. Yes this right. [inf. 93 [93]

Sad to consider that the occasional rise of painting being chiefly from the popish princehood, the improvement & culture of it (except for the virtuoso part of the cabinet of the grandees &c.) has turned wholly on the nourishment & support of **superstition** (chiefly too) in ugly forms & exaltation of the vile swelling passion of beggarly modern devotion & ignoble **enthusiasm** (as in *Miscellany*, p. 126,7,8, and Letter of **enthusiasm**, 35, 36...). Witness the best picture in the world, *Domenichino's St. Jerome*.

Remember here (as prefatory) to anticipate the nauseating, the puking, the delicate *tender-stomached* squeamish reader (pseudo- or counter-critic) delicately: "Why all this? And "Can't one taste or relish a picture without this ado?" (So in *Miscellany*, the porosopopage, page 278, 166). Thus kicking, spurning at the speculation, investigating, discussion of the *je ne sais quoi ---- Euge turum & belle nam belle hoc excute totum – Quid nom insty habet?* (Persio Sat. 1) ----- So the "*I like*", "*you like*". Who can forbear? Who *does* forbear? Therefore in vain. Kicking indeed against the thorns. Hear therefore. Have patience. Wait the tale. Let me unfold &c.

Chief support of painting where? ----- Christianity! ----- *Wretched model! Barbarian. No form, no grace of shoulders, breasts (here cite the poets, finest works of *Apollo*, *Jove*), no *démarche*, air, majesty, grandeur, a leap incomely proportion & species, a mere *Jew* or *Hebrew* (originally an ugly scabby people). Goth shape & physic: with half beard naked, not one nor the other, dark long hair, snivelling face, hypocritical calling, countenance & at best

* Of true criticism (of which an art must be found), see *Soliloquy*, p. 240: "For to all music there must be an *ear* proportionable, there must be an *art of hearing* found". So of **seeing**, &c.

* Also that other permanent question of these sprightly critics: viz., "how does that garment hang on?" ----- Answer, "it does not hang at all; it is a dropping. You catch sight only in an instant". So in running figures, in a horse full speed, in the Gladiator Farnese. Who ever saw this subjects precisely & distinctly in any such attitude? So a man falling from a precipice, an *angel*, *mercury* flying. Michael Angelo natural attraction of his resurrection figures upwards (ill represented in the print, a poor one).

All this instantaneous. All is invention (the first part or division of painting). *Creation, divining*, a sort of *prophesying* & inspiration. The poetical ecstasy & rapture. Things *that* were never *seen*: no nor *that* even *were*: yes feigned. *Painter* as *poet*, a *second-maker* – See *Characteristics*, vol. I, p.207.

⁶⁴⁷Inf. 88.

* Memd. Here the general subject viz.. God the father a broken, wrapped up, amused, old man: consumptive-look, haggard, with carcass in lap, a dead Christ held fort in winding-sheet, a pigeon in bosom, and a cubberly *habende hoy* or two, of an angel (hemaphroditical forms half-man half woman, in petticoats & broad flopping wings) with a dozen or some of the peepers, raw callow heads (like gaping birds out of a nest) stick in unnaturally, is seen a pair of wings without a body, & called cherub.

From hence (as taking ground from a high ilation) thunder & rain (but comically, & in good humour) against common-prayer-look-cuts, glass windows & tapestry figures of High-Church & chapel. Better the perfect in the kind; and statuary introduced altar, a true altar & image &c as becoming. And justify this by Queen Elizabeth's rant cited by an ingenuous author & learned gentleman in priestcrafts and persecution (Mr. C _____ is the cited authority, but not Mr. C _____ nor his pamphlet by name).

melancholy. Mad & enthusiastical in the common & lower way, more so well as even the bachinnals & bacchiades (of which see sup. 28).

But of this more when we come to speak of the **decorum**. And there add (in notes) the painters without any manner of necessity or prescription that I know of, representing the husband of the blessed virgin as a broken blind doating old man at the very best of our Lord & saviour: although heavily palpable (& *better to be supposed*) that according to the Jewish practice highly commendable in suitable marriages & regard to separation) that the parties were of equal or suitable age, and not 30 and odd years after: the same Joseph is seen going out without kindred in search of Christ.

[24] [7. Encouragement/Motives. Contra.]

1. Invention of prints, etchings (which are originals) answerable to *printing* in the commonwealth of letters. Hence eye of the public framed: although injured by the false (French & Flemish) taste & ill cuts in books of learning always ill because of cheapness of the impression.
2. Early in the introductory part. Memd. As to the benefit to mankind & the youth: not only *emollit mores*, but forms – diverts the noble (& idle) from extravagant experience of time & estate: gaming: riot: excess: lazy habits & its consequences, as below p.45.
3. Memd. Πολλακιζ εθανπασα ... and upon that tone, to remark observe “how great an ambition in nobility, gentry, wits &c to be knowing-master’s hands comparisons drawn from painting. Poets, orators, divines. Lives of painters even modern and mere *reckless such as they are* (see below p. 30, at the end) much canvassed, emphatically related, in [25] the good company, among ladies &c.

This in the preface or introductory part with much throw off into the notes below it.

See also about the *master-painters* lives, & occasional relations of their *personal & hand-characters* resembling & instructive as well as entertaining. See (I say) below 64. [64]

Memd. To premise, as an observation on the usefulness of the treatise (modestly insinuated) the knowledge of men & manners even in the vulgar characters & lives of the plastics or artists, ancient & modern even as wretched as they are, so well remembered & told in story’s fresh & attested without interest or design to vary, odd or impose. And in this respect observe “how the works, & characters of the masters correspond, & their own proper & personal characters legible from their artificial second-characters (i.e. their works)”. Observe, I say, “how this is noted & observed in the treatise”. [25].

Also this concerning *excursions, derivations, diverting tales, episodes, miscellany, occasional reflections* (possibly, as *Lucilius said*, for my own sake) *I* have always thoughts strange that authors should be found (and *readers* to *support* them) who could purpose wise & couch their fragments & spare-thoughts as if pity the world should loose the least. (See Soliloquy, p.164; and Miscellanies, p. 4,5,6).

With respect to *self* (apologising for this recommendation of *Plastics &c.*, viz.: That being sick & under pains, watching, insomnies &c: and also disturbing business or affairs overmuch for one in a low habit &c: the costume of viewing the *forms* & raising new spectres not only good, as *characters* drive away the species of haunting forms of faces, grimaces &c. in weak stomachs indejection headaches &c. But in reality helping the passions, calming, allaying, introducing new. But this conditionally that the just virtuoso-rules be practised & none of the frightful or ghastly spectacles (*Apollo* executioner of martyrs in the very flaying act) any more than the lascivious be admitted. For each of these are false and never ryparography.

[61] Praises, recommendations of the art

Had I been born a Christian catholic, where Christianity & imagery was national cult &c.; I should say to myself, or as I now am, shalt say to such a one, in favour of poor art & artists recognised however by heaven & divine law (*jure divino*) “Sir! Can you worship thus? Can you raise your idea upon such ideas? Would dogrill serve you for hymns? Bag-pipe or Jove-harp for music & hallelujah? Can you see your Christ twice crucified, him broken & distorted of whom it was said *a bone of him &c.*? Him disfigured of whom it was written Him decreptly, gaulty, old &c who never had a blemish wound or disease; & who was so young a man still even when he suffered? Him who was

purposely by the wicked placed between two thieves in disgrace, made resembling to such countenances and of the same looks, mean, form, & passion as either rascal?"

Dilemma, about the use of pictures by Christians. Either *none* or *good*. Church of England (high Church) & Lutheran miserable. And in this sense *odi puitatores* as in *Characteristics*.....

And here again (in favour of painters) memd. To insist as before (supra 35) that beautiful forms beautify; polite polish... on the contrary Gothic gothicize barbarous barbarize &c. [62]

1. In respect of economy & as delivering from other luxuries & expenses when rightly taken. First because of its own nature; the *το καλον*: expansiveness & richness being the very ruin of the art according to **Pliny** in *Characteristics*.

Also for reason hinted just below. And here a place for moralising. "Every one covets in proportion to the appetites of expense: not *florid & generous* as is vulgarly conceived: but *modest & generous*. Love of giving largition communication, joined with hatred of waste, needless expense --- Frugal ergo liberal --- Saving ergo beautiful ---". A good father excellent man & knew thought his lad to fling away farthings in view of generosity. This directly the contrary road, & I fear would sooner teach him avarice, increasing his wants & negligence & his appetites not decreasing: on the contrary his ill appetites & affections rising stronger by the contempt of other people's wants, & the noble pleasure of relieving them by what he neglects & spurns. Hence heart hardened.

The roman *via frugi*. The first **Cato**.

Above all the Englishman because of a court, & place-preferment Prostitution &c.

--- But it may objected "thus this makes against our subjects viz. pictures". --- If it does so, so let it.

Let it take its chance, god's name --- But let us see first. Examine the true **taste** &c.

[34] [8. Rise & Progress, Declension & Revival of 2nd Characters]

Query here from Herodotus Diodorus Siculus Marsham, &c; about the records of the Egyptian; how far back. (Inf. 36).

Hierarcho-political reason as above 27, 28, 31, for retaining the first ancient & hieroglyphic forms & pictures of the gods &c.

Politeness in figures helped still to polite Greece. So music &c. --- But *Plato* & other philosophers & sages, look *wilfully* towards the Egyptian caves (as lovers of rarities for such the Athenians, such the Greeks in general, & so humoured even by a Xenophon) admiring mystery hiding secrets from the vulgar. This, as being frightened by the popular spirit felt so several in the person of their master Socrates: besides *Plato* & *Pythagoras* affectation of legislationship & pulse beating towards the noble ambition, to which the first a sacrifice, & the 2nd often tempted, & in state-affairs, under *Dion*, brought in considerable danger. Hence his emulation with *Homer*, envious & somewhat detracting way too truly objected by *Dionisus Halicarsussus*.

True indeed that by this mysterious & hierarchical polity the state of longer duration⁶⁴⁸. For, of what duration Egypt? --- But then what a state! What barbarity! Superstition! --- And when encountered once; how perpetual a slavery, from made & Persian to Mameluke & Turk! [35]

Insinuation from hence, as to the last present grand hierarchy of Romish Church whether not better to have followed the Egyptian in this (as in many other things) & kept the *orthodox-forms* horridly savage (& consequently inspiring superstition) as in reality their first were from the gothic times or last faces of the empire & of arts when images &c. were introduced.

And although protestants take the contrary weapon (& very justly for the present period) yet for the longer & more extensive period of time, query whether this way not weaken & supplant as it polishes & refines --- *emollit mores*. Nothing more true in nature can be said. So chiefly a fine picture, or statue frontispiece, a fine piece of music --- Effeminacy indeed, an evil consequent: but not necessarily so, if the magistrate provides, without totally banishing (as *Licurgus* some sorts of music & most arts because of his local & specific commonwealth) or prohibiting as *Plato* in the case of *Homer*.

Therefore, as *beatous* forms polish (taking politeness with its consequences) so ugly, *barbarise*. None impossible: or if practicable, still equally barbarous. (Inf. 61).

Moses (non obstante 2nd commandment) raised a serpent, & after him, the arch & sancti sactorum their churches & c. the brazen tree its buds &c.

Prohibition therefore such as Egyptian, Jewish (or suppose Scythian or Persian) & absolute abhorrence of figure or temple, a savage & barbarising enthusiasm. [36]

Apology & protestation against entering into the decision of the Egyptian & Chinese presentations to antiquity (so far beyond *Moses*'s) in their records (as above 34) although recite the authorities. But this assert that neither *Jew*, *Egyptian* nor *Chinese* polite.

⁶⁴⁸Proof of this, from the hierarchical policy & hope always to engage the sovereign & bring power & reconcile even the conqueror partly by superstition (sin & pleasure) partly by policy, as assistant to him. Hence easy betrayers of their national form, prince & people. Trust to spiritual weapons for their own preservation at least (come what will of nobles, prince & people) as when *Atila* was met, & *Alexander* by the Jewish priests (see *Arrian*). Hence the oracles (although a Grecian & much limited priesthood) after they had stood steady all along, yet when things desperate & almost all Greek conquerors (Athens not resisting but driven to sea) began to faint, & preach submission. This *Herodotus* saw (cite places in notes) & honestly noted. Although for this & other freedoms* cashed by honest *Plutarch* himself a priest. *i.e. *poetic liberty* in complaining of gods.

This a judgement of politeness --- if polite; show me a picture, a statue, coin, proportion, nature --- But *Arabic! Japan! Indian!* --- Savage, Christian. Even in their portraiture, pleasure-pieces, wanton-pieces --- Also gods, Christian; frightful according to Egyptian⁶⁴⁹ & Syrian models or Turkish mosques, no architecture of statuary or figures: or as bad as none.

Frightful, horrid, cruel ideas advanced & entertained by such *divine* forms: soft gentle *human* ideas, by truly *human* forms & divinity represented after the best sweetest & perfectest ideas of humanity to the vulgar. But without application to divinities, & simply viewed & contemplated in cities, groves, highways, places, gardens, forums &c. *emollis mores*.

“Bad figures; bad minds” --- “Crooked designs; crooked fancies” --- “No design: no thoughts” --- So Turks &c. --- “No imitation: no poetry” --- “No arts of this kind: no letters, or at least in a poor degree” --- So politeness always hold proportion to art & imitation, figures, design, &c.: and this (excepting forced causes & not durable) holds proportion with laws & liberty. So where the one is with a tolerable progress in the first species (viz.. 1st characters) the other (viz.. 2nd characters) will soon prevail. And where it ceases, & tyranny (such as the eastern monarchies ancient & modern) prevails, art & 2nd characters accordingly sink; see Japan! *Mogul!* China! Turk & Tartar. --- Show me amidst that infinite delicacy of other work a single 2nd character, a *form*, even but a single figure, a perspective, a statue, coin, palace, architecture that is not worse than gothic – show but so much as a vase! Till in China thought by us & the Dutch.

[37] *em branco*

⁶⁴⁹Sup. 27, 28, 35.

[27] [9. Ancient masters & works in statues, heads, reliefs, entails &c]

[títulos na margem]

APELLES

Beginning of ancient reform, improvement & perfection of *Iconics, plastics & graphical imitation* about the same time with the *poetical* (after the great model Homer) in the two branches of dramatic viz.. tragedy & comedy [See Characteristics...]. Euripides before, and Menander first after *Apelles & Protogenes* or new upon their contemporaries, the art of colour being not in its perfection (or beyond *four*) till then.

RAPHAEL

Therefore *statuary*⁶⁵⁰ first in order of time (history & nature: as said of other arts in Characteristics v...p...) then painting. For *design* indeed the foundation: colours are after-ornaments (& so to be regarded by *Tyros*) although *drawing* of necessity when statuary perfect. Therefore Zeuxis not yet an Apelles. And had Raphael ever had an equal since him in idea & grace, he had been surpassed & not the first & only great in painting, because of some improvements perhaps in colouring after. Though ---

EGYPTIANS

Egyptians although so much earlier & so *vastly* ancient; yet barbarous. Why? A low in this case. Orthodox designing. *Hiero-glyphics*⁶⁵¹, sacred-Christian, reformation of these *first forms*, sacrilegious, heretical. National-church-painting. Figures of the gods still monstrous (although somewhat Greek) whilst in Asia or Africa: as Jupiter Hammon. Diana of Ephesus --- Anubis, Canopus The animals once ill designed as at first when given by *Isis* or other sovereigns to be kept alive & mourned for when happening to dye (being in memory of her mungled husband, whose true body was still concealed. See Herodotus – Diodorus. Marsham...). These animal-forms, I say, being never after to be innovated. The religion of the Egyptians being thus made **specific* both internally within their day & with still greater division & abhorrence from externs. Not thus the Greek-roman & other heathen worships. For here an emperor, or philosopher or historian (as Herodotus) travelling could be initiated severally in each **worship*.

Against academy-life-painting (as inferior to study of ancient forms & culture of ideas) "Let but anyone read Plutarch & Xenophon on the Spartan discipline, diet & care of breed, conception, birth & nurture of bodies; & then

⁶⁵⁰Inf. 49.

⁶⁵¹Inf. 31, 32.

*Christianity. So the Jewish religion specific. Christian not: till after Christian & settled by successional authority. E.g. had a proselyte to the Jewish temple & religion been at Jerusalem or in Judea at the preaching of Christ & been conversed afterwards carried away & lost in a foreign land, like China or Japan; in this case he would not have been an specific unless he had an apostolic revelation or cruxifixion; but at liberty to have relinquished the Jews even although he found a Syangogue, circunfixion & sabbatising in that very new country to which he was carried. Thus also during the controversy between Paul & Peter the Christian religion less specific whilst one conformed the other absoluted dessented from the Jewish rite with anger & reflection, on the occasional-conformist Peter. And thus also the protestants sects more or less specific as they allow latitude & communion with others: not absolutely damning-condemning. But the church of Rome absolutely specific as exclusive peremptory negatively & affirmatively. This by way explanation only of the phrase specific. So to return again to our *specific forms* the barbarous sculpture & hieroglyphic notes of the Egyptian priests.

* Note that all the true antique figures (& especially the single female heads* or busts) of bacchanals have a deep eager severe ecstatic or enthusiastic air. Nothing like disorder from wine: nothing drowsy, frolicsome, wanton, or so much as gay or smiling: but on the contrary stern & rigid, the passion of the plain prophetic oracular kind, *fanatic & lymphatic* (as in Letter of Enthusiasm &c.). Whence the guess of Hensius** (though so rash an obtruser) wonderfully engaging & persuasive, entering into the spirit of the Ode of Horace there cited & into the rest of Antiquity as by these figures & heads of bacchanals is so confirmed & illustrated. Also the place in *Livy* *ibid.* (viz.. Letter of enthusiasm p...) and *Miscellanies*, p. 39,40,66,67 & notes. *Full of the holy ghost --- full of grace* (as the Molinists & Quietists, Mystics, Quakers, new prophets). Same passion by modern painters in some of their saints, as for instance [see in *Modern*

wonder, if he can, why ancient life beyond modern (porters) & Spartans beyond even the rest of Greeks in number of victories, at the Olympics &c: or that Leonidas & his 600 at Thermopilae &c. [inf. 49 [49]

1. Ancient masters how much honoured & in repute from *Zeuxis & Apelles, Fabius Pictor* &c. to *Diognetus*, Marcus's master.....
2. Philosophy itself out of school of *design* & plastic art. Sophronicus's son, of whose own hand the graces &c.
3. In the question, whether the statuary or painter noblest, remember. That besides *Socrates* of Sophronicus &c & his graces &c. Nothing mechanic, even much less than painting although seemingly the contrary. For note the story of Raphael contending with Michael Angelo & mastering (by command & precept to an ordinary stone-carver) one of the perfectest if not the perfectest of modern statuary. Also the ancient statuaries wrought more immediately for the temples, the Lares, the Gods, Heroes, patriots, ancestors, magistrates &c. The painters more for pleasure & beatous contemplation.
4. Therefore [22] statuary *the mother-art* to painting in the first place on account of *religion*, and *civil government* (as these stood among the ancients) the family, heroes, patricians, patriots &c. as well as *penates* ("he deserves his statue in gold!" modern expressions which show the nature of the thing). And in the next place on account of the profound learning. muscles, anatomy, physics, symmetry (a statue viewed all around) more simplicity, unity [50] [em branco]

[29] [10. Modern masters & works in painting, etching, &c.]

[títulos na margem]

ENTHUSIASM

What our English life writer says of the enthusiasm of Domenichino.

Enthusiasm represented by modern masters, when of the prophetic ecstatic kind (as by ancient masters overleaf, p. 28) in the persons of *St. Paul*, the prophet *Jeremia*, *Saul* (4) Examples of this viz.

Monsieur du Frenoy⁶⁵² who wrote the *Ars Graphica* was himself a painter: according to our English translator p. 325⁶⁵³.

Query. What for a performer? --- This highly material because of this being an author.

Query also (for the same reason) about **Leonardo Vinci* so extolled by the French author Freart, who was refuted on this point: in having been shown that this piece (hich he brags of having translated) was not of Leonardo Vinci, nor of any worth; as the excellent Poussin testifies in his letter, if it be genuine and undoubted as published by Monsieur Bosse in his *Peinture Conversy* p. 56. [30]

Censure of *Hannibal Carache. His noted piece frequently ingrand, cliched by Carlo Marat with great exactness (viz. Christian & Samaritan women). Action all **theatrical*. Imitation of an imitation. At second hand. Not immediate. Not original, from nature. Art, by custom, becomes a new model. So the tragic tone on the stage each nation (as French & English *vice versa*) finds this better in their contrary than in themselves. Mrs. Baron. Our Monsieur Bary. So the dancing-master⁶⁵⁴ if symmetry followed. A fictious false & affected gesture & mien: not natural bow tread or entrance into a room.

The painter more than poet, stand beware of this (although even in tragedy Horace says *Et tragicus plerumque noblet srnone pedestri*) by reason that

Modern masters no learning. No converse, till after raised & known by their pencil. & then too late. Illiberal. *Disingenious. Sharks. Rakes*. What ideas when thus vulgar! Not even so high as what we call *good-breeding & manners* in a common sense. What sense of *poetic manners*, characters, personages, *moral truth*?

What kind of judges! --- Yet these give the blew & lead the great although are cheated as well as misled by these mechanic *knaves*. [inf. 51 [51]

⁶⁵²Inf. 38.

⁶⁵³Anonymous publisher, who praises him *ibid*.

*A *Florentine* great mathematician anatomist and elder than Raphael. Rival of Michael Angelo and restorer of modern-painting --- according to our English author (in Dryden's Frenoy) p. 260.

*Memd. Speak of his gallery with just applause that being after his contemplation of the ancient forms, and study of *Raphael* for which I have heard him censured by the best modern heads of eminent painters & virtuosi: "forsooth! As varying from his finer early manner & delicacy of his great predeceptor leader & countrymen *Corregius* from whence his Lombard School".

**Theatrical* &c. (see in *Notion*, chap....par...) or, which is the same as theatrical action, [*ulpit-action* as in foreign catolique-country (this may be safely pushed to ridicule our own priests accompanying the laugh; although against their real intension & art see at the bottom). And from hence have known a real able, but ridiculous, painter fall in raptures on the pathetic action of the Christ & the touch of the single finger on the breast (the other fingers in opposite position about it), when by this he really & truly showed & even demonstrated to me the affectation I suspected, & which I was always willing in honour of Carache to pass by un-criticised.

⁶⁵⁴Sup. 16.

History of revival of painting --- How far owing to *roman hierarchy (see Characteristics vol. 3 p.90). But liberty withal, viz. the *hierarchy* itself (archon for life, Ephori, generals of orders, Jesuits &c.) and also civil liberty the free states of Italy as *Venice, Genoa* & then Florence & other places. Besides that many little princes meeting & as it were co-habiting as private men, but grandees, in one city (as in Rome, or as a Carnival in Venice). This reduces things to a parity with a free state & independence with lots of painters & artists free, erects *a public* a nation *Italy* (see Machiavel's passion for Italy as the Greek φιλελλενθ) excites emulation &c. creates a taste, judgement &c⁶⁵⁵. (52)

Story of Domenichino (here at *Naples* ergo...) from Signor Paulo. After I had been to see the Chapel of the Thorn-Saint (St. James) called *the treasury* in the Archipiscopal Great Church. Where upon a consultation held by the ... convoked poor Domenichino was rated by the head (they wisely supposed that he would make no bodies without heads & therefore concluding that a head must carry a body) as ten crowns per head⁶⁵⁶.

So the poor painter stick the vault with heads (*Cherubins & Seraphins*) as an orange with cloves, to get his bread; though hard even at his taste. The work therefore unfinished, unstudied & much of it unworthy of him. The *pretty peepers* still very amiable & exemplar even by their gentility & prettiness. But sometimes even a bishop & principal figure *peeps*, which is very unsuitable, and sometimes such a figure stretched out too far in length, a mere whole possible because easier studied, & as it were taking breath or making way for thicker heads to appear the more excusably in Cloisters, elsewhere.

How judge of such things, without knowledge of this facts & lives of the painters themselves?

POUSSIN

Apply to Poussin's character what stands in Characteristics, vol. I p. 261. Viz. fidelity to art. This plainly the case of his discontent in France & being *set* & over-powered by the Cabal. This the reason why he afterwards (see if this be sure) naturalised himself a roman: resolved not to betray his art or renounce his manner. Drawing in little which the very kind is strictness without *truth* was the utmost he would do. But his other work of figures tolerably seizable.

Reason for this little manner viz.. *cabinet-furniture, pieces de cabinet* for ladies & the court. Ladies hate the great manner: love baby-sizes, toys, miniature. Besides this: the churches & palaces (if one spacious) were filled by the multitude of tolerable good pieces since the Carache's school. And therefore according to love of novelty & the humour of the age, he found this to be the most enabling him to get a living by a modest price (such as he set upon his prices with great integrity) the roof, stair-case, cupola & fresco painting (the chief in vogue) being abhorrent from his chaste, severe, just & accurate genius, which therefore kept itself to tablature & home study, wisdom, nature, philosophy, history, criticism, learning⁶⁵⁷.

* Memd. Under this head of hierarchy remark, in notes, viz.. "That We in particular (viz.. *Anglo-saxons*) & Church (quatenus Christian, independent of the magistry & of the parliament) are but a colony of the papal hierarchy from Pope Gregory & his dictionary mark &c. as in Characteristics, p.... vol.3, to which refer. And N.B. That notwithstanding this pope's great enmity to Letters (*true letters*: although himself so rhetorical) yet what came of music & magnificence! So in his life, in Platian & Monsieur Bayle. Glad would he have been after extinguishing of ancient heathen beauties (a reproach as he laughs) to have renewed art statuaries &c. upon the first model & taste, provided it had been new & like the attempted new Christian poem (page 240 of the same 3d volume of *Characteristics*) on the foundation of Christianity &c.

⁶⁵⁵See *Letter of Design*

⁶⁵⁶Ductes viz.. 5 to our pound sterling.

⁶⁵⁷ Poussin wonderful! When considered according to paragraph 3 of the *Notion*: and chiefly when considered also as a *French-man!* & working in little!

[67] Painter's character, education, qualification

See in *Junius*, his passages on this head.

The face-painter limner (as Cooper, Sir Godfrey Kneller, Riley &c): no study of their work after the knack & colouring got. No workmanship, no labour, no not so much as *thought* but when the party is sitting and sees. The patron Lord or Lady sees & is witness to all the industry, pain & study there is in the business: nothing when their back is turned,

But when a subject is given to a real painter, a heroic great subject; *good heavens!* What toil! What study! What meditation requisite! The 5 parts revolved, accommodated, determined. First *invention* raised, 2nd *forms* passed in review, proportion chosen suitably; 3^d *colouring* & taints in the same manner suitable: if tragical, tragic & so in general & in particular each figure with harmony considered. 4th the *passions moral* thought, sentiments, manners --- What a study! And 5th the collocation, general symmetry, disposition, as a general making his disposition & order of battle when about to engage. What restless nights! What *brown studies, reveries, ecstatic veins, rabiosa silentia* &c! [68]

{Here remember what said of Michael Angelo, Domenichino when surprised, over-heard or spied through a *key-hole* or *clink*, in agitation, rumbling, rolling on the ground, on all fours, prancing, caprioling (like a horse or quadruped-monster when such a one was to be imagined designed) gaping, staring, murmuring, roaring. So my painter (*Closterman*) going into his picture when in the dark & standing long before it.

“How great a shame for such an artist as a painter (an epic heroic-one) to know less of mathematics, measuring, statistics, common principles or rules of mechanical art than the most ordinary mechanic, the house-carpenter, common surveyor, head brick-layer, mason, or inferior architect! --- For the statuary, his very measuring tools & plummets will set him in the way!”.

Memd. *Michael Angelo to be justified against the French & other bigot-attacks, Pietro Bellonni's denial of *Vasari's* & the received account of his having taught Raphael; and particularly the French author *Freart de Chambray*⁶⁵⁸. Whose as impertinent censure of Raphael (his pretended favourite & abominably wrong commended as if it were *praising booty* upon his judgement of Paris) in his *Massacre of Innocents*, see his page 47, 48 and sup. 64 margin. [69]

Jordano. *Rabble-painter*, not only as painting rabble best (witness his rout of Holofernes's- camp in the treasury roof of the carthusians at Naples, & his great door-piece at the entrance of the church of St. Girobini *ibid.*) but as disguising himself best in a multitude in a confusion leap, variety of distances, sea & heaven mixed, in which his variety of taints & mad figures, especially the imperfect-*ones* at a distance to wonders. See what is applied of the *chorus-singers*⁶⁵⁹ (like the French) can't sing alone or with a *il corbo* or few strings accompanying.

*Spaniolet*⁶⁶⁰. *Bust-painter*, & of half-figures, old ugly figures, fierce stile (from Michael Angelo De Caravaggio) no drawing, the atipode of grace (witness his rival picture to Domenichino 's in the treasury of the great

**Confer* with *Sensus Communis* p.114 notes as above, 54. Monsieur Freart (according to his dogmatical character) reasons only on wretched print: having never seen the original: or if he had, having no eye in painting; only a good thought & maxim from affection to the ancients, & Raphael their student.

⁶⁵⁸P. 14. 64 &c. 70 &c.

⁶⁵⁹Sup. 56.

⁶⁶⁰Sup. 64.

church) horrid, monstrous. Is said to be well from waste upward, an *executioner*, from thence below. And indeed all his sociable figures, like himself barbarous & horrid.

[74] [11. Sorts of painters & painting.]

PORTRAITURE, FACE-PAINTING (see the distinct head below, 100).

Face-painting being almost the whole of portraiture (as profiles & busts in medals & the like) the artist may be & almost ever is ignorant of anatomy, proportions & the *five parts* excepting a small matter of the out-line (enough for copying, since a copy after a sitting face or figure & a copy after a face or figure taken in a cloth is much the same) together with some parts or degrees of the 3d part viz. colouring. And with this he may set up for a painter & great in his way, with draperies &c; if perhaps he hires not another, as is usual & do this or anything that happens if beyond a mere common figure single, or a single head. Thus good face-painters & *medallists* &c. without further study. For if perhaps a genius capable; it must be checked & spoilt: witness **Van Dike*. Sr. P. Lilly. And thus our *Cooper*, Peter Oliver & others in miniature. Were perfect in face painting ignorant in design & art. Mere mechanics: this not so much as a liberal art not to be so esteemed: as requiring no liberal knowledge, genius, education, converse, manners, moral-science, mathematics, optics: but merely practical, & vulgar. Therefore not discovering honour, gentility, knighthood conferred (glance at Sir. Godfrey Kneller but not reflecting on King William.). Yet see again below 100.

Ryparography: though by itself *naught*; yet to be understood & used by the *heroic master* to mix (but much modified) with his *heroic* as *the foil*. So, often the other *Homeric* form. [75]

THE TRICE OF ARISTOTLE

The prince of critics & great judge of arts distinguish painters into the *heroic*, who paint men better than the common of life, *better than they are by nature*, the *ridiculous lower comic*, who paint them worse than the common life, *worse than they naturally are*, and a middle sort viz. who paint them *true & just as they are*. But then this *truth*, in heroic, is falsehood & a blur, against the truth of art the *hypothesis* itself, whether it be scripture history, which is posed & *carried down*; or whether heathen gods or heroes or even great men, roman & Grecian chiefs consecrated as it were by age time & history.

In the middle kind, when according to truth may be comprehended fairs, camps, public places in modern cities. Hunting matches & parties of pleasures of gentlemen & ladies (whose figures, not the perspective paisage or animals, are principal)

[*títulos na margem*]

Ryparography

In the last detestable & odious kind excels the Flemish ... Brouer ρυπαρογραφοι.

*A portrait-painter sometimes (as Van Dike) attempts a family-piece, puts figures together in an action, lays a scene, unites, makes a disposition &c.

But this is launching out of his depth. Better a history painter if strongly invited should descend to this work for some great & *understanding* patron or prince (for if not *understanding* cannot be satisfied with the work on account of subordination & 2nd & 3^d & 4th &c. figures disobliged) than that the accustomed face-painter should offer to ascend so high as this, in which he will prove an *Icarus*. for so Van-dike: fantastic, apish, antic in his action, & wretched & false in his composition, collocation &c.

Grotesque

Memd. *All* grotesque painting not ryparography: although most may be such. Witness Raphael's monsters & grotesque after the *ancients, in Signor Bartoly Book of Prints.

Battle-Painting

Battle-painting although modern & little; yet next joined to humanity (proportionably little) because of the horse- noble animal, next to man! (of the *horse* treat elsewhere remembering the noble caste of the eye & head: the sublime air. The triton-horses, the hero-horses, half or quarter deities such as Achille's *Xanthus* & his speech (a noble subject for painting!) on which mention *Homer* & the *Pere Bossu's* excuse by Balam). The enthusiasm & inspiration expressible in the heathen subject & poet not in the sacred one not to be attempted (I fear) with any success. This *historically* true; *poetically* false. In the other (with the religious heathen who could join both) what effect! See *Letter of enthusiasm*, p.4,5,6,7.

[80] [Sorts of painters & painting in general]

Concerning mixture of works master with master (as "perspective by such a one, figures such a one or such a one") wholly false; so in my Claude de Lorain, figures by Jordano, the latter giants & out of size although moderately in harmony as to colouring. --- Remember Montague-House, which I was never willing to go to see after rebuilt & painted: because the better the masters the more violent the conflict & dissonance harsher. For although a man may submit *to* himself in this respect (although even the grandious Poussin, that equally great master in both kinds!, sometimes failed in this & could not enough below himself in perspective pieces) yet never *to* another. But Gaspar, his brother-in-law (by him taught) & being able only in the perspective part, was through necessity perhaps (although with judgement joined) a perfect model of *truth* in this kind.

Expose in this place the civil war, riot hub-bub, sedition, tumult, uproar of pieces, parts, colours &c in unmixed works. Ciepolo of the treasury at Naples, the Jesuits *ibid*. And refer (reciprocally) to *Notion* chap. V par. 2 & 9. [81]

[títulos na margem]

Miniature or lining

"*Miniature* (viz. the diminutive kind) if finished is false; if unfinished & true; serves only as machine-work, appendix or ornament to perspective".

*Exception in this place for small portraiture of *heads* only (for *bodies* would be mere puppets & ridiculous as everyone presently sees) which convenience & use renders agreeable, & friendship amiable. So *enamel* & *water-*

*Remember also to acknowledge the excellence & attainment of perfection in the *vulgar life* & *abject base life** (the two last divisions of Aristotle above in this page) by modern masters. But not so as to the heroic, epic, lyric (not even Raphael entirely: for how clogged! How diverted! How prostituted!). Only the *doggrill farce burlesque* --- *Parody*; *first comedy*; *Satire I*: mimes. But not tragedy: not latter comedy not after an *Iliad* like the verses given to on which he formed his Olympic Jove. *By masters (Flemish) not worth of being named. The boor-painter &c.

*Exception also in general for *miniature* & or the *diminutive* kind in *statuary* sculpture &c., & for all works in the plastic kind or of one substance, or even on a superficies plain with lines as lapidary or medal-imitations, or draughts in two colours *claro-escuro* &c. on account of reason given in *Notion* chap. V, par. 12.

Besides that there is no perspective field, or accompanying nature (sky, ground, distances, apendixes &c.) in mere effigies, imagery, round or solid work. And for high or low relief, the medal-leaning & antiquary science of anaglyphics (so necessary in society & for the use of mankind) as also the mere use & currency of carrying money (another necessity) familiarises & executes this distinctive manner in other kinds which are not fully supremely & strictly imitative as painting.

And thus of old certain considerable statuaries commended in the little way as (see Pliny) But of painters none that I remember --- (search for this in Pausanias, Pliny, Philostratus...).

colours (viz. in miniature still, for even roof-work & fresco is water-coloured & so Raphael's cartoons although bigger than life). But *enamel* especially being generally little & in its nature glossy, is still more false. Although the ancients who had not our way in oil had another (as they had many now lost) by burning which was for the largest as well as least manner & what was highly esteemed as by Pliny's remark of the masters's inscriptions of their names ΕΝΕΚΑΥΘΕΝ

Remember the reverse of the common phrase (speaking of meadow & perspective) "*It looks enamelled it is as if it were painted*" --- Ridiculous! Therefore this is just what should not be painted. And therefore when a real good picture is to be commended, say of it "*This is like perfect nature & not like paint*". For when **nature** herself *paints* (as something in wantonness & as if it were luxuriant) she ought not to be imitated, not her *picture* but *her-self* only (her *pure self*) copied. [82]

Battle-painting

Architecture or town-painting

Battle-painting if in little figures (unfinished & therefore true as said just before) is to be esteemed but as a species of *perspective* (according to which is said in the *Notion* chap. V par. 10) the same as *building & architecture* if the perspective-painter genius leads to architecture. But if the architecture be so far principal & as to draw or as if it were devour *the field (il campo)*, & standing single by itself without a town, people & natural appertances of a town-prospect; or without a country, ruins, rocks, wood & natural appertances of a rural or country-prospect; in this case this species of painting is *empty, foolish, false & below still-life. For this at least is true & taking in *vales, cavitats* & other proportionable & artful pieces contains as well the rules of mathematics or mathematical mechanics & elegant workmanship.

Ship-painting

Ship-painting (whether storm or calm) in which the Dutch as they well may excel, is also no more than a species of perspective: the rest being the mere knowledge of a hulk & ropes (no extraordinary science, not above the ship-wright) but if joined with rock, sky, sea-port &c; then *right & a true*, although inferior species of perspective.

[74] **Subjects of painting**⁶⁶¹.

See page 41.

.....

.....

Memd. Where unchaste pictures are censured (viz. p...) propose *Bacchus & Ariadne's* marriage as the *Ne plus* & pattern. See in 2nd vol. Inf. 103.

[103]

Through indulgence to the fashionable taste (viz. *gallantry & amours*; as in tragedy & poem, so in epic tablature) give for a subject & pattern of the *ultima linea* in this kind, the history of **Bacchus & Ariadae**.

First both *sexes* in perfect beauty: all heroic. Then *machine*: (**Juno** whom as Pronuba I would prefer to Venus, cupid being allowed in a distinct group in the air or otherwise so as not to intermix with **Juno** or her *car* or attendance). And in the next place as to the *campo* or perspective, both land & sea (Ariadne having been left in an Island) with the beauty of both as far as the principal life will allow. And thus grove, rock, port & shipping, as descent & train. A kind of ovation, solemn march or triumph. The hero & chief in agriculture & benefaction to mankind, a conqueror with

*Such are the pieces of.....

benignity, in opposition to a revenger, a *Mars*, a *Nimrod*. 3dly. The form perfect. Age youth strength no decay, no rawness, much less fat or bloating (as illiterate artists of the modern represent) but rather over-slim & effeminate like the eastern princes hence he came a conqueror of the softness of their manners, not those with the northern trace who abused his gifts & were thence noted for quarrels (--- *Puynare tracum est* &c. Horace...).

4thly. *Ariadne's* form the same with chastity waiting him in the marriage bower (as in *Xenophon*, who chose this subject in his *Symposium*) yet being *widow* not *virgin* may be allowed better to wait him with sacred but modest joy, intermixed with sorrow because of her abandoned state.

5thly. The comic part (as in Homer himself) viz. satyrs, fauns, &c. in the train & dance after *Bacchus*.

[83] Rise, progress &c. of painting

From the assertion or position of the reform of manners (the *emolis mores*) of 2nd characters or plastics.

And from a like assertion of politeness arising thence with a challenge of China, Japan, Mogul, India &c. to show a *form* or *truth* of this kind (as asserted already.....).

From hence I say, & because of obviating the objection of the decline of this age, better in other respects, although worse in painting than that of Raphael's may the demonstration that *in general & in the main* advanced but still more advancing *perspective* and many species⁶⁶² and parts of painting with engravings..... Thus fruit & flower-painting, animals, the comic Dutch, the mere paisage. The incomparable *Poussin* who if not turned to the diminutive kind & cabinet-pieces would even in figures & history have equalled the great masters as in perspective he made his Gaspar excel all before him this late. As well as *Salvator Rosa* had he known his own vigour, strength and had had right patrons. But France that seems to have done so much has held back & declined the taste. France which discouraged & can not bear her Poussin (nor he her) spoilt even Le Brun's &c. For even *Le Brun* much worse in colours than in print. And his gallery of *Louis le Grand & resolution prize pour clatier les hollandais* &c with his long parocked have necked *gallo-grecian* heroes. These monstrosities & the *manière caché* & horrid colouring with affected gesture & theatrical action of the *womanish-court* a bane to painting & infectious throughout Italy & Europe. [84] [em branco]

⁶⁶¹See this head separate, in the following 2nd book page 103 viz. the first there.

⁶⁶²See in the head of painters & painting 76.

[38] [12. The five parts of painting in general]

(See what is prescribed in *Idea of the work*; inf. P. 43)

1. Query. Monsieur Fresnoy's *Ars Graphica*⁶⁶³. Whether worthy of notice. Accordingly. Note that the 5 parts of painting are wrong reduced to three, by the marginal notes added, contrary to the sense of the author: who if not distinct in the 5 parts, has however reckoned 4, at least, & could have made no such enumeration as 3, according to his text.
2. In the first place. In the article of satire, or way of anticipation by raillery, censure &c (so necessary, according to the miscellanarian style, to turn off ridicule, excite the nauseating palate by piquancy, & feed the fashionable spleen) remember to note the wrong impertinent blundering application of the plastic rules &c. Scarce at any time in any of our modern poets or authors one single metaphor allusion, allegory, *simile* grounded on the art & formed on the painter's business but what makes the painter blush the art at loose himself, not cognisable in the description or comparison. Something silly preposterous, & betray in ignorance.
3. Also comparisons & parallel ran between painting & poetry (because of the *pictoribus against poetic* &c. & the *ut pictura poesis* (vers. 361) almost ever absurd & at best constrained, lame or defective⁶⁶⁴.

One says..... Another says..... [39]

As to habits, dresses & all which painters comprehend under that common phrase of *drapery*, should it be asked "in which of the 5 parts do we place this?", tis answered "in the 1st & 3^d". For not only invention but history & learning lye in the *first* part: and for whatever in art goes further than the out-line, must in respect of the draperies, lie wholly in the *third* part (viz. *light & shadow* with *colouring*). There being properly no *symmetry* or *regular measuration* of mere foldings so as to require anything of the 2nd part; and much less *life* or *passion* so as to have to do at all in the 4th. And as for the 5th, the *general collocation*, it is either *included* or *carried along* with the figures & bodies which it adorns or it comes in the architecture or trees as making part of the masses or balancing parts in the perspective; and as such, it belongs indirectly & not immediately to part 2nd.

[7] 1st part of painting. *Invention. Story. Imagery*

This being the point of the (five) parts, in painting. Although in poetry it is the Συτασιζ collocation whole, unity: of the French author (Monsieur Freart de Chambray) has made it also in painting: and not with parity of reason: since the manner of the *figure-nature* designation, or image-making is common to the poet with the rest of mankind especially the literate, viz. by work-written characters of speech, grammar &c:

But the painter's or plastic manner means or mediums peculiar to himself and art: not common to him with others. A man can please in wit, science, letters, politeness & even⁶⁶⁵ in the very judgement of *design*; yet no *designer* no hand, nor idea in order to attend.

⁶⁶³Sup. 29.

⁶⁶⁴Inf. 71.

⁶⁶⁵Almost: not quite so. For judgement will necessarily import some degree of polishing or working on the forms, species &c. See below

Therefore in this just part is involved the *materia plastica*. Without this and the or active part (according to the high philosophical division into the [8] αἰτιωδὲξ τι υλικόν) no work, no business, no advancement or foundation.

1. The good painter (*quatenus* Painter) begins by working first *within*. Here the imagery! Here the plastic work! First makes forms fashion(able), corrects, amplifies, contracts, unites, modifies, assimilates, adjusts, compounds, polishes, refines &c. forms his *Ideas*: then his *hand*: his strokes.
2. Thus Raphael, dying young (37) his idea before his hand. All other masters their hand before their idea. He still working on his till his death, hand (viz. colouring) scarce come to him: as painters observing his best piece of *this kind* viz. his Transfiguration *called* the first picture of the world (but Raphael would have judged otherwise: being mixed a double piece, not a whole).
3. Accordingly a proficient in this kind (and such a one when he found, and happening to read this *young*, would thank me) will apply to his idea and study invention for which a real *secret* (*non obstante*, rehearsal in Bays) viz. passing the forms in review (as shoulders muttering) then checking, redressing, imprinting, stirring, exciting: then criticising: then corroborating: - see *Instinct* below, p. 10).
4. The young painter thus becomes original (see *Characteristics*, vol. III, p. 262, notes, line 20) whereas by copying merely (although it is good in some degree and at first) he advanced little [9] and can *create* nothing of his own.

But again *the secret* (as just above) of invention is (when young) to view good models, etchings (the real originals and really original when of masters themselves) drawings, cartoons if not able to come as pictures and statues. And from whence *sleeping forms* between sleeping and waking, working on his ambition as well as fancy. [So Temistocles haunted and made his walks at night by the apparition of the trophies of Milliades (answerably to the statues⁶⁶⁶ said to walk in those days, when many of the family in the house, many in all public places. See Lucian)].

From these fleeting forms (call them the *effluvia* of **Epicurus** or the *Ideas* of **Plato**) the proficient collates still, disjoin, compares, adds, subtracts, modifies, tempers, allays for fear of wildness. Appeal to ordinary fancy of faces upon walls in obscure places where casual lines are drawn at random, and chiefly in fever, sickness or indigestion, grimaces and ugly forms: something fair and beautiful sometimes bestial and awkward. *These* drive away, beat down: *Those* mark, note, remember, raise, repass. So Raphael. So Guido. See their Letters. The first of his Galatea or Venus, in Pietro Belloni concerning his works. The second inwhere he says "that for the Devil (the idea of ugliness) he proposely keeps in out of his mind till necessary to print". Thus Raphael *a Raphael*, and Guido, *Guido*. [inf. 12 [12]

1. The reverse of this, & the ruin of young artists as well as virtuosos, judges, good eyes & tastes, is the contrary habit of not selecting, not gathering: suffering the ideas and present themselves & lead as engage & in-amour as they will or can (See *Characteristics*, vol. 1, p..., imperiousness of a *visa fantasia*). No order: no control: no regulation of the *forms*. No check, restraint or exception: but all permitted to the appearances – I fancy, ergo I choose – I am pleased therefore I will be pleased – But this impossible: not durable as in the chosen select & truly judicious & natural forms: these durable, eternal, more & more enchanting & instructive, improving, exalting: the other nauseating, soon quelling, satiating: then art & science condemned, slighted. What wonder?

⁶⁶⁶See what is said of bemoaningly of the want of statues below, p.

2. It is not the *je ne sais quoi* to which idiots and the ignorants of art would reduce every thing. It is more the *δοκει*: the *I like & you like*. But *why do I like?* And if not with reason and truth I will refuse to like, dislike my fancy, condemn the *forms*, search it, discover its *deformity* & reject it.
3. And thus the proficient in another science the true φιλοκαλοθ, forms his ideas; till *a habit* (as in *Cebe's Table* so reiterately enjoined). See below p. 12 part 3.]
4. First corruption⁶⁶⁷ from bad sculptures, prints, &c. and drawing without masters. For so in all other exercises, as fencing, dancing, &c. Better never have learnt. Ask all masters. Appeal to all able. For habits not to be broke. Besides, *conceit* gained & shiftiness; or *surfeit* contracted & aversion to the study & science. Ungrateful because unsuccessful. Hence pedantry in pretty virtuosos. Gentry lose their taste & exchange for a worse than mere painter's⁶⁶⁸. [13] [14] [em branco]

[59] *2nd part viz.. *Proportion. Drawings. Symmetries. Particulars.*

No intention to declare which & which are the proportions; how many's heads lengths, whether or ... to a body (this the academy, the painter's school, common, *practical*). But which & which species, many sorts, even of the heroic *genus*, *gregarian*, *legionary* form: thick truss, waste not so noble round, equally turned, as a *Hercules* of middle age much less in beauty of form, like an *Apollo Bacchus* (the true Bacchus) or a *Mercury*. Witness the best medals, as well as statues & ancient relief-works.

This founded in nature. For as *Hercules* (young) the finest form to succeed in all the 5 exercises & carry (as he is said to have done) the prizes of the so the form of *Mars* properest for war, *foot* or horse; as *foot*, because of the length of the fork, slow marching but gaining ground not for running. And *as horse* because of the short waste sitting best & long legs a help especially when the horse collapsed with the calf or shin as when they used no stirrups to draw & lengthen out their legs, to an inconvenience if the horse *anything* low.

Add to this the *thick-chestedness* for great breathe & long durance of fatigue. The length also of arms (accompanying the long legs) a principal matter in *fence* by the reach & in the cast of the lance as well thrust.

Also *height & tallness* generally attending this make more than the longer wasted equal & proportionable. Seldom the well made & exact bodies seem very tall, but middle-seized.

These the reason for the stated forms of the ancients, as they appear in the antiques & which the practising painters of the roman schools (present at Rome & studying the antique) learn by note, & do wonderfully, they know not only themselves.

And this is the great subject on which the learned anti-*Euphrakon* wrote his treatise concerning symmetry & the different proportions belonging to the different & sub-divided under-species of the *genus* MAN. See Characteristics, I, 144. [60]

Add to this "that as the view of *the antique*, the study of the *basso relievo*, statues &c (with coins & other assistances) can only be expected to qualify for the right conception of **forms** in the *heroic kind* (as said just above, overleaf) so this school alone of Rome (hence Raphael, Jul. Romain & Poussin) has as yet ever qualified for the pure & simple grace void of affectation: concerning which see in the other head, below (viz. p...) on the 4th part of painting: i.e. sentiment &c.

⁶⁶⁷See in Taste, below, p. 15 par. 2.

⁶⁶⁸See what is said on this head below, p. 15.

[87] *3d Part of Painting viz. Colouring*

Simplicity the main in this, as in all: but the way to it more strange & paradoxical⁶⁶⁹.

The several colours being assembled, & each absolute simple & unmixed in themselves make in the joint view the least principle & most complex starring effect that is possible. Thus patch-work of pure red white green blue yellow &c. Nothing so gorgeous, so luscious: & the more pure, the more ugly: the more simple, the more tawdry --- a rainbow, a fools-coat flower, or a real Harlequin fools-coat. A parrot, a peacock, jay, *pictaeque volucres* (as Virgil calls them), nature's painting. But nature not to be painted where she her-self paints. Not a picture of a picture.

This is the simplicity which delights *children *gaudy*-striking. "*It self a spectacle: not a medium by which other spectacles views are created, raised, exhibited*". Colours the instruments: not the subject-matter. Means: not end. Imitation, lesson, instruction, pedagogy of the eye; to make it learned, *erudite, polite, acute*, judicious in its choice & discernment of objects; in its imitation of beauty, its taste of good by which its pleasure consistent & casting, & by which by easy transition the mind's eye learns its art & fruition: the moral pictures known, & proportion discovered.

Thus in respect of painting and art of imitation by colour, the least simple [88] sincere & genuine in the cloth or sum of the tablature are those which are the most simple, pure & absolute in themselves. These the true art of painting abhors.

Nor would a *Raphael, a Jules Roman, a Titian* (the chief in this) endure such a glove notwithstanding the Pietro de Colona's & other corrupters with all the French, Poussin excepted. A mere *white*, a mere *scarlet*, a mere **blew* (the worst of all & the most abused because of the *lapis lazulis* & Pliny's reason of the rich fancy of the great & ruin of painting) all these so many monarchies or monarchs, independent, absolute. Now, nothing should be so, as to colouring, in the piece. The ambient *air & earth* (being the chief of the field or campo) govern chiefly & then the greater bodies. To the *air* or *sky* belong the clouds & all the recints which the painter thinks fit to raise out of them as he may to best advantage whatever he pleases in great variety. To the other part viz. the earth belong the rocs, ruins, pieces of architecture, trees, rivers, pools, broken grounds of all sorts, out of which also the painter may for the justness & economy of his figures, use whatever the variety of tints which he finds occasion or thought to use.

Next to these two fundamental repositories, come the great and near figures themselves with the great draperies whether on or out of the bodies⁶⁷⁰. All these as they receive so they communicate to each other: the *sky & ground* chiefly to these: but these again something to those, & much to one another. For every considerable mass which eases light, every illuminated or coloured body in a picture is a *chamelion*, & borrows & catches something. *Every thing

*Note. That according to this division into 5 parts, this 2nd must be sub-divided into two of which figures (in respect of themselves) must make one, & perspective another. --- NO! Not so! --- For now see at last (according to Freart's reporting of Junius) that *perspective* (as *optic*) must be referred to in the last part, viz.. *collocation*.

⁶⁶⁹Infra 89 (3)

*Such, the bubbles of the soap-suds blown by children & ravishing, first for their regular figure (as the globe, the cube, the cylinder &c. in *Moralists*) and next for their colouring, the various & rich.

*An *azure-blew* for this reason also one of the worst of colours as it *robs heaven*, kills the sky: puts the very celestial bodies out of countenance. Kills sea, waters &c., horridly disagrees with *green* so useful & frequent & which if any might pretend to simplicity & absoluteness; but yet how false see in *Gaspar* & the best perspective-painters.

The *ultra-marine* or *lapis-lazulis* good (they say) to hold the colouring. Excellent! Therefore use, but mix, allay, change, break & modify it.

⁶⁷⁰Sup. 23.

*For this very reason a mass of *blue drapery, red, rose, yellow* &c not sufferable, "because it must *communicate* too much, & can *take* or *receive* but little or nothing. For how go about to break such a bright original & *wrongly* simple mass? Above all *blew* the worst.

gives & takes. And from this multiplicity of tints is formed that chief & amiable simplicity the very perfection of colouring.

*Contrapposizione delle tinte*⁶⁷¹.

**Marriage des Couleurs.*

1. --- Melting of colours --- symphony, harmony --- Age helping a picture why, but for this reason? --- Ridiculous! When we can have that effect instantly & without *loss* (for age looses & in the shades or sinkings expression vanishes). But we see with a false & artificial eye what is new, & expect the *new* genius, the mere *paint*, & won't believe our-selves that when colours are finest, work is worst. As if *old music (were this possible) could pass, when heard simple, but new music the contrary --- I remember in the working of a sketch once by a good master in history to have seen all run harmoniously & colours embrace love &c. when on a sudden a fine cherry-colour clapt in, made the very same painful harsh effect as a trumpet putting in, on a sudden, with a soft mellow voice & a the oboe lute in a chamber.
2. Remember here the story of the deaf man likening scarlet to a trumpet.
3. Strange paradox!⁶⁷² But leading maxim viz. "that tablature & painting, colours are i themselves nothing nor have nothing to do". For first all the *perfect & true* rejected as wholly false in the *workmanship*. The rest *dirtied*, deadened, mixed, confounded & as it were annihilated. --- The slave of all.

Remember censure of cartoons⁶⁷³: viz. Raphael's druggery for hangings. This a fatal-shambling-block of taste for English-men, being our grand model if no caution & *premonition*. All grandness, all false. The very pattern of falsehood. Curious to see how all turned together (bad music!) by so good a master, so prostitute to cardinals, popes &c⁶⁷⁴.

4. MAXIM [on the subject of *florid* colours, taken from maxim at the end of treat II viz. the *Notion*]⁶⁷⁵.

That "by as much as they attract to **themselves*, by so much they detract & derogate from the *design*, & render the execution of the piece defective & impotent". For if glaring colours in the standing frame or close about the picture, disturb the view & *weaken* the strength of our imagination on which the painter practices, & to which he chiefly applies; what effect must these colours have when introduced into the piece itself? And how is *that* attention likely to be commanded, *which* is necessary for *that* playing illusion or deceit *which* makes the sole use & beauty of the spectacle?

⁶⁷¹P. Bellona, Raphael, p. 38:5.

*Hence in opposition *maquerelage*, *libertinage*. Prostitution, as if it were *fornication whore-dome* of colours, unlawful *procreation*, *engendering*, *copulating*, spurious race, *bastardy*, *llegitimacy* &c. See bottom of page, first beneath.

*Or as if music were to be set at a distance & half of it drowned lost & unheard, that the other half might be the more music & more harmonious. Ridiculous! As if music near at hand & all in *heaving* (& so picture, all *insight*) could not be so governed & modulated as to hear *all* it should be heard & *as* it should be heard. --- Thus the glove & gloss of the new painting once off; i.e. when but once thorow dry; nothing else can add, if painted according to plastic truth. But that the modern painter although a Raphael (a *Poussin* chiefly) fears to do so he must wait for fame hereafter & be really better seen *then* (when perished in part even in his picture) than in his own time & in the perfection of his work. For if perchance he ventures to paint perfect & right at first, antiquity alone (the name of it) must give it protection: its own merit cannot, & the painter must be condemned for doing well, because he is modern: because the modern taste is false; and affectation of antiquity alone sets us right in ancient pieces.

⁶⁷²Sup. 87 line 3.

⁶⁷³Sup. 23 margin.

⁶⁷⁴Sup. 23.

⁶⁷⁵From NOTION viz. treatise II at the end.

*Here may be used, poetically & in the stile of this treatise, the expressions of the *ambition of the colours*, their *aspiring*, their *assuming*, their *encroachment on the art*, their *domeenering*, their *insolence*, *pride*, *avarice* (because of

It is evident that in the pieces of claro-oscuro, but especially where a single colour is added, if the design & history be well performed; the illusion becomes so strong, & the eye of the able spectator so fixed, & by a sort of enchantment in a manner *invited* to the subject, that the mind in its first transports requires not anything further: nor does the

fancy while this fervour lasts, suggests the least defect or suffers the least uneasiness for want of what is still behind. How must it prove therefore, when the whole force of colours, under a just management & due restraint, are added to the piece? And how real an enchantment must be then produced when all the resemblances of nature in her proper aspects are assembled & united harmoniously & in consort, to complete the summary & supreme work of art? [90]

The modern 4 colours viz.

1. *Terra-rossa, Ocre-rouge.*
2. *Terra gala. One jaune.*
3. *Oltra-marino, Azuro. Lapi-lazoli.*
4. **Terra-verde, de Verona. Ferrigna. Iron-coloured.*

The light & dark viz.

1. *Biacca di Cesare. Blanc de Plond. Ceruse.*
2. *Terra nigra.*

The last has also a dun colour akin to is called, *Terra d'ombra.*

The *green*, however, seems not an original or principal colour since it can be made by mixture of *black, yellow*, with a little *white*.

“A few hints only of this kind to be improved by others. This a foundation of *Ansa* only. Our consideration & work different. So to proceed” *&c.

[91] 4th Part. *Sentiment. Movement. Passion. Soul*

--- The divine part & only **Raphael's**, only *antique*. --- Something which is above the modern turn & species of grace. Above the dancing masters, above the actor & the stage, above the other masters of exercise. And this see ever the ordinary statuarys & painters see: & therefore no toe turned out; no chin held up; *no stalk, or tread or bridling, like the tragic a *theatrical* action. Yes the *sween* retained; the twist, the affected contrast, “*here & here, this way & this*

gold & silver, Jewels &c., what Pliny says, Characteristics, p....) as well as that *riot & luxury*, luxuriant &c. See just above, top of the page.

*Remember also here. *The reigning taint or regent-colour, master-species*. The real **complexion** from the *chief* in the *complex*, the *predominant* in the assemblage & mixture. This to be explained by the early practice of a curtain of any one colour drawn before the single window or entrance of light into a room. Be there in colours here will it instantly them all & forms one of those species of drawings reckoned amongst the *claro-scuro's* (amongst which is an old way of a particular colour as *yellow* or *din* added to the black & white, which makes 3 colours, although in strictness but *one* colour, the other viz. *black & white* being *shade & light* only, not colouring; not a piece to be said in colour in this account, nor indeed in the addition of this *one* real colour to *green, blew* or *red*. This being still in the singular, not plural. But when a real *second-colour* is super-added, a *progeny* arises as from male & female, & the parents beget abundantly --- Good reason therefore to stop at 4. For see how multiplied a generation! Although *kindred & so affectionately kindly consanguineously* allied & united. Therefore *live the ancients!*

*It must be remarked upon the whole, after the small explanation (not too precise or mechanical) of the 4 colours; “that this was meant by the 4 colours of Apelles &c”, in Pliny Lib ... Not merely without the mixture and reinet.

*No seat a horse-buck according to modern discipline & accountments, stirrups &c., with raised chin, tossing head, &c.

way”⁶⁷⁶. So the French modern school in reverse of Poussin *their renegade* or rather they his **rebels** since he had a right to be their *prince*.

This an eternal distinction ancients & moderns. The first ever without **affectation**: the letter (except Raphael, Poussin & the statuary Michel Angelo) all give into it more or less. And the cavalier *Bernini in this respect an apostase in statuary as Pietro di Cortona in painting both for this & for colours (see Colours).

Definition of **affectation** viz. “an expressed consciousness of grace, which spoils grace & its simplicity. “An attention itself to action, movement or attitude itself”. This impardonable even in a *Venus* & never allowed even there by the ancients. Many ill works remaining of the ancients (for must they have had not their underlings & *botches* as we?). But never a show or token of this **affectation** in coin, basso relievo, statue &c.

[40] *Fifth part viz.. System. *Composition. Collocation. Position. Symmetry general*

How agreeable this part! (essential & constituent of piece & tablature). Even when found in *ryparography*, animal, a dunghill (locks & hens), a flower, a fruit piece (according to what delivered in *Notion* at paragraph 3 of the introduction), if perchance the poor master has a genius of this kind: & has order in his head, to him indeed the *je ne sai quoi* yet perceived & executed, *il ne sait comment*: ravishes & delights others, *ils ne savent pourquoi*. [101]

[Shaftesbury não indica a página, mas ela. traz o mesmo título]

1. In this part, treat of the *magistrates* (together with the **hyperbole*) e.g.: in portraitures, even in half-lengths & heads, often a window open & a distant perspective of *small* & lessened objects now way not by any medium or middle size *united* to the great. This a plain breach of geometry, & an error in *the magnitude*.
2. By the very use of the *hyperbole* which is a voluntary & premeditated *error* from the *rules* of **perspective**, those very rules are plainly shown & be most necessary for the painter to understand. The deviation *in loco* requiring the nicest knowledge & reason: as for instance a distant figure on a ground near the horizon (the air appearing under its legs) or receiving a strong light on any extremity or particular part, comes to be excessive & large beyond its proportion, as in N. Poussin’s figure & perspective-piece of the Samaritan woman, where a pointing finger is longer than the whole head or face.

⁶⁷⁶Refer to *Notion*, chap.... last paragraph.

*Memd. *Bernini* wicked. Therefore, sit the hander on him as on Spaniolet, Caravaggio &c throwing in a word in behalf of Michael Angelo & Salvator Rosa --- This elsewhere, not here.

*Beware of the word *composition* here, since it may be applied equivocally to *invention*, part 1st.

*On the subject of the *hyperbole* (which I believe will require a distinct hand) remember principally the noble ancient statue of *Laocoon*. True example! But so unknown to modern judges, that it is even condemned by critics, as if the master (great as he was) had been such a blunderer as to mistake his sizes & give the form of a 20 or 21 year old to a pair of children not half-grown! N.B. This very statue (of which I blame the old print) a good subject for Mr. *Frei*, *Gribs* or other engraver, & able to fit the octavo size & stand in the page under this chapter, among the ornaments of *Second Characters*.

[41] [13. Of the Machine, machinery or deity-work]

--- *Deus intersit* --- Always necessary in the high heroic (as in the epic). No piece sublime without the action being in this respect, of full dignity --- *dignus vindice nodus*. No tablature complete in the high heroic kind without.

*Ergo *common history* (although of hero's such as Alexander, Caesar, Marc Anthony &c.) not of the higher epic order in painting; because no machine *introducible*, & much less *modern history* (except in the emblematic & oblique way which is of the irregular kind) since a *King William*, a *Louis* can much less appear in the field or council with a train of deities or with Mars, Minerva, Appolo, Mercury &c. But when the Christian machine enters (as in the case of *Constantine*) then the painter again rises, & heroism complete, the miraculous & sublime restored with credibility, through faith, tradition, sacred history, religion, as in heathenism & ancient machine.

But why ancient machine still superior to modern, see example in such a case as the weakness of human nature or the virile virtue in opposition to the female charms, or those of love. Take a *Hercules* (according to the common fiction) & a *Orphale*. Here the spins, lies & the camps &c. Cupids above & below triumph, insult, ilude. Venus laughs even fauns & satyrs may come in to add to the victory since the same fiction makes Hercules withal subject to the pleasure of wine & of the table. Now change the scene a take a *Tompson*. What machine? Not angels surely. And for demons much less. How would this appear? Ergo: moderns hit the sublime best in the move ghastly and (otherwise) ungraceful, *in-venuste* subjects of executioners & martyrs, or hideous dying pieces of *beggary*, *prayer* &c., as Domenichino's instance in the 2nd esteemed picture in the world (according to Poussin & judgement. See) viz.. St. Jerome raking the the hostile. A sacred mystery, seen with eyes of faith & comprimed by the very machine above. All noble! & exalting the low part. [42]

Nothing worse than the unskilful mixture & confusion of the machine work with the historical & human figures.

A delicate & just perceptible distinction & separation necessary. Not so as to make two pieces, or two styles, or two sorts of light (although somewhat of this better kind not amiss if well united by *intermediates*).

Examine Raphael's Transfiguration piece by this maxim & observe how the false double piece (viz. the part above) serves however as the machine part with infinite advantage.

Remember Rubens's Mercury with the 2 cardinals & queen, as an instance of the monstrous mixture of machine & history. Luxembourg Gallery, Paris.

*Subjoin. Ergo **fable** more the subject of *historical* painting than mere **history** --- Same reasons as in poetry. See Characteristics, Aristotle & places depending. This is besides the advantages of the machine the glovy's clouds & miraculous lights as **Apollo** in particular: the rays against his head as the sun; & something of this kind in proportion to other deities & demi-gods.

[94] [14. Of landscape-painting or perspective, considered by itself]

--- *Ruris ameni***Rivos & museocircunslita saxa nemusque.** Hor. Epis...

Also that of *Juvenal* (after Encomiums of the country in his own way, satire 3 in the beginning & the *Egorel prochytam prepono sabunice*

In vallem egerice descendimus & speluncas

Dissimiles veris. Quanto prestantius asset

Numen aquae, vividi si emargine cluderet undas

Herba, nec ingenium vio curent marmora sophia.

And that of the other severe poet (for even the severest allow & even exalt this relish of the truly *natural* so we see in this of **Juvenal**) in order from that foot or foundation to reproach & shame vice, & at being in itself the divine & *moral*⁶⁷⁷ according to the spirit of the *Luciuliu's*, the *Horaces's* &c) viz. **Persius** sat. 6 --- *Libertaque *meum mare, quâ castis impens dant populi; et multâ littus e valle receptat. Hic Ego securus vulgi &c.*

These are the images with which a mind must be filled; these the beautys that of which must be apperceived & with it must be *enamoured* & possessed, previously to this taste in painting. For so in poetry. What would pastorals (for instance) prove to one who had no relish the real *paisage*? The *rus*, *animals*, & rural objects?

Remember the several *orders* (as of old with Mr. Cloister in Richmond Park & St. Giles' woods) into which endeavoured to reduce the natural views: the last & most sacred, like the *alpine* kind where the vast wood & caverns with the hollows & deep valleys worn by the cataracts in the very rock itself, pines, fins & trunks of other aged tress (so *Rhapsody* page 389 &c.).

This attempted by *Salvator Rosa* but without the just speculation witness the *stickiness* of his noble trees (which he otherwise finely described) & his mangling them like *artificial trunes* & amputations made by man & with instruments contrary to the idea of those sacred recesses where solitude & deep retire ease the sense of gainful, lucrative & busy morals, makes the sublime pathetic & enchanting, raises the *sweet melancholy*, the *ravery meditation*. "Where no hand but that of **time**; no steel, no scythe but that of **Saturn's**". Secret suggestion⁶⁷⁸ of the world's ruin & decay; its

⁶⁷⁷Characteristics, I. 141.

*--- *meum mare*. So Horace's discription of this villa. *Continui montes, misi dissocianter opacâ Valle* --- and --- *Paulum siluce super his* --- and *urben ingiens Pinius, albaque populus urban hospitalen &c et obliquo laborat nympha.*

⁶⁷⁸Against the *atheists* of the world's (this globe's) eternity.

birth & just formation (ibid. viz. Rhapsody p.389-90, 393 viz. *line 22 “*where neither art, nor the conceit or caprice of man has spoilt their germine order &c.*”. [95] [em branco]

[85] [15. Of shortenings or fore-shortenings]

All the *shortenings* of figures or other constituent parts of the tablature, our painters have customarily called by the name of *fore-shortenings*, because indeed all shortenings of a particular single figure (standing by itself; & being *substantial* not adjective, but containing the point of sight within itself) are indeed **fore-shortenings**: i.e. *Shortenings fore-right*. But the point of sight being taken out the figure & removed to some other (which changes the whole economy of the tablature) the *shortenings* whatever they are become quite different; although the attitude of the figure be exactly the same. The whole drawing is then changed, be the figure transplanted but a half-bodies breadth either to one, side or other, or removed but a face's length either higher or lower in the piece. That is to say higher or lower in respect to the horizon which must be the first thing fined even by the most stupid & poultry draughtsman before he can draw so much as a man at table, a dish on it, a dog under it. For if the point of sight be just above the table so that the dish be seen into; if the servant raises the dish it must be seen by the bottom & no possibility of seeing into it unless the point of sight again be raised higher & the horizon supposed above the raised dish: & then the bottom dishes are not only deeper seen into, but the guest's heads are seen like the dishes before, & their crowns or upper parts discovered, chins & throats so much lost in proportion. The same side-ways right & left. Whence may rise the phrase *high-shortening, low-shortening, side-shortening*. [86] [em branco]

*Write this fluently, though a repetition of what written before in *Rhapsody* to which no occasion to refer here properly. For why not cite one's own, when studied? As *Xenophon* *, after Homer, & the poets. So Lucretius, Virgil. If moderns, imitate not; this because not so elaborate, not so just. *His battle of Mantinca in his Arquesilaus & in his history.

[57] [16. *Common citations & remarks]

Memd. On all occasion of citations of classic authors (the poets especially) make it a rule to consult the old editors & best commentators to make sure of the right text, orthography & interpretation: as also to discover (what may sometimes prove very happy) the parallel places of other authors.

Against libidinous⁶⁷⁹ representations in plastic art, this reflection (in a prosopopee of a master) “if I have a servant, a dependant, a poor relation or any friendly person much beneath me & at my command, am ashamed even although care & assisted in my life to use such a one & employ him in such a base service? and shall not I use my **art**⁶⁸⁰ my **science** thus, & prostitute my hand & pencil? Shall I scruple, out of respect & regard, to dignify the person to give a bawd’s, a pimp’s, a pandar’s part to one for whom I have but the least common esteem? & shall I use thus divinity muse & personage which is beauty & decorum itself in such a vile manner, & to such vilifying purposes?”

See also the good reasons of the pragmatistical author Monsieur Freart de Chambray (page 15, 16) of the loss & destruction of good pictures from *bigots* (as *Rubens’ graces* by Madam de Guies or Monpensier: query which?) although *Rubens’ graces* not so great a loss. Well if they were not a *Raphael’s*: the only painter fit. For even *Titian*, not fit. No heroic, *antique*, learning, poetry, enthusiasm. A Guido fitter; had he understood much beyond *les airs de tête*.

[58]

Aemilium circa ludum faber innus &c.

----- *infaelix guia ponnere totum.*

nescit &c.

This applicable to the *architect* as well the statuary & painter. You may know him (viz.. the *pseudo-architect*) by his extolling an inlaid floor: mighty nice draught (with collection of such) of the rails of a new modern altar, or the mosaic work & incrustation of He is a mighty admirer of *Pietro de Cotrona*, *Carlo Marat* above a *Raphael* or a *Carache*. He even allows Such a one having spent 3 or 4 years at Rome & got the mimical action & tones of the Italian with the idiom & phrase affected, comes home & the first thing you hear of him [Continue this picture remembering Mr. Talm---n].

* In praise, & as just mere character of the Greeks, note the two passages of Cicero & of Livy, the first such a *partial zealot*, the 2nd such a light admirer & lover of this nation. The first *ad fratrem*, when governing in Greece “*cum vero ei genem homine presimus non modo in quo ipsa fil sed elain a quo ad alios provincisse puteblo humanitas*; (see little pap. B. p.110). The other of Livy viz.. Lib. 39 *Nulla cum abe carum quas multas ad animorum corporiunq cultuan nobis eruditissima amnium gens invexit*. This in notes; not text.

⁶⁷⁹Sup. P.48

⁶⁸⁰Sup. over-leaf viz. 56, the top.

----- *Panaltibus & magnis diis*⁶⁸¹.

From hence take occasion to speak of the *Lares*, little statues portable, concealable, *moveables*. "Every one's first religion, *his family's*, his private & peculiar one: then *the public*"⁶⁸². When a man & partaker & intelligent in such affairs, *the community & common religion* i.e. the religion in common *pro aris & facis*. A perfect **toleration*, for private worship & public. No priest called: but master of the family *his own*; as in the main & in the higher degree the magistrate himself for the public the mere priests being but servants *one to a temple*⁶⁸³ a sort of *sexton* little better and the *augurus* &c. but a sort of *pedlars* in the trade, not aimed to be such *merchants & trades at large*, as afterwards for whole kingdoms, continents: as now the Jesuits (after gleaning up the remains of other orders in the catholic Europe where the whole tribe of orders &c have in some kingdoms & states swallowed two-thirds & have gone so far as not to leave slaves now remaining or a gentry & lazily enough to cover & guard em, or keep up the low tenance of a temporal & civil government) are gone to *Asia, China, America*, joining *real trade & commerce* with their *spiritual* & bidding for the magi-empire, by a previous universal monarch their assured slave. [56

[55]

Memd. The *malus musicus delitascens in choro* --- Where this is? In Arrian? Or? Subjoin this, as a reinforcement to what is noted (Characteristics, vol. III, 263) of the wrong conceit about ancient music. And apply this or rather *introduce* it when mention is made of *Jordano*. See below 69.

⁶⁸¹Eneid Lib. 8 in fin.

⁶⁸²Refer to *Letter of enthusiasm* p. 17, & explain.

*Not so at present (**Turk & Christian**) in Europe or Asia.... "*hard to find in any region a human society which has human laws*" (inquiry p. 96, 97) --- This self-citation tempered as many other by an *as I said to the Lordship elsewhere* particularly when it refers to *Letter of enthusiasm*. For as to the Inquiry indeed & other tracts it can not be so well said *to my Lordship &c.*

⁶⁸³Miscellany 43.

[44] [17. Citations and maxims moral & theological, applicable]

1. The two passages of the Απομνημονευματα of Xenophon (book...) dialogue of Socrates With the painter & statuary. Also with the amorous. Ibid.
2. **Inquiry** Page 104, 105. On the το καλον. A principal & fundamental citation for plastic beauty & contemplation.

Est aliquid quo tendis & inquod divigis arcum

----- atq extempore vivis. Persius Satire 3

Extemporary life miserable: better the settled *miser* or covetous passion (when attended with thought, name, family &c.) than the full easy contented, but uncertain floating. Not *prescripta ad munia jungis* (as the accumulator) but “what shall I do next?”. *Oscilantia*: visiting fashionable gentlemen of the town, set up with a pair of horses & a chariot. “Whether shall we go” “How pass our time till such or such an hour, the opera play &c.?”.

In the interim, caught by a thousand passions, hooks, suaves seem to catch those who are not engaged. But the accumulator (although the worst employed) more secure. The collector of a cabinet & instant virtuoso, still mere secure as nearer order, virtue, beauty. If taken with a *belle*; for once & so only; nor ever, nor a rake.

The unity & equality of life, made by unity of object. Therefore the artist (if in liberal art) one of the happiest men whilst truly *θιλοπονοζ*, & true to his art. Capable of doing the greatest good (as the intention of this treatise is to show). And therefore worthy even of a liberal & *noble* born youth: if an extraordinary genius, with particular reasons against the public & family engagements (i.e. *economy*, the chief part or duty of those persons). And so *Fabius Pictor* in Pliny: with many other Grecian if examined. [Ergo, examine. Also see what modern in vulgari &c.]. **[Inf. 55]**

[55]

What *Virgil* said of stealing verses from Homer (see in his life by Tiberius Claudius Donat) *facilit esse Herculi clavam quam Homero versum surripere*; so a figure from a great master’s piece in great design viz. history & composition where the 5th part (the *collocation*, just *position* & optics are observed) by reason of want of application: for how *apply* to any thing besides? How *adapt* but as there adapted, if the design be just, real, *one*, a *whole*?

Also the reason given by the French author (not quoting him as not worthy because of his detraction, insolence, conceit & what he so ignorantly says against Raphael’s Massacre print, p. 47, and even occasionally & bitterly against Michael Angelo, p. 14) viz. “*si bien qu’il est absolument impossible apres avoir derobe quelque partie du travail d’un autre peintre de la placer comme il faut dans une nouvelle composition, sans l’aide de la perspective*”. Now if

perspective be called to assistance & the figure new designed, tis in great measure original & a new figure, at least much more so than anything taken from a statue. Since the figure borrowed from painting must first be reduced as it were, to statuary & life, by the borrowing painter or copist & thence from that idea new wrought & so mastered into his new composition. Which is almost equivalent to an original design or drawing. (This passage is not put under its proper head. It should stand...) [56]

1. “*The most lovely thing in the world is love of one’s duty*”; **paint**; so of one’s **art**⁶⁸⁴. (*quatenus* painter merely; 7 more *quatenus* ingenious, virtuous & conscious painter in *humanity* &c. i.e. in reality *quatenus* poet, historian, philosopher.
2. The word Σκεσειζ by the deepest moralists borrowed from statuary anatomy designing, & applied as the most significant term of art in morals.
3. The *Quid verum alq decems*⁶⁸⁵ of **Horace** little understood (*like the thundering Bishops Fowler* in his answer to Letter of enthusiasm p. 4: great discovery &c.).
4. The **Vitae colour** (*quisquis erit vitae*) of Horace; as also his *operunq colores*, to be alluded to; commented & morally explained (with sublime & pathetic as much as may be) in the chapter below of *Colouring*⁶⁸⁶, the *melting, uniting, counterposition, marriage, symphonising, spreading, diffusing, communicating, conspiring* of the *teintis*.
5. Also that passage (a principal citation) in *Moralists* p. 215 “knowing as you are...well knowing in all the degrees & orders of beauty...&c. of which particularly *forms* &c.”. [inf.72

[72]

Learning music *practically* (as to play on an instrument or sing anything of this kind beyond mere rudiments & for better *speculation*, theory & ear) is the same in a gentleman a liberal youth, as learning to paint. It is *mechanical*. It is either poor & base if indifferent & slightly studied (& as the French say sililly *cavalereusement*) or if thoroughly & to perfection requires the *whole man*. See what is said on this subject above 19, 46.

But remember what as to statuary is feigned by the poetical author of *Thelemachus* against Philocles when compelled for a livelihood. One of the finest parts in his book.

Among other citations remember **Marcus**, a *rictus* wild-beasts &c. (and here innate ideas).

Also Socrates on painting in the *Memorables* instructing about the passion: mark of painting though high at that time as to *symmetry, form* &c. yet not as yet attained this *part* of the affections, the *pathetic moral* &c. [73]

“To look round, inspect, survey, dive into beauty; be present in nature in her sweetest aspects, see her causes & dependencies her *drawing*, design, muscling; her prosperity (παν μοι συναρμοση) her flourishing, a beatous perspective, the woods, the rivers, animals, birds (the rising singing lark) & thus joyously with the rest, celebrate nature’s festival, her birth-day, marriage, progeny, & give joy to the *incessant* creator”

Self-cite the passage in *Soliloquy* P. 317 “the *thalias, plymmias* &c willingly join their parts, & being alike interested in the cause of numbers, one with regret &c. in favour of disorder --- mad sirens --- pandarin”. So the generous painter (beware of false because of Titian’s, Caraches’ & other’s prostitution). But keep to what *should* be, & to the example of the great ancients. The majesty & gravity also of a *Roscius*, an *Aesopus* in acting. See Cicero what he says of one of them keeping to the grave & slow pronunciation: although not so popular & effeminate.

⁶⁸⁴See 57 & 45.

⁶⁸⁵See Decorous inf. 76 (3) & (5).

⁶⁸⁶Inf. 89.

See above what is said on obscenity in painters.

Self-cite also on good occasion the theological passage referring to art, in *Inquiry*, latter end of 1st book viz. p. 75. “*The elegant passion, or love of beauty running high &c.*”. *Ecstasy & rapture in the common subjects of art &c. Enthusiasm* ---

The rules of *perspective* lye hid (under the *je ne sais quoi*) like the rules of *morals right & wrong, equity & inequity &c.*

The philosopher & virtuoso alone capable of *prove demonstrate*: but the *idiot*, the vulgar man can *feel* recognise. The eye has a sense of its own a practice method peculiar & distinct from common reason or argumentation. Thus the equilibrium found so instantly in some creatures (as that of the wing in a swallow & the legs in a partridge & other *poultry*-kinds) as well as all their other instincts which are kind made by nature to rely on reason (virtuoso-like & according to that rule of *frustia fit per plura*) possesses in a less degree. But the *anti-virtuoso* again says --- Who is he? -- Who but the same, one & the same man from he who said he knew not what the *καλον* was ει πη επαινετον? Hence *Hobs, Lock &c.* still same man, same genius at the bottom. “*Beauty is nothing!*”, *virtue* nothing --- So “*perspective nothing, music nothing*” --- But these are the greatest realities of things, especially the beauty & order of perfection. These philosophers together with the *anti-virtuoso* may be called by one common name, viz. barbarous...

[53] [18. Maxims of the art.]

[Memd. For the maxims of art (the only which are to be marked with hands, as determined above, p.2 (4)). Bring *first* as many as possible into the *first* treatises & mark them still respectively with the hands afterwards both there & here].

1. "A tablature must have but *one* point of sight".
2. It must be seen only from *one* position, or point of sight, & be so wrought, that if nearer or further viewed, it appears imperfect. For if as well nearer or further, *here* or *there*; than well *nowhere*. The touches & pencil (as well as the dimensions in fresco-work & uneven superficies') must *trim the balance*, & drive you back, or bring you forward, as your eye (you will find) requires.
3. All very little painting (viz. less than *natural lessening* at convenient distance, constructed within & without the tabula or cloth) is false: & the less, the falser still. So mere miniature *false*: & only sufferable in *portraiture* of *faces*, not whole or half figures; which would be so much the more preposterous, as being *more* & the *littleness* amplified, & more apparent & resulting --- pigmy-baby-forms --- But in this respect (if history & real humanity) false: because no life so lessened can appear so distinct, or features be seen & counted --- Therefore bemoan *the excellent Poussin* employing the greatest truth of pencil & judgement in a kind or species that is in itself false; but for cabinets: and so he goes his livelihood best: modestly, & the great masters all before him, discouraging him from the noble size & that above life (of which otherwise so capable; witness his). But his pieces of 3 foot, not of the kind here censured. These excellent. His *plague* & other pieces in the French king's closet, of the unhappy little kind & relish of closet virtuosos' & the court. [54]

In the heroic stile (as either epic or tragic) the *hyperbole*⁶⁸⁷ has place & must reign: else no hero, no amplification. And therefore buskin, *coturnus*, high raised bigger than life, voice & tone suitable, & action (which makes the *stout & bellow* endured even to extravagance in the actors). But in the *common* practical & merely natural style *the hyperbole* runs to farce immediately and the buskins are stilts: the tones winning or bellowing in reality: the descriptions motions &c are "Horace's dwarf of Augusto's in arms": the genuine comic, becomes farce the middle comedy & *menander aristophanic*.

Even the great *Michael Angelo, his muscling action & movement gigantic: other painters too temerous & strict: sweet & natural; but unfit for any noble sally of genius, as *Domenicchino* the judicious correct, and Poussin: and, among the yet more modern, Carlo Marat, fittest for beauty & soft action; not fierce *terrible.

⁶⁸⁷Inf. 65 at the end.

*Confer with *Sensus Communis* p.114 notes below.

Of the happy medium & just hyperbole, see perpetual instance in divine *Raphael*. And here cite (in the notes) & reprove sharply the sharp French censurer & railler *Freart* (preface at the end....bigot-revenge against M. Angelo) particularly p. 47: being the exact description & very picture of the *false taste*. Nothing being so just & beautiful even on this very account as Raphael, in this Massacre of the Innocents (of which I have seen the original drawing). [inf. 70 [70]

Again as to the *hyperbole*. Even in perspective **Salvator Rosa*

Great MAXIM of colouring. See below 89 at the bottom.

Maxim of hyperbole viz. “for the hyperbole, *something* must be sacrificed” --- Therefore see *what?* The hyperbole must be *one* onely one *unique* simple. (See in the margin just over against this, behind)

Upon same subject of hyperbole apply Horace’s *Qui nil molihin inepte*. So the divine Raphael in this respect far beyond M. Angelo whose figure’s, labour & toil although without reason, showing great learning in design, anatomy &c. But particularly among the more modern, *Pietro de Cortona* who often *mobilus inepte*, over-does in this sense, as in his colouring & ornaments over-rich, magnificent, false. [71]

1. From the following two maxims (viz.. (1) “*frustra fit per plura*” &c., confirmed in practice by nature in anatomy; and (2) “whatever in poetic & plastic imitation, or rhetoric, is less to guess & results strong & striking although not

* So wrong was a certain cardinal’s judgement who having two cowering pieces to bespeak, a tragic ugly one and a pleasant beautiful one, gave the former to *Salvator Rosa* and the latter to *Marat*: whence this absurdity: “the devils & furies of the latter were angel-forms; the angels of the former, furies”

*A small history of this *Salvator Rosa* which though nowhere written or told, though past long before my time (for he died *ere* I was born.....) I will relate as if I had been present.

“He had chosen a cloth of a vast height in proportion to its breadth. It was full.....by..... This was with design to compose his perspective of huge *parts* (according to right & noble taste) taking in for the purpose as much height as was possible for his Rodhes & near tress which would require it. & choosing to loose the sharpliness of his piece both as to frame & portion of the space *without* &c as to the whole or body *within* rather than not approach these great objects of this kind; which therefore could not be seen to their tops if so not mighty a height be gained.

Accordingly when this was done he introduced his rock in the most stupendous manner (here describe it). This being designed & drawn to his fancy; he proceeds to adorn his piece (according to his natural ambition) with those wild savage figures of banditi wondering, gypsies, strollers, vagabonds &c., at which he was so excellent: and being puffed on still by that vanity, to make this also in great perfection & to advantage, he designed & painted them on a forward ground, in a full seize or rather larger than the perspective would allow at so *near* a distance. He had no sooner done this than he perceived what injuring he had done at the same time to his first design, & that after doing all in his power to magnify his rock & raise the majesty & grandeur of that form & principal part, he had pulled it back again, thrown it off to a distance, or, which was worst, kept it in the same place but rendered it *diminutive*, which in that peculiar form of shape of horror & dismay, would prove a sort of burlesque, & absolutely ridiculous (like a little elephant, a little camel &c.). this was the faulty *reiterate hyperbole* which destroys it self *, put all out of time & order & renders the whole fantastical & a mere vision, a sick dream, not a *clear view an inviting instructive exalting fiction or poem*.

But what does *Salvator* upon this. In an instant ere the paint was well laid, he strikes all out with a dash or two of his pencil, destroys his giant** niched in his hollow lane, “and draws a rock over his vast allowed” as *Dryden*’s in his *Proteus* of *Virgil*. But that his perspective piece might not want its ornamental human figures he redesigned upon a yet rearer ground places just such another figure or two of at least 3 sizes less, by which his *hyperbole* once again came right, the grandeur of parts in perspective restored, & his rock majestic, terribly, impending, vast came right, enormous, as it should be; and as he first *designed* it.

The picture (with another of the same beyond, its fellow) was purchased at a high price by the truly generous & worthy prince & governor the Viceroy of Naples; after whose death his pictures going to sale, the piece mentioned together with its fellow came into the hands of the author. And the piece mentioned being set in a counter-light, sufficiently discovers the passage related. *Ergo, the *hyperbole* must be *one*, simple, *unique*. ** Gigantic form.

expressed” – as by the *figure *ellipsis*); from these two maxims, I say, this deduction: “that the out-line when skipped or cast (as running over any part of the body & marked only here & there) & yet has its effect at due distance, shows the power of art, & has its suitable effect even on the unconscious spectator.

2. Remember the **ellipsis** (or *omission retrenchment reform reduction*) of the traces & harness in the divinity - & triumphal chariots, & even racing-chariots, ploughs &c. in medal & antique relief-works, *entails* &c.

Yet this however to be moderated in painting & *colours*; because of the maxim in the *Notion* chap.5 par. 12⁶⁸⁸.

3. Again of the **ellipsis** & out-line skipped (as just above (1) (2)) “The sense as well as the wit & fancy loves to guess when easy; hates to be over-helped, tutored, in leaping, running to take a lip, aiming at a trust in fencing, a recurring to the rule puzzles. The fruit of the doctrine to be as from nature & instinct, no lesson applied or thought of at the time. Besides that in views whether real or instructive that which is gathered from a few *characteristics*, or *notes*, principal aspects, touches, lines, features is more *powerfully gathered*⁶⁸⁹ more simply formed in the conception idea, more distinct & firmly lodged in the memory & sealed to the sense or understanding than what is multifaciously drawn, from a confusion of concurrent *indicatives* which destroy the effect of each other. So in rhetoric & a cause pleaded, the one good reason or the two or three principal grounds well argued; the rest slighted: ere the fine speech & enforced argument, over-turns the cause; shows the fine grammarian or logician, but destroys the orator. Not so Demosthenes, who having stuck his blow &c so the ragedious epics, enemies of the *detail* as all great wits. And so the great masters in their style of painting, hate minuteness & c. See *Characteristics* I. 144.
4. In the comparison between poetry & painting (1st & 2nd characters) this difference: “That what may decently be described in *one*; not to see the least in the other. So in a plague painted, macerated bodies & cadaverous looks indicative of the tones, but no plain sore, no one running boil, or plague-sore, no ulcer cancer or the like. From

*The power of the figure, & its supreme utmost politeness, well known to those who have studied the ancient critics & orators as well as poets, with what has been remarked on the stile of *Socrates*, *Demosthenes* &c (remember to search *Longinus* for this, also *Dionisus Halicar* & what Aristotle says, above all & let this be a full & large note of citations).

Even in comedy, a **Menander**, a **Terence**. *Ego-ne illum, quie illum, que me, que non?* --- So even a La Fontaine, in his first fable &c * *pas le moindre petit morceau*, when shows that author (who prostituted his muse & lost his real beauty & simplicity in his long, multi-form completely unshaped tales, where the *ill salt & scrudiness* attracts – *Carmina buranum* &c) to have imbebed the ancient wit, & to have known more of true dialogue than the celebrated *Fontenelle*, whose *Dialogues of the dead* are only tacked with *patch-work, common-place-book-writing*; without body, grace or characters **. And a single fable of *La Fontaine* will both with the lady page & philosopher be read (sincerely speaking) more repeatedly again & again at all hours & times than the finest of his ancient masquerader, whom he defames & defaces & are indeed real marks & spectres. No one of the real judges of the French but would allow they had rather be author of one such little fable as this of the ant & grasshopper (where characters & manners are touched & the very spirit & humours of the housewife & dame & idle gossip, the frugal man of business & the prodigal squire, are so exactly touched) than that either of the volumes of that other authors *uncharacterised* characters & dialogues of *phantoms & chimeras* with borrowed names & without a tale or story, a moral, design, draught, or any proportion of body or shape belonging to them. --- This author is worthy however of criticism, being one who was able to write well; as his dialogue of the *Pluralité des mondes* may serve to show. Where there is some kind of **imitation** (with allowance for modern air of gallantry) the chief & *common* scope, mark or bulk of the dialogue & poetry & all fictious work according to *Atheneus*, in *Characteristics*, i. 254 & so 196 Homer &c.

*So the omission of the two indicatives of the dialogue in the last lines, as in all his dialogue-manner; a thing of the nicest judgement & art, to know when & how to omit: of which **Horace** the great pattern after his master of *Greece*.

See *Characteristics* (upon the manner of *dialogue-writing*) vol. I p. 196, and what is said of the same false-manner of dialogue-writing, used by certain divines & other false imitators of *Plato* & the ancients. These dialogues of Monsieur *Fontenelle* being indeed only bad imitations of a bad false imitator **Lucian, good only in the stile & humour of the lower (the allusive) comedy & his master-mimic *Aristophanes*; the great paroder & only model of what we call burlesque & was quoted in the middle ages of politeness viz. from *Aristophanes*, to this *Lucian*.

⁶⁸⁸Sup. I. Self-citation [Apology for that] sup. I. 43.

hence argument *a fortiori*. How indecent is obscenity? When painting in other impurities is so nice & cannot *show* what may be said in the loudest harshest terms?

[Os textos que seguem se encontram em páginas e anexos não-numerados no fim do caderno]

(a) Memd. Sept. 14 1712.

From the French { the venetian painter (sent for, to England by Lady Manchester) *Rizzi*.
the Bolonese painter Carlo Cigniani. Fine colourist. Old man.

(b) Upon the Συσμηορτη

The reason why no backward landscape or distinct perspective (except rude and imperfect in pieces of forward and large humane figures in proportion to the cloth or *tabula* of whatever like --- so vice versâ no forward or distinct human figures when landscape and remote objects, a sky and a horrid one imitated to the like. Refer to passage in the *Notion*.

(c) General rules of perspective in the relief or lapidary-kind

I. That since this species of work is only a conjunction or falling together of statuary [upon a ground or plan] which forms the types by neat bulk or solids and has nothing to do with other helps or means (such as of colours showdown and lights) there should be no depths or distancies represented beyond that ground or plan out of which the statue-work projects nor [consequently] any diminution of objects on account of this distance except for about as much space within the ground or plan as answers to the bulk of the figures which project.

Reasons for this:

(1) as in Judgement of Hercules chap ... part ...

(2)

(3)

(4)

II. That there be a several point of sight for every figure (otherwise how would it prove especially on a convex as round a column such as the Antoninece's or a Trajan's?).

⁶⁸⁹ *Lecta potenter*. Hor. *Ars Poetica* v. 40, & what ensues by way of facility in the author's free pencil. *Verbaq provisam rem nom invita scquentur*. V. 311.

III. That the rest of the types or whatever other representations accompany the figures of human or animal life be as few as possible and those few when absolutely necessary not to exceed the former in actual height or bulk. So that when a house, a tower, a temple, a triumphant arch or lusty gate is represented the very edifice itself though in equal distance with the figures should be represented but very little higher than the figures.

Reasons for this

(1) Sacrifice to what is principal as in Judgement of Hercules chap... (2) (3)

(d) Hercules p.4 (10) L. 6 *Distant Figures*

The pieces of this kind being modern, as either of *Turks & Christians* against each other, or of the latter between themselves, the very nearest figures, besides their being indistinct (for they must be, if true), have arms or cloths so covering their limbs as to leave no room for the intelligent correct part in figure-painting, the muscling, drawing, &c.

Besides this, the squadrons, battalions, brigades, like real perspective-parts with redoubts, parts of bastions, batteries &c make up the perspective as principal unless (which is chiefly absurd) the great & little, the distant & the near *plain* object (as the featured face half-big as life in a great piece be joined together, the certain portraiture current piece of generals & admirals, where all false beyond a distance smooth & imperfect touch with a cannon near hand.

(e) Music not applied to the passions. Graduate working at Alexander. Dryden's odes.

Features enamouring. Characteristical note of passions &c.

Calendario Lunario e pronostio nuovo dell'anno bisestile 1712.

PRO 30/24/24/14

Procedimentos de transcrição.

1. Este texto traz anotações realizadas por Shaftesbury durante sua viagem final à Itália, para o que seria o comentário à tradução do texto de Prodicus, *The picture of Cebes* (publicada por Rand).
2. A transcrição reproduz o texto exatamente como se encontra no original, incluindo as palavras sublinhadas.
3. A paginação original é indicada entre colchetes em negrito.
4. Os textos riscados por Shaftesbury aparecem entre colchetes em negrito.
5. As demais páginas do caderno trazem registros de correspondência recebida por Shaftesbury em Nápoles, Itália, entre maio e dezembro de 1712.
6. Esta é a primeira transcrição realizada desse manuscrito.

[1]

[Memd.

In the great design of a kind of 4th volume to follow Characteristics take a name suitable as plastics, iconics &c. And for dedication see vol. III p. 10, 18, 19.]

[2]

Running Title ---

TABLATURE OF/PRODICUS { } TABLATURE OF/CEBES.

CEBES Appendix.

Memd. Notes (concerning modern painters and their stiles &c.) to be left till.

Premise (by way of apology of our Hercules-Tablature) viz. that no one figure purely graceful to be expected: not even virtue because of her eager action &c.

Begin.

No better way perhaps to show perfection and what can be done than show faults and example what cannot be.

The difficulty of doing well once known, the joy greater and the prize and value more, of what is good.

Vain attempts, essays and prepossessions and party-taking prevented. Such a master has done so. What then?

What if master moderns except Raphael, [Poussin].

[3]

Begin where left off viz. colours &c.

demonstration from gold and silver (portraits pearl or diamond-dust) as well as lapis-lazuli put in pictures.

The glories &c. bespoke ordered by the priests.

Even Raphael for tapestry: to Cardinals, monarchs, his cartoons.

Not so in Greece where monarchs came in for contenders for prizes out of Olympic and other games⁶⁹⁰.

Subjects given to painters, against the *καλον* and *Πηιλανον*.

Metamorphosis not absurd, resurrection, ascension, Elias-chariot &c. well. But fancy Samson⁶⁹¹. Eve (compare with Palas) not well, out of a rib &c⁶⁹².

[4]

Prostitution of painters to Lords Priests. Bigotry. Leadness.

A pimp. How not ashamed of this, since of the other fact: although that to one friend or patron this to all the world a common producer.

This a moral subject, yet confessed unfit, because so moral in the direct not poetically moral in the oblique another stile, manner, order.

So Achilles and Ulysses more moral than a Cato or even a Aencas [5] because made too perfect, as the other in reality so and too truly moral to make the subject, or anyway serve in a poetically moral piece.

Thus our Cebes a good narrative and discourse dialogue explanation, with an explainer or guide (as in the treatise the old man). But being put in effect, a mere hieroglyphic Egyptian Gothic performance, perspicuity integrity or ολυνοπλον.

However as an essay to make the best of it: and first maxim.

1. Not the same figure twice: [6] although even in different periods, least the imagination by way of prevention should lay hold of the same man and so multiply him.
2. Not man or a man but such and such a man as Hercules, Ulysses, Theseus.

Therefore Hercules to be taken here (according to the blunder of the Arabian Princess inform Talmasius is ashamed of, although advances for his learning [7] and to set off (as is usual) himself and his published author.

But what is yet more strange in poetical operations (as painting is one) the dubious or mixed are more moral than the perfect as exercising the passions. For if justice be to be represented; how possibly move or exercise the passions if a mere just act as of Roman senate or consul condemning or delivering over a Cethegus or a Catiline? But let it be a Papirus a Fabius or a Brutus to a son and see!

See the art and saver mystery of the good *τραγεδία*. For while love to country is seemingly [8] detested, as taking party on the side of the fatherly, social affection is in the mean time promoted, and the mind when cool brings all to rights to the passion being gained and natural affection recognised and promoted; which gained once, all is gained. And, what is chief, the fatal part and cold philosophy (whether Epicurean or Christian) expelled, selfishness lowered, humanity advanced. The mind cools again and shows that in mankind there can be no father or son &c. without a country, a nation, a people and therefore this first (where tyranny hinders not) a country and society above all.

[9]

⁶⁹⁰Statues formed from these from these combatants, Spartan breed, Milos &c. therefore these the models, not life [as in Sensus Communis]. Hence Raphael &c. so a fault lapidarys.

⁶⁹¹Jaw-bone. Sist.

⁶⁹²Christ's wounds make him of a sick-wounded look. This recognised by the good painters.

Cause of growth of 3 arts (sculpture, statuary, painting) in Italy. Union of so many princes and states. Little princes almost as private men.

Church, hierarchy, its state. Free government. Counsels under archbishops, generals. The Pope. General and counsel of the Jesuits and other orders. These latter over the whole face of the globe from Peru to China.

Conclude

As conclusion of last piece (viz. Hercules &c.) pleasure of colours, the debauch --- as pleasant painting! --- The shop.

[10]

Pleasure here as in the piece. Moral same.

Must be quitted for a true taste and consequent enjoyment.

English temper. Hope from it. A hesitation of hardship severity in style sense &c.

This may run too far. Obscurus fio. But easily tempered. This the right side. Mark of a good genius. Quod prosit.

[11]

[A comparison of tastes. Contraries, the mellow and the harsh. Organ and flute. Trumpet and lute. Ripe beuré pare or bergmoot dropping and caught under the tree, with the repositied unripe bom christien or hard masculine crusty Maitre Jean].

In a composition the chief, unity. Μυλθειζ. So a piece or picture its greatest perfection that it should be ONE i.e. concur in one, one meaning, sense.

Seen in one view. One respect, aspect.

By one act of the eye or mind: at one point of sight (no removing station, so as to see some parts at such a distance, others at a nearer or further.

Not so much as losing sight or thought of one, while looking on the other.

[12]

Reference to the Notion-piece, chapter V § 11 and 12. Hyperbole not allowed to painting (although centaurs, mermaids, satires and persuasive similar forms of mixed humanity) although to poetry.

Ergo, save in metamorphοσειζ. Great art and tenderness. Not the midway but beginning or end. The common theme Acteon visible how modern painting blunders (so in religious miracles which in decency not name) horns grown and waterings. Rule of consistency broken as above.

He were a wretched painter who being to historize David and Goliath should make the disproportion even according to truth of history or fact (since the seeming true not real is the poetical truth). This covered in a poem but not when coram oculis. [13] And thus this difference discovered by those who know only the rules of tragedy which admits not in action and on the scene what the epic does in the narration. Incredulus adc.

The heroic, epic, loves the bigger than life. So the Cothurnus high raised.

In the comic, detestable, try a stampskerk Therefore I can't but bemoan a Poussin little and indignor to see a Caravaggio or a Salvator Rosa great.

[14]

Proof from an instance or two (as that of the loquaturius in Pliny) that the moderns have yet no idea of what the ancients had. And even now no moderns but free governments and assemblies can feel the thing. Not by the college or pulpit or bar.

It arises hence an enthusiasm or swelling teeming of the mind, labouring to be delivered, and big with high thought and action, such as a private cause will not bear, but majesty. A people, nation, tragedy and tragic affections sympathy real in the speaker, although false, yet induced, for the instant, and felt.

[15]

Maxim.

What proportion the several figures in a group hold to the principle figure that the groups to the principal group. This vulgarly known. But the hic labor hoc opus, to conceal the art: the liason invisible. Transition, as in style, poetry &c.

A demonstration viz.

From a statue of marble or brass. Then colour it flesh and blood! A [16] spectre! --- Why? Imitation not absolute, entire throughout but limited, reserved and with exception, partial.....

Imitation therefore of what? --- Of a whole (as in a poem) and of an action, a passion, manner: not of flesh and blood not of clay (so poor a thing and mind taken off from the great and chief) as in Rubens &c. His warmth vicious in both senses, and thought mean and unheroic like his figures and flights in the air.

[17]

Theatrical imitation. I.e. ideas of action taken from that of the stage. Hence over tragical, horrid, bombast buskin. Affectation, sweer, twining, dancing. None such in antiques or Raphael.

Affectation [so Christ in the semanton woman of Carach] Mrs. Barry &c.

Again supertragical. Hyperbolic. Honour [as in some crowded battles overwhelming]. Ideas from sick and troubled dreams not nature.

This striking at first, lasts not.

[18]

Imitations of simple passions as anger (Homer). So characters of Theophraste, La Bruyère, in fable, La Fontaine.

Imitation of what? 1st of a whole. 2nd --- next to a whole viz. a constitution, part, a member; that portion or piece (whence the phrase piece for a whole).

1st a whole action. Mischief of anger and quarrel of the Greeks' loss and restoration of Troy.

Next. Anger by itself. Loss of Troy or of the mere pack by itself. Achilles by himself. (Eneas not a character so not the same effect this poet in this respect being less happy than Homer). Quam similis [19] utenq est sims as in Characteristics p. vol. 3.

Thus Falstaff. Why (although rude) so pleasing. But to Englishmen only.

So a character of an old English jest. Hastings my neighbour, in my Grandfathers' own hand at a pleasant leisure hour.

[This perhaps set whole in notes at the bottom. These being attractive spells, the aromatics to the palate, the town tack coffee-house-club-wonderment and narration one to another]. [18]

Chapter Of species, forms, ideas..... Qui species alias veris &c.

Thus convulsion, horror (as in Raphael's demoniac and Ananias) right. But this transferred, although into battle, wrong.

Sick dreams [Ars Poetica V. 7 Egron ... meditantis somnia Pers.]. so mad painters hit the fancy but this cooling, the piece a monster. [19]

[The good painter first makes forms from his ideas (a mighty work!) then his hand. Thus Raphael dying young. His idea before his hand. All other masters had their hand before their idea. He still working on the ideal to his death and hand viz. colouring scarce yet learnt]

Thus old D. of Buck viz. a Bays mouse Montague (name ill given by his enemies designed in contempt) [plain dealer no character no sense].

Andrew Marvel all the same humour but national⁶⁹³, particular ergo of the first [20] not third and most beautiful comedy Menander &c.⁶⁹⁴

Humour (a species form rightly taken) humour-ist as mannerist

Thus in authors. Theophraste. Terence. Plutarch (understood Characteristic) otherwise simple not deep. So Suetonius historian. Petronius romancer. The modern Cervantes such another long copious writer (see Macrobius). No order form: no constitution collocation ordinance: only characteristic.

Thus intelligence of imitation and of what imitated: for mere imitation is mimicry. Ergo some instruction truth [cite Aristotle (in the notes) viz. his Poetics and in the beginning of his

1st puerile. As "this is a horse! This is an eagle!" --- So on. More and greater truth, to moral and characteristic.

[Horace's great place and hinge of his poetics. Descriptas servere vices operunque colons and so [21] the truth of affections imbebi juvenis tandem &c. and thus veras hinc dicere voces vers. 318. 178. On which see Monsieur Dacier's Horace.]

⁶⁹³As Falstaff. Un infatigable to a stranger.

“Charta Socraticae” [*Design of a Socratick History*]

PRO 30/24/27/14.

Procedimentos de Transcrição.

1. O manuscrito inédito e inacabado de *Design of a Socratick History* encontra-se no Public Record Office e tem 163 páginas.
2. Esta transcrição parcial é complementada por cópia do restante do manuscrito. O leitor poderá contar, a partir de 2003, com a edição completa acompanhada de uma tradução francesa, de responsabilidade de Laurent Jaffro e Lawrence Klein.
3. A paginação original encontra-se em números entre colchetes em negrito. O mesmo vale para as passagens riscadas por Shaftesbury e as minhas intervenções.
4. Sobre o sentido desta peculiar “biografia” do filósofo grego, o leitor pode consultar *Soliloquy, or advice to an author*, livro 1.

⁶⁹⁴[Refer to Characteristics].

[O manuscrito inicia com três páginas não-numeradas, aqui indicadas por I, II, III].

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[1] Design of a Socratic history

Title of the Work [*Charta Socraticae*. Or sermons socraticae as Ode 21 of Horace, book 3: *non ille quanquam socraticis malet sermonibus* ---] (motto) --- sapere est principius & finis

Rem libi socratic paternut &c. Horace, *Ars Poetica*.

Order of it as follows

Book the First.

1. Preface showing the reason of the undertaking, order of the work, apology as to modern religion. The nature of the history: what incident: and that of philosopher especially Diogenes Laertius, and from whence falls naturally into what follows. (See instructions n. 2 and supplement infra, p. 52, 53).
2. The life of Socrates from Diogenes Laertius and others⁶⁹⁵: and concluding with his death and the censure of it falls naturally into Xenophon's expostulation, and the first words of the Memorables, *τολλακιρ εθαυματα* --- See page 2⁶⁹⁶.
3. The 4 books translated. See p. 4. (and notes on them, see p. 6).
4. Discourse on the order, composition and symmetry of the four books of Xenophon (of which the economics, far from being a part) in the conclusion introductory to the following apology (see p. 8).
5. The apology of Xenophon translated (see p. 10) with notes (see p. 12).
6. Discourse on the two historical pieces of Xenophon (or) *on the writing of Xenophon* (p. 14).

Here end the first book. Memorandum: the general title of the pages of this first to be *history*, as thus (1) Preface to the history. For (2) History of Socrates: Diogenes Laertius &c. For (3) History of Socrates: account of Xenophon, his historian. For (4) History of Socrates: Discourse on the *Economicus* of Xenophon. For (5) History of Socrates: the apology of Xenophon. For (6) Discourse on the two pieces of Xenophon. [2]

[1] Book the Second

1. Preface. The idea of the collection. Reason why these tracts separated from the former, why some but short, why some fragments: dialogues, dramatic pieces, orations from friends and enemies. P. 16. [See query 15].
2. Economics of Xenophon (p. 18) and notes (p. 20).
3. Discourse on the Economics. No part of the Memorables (as above) and more loose on the Convivium which follows, on which something by way of preparation to the following (p. 22).
4. The Convivium (p. 24) and notes (p. 26).
5. Discourse on the two pieces of Xenophon whose looser pieces more true than any of Plato's, unattested by himself and not speaking at all as an historian. Only pictures and sometimes not so much as that. From hence fall into the account of the friendly and unfriendly pictures and fictions, first unfriendly (p. 28).
6. Aristophanes' comedy (not whole) (p. 30) notes (p. 32).
7. Discourse on it, and introductory to Plato (p. 34).
8. Plato's Convivium and other fragments (p. 36) and notes (p. 38).
9. Discourse on them, concluding so as to prepare for the Apology representing the town of Athens and opening the scene (p. 40)

⁶⁹⁵The examination of the *το δαιμονιον* to be in this place, partly.

⁶⁹⁶The life of Xenophon in this place, between 2 and 3. See p. 68 and Instructions p. 53.

10. Apology, Crito and Phaedo (p. 44) notes (46).

11. Concluding discourse (p. 48). [2]

Common place for remarks general, works, citations and passages of authors not determined, where to have their place see p. 50.

Common place for queries, general ideas, general cautions, instructions as to the composition, style, genius, writing thing in controversy &c.: see p. 52..

Letters of Socrates (to be placed at the latter end, but in the life): and Xenophon (the same) translation. Page 54.

Notes on the letters. Judgement of them, which true which not. P. 56.

Matters referring to the to δαίμονιον p. 66 (which is to be placed in the Life of Socrates partly, but chiefly as directed p. 80, n. 10).

Matters referring to the life of Xenophon (to be placed just before the Memorandum: as is shown below in instructions n.4. See below p. 68.

[Table of Cebes (the Socratic) to be added last of all, after the three pieces of Plato and the death of Socrates in Phaedo. The same discourse which concludes with Plato and the Platonic history, introducing to this of Cebes, the only Socratic remaining besides our two. See page 162].

Common place for certain thoughts and reflections fit to be produced in this work but not determined to what discourse or what note they shall be added. See p. 82.

Place for the *marginal notes and index* (to be made alphabetical and full at the end of the first Book, for finding out of places). See page 226.

Place for the same *marginal notes, index* of the Second book. See (...).

Advertisements as from the printer [58].

New place for the second thoughts and composition of additional pieces. 162)

[Note on the table of Cebes, p... Discourse and Conclusion, p... [Memorandum: the similitude between this picture and that of Hercules in the Memorables, book 2]]

[2] Number 1. PREFACE.

Or Prefatory, Preliminary discourse (1st); Introductory, by way of Introduction; or merely Introduction. As thus. In one page *History of Socrates* [or Socratic History] and then over against it in the other page, *Introduction*, and so on afterwards: as in the frontispiece the leaf before: see the memorandum.

1. That when I have considered I have often thought it a thing very absurd and unaccountable to hear ancient names quoted with great authority, when at the same time there was no manner of right understanding or notion of those talked of. And whereas a man would be ridiculous who should in any grave concern bring instances of Cadmus or Orpheus; yet it is not in itself less absurd when Socrates or any such, being quoted; neither the person that quotes nor any of the standers by that hear, have any notion who Socrates was and understand and conceive his story as ridiculously and fabulously as that of Cadmus or Orpheus. However this I have observed that in very many occasions the citation of some wise ancient by a person of prudence [*pietate grave & mentis*] has great weight to do good. Therefore I thought it not altogether absurd to attempt to set this in a right light: especially since I think (it is my opinion and while be seen afterwards whether so or not by one who will read this) that there is nothing nor no person in ancient history of whom we may have a clearer plainer view and more entirely known⁶⁹⁷: even so that (it is my opinion) no person whom we do not now actually converse with but have knowledge of from history ever so fresh an be better known to us and (in my opinion of which the reasons shall be given afterwards) hardly any or at least but very few so well⁶⁹⁸.

2. Now how others will be affected by this I know not (so that what is done perhaps will be only a piece of curiosity of ancient history and no more). But this I know that I my self have ever been mightily affected and could never read anything of this kind but with profitable delight, and as helping to correct my faults, make me ashamed of my self and in love with virtue; having not easily found anything that has made me more heartily applaud temperance, justice, friendship and seek to form and my self to these; which if it be so with others, I have done well in setting this in the clearest light, and giving those a view of it who could have had a sound one no otherwise than thus⁶⁹⁹, at least if it be not so; I have done no harm, and my self much good since I could not but be more and more taken with those things as I more inspected them; and that I have had the imagination all along of doing good to others and doing my friends a courtesy: which is no small pleasure. (See supplement to this below) [59] (Supplement to 2nd).

That as the ancients excelled⁷⁰⁰ us in policy and government so in the knowledge of this sort (viz. morals) they were not less happily knowing⁷⁰¹. Livius, Tacitus and such great men have been commented upon wit success and applause, and have given occasion to the finest pieces and discourses which our modern language can boast of. But as to morals this history of Xenophon and what attends it (the properest subject of that kind) has never given occasion to anything of that kind. Although could it be happily done, it would not be less beautiful or less advantageous certainly, and as to explanation it needs it yet more than that of the other sort or any of those pieces. The subject takes in of necessity much of policy, government and history of the lives of great men (either in part or wholly Socratic) orators,

⁶⁹⁷See Citations, 3.

⁶⁹⁸See what in appearance contradicts this, inf. P. 71, column two, latter end.

⁶⁹⁹It being not enough to understand Latin. Many excellent geniuses in England such as have not had that advantage who deserve and are capable of the treasures of the Ancients. Besides this kind is ornamental to our language &c.: that force with good intention &c.

⁷⁰⁰Speak moderately.

⁷⁰¹Take care of the objection. Viz. the moral of the gospel.

captains, statesmen, philosophers, poets, historians and all that have excelled in any sciences (Xenophon himself, the divine Plato, Dion, Demosthenes, [Eschines?] Euripides, Alcibiades [Phocion])⁷⁰². (...) For all these were either immediately disciples of Socrates or of his disciples, and drew from his fountain. When the manners, the [inf. 86 costumes, the police &c: of ancient cities, mighty commonwealths, fertile in virtuos men and actions, and the sources of those arts and that knowledge and learning which from the rudeness of a barbarous age and nations we have lately received. [Forget not in this image the lower arts, statuary, painting, architecture &c⁷⁰³: as well as the great legislators and founders or restorers of Commonwealths].

Remember too the veneration that the great Romans had for these and how they drew all from them. The Cicero's, Cato's, Scipio's, &c⁷⁰⁴: [remember Pancetius and Fabius, his accusation old Cato's leraning Greek at last himself⁷⁰⁵] of which we shall afterwards speak more [see p. 16 930]. And in this view, this idea, we have undertaken the work: which we with we may be sufficient &c. [inf. P. 58

3. That as to history (such as unfortunately all of that kind is) nothing shall be omitted and what is produced, the authors cited for it. As to the translation of the philosophy; as the errors are considerable by small omissions in the text and false readings; so the main sense shall be followed as chiefly to be relied on (in the same manner as in the history and main character of man) although if there be any receding from the common reading; account shall be given of it wherefore and on what grounds, and the different readings always marked. (This in the place of advertisements, not to load the preface, *oration, diction*).

4. To give an idea of the work as brought into the shortest bounds. Therefore Plato, cut off and even Xenophon himself in the Economics. (See Ideas p. 74 (7)).

5. That philosophy⁷⁰⁶ has had a hard fate for it is known that although the most pious and those (both ancient fathers and moderns) that have been the greatest ornament to our religion have embraced and cherished it; yet the boldness of men (in this latter age particularly) has created a great jealousy of it although unjustly and has made it the work of indignation with the defenders of religion and our fate, and on the other side it may de observed that the very opponents and contrary are at enmity with philosophy as apprehending it (which it really is) a great support for religion and closely joined to it. But, in reality, none that wish well to religion, or who merely wish [59] well to mankind and happy living, ought upon any account to inveigh against this [something of this kind but with great caution]. Then in the next place. The example of Boetius a Christian who mixed not anything (as others have done and now usually do) with religion: but treated it apart, so we in the same manner. And therefore from henceforward no mention more of anything but philosophy. The mysteries of our holy religion not being to mixed.

⁷⁰²Through Diogenes from Anthitenes.

⁷⁰³ Olympic and Istimian games, exercises &c.

⁷⁰⁴See what is said of Scypio as to the works of Xenophon (or his Cyropaedia) that he bragged of having wore it out (...). See below 69 (4).

⁷⁰⁵Of this, not here, but in the second preface and the opening of the second book. See p. 16 (3).

⁷⁰⁶Take care before hand to explain *what philosophy* least metaphysics &c. be understood.

[2 – Shaftesbury repete a numeração]

Number 2: The life of Socrates: from Diogenes Laertius and others.

[As seções “Life” e “Death” são apresentadas no manuscrito em colunas paralelas].

Life

1. His mother. See Plato, Theetetus. Whether fiction of Plato or not.
2. Memorandum: many passages lost, as that of Marcus B...C..., when Xantiphus has taken away his clothes. Remember also that place of Marcus concerning Perdiccas' his invitation. Diogenes Laertius and Seneca mention Arquelau, not Perdiccas. See Plato Theog. P. 90. Observe here what is said of Crito's friends (in Crito) which he speaks of in Thessaly and those countries to whom Socrates could be welcome. Concerning Archelaus also p. 321.
3. The oath *per canem*. Deum Egyptorum, p. 329 (not used but in Plato). See below, p. 12 (3).
4. Extravagant things reported of Socrates (as drinking (...) &c.) whence all of this kind and all the ralleries and inventives chiefly. See below in Discourse before Plato p. 34, nos. 2, 3, 4:
5. Part of which must come in here concerning the to δαίμονιον. See p. 66. [Remember that there is much said of Socrates below upon Aristophanes p. 34 and something p. 22]. [3]
6. His retreat at the rant of the army at Delos. Plato, Laches, 481. [Query: concerning the age of Socrates at this dialogue because he makes him young in respect of Laches]. No doubt but that Socrates being in the fight⁷⁰⁷ (whether that be true or no examine) must needs have gravely retreated and not as a coward. But as to his rescuing Alchibiades or (...) all this must be addition. For how should Xenophon (such a hero) not speak of it? He whose passion was so great for arms? He who wrote the praise of Agrilaus, the romance of Cyrus &c? See below 95 (11).
7. Aspasia eloquence --- mistress to Socrates. Plato in Menexemus 517. But all this is mere raillery, so nothing to be relied on. For he is rallying the orators, particularly Pericles whom Plato always scourges. [Observe in this place a full chronology. Aspasia he speaks of as having seen her the day before and yet he himself in this very same page calls himself old].
8. (...) of Socrates drinking. Reason for Plato's feigning this: of which we shall speak below (see p. 78 (8)) although otherwise Socrates forlorn to a great degree if ever (as seldom ever) at a feast. See Memorables, B...C...sect...
[infra 80]
9. Query: concerning Socrates dancing. See the passage in the Convivium of Xenophon and notes (2).
10. Remember as to all those particular enquiries (which by being placed here may make the reading unpleasant, disturb the order and break the proportion of the piece which, as *a life*, should be written with spirit and agreeably) to refer them to the discourses below. As particularly (...). and as for what is imperiously objected to Socrates to be sure least of all to mention it here to give prejudice, but refer to discourses below, particularly the SOCRATIC IRONY to n. 5 of Book 2 p. 28.
11. Concerning Socrates see Epistles of Plato 2nd (of which see p. 51, 7). Also Epistle 7 of his accusation, death. As that for that Socrates in Epistle 11 it is another person⁷⁰⁸ and not our Socrates, for Plato speaks of himself as aged a few lines after.

⁷⁰⁷ Simphais asserts it, C. 31. But this from Plato in probability: so no great stress to be laid.⁷⁰⁸ See concerning a certain Socrates minor in Plato, Politics, p. 528.

12. The expression of Socrates in Diogenes Laertius 185 after reading of Plato's *Lysis* (if it could be that that very dialogue was written when he was so young) *Oh Hercules! What fiction does this youth &c.* [But place this rather in the discourse after *Crito* and preparatory in *Phaedo*].
13. Concerning the offer of escape out of prison whether by Eschines' his meant or *Crito's*, a question (see the discourse on *Crito*, 482). Diogenes Laertius 186 no strict guard everybody willing that he should escape. But Socrates held the Athenians to their words and would die. [query: whether this not rather in some discourse below, as after the two historical pieces or ...] [81]
14. Concerning his home-life, besides what is in *Crito*, see *Phaedrus*.
15. The odd stories about Socrates, his second wife daughter to Aristides the Just, called Myrtho, and by her a son answerable to her character as Lampocles was answerable to Xantippe. Whence all this gluff?⁷⁰⁹ And likewise his appearing by two wives then they quarrelled with an insipid saying that it was strange that two women should fight about a men so ugly as he was. To take notice whence this and the like nauseous fictions came. And to speak of them slightly without spending many words, ranging them amongst those of the impious feats of war, drinking, loves &c.: of his indiscreet friends and ignorant admirers more injurious to his memory than his enemies.
- Query: what Lucian says to this? And if he spare him on the subject of his two wives; sure enough he either never heard or regarded the story. Query: what Plutarch says to this? [inf. 156]
16. Of the writing of Socrates. Besides what in the prison, hymns, fables, observe the dialogues in which he exercised himself as Epitetus mentions: who asks *who ever writ more than he?* And see what was charged upon Eschines as a plagiary for taking some of Socrates' writings out of the hands of Xantippe? See Diogenes Laertius and Hesechius Illustrius, in Eschines' life.
17. Of the sublime and tragic way of Socrates hinted in Arrian III, 22, and shown in Marcus at the end of his 55th book. See in notes on Arrian p. 106.

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18. Of his *never travelling* besides what Xenophon (his historian) says: see even Plato in *Phaedrus* a little after the beginning. And what in *Crito* towards the end, by the same Plato. And yet what magnifying of travels and foreign barbarian learning by Plato elsewhere and even in the mouth of Socrates viz. *Phaedo* a more historical piece than any after the *Apology* and *Crito*. Which sufficiently shows how differently Plato is to be considered as writing for Socrates sometimes but after for himself and his own notions of education, manners, philosophy &c: Xenophon being so positive against this relish of Socrates and his despising and rejecting foreign learning and all excepting moral, political and practical, for the ingenuous, free born, youth.

[2] *Death*

1. The account of his death [see below p. 14, p. 46] and the circumstances of his trial, the temper of the people, nature, his accusation, manner of defence: *a complicated affair*: but last of all, what condemned him (or it had passed over slightly) was his stoutness (as the say) and what they thought insolent, not the bend and beg raging deference to the great authority and majesty of the people. But this will afterwards fully appear. The corrupting of the youth and the accusation of atheism were good handles and of service to his accusers by influencing here and there a man, and by way of accumulation, aggravation, and feeling out of his ill behaviour. But the main was this: that Socrates would tell the Athenians and censure and correct them and live after that manner amongst them, and the Athenians would

⁷⁰⁹Much of this sort in Suidas.

not bear this, and upon this point the cause was tried. *Will you desist or no?* Socrates declares highly the contrary; therefore submits to death. See the whole Apology of Plato, particularly p. 30. Inf. 13 (5).

2. Of Socrates his voluntary death. See Crito notes (1). And that he might have had banishment after the first sentence pronounced. See Apology of Plato, but particularly in express words in Crito p. 39. Passages of Epictetus inf. 133. See supplement to this note below, p. 80. [3]
3. Death of Socrates. Repentance of the Athenians and violent degree against the accusers. See Diodorus Siculus. (A. D. 1704) (See in Ασκηματα p. 243 about the effect of Socratic death).
4. The Athenians forbidding afterwards the mention of the odious sentence and fact. Yet Euripides touched in (as Xenophon, unseen, in his Κυροπαεδια, see below p. 144) in his Palemedes. And of this and the cause of Isocrates' touching the affair so lightly: see the argument before Isocrates' oration in praise of Buscridi.

Query: who the author of the first of these arguments? The latter is Wolfs', but the former of some ancient perhaps, and showing in this historical part for Socrates' life. Very remarkable. [infra 80

(1704/5)

5. About his dying for the of a God, some indirectly but not directly, for in reality condemned as an atheist rather. Memorandum: to read query what Cudworth says of it, and observe Epictetus in Arrian of Wolf edition, p. 133. Τεον δυνοριγειν in the singular (Supplement to note 2). Of his voluntary death see Plato in Crito as above in notes on Crito, p. 46 and 62. [infra 157
6. Isocrates a great friend of Socrates, not only by the passage of Plato in Phaedrus, but by the fragment of Plutarch of his life, where it is related that Isocrates grieved extremely and appeared publicly next day in mourning for his death.

See his fortitude also (imitating and encouraged by Socrates') against the 30 tyrants mentioned in the same life of Plutarch. Isocrates older than Plato by seven years.

7. *Corruption of the youth.* Objection common to all the laugh, eloquence, rhetoric as well as logic or physics. This not Anaxagoras only Protagoras, &c.: but even Isocrates see himself in his last great work *De Permutatine* (p. 316). And remember also his piece written against Polycrates for Socrates his sake, viz. *Oratio pro Buscridi*; and what is said there for Socrates as much as was comment because of the prohibition of the Athenians only Xenophon (a banished man) dared openly transgress.

[4] Number 3: THE FOUR BOOKS OF MEMORABLES OF XENOPHON - Translation.

[See what must intervene here, between the life of Socrates (viz. the life of Xenophon) and this. Infra, Instructions n.7, p. 53]. Life of Xenophon, 68.

(Cuatro columnas paralelas por página)

Book 1

1. The title ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΜΑΤΑ. Query: whether *Memoirs*, or *Memorable*, or *Memorials*, or *Commentaries* (infra 158). Remember to mistrust the word memorables because of our being used to it from talking and citing the French as well as the Latin translators. Besides that *Memorables* seems to promise great things: which is not the meaning of the Greek. For this is modest and signifies only the memory of things past the *records* or *remains*. [158] **Ann. 1704.** 53. [From above P. 4 (1). Απομνημονεύματα to be rendered commentaries in Latin as well as English. See Cesar's commentaries of Jungermannus the Greek edition same word Απομν: which was the original in Cesar's mind and thus rightly put by his Greek translator (so Arrian in his preface to Epictetus, his commentaries υπομνηματα although not Απομναμ). So A. Gaellius L. 14 C. 3 calls these books Commentaries. Dictorum atque factorum Socratis comentarios. (N.B.) Which words Socrates being left out in the title (often shortened a word or two in the M. A.) may perhaps show a words wanting in each of these titles to the two philosophical pieces of Xenophon and Arrian (so like to one another) and that the one should have Σοχρατωζ after Xenophon and the other Απομνημονεύματα after Ετικλ ---. This but conjecture.

But remember this whole chapter in A. Gaellius of companion of Xenophon and Plato and the examination of their difference⁷¹⁰, to be inserted in the proper place. See

2. P. 16, L. 1. But perhaps *in this place* many people *who think they philosophise (or thinking to philosophise)* will say *here* (or may say), that one who is honest cannot become dishonest, one who is sober and honest cannot ever possibly become dishonest and shameless [see note 7 and just before this [5] place, in the foregoing page last line, remember to translate thus: *because at that time they were persuaded this was best &c.*: not that they did it as dissemblers for then the objection could not follow which is an objection to their sincerity, and recall improvement *in dome degree*. Which Xenophon asserts, both here and below, p. 18, 19, c. 24, 25 by showing that they were afterwards spoil and corrupted. See notes, 84.
3. 16.1. εχω δε ωει τυτων [*But as to this*] with respect to the foregoing, 15.VIII, that being *assent*, this *dissent*.
4. 24.1. Follow the different reading.
5. 40.3. καλον φιληταξ; query: whether this does not rather signifies *love* then *kiss*, or has the double meaning and is equivocal as in the Convivium (...)
6. 53.8. That whoever he be that is not thus mastered but may be [104] called a **free-man**, it ought to be his wish never to light on such a servant: but what for him who is himself a slave to pleasures of this kind, he ought to pray the gods that it may be his fortune to serve under good masters [(or) to find good masters]. For it is thus only that he can possibly do well or ever hope to be preserved. [(or) for this is the only way in which there is any safety for him].

Book 2 [4]

1. 96.6. οιλετων &c.: *domestic slaves* for *slaves* is harsh and *servants* will not signify the property which the master has and his loss in their death.

⁷¹⁰Not whatever A. Gaellius allows. For as to Xenophon's not mentioning Plato, he mistakes (see) and as for Plato not Xenophon, why? Because an outlaw.

2. 111.6. απο τ Σκυλητησ &c.: that sailing in the ocean, men avoided the famous Scila. See notes p. 85 (9).
3. 125.15. απο τ συκοφαντων λαμβανειν, to make reprisals upon the informers, to squeeze them, make them guilt their hold, and pay to boot [seek a graver expression: but this is the sense]. See the following page XIII, and notes (12).
4. 121.7. φαοτ and so in other places where it is negligent, translate *they tell us*.
5. 129.10. δια τα ωεαχματα. *In this exigency of affairs* (for this and the foregoing cases were all about this [5] time in which the affairs of Athens were in such an ill condition, viz. when).
6. 115.penult.; 124.X; 128 I; 143.penult. σαωοιδα οιδα οιδα. See notes p. 89 (14).
7. 143.ultim. βασιλευζ must be rendered governor or prince, it being the meaning and sense, and because of the following word βασιλενοι, a verb which must be rendered governed. But place this in the critical notes (as in instruction 13) and there also show that the word βασιλευζ chiefly signifies this and will not always answer to the word *king*; it signifying sometimes a chief magistrate in a democracy as (...) and even here in the line or two following it appears to be an effective magistracy that is spoken of and in a commonwealth, and so what follows supposes a general *in a commonwealth* or otherwise it would not be sense. [this last in this and not in the critical notes merely].
8. 149.10. χηματα, not *pecunia* but *necessaries*, goods or some other such word. Socrates plays upon the word. [104] (An. Dom. 1703)
9. 107.4. τατεχδουτα καλα ξυ ηδεα νομουζοντζ. Query. Whether meant *the things that are pleasurable the same beautiful* (i.e. taking pleasure for good) or the same things for pleasurable and beautiful (i.e. pursuing one and the same thing, having one and the same good). If it were this latter then just men would have to fight too (which Socrates denies) for they have one and the same good. Therefore it must be the first sense. By which Socrates (as often) opposes pleasure, τα καλα, to the τα καλα ξυ αγαθα, i.e. the *το καλον* itself, the good man's το αγαθον (See (...) and denies pleasure to be good).

Book 3. [4]

1. 140.last line. Εδιδαξεν. He did not *so much* as teach &c.
2. 206.penult. οψουν. Translate in this place *made dishes*. In the next page l. 13, translate *dish*, and in the pages before *saucers* or (...).
3. 184.6. σπιτηδευμα. Not in the common sense *institutum*, but made from σπιτηδειον the adjective and σλιτηδεια so often used by Xenophon for advantages, [5] helps, emoluments, conveniences, necessities of life, goods. (...) See 113.15; 117.10; 119.9; 122.10. (...) See also σπιτηδευμα 228.2 where it seems to be in this and not the common sense. Also (...) in the common sense. See 158 also in *hiero* (although this may partake of the other sense as well) in 245 of the other tome, line 6. Again in the common sense see (...) Upon the whole, translate in this place κραπσον σπιτηδευμα, *the happiest circumstance* or (...) [after all I much question if there be any other than the common sense. Consider what follows in this page 184, that about fortune and practice and the word σπιτηδευοντεξ]. [104]
4. 149.10. χρηματα, not *pecunia*, but *necessaries*, goods, or some other such word. Socrates plays upon the word.
5. 158.8. εκεινοξ, εκεινουξ. After the first add *as mediators*, after the second, *for protection*. (An. Dom. 1703)

6. 153.8. οτοι σπισαμγει: Levenclavius finds this place amiss and adds: but with a less change of the text one may read only ων οι σπισαμγει, and is perfectly well if this οι after ων runs well, and there be any example for it in Xenophon's Greek. If not some other small article after ων which seems plainly to be the word, and οι also answers perfectly well to the above and to the οι in the next line following. Query: example for this, if any, where? See but a little below 156.12 ων οι, which doubtless is the true reading of the place above. So in the next page, 4, ην οι.

Book 4 [4]

1. P. 241 l. 8. Τοιαντη ορμν τω ανμω. So great a commotion, vehemence, bent, impetuosity.
2. P. 242 l. ult. δικαιωσ (speaking of horses &c.) translate orderly good. And afterwards in the following line το δικαιον translate goodness and virtue.
3. P. 250, l. 6. τινας ωδαχαινονλασ αυτον, viz. νομον: it is not non observare: but non ponere. Omit it in their laws. Permit it. See note 2 next leaf (2) and in [5] the following line το δαναμωοιν, translate act unlawfully and unjustly, for this relates to the laws of God not of men.
4. P. 273 l. ult.: οσοντα: perceive, find by experience, viz.: because they themselves grow better and happier, that I who am the occasion of it, am that good and happy man as to my own life.

[6] NOTES ON THE FOUR BOOKS OF MEMORABLES OF XENOPHON.

[For the division of the books into sections see page 98, and for the first and leading note see below page 120 (39)]

[Quatro columnas paralelas por página]

BOOK I.

[First note see below 120]

1. [120] 39. FIRST NOTE [according to instructions: above, page 108]. After something in the nature of an exordium, remember to give account of the division of the books: commend the Oxford editor and his division considering his end viz.: to divide it into equal portions and reduce it into small and equal parts for the advantage of scholars that study Greek but this answers our purpose in a translation which is to give all the light possible to the genius of the several dialogues and to the economy of the whole piece in both which respects the dividing into small and equal sections and paragraphs (a thing in the other sense very useful) would be a great obstacle. But as Xenophon himself has not made any divisions other than of the books themselves; so neither would we place those divisions of our own which we have made except only in the margin. That if they happen not to be right or to be contrary to the sense of the reader he may be the less disturbed by them and by the text of Xenophon not suffer throughout means. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th paragraphs are for all answers to accusers; the 5th besides his defence; praise and answers other little cavils and detractions. After this say in short as to this first book in a manner the whole, and complete in itself the defence of Socrates being carried through the 3 following do but enlarge upon it, taking each three principal parts of this book to illustrate as shall be shown afterwards.

And thus Xenophon begins his first book opening it with the accusation of Socrates [nothing to intervene] 40. B I, l. 4, ἀδικει Σωχρατηζ &c: this is the very form and words of his process of indictment, the original of which was still in being in the time of Favorinus, as late as the time of the emperor Adrian, and was kept among the other records of the Athenians in the temple *Εν τῷ μετῶ*. The whole of this is thus⁷¹¹ ... which is the same as in Plato --- difference only in the last word, not material and in Xenophon and Diogenes Laertius the same sense.

2. [7] P. 31, l. 13. The verses of Hesiod. See Plato in Charmides p. 468 latter end.
3. P. 22, l. 1. Concerning the 30 tyrants and the comparison of the cow-herds &c: compare the place of Plato in Gorgias, 351.
4. P. 11, l. 12. Compare with the place of Plato in Gorgias (p. 354) laughing at the Sophists professing to teach virtue and complaining of the ingratitude of those they have taught.
5. P. 43. Concerning the deity. Bring in, in the notes, the places of Plato [or else refer to those places, in case they are placed elsewhere]. Viz. 953, 957, 1009.
6. P. 42 l. ult. Objection against Socrates. See the charge laid home p. 37.
7. [84] P. 13 Chapter 12, 13, 14 &c: see translation p. 4 (2). Here is the great and most considerable objection of the enemies of Socrates: and that which Xenophon lays the most weight upon, despising the rest in a manner and looking upon this as the only one that is likely to take with the wise and good men and lovers of their country. To answer this therefore he employs all that follows to the very end of this section (i.e. to p. 28 c. 49). There is nothing smoother, softer, gentler than the stile and manner of Xenophon: and here is it that one may well say with Cicero melle dulcior sed a forensi strepitu remotissimus. For here he has a hard and angry kind of controversy to manage and in a subject of the most intricate nature (that of our passions) and exceedingly perplexing and hard to speak of

⁷¹¹See also Pausanias.

without falling into confusion of words and thought; yet see with what simplicity and easiness he meets it and how far from that wrongly and angry way which is common. This way seems so strange to us that are unacquainted with it and to those that know not Xenophon's stile, that the discourse will seem to be mean at first, incoherent, unstudied and loose so as not to consist with it self. But to set this in its proper light (since it is so hard to reach him in a translation) the argument hands thus [see supplement, infra 102]. [102] It is objected to Socrates that notwithstanding it be true that Socrates was continent, virtuous, frugal &c (for the contrary to this he never was once charged with so much as by these accusers) yet, by learning the young men to dispute artificially and particularly to inquiry nicely into the things of government and to examine and censure, he by this means learnt them to be above and despise the laws and the form of government of their country and to be violent. To this Xenophon answers in the first place; that as to knowledge the art of reasoning, elocution and ability of this kind, considered in themselves, they are far from disposing to anything of this kind but on the contrary rather, to softness and fair means [although below he confesses that with intemperance they make worse. See in the 4th book, p. 233, l. 3]. But says the objector in opposition to this: this we know that Critias and Alcibiades [84] men mischievous to the commonwealth were his familiars. This Xenophon acknowledges true. But what this familiarity was he explains, and shows, in answer to the accusation, that they were of such strong ambitious natures each of them from their earliest youth that before they grew in an age to learn philosophy and converse with Socrates they had formed the most ambitious designs, and had received a tincture which was in a manner impossible that anything should cure. So that it was not that Socrates affected their acquaintance [remember to redress Plato who gives so wrong an idea of Socrates in this point] but this aspiring young men of parts and forwardness, sought all the way imaginable Socrates to converse with them that they might improve, and be masters of reasoning, argument and of that learning they knew would be of such vast advantage to them in their affairs. But (says the objector) why would therefore Socrates assist them, being such men and not see that they were temperate and modest before he gave them such advantages which they might make such ill use of? To this Xenophon answers, that all that a man could do Socrates did to make them temperate and that in reality he brought them so to practice and temperance that they behave themselves modestly and well and not only as dissembling to deceive Socrates, but in reality were changed for the better and grew into a good habit of that kind, were orderly, discreet, modest ashamed of their vices and in some degree good and honest. This the objector [88] (for we must suppose such a one all along in this argument) takes exception at, and protests against. For says he, if they had ever been made in any degree good and honest; they could never have been so much contrary: a person that is once good always remaining so. In answer to this (as being a matter of philosophy and nicer speculation) Xenophon takes not a little pains to show that Socrates was not wholly imposed upon (for that will be all that this charge will come to, granting it true what the objector would have). [See more of this upon the same passage below p. 16 l. 1. See note (...). And in the same page a censure of the French translator que le sage est toujours sage. But no French].

But then when Xenophon has established this, the objection remains, how therefore came they afterwards to be so excessively dissolute and ill. To this Xenophon answers, that in the first place, as they were never wholly cured [89] from their ambition and that which was so strongly their natural temper before they knew Socrates, so when they came into affairs and were no longer as before daily, in the company of Socrates they soon lost their strength and support against vice. And in the 2nd place they each of them besides had something particular which enflamed them and made them yet worse. Critias by chance was kept in a loose and dissolute country. And Alcibiades

women flatterers &c.

All this controversy full of thorns &c. Xenophon creates with that meekness and that unaffectedness of appearing acute; that could not but thus inlay upon it. That by carrying an eye all along over this dissertation and the other controversies with Socrates' accusers the reader may make acquaintance with Xenophon's manner, and comparing this with the modern way of writing controversy if even the style and manner of Xenophon not it self a lesson of morality and able to inspire a sweetness and goodness &c.

8. P. 15 last line [see translation p. 5] n. 2.
9. P. 16 L. 1. One who is just (or honest) &c. although it be the [90] scope and intention of Xenophon by this objection (relating still merely to Critias and Alcibiades) by the answer to show that Socrates might justly have some hopes of them and that in reality they were made better and in this sense also improved while they conversed with him; yet he takes occasion here to show the ill understanding which people have in what relates to improvement in morals and corrects here the vulgar conceit of the generality of the world (for it is not a peculiar but a general opinion that he is speaking of).

It is the common and settled opinion in these matters to think that people's honesty in a certain fixed thing with them being come once to such an age that what their character is they, it sometimes to be and that however unlike a man's self a man may be in all other things yet that in this place he is the same. As a proof of this. There is not any person who being at any time betrayed or anyway ill used by an acquaintance but cries out he was deceived in him. Nor does he ever attributes any former benefit he received to any goodness in him; but all was design, all was hypocrisy and no acknowledgement or gratitude for anything formerly received. Thus friendships are easily concealed, broke and turned into enmities. But we never consider that as our health is altered by the state of things about us, so with the generality of mankind and those who think not [92] of such a thing as discipline or watch over themselves, it must necessarily happen that their circumstances of life and many things must alter them. Nor can they be in form and resolute in good in one time as at another. He who was a while since when in good company influenced by good relations in a good state of the public, capable of doing very great and worthy things, and who hereafter may come to be so again; yet at the present in the absence of those friends in worsen company and in a lose state of the public and of affairs, may give way to many things which if not of the last baseness, and such as take away all shame &c. he may recover from. What different actions do we see from persons oddly constituted, capable of doing the greatest things in the world at one time and the greatest meaneness at another. In war this is well known be that it brave is not always brave although the truly brave man be indeed ever so and so the truly just and virtuous man nor is this what Xenophon opposes. Far from it. But the French translator here quite mistakes it (not seeing the scope or drift of Xenophon): and makes Xenophon to start a question about true wisdom and virtue with doubtless contradicts the sense of Xenophon. For that Xenophon is far from supposing that to be the case in this argument about Critias and Alcibiades and that he is far from making it a parallel case between the wise Socrates and his imperfect disciples, so as that he should be here pleading for Socrates' his chanceableness [see note 7]. [94] But Xenophon excellently shows us here to our selves, shows us false security about our selves, and encourages us to virtue.

10. P. 12 L. 10. The main of the object is on (viz. that Socrates by such a nice critique of things and by giving his disciples a superior sense, made them superior to the laws and violent in public affairs) this Xenophon answers to the rest little and insignificant circumstances (an expression which perhaps Socrates might use disparagingly as his way was what was not of virtue) he passes by and despises going always to that which is significant, and as his way is taking every occasion to instruct and improve by sensible reflections and morals [see supplement inf. P. 96]. [96]

P. 12 L. 10. Xenophon answers to the objection first that policy eloquence &c and such contrary advantages do not make men more violent and secondly that however he thought them virtue first: and that afterwards. See p. 15 L. 8 and p. 283 L. 1. [back to 95]

11. P. 11 L. 5. ὁδὲ ἐρανοὶ χρηματώζ. This by way of preparation against the charge of Critias who was horribly covetous and aggressive. Infra p. 113 antepenult.
12. P. 28 L. 10. Crito clerophon &c. He reckons those that were dead, it is plain by the expression and sense. Plato was living for lived at least as long as Xenophon if not longer and must have survived him in probability. For Xenophon was the elder and Plato lived to past 80 (see p. 8 (1) and p. 15).
13. P. 31 L. 1, p. 33 l. 6. See p. 76 col. 2nd.
14. P. 36 L. 11. See prayer of the brave Spartans for magnanimity in Plato ...
15. P. 42 L. 4. Explained by Anthistenes in the Convivium: to which refer. [96]
16. P. 33 penult., and so p. 11 L. 7 and p. 53 penult. Particular detestation of Xenophon's on this subject of mercinariness. Aristippus, plainly in the charge. How far Plato (for the Sicilian court) may be hinted at, a question. Consider the Letters of Xenophon genuine and suspected. [supra p. 15].
17. P. 59 L. ult. κὶ καλοκαγαθίαν ἀγειν. Viz. as a proof of what he said at the beginning of this 5th chapter (as the chapter ought to be marked). P. 42 L. ult. Xenophon asserts the contrary and all that follows to the end of the book is to make it appear.
18. P. 60 L. 8. προεξεπεν. For Xenophon is in this place answering of the 5th chapter or section (i.e. what ought to be the 5th but the 4th in the Oxford edition) and showing that not only Socrates turns from vice; but to virtue. And so some lines below, ending of book.

P. 62 L. ult. ἀποδεσεῖν is said with respect to that above cited προεξεπεν. For it is the actual forwarding of virtue that Xenophon here shows Socrates to be proper for, and not merely as one fit only to take off from vice but to be an assistant to a further progress in virtue.

P. 15 L. 8. Charge, of not teaching virtue first; but entrusting young men with learning and advantages dangerous. Answer to this charge more particular and at full again, below p. 232 L. ult. [98]

Division of Book First (into 5 sections) the 2nd section beginning p. 9 where the 2nd chapter of the Oxford edition the 3rd at page 28 # 49. The 4th at p. 31 # 56. The 5th at the 3rd chapter and the second part of the 5th at the 4th p. 42. Account of these 5 sections see note p. 120.

19. P. 24 L. antepenult. Observe the transition from Critias to Alcibiades, not immediately but gracefully with a reflection between.
20. P. 21 L. 5, P. 25 L. 6. λέγει. It is related of &c. not that the relation is of a thing doubtful, or that Xenophon was then but a child and knew not this of his own knowledge this being before his time. Observe therefore the exactness of Xenophon for neither of things done in his absence (see the death of Socrates from Hermogenes in the 4th book and in the Apology) nor in his youth when he neither heard of or was not so in being as to be assured by being at that instant conversant and in the way of these things so as not to be deceived, in neither of these cases does he relate but with this exception and giving notice. See notes B. 2 P. 89 (14).
21. P. 30 (in the Latin). Column 53 line 3 hoc dicere viz. what is marked with the pencil above and should be in italic letters to distinguish the acknowledged words and maxims of Socrates from the wrong inferences and ill

connections of these gathered by the accuser. For of these maxims Xenophon says it is true the mere Socrates' and more (says he) I heard him add also upon this subject that &c. [102]

22. P. 28 l. 4. Ομιλητηζ. See p. 84 col. 2 (3).
23. P. 42 L. 5 of ordinary venery: see in the Convivium Anthistenes p. ...
24. P. 42 ult. and p. 43 3. All the foregoing objections of the downright accusers are fully answered in the 3rd book. This here is reserved for the 4th in which he shows in what sense Socrates used to scepticize and doubt (a thing too much in Plato) and this in the discourse with Eutedemum. P. 212. [106]
25. P. 12 L. 6. Αλλανη Δια ο καταγορθ εφη &c. It is to be remarked here the manner that Xenophon takes. For, that the method may be more perfect, and the whole matter examined and treated more concisely and with more simplicity and perspicuity; he makes all this [see p. 102 supplement] but one continued argument (from section 2nd to the end) which if he were to have divided by answering to the accusers according to the form of their charge and in their own order; the order of the discourse [would] have been quite different more diffuse, and had run out into a much greater length. But Xenophon makes one tread of the discourse: setting himself to reason with the accusers and bringing their objections against himself in the proper place and because he answers in such a manner that is not full but such as may bear a farther objection he makes another person to take the part of the accuser and object against him: but when it is only in the nature of the argument and a foreign objection not actually what the accusers in very words objected, Xenophon then constitutes another person by saying somebody or a certain person: this being to be observed that what the actual and real words of the accusers were, he always distinguishes by saying ο καταγοροζ &c. [see supplement inf. 136]. [136] This is the direct and open accuser himself that now speaks. For in all this it must be observed that there are two sorts of accusers and accusation dealt with. The one obliquely traducing and aspersing by reports of him, comedies and libels made against him, the other open charging and arraigning him. Of the first kind one that we have passed over, in the 3 last paragraphs particularly: on the 2nd kind is this very charge where the accuser himself [138] speaks. For having passed over several of the lesser and oblique accusations which if mentioned by the accuser wre rather insinuated than openly spoke, Xenophon insensibly and agreeably falls into the words of the accuser, in his public declamation against Socrates. This order will be better understood when the Apology of Plato has been read. [106]
26. P. 62 (the concluding note) [see instruction next leaf]. Remember in this place to bring in the exact account of the order of sections which is in the Discourse p. 8 but which must not be after that manner there, but more shortly expressed. **Inf. 110**
27. P. 36 Section 5 (which is also the last. See 2nd part below l 12). Having now ended with the accusers (those I mean who were actually so, not the censors and detractors with whom he has got to do) and having concluded the immediate controversy (although indeed the whole work to the very end is in some degree a continued expostulation with them: all the three following books depending upon this first) he now comes to prove (over and above his mere defence which has been the subject hitherto) that Socrates was (as in the preceding words of the last section) not only not a corrupter, but of the highest advantage and improvement towards all virtue both by words and actions which he shows, beginning first with religion and then as to that which with him and Socrates is the main foundation of all virtue, temperance. So that this last section is a pattern or model of his conversation with the youth and his education of them. And to this last section answers the last book.
28. P. 25 L. 9. The dialogue with Pericles. This is of the wrangling kind or what according with the distinction of Plato's dialogues is πειρασικοζ, sceptic, confounding, of which kind the greatest part in Plato. But none in Xenophon: except this one.

29. P. Section 2nd. Xenophon having answered to the first part of the charge (viz. impiety) now comes with the 2nd (viz. education of the youth) and in the first place shows what truly is the corruption of the youth and what properly should have been Socrates' charge: but which the accusers pretended not to charge him with. So that Xenophon begins his argument (for all this section to the end is one continued argument and thread) with that which should have been imputed to Socrates as a corrupter of the youth and shows the absurdity of his charge from the accusers varying from the common sense and notion of corruption of youth, and from the innocence of Socrates, and not only innocence but his excelling in those things which are the foundation of all virtue and contrary to corruption. But then, says the adversary (allowing all this of Socrates' good life and severe virtue to be true) he teaches certain arts &c. which being spread among the youth infect them &c. and so the argument goes on (see p. 84 note 7). The chief of all, and that which it wholly turns upon, being the case of those famous two (Critias and Alcibiades) who had been Socrates' acquaintance.

30. The particular and most urging case (that of Critias and Alcibiades) being over, Xenophon comes to other calumnies relating in general to all the youth that frequented Socrates and here the accusers charge him with the mischief he did in private families by teaching children insolence and disobedience [112] to parents, disrespect to relations and disregard of friends, which is what Xenophon answers to in this section. The next section being that which charges Socrates with the same mischief towards the public and city. But that which in this section he speaks in short, he afterwards makes the subject of his 2nd book which answers to this section, as the other two books do also to the sections that follow.

Section 5 part 2nd. This part that now remains and makes the last section answers to what was advanced in the former and supports it. For having shown there that Socrates led the way to piety and to virtue, and being objected here that notwithstanding Socrates both by example and words was proper to excite; yet not to promote; Xenophon undertakes it to show in this place that in both these respects he promoted as well as incited: and for the first instance he brings the noble discourse with Aristodemus (answering to what was said by way of reproof only against superstition in the foregoing part) and in the second place as to temperance and virtue he brings that second noble one with Antipho (answering to what was said only by way of reproof to Xenophon) and in both these Xenophon shows how really and soundly he taught and exactly instructed, as well as reproved, and that he promoted as well as excited.

31. After this, before he concludes the book, he takes occasion in a further discourse with Antipho to show how Socrates excited to public affairs and made it his business (see p. 60 L. 2 and note of the Memorables) to instruct and educate men for the service of their country and administration of civil affairs, so that having in the first place justified Socrates against the charges of his accusers he concludes this book by showing his serviceableness both in religion, morality and policy and after what manner he acquitted himself of his duty to God, to mankind and to his country. And thus is this first book complete within himself. [see the note which must follow immediately after this infra p. 116 (37)]. [116]

32. (37) P. 43 L. 1. Πογρξεψαδαμ ... επαρετλν &c. προαγαγειν δε ωξ &c. The objection was so noted in Xenophon's time, that he says this in short here, without explaining it. Although the last book it is sufficiently explained by Xenophon's particular answers. Socrates was said not to carry to any proficiency in virtue or knowledge in the first place because (as his traducers said) he never taught but by scepticising, confounded &c. Neither if he had any opinion of his own, did he ever open it or plainly teach it to any. This Xenophon answers to p. 232 L. 10 and 241.1. and in the next place, that which was also objected to Socrates upon this head, was that he took no course to instruct any in any sciences, nor was able to give any young man education in this sense: being as

some of his traducers affirm (particularly some of the Pythagoreans on the account of his laughing at their high sciences. See) wholly ignorant in this things, to which Xenophon answers at full in the last book also

[112]

33. P. Section 4th . the last and most inciduous charge of the accusers is this with respect to the commonwealth and which is carried further here than in the case of Critias and Alcibiades who were (as the accusers said) made despisers of the law &c. But here Socrates is accused of direct, tyrannical principally and of being active encouraging and instigating to sovereignty against the people and with a sort of hatred of democracy and malice and contempt towards the people [114] and their authority: the contrary of which Xenophon shows to be most true, reserving himself to say more afterwards as in the 3rd book which answers to this section.
34. P. 34. L. 12. Καταγδ τωζ νομωζ &c. Xenophon in this part of the charge of Socrates uses the same manner towards to expose the strangeness and absurdity of their charge, as he did before in that part related to the youth (See ...). For, in the same manner as he there shows what properly might have been called corrupting of the youth; so here he shows what properly might have been called a crime towards the public. but neither anything of the first kind as to the youth nor anything of this second kind as to the city; being ever once so much as objected against him; how mostrous is that he should have been condemned on this account! Which exclamation Xenophon, in his way, makes as it were, here. Concluding this controversy with his accusers and judges at the end of this section with this expostulation which is suitable to the beginning, πολλακιζ εθαρμασα.
35. P. 34 L. ult. ει δε τι δοξειεν αυτω σημαιναδαι &c. Note upon this place to explain the meaning of it [obliquely not directly] that which is testified of Socrates that he followed sacredly his reason and what even from his youth, that dictated he firmly adhered to. See ...
36. P. 39 L. 13. It was convenient to make a new paragraph pf this because of the following dialogue. Otherwise we would not willingly have repeated it from what is before (which it is so closely connected to) and what Socrates says pleasantly about inciting and delicious meats. Compare this with what is said immediately at the close of the dialogue (it being the same sense continued) the meaning of this as well as the neatness of the thought will appear more exactly. [116]
37. [Ver nota 32]
38. P. 38 L. antepenult. ποτον δε παν. i.e. not only water, but any water so as not to be nice. See B. 3 p. 202.7.
39. [6] [Place this in the life of Xenophon] P. 39, # 8, 9, 10 &c: Compare this of what is said of Critobolus in the Convivium and og his love for this very Clinias. This confirms the report of Artippus in Diogenes Laertius that Xenophon was in the same circumstance with Critobolus. And if one may go farther in consechive; perhaps if the extravagant passion of Xenophon in his youth were such as Critobolus' is there represented and as Xenophon's in his own name and in real history is here hinted; perhaps the advice also which is here given to Cristoblus of travelling and quitting Athens was what Xenophon applied to himself or was by Socrates himself both then and afterwards urged to him. Upon which, for his better delivery from this and other corruptions of Athens he might undertake his voyage into Asia to Cyrus who (as is plain from Xenophon and his history) pretended at first only an expedition against some Barbarians not a civil war from whence came Xenophon's disagree with the Athenians. See Pausanias.
40. [Ver nota 1]. [122]
41. P. 36 L. 1. This arises thus. Socrates (says Xenophon) not only was far from a corrupter of the youth; but was by words and example of great good to them by turning them from corruption and instructing them in all excellence and virtue. And (by and by, in the 2nd part of this 5th section) not only by turning from vice and giving or inspiring a

desire of virtue, but in demonstrations, discourses and in his manner and use of philosophy, he was also of the highest force and efficacy (contrary to what has been alleged by some) to instruct and carry on to all virtue &c. See below p. 128 column 1 at the end.

42. P. 54 L. 1. Antipho]. This is a new defence of Socrates (from his own mouth) against another sort of accuser or detractor --- so all this book is defence all above having been so.
43. P. 22 L. antepenult. νομοιζ and not νομω. For Socrates did not acknowledged the authority of the tyrants and consequently not of their law. See in the 4th book p. 241 L. 11. [124]
44. P. 3 L. 1. Hypothetical argument from the position in his accusation that although he believed not in the gods and was atheistical (for such was his charge) yet he talked of certain divinities which, says Xenophon, was not mere talk. But at the same time such an owing of their power as could not have been had he not believed it, and acknowledged a Providence. [See marginal note next leaf].
45. P. 1 L. 4 Form of the accusation]. Justly and cunningly laid. Although a seeming absurdity and contradiction (as, when applied to Socrates it was indeed the greatest in the world) yet the accusers managed most exquisitely and with consummate art both these points which at every moment seem to shock, and clash with one another. For when they spoke of his atheism and turned that part of his charge against him they drew their arguments from his philosophy and what was usually objected to philosophers. And when they accused him of novelties in religion from his discourses about the divinity [130] (which was apparently the reverse and opposite of the other), they then showed that was his talk only (as the clouds instead of the deity in Aristophanes) but not his belief a mere deity of the clouds for the words εισηρωων (or εισηγουμλθ, as in Diogenes Laertius, which is in all one) does not imply that he positively believed. Which if it did (or as the accusation would import; if that word were not in) this would be a contradiction in terminus and it is remarkable that Plato in the Apology, to show the contradiction more full (taking a liberty which Xenophon as a historian is far from doing) has left at this latter word, but all the rest retained. See above p. 65 Col. 1 (14).
- 46 P. 9 L. 5. σω σημιδινειν τοιζ ανθρωποιζ περι τ ανθρωπειων παντων. All this has a double sense. The religion of the vulgar and of the wise. The deity everywhere, not in a particular place (as the vulgar) seeing everything not with eyes (as the vulgar) signifying of all things not of some only (as the vulgar) i.e. not by signs but reason &c. See above 91 (8). See also the next following note. [134]
- 47 P. 38 L. 1.2.3 &c. Socrates immovably following whatever he thought σημαιδαι ωαεα δεων which plainly was reason [speak modestly however]. See what was known and common tradition of Socrates (to which this agrees) of his ever following what he received as a law and dictate from his reason: and this immovably. See ... Compare this note with the note immediately preceding and with what that is compared.
- 48 P. 8 L. 4. After having ran through his opinions doctrines and words he comes to actions and his life and brings that great example of his piety and sanctity in the regard of his oath with respect to the nine captains that were unjustly put to death by the Athenians of which they afterwards so much respected (see Plato's Apology and also) owing at the same time the piety and integrity of Socrates which being a thing of that vast note through Greece and all the world and Socrates having them so signalled himself; it is this that Xenophon wonders at, and reproach the Athenians with; that leaving other matters of speculation, crimes made from words and inferences from words; they did not look upon him in his life and actions and in this particularly so conspicuous a one, by which he was demonstrated the justest and most pious of all the Athenians, and the very worthiest of their fellow-citizens.
- 49 P. 10 L. 14. This also, is in answer to the accuser and to that accusation of his causing the youth thus to neglect their bodies (see in Aristophanes what is said of himself and his disciples particularly Cherephon). So different was

that [136] corruption of the youth imputed to Socrates from that which more naturally is understood by corruption, and which is it in a true sense. It was necessary to remark this. For, Socrates' case being then so known in the world, there needed not a more explicit expression of this. But at this time it is necessary that this be noted and that we carry in our mind that of Aristophanes and his traducers as to this part: otherwise this of the body in this place will stand oddly and not be read currently nor understood as it should be.

50 Ibid. (viz. P. 10) L. 10. Neither did he profess teaching &c.] This is in answer to the accuser, Aristophanes and the rest making a professed master as the others sophists and philosophers of the times. See the preceeding note which should immediately follow this.

51 P. 11 L. 5. Covetousness not taught to the youth]. This also is in answer to the accuser (so it must needs be but where any such formal accusation of Socrates is found I yet know not. Perhaps in Aristophanes somewhere it may appear). See afterwards in the 13th page what is said of Critias as being made what he was (that is to say covetous and rapacious) by Socrates. [Neste ponto, Shaftesbury numera novamente as notas a partir de 51. Seguimos no entanto a numeração anterior, indicando a nova entre parênteses] [138]

52 (51) P. 47 L. 6. εὐ ἰδίῃ. Because Socrates in his answer just before, dissembles his knowledge of Aristodemus' meaning; and presupposes the deity's regard to man.

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53 (52) P. 40 L. 2. ἡτ δρασσειον (not εοασων) as in the variant lecture. And as to this way of addressing himself to Critobulus, perhaps Critobulus might have been indeed of the quite contrary temper effeminate and cautious enough, not of the hero-blood as Xenophon. Which makes it doubtly pleasant and doubtly useful. For as this touched both Xenophon and Critobulus in their loves, Critobulus remotely in his effeminate and Xenophon in his daring and desperate temper which afterwards sent him to the war, in spite of Socrates and indeed of the oracle too. But this was the wonderful way of Socrates and many of these beauties escape us in this distance of time &c. [158]

BOOK 2 [6]

1. P... L ... [See p. 9 c. 1]. After having got clear of the accusers and answered the other adversaries and objectors; and having now done with the controversies; he comes now more fully and in a more open field to show what he concisely showed, and gave a specimen of before, viz. that Socrates was not only a perfect innocent and good person (that is the first degree) but that he was communicative of that goodness and beneficial to the city and an honour to it, so far from being an injury or disgrace to it (this is the second degree) and in the 3rd place that he was not only good and proper to take off from vice (as some more moderate adversaries allowed him to be, but who at the same time denied his ability to lead others in virtue) but that he was as well able to carry to virtue, and instruct in virtue, as to drive from vice. To this purpose Xenophon taking occasion from the subject which he quitted in the foregoing book and carrying on still that assertions that he was excellent as to all promotion and improvement in virtue as well as blessed to the city he lived in, he opens the scene with that noble conference with Aristippus (one of his friends, although of the most desperate, as you may see) and telling him freely his faults does not only acquit himself as to the first part but nobly encourages to virtue (which is the thing the cavillers dispute). [7] Thus does Xenophon artfully and easily connect this book with the former. Leaving nothing abrupt but an easy and natural continuance of the subject and discourse. Although at the same time this be a new beginning and entrance on the subject in a formal manner so as to treat at large in the following books what was shortly summoned up in the first (which was complete in itself). To which end this whole book is employed on friendship and the duties and offices of life towards parents, relations, companions, familiars &c. as the following book is employed on the

commonwealth: and as a foundation of both these duties he places first this dialogue with Antippus about education which is the preface to this and the following books (Xenophon beginning anew) at the same time representing the freedom of Socrates in reproving of his friends. Afterwards Xenophon shows other ways of his reproving and correcting as Lamprocles and then Chericrates. And in what follows in the 3rd section he teaches and instructs in friendship and in the 4th practices. [84] So that the whole of this book is spent upon his friends and friendship which Xenophon in the last section proceeds to show how wonderfully Socrates was useful in, and indeed how benign and good and how engaging, winning and moving is all the whole that follows and the whole both entire! Which is one body (as it were) of friendship as the following book is of commonwealth. See p. 9 col. 1 towards the end [See supplement p. 89]. [89]

And observe that although the beginning of this 2nd book be as it were connected to the end of the last and that the first dialogue and entrance be upon the subject of virtue in general yet this book in particular (as relating to family and friends) refers to section the 3rd of the first book, in the same manner as the following third book refers to the section 4th about the public and that the last book of the 5th and last section concerning the instruction and education of the youth &c [See below (17)]. [84]

2. P. 63 L. 1. προδεω. See infra p. 96 col. 1 (18) also p. 9 col. 1 line 6. Note also the connection of the discourse, this beginning of the book with the end of the other.
3. P. 63 L. 2 and 4. σουνταζ and again σουοντων. So P. 198.1, P.128 L. 1 and εταιρω P. ... not as above in the 1st book P. 28 L. 4 ομιλητηζ such as Crito, Cherephon &c. Aristippus therefore not one of these: but of the loosest of Socrates' familiars and in a manner an enemy and opposite to Socrates although a frequenter of him and a disciple.
4. P. 74 L. 1. The parenthesis showing that Prodicus had that that was secret and that which he read more publicly. See concerning Prodicus reading a work of his about the gods and being in danger of his life ...
5. P. 73 L. ult. The word φιλοσοφοζ not yet in use although yet see P. 16 L. 1. [85]
6. P. 80 L. 12. In this place Xenophon (or rather Socrates, but name not either) has regard to the Lacedemonians. The picture is made upon their commonwealth. See a passage in Plato about their honouring old age &c. page ...
7. P. 81 L. 5. Hence it appears that Xenophon affects the more simple style and shows the purpose specially when he speaks after Socrates: from whom he learnt that simplicity. As Plato his more sublime style elsewhere.
8. P. 74 L. 3. The picture of Prodicus compare places and the whole with that of Cebes the Socratic at the end of all the work.
9. P. 111 L. 6. (απο τ Σκυλληζ &c) sailing in the ocean, and famous added. These comparisons being what we are not used to so as pleasantly to call to mind the Scylla which when Caribides is joined to it everybody remembers.
10. P. 110 L. 7 and P. 112 L. 5. See in the Convivium p. ... the profession of Socrates in raillery. [88]
11. P. 124 L. 9. By the instances that follow it appears that as Socrates prepared Eutherus for a potent friend, so he prepared such a one for Eutherus, and made his service complete as in the **two** following instances of Archedemus and Hermogenes.
12. P. 125. 12. It is plain there was not a small labour and management in all this nor is it hard to see the weightness of this affair and the many ways of contriving, inventing and conducting it; although Xenophon relate it with so much simplicity and in his way. See translation (3) and infra (15).
13. P. 129 L. 10. δια τα ωεαγματα. See translation n. 5. But as to the season it must in probability have been the year or two before Socrates' death when Xenophon was old enough to be present and know these things of his own

knowledge; and if this proves so in history that the city of Athens was then in such distress show it in this note and confirm the testimony of Xenophon. See the following note.

14. (See the preceding note). P. 115 penult. σωοιδα; P. 104 L. 10 οιδα, and so: P. 128 L. 1 οιδα. This is all of Xenophon's knowledge for, where he speaks of things in his absence and before his time he expresses it otherwise (see notes on B. I. Page 20) as for example ...
15. P. 127 L. 9. The answer of Archedemus. All this supported still and animated by Socrates the conductor of all this under-hand and at bottom, or openly and avowedly defending, pleading, maintaining &c. See above (12). [90]
16. P. 63 L. 2. (Beginning of the book). εγκροτειαν (the foundation of virtue both Socrates and Xenophon. See
17. Ibid. L. 3 Temperance] It is no wonder that he begins this book of friendship after this manner for see in the chief discourse of friendship below with Critobulus, how he begins which answers to this.
17. [Ver acima].
18. P. 100 L. 10. Make a short note on this beginning with Critobulus answering (17) the note immediately preceding this, and that virtue can only qualify for friendship.
19. P. 112 L. 1. ωζ τωζ μ καλωζ [μη, fortisse] φιλησαντοζ &c. The sense seems to require the negative particle which may have been slipped and the error not seen by ordinary readers. The place being of such delicacy.
20. P. 64 L. 2. The answer of Antippus, according to his character turning the discourse (with humour and a turn of wit) to the advantage of la bonne chere .
[Shaftesbury numera a nota 21 como 20]
21. (20) P. 97 L. 5. The transition from the infinitives (where Xenophon relutes) into the very words and speech of Socrates, without any connection and insensibly, is a designed negligence, and is a grace.
22. (21) P. 104. L. 12. Pericles, and after Themistocles; whether as opposed, or joined. Whether commending Pericles to gather with Themistocles or disparaging him in respect of him.
If it be this latter (as doubtless it is see below note (36) p. 136) it is true that there is much of this spirit (viz. contempt of Pericles) in Plato and even the dispute of Alcibiades above in the first book is abusive and exposes him. If it be this, read his life and the passages of Plato also; and consider the cause. If it be not thus, consider this place and what is meant by his charms and spells. See below note (36) p. 130. [94]
23. (22) P. 107 L. 4. τα αυτα καλα σι ηδεα. Viz. honours, preferments, riches &c. (falsely).
24. (23) P. 106 ult. P. 107 L. 2 (see also below p. 131 Col. 1). δεονται γδ αλληλων σι ελευσει. Remember natural affection, need of company and society &c.
25. (24) Ibid. L. 12. δια πολεμω viz. that war above mentioned, enmity, disagreement: anger, jealousy which in his sense are an unhappy kind of war, or (as it is the fashion nowadays to speak) make a state of war.
26. (25) P. 108 L. 7. There is a wonderful happy turn and conduct in all this that Socrates says in defence of friendship. For being unwilling to show the worst side of mankind, or directly to speak those truths which might be wrong apprehended by his young [96] man full of that despising inverging temper and ready to pronounce in prejudice of society and virtue; he therefore so manages this as no way to betray the truth and yet not to lay open what Critobulus was not yet fit to reason upon. It is plain from the whole sense of Socrates taken together that he shows this to be a truth that men admiring the same [inf. 104 (9)] outward things [as good] such as honour, riches, power cannot but be jealous of one another, hate, quarrel, contend and be in a sort of war with one another or at least perpetually on the borders of it. but then again he shows that the truly good and virtuous man is not comprehended here since it is not on the account of those goods that he acts in the public: not pursuing either honour, riches,

pleasure, or any of these so that he easily shows that between the truly good and virtuous there can be no ground of dissention but an eternal friendship which nothing can violate. But as he dares not [inf. 110] [110] expressly say thus much and discover plainly his definition of virtue (according to which so few would be virtuous) he shows upon the whole what he declares in the beginning, that this is mixed and of a various kind. That is to say, that the most of those who are called good, have a mixture of vice which is the occasion of this disagreement; and that even those whom we account ill men and find to be of the worst sort, have yet such dispositions proper to them (and not to be separated from human nature) as necessitates them to friendship and society somewhere or other (see B. 3 p. 82.1). So that Socrates easily shows it to be the best part to seek and cultivate friendship and that amongst the best and most virtuous. [112] And in concluding with Critobulus raises to a prodigious height the difficulty of war and dissention between the good and just: which as Socrates makes it is not only difficult, but impossible. But without showing the bottom of this and leaving Critobulus to take this in a looser sense as relating to men of mixed character (although of the better sort still) he takes off his discouragement and gives him better hopes and a more reconciling prospect of virtue. nothing can be finer and nicer than this. [Take care of too openly discovering the sentiments of the porch]. [98]

Division of the Book 2nd. (Into four sections) the 2nd at the 2nd: p. 81. The 3rd at the 4th p. 95. The 4th at the 7th p. 115 [account of the sections see above p. 6 and 7].

27. (26) Line 2nd. εγκρατιαν. This, as the foundation of friendship (the subject of this book) as well as of all virtue both towards friends and in the public. See what Xenophon says P. 53 L. 2 and what goes before. [102]
28. (27) P. 81. Section 2nd.]. Having in the preceding dialogue with Antippus, laid the foundations and principles both of domestic and public virtue in the education of this supposed prince and afterwards Hercules; Xenophon now proceeds to the duties of friendship and begins with that towards parents and then other relations. And by bringing this instance in his own son Xenophon takes this advantage that at the same time (as it were undesignedly and casually but with foresight and excellent contrivance) he gives an historical account of matters relating to Socrates' private family as of the temper of Xantippe and this his son he having in neither been very happy the first impetuous the other dull and ... as may be seen. [102]
29. (28) P. 81 Section 2nd line 1.]. Αιδομενθ δε ποτε Λαμπρακλεα &c. All although the order of this be as we have just now remarked and nothing more regular, methodical or more contrived, yet Xenophon enters into this abruptly and as by chance, which is not only because he affects this negligence and that an appearing formality would be ill specially in this sort of writing, but, also particularly in this place because this instance of filial duty being (for the reasons just now alleged) taken from Socrates' own family, it would have been ungraceful to have introduced this by saying that thus Socrates taught duty to parents because it would vulgarly be answered, it was his interest.
30. (29) P. 88 L. 2. Cherephron and Cherecrate &c.]. Xenophon having shown duty to parents goes next, to relations of whom also (viz. those of greater distance) below in Aristarchus 116. Here also the connection is left to make from the sense; not expressed in words.
31. (30) P. 95. Section 3rd.]. Having shown the duties towards relations, he comes to the other part of friendship and the use of friends showing the strange and unjust neglect &c.
32. (31) P. 92. Dialogue with Anthitenes]. In this reproof about friendship Anthitenes perhaps (being poor) the person neglected, the other party (one of Socrates' friends) Xenophon would not name. [106]
33. (32) P. 100. Dialogue with Critobulus]

34. (33) P. 115 Section 4th. Hitherto reproof and advice (showing, as in the beginning, that Socrates by reproofing and together with reproof advised) at first Aristippus and then Lamprocles then Charecrates, afterwards some of his friends who are not named, and afterwards Critobulus. Now from henceforwards, another sort and not philosophical and rational merely but so as to act and concerning himself in affairs and lay himself out: undertaking, advising, assisting, encouraging. [112]
35. (34) Ibid. L. 11 i.e. affecting [or esteeming as good] either riches, power, pleasure. But this is finely hid, and said less harshly. [122]
36. (35) [from above p. 112/114] (An. D. 1703) Page 72 Line 5. υ δοκει των τοιωτων [the vulgar and right reading as the Oxford editor admonishes so τωκ οντων τα εφ: Epictetus, and Xenophon himself after this manner below p. 77 L. 7 των γαρ ιντων] διαφροξιν τα εκπσιατων ακπσιων; which brings to mind Horace's tuo vitio rerumne labores nil referre putas? --- Satire 2 L. 1 and miti res nom me rebus subjungere conor subjungere the true reading instead of submittire. See the old edition of origins and confession of this reading in all the old M. S. p. 514 of the Plant edition. This of Horace's being said an occasion of ARISTIPPUS whose whole character and discourse suits here with this and all of the Socratic story so well in his mind, and so constantly. Remitibi socraticae &c. and noturna versate manu &c.
But as to that of Aristippus miti res nom me &c. how little is this understoodly Darcier and such commentators! How otherwise possible by such as are so little versed in these writings. Subjungere: i.e. σωτατλειν⁷¹² the common word in Greek morals σωτατλειν ξαυτον τοιζ οχοιζ. See Simplicius at the end of his comment. And then Horace himself again in [124] a contrary (as are his pieces) very Epicurean letter to Scceva, the 17th epistle. Regibus uti noblet Aristippus. And although Horace fighting for him pretends omnis Aristippum decuit color & status & res and only ferre presentibus equita. See notes upon Arrian p. 26 col. 1.
37. (36) An. Dom. 1703. Page 103 and 104. In this dialogue with Critobulus the ingenuity of the youth, who preventing Socrates very often and taking up his sense, Socrates order it so as to speak the less himself and make the youth speak for him.
* This the translators not seeing divide not the dialogue right. For beginning at the philters and charms mentioned by Socrates for that purpose of gaining friends. Crit.: Πολεν πων &c. Soc.: αμετι αι Σειγλινεζ &c. Crit.: Ταυλυ πων &c. Soc.: πκ αλλα τοιζ επι αρετη &c. [this would be strange and unnatural in Critobulu's mouth asking and answering himself: neither suitable to the respect carried to Socrates, nor the polite and easy manner of Xenophon in writing dialogue]. [130] Crit.: Σχεδον τι λεγειζ [this is what is said above (in this note) that ingenuity of the youth in preventing Socrates. And so again below after Pericles proposing Themistocles and being answered to Themistocles, then in the same manner again preventing Socrates again Δοκοιξ μοι λεγειν as follows] τοιαυτα Χρλωαι ... σι ιξυροζ εστιν. Αλλασ δετιναζ οιαδα επωδαζ; [for this is still Critobulus to whom in answer] Soc.: υκ. Αλληκωσα μ οτι Περικηεζ &c. [and then in answer by opposition to Pericles] Crit.: Θεμιστοκληζ δε &c. Soc.: Μα Δι υκ επαδων, [a secret reproach from Socrates to Pericles for flattering and corrupting the city as he did (see what is noted above 21 in page 92 ...0)] Crit.: Δοκεισ μσι λεγειν ω Σωκρατεζ &c. Here is plainly Critobulus that speaks. Which is in the same preventing anticipating manner as above.
This shows the art of Socrates and different descriptions of characters by Xenophon, changing the manner as Socrates did according to the person discoursed with.

⁷¹²And yet upotatlein sometimes as Arrian l. 1 C. 12 near the beginning.

Here observe Critobulus, his character. Socrates' love for him for his father's Crito sake. Or query: if as the critics guess Critobulus in most places (as plainly in the Symposium) for Xenophon out of modesty. [134]

38. (37) P. 105 L. 3. Mind again the ingenuity of Critobulus in this place disturbing Socrates with a kind of sophistry of his own. And again line 11 coming to the point and main question: on which Socrates in return (see above (36) p. 124 & 130) prevents and anticipates the youth, in line 13, Η παρατλει σε ω κοιτοχαλε ... to which Critobulus his handsome deduction in answer, shows him an expert disciple, a reasoner and eloquent.

39. (38) P. 108 L. 14. Ει δετιζ εν πυλει. A plain reproach and charge of those that aspire to honours in commonwealths especially such as at that time aspired in the Athenian commonwealth (such as Pericles Themistocles mentioned just before) who if they disagree among themselves no wonder: but if rightly expiring that is [136] to say, if as here expressed, if as honest men and with honest intentions then (says Socrates) positively they would not disagree, but mutually love and help and honour.

Thus Critobulus is answered.

40. (39) P. 107 L. 4. τατε γδ αντα γαλα σι ηδεα opposed (as often by Socrates) to τα καλα σι αγαθα. See above p. 104.

41. (40) P. 111 L. 5 and P. 114 L. 1. Note the easy and agreeable term of Socrates' conversation and instruction. How free his disciples with him! What liberty of raillery! Humour! Irony against himself! And by the merest youth [as this Critobulus (or Xenophon)] for in both these places the youth treats Socrates [139] in an agreeable sort of irony⁷¹³ for neither did he think that Socrates would help him to the καλον of his kind p. 111 or tell a lie for him p. 114 as he wishes him, but not servingly or innocently the youth being a little too knowing and not only knowing (above such a mere Simplicity as this would be) but experienced in friendships (but of the wrong kind) as in Clinus Alcibiades beautiful son above in the first book p. 40 where it is not probable that Critobulus is mentioned as younger than now in this 2nd book where he appears with all the wit and ingenuity of one long come into converse of the world. See the notes immediately preceding this. [158]

An. Dom. 1703.

42. (40) Book 2. P. 115 L. 9. πτεγδ καλα πτε αλνδη λεγοιω αν. Respectful ending. See what is added to note (39) just before in page 139 in the margin marked * [nota 19].

BOOK 3 [6]

1. [see the other page what should be here]

(3) [7] [what should be (1)]. After having in the 2nd book run through all the ordinary duties of a civil life and acquitted that part that relates to friends relations and friendship (the whole subject of that book, after that first general introduction as it were and ecominum of all virtue to Aristippus) Xenophon now in this following book take upon him to show the effect the effect of Socrates as to the commonwealth and his service to the public and the city both in the greatest things and in the meanest. At first in military affairs which reaches to the end of Pericles; then civil and the administration of the commonwealth which is contained in Glauco and Carmides. And 3rd in morality (in which he shows the contrary against the accusers that those principles they charged him with were of the highest benefit to the commonwealth rightly explained as here they are) and after this he design in the 4th place to show how useful he was even to the very artisans of the city and to the commonwealth. How popular, how free, how condescending to all sorts

⁷¹³Yet with what respect too in the main, see the end of the dialogue p. 115. Such was the freedom taken with Socrates and yet such the respect really paid to him from his intimates. How delightful as well as profitable a commerce!

studying not to offend or abuse, but to rectify and amend as much as in him [84] lay; and in the 5th place, after he has shown what regard he had to the mind he showed how he took care also and encouraged his fellow-citizens to look after their bodies which particularly the Athenians of all the Greek at that time began to neglect (which by rendering them effeminate was the great occasion of their ruin and their defeats. See p. 159 l. 9 and ...). And on this account (after the courtizan. See p. 98) he pursues chiefly their intemperance in eating and so concludes this 3rd book answering at the same time in this book at full, all those objections of the [85] accusers one by one which he shortly answered in the 1st book and reserved until now.

Such is the exact order of these books which seem so negligent and to contain discourses and dialogues, so independent one from another and rather brought on by chance (as one who is relating a story calls to mind first one thing and then another) rather than as constrained in a series and exact suite and order. But this is the simplicity and beauty.

Observe also (as is observed upon the 2nd. See supplement to note 1, below p. 89) that as that book answered to section 3 of the first book on the subject of friends &c: so this to section 4 of the first book on the subject of commonwealth in the same manner as the last book also, to the last section. [6]

2. (1) P. 138 L. 4. This relates therefore to the commonwealth (as is shown below p. 9 col. 1) so that those words viz. P. 137 L. 1 τα εαδων are of those excellent arts which relate to human affairs, society and the commonwealth. Of which this book treats both as to military (first ad this dialogue and the next and of following one also with Pericles) and then civil with Glauco, Charmides. [see below (4)].
3. [(2) P. 137 L. 7. Perhaps this was Xenophon himself. But being named once he would not again name himself there being no dialogue (taking that of Euthedemos and Antippus for one continued one and that of Aristippus as cohering with the first) which is absolutely with one person twice, and this would have been with ill grace, at least with Xenophon (who in the whole Convivium names not himself once: but lets others hear his part). Query: whether this be positively so or not? See below 69 col. 2.] [88]
4. P. 137 L. 1. το καλων. And not of those higher and greater sciences and arts military and civil but also the same as to inferior arts. See p. 185 L. 1. So that in all respects Socrates was useful to the city and his conversation improving. [see above (1) and below (9)].
5. P. 195 L. 6. (of Theodora) ουμονον μαλακωζ, αλλα σι ευνοικωζ. Thus Socrates would inspire good things and friendship on all occasions if unable to reach and perfect and entire virtuous friendship yet to insinuate of that sort in other degrees all he could and so as to make those women who gave themselves that liberty to be however not totally prostitute, and that even this sort of depraved creature might be less voracious, less mercenary, less abandoned than commonly they are. But Socrates has another end in this also. [89] [passed over, by chance]. See next leaf. [91] Viz. that by reckoning up these good and honest arts amongst others which he knows she as little practices, he may draw that following confession from her, which so much exposes her weakness and want of sense in her own affairs and the little worth of any love or friendship which she may pretend. There can be nothing more artful than this way and turn he takes in the discourse, without the least offence, and even with obligation, to set out the manners of a Courtesan to his friends, and this in a discourse with one, and one whom he doubtly mocks by making her eager to be acquainted with him and oblige hom, and even to be fond of him. [nothing to intervene between these two notes].
6. P. 195 L. 13. It is this that follows which has given offence to some and upon which the enemies of Socrates have fastened their censure. But having in the beginning of the section [see also below note () which precedes this] shown the scope and design of this dialogue there need not be anything said here by way of apology or answer to those censurers who never entered into the sense of Xenophon or Socrates, nor understood this manner of writing;

nor indeed so much as understood the world but taking Socrates as merely a philosopher and no more, frame a certain solemn and severe character for him, utterly contrary to what his was; and in this false view censure whatever is of o more open free and polite conversation. For were the scope of this dialogue rightly taken, as it is merely to play with and despise this beauty and her trade, which way could [93] this have been carried on as it is, and the lady so managed as in the end, and this so exquisitely and if by what Socrates says here in this place and in those touches he gives of things so important in those mysteries which chiefly concerned the interest of this lady, he had not drawn her to attention, won her ear, and made her impatiently fond of him, and desirous of more of his conversation? By which handle he wrought her as he pleased, and civilly made a jest of her to his friends that were with him, to whom his end was to show the manner of courtesans and how to despise these creatures and their beauty.

- (7. [this note to follow immediately the note of the 5th section p. 113]. [Ver nota 15 abaixo]).
- (8. [Idem acima] [97])
- (9. [Infra p. 120 198. Epigenes]. It has been already shown in what has been remarked on the beginning of this section [see below p. 115] that this latter part of Xenophon's 3rd book is directed against those vices of effeminacy, debauch or laziness or whatever else is in particular).] [99]

Division of Book 3rd (into 5 sections) the 2nd at the 6th p. 164. The 3rd at the 8th p. 174. The 4th at the 10th p. 191. [account of the sections see above p.7 and 84].

7. [see above (4) and (1) and (2) of the connection of the books]. Οτι δε τωζ ορεγομχεπς το καλωv. Although this seems to follow so naturally from what precedes in the foregoing book to which this is in a manner connected as all the books are to one another; yet this beginning relates to what is said in the close of the 4th section of the first book (on which section this book is built as is said above) το δε καλλισηζσι μεγαλοπρεπεσατηζ αγετηζ &c. and a little before, p. 34 L. 7 τα μεγρα, showing that Socrates was of the highest good and advantage to the city by teaching the chiefest things that concerned his interest and this he shows in particular in this book beginning with military affairs (which is solely the subject of this section) and afterwards as to civil.
8. P. 149 L. 1 Nichomachides]. In the same manner that Socrates abated the pride of those that were chosen degrading them in their own opinions that they might learn and be industrious, not presumptuous; so on the other hand towards others he extolled them, that as they might learn to command; so these [103] to obey, thus Socrates in all respects was careful of the city and commonwealth. Guiding in the first place, all that he could, to a right choice afterwards, when chosen, instructing and warning and towards others endeavouring (when the choice was made) to justify it in the best manner that others might acquiesce in it whatever it were, allaying heats and satisfying affronts (as here in the case of Nichomachides) that there might be nothing like sedition, but a respect to the law and the people even by those who were injured. Thus Xenophon shows Socrates as he truly was and as he asserts him a lover of the people, and a common father, as it were, of the city.
- P. 159 L. 9 in Pericles see note (17).
9. P. 164 Section 2nd]. Civil affairs &c.
10. P. 174 Section 3rd]. To one who has not accurately examined and considered of this piece of Xenophon's as the greatest part of these discourses seem unconnected and without any exact relation to one another; so this section in particular must [107] appear so [and that there should be this air of negligence is not only more agreeable by taking off from the formality of long divisions and subdivisions; but in this sort of writing it is a manner absolutely necessary. See infra 119 (4)]. But there is nothing more orderly and exact. It is to be remembered that this is the

book which answers to the 4th section of the first book and that he is here showing the effect of Socrates as to the city and commonwealth which he has done in the preceding dialogues as to military and civil affairs and which he comes to show also in lesser things in the section which follows this. Now it is to be remembered also that one of the reflections on Socrates, and what Plato by his picture of him, gave so much ground for, was that he wrong-led like the other sophists and debated but without profit, or doctrine, skepticizing only so that there was little profit to standers by or to any of mankind that sought any other improvement except in that mere speculative way, and in philosophy of that sort: now Xenophon on the contrary maintained that he philosophised not doubtingly and perplexingly but certainly, plainly and affirmatively, teaching and defining as well as confuting [111] so as that his hearers might best and with most advantage learn, not so as with most credit he might come off victorious as a disputant (such are the words that introduce this section) and that in the next place he not only profited by teaching morals, but that even in philosophising and reasoning after his way he instructed also even in other things so as be useful in his conversation, and profitable in all other respects as well as in philosophy: while he omitted not to consider and bring it into the discourse on every occasion every subject that related to the conveniencies as building, furniture, arms, the situation of houses and temples. So that the most ordinary person was both entertained and profited by Socrates' discourse, far from that useless sublime of other philosophers, or as he is elsewhere represented. And thus is Socrates shown by Xenophon to be in his very philosophical capacity of use and profit to his fellow-citizens and of service to the commonwealth. And thus in this section introduced and ranged it being chiefly moral and to show the principles which he publicly taught and endeavoured to possess his countrymen of. For as to that other part of philosophy and those demonstrations which are of the greatest difficulty and for the capacity only of those who thoroughly philosophised, this Xenophon artfully and methodically reserves for the last book. [113]

11. P. 176 L. 13, P. 178 L. 85, see below (22) (23). P. 185 Section 4th. Artisans &c
12. P. 187 L. 2, 188 L. 5, 189 L. 10. It appears from these places that Socrates did not only aim at being conversible and familiar with all, and at the same time to teach every one to improve in their way: but that he found a way still to make some moral thought arise out of the subject and to put them upon what was virtuous, that they might be in love with that and make their arts to serve in some manner the interest of that.
13. P. 191 Section 5]. That which remains of this 3rd book and which is comprehended on this section seems to be on so various and different subject and to consist of several conversations and passages so independent on one another that, here at least, if nowhere else, it may be imagined that what is written is merely occasional and miscellaneous use without any design of coherence or connection. But as there is nothing else in this piece of Xenophon which bears not its symmetry, proportion and place with the rest so neither is this without order: but is entire and of a piece [115] with the rest. To give account therefore of this we must consider [in the first place] what is said in the first book (section 2nd ...) concerning the care of a constitution and body: and that this is not only spoke of as a private good and benefit: but as a thing of that consequence to the public as the neglect of this and the consequent effeminacy of the Athenians is in the discourse a little before with the younger Pericles lay down as one of the principal causes of the decay and ruin of the commonwealth and of their losses in war. Now the whole of what follows in this book, is on this subject and as such belongs properly in this 3rd book which relates to the commonwealth. It is needless to say that effeminacy, amours with courtesans and debauches in eating are the opposites to this that is here aimed at, and are utterly contrary to that discipline and ruinous of that state of body recommended and exalted to. Therefore as in the latter end that vice of delicacy and luxury in eating is particularly stigmatised, so here in the beginning that of effeminacy and the corruption of women is treated with more softness

and gentleness as with deference and regard to the sex; and not only thus, but with an air of humour and gallantry suitable to the good breeding and politeness of Athens and to that happy genius and wonderful wit of Socrates who could in every in every shape and in conversations and company of every sort be profitable and improving, who could turn everything into virtue and morality and even where gallantry was to reign and be the principal subject be moral still, and give to every thing the turn of virtue so as to make that be sought for, and principally regarded. [117] Thus therefore the aim and scope of this flattering polite insinuating dialogue, is in the first place to expose (but with all the and good breeding in the world) the artifices and wiles of womankind and of the fair ones. And in the next place to show how superior Socrates was to the rest of this kind and how by treating this matter as he does, he learnt his friends at the same time to be superior also. Nor can anything be said in this place that can give a perfecter light to this passage or a clearer view of the whole than that above of Xenophon himself where speaking of effeminacy and those courses that are ruinous to a constitution he shows us Socrates (in the same manner as here) opposing this, and teaching other things. But (says he) “was not formally or as a mere pedagogue or master that Socrates taught; but by his carriage, his manner, his converse and way of teaching these things it appeared how superior he was in this kind and by what inviting example he gave of himself and of his power in treating these things with such ease and familiarity; he inspired those virtuous desires and created the highest hopes in those that were his followers and admirers that they by inviting him should attain to the same happy ease and security in virtue”. To this purpose Xenophon himself speaks. The strict translation is above (book I, section 2nd in the beginning) [see on the other side of leaf number (3)] [the other notes on Theodora are scattered up and down from p. 88 onward] [that which next follows this is (7)]. [93]

14. (7) P. 191 L. 4. *οτι κρειτλον ειη λογω το καλλθ τρωαικοζ*. It is on these words that the following action and affair depends. It is this that Socrates is moved, and as it were alarmed at, to hear the beauty of a woman so profusely commended so as to make in all probability a dangerous and strong impression on some of his friends that heard and on him chiefly who had seen and was the reporter of this dangerous object. Who it is not without likelihood was Xenophon himself (of which above ...) . Socrates to stop this contagion resolves to meet this mighty danger, and try his strength with this enemy opposing his forces to those of one so potent and victorious. [95] Upon this the party is made to the great satisfaction of this friend of Socrates who was to introduce him and who was wonderfully desirous to see this interview which could not but be wonderful agreeable [and in which (if our translation attain but in any degree of that beauty which is in the original) Socrates appears with all the gallantry, politeness and breeding even of a courtier, without losing anything, or prejudicing the character of a philosopher. Although it is not here that he appears in that dress nor are his discourses formed as elsewhere according to close and exact reasoning and by interrogations and dialect for what could be more absurd than this in the chamber of a belle? But at the same time that he seems to say all those us all flattering things and in that air in which women especially beauties are treated, there is nothing that can be said of the artificies and wiles of this Sex and those of her perfection which he does not say and instigate: so that the whole is a continued raillery]. [query: whether this should not be in the discourse rather?]. Yes.

[Nothing should intervene except very slight]

15. (8) P. 193 L. 11. Comparison of the spider &c. Were not this so mixed with other engaging things of which Socrates' discourse is full and which amuse and flatter Theodora so as to turn her from that other sense of Socrates which is the bottom of all he says; this would be the most provoking and abusive [97] discourse in the world. For were this that Socrates says of her livelihood and what he compares it to, spoken in another air what could be more reproachful for Theodora to hear? Or what could be more scornful than to be thus treated, her life and gains thus

examined, her furniture, ornaments, expense thus inquired into, and the foundation of all this, her chief interest and mystery of her trade thus represented and so ridiculously treated with such contempt? But Socrates with a peculiar address and insinuation says all those things even in the presence of Theodora and as complimenting her, which exposes both her and her maintainers in the grossest manner. For whatever he said above in the beginning of the 2nd book in his discourse with Aristippus when in earnest when in earnest exposing the meanness of being ensnared by artifices and caught as those silly animals by baits and allurements of this kind and to pay so dearly for their impotence towards a certain passion, all this he repeats here in the following comparisons enforcing as strong a manner although with an air of gallantry and in a finer sort of irony. [121]

16. P. 198 Epigenes]. It has been already shown in what has been remarked in the beginning of this section [see above p. 115] that this latter part of Xenophon's 3rd book is directed against those vices of effeminacy, debauch, laziness, or whatever else is in particular destructive of the constitution of the body and a hinderance of it in those functions and exercises by want of which and by neglect in this kind it appears (as has been said) from the discourse a little above with the younger Pericles, that the Athenians were greatly sufferers. The other commonwealths around them as that of Sparta, and Thebes in imitation of Sparta taking such great care at that time and training the youth with such wonderful application in all the exercises that form a strength vigour and agility of body. By which means they had such great advantages in war and in the discipline of their armies. It is this which in the following dialogue is so much enforced. In the former dialogue the effeminate part was treated and those dangers which were too strong for Alcibiades and which threatened Xenophon formed by nature another herd, but saved from those temptations which go along with it. and that it is Xenophon himself who was chiefly concerned in that dialogue we have already told our conjecture. Now in this that follows with Epigenes the character of the person (which may be easily seen) is perfectly opposite: and the corruption which is struck at [123] of a quite different kind. Epigenes was also one of those whom Socrates affected but a youth who had nothing of that character or heroic turn, the farthest that could be from ambition, with low and mean thoughts, and rather dejected and melancholy, so as hardly to think anything that was formous or reputable worth his concern and slighting every ornament or advantage of his person and outward form. This made him slight all those exercises and that robust and vigorous habit of body which with the ancients was a thing so much in esteem and so looked after that we can have no idea from anything of our own time of what this discipline and way was, by which they formed their bodies to such strength, hardness, agility and health. I mention this, on this account, because, otherwise, without carrying this idea along with us, we cannot possibly apprehend as we should do the sense and force of what is said to Epigenes. It is thus therefore that Socrates not only pursues the service of his friend and of this youth himself, but with respect to the public (as appears sufficiently in this) he is concerned that any of his country men or the youth of Athens should thus neglect themselves, it being a thing of that ill example and of that injury at that time of the commonwealth.

[Immediately to follow]

17. P. 198 L. 8. Such reason had Socrates to lay [125] stress upon this neglect of exercise amongst the Athenians, and to censure it as here and above in Pericles; that if it be but considered what the causes were of the growing of Thebes which was about this time, it will be found that their imitation of the Spartans in these exercises of the youth was the chief ground of it as will appear to anyone who knows anything of the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopides and the revolution brought about by these two, so much to the advantage of their own country above the rest of Greece. [make a reference hither from the notes of that passage of Pericles. P. 159 L. 9].
18. P. 201 L. 11. Οργηομλου &c. This passage arises from the subject of what precedes, and is connected to the rest only by that comparison which is here made of the ill habit of the mind to that of the body. Otherwise the passage

itself principally regarding the mind is not of this place. But it being a word only Xenophon has inverted it here, as grafted on what is said of the body just before.

19. P. 201 L. ult. στι δε τω ψαχην
20. P. 142 L. 1. Discourse to one, chosen in officer]. Remark the discourse continued. Not always questioning. And this to the younger sort chiefly; as the next discourse, where on that account he takes more liberty.
21. P. 143 ult. νεανια]. Remark as in the note just before.
22. P. 176 L. 13. Socrates avoids metaphysics nor does he opens his mind here where he is attacked, but turns the discourse to other sort of profit; there being none in this. Nor was this a place to speak of the good of virtue as was his opinion. Nor indeed elsewhere [131] but by inference (although yet, see at the end of this dialogue how explicit!) (see next note below): this book being part for the world, and to show Socrates as he appeared to the world, and as he treated these matters (not when he most nicely dispute with those who could with the same patience as he himself examine the very bottom of the things, but) with the generality of mankind (as here is public) or with young men (as Euthedemus) to whom he explained things after the best manner but not so as to form a system which by those that came after him was done but not by Xenophon his historian, who therefore takes care in this matter of good and ill to restrain himself, and show how Socrates did so on these occasions. But Plato is all the contrary. for as he entered into metaphysics so he made Socrates enter, and not only privately but before all the world and in great companies everywhere and eternally. And to this purpose in order to correct this very wrong view of Socrates and his disputes (his way and manner especially in public) Xenophon seems particularly to recite this part of Socrates and shows in this very passage by the words of Socrates that he refused absolutely to enter into the metaphysical dispute of the καλα κι αγαλα, and would not discourse of what was ever and all times such: but suffered Aristippus to press the absurdity upon him, which (as Xenophon shows in the beginning of this) he rather took upon himself as suffering himself to seem confuted, rather than engage in what was not profitable, nor could advantage those that were the hearers. And is remarkable here that he values this seeming wisdom so little and thinks it so little conducing to dispute of these things before the generality of mankind (whom to advantage was his end) that he chooses immediately to fall upon the discourse of houses, buildings and other conveniencies: leaving the metaphysical disputes behind. [see above p. 113 col. 4]. See the 2 following notes.
23. P. 178 L. 8. Observe that this seems to be still with Aristippus and so to the next page line 12 where he insensibly comes out of the dialogue into history. And so as in a manner to explain what is concealed in the discourse above, as to the Dogmata.
24. P. 179 L. 12. See the 2 notes that immediately precede and above p. 120 (30).
25. P. 181 ult. and 182 l. See above p. 94 col. 2 (23) (24) (25) the mixture of the vulgar. But this belongs not to the wise man.
26. P. 153 L. 8. See above p. 104 (6). [135]
A. D. 1704.
27. Page 182 about Enog. Quote Isocrates to Demostenes in section 17 of H. Stephen's division, if this whole piece of Isocrates be not to be taken in (as below 162) if so; a reference only.

BOOK 4 [6]

1. [See what must have been the first note placed here p. 84] [84] [omitted by chance]. [85]
(5) [which, of right, should be (1)]. Our historian (according to the plan of this first book having gone through the character of Socrates towards his friends and towards the public (which are the subjects of the two preceding books)

comes in the last place (according to his order in the first book) to give a particular account of his way of conversing with youth educating teaching and philosophising: of which all this book and the last section and conclusion treats. Euthedemus being the model and being all in a manner represented in one person, showing the steps and degrees and his way of formation of the manners and principles of one he took care of, and herein he shows none particularly his way of philosophising his opinions and dogmata and having shown both his philosophy it self and his way of teaching is his worth as a friend his life and manners as a citizen and his habit and doctrine [88] as a philosopher; he concludes with giving an account of his death[see supplement next note but one below].

(Supplement to the leading note of the book four above (5)). The 3 first sections are the 3 degrees with Euthedemus. The first forcing him to hear and disturbing him beating him from his conceit and proving and making trial of him. The 2nd instructing him first of all in religion and morality speaking his mind plainly and freely, no more disturbing him. The 3rd accomplishing him with the best gratifications [89] (after what preceded and what he first of all took care of) [viz. (1) ability as to action and practice of the world (which according to Socrates is still chiefly founded in virtue) (2) Ability and power in speech and reasoning (3) ability in other ways, as letters, sciences arts &c.] place this below, 107. And this is the whole of the 4th and last book until he comes to account of Socrates' death which concludes all.

P. 213 L. 1. See below (23). [6]

10. (1) P. 268 l. ult. The parenthesis rightly put, where Anaxagoras is spoke of. Those arguments about the sun being spoke from Xenophon himself not from Socrates. At the end of the parenthesis therefore it must not be translated honbalatur etian as if etain joined it to the immediate preceding words, but to those before the parenthesis. See supplement p. 121. [see (29). [121]

(Supplement to (1)) Query if this be Socrates' or Xenophon's words? Remark the great emphasis laid on this, because of the reputed diety of the grin; and the public religion. See above (28). [6]

11. (2) P. 250 L. 6. Incest not everywhere forbid by the laws (that is the meaning. For as to its being violated as a law and often unobserved that is common also to the other vices above named viz. irregilion and undutifulness to parents) this refers to the Magi and to the custom of Persia that was formerly in those ages and known long befor ethe time of Socrates. Nam magus ex matre & filio hascatur oportet. See Marsham 164/626 and translation above (3). [see p. 4 and 5.

12. (3) Ibid. L. 9. The laws of nature; laws of God, and what is unnatural, is prejudicial both κοινη and ιδια. [7]

13. (4) P. 252 L. 8. The divine order and contrivance as above in the preceding note. Remember in a note on this place to show what on the account of brevity is omitted by Xenophon: which elsewhere is so often said and which could not but according to Socrates way, have come in by enumeration (as in Euthedemus about God we see so complete and full) viz. intemperance its own punishment and so and so all other vice and depravity as well as treachery and ingratitude undutifulness to parents and those incestuous practices and disorders of venery which are the only instances that are taken in this place the rest being left to infer. And after this, at the close of the note bring that same exclamation as at the beginning in the same words of the text. νη τον Δια το Σωκε λειοιζ ταυτα ταντα ειοκε &c. [88]

14. P. 209 L. 1. First words]. Mark the connection to the end of the last book all the books being thus (although not perfectly thus as this) connected.

15. [ver item 1 acima]. [89]

16. P. 216 L. 12. Euthidemus. This first dialogue of the kind which in Plato is called πειρασικοζ. See at the end of it what Xenophon says p. 232 L. 5 and 10 which shows Socrates his drift and the reason of this provoking way. But

remark that this of the most perplexing kind is less so and more explicit than most of those of that sort of Plato, whence Socrates himself has been by some reckoned asceptic. (See Sextus Empiricus). [more on Euthedemus see below 115 supplement]. [115]

(Supplement to (8)) P. 216 L. 12 Euthidemus]. Not only this dialogue (although of that kind called πειραστικός) is more explicit than those of Plato. But even quite throughout there is a right sense although not at first obvious. See the explanation in the notes that follow viz. () () (). [Item seguinte numerado por Shaftesbury como (8)] [91]

17. (8) P. 270 L. 5. Xenophon treats this of devination &c. with apparent (assured?) air of raillery [take care not to use these expressions or any like them] (see in the Convivium the same spirit in the part of Hermogenes) and yet there is in this a double sense a serious and true one and natural. See the dependence of it upon the care of the body the lines before and the connection of it with what follows of the διμονιον immediately after. Compare this with the other explanations of the διμονιον in the 1st book what Aristodemus and in this a little before with Euthedemus. Section 2. Compare also with that in the last book p. 275 l. 10 and in the first book p. 9 l. 5. See next note and note (46) p. 130 col. 1 and the following note to that (47).
18. (9) P. 275 L. 10. Μηδεν ανολ τω δεων γνωμηζ. This plainly shows the natural explanation of the δαμονιον, and what the advice of the gods was, what devination, what inspiration, and what the inward oracle (viz. reason). See the preceding note. [93]
19. (10) P. 266 L. antipenult. γεωμετριαν. All this, and what follows of the other sciences must be understood with respect to what appears in the 3rd book viz. his care of his country at that time declining. For the Athenians rather choose any other study than what was of service to themselves. Thus they neglected polincy, economy, war, discipline, exercises (while other commonwealths their enemies cultivated this in the first place) and instead of this were famous for music, poetry, rhetoric and these other sciences of which Socrates makes mention. Principally Sparta banished everything besides these studies above mentioned that their little commonwealth (composed of so few in respect of the other commonwealths of Greece and Athens in particular so much more outnumbering them) might rival all the rest and not only maintain her self but be great victorious and potent. --- Therefore, we must take care not to apply the advice of Socrates exactly to what is now in our days. Policy, manners, interest of the commonwealth and education and every thing being widely different. Without this caution, Socrates might be thought wrong of, [95] as if he disparaged these sciences absolutely, and in the same manner as if he were giving advice to those of this present time and among us, which is a matter very different. Nor is there need to explain this farther. For, who sees not that it is a happiness if nowadays we can prevail so far with the youth of ruality, and gain them but to such a degree of virtue as to apply to anything like learning to improve their minds by any kind of science, or to anything besides the pleasures that may fit them in any degree for the converse of men, and the service of their country?
20. (11) P. 241 L. 4. εν ταιζ σπατειαζ. Therefore Socrates was in war and is here commended. But would not Xenophon his historian and himself a hero have told his great exploits if any such these had been? Therefore all this fictitious as Atheneus says. See above in the life of Socrates p. 3 (6). [97]
21. (12) P. 241 L. 6. This is a second time that he speaks of that great and remarkable action of Socrates in the commonwealth. But before in the first book it was otherwise made use of, than here. For in that place the circumstance of the bath being added (which here is omitted) it is brought as an instance of his reverence to the deity and regard for religion: in this place is mentioned with respect to his justice, and regard to the laws which he considered were violated by this.

22. (13) P. 241 L. 10. The thirty tyrants]. This too has been mentioned above in the first book (p. 22) but to another purpose and on another occasion viz. the concern of Critias and his antipathy to Socrates.

Division of Book 4 (into 4 sections). The 2nd at the 3rd. --- The 2nd part of the 2nd at the 4th. --- The 3rd at the 5th. --- The 2nd part of the 3rd at the 6th. --- The 3rd part of the 3rd at the 7th. --- The 4th at the 8th [account of the sections see above p. 88 and 89].

23. (14) Section 2nd part 1]. Hitherto the first part of his discipline way of education (of which this book the model as said above) viz. his first approaches, incitements, proofs, trials in which he disturbs, dejects, perplexes &c. Now succeeds the 2nd part, in which nothing of this but plainness, openness, explicitness, encouragement. But it is not here neither, that Socrates immediately opens himself so as learn and teach all he can and to give those accomplishments and advantages (such as power in discourse argument eloquence discernment practice &c.). But before this (which is a 3rd degree and is in the 3rd section) here is this second degree viz. religion and virtue which is previous to all else and which he first secures and takes care of and thus it is that he proceeds with Euthedemus fro being now on better terms with him and the preliminaries and trial being over, Euthedemus [103] still adhering to him and becoming his friend and disciple, he comes now to teach and freely communicate to him and begins with this noble discourse of the deity. And this is according to the order of the last section of the first book to which this last book answers. This of Euthedemus, answering to Aristodemus.
24. (15) Line 1. λεκτικῶς κι ωεακτιπεεζ κι γνχανικῶς as answering to the 3 parts of the section below. ωρακ: first then λεκτικῶς. Then μηχανικῶς. Sup. 89.
25. (16) Line 3rd (viz. first of page 233) σωφρασωλω. Viz. by religion in this first part with Euthedemus: and by virtue justice &c. in the next part with Hippias.
26. (17) Section 2nd part 2nd]. take notice of the agreeable way of Xenophon's diversifying the subject for although this that follows be only the orderly explanation and making out of what he has proposed and declared before of Socrates' method of education, and therefore that this should rather have been continued in the person of Euthedemus or some other disciple; yet he rather chooses to break this too strict and formal order and chooses out (as equally proper to the same purpose [107] and end) discourse with Hippias the sophist which was (according to Socrates' his way and according to Aristippus 2nd) addressed as well by his friends and disciples then present, as to Hippias. And thus is the order of the work preserved and at the same time by this variation and pleasant mixture of circumstances (in which Socrates' character is still more shown) the beauty and graces of the work are added to. See supplement infra p. 111. [111]
- (Supplement to note () above on section 2 part 2). But before he proceeds to this discourse with Hippias he makes a kind of digression to show how in the first place he showed that by action which is afterwards shown by words. --- See what follows this note viz. (11) and (12) above p. 95. [107]
27. (18) Section 3rd part 1]. See above first note page 89 and p. 103 ()
28. (19) Section 3rd part 2]. See above page 89 and p. 103 (15) and see supplement below p. 113. [113]
- (Supplement to (19) viz. to Section 3 part 2). Remember to bring to mind in this first note, what Xenophon has been saying of his speaking his mind freely to a friend (see p. 232:9.....) and alone (see p. 216 antipenult.) for so this dialogue plainly enough appears to be as well as that first. Although the middle one (concerning the deity) be not so. Now this being of a kind more retired and particular (not as when he dispute with an Aristippus or and Hippias) he opens his mind more freely; and yet here Xenophon who shows this (as he tell us the line or two below) for a pattern of his dialect, does it with great reservedness and so as to leave us (according to Socrates his

own way) rather to find out the rest our selves. Nor does Xenophon here but at a great distance show us anything like a system although yet it may be perceived. [See what is noted below p. 131 Col. 3] [107]

29. (20) Section 3rd part 3]. See above p. 89 and p. 103 (). [111]
30. (21) Section 4]. Conclusion, by the death of Socrates. Observe the address and artifice of Xenophon to bring on the catastrophe insensibly and so as to conclude with it. this being connected to the last words of the preceding section [compare this with what is noted above p. 91].
31. (22) P. 210 L. 3. ετεκμαιετο. This relates to what follows with Euthidemus Socrates having other ways of trying the youth whom he chose and adhered to. See in the conclusion of this first discourse what his judgement is; and wherefore. [115]
32. (23) P. 213 L. 1. Ευλυδημον τ καλον. Whether handsome or good --- rather the latter. See afterwards p. 232 l. 7 where he is called good and worthy. And remember Ischomachar in the Convivium.
33. (24) P. 222 L. 6 ο εκων η ο ακων. [117]
34. (25) P. 229 L. penult. Beauty riches health fame &c. not goods]. Bring in here the place of Cebes at the end. It being so exactly Socratic and so fitting this place. But perhaps all Cebes to be brought into the work and if so then a reference only. See below p. 162.
35. (26) P. 228 Penult. σογια not the true wisdom; but in the vulgar sense in which Socrates takes it. for true wisdom is that which by this argument he proves the only good.
36. (27) P. 231 L. 2. Another paradox. Who the truly richman (as before p. 182.12 who truly asking and who not) and so in this discourse with Euthedemus a little before p. 223.12 who free liberal ingenious and who vulgar and a slave.
37. (28) P. 233 L. ult. σ ηλιοσ, p. 234 L. 5 σεληνη. Remember to remark the reason who they are thus spoke of so particularly: because divinities with the Ancients --- else this may appear low, and the piety of these passages not understood. [120]
38. (29) P. 295 L. antipenult. νομουζ δε πολεωζ (εφη) γνωσκειζ; --- first with respect to this particular city and then with respect to that greater city of the universe of which Socrates considers men as citizens (See) and thus he afterwards extends this notion of law to the divine laws and good of the whole in p. 249 l. 12.
After this.
P. 250 L. 6 [see above p. 6 (2)]. He makes the opposition between the two laws. And thus the definition and explanation of justice is complete although this be to be gathered by observation; and not presently obvious the turn of the discourse being to be observed. For Hippias not making this opposition himself until now that Socrates leads him to it, Socrates had time to make that long discourse in praise of the laws and of the observers of them.
39. (30) P. 264 L. 6. Xenophon comes insensibly out of this discourse in the same manner as out of that with Aristippus 2. As noted below p. 131 (23). [121]
40. (31) P. 274 L. 11. This must needs be a corrupt place and the word σποκτεινειν turned into ποιειν and so the preceding word changed accordingly. The sense plainly shows it.
An. D. 1703.
41. (32) P. 272 L. P. 242 L. 7. How well Epictetus takes the sense of this and the right story of Socrates particularly this of his death! See chapter 2 of book 2. See also the chapter 5 of the same at the end of page 133 of Wolfius.
[123, 125, 131] [indicam "Book 4" mas encontram-se em branco]

[8] NUMBER 4: DISCOURSE ON THE 4 BOOKS OF XENOPHON AND CONCERNING HIS APOLOGY.

MEMOIRS [Coluna 1]

1. P. 28 L. 10. It is plain that these books were written late in Xenophon's life from what he says of the Socratics that none of these either young or old ever misbehave or did any ill action. So that Xenophon who (with Plato) was of the youngest of his disciples had buried all these and Phaedo also is reckoned: who was but young when Socrates died (see) [See notes p. 94 (12)].
2. For the division of the books into sections see p. 98 inf. [See Query (11) and Anticipatory p. 108.

First then as to the order of the books (the beauty of order being to conceal it and make it insensible). Xenophon having stated the strong charge divides his answer accordingly speaking first as to the charge of atheism and irreligion which he considers in the first section and having shown the absurdity of this charge answers to that of the education of the youth particularly in those two famous examples of Critias and Alcibiades which being of the strongest appearance against Socrates he answers at large in the second section. Afterwards he answers the double charge towards friends and the commonwealth in the two following sections and whereas Socrates is accused there of being an infuser of tyrannic principles. Xenophon maintains how on the contrary Socrates was truly popular a lover of the commonwealth and of mankind and that not only he was innocent and just so as not to deserve punishment: but highly and beyond anyone deserving of his country a grace and honour to it while he had, and of the highest service to it by encouraging to virtue which in the 5th section he proves. But then there being another sort of accusers [9] (or rather detractors) who allowing him merit yet lessened it by denying him so capable as was said by instructing in virtue and conducting to it, the 6th section is employed in this showing (although in short) how much he was capable to make virtuous, and actually did so. [See p. 6 col. 2].

The reason for this deduction of the order of the books. Because to those that have read them in translations they appear and are indeed, all confused and it has been confessed to me by those who yet admired the main of this book and the things in it that yet it seemed no way to cohere and that they could find nothing of order or connection. Whereas were we to take these books only as a pattern of writing there could be nothing better to show order and contrivance, a matter in its nature so various and difficult (with any grace and retaining any beauty) to bring order and connect, being here so finely done, the joints and liasons so fine and the members so proportionable. Which makes me observe that of Plato in Phaedus to show how much these men were the models of good writing, and so esteemed by the best writers as Horace &c. owing them their masters.

In the next book he takes this up again, and both here and in the following book shows at large (and in the most sensible manner in the world) how truly he was useful in the world and how his life was passed continually in doing good not merely in philosophising merely in the speculative way, or as he appears in Plato, framing syllogisms, pursuing abstruse and subtle inquires indefatigably, in a sort of philosophic fury with an ardour of dispute and controversy: reasoning metaphysically (a thing he perfectly declined and was the farthest from that could be) not merely framing thoughts about the government and reasoning about the nature of the commonwealth and politic institutions; but actually pursuing the service of his country pursuing the service of his friends employing himself in their behalf and rendering them securable friendly and serviceable to one another and to the commonwealth. Which is what reigns through this book and goes far in the next where he is seen still allaying the furious and exasperated spirits; raising and confronting the dejected reclaiming those that were to prompt and ambitious and forward; and urging on and assuring the backward and modest. Calming the accidental heats and disgusts of his friends (or even of strangers whom he came to reach) with one another and chiefly towards the

commonwealth if at any time they were apt to fly out against their country and take any repulse amiss. But as the second book is friendship; the third is chiefly the commonwealth, and his usefulness even in the most ordinary things as in architecture home painting armour &c. But this still intermixed with morals and principles distributed proportionally through all the books (although chiefly reserved for the last) and it being withal Xenophon's meaning in this book to show Socrates' popularity, his familiar converse with the lowest Athenians and his willingness to do some good even to the most vile [viz. Theodora] and this chiefly in answer to the charge of monarchicallness &c. [inf. 118

In the last book all that precedes the death of Socrates relates particularly to his philosophy and his manner of teaching and instructing the youth where Euthedemus is the model. And here he justifies Socrates against the diminishing insinuations and detractions as well as formal accusations of his enemies as to this of his treatment of the youth his sincerity and capacity in it. [See account of the sections [or whether anything of this must be said here see p. 108 col. 3 the end].

And this was the conclusion of his first book; so here of the whole. This book answering to the last section of the first: as the two preceding books answered to the two sections preceding (See account of the sections p. 110, 112, 114. And the account of the books at the beginning of each book p. 6, 7 and 84).

3. How tender Xenophon is of the sex is seen in that of Theodora which being brought as an instance of the corruption of the youth yet Xenophon has chosen this dialogue of Socrates than which nothing can be softer nor no raillery and abuse more fine. And this without any comment of Xenophon more [119] than by the place it stands in; although in the case of Alcibiades he plainly showed this of women to be one of the fatalest corruptions.

Remember also in this place (where the dialogue of Theodora is apologised for) this thought. Viz. that out of deference to the sex Xenophon hazarded this censure and drew this upon him. Besides, that Xenophon was a man of the world, and wrote this to the world, and not which the utmost rigour of philosophy or as a treatise merely of that kind. But intermixed with policy, military, affairs, economy of which this is full. And gallantry amongst the rest. For this was to be agreeable and inviting not only for the use of those that were already philosophers and had embraced virtue; but to invite those to virtue who were strangers to it, and even in courts and polite places where it least had to do --- hence the censure of those critics of this dialogue, very impertinent. [See what is said (and should perhaps be here) above p. 95 col. 1].

4. Concerning the order of the books and Xenophon's hidings and connections and liasons. See (what should be here) above 107 col. 1.

[8] APOLOGY [Coluna 2]

1. The title apt to the cause mistake: $\pi\rho\omicron\zeta\ \tau\omega\zeta\ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma\alpha\zeta$ not Xenophon's appeal or Apology to them; but Socrates' which is contained in it, and where his speak to the judges is inserted: from which part it has the name of apology. Although really it be also an apology from Xenophon himself who rectifies other apologies and owning (as may be here perceived) the truth of Plato's Apology as to the main he writes this to prevent the objection of magnificent speaking the $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\gamma\alpha\rho\iota\alpha$ of Socrates so set out by Plato and others.
2. Observe this Apology to be written after Plato's and in a manner on purpose to set that in a true light: for so he declares naming several apologies that had been written although not any one by name. This however the most famous who knows not? And this pointed at. Xenophon long a soldier and man of the world (not a writer until late in his life) therefore this Apology after Plato's and if so, no longer a doubt but that this must be Plato's Apology

which he has a regard to , for what other Apology could it be? Besides this is fitted to it as a tally and easily discernible. See confirmation of this below 15 (4). [9]

[See the query as to the place of this remark; at the end of it p. 119 below].

3. Also the time that the Apology was written. Although it was better in this work to place it at the end after the commentaries (following the example of the Oxford edition) yet I look upon this to have been written before the commentaries according to the order that it is placed in the old editions.

First because this was written in answer as it were to Plato's Apology (see the preceding note) which could not have been of the latest in Plato's life: whereas the commentaries of Xenophon were written at the latter end and when he himself and Plato must have been in years (see note (1) of the preceding page). Now if the commentaries had been written at that time he would have inserted this in them. But that was a great work undertaken afterwards: [inf. 118 and the Apology having preceded he repeats not all, and is for that very reason short and abrupt as it were in the death of Socrates, but at the same time adds and retrenches according to his purpose and repeats only what is absolutely necessary. Omitting the particulars of his behaviour and speech before his judges (which otherwise he certainly would have not omitted nor would have repeated from his commentaries ungracefully) instead of which he only says a word by way of anticipation about the middle of the 4th book p. 242 concerning his behaviour but in general and not reciting any particulars as in the Apology.

Another reason. Xenophon repeats the words of the accusation with such particularity and care as would not have been if he had treated of this fully before⁷¹⁴. --- Let anyone consider the Apology as written first and the great work afterwards; it will appear natural but considering the repetitions the other way, [119] as taking the great work to have been previous, this will seem unnatural and unsuitable.

There was no reason in the world why those passages of Socrates both at his trial and afterwards, being so remarkable as they are, should have been omitted but because they have been already treated of in the Apology which was gone abroad in the world. But this being thus; Xenophon contrived this as well as possible, to avoid ungraceful repetition: and therefore divides in the contraries, and distributes part of the manner in the beginning of the work where he treats of his death and apology. [Query whether this should not rather come after the apology in the discourse that follows (or in the first note on the Apology) and so only a word of this here: asserting the Apology to have been anterior and referring to the following discourse for the reasons?].

⁷¹⁴The objection of the particles de and ti at the beginning of the Apology is nothing to those who know the usual manner of beginning books on any strange subjects ever so new. This common to all the Greek authors as well as Xenophon

HOLLAND 1704. COMING AWAY AND ON SHIPBOARD.**PRO 30/24, 27/11.****Procedimentos de transcrição.**

1. Redigido entre a primeira estadia na Holanda em 1698 e sua volta à Inglaterra, este pequeno caderno alterna textos em inglês, em grego e ###. Por isso a transcrição concentra-se nos textos em inglês. Para os textos em grego e os ###, consultar a fotocópia do manuscrito em anexo.
2. Os textos gregos suprimidos são indicados por * * *.
3. Os ### são indicados por ###.
4. A paginação do manuscrito encontra-se indicada entre colchetes, em negrito.

[1] * * *. C. 40. Find see ASKHMATA p. 362 &c.

The * * *. C. 50.

From former preface⁷¹⁵.

--- At length retired. Extricated ... Again engaged? Again seized? --- Inevitably, if an inlet to one former feeling. * * *. M ...

Remember what thou carriest in thy breast ... Those former inflammations ... Spark getting in ... Fuel within ... Embers ... perignes suppositos ciniri doloso. Think of that import: furious import: temper of thine. And what trust?

Enough said though, written ... What further? Now form. Now adhere. Nune aminis opus &c: The combat here, in the smallest things (great follow transition easy). * * *. 75. On this piety, sanctity, life, duty. ... * * * ... 38.

Therefore as self-legislator ... LAWS ... SWEAR!

* * *.

And now last time. And for ever.

--- * * * * * * * * * The chasm ... view the past. # # # ... And what between! (!) How near sunk! And dost thou live! ... # # # Dreams. Night. death. Perdition. ... Remember: right dream: inf. P. 5. III. Eyes down (inf. P. 5) and chiefly new approaches, sights, company & # # #.

No more relaxations. No more episodes. All of a piece.

No apologising. No show of inward work. No hint. No glance. Not event to ad: (inf. 4:3) not to Ism. (inf. P. 4).

Remember: how becoming such a silence, not the sullen reserved, but the smiling soft: not ironically smiling, but * * * ... but if not pleasing, no matter since becoming, * * *. L.2:18.

The RESPONSES. * * *. Be it so. Right. Well and good. Excellent. (for is it not excellent what the providence sends?) If the borrowed finery (fame, fortune &c) drop off, price meal or at once; let it go. Goodbye to it. Fare it well. Joy go with it.

Remember: how thou hadst it, and on what terms what it cost thee to get and keep. And what the true terms are. ... Friends, country, an eye, enemy, sedition, war, tyrant; Καρετε αυτο σψ νγιαινετε. L.1.C. 29.

See Almanac 1704 beginning. "Root of disease, how deep! The old levelled, evacuated, like frontier place to be decooperating heartily, gladly. A broken, tumbling: colossus: house of cards: perishing, sinking. No stop. No pity ... Away! --- proterum in mare valet cure. The farewells. Les adieux.

[2] Laws. Ανδωποισ ερτυγγανων.

Tab. 1.

Νομ α.

* * *. C. 43.

[3] Νομ β.

* * *. C. 43.

[4] Νομ χ.

* * * ... C. 45.

⁷¹⁵First return 1699.

* * *

The 3 ruins of laws, and all else:

1. FAMILY. ΕΣΤΙΑΣΕΙΣ. Guests. Table. --- House garden. --- The virtuoso-kind. * * *. What the things in themselves, for time, substance, matter. --- Pausanias and the ruins of Greece. --- Rome. --- Cardinals. --- Nero. --- Sardanapoulos. --- The Persian and his paradises. Μετρον κτησεωξ το σωμα. The rest a precipice, abyss. Polinicy and Eteocles. And that by so much as these are slighted, by so much more is honesty, faith, &c established. And vice versa. * * * &c. M. 3:7. --- Alenea? --- Gyara! ... how?
2. PUBLIC. η ΠΙΑΤΡΙΣ. Senate, cabinet, field (military, civil). Elections, interests, NEWS. --- Down all. --- Silence. --- Ignorance. --- It is past. The farewell period (viz. the victory at Rochester). Almanac August 22 1704.
3. FRIEND. {ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. In general. Vulgar feeling cut off. * * *. C. 4 c. 3. No indulgence. No leaping, conducting of the heart. * * * C. 22. But δαγγει. Combat pleasure, interest, fear not want of natural affection.
 {Ad. * * *. Nec tardum op: --- this of old. Now not even this: no thought, hope, endeavour ... Cato and his friend in Plutarch. No plying, excusing, adorning. Be the purple, and that's enough. ... New character (late letters, mirth ease complained of). Same in converse, never earnest. No more clearings, openings. Ceres. Mystery. Darkness. The honest irony jest all. Ασκηματα p. 362.
 {Artabun & To the bottom (here as above with Ad.): what? who? Always as a child. Inwardness! Intimacy! Earnest! Secret stories, closet ... Saturnalia lib. 25. No more pathetic (family Ad. the: as at first return drawn in). No more such handles, hold, inlet, ascendancy. For this once gained, all is lost. They conquer, and they know it.
 {Ism. Th.: Fly! Fly! * * * ... * * * . L. 3:12. Liberty! ... Resolved. No explanation: no apology: familiarity: sympathy (death! ruin!). But mystery, Ceres (as just above Ad.).
 {Pheraulus. Customs at night broken. Impressions and what at that time? --- But affairs! --- No matter. Venture all rather than is venture.

[5] Appendix 1.

Conservatory rule.

The Εχσελισιξ keen, sharp set, strongly bent (anticipate, prevent). ... Sharp regimen. ... Allay of temper ... Restrained, weaned affection, diminishing the objects, bringing to view the viler but truer side of things.

I. COUNTENANCE suitable viz. low meek simple. A change here, how instantly followed by a change within! ... Mimickry. Imitation. Humouring. Acting. Detestable! ... * * * C. 54. ... How monstrous! when even the το φαιδρον as yet befits tee not. See what befits (Ασκηματα p. 10. 176 ... The sores, wounds, feavour) ... Why * * *, and * * * I. 2:8 ... Eyes down. (Spartans, Pythagoreans, Πρκοπλων) ---

II. GESTURE chast, still, quiet, grave. And leave that other bold, open, loose, boisterous way ... subjects new ... a new man ... cool, cold ... serious, slow, doubting, indecisive.

Neither a reformer, nor an entertainer. No rebuking brow (thou rebuke!) ... No catches, starts ... no shrugs, starings, lift up hands or eyes, wonderment: surprise ... nothing **emphatical**.

III. VOICE soft, restrained ... a lower key ... pronunciation, accent, agreeing.

As this restrained, so speech, words. Else heat, fancy, ebullition, flux ... φουρειν.

Remember therefore. "Neither the flashy, sudden, precipitant way. Nor the animated, loud, emphatical. But the **still**, **backward**, **soft**, **deliberate**. ... remiss, liveless, rather than so lively ... dream. Eyes set, and voice suitable to this.

IV. WORDS plainest, fewest --- No graces of speech, repartees, wit: raillery, irony: scoffs, jest: story (and of self c. 53)

No adding: diminishing: palliats: abreviats: expatiating: aggravating: exaggerating: flourishing: embelishing: paraphrasing: (i.e. lying) ... Extolling: decrying: urging: declaiming. ... Figures, metaphors (simplicity!) how abhorrent!
Pleasure in pleasing. No more. --- Profiting? --- What profit? τι κωιειξ; and τω φλιστικω. L. 3 C. 14 in fine.

[6] Appendix 2.

The first and second warner.

L.3 C. 16. L. 4 C. 2.

Remember therefore the SECRETION natural, necessary: and make it: use it: in the first regimen and in the second: but first chiefly.

And therefore, the terrible pages ... "Sworn to what laws? Proselite to what? devoted to whom? ... Cut off joy, tenderness, sympathy, intimacy. Learn to be with self, commune with self &c ... What companion? Associate? Friend? ... a wrong season. Winter ...

And hence the terrible precept. "To take pleasure in nothing. To do nothing with affection. To promise well of nothing. To engage for nothing."

Conclusion.

"The curtain over all..." To find out a CHARACTER ... "The tenor key..." Brows mixed, communicable, conversible: change easy ... "The medium: third thing: nor jest: nor earnest (for what jest? &c.) ... The balance, exam (Feathers, lead). Bring it even. Always redressing. Never cease. Never rest. ... Best practice, contraries: just in the teeth of temper. Just opposite to humour". Now check. Now give the turn &c. Colossus. Promontory. Ασκηματα p. 362 &c.

[7] LAWS * * *

Tab. 2.

Νομ α.

* * *. L. 2 C. 21.

The four sorts. 1. Vicious. 2. Mixed. 3. Necessary. 4. Unnecessary. Ασκηματα p. 78. The weeds. Suckers. Warts. Wens. (ibid.): and this where am I? in which of the τρειξ τοποι? In which of the two regimen's? ... and hast! Fight it out! * * *. L. 3 C. 25.

Νομ β.

* * *. 127.

Νομ γ.

* * *. C. 46. 47. 70.

* * *. M. 7. 60.

[8] Appendix.

Peace. Calm. Cessation. ... Truce first: and then peace, casting, solid. ... Clear stage: room. Place. Preparation. Reception. ... Agriculture. Defricher (choking weeds, bran, moss) clear: and so manure.

1st. Reserve. Stillness. Deadness. SILENCE. No whisper, or voice within. motion. Action. Looks. Gesture allayed. --- Sharp regimen. --- dullness, faintness, dryness (Ασκηματα 186). And body corresponding.

All sunk and death without, to help with that other death within ...

2nd. But these fancies once dead; and others arising; then the contrary: 1 countenance, 2 gesture, 3 voice raised, strong, bold, emphatical ... --- Free regimen ...

3rd. The outward (as well as inward) simplicity, modesty, decorum: and here equally as in company.

None of those dissolved loose manners, actions of a body ... Faces, shrugs, noises, yawnings, gruntings, shuttings ... The natural offices, and the decorum of this place --- The honourable, the great as well here, as there. What presence? The two αθεο σψ ο υμετερο Δαιομων L.1 14. Add a third, viz. the divine man, and suppose him present, according to precept. C. 51. And as when he says * * * L. 1 C. 29.

And thus * * * L. 1 C. 4.

To be ready therefore at all times, as his honest and trusty disciple, to say come and see!

For is there not a greater that sees?

* * *. L. 2 C. 76.

[9] RULES.

MORNINGS. See Δογμα of the place inf. And Instructions inf.

I.

1. What dreams in the night past? What disposition in waking? What impressions? And whence, what regimen? According to this, and to the business of the day. * * *, l. 4 c. 6 in fine.

2. What Δογμα formed from the night predominant in the day? What principal **law, instruction, theorem**? The immediate one to work upon, manage with, stir by, bring in play. * * * (L. 2:18). The leading fancy of the Ηγμονικον to command in chief for the day and to be foremost in action until new cases from abroad require a new disposition and the another should take the van.

3. The 3 laws of table 1st said ever with appendix (4 words) and the terrible precept (other 4 words) and this distinct and plain.

The ADORATION vide inf. ...

II. THANKS Το Κεκληκοτι. L. 2 C. 1.

1. For admission: as being introduced, although worthy of the spectacle: for being not of the spectacle merely, but a spectator: not of the * * *. M. 6. 42. --- GO VIEW.

2. For the two lights, guides, masters, the same two witnesses in each degree. Prince's slave. For the memory of the beginner and of the two that followed ... For the first and second commentaries: two such disciples and historians! ... And for the divine enthusiast: the examples and the instruction. --- GO FOLLOW.

Δογματα (inf. ...)

* * *

[10] NIGHTS. Δογμα ... and Instinct.

I. 1. What fancies in the day now past? What **action**? What success? Beating or beaten? Ground got or lost? **Visa**? Δογματα; thou on them? Or they on thee? What with ones? What good? What old inveterate enemy? What new? What habit broken? What conformed? What checked? What symptom better? What worse? ... How as to sores? The wounds? Feavour? ... Healed, cured, abated? Increased, inflamed, breaking out anew? Αναπολει τα πεπραγια. L. 9 C. 6 in fine. * * *, L. 3 C. 10.

2. What **Dogma** from the day? What proved one worth keeping by? What feeling, energy, impression best to dwell on? What take to bed with thee? Sleep upon ... the scholar ... the seeds-man and the seed time.

3. Laws of tab. 2. Σπιουεντω ων and this the chief of that scene. Also chief part of the third Τοπθ – * * *. L. 1: 18. And εντη κοιτη L. 3:10, rules for the place see instructions inf. In dreams, restraint; some at lost, if not full; strive, aim.

The ADORATION. # ult. vid. inf.

II. THANKS, τω Αποπεμκαντι, Απολυοντι.

1. For DISMISSION, as having been admitted, now discharged. * * *. M. 4:48.

--- GO. For thou hast viewed.

2. For the leaders in this, as well in life.

* * *, M. 7:19.

--- GO. For how much better have gone before?

* * *. M: ult.

Δογματα (inf. ...)

* * *. L. 3 C. 22 p. 315/316. And the contrary. * * * &c. p. 332/333.

[11] REGIMEN 1st. See Almanac January 1704.

Strict. Close. Sharp. Severe. Low. Cold.¹

Ενκλισιζ.

Therefore at all times and all places, and chiefly company. Also alone. Particularly.

1. When reason for self disgrace; **laws** broken, forgot.
2. When outward affairs go with more than ordinary success. When country, cause, commonwealth, Europe, the family, the grange, the Δοξαριον &c. when now as at this instant at the Briel (August 20 1704) viz. victory in Germany. Joy, transport, fervour, involuntary thoughts, dreams.
3. When even to action, as φορειν or the like # # #. For as the # # # would (!) if ever again, if again relapse * * * &c. Ασκηματα p. 85.
4. When one come by any * * * wrestled with, or defeated. * * *. L 2:18.
5. In, or after the light, gay, vain or airy frothy disposition.

In these cases no sparing. No pity.

Go to the terrible pages 176 &c. the incisions, caustics, cauteries, corrosives, acids ...

Abstaining from high food within. (viz. the deity, sublime, Plato, poets, history and reading, all but chapters and those the severest as L.4 C.9 and L. C.).

And in the room, that low abstinence, poor and starving diet, fit to reduce this exuberancy, lux: this florid feverish hot blood ... Mortification. Dejection. Nothing less. And let it be οφρυζ (L 2:8) for what can it be else?

REGIMEN 2nd. See Almanac January 1704.

Free. Loose. Open. Soft. Easy. High. Holt. Cordial.

Ορεξιζ.

And therefore seldom cautiously, and never but alone.

Particularly.

1. When a real melancholy. For this will soon revive.
2. When outward affairs heavy. ### tumbling. ### sinking. ### and all of that kind perishing.
3. In pain. Sickness. Loss of friends. Prospect of death, danger, hardship.
4. When conqueror in any of the * * *; L. 2 C. 18.

In these cases, NO FEAR. Go to the sweet, divine facetiousness ... * * *; L.1:27. And * * * L.2:6. Ασκηματα p. 374. ... The soliloquy's, Ασκηματα p. 375. High up! Aloud! ... Τελωζ, and proper reverse of law 1. --- * * *. Ασκηματα p. 352.

* * *. (* * *...) L.3 C. 24 in the middle. The rule of Marcus. * * *. 6:48.

FALTA PÄGINA 12

[13] RESOLUTIONS.

Κεκεικα.

Thus as to **laws** (and rules which have the force of laws) therefore * * *... C. LXXIV. And * * *. LXXV.

Now certain **RESOLUTIONS**. What respect to inward and outward character. And remember from what judgement: and premeditation.

These also * * *, not so much as to be called in question, unless reinstated; same retreat; distance, the dim and dazzle of objects removed ...

I. RELIGION.

Κατ οικονομιαν ...

Church, mysteries, rites &c. sacred. Reverenced. The silibine books, authority. Auspices. Harioli. Sacrificuli.

(I)

1. For thy own sake; the εχειζ, what? --- Men: society: city: laws. Ασκηματα 118. 120.

For others sake; the Προληπειζ, what? --- How apply them to the subjects? How to deity? 121.

Οπω ιδ το Συμφορον εκει σψ το Ενοεχεζ. C. 38. 118. Hear the porch ...

Revelation: rewards: and punishments: bonis male: malis bene. How otherwise?

What then disturbs? Modern superstition? --- Be thankful if not Indian. --- Christian priests? --- Not druids.

Thanks for so harmless and ingenious a superstition: so near Platonism. What remedy? Overturn foundations? How rebuild? How dispose of ILL? What cause assign? Even a Plutarch himself; see how!

Either right Δογματα and Chrys. or atheism. If neither, be content with this.

2. The world's passing first through atheism to shake off Gallisme. A disease worse before it mends. Vice corruption at its height 'ere heard. But wilt thou join, assist?

Leave it to the atheists epic: Pyrr: stabists, wits, libertines, half-believers, and inwardly gauld, and those that bite the chain, the contrary enthusiasts, sectaries, &c. Is this work for a disciple of the Ancients?

3. The childishness and poorness of this. --- Cato to Cesar about this --- What if in ancient times? "Oh people! Hear! Learn! There is no Apollo, no Minerva, no PARTUS of a brain, none of a virgin! See how the wiser atheists can despise this"⁷¹⁶. [14]

4. This like the Christians themselves in former times. Since this is now the established religion and these the laws of the commonwealth.

5. A double advantage from the contrary practice. Saving from the αιγεολον (LV) and Φλυαρια Ψυχρολον (... 340/341) and withal rightly exercising, by the suppression of the Ορεξιζ (so in Ασκηματα p. 336: now check, now give the turn &c.). and hence the Ησυλια οιαν δει (390/391). The Ενκοσμια (ibid.) the Ενσαλεια (ibid.).

(II) Hence a new character: to new people, new; old, save: withdraw: lower key. Sacrament: vow, on this.

(III) To comprehend in this, all weakness and vulgar credulities: witches, spectres, dreams, prophecies, astronomy, palmistry, alchemy &c. Excellent exercise against the Ορεξιζ and φλυαρια (as above, 5 in this page). And thus as to other vulgar errors and half-superstitions: the moon: prognostics: marking the children in the womb, by appearances &c. See Almanac, January 6 1704.

(IV) As no dissent; so no over-forwardness. Thus in the temple: no officiousness, responses &c: but passive, still, conformable, barely; and no more. See Almanac January 1704 first leaf.

(V) The examples of right reconciliation: of vulgar and wise religion. Δια τωτο δπισαδη Διθ ειναι ψοσ, σψ λω. L.2 C. 16 in fine. So also ... (15)

II. STATE.

[15] [16] [17]

III. FAMILY & private life (economy)

Almanac 1703. { 1. Payments, accounts. --- 2. Perquisites. --- 3. Wine. --- 4. Coach. --- 5. Table. --- 6. Old servants: tenants. --- 7. Park. --- 8. Horses. --- 9. House and garden.

[18] [Restante do manuscrito: ver fotocópia]

⁷¹⁶Old Lord Halifax.

Notes.

PRO 30/24, 27/13

Procedimentos de transcrição.

1. Apresentamos aqui a transcrição de um pequeno texto inédito sobre pintura e entusiasmo, contidos num pequeno caderno de notas. Esse caderno parece ter sido redigido por Shaftesbury em 1691, com adições feitas em 1712, e traz textos diversos em inglês, francês, latim e grego. Sua existência não foi notada pelos estudiosos, e contém material de relevância para futura pesquisa. Restringimo-nos, dadas as prioridades da pesquisa, à transcrição do texto relevante para esta e do índice de temas apresentado por Shaftesbury, com respectivas páginas em que o texto se encontra. Resta definir ainda a natureza desse caderno, que traz, sob determinados tópicos, citações e comentários. Muitos de seus textos foram riscados por Shaftesbury, o que indica sua natureza incompleta ou insatisfatória para o autor.
2. A paginação original é apresentada entre colchetes em negrito.
3. Trata-se da primeira transcrição realizada desses textos.

Faecunditas. 1 – 2; 38 – 9.
Commentatores Classicum autorum. 4.
Virgilius. 6.
Superstitio. 8.
Conversation. 10 – 19.
Virtus. 20 – 26.
Grammatica. 28.
Vita. 30 – 34.
Dei. 36.
Deus. Deitas. 40.
Animalia. 39.
Roma. 44.
Petronius. 46.
Philosophi. 48 – 9; 66 – 7; 82.
Dio Cassius. 50 – 7.
Xiphilinus. 59.
Arrian. 60.
Libri Philosoph. Moral. 62.
Historiae Scriptures. 64.
Vaticinato. 68.
Xenophon. 70 – 7.
Diogenes Laertius. 79.
Dictionar. Sto. 80.
Marcus. 84.
Plato. 86 – 9.
Aelianus. 99.
Editiones Librorum. 101 – 2; 108.
Epictetus. 103 – 4.
Homerus. 105.
Graecia. 110.
Pictura. 112 – 13; 118 – 19.
Horace. 114.
Enthusiasmus. 116.

[112]

Pictura]

A liberal art {Pliny I. 35 p. 206 Delphin}.

The art not perished in Pliny's time, who only prophesises of its death. Hacterus dictum sit de dinitate artis morientis (35(5)). Which he concludes from the luxury of the Romans in statues of all precious matters, inlaid works, embosses, stones &c. in respect of which good drawing, just design and truth of work began to be despised. See the beginning of this 35 book.

Another cause of its decay from luxury and the importation of riches, colours than such as had been used by Apelles and the great masters. This colouring he calls the florid and which were too rich to be furnished by the painter but were bespoke or furnished at the cast of the person (apost dominus pingenti prestat). The other he calls the austere. And thus says he "rerum non animi pretus excubatur. The caste, and not the life is sought after".

Below again (p. 214 of the dauphin edition) he shows the care which Apelles took to subdue the colours by a darkening vanish ut eadem res (says he) nimus floridis coloribus austeritatem occulte daret.

And he says, but a little before, of one of the finest pieces of Apelles, "that it was wrought but in [113] four colours only (p. 212 l. 10). So great and venerable was simplicity held among the ancients and so certain was the ruin of all true elegance in life or art where that was quitted, and constrained.

[Ryparography Ρυπαρογραφοι. Pliny L. 35 Cap. 10 Ed. Delphin]

At the end of this chapter Pliny speaks of noble modern painters from Augustu's times to Vespasianu's. how therefore can Petronius (whose Eumulpus speaks of the total ruin of the art of painting) be imagined to be of Nero's time? And is it not proof enough of the flourishing of this art that the emperor Marcus learned it of Diocratus?⁷¹⁷

In the following chapter at page 227 line 10 in coloribus severus is a great character of a painter. And presently again below, p. 229 line 8 anterior colore as a great praise of one who but for his untimely death (he says) would have been the greatest of masters. So p. 231 e severissimi pictoribus.

P. 230. Metrodorus a philosopher and painter (scholar to Carneades). So Diogretus to Marcus. See # 6 and Gatraker's note, whose accuracy I wonder this instance has except.

Precedency given to it above statuary by Seneca. See Epistle 88 where philosophically he excludes painting from the liberal arts as much (says he) as statuary, which vulgarly was excluded. [inf. 118

Naples, April 1712.

Enthusiasm of Painting.

Junius, De Pictura Vet. p. 32, 33 (whom I call the modern collector).

"Poeta certe phantasiae vivida, veluti enthusiasmo ac vaticino quodam furore correptus, letas interdum nympharum choreas et proteram satyrotum nequitiam, arma quando que et effrenatos cum curribus suis equos, faces quoque deorum et miscentes proelia furias attonitus adscripti: atque in hoc motoe semel mentis calore, non sustinen velut clausis thesauris diutius incubare, majore quadam vi gravide mentis concitatus et instinctus, per ambages deorum que ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum fromentum, precipitat liberum spiritum ...".

⁷¹⁷See M. § 6 and Capitolinus in his Life

This only borrowed from Petronius. The following two citations are impertinent and wrong (encouraging wildness) but the rest of the citations of this page of Junius (viz. 33) and to the end of the chapter is worth revising, and applying.

Quot quot igitur huic cune sedulo incumbere in animum inducunt, de industria quandoque sumunt certas quasdam imagines, quas quam numerosissime versent, velu eadem cerq alicae atque alicae formae duci solent. Plastae certae atque ii Qui coloribus utuntur, ex ipsis rebus [119] capesunt notiones quibus lineamenta, lucem, umbram, eminentias, recessus iminentur. In simbulis corporibus prestantissimas quasque vere pulchritudinis notas observant, easque in unum aliquod opus conferant; ut non tam didisse a natura quam cum ea certass, aut potius illi legem dedisse videantur. Quis enim putet ullam unquam talem fuisse faeminae cujusquam pulchritudinem, in Qua nihil desideraret non vulgare iudex? Nam tametsi in ipsis naturae normis atque dimensionidy universa perfectio est; tamen utriusque parentis mistio, tempus, caelum, locus, improvisus aliquis casus, et vaga quaquis cogitatio naturali formae, non nihil possunt detrudere. Semilitudinum quidim in mente reputatio est, inquit Plinius⁷¹⁸, et in qua credantur multa fortuita sollere; visus, auditus, memoria, hausteque, imagines subjoso conceptu.

[See what follows. If this were true in nature (as I would not believe because of founding no reason on mere hypothesis but evidence and truth. Painters are well warned: and our wives should learn.]

#3. Sic instructi sano retoq iudicio summorum artificium labores excutinant ipsis quandoque artificibus felicius; cum in iis propria operis amor atque alienae artis obctretacio severitatem integritatem iudici non raro infringant.

Here also he (Junius) quotes Arrian L. 3 C. 6 of the κοινθ νωξ: the κοινθ and τεχνικθ ακοθ and other proper quotations.

[116]

Enthousiasmus.

See what Plutarch says of the noble enthusiasm of the Spartans. The object their country. Cited by Gataker on #16 of L. 1 of Marcus on the word κοινονοημασυνθ.

Enthusiasm of painting see Painting/Pictura overleaf, viz. 118. [117]

⁷¹⁸Nat. Hist. Lib. 7 Cap. 12.

