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Doctoral Thesis
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/T.8.2021.tde-20082021-122741
Document
Author
Full name
Thiago do Nascimento Fonseca
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2021
Supervisor
Committee
Arantes, Rogério Bastos (President)
Avelino Filho, George
Azevedo, Paulo Furquim de
Limongi, Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra
 
Title in Portuguese
Custos e interesses: o viés político de instituições anticorrupção independentes
Keywords in Portuguese
Accountability
Anticorrupção
Corrupção
Independência
Tribunais de contas
Abstract in Portuguese
A presente tese de doutorado contesta a recomendação amplamente disseminada segundo a qual instituições anticorrupção devem ser protegidas por amplas garantias de independência para preservar sua imparcialidade. Segundo o novo argumento aqui proposto, em democracias agentes anticorrupção protegidos por garantias de independência desejam manter e ampliar seu poder institucional. Para atingir seus objetivos, estes agentes abrem mão de sua imparcialidade e evitam impor custos políticos a governos majoritários em contextos de estabilidade política. Com dados do controle exercido pelo Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) sobre os municípios, o método de regressão descontínua proposto compara aliados do governo e da oposição federal no nível local, superando a estratégia predominantemente utilizada por especialistas, de comparar a nomeação política e técnica das lideranças dos tribunais de contas. Mesmo com amplas garantias de independência e independentemente da origem técnica ou política dos ministros do TCU, os resultados mostraram que os aliados do governo federal no nível municipal são menos controlados do que os da oposição federal. Evidências qualitativas e testes empíricos adicionais também sustentam as principais premissas do novo argumento. A implicação dos achados é dupla: de um lado, o viés político de instituições anticorrupção independentes confere vantagens competitivas para atores políticos específicos, gerando desequilíbrio na competição democrática; de outro, eleitores, quando discordam deste viés político, não dispõem de meios para reagir contra agentes protegidos por garantias de independência.
 
Title in English
Costs and interests: the political bias of independent anti-corruption institutions
Keywords in English
Accountability
Anti-corruption
Audit courts
Corruption
Independence
Abstract in English
This dissertation contests the widespread recommendation according to which anti-corruption institutions must be granted independence guarantees in order to preserve their impartiality. According to the new argument proposed here, in democracies, anti-corruption agents protected by independence guarantees wish to hold and enlarge their institutional power. To achieve their goals, these agents give up their impartiality and avoid imposing political costs on majority governments in contexts of political stability. With data regarding the oversight over corruption carried out by the Brazilian Supreme Audit Court, the regression discontinuity design compares federal government's and federal opposition's allies at the municipal level, overwhelming the main research strategy applied by experts, who compare the political and technical appointment of the audit courts' leadership. Even with broad independence guarantees and regardless of the previous technical or political career of audit court's heads, the results show that the federal government's allies are not under the audit court's oversight as much as the federal opposition's ones. Qualitative evidence and additional tests support the main assumptions of the new argument as well. The implication of these findings is twofold: on the one hand, the political bias from independent anti-corruption institutions affords competitive advantages to specific political actors and biases the democratic competition; on the other, voters, if disagree with it, have no means to react against agents protected by independence rules.
 
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Publishing Date
2021-08-20
 
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