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Master's Dissertation
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/D.12.2005.tde-01122021-153120
Document
Author
Full name
Arthur Carbonare de Avila
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2005
Supervisor
Title in Portuguese
Análise de um monopólio via mecanismos de leilão
Abstract in Portuguese
Modelamos um monopólio de objetos indivisíveis com compradores de demanda unitária. Determinamos o núcleo do jogo cooperativo e o equilíbrio competitivo. Apresentamos três mecanismos (Leilão Discriminatório, Leilão de Preço Uniforme Mínimo e Leilão de Preço Uniforme Máximo) para produzir resultados do núcleo e do equilíbrio competitivo que induzem um jogo não cooperativo de informação completa. Para cada mecanismo determinamos todos os equilíbrios de Nash e, ao eliminar estratégias dominadas, vimos que os payoffs de equilíbrio são os mesmos e idênticos ao resultado ótimo para os compradores no núcleo. Relaxamos a hipótese de informação completa e derivamos as estratégias de equilíbrio simétrico com e sem preço de reserva para o vendedor. Provamos então o Teorema de Equivalência de Receitas, aplicável aos leilões apresentados, e determinamos o preço de reserva ótimo para o vendedor.
Title in English
Analysis of a monopoly via auction mechanisms
Abstract in English
We modeled a monopoly with indivisible objects and single unity demand buyers. We de termine the core of the cooperative game and the competitive equilibrium of the market. We present three mechanisms (Discriminatory Auction, Minimum Uniform Price Auction and maximum uniform price auction) to produce results of the core and the competitive equilibrium. These mechanisms introduce a non-cooperative game with complete Information. To each mechanism, we determine all nash equilibriums and, eliminating dominated strategies, we show that the equilibrium payoffs are the same and identical to the best result for the buyers in the core. Than we and Maximum Uniform Price Auction) to produce results of the core relax the hypothesis of complete Information and we prove the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, that applies to the auctions presented, and we found symmetric equilibrium with and without reservation price for the seller. Then we prove the revenue equivalence theorem, that applies to the auctions presented, and we determine the best reservation price to the seller.
 
Publishing Date
2021-12-01
 
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