• JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
  • JoomlaWorks Simple Image Rotator
 
  Bookmark and Share
 
 
Mémoire de Maîtrise
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2021.tde-09042021-171224
Document
Auteur
Nom complet
Ana Beatriz Bexiga Dutra
Adresse Mail
Unité de l'USP
Domain de Connaissance
Date de Soutenance
Editeur
São Paulo, 2020
Directeur
Jury
Limongi, Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra (Président)
Freitas, Andréa Marcondes de
Silva, Mariana Batista da
Titre en portugais
Desvendando a estrutura do jogo: o papel dos relatores no presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro
Mots-clés en portugais
Coalizões
Partidos
Poder Legislativo
Processo de Emendamento
Relatores
Resumé en portugais
De acordo com a literatura, a formação do governo de coalizão acarretaria aos presidentes altas taxas de sucesso na aprovação de suas políticas públicas. Porém, isso não se dá de forma imediata. Coalizões são formadas por partidos com diferentes preferências e diferentes eleitorados. Há, portanto, conflito entre os membros de uma coalizão. Cada um dos integrantes tem sua preferência específica. Propostas de lei enviadas pelo Executivo não necessariamente representam o interesse da comum aos integrantes do governo. Neste sentido, em sua passagem pelo Legislativo, as propostas passam por ajustes, isto é, são emendadas para que representem o interesse comum aos membros da coalizão. O principal objetivo desse trabalho é o de estudar como os partidos compartilham entre si a tarefa de modificar os projetos propostos pelo Executivo.
Titre en anglais
Unraveling the structure of the game: the role of rapporteurs in the Brazilian coalition presidentialism
Mots-clés en anglais
Amendment process
Coalition
Legislative Power
Parties
Rapporteurs
Resumé en anglais
According to the literature, the formation of a coalition government would result in high success rates for presidents in approving their public policies. However, this does not happen immediately. Coalitions are formed by parties with different preferences and different constituencies. There is, therefore, conflict between members of a coalition. Each member has a specific preference. Bills sent by the Executive do not necessarily represent the common interest of government officials. In this sense, as they pass through the Legislature, the proposals undergo adjustments, that is, they are amended so that they represent the common interest of coalition members. The main objective of this work is to study how the parties share among themselves the task of modifying the projects proposed by the Executive.
 
AVERTISSEMENT - Regarde ce document est soumise à votre acceptation des conditions d'utilisation suivantes:
Ce document est uniquement à des fins privées pour la recherche et l'enseignement. Reproduction à des fins commerciales est interdite. Cette droits couvrent l'ensemble des données sur ce document ainsi que son contenu. Toute utilisation ou de copie de ce document, en totalité ou en partie, doit inclure le nom de l'auteur.
Date de Publication
2021-04-09
 
AVERTISSEMENT: Apprenez ce que sont des œvres dérivées cliquant ici.
Tous droits de la thèse/dissertation appartiennent aux auteurs
CeTI-SC/STI
Bibliothèque Numérique de Thèses et Mémoires de l'USP. Copyright © 2001-2024. Tous droits réservés.