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**The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: orchestration as a  
governance mode**

São Paulo  
2021

**MIRIAM LIA CANGUSSU TOMAZ GARCIA**

**The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: orchestration as a  
governance mode**

**A Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima: orquestração como  
modo de governança**

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Program in the Institute of International Relations at the  
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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. João Paulo Cândia Veiga

São Paulo  
2021

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*To my parents for their endless love and support.  
To my beloved sister for our friendship and life-lasting partnership.  
To all those who dedicated their lives to protect nature.*

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“In nature, nothing exists alone”. Rachel Carson

“É que tem mais chão nos meus olhos do que cansaço nas minhas pernas, mais esperança nos meus passos do que tristeza nos meus ombros, mais estrada no meu coração do que medo na minha cabeça.”  
Cora Coralina

## ABSTRACT

GARCIA, M. L. C. T. (2021) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: orchestration as a governance mode. Tese (Doutorado em Relações Internacionais – Instituto de Relações Internacionais). Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.

Even if States are the central actors, this research is based on the premise that facing climate change requires the participation of subnational governments and non-state actors. Over the past few years, the landscape of global climate governance has changed with the participation of non-state and sub-national actors which are also called non-Party stakeholders. There is also a growing recognition of the role of non-Party stakeholders as implementers of climate actions that are complementary to the national commitments. Non-Party stakeholders can voluntarily pledge for climate commitments both individually and collectively as members of cooperative initiatives. Such pledges are recognized and promoted by the intergovernmental sphere in a governance mode called orchestration. This study focuses on the case of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, an initiative led by the United Nations Secretary-General Office, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, and the presidencies of the Conference of Parties 20 and 21, led respectively by the governments of Peru and France. The Lima-Paris Action Agenda was established as one of the pillars of the Conference of Parties 21. One of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda main objectives was to demonstrate the engagement of non-Party stakeholders by bringing together cooperative initiatives with ambitious climate commitments in terms of mitigation and adaptation impact. Based on the collection of primary data, this study reconstructs the emergence and operationalization of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda towards COP-21. Then, the research argues that the Lima-Paris Action Agenda catalyzed the institutionalization of orchestration as one of the governance modes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat for the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement. In addition, the thesis presents an analysis of the performance and accountability mechanisms of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda initiatives. This research contributions to the global environmental governance literature are threefold. First, the thesis investigates the conditions that allowed the rapprochement between the intergovernmental sphere and the transnational sphere. Second, the study discusses orchestration as one of the governance modes employed by intergovernmental organizations. Third, the research provides an analytical framework for assessing governance structures and accountability mechanisms for cooperative initiatives.

**Keywords:** global climate governance; orchestration; Lima-Paris Action Agenda; cooperative initiatives; accountability.

## RESUMO

GARCIA, M. L. C. T. (2021). A Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre mudança do clima: orquestração como modo de governança. Tese (Doutorado em Relações Internacionais – Instituto de Relações Internacionais). Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.

Esta pesquisa é fundamentada na premissa de que o enfrentamento da mudança climática demanda a participação de governos subnacionais e atores não estatais, mesmo tendo os Estados como atores centrais. Ao longo dos últimos anos, a paisagem da governança climática global tem sofrido alterações com a maior participação de atores não estatais e subnacionais, também denominados de non-Party stakeholders. Estes são reconhecidos como implementadores de ações climáticas complementares aos compromissos nacionais, pois pleiteiam compromissos climáticos voluntários tanto de forma individual quanto coletiva, ao fazerem parte de iniciativas climáticas transnacionais. Tais compromissos são reconhecidos e promovidos pela esfera intergovernamental em um mecanismo de governança denominado orquestração. Este estudo tem como foco o caso da Lima-Paris Action Agenda, uma iniciativa liderada pelo Escritório do Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas, pelo Secretariado da Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima, e pelas presidências da Conferência das Partes 20 e 21, lideradas respectivamente pelos governos do Peru e da França. A Lima-Paris Action Agenda foi estabelecida como um dos pilares da Conferência das Partes 21. Um dos principais objetivos da Lima-Paris Action Agenda foi demonstrar o engajamento de non-Party stakeholders com a agenda do clima ao reunir iniciativas climáticas transnacionais que apresentavam compromissos climáticos ambiciosos tanto para a temática de mitigação quanto para adaptação. A partir da coleta de dados primários, este estudo reconstrói a emergência e a operacionalização da Lima-Paris Action Agenda rumo à COP-21. Em seguida, argumenta-se que a Lima-Paris Action Agenda catalisou a institucionalização da orquestração como um dos modos de governança do Secretariado da Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima para a fase de implementação do Acordo de Paris. Esta pesquisa contribui de três formas para a literatura governança ambiental global. A primeira contribuição é a investigação das condições que permitiram a aproximação entre a esfera intergovernamental e a esfera transnacional. A segunda contribuição é o debate sobre a orquestração como modo de governança de organizações intergovernamentais. A terceira contribuição é o desenvolvimento de um quadro analítico para a avaliação das estruturas de governança e dos mecanismos de accountability de iniciativas climáticas transnacionais.

**Palavras-chave:** governança climática global, orquestração, Lima-Paris Action Agenda, iniciativas climáticas transnacionais, accountability.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
CCAC	Climate and Clean Air Coalition
CI	Cooperative initiative
COP	Conference of the Parties
CIP	Climate Initiatives Platform
	Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik/German Development
DIE	Institute
FOF	Function output fit
GEG	Global environmental governance
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LCTPi	Low Carbon Technology Partnerships Initiatives
LPAA	Lima-Paris Action Agenda
MPGCA	Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action
NAZCA	Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NYDF	New York Declaration of Forests
OCDE	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SE4all	Sustainable Energy for All
TEM	Technical examination meetings
TEP	Technical examination process
TNGO	Transnational nongovernmental organizations
UNCBD	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSGO	United Nations Secretary-General Office

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## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

*“(...) The Lima-Paris Action Agenda is an integral part of the outcomes here in Paris. It will complement the new agreement and will continue to highlight the critical role of non-state actors transforming our societies. Last year, I hosted a Climate Summit in New York. It gave birth to new multi-stakeholder partnerships and initiatives on forests, renewable energy, sustainable transport, resilience, finance and other areas critical for addressing climate change. (...) The Lima-Paris Action Agenda builds on this progress. (...) The United Nations system will continue to support climate action in partnership with all stakeholders.” Ban Ki-Moon (2015)<sup>1</sup>*

As stated by Ban-Ki Moon during the 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) 21, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) relies on the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General Office (UNSGO) to mobilize non-state actors in order to build momentum for the adoption and the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The LPAA is an umbrella initiative led by four actors, the Peruvian and French Presidencies of COP-20 and COP-21, respectively, the UNSGO and the UNFCCC Secretariat. These actors, known as the Quartet, mobilized multi-stakeholder initiatives, or cooperative initiatives, on several thematic areas of the climate agenda, such as cities, energy, forest, among others. The cooperative initiatives of the LPAA advanced climate pledges both for the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and the implementation of climate adaptation actions. During COP-21, these initiatives were showcased in the Plenary Room, the highest stage for Parties negotiation, to encourage states to commit to the Paris Agreement.

The COP-21 Decision, adopted in conjunction with the Paris Agreement, acknowledges the results of the LPAA (paragraph 116) and agrees to convene, building on the LPAA, a high-level event in each session of the COP during the 2016-2020 (paragraph 120). This annual event, among other functions, shall provide meaningful and regular opportunities for the effective high-level engagement of Parties, international organizations, international cooperative initiatives, and non-Party stakeholders, a term that encompasses both non-state and subnational actors (paragraph 120 d). The document also mentions the decision to appoint high-level champions to facilitate the engagement of non-Party

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<sup>1</sup> Available on <https://unfccc.int/news/ban-ki-moon-closing-address-at-cop21-action-day> - Access 19 December 2019

stakeholders in the 2016-2020 period (paragraph 121). In this sense, one can conclude that the involvement of non-Party stakeholders is institutionally secured in the UNFCCC Secretariat.

At COP-22, which had Morocco in the Presidency, a new structure was adopted: the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (MPGCA), representing an institutional home for non-state and subnational actors in the UNFCCC Secretariat (COP-22 Decision, paragraph 19). According to the UNFCCC<sup>2</sup>, the MPGCA supports the implementation of the Paris Agreement by enabling collaboration between governments and cities, regions, businesses, and investors acting on climate change.

The period between 2016 and 2020, in which the Marrakech Partnership was also active, can be defined as a challenging moment for global climate governance. Despite the worldwide prominence achieved by youth movements for climate, especially due to Greta Thunberg's leadership, from a multilateral perspective, the scenario has not kept up with the Parisian momentum. Two emblematic examples of the challenges faced were the United States of America's announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and the Brazilian decision not to host COP-25 in 2019, compounding the tremendous setbacks in the country's national environmental agenda.

Nevertheless, in the same period, the engagement of non-Party stakeholders grew steadily. Initiatives such as the coalition "We are still in", gathering subnational actors and business in the USA, and the launch of the Race to Zero Campaign by COP-25 and COP-26 Presidencies, inviting cities, states, investors and companies to adopt pledges of carbon neutrality by 2050, demonstrate that climate change has unequivocally become a multilevel governance issue.

Despite the backlashes against multilateralism in the climate agenda, the COP25 Decision to renew the mandate of the MPGCA and to continue to appoint high-level champions for 2021-2025 is noteworthy (paragraph 27). This Decision consolidates the formal interactions between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres in global climate governance. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) adopted an architecture similar to LPAA's, by establishing the Sharm El-Sheikh to Kunming Action Agenda for Nature and People for the

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<sup>2</sup>Available on <https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership-for-global-climate-action>\_Access 20 January 2020

CBD COP-15, initially scheduled for October 2020 and postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

As declared by the former UN Secretary-General in the quote that starts this chapter, there is political will for the rapprochement of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres in the UN system. There is, thus, also a need to investigate under what conditions this rapprochement, especially from a UNFCCC perspective, emerged and how its institutionalization in the long term was conceived.

In order to do that, this thesis draws on the neoliberal institutionalism scholarship from IR. It is assumed that states remain the central actors in world politics, but it is recognized that non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, can exercise authority and engage in political action (Keohane, 2012). Hence, the safeguarding and management of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, require the participation of a diverse range of actors acting in different governance levels.

To what extent does the multilevel approach for climate action impact global climate governance? What are the main drivers for the interactions between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres in global climate governance? How are the two spheres reshaped by these interactions? This thesis' main goal is to investigate the interactions between the intergovernmental sphere, focusing on the UNFCCC Secretariat and the transnational initiatives sphere, encompassing non-Party stakeholders' individual and collective climate actions. To attain this goal, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda has been selected as a case study. At first, the thesis analyzes the emergence and lifespan of the LPAA with a focus on how international organizations and Parties designed an architecture to convene cooperative initiatives in the run-up to COP21. Then, the performance of the initiatives integrating the LPAA for the 2015-2019 period is investigated. Finally, the thesis proposes an assessment framework to unpack the governance structure and accountability mechanisms of climate cooperative initiatives.

## **1.1 Orchestration as a governance mode for building bridges between the transnational and intergovernmental spheres**

The involvement of non-state actors is a distinctive feature of global climate governance (Bäckstrand et al. 2017). The UN climate diplomacy has encouraged the inclusion of non-state actors in the intergovernmental arenas through side-events, Climate

Summits, and the showcasing of non-Party stakeholders' individual and collective climate actions. Not surprisingly, one of the most interesting contemporary phenomena in this scenario is the change in the composition of institutions in global environmental governance, with a relevant presence of representatives from the private sector and civil society organizations (Abbott; Green; Keohane, 2015). That analysis is complemented by Hale (2016), who affirms that the Paris Agreement seeks to place the phenomenon of transnational climate actions at the center of the new climate regime.

In the run-up to the Paris Climate Summit in 2015, the rapprochement between the UN system and the transnational cooperative initiatives had gained more attention. This can also be attributed to the leadership of Ban Kin-moon in the 2014 UN Climate Summit in New York (Pasztor, 2016). Throughout the Paris Agreement negotiation process, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, in partnership with the COP Presidencies from Peru and France as well as with the UNSGO, connected the transnational sphere to the intergovernmental arena by establishing two platforms: (i) the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and (ii) the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) portal.

The launch of these two initiatives focused on a positive narrative not only to build momentum for the Paris Agreement but to increase climate ambition. For instance, even considering all contributions submitted by countries in their first cycle of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), global temperature would increase between 2.9°C and 3.4°C by the end of the century (UNEP, 2016). This scenario is not at all representative of the Paris Agreement goal to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. According to an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report published in 2018, climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C, and increase further with 2°C.

The difference between the path of global emissions of GHG that considers the actions and commitments made by states in the intergovernmental arena, and the path required to achieve the IPCC recommendation is called the emissions gap. Since 2010, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has been publishing annual reports with information on that difference. In the 2019 UNEP Emission Gap Report, the analysis shows that the emissions gap between implementing the unconditional NDCs and the 1.5 pathway is about 32 GtCo<sub>2</sub>. The 2019 report emphasizes the need for a “dramatic strengthening of the NDC”, meaning that countries must increase their NDC ambitions threefold to achieve the

well below 2°C goal and more than fivefold to achieve the 1.5 goal. Additionally, the UNEP Emission Gap Reports have been indicating that non-state actors, including the private sector and civil society organizations, can contribute to reducing the gap, especially in sectors such as agriculture and transportation, with actions such as deforestation reduction, energy efficiency and dissemination of renewable energies.

Chan et al. (2019) argue that non-state efforts could and do complement governmental approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation action and, more broadly, to the sustainable development agenda. The authors highlight that non-state and subnational actors' contributions could be accounted for in different approaches, for example, by providing knowledge and information for better policies, diffusing norms, building coalitions, and strengthening proactive actors. The positive role of those actors, organized in cooperative initiatives, was recognized by the intergovernmental sphere, as the Decision of COP21<sup>3</sup> "encourages Parties to work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyze efforts to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action". This rapprochement is introduced by the literature as a new model of governance based on the orchestration from international organizations towards transnational initiatives (Chan et al., 2016).

It is understood that international organizations employ orchestration when they engage intermediary actors – non-state actors, transnational networks, and other international organizations - on a voluntary basis to address targets - States or the private sector - in the pursuit of the international organization's goals (Abbott et al., 2015). Abbott et al. note that orchestration distinguishes itself for being indirect and soft. Although still poorly identified and studied as a governance mode employed by international organizations, orchestration is widely used by international organizations in parallel with the traditional attributions conferred on them, such as delegation and collaboration (Abbott et al., 2015; Dryzek, 2017; Widerberg, 2017). In other words, not only is it possible to observe the increase of non-state actors acting in the international scenario but also the recognition of their role in solving collective problems (Boran, 2019; Chan et al., 2019; Chan et al., 2015; Bulkeley et al., 2014).

At the twentieth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP20), held in Lima (predecessor to the COP that would adopt the Paris Agreement), the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) initiative was launched to increase the presence and give greater visibility to non-state actors. The LPAA was led by four actors, known as the "Quartet": the

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<sup>3</sup> Available on <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2>. Access on: 20 January 2020

Presidencies of COP20 and COP21, Peru and France respectively, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The initiative's main goal was to strengthen climate action throughout 2015, in Paris and well beyond, by (i) mobilizing robust global action towards low carbon and resilient societies; (ii) providing enhanced support to existing initiatives, such as those launched during the United Nations Secretary-General Climate Summit in September 2014; and (iii) mobilizing new partners and providing a platform for the visibility of their actions, commitments, and results in the run-up to COP21.<sup>4</sup>

Even though LPAA was an initiative aimed at non-state and subnational actors, it was regarded as the fourth pillar of COP 21, along with the themes of mitigation, adaptation, and funding. All 78 initiatives gathered under the LPAA were disseminated by the Quartet in various communication platforms, and specific events were held during COP 21 to promote them. According to Widerberg (2017), the logic behind the establishment of the LPAA rests on two elements, the proactive leadership of the Quartet members and the assumption that an increase in the visibility of climate actions by non-state actors would be conducive to the adoption of an agreement at COP 21.

Finally, there is a need for an investigation on the extent to which that recognition of transnational and subnational initiatives is also accompanied by *accountability* mechanisms. This thesis adopts as a concept of accountability the definition proposed by Grant and Keohane (2005), which states that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so. There is a recognition that more transparency and the adoption of new accountability mechanisms by non-state actors in the post-Paris Accord period are crucial to ensure the legitimacy of orchestration as a mode of governance (Bäckstrand et al, 2016). On this account, there is a gap in the literature on accountability mechanisms for case studies in which orchestration is a governance mode.

## **1.2 Research design and objectives**

The research approach draws on concepts such as (i) orchestration as defined by Abbott et al (2015); (ii) non-state actors' accountability in global climate governance as

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<sup>4</sup> Available on <https://unfccc.int/media/509508/lpaa-primer.pdf> Access on 05 January 2021

posited by Park and Kramarz (2019); (iii) and transnational climate change regime complex as proposed by Abbott (2014), and Pattberg and Widerberg (2017).

The research has three main objectives. The first objective is to analyze orchestration as a governance mode for international organizations and the interactions of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres in global climate governance. The first analytical article will reconstruct the causal chain concerning the orchestration process in the design of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, from its inception in COP-20 to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and COP-21 Decision. The second objective is to identify whether the adoption of accountability mechanisms by initiatives integrating the LPAA is correlated to their performance in the period of 2014-2019. The selected time span encompasses the period from the emergence of the LPAA and the UNFCCC mandate for Global Climate Action as on the COP-21 Decision. The third specific objective is to provide an analytical framework to assess the governance structure and accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives, and to conduct an in-depth analysis of one cooperative initiative focused on forest, the New York Declaration on Forest. The objectives previously mentioned lead to the following research questions:

1. How does orchestration as a governance mode affect global climate governance? What were the underlying conditions allowing orchestration to be institutionalized as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat?
2. How can cooperative initiatives' output performance be assessed? To what extent do different types of internal governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives, including accountability mechanisms, matter for their output performance?
3. How does the architecture of the transnational regime complex influence the accountability procedures of cooperative initiatives? Are there different accountability relationships ruling cooperative initiatives? How can these different accountability relationships be distinguished? And how can these relationships be analyzed?

To answer those questions, one has to go beyond orchestration theory. Nor does it suffice to analyze the accountability theoretical framework as proposed by Park and Kramarz (2019), focusing on two-tiers accountability for global environmental governance. Rather, it is necessary to combine a diverse set of levels of analysis: non-Party Stakeholders; states; and international organizations and their interaction in the multilateral arena.

The main hypothesis with which the researcher works is that the LPAA – an initiative conducted by the UNFCCC Secretariat, UN Secretary-General Office and the French and Peruvian diplomacy - has led to the institutionalization of orchestration as a governance mode in the UNFCCC Secretariat. The secondary hypothesis tested is whether the governance design, including accountability mechanisms, of initiatives integrating the LPAA is associated with better output performance from these initiatives.


### **1.3 Levels of analysis**

Despite introducing global governance as an amorphous term, Zürn (2013) defines a global governance system as the sum of all institutional arrangements, meaning the international, transgovernmental or transnational, beyond the nation-state. The author argues that international regimes, defined as social institutions consisting of agreed-upon and publicly announced principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas, are central to global governance. Furthermore, the author states that international organizations are the material entities and the infrastructure of the international regime.

Considering climate change as an International Relations field of study and following the reasoning advanced by Zürn, the global climate governance landscape encompasses both the intergovernmental and transnational spheres. The institutional arrangements among these material entities no longer correspond to the traditional rule of authority delegation from states to international organizations, since new governance modes, be they orchestration or collaboration, are also employed by the material entities.

The 2014 IPCC report presents a figure to plot the landscape of agreements and institutions on climate change (see Figure 1). According to the report, the lines connecting the institutions and types of agreements indicate different types of links, e.g., the UNFCCC and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concerning aviation emissions. Furthermore, the report acknowledges that the landscape is rapidly changing.


**Figure 1: Global climate governance landscape pre-Paris Agreement**



Source: IPCC Report (2014)

Indeed, since 2014, the partnerships instance representing climate cooperative initiatives has grown steadily in the global climate change landscape. But, most importantly, it is also connected to the UNFCCC process due to the institutionalization of orchestration as stated on the COP-21 Decision. In this regard, an updated version of the figure (see Figure 2 below) is proposed, with green arrows representing the orchestration process from the UNFCCC towards the members of the transnational sphere: investor governance initiatives; other certification systems; partnerships; and transnational city networks.

**Figure 2: Global climate governance landscape post-Paris Agreement**



Source: adapted by the author based on the IPCC Report (2014)

This evolving landscape of transnational initiatives in global climate governance is well represented on Figure 3 proposed by Chan et al. (2021) listing all the initiatives related to the UNFCCC process such as the LPAA, Marrakech Partnership, among other. And, those in other international processes such as the UN Climate Summits led by the UNSGO in 2014 and 2019


**Figure 3: Landscape of transnational initiatives in global climate governance**



Source: Chan et al. (2021)

Finally, figure 4 shows the three units of observations that are part of the analysis proposed by this thesis, namely states, the UNFCCC, and cooperative initiatives. The arrows represent the governance modes ruling the relationship among entities.

**Figure 4: Thesis levels of analysis and unities of observation**



Source: Elaborated by the author

## 1.4 General overview of the methodology

The type of methodology should be chosen according to the research question. To demonstrate how orchestration as a governance mode was institutionalized and the adoption of accountability mechanisms by cooperative initiatives integrating the LPAA, a mixed-methods approach will be applied in the thesis.

Process tracing will be used as a qualitative method to reconstruct the orchestration causal chain aiming at causal inferences related to the adoption of COP-21 Decision. From June to October 2019, 19 semi-structured interviews were conducted among senior experts from civil society organizations, negotiators, and former members of the Quartet. Triangulation will be applied to the interviews' content based on documental analysis and participant observation. The quantitative method – through statistical data analysis and correlation tests - will be applied to test whether the performance of cooperative initiatives, including those that are members of the LPAA, is correlated with the adoption of accountability mechanisms. The analysis draws on a database developed by the researcher gathering the following variables: categories of accountability mechanisms for cooperative initiatives based on Widerberg et al. (2019); the performance of cooperative initiatives as proposed by the ClimateSouth Project<sup>5</sup>; orchestration as advanced by Roger and Hale (2014); and the focus area of the initiative as categorized by the LPAA. Finally, the thesis proposes an analytical framework to assess the accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives and applies it to an empirical case. Table 1 summarizes the structure on which the analytical framework relies.

**Table 1: Accountability in global climate governance: an analysis of members of the cooperative initiatives' accountability vis-à-vis each initiative leading organization and/or Secretariat**

<b>Level of analysis</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Unit of analysis</b>	<b>Data for the analysis</b>
Cooperative initiatives	Who should be held accountable?	Members of the cooperative initiative	Climate South Database

<sup>5</sup> The initiative is led by four organizations: the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, the African Centre for Technology Studies, and The Energy and Resources Institute.

Available on <https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/publication/cooperative-climate-action-2013-2018> Access on 15 December 2020

	To whom are members held accountable?	Cooperative initiative leading organization and/or secretariat	Climate South Database
	What should members be held accountable for?	Pledges and/or commitments taken by the members	Climate South Database
	By what processes and standards are members held accountable?	Standard-setting or information disclosure	Based on Widerberg, Pattberg, and Brouwer (2019)
	What sanctions exist for punishing noncompliance?	Applicable only for standard setting. In this case, members risk losing the label and/or certificate.	Based on Widerberg, Pattberg, and Brouwer (2019)

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Mashaw (2006)

### 1.5 Thesis structure and general overview of the main contributions

The thesis is divided into 6 chapters and 3 of them corresponds to articles that can be read separately. This introduction corresponds to chapter 1 and sets the stage by briefly presenting the research design, level of analysis and methodological approach. Chapter 2 delves deeper into the theoretical approach of the thesis highlighting the gaps in the literature. First, it introduces the historical process of global climate governance and the emergence of transnational actors. Then, it provides a conceptual connection between orchestration as a governance mode and accountability mechanisms in the transnational sphere. Chapter 3 – corresponding to the first analytical article - presents the narrative of the design and operationalization of the LPAA and investigates how orchestration was institutionalized in the UNFCCC Secretariat. Chapter 4 – corresponding to the second analytical article - assesses the outperformance of the cooperative initiatives that are members of the LPAA in terms of internal governance arrangements, including accountability mechanisms. Chapter 5 – corresponding to the third analytical article - is an in-depth qualitative case study of The New York Declaration on Forest, one of the LPAA initiatives, based on the proposed analytical framework to assess the accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It summarizes the main findings and presents the implications for future research and policymaking.

The framework outlined above enhances the understanding of orchestration as a governance mode and its impacts on global climate governance. In empirical terms, two major contributions are offered. First, an in-depth analysis of how the intergovernmental sphere is impacted by the application of orchestration as a governance mode. Second, the identification of constraints and opportunities to enhance accountability mechanisms for transnational initiatives, based on an output-performance analysis and an analytical framework. Both contributions highlight how different units of analysis, such as the UNFCCC Secretariat, the Parties, and the non-Party stakeholders, interact in the global climate governance landscape.

Finally, this thesis also provides recommendations for policymakers and practitioners at the international level. As the study focuses on the governance arrangements of transnational initiatives, the results can potentially have practical implications for the design and adoption of accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis can also contribute to a lesson learned approach for the establishment of intergovernmental frameworks to engage non-Party stakeholders. The narrative of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda process, including its success and pitfalls, can be shared with policymakers at the international level, as orchestration has gained a more prominent role in global environmental governance.

## CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW

Tracing the history of the three United Nations Conventions adopted during the Rio-92 Conference to address biodiversity conservation, climate change, and desertification, it can be said that climate change embodies the thematic that has gained more prominence in International Politics. In this scenario, Held and Roger (2018) argue that the Paris Agreement is the most important international treaty in recent years. The high-profile status of climate change can also be observed from the academic<sup>6</sup> and social perspectives. For instance, International Relations (IR) literature has seen the development of a specific field called global climate governance.<sup>7</sup> Also, the COPs have seen a growing number of participants from civil society, an increase more substantial than any of the other UN Conventions<sup>8</sup>. More recently, youth movements have also been active worldwide demanding more ambitious climate actions.

A transformation in the way climate change is addressed at the international level since the establishment of the UNFCCC is also noticeable. The rapid increase of new organizational forms in the international arena, such as informal institutions and transnational networks, marks a dramatic change in the composition of institutions of global environmental governance (Abbott; Green; Keohane, 2015). Hale (2020) points to why transnationalism is particularly abundant in the environmental realm. The first reason is the “intermestic” – international yet domestic - nature of environmental issues. The second reason is the openness of the environmental community to subnational and non-state actors acting as experts and implementers. These actors, according to Hale (2020), acquire authority, contest outcomes, and take on governance functions in environmental politics.

The literature offers a number of different analytical lenses to investigate the non-state actors phenomenon in global environmental governance. Several authors investigated the phenomenon from a “private authority” perspective (Green, 2013), or debating voluntary programs through a club theory perspective (Potoski and Prakash, 2009) as well as numerous

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<sup>6</sup> It is noteworthy that there is a considerable imbalance between natural and social sciences research on climate change. Overland and Sovacool (2020) estimate that, from 1990 to 2018, natural and technical sciences received around 770% more funding than the social sciences and humanities for research on climate change.

<sup>7</sup> For more information about the emergence of global climate governance as a field of study: Gupta, *The History of Global Climate Governance*, Cambridge University Press, 2014

<sup>8</sup> Available on <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/statistics-on-non-party-stakeholders/statistics-on-participation-and-in-session-engagement>  
Access 20 January 2020

publications of non-state market-driven governance systems, such as third-party certification schemes (Cashore, 2002). More recently, the role of non-state and subnational actors is being analyzed as implementers of climate action (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Chan et al. 2015, Boran, 2018).<sup>9</sup>

It is perhaps not surprising that the debate opposing the public and private domains is no longer central to the studies of the transnational sphere in global climate governance. A key reason for this shift rests on how the transnational sphere has evolved. During the UNSG Climate Summit, in 2014, the transnational initiatives showcased by the United Nations Secretary-General Office not only gathered non-state actors (such as the private sector, civil society organizations or social movements) but also initiatives composed by subnational authorities, states, and international organizations, such as the World Bank or the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). For instance, the "Sustainable Energy for All" (SEforALL) initiative, launched by Ban Ki-Moon in 2011, gathers governments, the private sector, and civil society organizations to drive more action toward the achievement of the targets of the Sustainable Development Goal related to energy (SDG 7). Another example is the "The New York Declaration on Forest", encompassing subnational authorities, the private sector, the indigenous movement, and civil society organizations, and pledging for the protection and restoration of global forests. These two examples represent only a small sample of several transnational initiatives launched over the past decade bringing together states and non-state actors.

This innovative model of gathering the public and private domains under the same initiative umbrella has grown steadily since the lead-up to COP-21. This thesis argues that the increase of individual and collective climate actions by non-state and subnational actors and the rapprochement of the transnational and intergovernmental spheres in the post-Paris Agreement period are due to the orchestration of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.

Conceived by the UN Secretary-General Office, the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the Peruvian and French Presidencies of the UNFCCC COP-20 and COP-21, the LPAA showcased 78 cooperative initiatives "bringing together states and non-state actors with concrete climate commitments and actions."<sup>10</sup> The COP-21 Decision acknowledging the role

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<sup>9</sup> For more information about non-state actors in global environmental governance: O'Neill (2009), Potoski and Prakash (2009), Avant et al., 2010; Held and Hale, 2011; Cafaggi et al., 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Available on: [https://www.inbo-news.org/sites/default/files/16029-3-GB\\_plan-action-lima-paris-A4-def-light.pdf](https://www.inbo-news.org/sites/default/files/16029-3-GB_plan-action-lima-paris-A4-def-light.pdf) Access 20 January 2020

of non-Party stakeholders<sup>11</sup> and, subsequently, the launch of the Marrakech Partnership on Global Climate Action as a formal structure in the UNFCCC Secretariat confirm that the lines between the public and private spaces are blurred in global climate governance.

Taking that into consideration, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the connections between the intergovernmental sphere, mainly through the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the transnational sphere focusing on the role of orchestration and cooperative initiatives. Based on emerging literature that breaks with the public-private dichotomy and stipulates the hybridity of climate multilateralism, the goal is to understand how global climate governance is structured and how the connectors of its architecture, namely governance modes such as orchestration, influence the intergovernmental and transnational spheres.

Falkner (2016) argues that the adoption of the Paris Agreement turned into a new milestone for environmental multilateralism by restoring the role of the UNFCCC as a negotiating arena. Furthermore, Hale (2016) emphasizes that the Paris Conference consolidated the transition of the climate regime from a "regulatory" to a "catalytic and facilitative" model. The key component of this change was the fact that the intergovernmental regime includes climate initiatives of non-state and subnational actors. Consequently, one of the central arguments advanced by this thesis is that the participation of Parties, international organizations and subnational actors in the transnational sphere and its rapprochement with the intergovernmental sphere have promoted a new and additional *raison d'être* for the UNFCCC Secretariat.

This literature review chapter is divided in four sections. Firstly, it presents an introduction to the emergence of global climate governance as an IR field of study. Secondly, it describes the Lima-Paris Action Agenda as a high-level orchestration process. The third section discusses how orchestration as a governance mode can expose the accountability challenges in global climate governance. Finally, it illustrates the knowledge gap that this thesis aims to address.

## **2.1- Unpacking the concept of global climate governance**

While acknowledging the concepts of polycentric governance (Jordan et al., 2015, Ostrom, 2010) and fragmented architecture of global governance (Biermann et al. 2009) for

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<sup>11</sup> Hale (2016) explains that the term non-Party stakeholders 'was adopted as a demand from subnational authorities, such as cities and regions, that stated their efforts were not represented in the terminology "non-state actors" as they are *per se* public actors'.

their explanation on the role of non-state actors in global climate governance, this thesis draws on Abbott's (2014) definition of transnational regime complex for climate change and the concept of hybrid multilateralism (Backstrand et al., 2017; Küyper et al., 2017). In order to contextualize these concepts, a brief introduction on the intergovernmental and transnational spheres is necessary.

### **2.1.1 - The UNFCCC Secretariat at the heart of the intergovernmental sphere**

After almost three decades, the decisions adopted during the Rio-92 Conference are still one of the strongest pillars of global climate governance. This is particularly the case for the climate change and biodiversity conservation agendas, as the UNFCCC and the UNCBD are still central to the intergovernmental sphere.

The UNFCCC is a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) with a near-universal membership of 197 countries that are called Parties to the Convention. MEAs are considered a legally binding agreement between several states and many terms can be used to designate them, such as Convention, Agreement, Protocol, Covenant or Treaty. The "framework conventions" were conceived to provide decision-making and organizational frameworks for the adoption of subsequent complementary agreements and contain obligations of general institutional nature.<sup>12</sup> Entered into force on 21 March 1994<sup>13</sup>, the UNFCCC goals are stated in the Convention Article 2:

“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (UNFCCC, Article 2)

In the principles presented in the Convention Article 3, it is stated that "the Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, based on equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated

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<sup>12</sup> [https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/negotiators\\_handbook.pdf](https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/negotiators_handbook.pdf) Access 20 January 2020

<sup>13</sup> <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change> Access 20 January 2020

responsibilities and respective capabilities." Moreover, developed countries should take the lead in implementing climate actions.

The UNFCCC Secretariat is headquartered in Bonn, Germany. According to Article 8 of the UNFCCC, its main functions are (i) to make arrangements for sessions of the COP and its subsidiary bodies; (ii) to compile and transmit reports submitted to it; (iii) to facilitate assistance to the Parties; (iv) to prepare reports on its activities and present them to the COPs; (v) to ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies; (vi) to enter, under the overall guidance of the COP, into such administrative and contractual arrangements; (vii) to perform the other secretariat functions specified in the Convention and any of its protocols and such other functions as may be determined by the COP.<sup>14</sup>

The Convention establishes in its Article 7 that the Conference of the Parties is the supreme body responding to the regular review of the Convention implementation and any related legal instruments that may be adopted. Additionally, the COPs aim to facilitate the coordination of measures adopted by Parties to address climate change and its effects, and establish subsidiary bodies for the implementation of the Convention. The rules of procedure of the COP were adopted at its first session, held in Berlin in 1995.

Regarding the UNFCCC, the COP Presidency is elected to preside over the work of a COP, meaning a one-year cycle, and has many relevant functions to the negotiation process, such as to allow or refuse the discussion and consideration of proposals, consider amendments to proposals, decide when to put a question to the vote, determine the order of voting on proposed amendments, designate the Chairs or co-Chairs of working groups. The Chair, or the President, is elected by all Parties to the COP and the position rotates among the five UN regional groups.

The UNFCCC is the parent treaty of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The COP also serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), in which states that are not Parties to the Agreement participate as observers. The CMA's main goal is to oversee the Paris Agreement implementation and make decisions to promote its effective implementation.

Additionally, the UNFCCC comprises two permanent subsidiary bodies, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body

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<sup>14</sup> <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf> Access on 19 January 2020

for Implementation (SBI), and other ad hoc subsidiary bodies established by the COP or the CMA to address specific issues. The SBSTA assists the governing bodies, COP, and CMA through the provision of timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters. The SBI assists the governing bodies in the assessment and review of the implementation of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. In addition, the SBI is the body that considers the biennial work programs for the Secretariat. There are also constituted bodies, such as the Adaptation Committee, and entities operating financial mechanisms to provide financial support to the activities and projects of developing country Parties that are represented by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

Keohane and Victor (2010) coined the notorious term regime complex for climate change to describe a "loosely coupled set of specific regimes" that has advantages, such as adaptability and flexibility, in comparison to a potential comprehensive regime. According to the authors, the elements of the regime complex, which might sometimes be conflicting and sometimes be mutually reinforcing, are the result of states' choices at different times and on different specific issues. For instance, the authors highlight that the efforts to create climate institutions cluster around the UNFCCC. However, none is organized in a hierarchy. Having said that, it is argued that the UNFCCC's role is still relevant as it could act as an umbrella, with the possibility to evolve to become the core of an integrated regulatory system.

The global climate governance landscape has changed considerably since Keohane and Victor's publication. However, the central role of the UNFCCC in the intergovernmental arena remained, especially with the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The diplomatic epic failure to adopt a new legal instrument in 2009 during COP-15 Copenhagen shifted the intergovernmental approach from top-down to bottom-up (Held and Roger, 2018). The Paris Agreement is built on a pledge and review system conceived in the lead-up to the COP-21. In this system, states submitted in advance of the Paris Climate Summit their "Intended Nationally-Determined Contributions" (INDCs), which became "Nationally Determined Contributions" once the Paris Agreement is individually ratified. Each Party voluntarily pledged, registered and communicated through NDCs their contribution to the Paris Agreement common goal of "holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Article 2). According to Pauw and Klein (2020), NDCs are "near-universal, medium-term, country-driven climate action plans under the Paris Agreement, formulated within the

context of bounded self-differentiation". Finally, Held and Roger 2018 affirm that the Paris Agreement architecture provides a significant role to non-Party stakeholders that can implement climate actions, mutually reinforcing those led by states. The authors defend that interactions between states, non-state actors and subnational actors are needed at the domestic level, in order to ensure a movement towards a decarbonized economy, as well as at the international level, to facilitate a more dynamic governance ecosystem.

### **2.1.2- The emergence and consolidation of the transnational sphere**


The straightforward definition of the transnational sphere contrasts it with the intergovernmental sphere. Presumably, the transnational sphere would capture all non-state actors' actions. For instance, a company pledges that will have 100% of renewable energy source in its operations or a city can join a transnational initiative pledging to reduce its GHG emissions. All the commitments that can generate emissions reductions and adaptation and resilience benefits can be called as climate actions. These pledges can be made individually, for example an investor decide to decarbonize its portfolio or when a non-state or subnational actor decide to become a member of a cooperative initiative such as states and regions members of the Under2Coalition pledging to reduce their GHG emissions.

According to Andonova et al. (2009), transnational governance consists of transnational actors operating in a political sphere in which public and private actors interact across national borders and political jurisdictions. As stated in the introduction for this thesis, the UNFCCC COP-21 Decision employs the concept of "non-Party stakeholders", which encompasses non-state actors and adds yet another layer of complexity to transnational action: subnational actors. Moreover, the global climate governance literature also describes coalitions, platforms and other innovative governance arrangements gathering two or more non-state actors, subnational actors, states, or even international organizations, as cooperative initiatives (Chan et. al. 2018; New Climate Institute, 2019; UNFCCC, 2019). In this thesis, the definition of the transnational sphere comprises all cooperative initiatives and individual climate actions pledged by non-Party stakeholders.

The debate about transnationalism gains new layers due to non-state actors' involvement in global climate governance (Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Küyper et al 2017). UN climate diplomacy has been a pioneer in the inclusion of non-state actors, facilitating their access and participation in negotiation processes (Bäckstrand et al., 2017). Hale (2016) points

out that the dynamic of transnational initiatives was neither perceived by United Nations officials as competition nor as an alternative to UNFCCC; but rather as a way to stimulate Member States in their efforts to achieve their goals. The figure below, from Morin et al. (2020), shows the cumulative growth of climate cooperative initiatives from 1990 to 2018 based on data by the UNEP and UNE-DTU partnership Climate Initiatives Platform (CIP). In order to be featured at the CIP, an initiative should fulfill the following criteria: (i) include several non-state actors (it may also include states and international organizations) taking voluntary action; (ii) have as their objectives to reduce GHG emissions or to increase resilience; (iii) have an international scope or the potential for significant impact on a global scale; (iv) have a focal point. As illustrated by the figure 5, the growth of new initiatives (light blue) coincides with the Paris Climate Summit in 2015.

**Figure 5: Growth of climate initiatives (1990-2018)**



Source: Morin et al. (2020)

Consequently, the concept of hybrid multilateralism describes a growing trend in global climate governance of bringing together the domains of multilateral diplomacy and transnational climate actions (Bäckstrand et al, 2017). For the authors, hybrid multilateralism, institutionalized by the Paris Agreement, can be defined as the following:

(...) hybrid multilateralism denotes a bottom-up climate policy architecture that combines voluntary pledging by states with an international transparency framework for periodic review and ratcheting-up of ambition, in which non-state actors play important roles as implementers, experts, and watchdogs. Second, hybrid

multilateralism refers to an increasingly dynamic interplay between multilateral and transnational climate action, where the UNFCCC Secretariat has taken a role as facilitator, or orchestrator, of a multitude of non-state climate initiatives and actions. (Bäckstrand et al., 2017. P. 574)

As matter of fact, the hybrid nature of the Paris Agreement is broadly accepted by the literature (Table 2). From a state-led perspective, this means a change from an exclusively top-down approach, with emissions reductions targets defined at the international level (such as the Kyoto Protocol), to the implementation of a bottom-up approach with the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that Parties submit to the UNFCCC in the framework of the Paris Agreement.<sup>15</sup> However, the new rules set by the Paris Agreement does not exclude governance from the intergovernmental arena. Au the contraire, it expands the recognition to the transnational arena and the voluntary commitments from Parties.

**Table 2: A literature review of the hybrid nature of the Paris Agreement**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Main argument</b>
Rockström et al. (2016)	The Paris Agreement hybrid nature as a combination of top-down elements (limiting global warming at well below 2°C) and countries' obligation under the NDCs with a polycentric bottom-up approach.
Van Asselt et al. (2016)	The Paris Agreement embodies a hybrid model of international climate policy, with a mix of bottom-up and top-down elements, in which Parties are required to submit a non-legally binding NDC every five years.
Bodansky and Diringer (2014)	In the lead up to Paris, the authors state that the agreement to be adopted would have a hybrid quality, which seeks to balance national flexibility and international discipline.
Dimitrov (2016)	The combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches to global climate governance from a state-led perspective characterizes the Paris Agreement.
Stua (2017)	The Paris Agreement as a 'hybrid, holistic, harmonized' model of multilevel climate governance.
Bäckstrand et al. (2017)	Hybrid multilateralism was institutionalized through the Paris Agreement for two reasons. First, a mix of bottom-up flexibility and top-down monitoring, reporting and review. And the intensified interplay between state and non-state actors in the new landscape of international climate cooperation.
Küyper et al. (2017)	The Paris Agreement is a hybrid of state and non-state action, exemplified and solidified through NDCs and orchestration.

Source: elaborated by the author based on Küyper et al. (2017)

<sup>15</sup> For more information about the NDC: Höene et al.,2016; Keohane, Oppenheimer, 2016; Bodansky, 2016; Doelle 2016; Röser et al. 2020.

As this thesis positions itself within the branch of research that focuses on the interactions of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres in global climate governance, it has adopted arguments both by Bäckstrand et al. (2017) and Küyper et al. (2017) for the hybridity in the post-Paris era. These authors acknowledge the change in how state-inter governmental dynamics work in a scenario ruled by the Paris Agreement, mainly through bottom-up pledges advanced by each country's NDC. But the authors also integrate the transnational sphere, recognizing the role of the UNFCCC as an orchestrator of non-state actors.

Furthermore, Küyper et al. (2017) argue that the Paris Agreement establishes a hybrid architecture that amends previous roles and creates new opportunities for non-state actors vis-à-vis states. In line with this argument, this thesis argues that the rapprochement of the transnational sphere cannot be considered as a competition. Rather, the transnational sphere should be understood through its complementary supporting role helping states fill the GHG emission gap, in addition to the roles played by non-state actors already identified by the literature, as knowledge brokers and watchdogs, for instance. Held and Roger (2018) argue that the Paris model's success is likely to depend on the development of what they call a "dynamic global climate governance ecosystem". At the core of this "ecosystem" are the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. They go even further, stating that states and non-Party stakeholders must have high levels of confidence in the UNFCCC itself to advance domestic policymaking. However, that core also depends on a range of complementary actions by national governments and non-Party stakeholders.

“In short, to succeed, the UNFCCC must be oriented towards enhancing the actions of state and non-Party stakeholders, whose actions must, in turn, be adapted to work within and implement the new institutional context and commitments that the Paris Agreement has created. The Paris model of climate governance recognizes that these kinds of potentially mutually reinforcing actions will be required to move the global economy towards a decarbonized state. And, among nonstate actors, important strides have been made as well, helping to facilitate a more dynamic governance ecosystem.”  
(Held and Roger, 2018, p. 535)

This positive tone is also defended by Abbott (2014) when proposing the term "transnational regime complex for climate change", which builds on the classic regime complex definition proposed by Keohane and Victor (2010). Abbott (2014) explains that a

governance innovation is needed in a multilevel structure, enhancing the interaction of inter-state and transnational actions by helping to fill governance gaps, influencing the behavior of governmental and societal actors, and generating governance innovations that stimulate and inform inter-state negotiations. Finally, scholars have developed theories to explain the engagement of transnational actors in multilateral negotiations, as they are important in shaping public perceptions via the media, drawing on either expertise or their ability to represent broader social interests (Hale, 2020).

## **2.2- The unprecedented governance arrangement of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda**

During the Paris Agreement negotiation process, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC promoted the connection of the transnational sphere and the intergovernmental arena by establishing two platforms: (i) the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and (ii) the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA).

The LPAA was launched during the UNFCCC COP20 in Peru and it was orchestrated, since its inception, by the "Quartet": the United Nations Secretary-General Office – bringing its experience from the UN Climate Summit; the UNFCCC Secretariat; the COP Peruvian Presidency; and the French incoming COP Presidency. According to Laurent Fabius, former French Foreign Affairs Minister: "The idea behind the LPAA is simple: the commitment of governments is key to fight climate change, but they cannot be the only ones to take action. The private sector, local governments, investors, NGOs, citizens, everyone must join their efforts in the same direction."<sup>16</sup> In this sense, the LPAA's purpose was to catalyze and showcase non-state actors' climate actions.

While NAZCA consisted of a self-pledge platform gathering more than 11.000 climate actions from single instances (such as a company or a municipality) at the time of COP-21 (Widerberg and Stripple, 2016), LPAA gathered 78 high-level cooperative initiatives on twelve themes related to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Widerberg (2017) argues that the LPAA's creation was expedited by a proactive leadership at the executive level among the partners in the Quarter; and its biggest feat to date has been the mobilization of the UN system and affiliated organizations, cooperative initiatives, non-state and subnational actors, and governments toward a common goal.

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<sup>16</sup>Available on <https://unfccc.int/media/509508/lpaa-primer.pdf> Access 22 January 2020

According to Chan et al. (2019), positive arguments for non-state actions in global environmental governance can be clustered in four categories: (a) "the more the better", (b) "everybody wins", (c) "everybody does their part", and (d) "more will bring more". The arguments are presented as neither mutually exclusive nor expressive of single ideas. In general, the authors argue that non-state action can help close gaps in governance, provide knowledge and information for better policies, deliver scalable and replicable solutions, and stimulate more action by diffusing norms, building coalitions, and strengthening proactive actors. However, some issues are indicated as a risk to be considered in the analysis, such as a lack of clear accounting procedures for data aggregation, regional imbalances regarding where climate actions are taking place, and the need for high-level political support for their growth. Additionally, other studies conclude that a multiplicity of roles can interfere in the actors' ability to demand accountability from states and to criticize arrangements (van der Ven et al. 2016; Küyper et al. 2017). Ultimately, thus, there is no consensus in the literature on the role of subnational and non-state actors as implementers of climate action.

The contributive role of those actors, organized in cooperative initiatives, was recognized by the intergovernmental sphere, as the Decision of COP-21[1] "encourages Parties to work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyze efforts to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action". In a similar vein, Hale affirms that the Paris Agreement seeks to place the phenomenon of transnational climate actions at the center of the new climate regime. And Küyper et al. (2017) argue that orchestration has become a key concept in global climate governance.

It is understood that international organizations employ orchestration when they engage intermediary actors - non-state actors, transnational networks, and other international organizations - voluntarily to address targets - states or the private sector - in the pursuit of the international organization's goals (Abbott et al., 2015). As a result, it is possible to differentiate the orchestrating act from the traditional governance hierarchy, or the practices of delegation, by two fundamental characteristics: it is indirect and *soft*. In orchestration, organizations act through intermediaries, who may be actors in civil society or even other international organizations, and with no control over them to reach targets, which may be states or the private sector (Abbott et al, 2015). By adopting orchestration as a mode of governance, international organizations seek to overcome budget, technical expertise, and execution capacity gaps. Abbott et al. (2015) postulate two types of orchestration: "managing states" and "circumventing states".

In the "managing states" model, international organizations act as orchestrators of intermediaries, so they can shape the preferences of the state. In turn, by employing the "bypassing states" mode, international organizations can convene intermediaries to influence how the private sector conducts its activities without the intervention of the state. Finally, it is fundamental to highlight the premise that states can encourage orchestration when the goals are clearly agreed, but both states and international organizations, either jointly or separately, have gaps in their ability to fulfill these goals.

Turning to the governance relationships that rule the multiple actors in global climate governance, Avant et. al. (2010) present the principal-agent debate, in which an actor, the principal, delegates to a subordinate, the agent, the authority to resolve one or multiple issues. In the field of International Relations, this theoretical framework is normally used for the analysis of the delegation of authority from states to international organizations.

In this sense, Abbot et al. (2018) highlight the "governor's dilemma", in which it is assumed that no governor, or even a regulator, has sufficient capacity to govern alone; thus, generating a demand for the engagement of agents. These authors expand the debate on the principal-agent theory, which would have delegation as its governance mode, and present the governor's dilemma for indirect governance modes, such as cooptation and orchestration.

According to the authors, indirect governance arrangements have a central problem of power. The intermediaries (agents) who have skills such as expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity to achieve the governor's objectives (principal) are difficult to control. On the other hand, an increase in the governor's control constrains the competence of intermediaries. The governor's dilemma can then be described as follows: if it emphasizes control, it limits the competence of the intermediary and runs the risk of political failure; if the skills of the intermediary are emphasized, there is a risk of failure of control. According to the authors, control is defined as a set of instruments that the governor can use to shape and restrict the behavior of intermediaries so that they follow the governor's objectives. Finally, the authors point out that in orchestration arrangements the distinction between governor and intermediaries may be more difficult to identify when considering that neither party has authority over the other.

Abbott et al. (2018) also point to potential difficulties that can arise in modes of governance based on orchestration.

Governors choose orchestration to extend their authority, limit their costs, and gain other benefits of intermediary independence. But governor support may induce intermediaries to shift their focus from independently pursuing (aligned) policy goals to winning contracts, grants, and endorsements (Cooley and Ron 2002): NGOs focus on international donors rather than development work; rebel groups focus on foreign sponsors rather than military preparations. Intermediaries lose the relationships, skills, nimbleness, and policy commitment that originally made them attractive. (Abbott et al. 2018, p. 20)

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Lima-Paris Action Agenda case constitutes a well-defined orchestration arrangement concerning the roles of orchestrator/governor and intermediary/LPAA initiatives. The next chapter will present the all the processes that led to the establishment of the LPAA.

### **2.3- Accountability in the transnational climate change regime complex**

The orchestration led by the Quartet granted public recognition to cooperative initiatives for their role as climate action implementers. This dissertation agrees with Bäckstrand and Küyper's (2017) argument that transparency and accountability mechanisms for non-state actors are crucial for the legitimacy of orchestration as a governance mode and, more importantly, for the UNFCCC Secretariat.

This dissertation draws on the accountability concept established by Grant and Keohane (2005) which is also picked up by Pattberg and Widerberg (2017) and Kramarz and Park (2019):

The concept of accountability implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so. (Grant; Keohane, 2005. p. 29)

Grant and Keohane (2005) defend that different accountability mechanisms could be applied to regulate global powers in a manner compatible with democratic principles. The authors identified seven accountability mechanisms already present in world politics that could be applied both to the intergovernmental and transnational spheres. These mechanisms fit into two theoretical models of accountability, namely participation and delegation (Table 3). In brief, under this framework, multilateral organizations and states are the only types of organizations in world politics constantly subjected to delegated as well as participatory accountability models.

**Table 3: Accountability mechanisms in world politics**

<b>Accountability mechanism</b>	<b>Short definition</b>	<b>Theoretical model of accountability</b>
Hierarchical	Accountability holders can restraint career opportunities. E.g. leaders of an organization – subordinate official	Delegation
Supervisory	Accountability holders can restraint the power-wielder's ability to act, loss of office is possible. E.g. states - multilateral organizations	Delegation
Fiscal	Accountability holders can impose budget restrictions. E.g. states - multilateral organizations	Delegation
Legal	Accountability holders can demand procedures and/or criminal penalties. E.g. international courts - individuals	Delegation
Market	Accountability holders can restrain access to capital. E.g. financial institutions - firms	Participation
Peer	Accountability holders can promote negative effects on network ties/support. E.g. transnational networks – their leaders	Participation
Public reputational	Accountability holders can diffuse positive or negative effects on reputation E.g. individuals - firms	Participation

Source: elaborated by the author based on Grant and Keohane (2005)

However, global climate governance has evolved over the past two decades, welcoming more and more the participation of non-state actors. Consequently, the framework advanced by Grant and Keohane is necessary but not sufficient to explain how accountability relations are established when orchestration is the employed governance.

Avant et al. (2010) point out that the rise of multiple actors with authority in world politics does not necessarily entail the reduction of state power. *Au contraire*, in some cases, it can imply more power to the state as global governance structures are informal. Additionally, the authors shed light on the importance of new research focusing on accountability. That is because the issue is not necessarily the lack of accountability, but the different accountability mechanisms that actors in global governance might adopt. The authors conclude by stating that new analysis on the demands of accountability can reveal information about how actors exercise power and how to understand their responsibilities and missions.

This view seems to be consistent with Kramarz and Park's (2019) argument that global governance does not necessarily lack of accountability. The authors go even further and

present an accountability trap in global environmental governance: there has been a growth of accountability mechanisms to hold those governing the global environment to account; such growth is based on the assumption that this will improve governance and therefore environmental outcomes – while environmental degradation continues (Park and Kramarz, 2019). Applying the rationale of multiple actors engaged in public, private, voluntary, and hybrid global environmental institutions, the authors defend that this scenario influences the framing of the actors' environmental priorities and how their accountability is devised and measured. They propose that accountability should be interrogated at two tiers of governance: the design and the execution of environmental interventions.

We have argued throughout that accountability can be a meaningful tool for environmental action only if it is incorporated in the first tier of environmental governance, where agenda and goal-setting take place: from the understanding and framing of problems to formulating alternatives and choosing appropriate strategies for action (Kramarz and Park, 2016, p. 19).

Considering the need to expand the research about accountability mechanisms in global climate governance, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda is a prolific case study, as it allows us to investigate the two building blocks proposed by Park and Kramarz (2016) and Kramarz and Park (2019). As for tier 1, to what extent accountability mechanisms were taken into consideration by the Quartet while orchestrating high-level cooperative initiatives? How did the Quartet envision the relationship between the cooperative's initiatives and the UNFCCC Secretariat after COP-21? Regarding Tier 2, how can an accountability relationship be established between the orchestrator and cooperative initiatives encompassing a variety of governance arrangements and institutional functions? Are there any accountability mechanisms, such as Grant and Keohane's peer and public reputation mechanisms, governing the relationship of cooperative initiatives towards the orchestrator?

Küyper et. al. (2017) point out the difficulty to conceptualize accountability in relation to orchestration, as the lack of a principal-agent dynamic muddles accountability relationships. In this sense, the exercise of clarifying the levels of analysis and units to be studied becomes even more crucial due to the governance dynamics to which the orchestrator, in this case, the UNFCCC Secretariat, is submitted to. In the same paper, the authors state that:

Given that the contributions of non-state actors through orchestration portals and other cooperative initiatives are often said to be necessary to close an emission gap

in the Paris Agreement, maintaining accountability will be vital to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. This should entail accountability of both the orchestrator (to set up and maintain portals with quantifiable and comparable information to help avoid double counting) and accountability of targets (to ensure they make efforts to live up to their commitments). (Küyper et al. 2017, p. 11)

As presented above, and assuming accountability represents a double relationship (accountability holder/accountability wielder), the authors do not specify the considered pair for the accountability analysis meaning who is accountable to whom. It can be questioned whether the authors were willing to emphasize the need for the UNFCCC, as the orchestrator, to be held accountable to the international community as a whole. However, it is argued that the UNFCCC Secretariat as orchestrator should be held accountable to the Parties and under a delegation governance framework. In this sense, the principal-agent relationship between the UNFCCC and the Parties is clear, and the Parties could withhold the UNFCCC Secretariat mandate. This debate is further developed in Chapter 3, which analyzes the delegation chain between Parties and the UNFCCC Secretariat that has led to the adoption of orchestration as one of the UNFCCC's governance modes in the COP-21 Decision.

The other accountability issue raised by Küyper et al (2017) is related to targets, meaning the climate action pledges taken by intermediary actors in the orchestration process. As for the LPAA, targets were pledged by cooperative initiatives. In this case, the double relationship of accountability could be understood in two senses. First, one could look at the pair "cooperative initiative-orchestrator". Second, and considering that cooperative initiatives are formed by at least two members, it is also possible to consider "members of the cooperative initiatives-leading organization of each initiative" as an accountability pair of analysis.

Finally, Park and Kramarz (2019) recognize the limits of accountability as a potential source for institutional performance. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to identify how actors and cooperative initiatives outputs lead to better environmental outcomes. A discussion about cooperative outputs is further developed in chapter 4.

As summarized in this chapter, orchestration as a mode of governance can be analyzed through the lens of the governor's dilemma. Intermediary actors in the orchestration act as agents without the risk of loss of authority. Thus, the investigation of the existence and use of accountability mechanisms by intermediary actors vis-à-vis the orchestrator presents itself as an object of study for a better understanding of the governance relationship between these actors. Given that, when intermediary actors are organized as cooperative initiatives,

as is the case of the LPAA, the question about the accountability mechanisms ruling these governance arrangements is also raised.

#### **2.4- Knowledge gap and research relevance**

Several strands of IR literature advance the debate about accountability as a democratic value in global governance (Held, 2004; Moravcski, 2004; Scholte, 2004; Keohane et. al 2009; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014). For instance, Bexell et al. (2010) address the potential role of transnational actors in the process of democratizing global governance. However, it is not the purpose of this dissertation to propose a normative debate about the potential relationship between the adoption of accountability mechanisms by transnational actors and the democratic deficit in global governance. In a similar vein, Grant and Keohane (2005) argue that we should resist the temptation to narrow the issue of accountability to that of democratic control; as the aspiration should be to create and support various kinds of accountability systems in world politics based on the possibilities within the democratic theory. This research positions itself within the empirical branch of the literature by examining and discussing how accountability mechanisms are crafted and implemented for the specific case in which an international organization employs orchestration in global climate governance.

As for orchestration as a governance mode, Bäckstrand and Küyper (2017) argue that as the UNFCCC involves the exercise of public authority, decisions should be democratically legitimated. In this sense, the authors assess the orchestration for the LPAA and NAZCA against a framework of democratic values: equal participation, deliberation, accountability, and transparency. For both orchestration processes led by the UNFCCC Secretariat, transparency and accountability mechanisms are nascent at best, nonexistent at worst. Further, the authors propose that future scholars should attempt to isolate how different democratic values, such as accountability, contribute to the enhancement of governance function in the post-Paris era. Widerberg (2017) also highlights the existing knowledge gap about orchestration. The author argues that the literature has been addressing orchestration as a dependent variable; and new research should address it as an independent variable. By considering Widerberg's (2017) note on the need to treat orchestration as an independent variable, this dissertation will discuss to what extent the LPAA orchestration process can be associated with the adoption and/or development of accountability mechanisms by cooperative initiatives vis-à-vis the orchestrator.

Furthermore, this dissertation is based on the assumption that more prominent role of non-state actors as introduced by the hybrid multilateralism concept. According to Küyper et al. (2017), there is a need to balance more orchestrated contributions and the ability to monitor the contributions through accountability mechanisms in a hybrid multilateralism model. The academic debate has addressed the effectiveness of cooperative initiatives through an approach focused on the delivery of their promises (Hsu et al., 2016; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2017; Chan et al. 2018; New Climate Institute et al., 2019). This research aims to fill the gap about how governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives, including accountability mechanisms, influence their performance by providing an empirical analysis of the LPAA initiatives.

Finally, as stated by Hale (2020), the merging of intergovernmental and transnational governance in global environmental politics represents a ‘fascinating evolution’. This research can, thus, be justified by criteria of social relevance and practical implications. As for the first criteria, climate change must integrate the research agenda of social scientists. As the latest IPCC report (2018) highlights, the continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause more warming and long-lasting changes to all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, invasive, and irreversible impacts on people and ecosystems. This will require more responsive public policies and new solutions from governments and non-state actors. Secondly, practical implications pertain to the necessity of better understanding governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives acting not only as experts and watchdogs but also as regulators and implementers of climate action.

## CHAPTER 3 - THE LIMA-PARIS ACTION AGENDA AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ORCHESTRATION AS A GOVERNANCE MODE

*“In the run up to COP20 in Peru, a small and diverse advisory group – led by Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, then Environment Minister – made a striking observation: at the COPs, the business conferences took place on one side of town, while negotiators met on the other. No wonder so few negotiators knew of the groundswell of business support for climate action. So we proposed something quite controversial. Let’s get the two groups together, so leaders from across sectors could share insights into what was possible if we aligned international policy with business investment and civil society action. The idea didn’t go down well with everybody. Some felt the UN negotiations should be reserved only for countries. But it worked. A growing number could see that, without all the stakeholders involved, it would be impossible to show the rapid growth in support for an ambitious climate outcome.”<sup>17</sup> Paul Polman, former CEO of Unilever.*

### 3.1 Introduction

The words of Paul Polman in a testimonial regarding the negotiation process of the Paris Agreement illustrate how rapidly the landscape of global climate governance has changed since COP21. The consolidated presence of non-state and subnational actors is one of the critical features on this shift. What were the conditions for the rapprochement of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres? How did orchestration gain prominence as a governance mode for the UNFCCC Secretariat? Most importantly, what were the underlying causes for the institutionalization of orchestration on COP21 Decision? The analysis in this chapter rebuilds the steps that led to the institutionalization of the orchestration as one of the governance modes in the UNFCCC Secretariat, from the emergence of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda to the consolidation of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action.

The researcher argues that the cause of the institutionalization of orchestration is its employment as an ad-hoc governance mode by the UNFCCC Secretariat in the run-up to COP21. The first causal mechanism is built on the fact that the UNFCCC Secretariat adopted the orchestration in partnership with the Presidencies of the UNFCCC COP-20 and 21, respectively Peru and France, and the United Nations Secretary-General Office, hereafter called the “Quartet”, creating the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA). The UNFCCC Secretariat institutional choice was supported and legitimized both by Parties and the UN system at its highest-level. The second causal mechanism reveals that the Quartet was able

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<sup>17</sup> <https://profiles.paris.com/profiles/> Access on 20 December 2020

to get Parties buy-in for the LPAA due to the fact the platform gathered high-level initiatives comprising non-state actors (civil society organizations, businesses, and investors), subnational governments, countries, and international organizations. The third causal mechanism relies on the fact that the LPAA initiatives were designed to deliver their climate actions beyond December 2015 and that the Quartet convened Parties' support in the final moments of the COP21 negotiations. In conjunction, the three mechanisms resulted in the outcome of the COP21 Decision mentioning the role of the non-Party stakeholders and establishing a mandate for the High-Level Climate Champions as well as the subsequent launch of the Marrakech Partnership in 2016.

This chapter's contributions are threefold. First, it provides empirical evidence on orchestration as a governance mode, contributing to the debates about global climate governance. Second, the analysis provides theoretical insights unveiling under which conditions orchestration was institutionalized in the UNFCCC Secretariat. Third, the chapter conceptualizes that since 2015 the UNFCCC Secretariat and the High-Level champions have been implementing a “responsive orchestration”, meaning that they are expanding their orchestration techniques by acting as knowledge brokers between non-Party stakeholders and Parties.

The chapter is divided as follows. The first section describes the process-tracing method utilized as well as the data-collection process. The second section provides a description of the political process of bringing the transnational sphere closer to the intergovernmental arena. The third section presents an analysis of the LPAA and its orchestration process. The fourth section analyzes the causal mechanisms and the outcome of the institutionalization of the orchestration as one of the UNFCCC Secretariat governance modes. Finally, the last section debates the implications of this outcome to global climate governance.


### **3.2 - Methodology**

Considering the need to understand the political choices and institutional arrangements that led to the institutionalization of the orchestration as one of the UNFCCC Secretariat's governance modes, process tracing was selected as the most appropriate method to investigate the ‘casual mechanisms in a single case research design’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).

As described by Beach and Pedersen (2013), this method allows us to unveil the theoretical process of the causal relations between X and Y, and in ‘particular how causal forces are transmitted through a series of interlocking parts of a causal mechanism to produce an outcome’. It is, thus, assumed that X by itself is unable to produce Y. When applying this reasoning to this chapter, it can be inferred that orchestration in the lead-up to COP 21 was unable to ensure the institutionalization of orchestration in the Decision of COP21 by itself. In other words, there were causal mechanisms linking the cause to the outcome. Moreover, the authors differentiate between three variants of process tracing: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining outcomes.

The ‘explaining outcome process tracing’ represents the “ambition to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case-centric than theory oriented” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). The case study in this chapter fits the explaining outcome process tracing variant, as it required a set of mechanisms that worked together and that were specific to the context of the LPAA.

**Figure 6: Explaining outcome process tracing**



Source: elaborated by the author

The empirical material for this chapter consists of a diverse set of sources: (i) notes from participant observation in UNFCCC Secretariat meetings about Global Climate Action in 2019, (ii) UNFCCC COP-25 official and side-events, (iii) data from 19 semi-structured elite interviews, (iv) documents from the UN and other sources of grey literature. Nonetheless, the interviews and their qualitative content analysis are the most extensive source of primary data. The interviews were transcribed, anonymized, and triangulated with notes from the participatory observation and information collected from official documents and press interviews.

One critical step in the data collection was the participatory observation that allowed me to analyze *in loco* the UNFCCC Secretariat acting as an orchestrator. Professor Sander Chan, the researcher supervisor during her doctoral exchange period in Germany, is one of the leading researchers on the “Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions”. Thanks to him, the researcher was invited to participate in events about the Global Climate Action at the UNFCCC Secretariat. The events gathered the “Global Climate Action community”, which encompasses employees from the UNFCCC Secretariat, former and current Global Climate Action champions, diplomats from countries known as “Friends of Climate Action”, and representatives from academia, civil society organizations, and cooperative initiatives. It is also noteworthy that during period at DIE, the researcher was co-organizer of a two-day workshop called “Global Climate Action: beyond 2020” which also gathered the same representatives from the GCA community. As one of the event’s moderators, the researcher had the opportunity to engage in conversations with the participants. While the notes of the workshop and the conversations are not coded as empirical evidence for this chapter, they were extremely enriching to understand the functioning of the GCA community and to establish a network of contacts for the interviews.

**Table 4: List of events attended as an observer by the author**

<b>Name of the event</b>	<b>Approximate hours observed</b>	<b>Date</b>
Marrakech Partnership strategy and planning workshop	12 hours	13 and 14 May 2019
UNFCCC COP25	40 hours	02 to 07 December 2019
CAMDA High-Level Meeting “Enhancing the Impacts of Global Climate Action	4 hours	21 June 2019
UNFCCC COP-25: Pressing Record on Climate Action CAMDA workshop on tracking progress 2020-23 <sup>18</sup>	4 hours	5 December 2019

Source: elaborated by the author

The interviewees selection was conducted based on a procedure called ‘snowball sampling’ (Tansey, 2007). Based on the observation the researcher conducted during her

<sup>18</sup><https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/AGENDA%20for%20the%20CAMDA%20workshop%20on%20tracking%20progress%202020-23.pdf> Access on 20 December 2020

doctoral exchange period, a first set of representatives was identified. Subsequently, the researcher asked each interviewee for other relevant names until a robust sample of 19 interviews that were conducted fifteen in English, three in French and one in Portuguese. In total, this represented more than 11 hours of content transcription. The obtained sample included individuals from the Quartet, negotiators from Parties, representatives from civil society organizations that are members of the LPAA cooperative initiatives, and academics. Additionally, this sample was only achievable after sending 42 invitations via email. The request for an interview was accompanied by a brief presentation of the research goals. Generally, the first reply was positive. However, not all contacted individuals responded to the follow-up messages. The interviews were conducted between June and November 2019 and they were recorded in audio format. All interviewees were asked to give their consent.

The table below illustrates the list of interviewees and it is presented in a confidential way regarding their identity and specific information about affiliation to preserve anonymity and to avoid possible triangulation based on interview statement. The interview guide was structured around questions to capture the design and implementation of the LPAA as well as the period from COP-21 Decision onwards. Finally, the contents of the interviews were cross checked with press interviews, official and unofficial documents, and the literature.

**Table 5: List of semi-structure interviews**

<b>Reference</b>	<b>LPAA relation</b>	<b>Interview First Request Date</b>	<b>Interview Date</b>	<b>Type of interview</b>	<b>Interview Length</b>
1	Quartet	16 June 2019	18 June 2019	face-to-face	22m38s
2	Quartet	24 June 2019	28 June 2019	face-to-face	19m15s
3	Quartet	24 June 2019	05 July 2019	online	38m31s
4	Party	03 July 2019	09 July 2019	online	43m50s
5	Non-Party stakeholder	15 July 2019	17 July 2019	online	49m08s
6	Quartet	05 July 2019	26 July 2019	online	32m33s
7	Quartet	03 July 2019	30 July 2019	online	53m35s
8	Academia	15 July 2019	31 July 2019	online	21m37s
9	Non-Party stakeholder	18 June 2019	31 July 2019	online	38m05s
10	Non-Party stakeholder	15 July 2019	02 August 2019	online	45m02s
11	Party	15 July 2019	06 August 2019	telephone	24m34s
12	Non-Party stakeholder	05 August 2019	15 August 2019	online	31m48s
13	Academia	06 May 2019	19 August 2019	face-to-face	55m53s
14	Academia	05 August 2019	22 August 2019	online	29m46s
15	Quartet	19 July 2019	27 August 2019	online	31m13s
16	Non-Party stakeholder	15 July 2019	28 August 2019	online	35m38s
17	Quartet	05 August 2019	10 September 2019	online	46m58s
18	Quartet	05 August 2019	14 October 2019	online	41m18s
19	Non-Party stakeholder	16 August 2019	13 November 2019	online	24m52s

Source: elaborated by the author

### 3.3 Orchestration in global climate governance

#### 3.3.1 An overview of the orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat until COP 21

The failure to achieve a new international agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 paved a new road for climate diplomacy. For instance, Ban Ki-moon has highlighted that “(...), this setback in Copenhagen also emboldened me to redouble my efforts in engaging all major stakeholders to secure a binding global climate agreement.”<sup>19</sup> One of the most relevant features highlighted by the former UN Secretary General is that he was not only seeking the support of Member States but also from other stakeholders such as companies, investors, and cities. As previously stated, the Paris Agreement represents a resounding shift on how states commit to climate action due to the adoption of a bottom-up approach, embedded in the NDCs. But what are the underlying factors for the shift at the highest UN-level regarding the engagement of non-state and sub national actors? This subsection will describe the institutional timeline of the orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat.

The COP-17 Decision established a subsidiary body called the "Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action" (ADP) that was divided in two work streams. The work stream 1, also known as the work stream for the 2015 agreement, was responsible for the conduction of the "process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties" (paragraph 2). Also known as the pre-2020 ambition, the work stream 2 was responsible for the launch of “a work plan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties" (paragraph 7). It is critical to note that even if adopted in 2015, the new agreement would have its goals from 2020 onwards. This is the case because the period up to 2020 was covered by the Kyoto Protocol. In this sense, there was a shared understanding about the importance to raise the ambition to this gap period between 2015-2020. In December 2012, for COP-18 in Doha, Ban Ki-moon announced that he would convene world leaders in 2014 to mobilize action and ambition in relation to climate change.

As told by Tracy Raczek in her testimonial for the Profiles of Paris<sup>20</sup>, the UNSG Office pulled together a special Climate Change Support Team to design a climate change

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<sup>19</sup> Available on <https://profilesparis.com/profiles/> Access on 20 December 2020

<sup>20</sup> Available on <https://profilesparis.com/profiles/> Access on 20 December 2020

strategy that would capitalize on the Secretary-General's decisive contribution for the climate process. Still according to Raczek, this high-level team had their activities organized in four tracks: (i) a government track to build trust and strengthen relations between Member States; (ii) a partnership track, entitled the "Action Agenda"; (iii) a finance track to spur commitments by various groups of the financial sector; (iv) a communication and outreach track to innovatively reach audiences with a scientific and economic evidence-based and solutions-driven narrative.

On the path of Action Agenda, the COP-18 Decision encourages the ADP work stream 2 to intensify the technical examination of opportunities for actions with high mitigation potential with the participation of non-state actors (paragraph 5). According to Hermwille (2018), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), proposed the creation of a space for facilitative discussions called technical expert meetings that were held for the first time at COP-19 in Warsaw.

Concerning the UN Climate Summit, a preparatory meeting was held in May 2014 in Abu Dhabi. In September 2014, at the margins of the UN General Assembly, cooperative initiatives were announced in eight action areas: agriculture, cities, energy, financing, forests, industry, resilience and transportation. According to Raczek, the Summit "shifted the narrative on climate change from crisis to an economic transition with potential co-benefits, incentivized mitigation even without having a global price on carbon and placed the responsibility on all to act". But, more importantly, Raczek stresses that it was held with "sufficient time for the political ramifications of the gathering to reach capitals and return to the negotiation chambers."

This back-and-forth dynamic between the intergovernmental and national spheres already showed its results during Lima COP-20 in December 2014, with relevant achievements for Global Climate Action such as an article on the Decision encouraging the UNFCCC Secretary General and the President of COPs to convene an annual high-level meeting on enhancing the implementation of climate actions, the launch of the NAZCA portal, and the inception of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. In the words of the former Peruvian Minister for the Environment and COP-20 President, Manuel Pulgar Vidal, "(...) this recognition of non-State actors was not a unilateral decision of the COP presidency: it was the result of the willingness shown by cities and local governments, and by the business community, to step up to the challenge of reducing emissions and addressing climate risk."

Throughout 2015, the Quartet was established, and launched the LPAA platform as well as the LPAA Climate Week Event during COP-21 to showcase the cooperative initiatives.

The resounding success of the engagement of non-state and sub national actors is captured in the COP-21 Decision, which mentions eleven times the role of non-Party stakeholders, establishes the roles of the High-Level Climate Champions, and calls for the strengthening of the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential and associated adaptation, health, and sustainable development co-benefits in the period 2016–2020, also known as the ‘technical examination process’ (TEP). Also, the Paris Agreement acknowledges the participation of non-Party stakeholders in three review processes. First, Article 13 on the review of the NDCs implementation mentions the engagement of technical experts. Second, the global stocktake, to be conducted every five years from 2023, will provide information to support NDCs revision. And Article 15 related to the compliance mechanism calls for the involvement of an ‘expert-based committee’. The operationalization of all those mechanisms and of how non-Party stakeholders could be engaged are still being negotiated. However, van Asselt et al. 2016 argue that regardless the potential limited roles of non-Party stakeholders in the formal review process, their independent assessments have significant influence.

Regarding the institutionalization of the orchestration process, only at COP22 in 2016 was the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action established. The Global Climate Action has been living up to its ambition through different channels of connection between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres such as the Talanoa Dialogues, implemented in COP-23, the 2019 UN Climate Summit under the leadership of UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutierrez, the COP-25 Decision to renew the mandate for the MPGCA, and the 2020 “Race to Zero” campaign launched by the Chilean and the British High-Level Climate Champions, Gonzalo Muñoz and Nigel Topping, respectively. The box below showcases these institutional landmarks in a timeline. The next sections of this chapter will investigate the institutional process from the LPAA to the COP21 Decision and the implications of the institutionalization of orchestration in global climate governance.

**Table 6: Timeline of the orchestration in the UNFCCC**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Institutional Process</b>	<b>Contributions and linkages to the Global Climate Action Agenda</b>
December 2011	UNFCCC COP 17 Durban	COP-17 Decision to establish the "Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action".
December 2012	UNFCCC COP 18 Doha	Ban Ki-moon announced the UN Climate Summit.
November 2013	UNFCCC COP 19 Warsaw	COP Decision announced the Technical Examination Meeting (TEM) on mitigation.
May 2014	Abu Dhabi Ascent	The event, convened by Ban Ki-moon, gathered government and non-state actors' representatives to identify the action areas of the UN Climate Summit.
September 2014	United Nations Climate Summit - New York	The Summit gathered governments and non-state actors that announced commitments to climate action in eight areas: agriculture, cities energy, financing, forests, industry, resilience and transportation.
December 2014	UNFCCC COP-20 Lima	COP-20 Decision (1) welcomes the Lima Climate Action High-level meeting convened by the Peruvian COP Presidency and (2) encourages the UNFCCC Executive Secretary and the President of COP to convene an annual high-level event on enhancing the implementation of climate actions.  Launch of the NAZCA Portal.  Establishment of LPAA orchestrator Quartet.
2015	LPAA - Quartet meetings	Throughout the year LPAA Quartet held meetings and promoted the initiative in all UNFCCC sessions.
December 2015	UNFCCC COP-21 Paris - 2015	LPAA Climate week during COP-21 and with the presence of the UN Secretary General and COP President

		COP 21 Decision (1) welcomes the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders, (2) resolves to strengthen the TEP in the period 2016-2020, (3) acknowledges the results of the LPAA, (4) encourages non-Party stakeholders to register their actions on the NAZCA Platform, (5) agrees to convene during the period 2016-2020 a high-level event, (6) established the high-level champions role to act on behalf of the President of the COP, (7) launches the TEP on adaptation in the period 2016-2020.
December 2016	UNFCCC COP-22 Marrakech	COP 22 Decision welcomes the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action; Launch of 2050 Pathways by the High-Level Climate Champions.
December 2017	UNFCCC COP-23 Fiji/Bonn	COP 23 Decision (1) takes into consideration the work of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action, including the Summaries for policymakers of the TEP and Yearbooks of Global Climate Action prepared by the High-level Champions with the support of the Marrakech Partnership, (2) welcomes the Talanoa dialogue.
September 2019	United Nations Climate Summit - New York	UNSG convened a second Climate Summit announcing initiatives in nine thematic areas: mitigation, social and political drivers, youth and public mobilization, energy transition, industry transition, infrastructure, cities and local action, nature-based solutions, resilience and adaptation, climate finance and carbon pricing.
September 2019	UNFCCC COP-25 Presidency Campaign announcement	Launch of the Climate Ambition Alliance

December 2019	UNFCCC COP-25 Santiago/Madrid 2019	COP-25 Decision (1) welcomes the continuation of the Marrakech Partnership and decides to continue to appoint high-level champions for 2021-2025, (2) requests the UNFCCC Secretariat to continue engaging with non-Party stakeholders and enhancing the effectiveness of the NAZCA platform including the tracking of voluntary action.
June 2020	COP-25 and COP-26 High-level Climate Champions Campaign announcement	Launch of the Race to Zero Campaign

Source: elaborated by the author

### **3.4 Unpacking the Lima-Paris Action Agenda**

Several strands of the literature debated the ‘groundswell of climate actions’ in the lead-up to COP21 (Chan et al, 2015). For instance, Bäckstrand et al. (2017) recall that the rapprochement of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres officially started during the “Action Day” of COP 20, representing the launch of the LPAA and the NAZCA portal. This argument is also echoed by Hale (2016), emphasizing that ‘it is clear that the LPAA served the larger goal of linking the groundswell of climate actions at all levels directly to the UNFCCC process’. Also, Hickman et al. (2019) ‘conceptualize the UNFCCC Secretariat as an orchestrator that strategically interacts with subnational and non-state actors to motivate national governments to take a more ambitious stance on climate change’. Widerberg (2017) proposes an assessment of the LPAA performance. Moreover, several analyses were conducted to assess the initiatives’ performance (GGCA, 2015), as well as the GHG mitigation potential of the climate cooperative initiatives (Hsu et al. 2015). However, and in light of all those findings and well-established debates in the literature, additional research is necessary to investigate how orchestration was institutionalized as one of the governance modes in the UNFCCC Secretariat.

#### **3.4.1- The orchestration process in the lead-up to the Paris Climate Conference**

Hale (2016) argues that non-state and subnational actors have become more central to the climate regime in at least three ways. First, the author points to the orchestration process that created the LPAA and the NAZCA portal. Second, the fact that the “Action Agenda” was one of the COP21 pillars alongside, and equal to, the NDCs, financing, and the climate agreement. Third, the COP 21 Decision that sets out a larger role for non-Party stakeholders. As argued by Hale (2016), the rise of the transnational sphere is not a new phenomenon, but it gained traction, scale, and most importantly, a close linkage to the intergovernmental process. In a complementary analysis, Hickmann et al. (2019) argue that, although the UNFCCC can be defined as an intergovernmental treaty secretariat with a relatively narrow mandate, it has expanded its activities by employing orchestration as governance mode. The authors state that, by acting as an orchestrator, the UNFCCC Secretariat adopted new roles and functions in global climate policymaking, such as the strategic interaction with non-state and subnational actors to motivate Parties to adopt more ambitious climate goals. Three examples of initiatives orchestrated by the UNFCCC Secretariat are described to support the authors argument: Momentum for Change, NAZCA and the LPAA. The first initiative, Momentum for Change,

was launched in 2011 to showcase and reward practical climate solutions. The other two initiatives were orchestrated in the lead-up to COP21. The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform was defined as the official registry for both individual commitments and cooperative initiatives commitments. The NAZCA platform was launched in Lima during COP20 to recognize non-Party stakeholders' efforts and to be an accountability monitoring tool. A High-Level Action Day, gathering non-Party stakeholders' representatives, was also organized in COP20, representing the nascent moment of the LPAA and the agreement of the Peruvian and French COP Presidencies, the UNSGO and the UNFCCC Secretariat, known as the Quartet, to work together to mobilize and showcase cooperative initiatives with the highest potential impact in the climate agenda. The independent assessment of the LPAA (GGCA, 2015) argues that not only did the initiative play a role 'to accelerate this groundswell of climate action' but to also 'bring it to a higher level of scale and ambition, by seeding and nurturing cooperative climate initiatives.

The NAZCA portal is classified by Hickmann et al. (2019) as the most prominent contribution of the UNFCCC Secretariat in terms of bringing non-Party stakeholders closer to the intergovernmental process, due to the fact the UNFCCC Secretariat plays the role of NAZCA manager and coordinator. It is also noteworthy that the NAZCA portal showcases data from external providers such as CDP, the UN Global Compact and the Climate Bonds Initiative, among others. In other words, the UNFCCC Secretariat relies on the support of data providers to validate the information to be included on the website. In fact, the NAZCA portal was designed to act as a monitoring, reporting and assessment tool of individual and cooperative initiatives' commitments (Widerberg, 2017). In contrast with Hickman et al.'s (2019) argument, it is argued that the institutionalization of orchestration in the COP21 Decision is closely connected to the establishment of the LPAA, as the following sections will show.

According to an official document released by the Quartet, the LPAA main goals were (i) to showcase, in each of the thematic areas, key actions on mitigation and resilience, (ii) to demonstrate climate commitments through non-state actors' actions, and (iii) to encourage others to follow the same path. As stated previously, the LPAA climate commitments were organized in cooperative initiatives with several functions and governance arrangements with the capacity to act locally as well as to gravitate around the formal negotiation process (Bäckstrand et al. 2017). Also, the Quartet divided the initiatives into twelve thematic areas:

1. forest
2. agriculture
3. resilience

4. transport
5. building
6. private financ
7. short-lived climate pollutants
8. renewable energy
9. energy efficiency and access
10. cities and subnationals
11. business
12. innovation

Moreover, at COP21, the LPAA hosted a series of high-level events on the twelve thematic areas, which took place in the official negotiations zone from December 1 to December 8, 2015. It is noteworthy that civil society organizations' events are defined as side-events during the COP, and they are held in rooms that are separate from negotiation rooms. However, all LPAA events were held in the Plenary Room, originally designated for Parties. According to one of the Quartet's official presentations, the high-level events had three goals. The first goal was to review the rationale for a 2-degree consistent and resilient scenario in each of the thematic areas. The second one was to present the major contributions of LPAA initiatives. The last goal consisted of debating the future of the initiatives, including the challenges ahead and expected progress. Also, an Action Day was held on December 5, 2015 to invite the incoming COP presidencies 'to convene a high-level event on Climate Action'.

### **3.4.2 -The LPAA orchestration process**

Abbott et al. (2015) conceptualize the orchestration as an indirect and soft mode of governance that relies on inducements and incentives from the orchestrator to like-minded intermediaries to govern targets in line with orchestrator's goals. In a chain presented as O-I-T, orchestrators do not involve mandatory controls. According to Abbott (2015), orchestration techniques aim at influencing desired behaviors through diverse pathways such as:

- 1- Enlisting existing intermediaries.
- 2- Catalyzing the formation of new cooperative initiatives through convening, persuasion, and reputational incentives.
- 3- Provision of positive incentives for organization formation through public recognition, endorsement and showcasing at public events.
- 4- Provision of ideational support through information and guidance.

5- Provision of direct material support, not necessarily direct, but through facilitating third-party financing.

6- Steering through criteria, priorities, the highlighting of successes.

As for global climate governance, Abbott (2017) recognizes the potential number of orchestrators, such as the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNEP, among other international organizations. It is argued that these actors lack authority for mandatory governance, vis-à-vis states and private actors, and that they lack operational capacities and material resources. In light of these shortages, orchestration allows intergovernmental bodies to engage or to support the establishment of intermediaries that are able to provide supportive capabilities, such as experience, contacts or authority. Also, the author argues that the LPAA is classified as a directive orchestration process, as the orchestrators adopted several criteria to enlist the intermediary cooperative initiatives.

In the case of orchestration in the lead-up to COP21, Bäckstrand and Kuyper (2017) point out that the conditions for the emergency of the orchestration relied on the UNFCCC Secretariat's low governance capacity, the availability of multiple intermediaries, the legitimacy of the orchestrators, and the goal divergence among states that were still negotiating the then to be adopted Paris Agreement. Moreover, the authors differentiate the 'high-level' orchestration represented by the LPAA from other orchestration mechanisms that rely on a 'bottom-up' pledging and self-reporting by non-state actors in the form of registries or platforms such as the NAZCA portal. The table below, adapted from Bäckstrand and Kuyper (2017), illustrate the two orchestration processes. The authors shed light on the fact that cooperative initiatives act as meta-intermediaries of individual and collective climate commitments aimed at states and private actors as the targets.

**Table 7: Orchestration in the UNFCCC**

	Meta-intermediaries	
	LPAA	NAZCA
Orchestrator	Quartet of COP presidencies, UNSG Office, UNFCCC Secretariat	UNFCCC Secretariat
Intermediaries	Business, sub national actors, civil society, governments, public-private partnerships gathered in cooperative initiatives	Corporations, investors, cities and sub national authorities, civil society
Targets	States and private actors	States and private actors

Function	Implementation of pre-2020 climate action	Implementation of pre-2020 climate action
Type of action	Commitments by cooperative initiatives e.g. members of the cooperative initiatives reducing their GHG emissions	Commitments by individual Actors e.g. a company claiming to use 100% of renewable energy in its operations

Source: Adapted from Bäckstrand and Kuyper (2017)

According to Widerberg (2017), the LPAA demonstrates that two types of orchestration can work simultaneously. The author argues that the Quartet applied the ‘managing states’ technique when shaping the states’ preference for the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Also, by engaging cooperative initiatives with goals of GHG emissions reductions, the Quartet was employing the ‘bypassing states’ orchestration technique. The author’s findings demonstrate that the orchestration process was not linear. It was rather ‘messy and ad hoc’.

### 3.4.3 LPAA as an intervention theory

Abbott (2017) argues that orchestration can be considered as a strategic approach, as opposed to spontaneous or decentralized coordination approaches. This is due to the fact that orchestration requires more strategic constructions that are often made at higher governance levels aiming to enlist intermediaries, as well as to catalyze the establishment of new structures that can act as intermediaries. In other words, orchestration requires an intervention with actions to achieve an overall goal.

In line with this argument, Widerberg (2017) conceptualizes the LPAA as the “translation of individual ad hoc events into a continuous and institutionalized ‘programmatic intervention’ with a vision, goal, resources, and leverage mechanisms to obtain a desired societal change.” The author, thus, proposes an innovative methodological approach, called ‘reconstructing the intervention theory’, to assess the LPAA performance. In the article, the author defines the intervention theory problem as “the need for more ambitious commitments by Parties” and proposes that the solution is “to showcase non-state climate actions”. The reconstruction of the LPAA intervention theory builds on a tripartite scheme.

First, it provides the context in which the intervention took place. It is argued that the LPAA was the result of three dimensions. The functional dimension represents the need to bridge the emission gap of GHG emissions. The institutional dimension reflects the ‘bottom-

up' approach emerging in the lead-up to the Paris Conference, which includes the ADP workstream 2 and the groundswell of non-state and subnational climate action outside the UNFCCC. Lastly, the leadership dimension aims at bringing the transnational sphere closer to the UNFCCC process to influence governments.

Second, the causal theory connects the intervention outputs to the goals. It is argued that the dedicated staff from each of the Quartet members in a steering group gave strategic leadership and diplomatic leverage to the LPAA, which represents the input side. Meanwhile, the outcomes are divided into (i) short-term outcomes, translated by the need to send a positive signal for states to adopt an agreement in Paris; (ii) intermediate outcomes, illustrated by the enhanced climate actions commitments from non-state and subnational actors and states; and (iii) long-term outcomes, to close the emission gap between the current emission trajectory and the one needed to achieve the global warming goals.

The third component of the 'reconstructing the intervention theory' methodology is called the normative theory. Here, Widerberg (2017) discusses the assumptions of the intervention that, in the case of the LPAA, are argued to be multiply connected to the idea that non-state and subnational climate actions and commitments are beneficial. The author only acknowledges that there were debates over the LPAA's content and structure, interactions, incentives to the initiatives, and the internal politics and bureaucratic difficulties within the Quartet on how to proceed with the LPAA. However, Widerberg (2017) does not provide an in-depth analysis of the assumptions of the LPAA, nor does it present an analysis about the institutionalization process of the LPAA. Finally, Widerberg (2017) argues that the LPAA was supported not only by the Quartet but also by an entire global climate action ecosystem of external actors comprising experts and practitioners. These actors offered considerable and critical inputs such as organizational and convening support, monitoring, analysis, and assessment of the cooperative initiatives' climate commitments. Moreover, the author states that the orchestration process is thought to rely on an intricate structure and a long causal chain between the inputs and the long-term outputs. Considering all these factors, the author concludes that it is not possible to attribute the future reductions in the emission gap exclusively to the LPAA. Nonetheless, the author recognizes that:

“Perhaps the biggest feat of the LPAA to date has been the mobilization of the UN system and affiliated organizations, cooperative initiatives, non-state and subnational actors and governments toward a common goal, without getting bogged down by the diplomatic process and competing national interests which

often are blamed for slow progress in global climate governance.” (Widerberg, 2017, p. 732)

The analysis advanced by Widerberg (2017) is critical to lay the foundation for the debate of the LPAA orchestration process, especially because it opens the LPAA ‘black box’ and offers an analysis based on empirical evidence. However, it fails to provide an analysis of the connection of the LPAA to the UNFCCC formal process, as well as of how it was further integrated into the intergovernmental process by the COP21 Decision. Considering all the debates presented in this sub-section, this chapter argues that the LPAA was the critical factor for the institutionalization of the orchestration as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat. Process tracing will be employed to unveil that causal chain.

### **3.5- The orchestration institutionalization process**

As mentioned above, the LPAA was defined by the French Presidency of COP21 as one of four pillars. In the words of Laurent Fabius, President of COP21, “The LPAA is the fourth pillar of the “Paris Climate Alliance”, together with a legal universal agreement, intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) from states, and finance and technology.”<sup>21</sup>

As described in an official document<sup>22</sup>, the LPAA’s goal was to “underline and showcase this action as an essential foundation for future success in implementing the new Paris climate change agreement”. On this account, a set of ambitious high-level initiatives was orchestrated by the Quartet throughout 2015. But the LPAA also embodies another innovation for the intergovernmental process, as it included a set of events involving non-state actors over several days during COP-21. In the words of one interviewee:

“We organized the first action agenda day in a COP ever, because that was the first one in a Plenary Room, the place that was created to convene Parties or countries. So it will be at that place as a way to send a political signal to the world in relation to the importance of having non state actors into the table. So that was important. That is why we decided not only to do it in the Plenary Room, but to invite the Secretary General of the UN at that time Ban-Ki Moon.” (Interviewee 3)

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<sup>21</sup> Available on <https://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/626131/lpaa-press-kit-english-complete.pdf> Access on 30 January 2021

<sup>22</sup> Available on <https://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/626131/lpaa-press-kit-english-complete.pdf> Access on 30 January 2021

As stated by Christiana Figueres, the former UNFCCC Executive Secretary, “The various LPAA events happening in Paris, alongside the commitments also on the NAZCA Portal, demonstrate that contributions needed to realize success in Paris will come both from national governments working in concert with one another and from those outside the formal process.”<sup>23</sup> Considering all these features, it is argued that the LPAA, including its political and institutional backgrounds as well as its work throughout 2015, can be understood as the cause of the institutionalization of orchestration as a governance mode within the UNFCCC Secretariat. The following subsections present the causal mechanisms compounding the theoretical framework.


### **3.5.1- Causal Mechanism 1: The Quartet of orchestrators’ uniqueness**

The first causal mechanism is built on the uniqueness of the set of orchestrators of the LPAA. When Abbott et al. (2015) coined the concept of orchestration, the authors emphasized the role of one international organization engaging intermediary actors to impact targets that are commonly states. However, in the case of the LPAA, the orchestration process was deliberately conducted by four actors: the UNFCCC Secretariat, the United Nations Secretary-General Office, the Peruvian Presidency of COP20 and the French Presidency of and COP21. It is argued that this particular arrangement is one of the causal mechanisms that allowed the Quartet to obtain Parties’ support to both the mention of the role of non-Party stakeholders on the COP21 Decision, and the mandate for the UNFCCC Secretariat to formally engage on this matter. During the data collection and field observations, four elements of the Quartet arrangements were highlighted as critical for the success of the orchestration: the geographical balance between the Lima and Paris chancelleries, the relationship between the COP Presidencies and the UNFCCC Secretariat, the participation of the UNSGO and the work of the Quartet throughout the preparation for COP-21.

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<sup>23</sup> Available on <https://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/626131/lpaa-press-kit-english-complete.pdf> Access on 30 January 2021

**Figure 7: The elements of causal mechanism 1**



Source: elaborated by the author

### 3.5.1.1 – Lima-Paris: geographical balance

The adoption of the Paris Agreement required a consensus of 193 countries. The refusal of one country, regardless of its size or economic relevance in the international system, would jeopardize all the diplomatic efforts. The shadows of Copenhagen’s failure were still vivid in the back of the minds of those paving the way to COP-21. For instance, a poignant quote of the UN former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, emphasizes the pressure felt by those in the intergovernmental sphere of climate governance “Unfortunately, we did not “seal the deal” in Copenhagen and no binding agreement was achieved. For me, it was the most embarrassing and humiliating experience as the world’s top diplomat.”<sup>24</sup> Moreover, as stressed by one of the Climate Policy Advisor in the Office of Ban Ki-moon:

“Post-Copenhagen, climate fatigue had set in both at the Head of State and Government level and with the wider public. People were tired of hearing about the catastrophic consequences of climate change and the negotiations were seen as incapable of delivering a solution. Many developing countries saw the negotiations as a zero-sum game, where the western historic emitters, technology owners and producers would be the winners and developing countries would lose on emissions, technology, finance and building resilience through adaptation.”<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Available on <https://profilesparis.com/profiles/> Access on 20 December 2020

<sup>25</sup> Available on <https://profilesparis.com/profiles/> Access on 20 December 2020

The element of confidence was fundamental to ensure a prosperous environment for negotiations and one of the pillars to build confidence was to overcome the resentments from developing countries and the perception that the process was led by and in favor of developed countries. On this account, Felipe Calderon, former president of Mexico, who oversaw COP-16 held in Cancun, stated “First, we needed to take urgent action to rebuild confidence around the multilateral negotiation process. Every party to the Convention needed to be reassured that its voice was going to be heard and that they would have a say in the final document”<sup>26</sup> The data collected on the interviews corroborates this argument. For instance, interviewee 3 claimed that “the benefit of having two countries working together towards the same goal that also could reflect a world balance of the world. North-South, developed-developing and many other things.” Interviewee 9 stated that “The design (of the LPAA) has been the result of a very effective implemented strategy of its leading members. And I think part of this effective design was the key partnership between a developing country, a developed country, and the Secretary General. The UNFCCC was among the four of them, but the UNFCCC had not a mandate to do it.” As recalled by interviewee 7, even the choice of the name of the orchestrated platform was picked to reflect the geographical balance: “Lima Paris Action Agenda (was chosen) to give this impression of construction between two presidencies”.

“(…) This is important to reinforce that if a lot of people are talking today about the Global Climate Action and the role of non-state actors and these action-oriented commitments it is not a casualty. It has been the result of a very effective implemented strategy of the leading members of the LPAA. And I think part of this effective design was the key partnership between a developing country, a developed country, and the Secretary General. The UNFCCC was among the four of them, but the UNFCCC had not a mandate to do it. UNFCCC and UNSG were supporting the French Presidency in that role. That kind of partnership connecting North and South and with the political leading role of the UN Secretary-General was highly effective. When you see the outcomes of the LPAA, the main key messages, the political narrative of the LPAA and the sort of initiatives and the outcomes on resilience, forest or land-use or water, you can see this balance perspective among developed and developing countries also in finance. So, I think it is important this balance between developing and developed regions is reflected on the political key messages of the LPAA.” (Interview 9)

### **3.5.1.2- The interactions between the UNFCCC Secretariat and the COP- Presidencies**

As mentioned above by the interviewee 9, in the run-up to COP-21 the UNFCCC Secretariat joined the orchestration endeavor without an explicit mandate from the Parties.

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<sup>26</sup> Available on <https://profiles.paris.com/profiles> Access on 20 December 2020

Several strands of the literature debate how international public administrations (IPA) overcome their limited mandates. Depledge (2007) highlights that chairpersons and secretariats play a critical role in global environmental governance due to their attributions as managers of the negotiation process. The author provides an innovative approach, which relies on the analysis of the relationship between those two actors, as she recalls that literature is sparse on this matter. Moreover, she argues that Secretariat action behind the scenes requires close coordination with the Chairperson. Also, Depledge states that “chairpersons and secretariats are locked into a mutually-enforcing relationship and symbiotic division of labor”. She argues that the symbiotic feature of the relationship is based on the fact that the Secretariat is part of an international public administration and chairpersons represent the results of an election from the Parties.

In line with the literature, the empirical material collected indicated that the COP-20 and COP-21 Presidencies and the UNFCCC Secretariat worked very closely. For instance, interviewee 6 recalled that: “It was important that the process was seen as having the support of the United Nations. Otherwise, it would have been seen as a process only of the French presidency and it would have been much less interesting”.

### **3.5.1.3- The role of the UNSGO and the Quartet in action**

As mentioned above, the United Nations Climate Summit in 2014 set the tone for the orchestration process of the LPAA. Not only did the participation of the UNSGO in the Quartet represent an endorsement for the platform from the highest level of the UN but also an approach to share all the work conducted for the Climate Summit. As mentioned by Manuel-Pulgar Vidal, president of COP-20, in his testimony to the Profiles of Paris:

“The coalition of interest created in Lima and beyond is, in addition, supported by the highest levels of the UN system. The current UN Secretary General, António Guterres, and his predecessor Ban Ki-moon have both been unstinting in their support for urgent action on climate change. Both in the run-up to Paris, and subsequently, regular UN climate summits have helped keep focus on the issue, and have used the power of the Secretary General’s office to good effect to maintain momentum”.<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, one representative of the UNSGO at the Quartet stated during the interview:

“There was a clear recognition by a number of actors both in the office of the UN Secretary General, but also in a number of governments that the actions of non state actors in demonstrating what they can do would be very helpful for

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<sup>27</sup> Available on <https://profilesoparis.com/profiles> Access on 20 December 2020

the process. That wasn't the only thing that made it successful. But if it hadn't had a Lima Paris Action Agenda, I don't think that would have been enough momentum to carry us through to the finishing line.” (interview 15)

All the interviewees that mentioned the environment of the day-to-day of the Quartet (interviewees 3, 8,15,16) highlighted that it had a good work dynamic. For instance, interviewee 3 recalled that “The two presidencies started work in 2013. And we ended with the Paris agreement in 2015 working hand by hand.” Moreover, “what can I say, I mean was that this was a huge operation. very good cooperation between Lima, Paris and New York, I must say, and Bonn as well” (interviewee 15). Interestingly, the same interviewee mentioned that they called the leaders of the Quartet “the Four Musketeers”. As recalled by interviewee 9, the volume of work for the members of the Quartet throughout 2015 was quite elevated:

“By consultation, by bilateral meetings, we presented the LPAA strategy, the first press conference of the closing of COP-20 in Lima that was the moment of launch. The LPAA itself was developed during COP-20 and for that the action event in Lima had invited the minister of foreign affairs of France to co-host the event was critical to set up the LPAA as a partnership. So we presented the LPAA in the press conference in Lima and then we met in January 2015 to first a strategy planning meeting. Then we were presenting the LPAA in every and each intersectional and each relevant political framework meeting at that time. Just for you to be aware in 2015 we had four intersectional meetings before Paris. So there were a lot of negotiations going on and in each of them we were presenting the LPAA, the progress, the objectives. The climate community was very much aware about this strategy.” (Interview 9)

Despite the scenario of growing attention from the international community, the cooperation between the Quartet members was highlighted:


“And I, I think, you know, another which is not only related to the Lima Paris action agenda, but to the broader success of Paris was a really good effective cooperation between the leaders (...). The President of Peru and France, the (UNFCCC) Executive Secretary and the Secretary General, you know, and some other leaders as well, but certainly these four, this was really, really important and without that, it wouldn't have happened. And it was, if I compare it to what happened in Copenhagen five years before that, that was not the case. leadership by itself is not enough? Without the leadership these things cannot work.” (Interview 15)

### **3.5.2 - Causal Mechanism 2: LPAA High-level initiatives**

The second causal mechanism draws on the fact that intermediaries orchestrated by the Quartet in the LPAA were high-level initiatives encompassing ambitious climate commitments

and gathering not only non-Party stakeholders but also international organizations and states. The orchestrators mobilized 78 initiatives that were divided into 12 thematic areas. The pillars of the second causal mechanism are: the objectives of the LPAA, the strategies for the initiatives' selection, the interactions between the intermediaries and the orchestrators in the run-up to COP-21, and the incentives provided to engage the intermediaries.

**Figure 8: the elements of causal mechanism 2**



Source: elaborated by the author

### 3.5.2.1 - Objectives of the LPAA

According to the interviewees, the Quartet agreed that the LPAA could fulfill different roles in the run-up to the COP-21. On this account, one of the first objectives envisioned by the Quartet regarding the LPAA was the opportunity to frame a positive narrative about climate action, as it would provide a collaborative tone to the UNFCCC process (interviewees 2, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12). The second objective, intrinsically linked to the first one, was to back this narrative with implementable climate actions taken by sub national and non-state actors (interviewees 1, 5, 6, 8, 15, and 19). In line with these arguments, a few interviewees (3, 4, 11, and 13) also recalled the goal of showcasing multi-stakeholder platforms that could close the emissions gap. Finally, one of the most interesting objectives was the recognition of the need to connect the UNFCCC process with what was mentioned by the interviewees as the real economy (2; 3; 4; 9; 10, and 13). Here, what is important to be highlighted is that the growing participation of observers during COP (which also encompasses a greater level of civil society activities around the negotiations, such as side-events) were still perceived as an outside part of

the negotiation process. The LPAA was not conceived to be an extra side-event or something promoted by the COP presidencies as an initiative focused only on civil society. Instead, it was recognized as a way of bringing to the negotiation table signals of those actors' commitments. As mentioned by a former negotiator during an event at COP-25, "this was unthinkable prior to Paris". Furthermore, the LPAA could play a specific role in case of failure in Paris. In the words of interviewee 9 "The French team was seeing in the LPAA and all the positive messages, outcomes, and commitments as a backup political message strategy in case we did not reach an agreement." Interviewee 1 summarizes the spirit that gathered the Quartet.

"The objective I think is really simple. It was really to demonstrate that there was a global demand for an agreement in Paris in 2015. And that not only were businesses and cities and a lot of actors ready, but they were already taking their own commitments, they were happy to go forward and had ideas and plans, etc. But they needed support from governments. And so that they wanted to have some sort of certainty that countries would take that seriously and put themselves on a track to go in that direction. So it was basically those two things, demanding further certainty so that they say, okay, we're ready to go in that direction. But we need to be sure that it's worth it that you're not going to change your mind in five minutes. And second, and also the other way around to tell policymakers we are there. We're ready. We're waiting for your signal. We're already getting organized. So you need to take one step further and build an international common governance to help support that action." (Interviewee 1)

As the participation of non-state actors in the intergovernmental arenas is still perceived by some Parties as not legitimate, it is surprising that only one interviewee highlighted that the LPAA could not benefit the process to Paris:

(...) it makes a lot of sense that, you know, as an organizer of a summit, you want to have concrete results. And therefore, you know, you look up all these partnerships, and you have at least something to present to the world if you don't have an international agreement. But there might also be Parties that are willingly, not only Parties, but also non-state actors that are willingly undermining, you know, the political process. (...) So it might also be (multi-stakeholder) partnerships can actually undermine the international process. (interviewee 13).

### **3.5.2.2- Strategies for the initiatives' selection**

As mentioned before, the LPAA was conceived during COP-20 in Lima and it became the fourth pillar of the French Presidency for COP-21. According to interviewee 6, the press release was issued in Lima after the four orchestrators agreed on the LPAA. In the words of Interviewee 9:

“The LPAA itself was developed during Cop-20 in Lima and for that the action event (we) had invited the minister of foreign affairs of France to co-host the event. (It) was critical to set up the LPAA as a partnership. So we present the LPAA in the press conference in Lima and then we met in January 2015 to first a strategy planning meeting” (Interviewee 9)

The novelty and the fact that the LPAA was officially launched in December 2014 increased the pressure for the delivery of a high-level event for the COP-21, one of the most critical stages of global climate governance. According to the interviewees (3,6, 7 and 9) there was a steering committee responsible for making the decision that was backed by the technical teams (interviewee 9).

“The design specifically and the structure the four members of the LPAA were working on the steering committee and they divided the thematic areas was taken by one of specific team. So, for example, the forest and resilience took the lead on most of the other ones. And the concept again was always building on the outcome of the summit that was action-oriented, solution-oriented, specific commitments.” (Interviewee 9)

As for the selection process of the initiatives, some interviewees shared concerns regarding a lack of transparency (4 and 5), which was explained by other three interviewees as the result of making the LPAA from scratch (8 and 18). One interviewee highlighted that in January 2015 the teams representing the Quartet started what could be called a “blank page” (06) without any concrete model to follow (8).

This shared perception of novelty can be explained by the fact that the LPAA had a different set of orchestrators when compared to the UNSG Climate Summit. However, interviewees 9 and 17 highlighted the possibility to start mapping the initiatives based on the UN Climate Summit set of initiatives already orchestrated by UNSGO (interviewees 9 and 17).

As for the initiatives’ selection process for the LPAA, three interviewees (2, 3 and 6) explicitly mentioned the need to avoid any action that could be interpreted as green washing and the signals the Quartet could send by engaging high-emitters actors such as oil companies (2). This can be further demonstrated by a declaration of a French civil society representative asking the French President to withdraw the “Oil and Gas Methane Partnership”.<sup>28</sup> However, there was also an “all hands-on deck” approach. For instance, interviewee 1 said: “I think the idea was to cover a spectrum as large as possible. And so, reach out to a wide variety of different actors and try to get the best out all of them making”.

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<sup>28</sup> Available on <https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/the-lima-paris-action-agenda-a-questionable-melting-pot/> Access 17 November 2020

Several interviewees (1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18 and 19) mentioned that the work conducted by the Quartet followed a list of criteria for the selection of initiatives. They highlighted the following criteria: clear need to have a climate thematic, ambitious commitment, international approach, institutional and financial robustness, geographical diversity across initiatives, ambition, and capacity to deliver and report. All those criteria were listed on an assignment grid (interviewee 18) for the assessment of both the technical and higher rank officials of the steering committee. This information can also be found in one LPAA official document released on the UNFCCC website and one independent assessment of the LPAA initiatives that affirms that the criteria for the initiatives' selection were:

1. Be cooperative, be inclusive, open, and regionally balanced.
2. Be ambitious: short- and long-term quantifiable targets – transformative actions guided by a 2°C and resilient pathway.
3. Be science based: Address a concrete impact of climate change mitigation or adaptation issues to get us on a resilient and below 2°C pathway.
4. Have the capacity to deliver. Ability to directly deliver and implement commitments.
5. Showcase the implementation of existing commitments (sufficient level of maturity in Paris)
6. Follow-up and report. Ready to report on implementation.

The selection process was highly debated among the Quartet (interviewee 7), it “was not particularly consistent over the time of the LPAA” (interviewee 8). In the words of an interviewee

“here (it) was definitely a process of kind of back and forth about, you know, what these pre criteria should be, how stringent should they be, how long should they be, and that was, you know, kind of iterated in various different discussions and dialogues over a number of months” (interviewee 16).

Interviewee 3 made an interesting comparison between the NDCs and the initiatives' climate action commitments, stating that the logic of accepting all pledges was “to bake confidence across different sectors”.

“So all after Copenhagen was a strong effort to recreate confidence. So that is why the first generation of NDCs were created with the idea to recreate confidence. And now we are working to enhance NDC and trying to have more science-based targets. It is the same with the action agenda. In the beginning, the only requirement or the only ask that we put on the table is what related to the Nazca portal So the idea to release their target, some timeframe, a specific action, etc. but no more than that. But after that, fortunately that development of many actions from a lot of actors for example the sciences-based targets initiative or the development of coalition the forest and land-use or the transport decarbonization Alliance, and many others. they have a defined role, a clearer target (...), information and data requirements. So I think that we did a great

thing in the sense of not putting too many references in the beginning. And the process fortunately has evolved in a way in which now it is clearer the targets that they are offering and the pledges and targets the way to measure it.” (interviewee 3)

Finally, it should be highlighted that the LPAA’s orchestrator Quartet identified and mobilized intermediaries, but also that, as said by interviewee 8, “some of the initiatives were really incubated by the Quartet”. For instance, 40% of the initiatives were launched in 2015.

### **3.5.2.3- Interactions**

The interaction between the orchestrators and the intermediaries was defined as being regular throughout 2015 (5, 7, 8, 10, 16 and 19). For instance, it was mentioned that the technical team at the French side was working according to the different thematic areas of the LPAA such as transport, cities and business, among others (interviewee 7). The interactions were also based on the assignment grid or the questionnaire that was sent to the initiatives (interviewee 7). As stated by interviewee 16:

“So both within the French team but then also within the broader Quartet, they had a fairly good amount of capacity to engage with a lot of these initiatives, to understand what they're doing, understand some of the obstacles they were facing and how they could be, you know, best represented at COP 21 (....) So the I think the engagement and interaction was quite strong. And, you know, in addition to those meetings, there were, you know, constant phone calls and emails and all sorts of other types of communication.”

Moreover, interviewees 5 and 19, who were both representatives from initiatives that are members of the LPAA, highlighted an active dynamic of exchanges in the run-up to COP-21.

“The connections with the French government were extremely close. Extremely close, I would say that it was almost on a daily basis that we've worked with them before. And I think that we worked extremely, extremely well in this respect. I mean, with a lot of how can I say, a lot of respect from both sides. Okay. It was extremely, extremely interesting.” (Interviewee 5)

In the words of interviewee 19, the interactions also related to the content the initiatives provided to the Quartet.

“I think one of the things that they did to help coordinate the interaction was to start to put these activities into thematic pillars or sectors and they held many calls between Lima and Paris (...) but in the end, I mean when it came down to the judgment of which efforts would be featured? That was definitely a decision

by the Secretariat and the presidency teams and members of the Secretary General's office. So it was like a series of meetings and I believe civil society groups had to put forward detailed descriptions of the initiatives that they were working on. And that would have been like submitting an email or some sort of documented report or seen as some sort of life form that you'd have to fill out to share what they were working on and what were the details and potential of those activities. And then those the combination of those inputs were compiled, and then among them, different initiatives were selected” (interviewee 19)

#### **3.5.2.4 - Incentives**


Orchestration is clearly defined by the soft inducements that the orchestrator offers to the intermediaries. This was confirmed in the case of the LPAA during the semi-structured interviews, as the endorsement, or the public recognition provided for being a member of the LPAA, was mentioned as one the main incentives for being part of the LPAA (1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 19). One interesting aspect concerning public recognition is highlighted by interviewee 3: “So I think that they were seeking at the same time to have a more formal recognition of that long term strategy because in the business sector, we do need not only to have good behavior and long-term ambition, but sometimes you need policies to support your action.”

Two interviewees (6 and 10) highlighted how powerful this approach can be to mobilize non-state engagement. Another incentive mentioned was the possibility to gain legitimacy as the initiatives were “showing they were part of the solution” (7) and that they “would trigger positive feedback for their image” (1). Surprisingly, one interviewee did not identify any incentives (4) and interviewees 5 and 9 did not mention the visibility as an incentive (5 and 9).

“Well, I think the incentive was just the credibility and the ability to have some kind of official participation in the Paris conference. A number of organizations wanted to be part of it. That was an important stage to be seen and it was important for their legitimacy. So beyond that, I don't think there are any incentives.” (Interviewee 8)

### 3.5.3 Causal mechanism 3: Parties' support to an orchestration process was designed in a way so that intermediaries' impacts would go beyond the adoption of the Paris Agreement

**Figure 9: elements of causal mechanism 3**



Source: elaborated by the author

#### 3.5.3.1 – LPAA continuity

The causal mechanism 3 captures two interrelated elements. The first element is the willingness of the members of the Quartet for the LPAA to go beyond Paris. And the second is the fact that the process was formally adopted by Parties in COP 21 Decision. As clearly stated by Tracy Raczek in her testimony to the Profiles of Paris:

“Many stakeholders had expended significant professional and personal capital to build commitments for the Summit and for Paris, which would require action far beyond 2015 to implement, so they wanted assurance that the United Nations would not abandon this effort post-Summit or post-Paris. For this reason, it was essential that we engaged as much of the UN System as possible and key partners such as the World Economic Forum and World Business Council on Sustainable Development to ensure follow-up and support could be provided by expert partners with long-standing mandates given that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s tenure would end soon after Paris. Collaboration with Peru, France and the UNFCCC also enabled part of our work, the Action Agenda, to transform into the Lima-to-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and, with Paris, the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) which helped provide partners the assurance of a longer-term framework in which to engage.”<sup>29</sup>

That was further confirmed by the Presidents of COP-20 and COP-21, respectively Manuel Pulgar Vidal and Laurent Fabius, in an official document of the LPAA released prior to December 2015. Pulgar Vidal states that “We are completely sure that because we have worked very hard during this last year, it has also the legitimacy of all the countries and we will

<sup>29</sup> Available on <https://profilesparis.com/profiles> Access on 20 December 2020

have all the support of the host of COP22/CMP12 in Morocco.” In a complementary statement, Fabius defends that:

“The cooperation between countries and other actors must be reinforced. I am deeply convinced that COP21 is a step further in this direction. The recognition of the role of non-state actors is growing within the formal process, and we can only welcome this evolution. We need to amplify the movement continuously. We need to reinforce the outlines of a broader and transparent governance of the LPAA, to which civil society should be associated. It is the responsibility of the French Presidency of COP21 during 2016, as well as the responsibility of incoming presidencies.”<sup>30</sup>

The establishment of orchestration as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat was also advocated by experts. This was one of the recommendations from the LPAA Assessment Report commissioned by COP-21, which institutionalized a long-term Action Agenda to provide ongoing high-level political support to the cooperative initiatives. The experts argued that “The assessment reveals the key role played by high-level political leadership and a dedicated core team in driving forward the Action Agenda”, and this would be “crucial for facilitating implementation of current initiatives, and catalyzing, seeding, and scaling up new ones beyond 2015.”

However, there was not a consensus across the interviewees on how the members of the Quartet envisioned the continuity and the durability of the LPAA. For instance, interviewee 8 emphasized that the debate “was not particularly well developed before Paris”. Interviewee 13 provided one potential explanation for the continuity topic not being an agenda priority: orchestration relied on the COP-Presidencies.

“I would say that presidencies, often they don't want to say too much about what is after. But then, of course, they did have a longer perspective in mind, but also especially before the Paris agreement, which you are talking about. I think the main objective was really the Paris Agreement. So the main objective was really to have an extra argument for an ambitious agreement. And in that sense, I don't think LPAA was ever designed for implementation. It was not designed to help realize NDCs. But I think there was to some extent of focus on the longer term in the sense that one of the issues that often came up was the question of continuity” (interviewee 13)

As the COP-21 Presidency was hosted by France, the issue of continuity was more relevant for the French chancellery, as further demonstrated by interviewee 7:

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<sup>30</sup> Available on <https://profiles.paris.com/profiles> Access on 20 December 2020

“Of course, that (LPAA continuity) was discussed. There is a decision that was taken at COP-21. This decision was also negotiated by the (French) team. We had a team that spoke to non-state actors and prepared the LPAA, the steering committee, and in the French team there were also negotiators for the Work Stream II, the negotiation track for non- states actors. We wanted the decision to take into account what was happening in COP-21 (...) and we asked the following COPs to continue this process, particularly on the question of accountability. What is not followed over time is a disistimulation (sic) for the actors in terms of accountability.” (interviewee 7)

For both interviewees 15 and 16, the continuity of the LPAA was clear. Nonetheless, as stated by interviewee 16, the shape of the LPAA and the orchestration process after COP-21 was still unknown during the negotiations at COP-21. That is because the LPAA Steering Committee was not part of the negotiation teams from France and Peru.

“The Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, and, and I know for sure, the Secretary-General of the UN, they didn't think of this as just simply to help Paris. It was meant to be a long term.” (interviewee 15)

“Yes, very actively (the debate about LPAA continuation). I think they saw it as a legacy for them from COP-21. They really wanted to ensure it had some continuity after Paris. But there was a lot of, you know, confusion and lack of understanding of exactly what that would look like. But yeah, it was a very, very active topic of conversation. Even during COP-21, trying to figure out what happened to the LPAA afterward because there wasn't a lot of, you know, certainty about what to do with it. And it really took a while. (interviewee 16)

As previously mentioned, designing and implementing the LPAA in a one-year period was described as a herculean task. The amount of work required to ensure the most successful high-level event at the Paris Conference was mentioned by interviewee 1 as an explanation for the low-level debate on the continuation of the LPAA.

“There was a debate, of course, we knew something would be needed. But in the meantime, we were like, basically, drawn by the task. There was so much already that we wanted to deliver to that COP. And it has really been seen as a next step. This being said, there was a great deal of work around Nazca where we are always trying to push the UNFCCC so that they develop Nazca accordingly so that he could become the actual reporting and public monitoring tool.” (interviewee 1)

“It's different. I mean, I don't know about everyone else when it was, you know, we had a very clear objective that was COP and we just wanted to do everything to ensure that COP would be successful.” (interviewee 10)

According to the interviewees, the debates about the continuation of the LPAA envisioned different scenarios. As recalled by interviewee 8, it was even considered the possibility of creating “a foundation or a secretariat but some argued it should be in the UN”. This was also mentioned by interviewee 6 “I thought that France could also have a particular responsibility and create a kind of spin-off or to have a dedicated team that could have continued to follow that (the LPAA). (But) it seemed more difficult to do it like that than within the UN”.

“I think, we can see that it is growing, that activity is growing, but can you say it's because there was the action agenda or is it because of the Paris Agreement attached which has given an impetus and also it now is the kind of center of this non state climate action really the action agenda? Or is it simply around those kinds of recurrent events, for example, that give momentum to the process overall? No. But now looking forward, I mean, there seems to be quite a durability simply by companies, entities and regions taking action and sometimes outside of the whole UNFCCC process. I think this is a bit of a kind of conceptual question of what is this kind of unique added value at this point?” (interviewee 11)

Interviewee 7 recalled that the integration of the non-Party stakeholders' role in the COP-21 Decision, as well as the LPAA and NAZCA, did ensure the continuation of the process as it was in 2015. For instance, the name of the orchestration process anchored in the UNFCCC Secretariat is the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action.

“Of course, we imagined continuity. For us it was not possible that there would not be one. (...). The question is to which extent the continuation is sustainable? You see the name was changed. LPAA was attached to the COPs (Presidencies). So, we talked a lot about the name. Because many people, also who work in communication, said the name should be universal for the process to be universal.” (interviewee 7)

As summarized by interviewee 16, the narrative of anchoring the Action Agenda within the UNFCCC Secretariat and with the support of the COP Presidencies prevailed.

“So, you know, there were various different proposals, you know, that we had put that we have proposed and that people have proposed about creating some sort of institutional home for it, and whether that was you know, there was the whole range of options. So whether that would be a French government agency, whether that would be at a new NGO that was created, whether that would continue to live with the UNFCCC Secretariat, whether that would be some sort of hybrid entity or exactly what that would look like. And, you know, there was talk about really institutionalizing that, you know, with, you know, some staff and maybe some funding and maybe, you know, a board and kind of things like that, obviously, it went a little bit more of a kind of light touch and kind of more

hybrid direction, mostly sitting within the UNFCCC, as well as, as within the presidencies”. (interviewee 16)

### **3.5.3.2 – Parties' support to Global Climate Action**

However, the design that was negotiated for the institutionalization of the Global Action Agenda would require approval by all Parties in COP 21, meaning a process similar to the adoption of the Paris Agreement. On this account, the opposition from one state would have undermined the entire process. As stated above, there were supportive factors to avoid Parties' blockage, such as the geographical balance between developed and developing countries in the Quartet, Parties as members of the initiatives, a strong presence of subnational actors, and the positive and effective narrative of Global Climate Action that proved successful during COP 21 not only in the venue of the LPAA but also in several spaces. For instance, interviewee 13 stated their surprise by the fact that many non-Party stakeholders also announced their climate actions outside of the LPAA, for example, in an event held by the Parisian mayor Anne Hidalgo.

Even if that scenario of ‘groundswell’ of climate actions is a necessary condition for Parties to support the institutionalization of orchestration as one of the governance modes for the UNFCCC Secretariat, it is not a sufficient one. The data collected in the interviews and its triangulation with the literature reveal other two elements that were critical for securing consensus for the adoption of the COP 21 Decision. The first one was the work conducted by Peruvian and French chancelleries, which showcased the LPAA, the NAZCA portal and the role of non-Party stakeholders both in their bilateral negotiations and in the draft text. On this matter, the role of the French climate ambassador, Laurence Tubiana, who later became the first High-Level Climate Champion, is identified as a central piece to the negotiations (Hale, 2016; Widerberg, 2017). The second element is the leadership of AOSIS – Alliance of Small Island States - in the negotiation track of work stream 2 focusing on the pre-2020 ambition. Hale (2016) argues that due to the work in opposition to the track of mitigation negotiation in work stream 1, work stream 2 had an open space for the inclusion of sub/non-state actors in the text. The author describes how several countries supported the inclusion of transnational actors in work stream 2, such as the Alliance of Independent Latin American Countries, Mexico, the Nordic countries, and the Netherlands. However, the role of AOSIS was crucial.

“Because AOSIS listed work stream 2 as one its key priorities within the G77, it was able to overcome opposition from states that espoused more traditional views of sovereignty. Even though a number of larger developing countries were not enthusiastic about opening the UNFCCC more to sub/nonstate actors,

they were reluctant to thwart a key AOSIS priority within the G77” (Hale, 2016, p. 17)

Also, interviewees recalled that support from Parties was not homogenous at the beginning (2 and 16). But generally, Parties perception varied from neutral to positive due to the lack of familiarity with the process (8), or the fact that the Action Agenda was not a priority in the negotiations (11). The testimony of interviewee 1 summarizes the negotiation dynamics for the approval of a COP 21 Decision institutionalizing orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat.

“For a long time that was really an intergovernmental process and there was no real space for those (non-Party stakeholders) and so they didn't really see so much value. It kind of came from the outside. (...) And, I think more and more countries realized first that this was a voice you could not really restrain, and that now that this space existed, that there was value to hear those voices. And I think some thought that there's no not real value, but they were not going to shoot down for no reason these actors (non-Party stakeholders), and they would rather have a useless space where things were going on, but keeping them occupied, and actually going in front or opposition with them. So there's been progressive interest or understanding welcoming of their efforts and their role for most Parties, and I think that's not really in question right now.” (interviewee 1)

Finally, in a Note to the UN Secretary-general from December 17, 2015, a few days after COP-21, it is mentioned that:

“Member State interest in the LPAA and the action agenda remains high. Many have voiced the view that political momentum on climate actions must be maintained post-Paris. At COP21 it was decided that the future role of non-state actors and the action agenda would be strengthened through the creation of a framework through which such action can be enhanced and scaled-up. The basis has been provided for Parties and interested organization to build a lean and efficient support structured that enable the further growth of participation and development of new initiatives.”<sup>31</sup>

“But ultimately, what matters is that there was consensus among the Parties to engage the Lima Paris action agenda within the UNFCCC process. We have seen in the past there were many times where one actor or another wanting to do something different and that was rejected by the Parties.” (interviewee 15)

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<sup>31</sup> Appendix 2

### 3.5.4 Outcome

The outcome of those three causal mechanisms combined was the institutionalization of orchestration as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat. For interviewee 2, “it was a great success to have the non-Party stakeholders in the COP-21 Decision”. It is noteworthy that the literature designates the set combining the Paris Agreement and the COP-21 Decision as ‘the Paris Outcome’; and that non-Party stakeholders role is only mentioned in the COP21 Decision. The Decision introductory paragraphs on the matter acknowledge the LPAA (paragraph 116), and paragraph 117 “welcomes the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions, and encourages the registration of those actions in the NAZCA platform”, “the encouragement for Parties to work closely non-Party stakeholders” and “the encouragement of non-Party stakeholders to increase their engagement with the UNFCCC in the scope of the Technical Examination Process for both mitigation and adaptation” (paragraph 119).<sup>32</sup> In other words, this last paragraph formalizes the rapprochement between the transnational and intergovernmental spheres.

The formal mandate delegated from Parties to the UNFCCC Secretariat is described in paragraphs 120 to 123, and it covers the period from 2016 to 2020. Paragraph 120 “Agrees to convene, pursuant to decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 21, building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and in conjunction with each session of the Conference of the Parties during the period 2016–2020, a high-level event”. The events were conceived in the same spirit of the LPAA, meaning to strengthen high-level engagement, provide an opportunity for announcing new or strengthened initiatives, take stock of related progress, and provide an opportunity for the engagement of Parties and non-Party stakeholders. Moreover, paragraph 121 establishes the role of High-Level Climate Champions, for the period of 2016 to 2020, to be appointed to act on behalf of the President of the COPs. The role of the High-Level champions relies on the work with both the UNFCCC Executive Secretary and COP Presidencies to coordinate the annual high-level events, engage with Parties and non-Party stakeholders, “including to further the voluntary initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda” (paragraph 121), and provide guidance to the secretariat on the organization of technical expert meetings. Paragraph 122 decides that the High-level champions should serve for a term of two years. Undoubtedly, this decision mirrors the partnership of the Presidencies from COP20 and COP21 in the LPAA that

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<sup>32</sup> <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2> Access on 25 November 2020

gathered two COP Presidencies. Finally, paragraph 123, “Invites all interested Parties and relevant organizations to provide support for the work of the champions”.

The data collected showed that the final design of the Action Agenda builds on the role of the High-level champions: “The entire architecture is based on the High-Level Climate Champions (...) that is to engage non-state actors. It was the idea of having Champions from each presidency and always two in order to have this continuity” (interviewee 2). This was also recalled by interviewee 9: “having clear decision of non-party stakeholders until 2020, a mandate to set up high-level events and the role of the champions (...) we consciously or unconsciously left all that to the champions, the GCA and the UNFCCC Secretariat”. The prominent role of the Champions was also confirmed by interviewee 18, who said that this specific design “makes the process very political and lacking continuity”. Finally, according to interviewee 13, the choice of the High-Level champions demonstrated that the orchestration would not rely exclusively on the UNFCCC Secretariat.

“In the Paris Decision where you do have this recognition that non-state actors are encouraged to report to Nazca. But also there you see kind of the network design of the Global Climate Action Agenda. Because if you look at the Nazca portal, like that there's no page where you can kind of enter your information. (...) All go through data providers. Yes. that was introduced, for instance, a High-Level Climate Champion and the whole idea was that you could have a focal point for climate action on a more durable basis right. And, also to lift the burden of organizing all this stuff from Presidencies and the (UNFCCC) Secretariat.” (interviewee 13)

The institutionalization of the orchestration as a governance mode in the UNFCCC Secretariat is an outcome of the combination of three causal mechanisms that reflect the political process of the LPAA throughout 2015. However, securing the mandate provides little guidance on how the process would continue from an operational perspective.

### **3.6 Analyzing how the outcome unfolded in the period of 2016-2019**

The timeline of the orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat is well-established due to the launch of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action in 2016 and the relaunch of the NAZCA in 2019, that now is called Global Climate Portal<sup>33</sup>. Perhaps, most importantly, in 2019, Parties adopted the renewal period for the institutionalization of the orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat as described in the Decision of COP25. Since then, the mobilization of

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33 <https://unfccc.int/news/re-energised-global-climate-action-portal--country-pages> Access on 13 January 2021

non-Party stakeholders gained more traction with the launch of the campaign “Race to Zero” aimed at climate actions explicitly committing to carbon neutrality by 2050. The campaign is led by Gonzalo Muñoz and Nigel Topping, respectively the High-Level Champions of the Chilean and British COP Presidencies.

However, the first period of institutionalized orchestration (2016-2019) in the UNFCCC Secretariat was not linear. The aftermath of COP21 represented the end of the Peruvian and French partnership as the Presidency and incoming Presidency; and a new duo was established between France and Morocco, as the host of COP22. The Quartet was dissolved, and a new structure was established between the UNFCCC Secretariat and the rotating High-Level Champions. According to interviewee 9, “the steering committee of the LPAA was ended up in Paris. Actually, I don’t remember if we had a meeting after Paris; I don’t think we did.”

The period after COP21, until the launch of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action in the UNFCCC Secretariat, reflected the need to accommodate the COP21 Decision recommendations, the rearrangement of the teams in COP21 Presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the new pair of COP Presidencies, France and Morocco. For instance, the complexity of the issues that had to be considered for the operationalization of COP21 Decision is further demonstrated by a Concept Paper from December 31, 2015 sent by French President, François Hollande, to the UNSG, Ban Ki-moon, proposing the establishment of a dedicated team for the coordination of the international pre-2020 climate action under the auspices of the UNSG. The document states that “the team would be responsible for institutionalizing and uniting, under the authority of the United-Nations Secretary-General, the coordination of all dimensions of pre-2020 action.” And it suggests that the teamwork should follow on from the 2014 New York Climate Summit and the LPAA and be legally attached to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and based in Paris.<sup>34</sup>

The institutional architecture of the orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat was only established in COP22, when the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action was launched. The change of the name from LPAA to MPGCA was highlighted by interviewee 6:

“I think that Morocco, obviously, worked a lot for the continuity of the LPAA even if we called it the Marrakech Partnership. I don't know why, but everyone wants to have their name, of course. So that's okay. I would have preferred that it stayed Lima-Paris because it was nice to show that it had started in Lima.”  
(interviewee 6)

However, the political momentum for the LPAA did not resonate with the same strength in the post COP-21 period. In the words of interviewee 3:

“After Lima and after Paris the action agenda change a bit. For example, it was created the Marrakech Partnership for Climate Action, a more interesting way of organizing the action agenda as we have a more active participation of the UNFCCC Secretariat. (...) Now we have the two champions that are related to the host country of the of the COP. I don't want to go to evaluate but what it is clear to me it is at the Action Agenda in relation to the formal process has loose attention, its political moment, so forth. So, what is the happened to the action agenda in the formal process it is amazing but what is happening with the action agenda during COP its is (...) and in some way in I don't know why in the Action Agenda is that have a became to be a like a side event during the COP. So it has already lost that idea of being part of the formal discussion of the COP.”

This was echoed by a representative of a cooperative initiative:

“We have seen the interest decreasing over time, okay, in a way which is, to some extent embarrassing because I can understand very well that the parties are so busy trying to come up with the rulebook and trying to come up with their own processes that they don't have a lot of time to devote to the non-state actors. mentioned to me that the place where the non-state actors could play the best. (...) Certainly. they do not know what to do with us. They do not know.” (interviewee 5)

However, it should also be acknowledged that, even if the orchestration techniques were less relevant during the COPs, the Marrakech Partnership promoted other activities, such as the annual launch of the Yearbook of Global Climate Action and the Regional Climate Weeks in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin-America and Caribbean, bringing together diverse stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Also, one should note that the interviews were conducted prior to the launch of the “Race to Zero” campaign that has been able to generate a new momentum by mobilizing Parties and non-Party stakeholders actors that collectively represent 25% of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and over 50% of world's GDP.<sup>35</sup> However, the challenges raised by the interviewees on the status of the orchestration in the intergovernmental arena, including its presence in the COPs, and the perception of intermediaries about the orchestration process, are relevant. Here, it is noteworthy that Parties' perception of the orchestration process remained neutral or positive, making it possible to secure the orchestration renewal mandate at COP25. In the words of interviewee 11:

“I think that there is broad support among parties to be honest all across I think there is a different level of engagement, active engagement. So personally, I am not aware of any party at this point who has been I don't know openly critical

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<sup>35</sup> Available on <https://unfccc.int/climate-action/race-to-zero-campaign> Access on 25 January 2021

of the logic of the action agenda or the mandate, as you say. It's not the highest priority for everyone. And I think that comes clear, for example, when you look at the budget negotiation, or simply like the engagement because I think a lot of the activities or like the events or whatever the idea is to bring parties and non-party stakeholders together and there are very few parties which would show up regularly. In think of support to the mandate I am not aware of any big opponent.”

Bauer (2006) recalls that the UNFCCC Secretariat has “technical, procedural and legal expertise, control over the flow of information, impartiality, and sometimes skillful and charismatic leadership.” In a similar vein, Depledge (2007) argues that the Secretariat does have features, such as knowledge and a good reputation, that may be viewed as authoritative. However, she emphasizes that those features do not mean that the Secretariat can wield significant authority over the Parties. This is specifically critical to understand the development of the new role of the UNFCCC Secretariat, with a secured mandate to employ orchestration. Also, Depledge (2007) provides an innovative analysis of the relationship between the UNFCCC Secretariat and the COP Presidencies. The author states that “chairpersons and secretariats are locked into a mutually-enforcing relationship and symbiotic division of labor”. This rationale can be employed to understand the relationship of the Marrakech Partnership and the High-Level Champions, as stated on the 2020 Yearbook, “The Marrakech Partnership and the Champions can and must provide a core and go-to space in which that leadership can converge, collaborate and execute together.”

The proximity of the UNFCCC Secretariat, through the Marrakech Partnership, and the COP-Presidencies, through the appointed High-Level Champions, pervade the orchestration as a mode of governance in global climate governance. A clear heritage from the LPAA, the arrangement provides both benefits and potential setbacks. On the one hand, it can count with the support of a figure appointed by the COP Presidency (reinforcing the dialogue with those elected to conduct the negotiation process), and with the geographical diversity linked to the COP Presidencies’ elections. On the other hand, the institutional process might lack continuity in political leadership and may need to rapidly adapt to the different profiles and backgrounds of the High-Level Champions (as they might require the revision of the orchestration strategies).

### **3.7 The UNFCCC Secretariat as a responsive orchestrator**

In the context of the Paris Agreement and the need for an ambitious ratchet mechanism for the implementation of the NDCs, Abbott (2018) proposes that the orchestration strategy might incorporate at least three elements. First, the orchestrators could embed influential intermediaries into the intergovernmental review process aiming at action facilitation, the introduction of information and ideas to the formal process, and subtle pressures on Parties. For instance, the Global Stocktake to be conducted in 2023 is already taking into account the non-Party stakeholder integration into the intergovernmental process. Second, and thanks to the ideational and material support from orchestrators, intermediaries could provide mitigation and adaptation strategies to government. Third, orchestrators should ensure that ideas, information and evidence from non-Party stakeholders are clearly communicated to. In line with Abbott's (2018) argument, this chapter conceptualizes the need to expand the toolbox of orchestration techniques, especially to attain the third goal of connecting non-Party stakeholders' ideas and information to reach Parties in the most efficient approach.

The COP-25 Presidency requested that the Marrakech Partnership conducted an open process to gather feedback in order to strengthen the Global Climate Action Agenda and to ensure it was fit to face the present challenges of the climate agenda. The results were presented in the 2020 Yearbook of Global Climate Action, highlighting six core emerging themes:


- 1- a narrative focusing on implementation and progress acceleration towards emissions reductions, resilience and scale-up finance.
- 2- the need for Champions to be creative and innovative to ensure the Marrakech Partnership is updated.
- 3- the strengthening of party and non-party connections.
- 4- the need to increase involvement and representation from developing countries.
- 5- the need to establish a sustained and coherent structure in the UNFCCC Secretariat at the MP
- 6- the provision of a shared sense of progress, both to ensure accountability and refine the narrative around opportunity and leadership.

Moreover, the message from the 2020 Yearbook is clear, stating that 'as the formal space for non-Party stakeholders in the UNFCCC process, "the Marrakech Partnership must serve as a bridge between Parties and non-Parties to accelerate the positively reinforcing ambition loop on both sides", enabling them to accelerate the collective implementation of the Paris Agreement.' The COP-25 and COP-26 High-Level Climate Champions also introduced

their strategies and activities to build bridges between Parties and non-Party stakeholders. The first activity is to replicate the Global Stocktake process to assess the state of systems transformation in key sectors with clear linkages to NDCs. In doing so, the Marrakech Partnership will provide an open-source set of supporting tools and progress indicators for the NPS climate actions. The second activity is to create a renewed architecture for the Marrakech Partnership to create a bridge between Parties and non-Party stakeholders throughout the year, and not only during COPs. The third activity is to promote a review of the criteria for participation in the Marrakech Partnership, which might include science-based ambition and alignment with 1.5, among others.

Considering the evolution of the orchestration strategies, this chapter argues that the renewal period of the orchestration as a governance mode expanded it from its original functions. These were mainly based on catalyzing new initiatives, providing incentives, or showcasing the climate actions to encourage Parties to engage more ambitiously on the climate agenda. The new functions described by the 2020 Yearbook demonstrate that the UNFCCC Secretariat and the High-Level Champions will convene the intermediaries, request more information about their actions and provide both facilitation and systematization of the information to make it relevant for both intermediaries and Parties. The “reinforcement of the ambition loop on both sides” can be classified as a responsive orchestration, as it expands the orchestrators’ tools in their pursuit to attain their governance goals vis-à-vis the intermediary actors and the Parties.

**Figure 10: Types of orchestration**

Orchestration	$O \rightarrow I \rightarrow T$
Responsive orchestration	 <p>The diagram shows the sequence <math>O \rightarrow I \rightarrow T</math> with curved arrows indicating feedback loops: one from <math>T</math> back to <math>O</math>, one from <math>T</math> back to <math>I</math>, and one from <math>I</math> back to <math>O</math>.</p>

Source: elaborated by the author

It is critical to recall that Abbott et al. (2015) coined the orchestration term by establishing a relation in which the incentives and support of the orchestrators to intermediaries would allow the latter to govern targets in line with the orchestrator’s goals (O-I-T). However, the orchestration case of the UNFCCC Secretariat cannot be classified as an ad hoc endeavor. Its institutionalization and renewal of mandate until 2025 will require a review process to keep

the governance mechanisms relevant to the new challenges of an era of implementation of the Paris Agreement at the national level according to each Party commitment presented in their NDCs.

The functions of catalyzing the establishment of individual and collective climate action as well as encouraging, assisting, and steering non-state and subnational actors' activities will still be needed. Even if it is not possible to connect the success of the Race to Zero Campaign so far to the recent announcements of Parties, e.g., China and Japan, to advance net zero targets, the narrative of non-Party stakeholders' commitments is once more successful at the global level in terms of mobilization. This groundswell of ambitious climate commitments will set the scene at COP26 in a scenario highly characterized by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, once the COP26 is completed, the challenges will remain for the UNFCCC Secretariat and the High-Level Climate Champions.

Responsive orchestration advances that the orchestrator can convene the intermediaries and facilitate their integration with Parties, as stated on the new strategies for the Marrakech Partnership. Thanks to its unique position at the center of the intergovernmental process at the UNFCCC Secretariat, and as the most prominent space for non-Party stakeholders, the Marrakech Partnership can act as a knowledge broker between intermediaries (NPS) and targets (Parties). In line with the orchestration theory, the new techniques will not involve mandatory control, as the orchestrator will still rely on indirect and soft governance. Also, responsive orchestration demonstrates more clearly to the Parties the benefits of this governance mode by facilitating the exchange of information with non-Party stakeholders. As for the intermediaries, besides the benefits of classical orchestration, such as legitimacy gain and reduction of overlaps, they will also profit from the connection with Parties. In sum, the institutionalization of the orchestration has challenged its leaders to expand their techniques to fit the emerging needs of an era of implementation of the Paris Agreement.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

The institutionalization of the orchestration as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat as stated in the COP21 Decision, and consequently the rapprochement of the transnational and intergovernmental spheres in global climate governance, consolidated the climate regime as a catalytic and facilitative model (Hale, 2016). This chapter investigated the conditions underlying the formal recognition of the non-Party stakeholders in the intergovernmental process, as established in COP21 Decision. It is argued that the recognition

of the LPAA as the fourth pillar of the French Presidency for the Paris Climate Summit catalyzed a series of mechanisms that allowed the COP21 Decision outcome. Those mechanisms are built on the uniqueness of the Quartet's orchestration of the LPAA, the configuration of the LPAA initiatives and the Parties' support to the continuity of the process.

Nonetheless, orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat has not been linear. The needed negotiation phase of the Paris Agreement rulebook in the intergovernmental process has been technical and more distant of the implementation approach of non-Party stakeholders' climate actions. One can observe a positive shift with the recent launch of the "Race to Zero" campaign by COP25 and COP26 Presidencies and the Marrakech Partnership. The campaign goal is to mobilize more climate commitments built on net-zero emission targets by 2050 from both Parties and non-Party stakeholders. The deliverables of this new orchestration platform are connected to the need to deliver actions on the ground that will be reflected at the national level. In this sense, the COP25 and COP26 High-Level Champions and the Marrakech Partnership presented their strategy of building bridges between Parties and non-Party stakeholders. This chapter conceptualizes that orchestration techniques expansion, in which the orchestrator aims to impact both intermediaries and targets, as a responsive orchestration. In this model, the orchestrator maps, analyzes and systematizes the information from the intermediaries to facilitate the connections between intermediaries and Parties.

## CHAPTER 4: AN ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND OUTPUT PERFORMANCE OF THE LIMA-PARIS ACTION AGENDA INITIATIVES

### 4.1- Introduction

In addition to the setting-up process of the LPAA, it is critical to examine the LPAA initiatives. While the previous chapter explained how the LPAA was conceived and operationalized by the Quartet in the run-up to COP21, and how it was institutionalized within the UNFCCC Secretariat afterward, this chapter aims to analyze the 78 cooperative initiatives<sup>36</sup> that were members of the LPAA in the 2014-2019 period.

An independent assessment of the LPAA initiatives, led by the Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions (GGCA) network<sup>37</sup>, was published during COP21 providing the state of art of those initiatives until December 2015. The network has continued to assess not only LPAA initiatives, but also cooperative initiatives registered on the Global Climate Action Portal (former NAZCA portal) and other initiatives announced in international climate summits, such as the One Planet Summit and the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit. The GGCA comprehensive analysis has been published in academic journals (see Chan et al. 2016) and it has also been acknowledged in the UNFCCC publications, such as the Yearbooks of Climate Action<sup>38</sup>.

The analysis conducted in this chapter is built on the GGCA work. And it goes further by seeking to understand which governance arrangements and accountability mechanisms are associated with better performance of the cooperative initiatives that are part of the LPAA. The analysis reveals several important trends that broaden our understanding of the role of cooperative initiatives in global climate governance. First, almost 50% of the LPAA cooperative initiatives have hybrid members comprising public, private and civil society actors. This provides additional evidence that the *loci* of authority are expanding not only to private authority forms - as presented by Green (2014) - but also to hybrid arrangements. Second, the data provides preliminary evidence suggesting that cooperative initiatives rely mostly on public funding for their actions. Third, cooperative initiatives' most common functions are "knowledge dissemination" and "campaign".

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<sup>36</sup> This thesis uses non-state and subnational actors – meaning individual actors - and cooperative initiatives - actors, including public authorities, gather in a collaborative governance arrangement - to denote a wide variety of actors and organizations that are considered as non-party stakeholders to the UNFCCC.

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.climategroundswell.org/> Access on 29 January 2020

<sup>38</sup> [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA\\_Yearbook2019.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA_Yearbook2019.pdf) Access on 29 January 2020

Following this introduction, a literature review is conducted on the theoretical debate about the accountability and performance of cooperative initiatives in global climate governance. Then, the research design adopted to investigate how governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives are associated with their performance is introduced. Building on the first two sections, an overview of the quantitative methodology is presented. This includes an explanation on the elaboration of the database for conducting t-tests. In the subsequent section, an analysis is proposed associating governance arrangements and the performance of cooperative initiatives. This analysis draws on empirical evidence from the database developed for this thesis. The final section includes conclusions and recommendations for further research, as well as for policymakers and practitioners at the international level.

## **4.2- Literature review**

The work to date about cooperative initiatives can be roughly divided into three main areas. First, scholars look at the emergence of cooperative initiatives and their functions in global climate governance. Second, literature offers explanations for the relations initiatives establish with the realm of public authority, both at the national and international levels. Some of these arguments and concepts have been discussed in previous chapters, but they are revisited focusing on LPAA initiatives. Third, there is a debate about the effectiveness and performance of initiatives when it comes to the delivery of their climate action promises. All those themes are further developed in the following subsections.

### **4.2.1 – Introducing the LPAA initiatives**

The rationale behind the gathering of high-level and ambitious cooperative initiatives as members of the LPAA is quite evident given the Quartet's thorough orchestration process in the run-up to COP21 (Widerberg, 2017; GGCA, 2015; Bäckstrand and Küyper, 2017). The independent assessment conducted by the GGCA for COP-21 advances three key findings as to the most up-to-date information in December 2015. First, the LPAA initiatives presented a high level of ambition, especially regarding their contribution to climate change mitigation, but several initiatives did not have enough clarity on the nature of their targets. Second, there was an unbalanced geographic "participation"<sup>39</sup> in over 10,000 instances of participation in LPAA

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<sup>39</sup> The authors measure "participation" as the number of times an actor joins any initiative, not the absolute number of actors participating in any initiative. For example, if the state of California joins 10 initiatives, it is counted as 10 instances of participation. According to the authors, this approach measures both the breadth and intensity of participation across actors.

initiatives. More precisely, at that time, 84% of the instances of participation came from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Excluding the "Covenant of Mayors" Initiative, which counts with thousands of European cities as partners, the OECD's instances of participation drop to 64%. As for the developing countries, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa presented medium levels of participation. Third, there was room for improvement considering the institutional capacity of the initiatives, such as staff or secretariat, budgets, and monitoring arrangements. The last finding is a core theme throughout this chapter; therefore, a comprehensive debate will be provided in the next sections. Additionally, and still based on the data from the GGCA independent assessment from 2015, another interesting evidence to be highlighted is the impressive scope of engagement from the LPAA initiatives worldwide. As mapped in the GGCA analysis, LPAA initiatives aim to be implemented in every single country in the world - except Liechtenstein. And only 15 countries do not have a single actor participation in one of the initiatives.

The Quartet divided the 78 LPAA initiatives into twelve categories: agriculture, buildings, business, cities and regions, energy access and efficiency, forest, innovation, private finance, renewable energy, resilience, transport, and short-lived climate pollutants. Perhaps two of the most prominent characteristics of these initiatives are that (1) most of them were also part of the 2014 UN Climate Summit, and that (2) a considerable number of LPAA initiatives were members of umbrella frameworks, meaning that a common framework of governance responded to different initiatives. Overall, these cooperative initiatives, comprising various and complex governance arrangements, were showcased by the Quartet as high-level and ambitious initiatives to support Parties to achieve the climate goals presented in their NDCs.

For instance, the Low Carbon Technology Partnerships Initiatives (LCTPi), convened by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), acted as an umbrella framework for four LPAA initiatives, namely: "Carbon Capture and Storage", "Cement", "Chemical", and "Renewables". While recognizing that COP-21 provided a key moment for business to support climate action, LCTPi seeks to create a solid framework for low carbon investment through a strengthened dialogue between business and government.<sup>40</sup> Another interesting example is demonstrated by the initiatives under the umbrella framework of the "Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform of Sustainable Energy for All" (SEforALL), launched by the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in 2011. SEforALL has three objectives:

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<sup>40</sup> For more information about LCTPi initiatives <https://docs.wbcsd.org/2016/05/LCTPi-PWC-Impact-Analysis.pdf> Access 31 January 2020

(1) ensuring universal access to modern energy services; (2) doubling the rate of improvement in energy efficiency; and (3) doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. The umbrella framework of SEforALL comprises seven LPAA initiatives: “Buildings Efficiency Accelerator Platform”, “en.lighten Initiative”, “Global District Energy Accelerator”, “Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform”, “Global Fuel Economy Initiative”, “Industry Energy Efficiency Accelerator”, and “United for Efficiency”. As indicated by Lundsgaarde (2017), the members of the initiatives of the SEforALL can take different governance shapes. For example, UNEP acts as an implementing mechanism for the “Global District Energy Accelerator”, and the World Resources Institute – a non-state actor – exercises a coordinating role concerning the “Buildings Efficiency Accelerator Platform”.

In fact, not only is UNEP a member of several LPAA initiatives but also the leading organization for the “Climate and Clean Air Coalition” (CCAC) - a voluntary partnership of governments, intergovernmental organizations, businesses, scientific institutions, and civil society organizations - that can also be considered a umbrella framework for three LPAA initiatives: “CCAC Oil & Gas Methane Partnership”, “CCAC Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs” and “Global Green Freight Initiative”.

Additionally, there are some overlapping initiatives. For example, the “Business Leadership Criteria on Carbon Pricing”, headed by the UN Global Compact, is also part of the “Caring for Climate”, which is jointly led by the United Nations Global Compact, the UNFCCC Secretariat and UNEP. Moreover, it is possible to capture overlaps in the forest thematic area of the LPAA. The “Bonn Challenge”, the “Lima Challenge” and the “New York Declaration of Forests” (NYDF) are aligned; and the NYDF is also one of the Bonn Challenge’s endorsers.<sup>41</sup>

#### **4.2.2- Governance modes ruling the LPAA initiatives**

The brief description of a few LPAA initiatives in the last subsection illustrates how cooperative initiatives have become a multilayered phenomenon. It is, therefore, unsurprising that complexity also echoes on other issues related to cooperative initiatives, such as their governance arrangements and their functions.

While the concept of private authority, introduced in the literature review chapter, is crucial to explain the emergence of the transnational sphere, and also acts an auxiliary concept

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<sup>41</sup> <https://www.bonnchallenge.org/blog/restoration-tracker-interview> Access 31 January 2020

that enhances our understanding on a restrict number of LPAA initiatives (such as the "Airport Carbon Accreditation" and "Taxis4SmartCities Initiative"), it is not comprehensive enough to capture the complex landscape of governance arrangements of the initiatives. LPAA initiatives include several examples that do not fit Green's (2014) private authority definition. For instance, initiatives gathering public authorities, such as subnational actors in the "Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance" or the "Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy"; also, initiatives comprising international organizations and states, such as "4/1000 Initiative: Soils for Food Security and Climate" or "International Solar Alliance"; and, initiatives that can be categorized as "first-party" standards, such as "Business Leadership Criteria on Carbon Pricing" or "Science-based Targets". As emphasized by Widerberg and Stripple (2016), a large number of cooperative initiatives are driven by nation-states involving both other states and non-state actors.

Regarding the internal governance arrangements of all LPAA initiatives, the GGCA independent assessment shows that around half of the initiatives can be considered robustly institutionalized according to organizational features such as staff or secretariats, budgets, work plans, and monitoring arrangements. Alongside these organizational features, funding should also be considered in the evaluation of cooperative initiatives' institutional robustness. For instance, Bäckstrand and Kylsäter (2014) note that the UN Public-Private Partnerships for the Rio+20 Summit remain government dominated with respect to their funding sources, governance structures, and implementation mechanisms. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that the same would be reproduced in the LPAA initiatives, as not only were they orchestrated by the intergovernmental sphere but are also comprised of international organizations and states. The next section will delve further into the descriptive statistics related to the governance arrangements and organizational features of the LPAA initiatives.

Finally, as all LPAA initiatives belong to a set of orchestration for COP21, it is important to contrast to which type of orchestration they were submitted to. While seeking to move beyond the concept of orchestration, Hale and Roger (2014) expand the concept in two directions. First, they note that individual states can and have engaged in orchestration alongside international organizations. Second, they point out that even if orchestration is often used to initiate cooperative initiatives, orchestrators can also try to shape or support existing initiatives. At the broadest level, the LPAA data set gathers initiatives in both orchestration types. For instance, the "Business Alliance for Water and Climate" and "Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change Call to Action" were initiated by the orchestrators. In

parallel, “Maritime Regions in Action against Climate Change”, created in 1973, and “WWF Climate Savers”, launched in 1999, were shaped by the orchestrators towards COP21.

### **4.3- Accountability for hybrid cooperative initiatives**

The literature suggests that the increased participation of the transnational sphere in global climate governance raises accountability questions (Chan and Pattberg, 2008; Avant et al. 2010; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2017; Küyper et al. 2017). In this chapter, the main purpose is to investigate the relationship between cooperative governance arrangements, including accountability mechanisms, and their performance. For this reason, the analysis draws on the accountability models for hybrid cooperative initiatives proposed by Widerberg and al. (2019).

The authors point out that cooperative initiatives generate a considerable amount of data, studies, and reports. In their view, this means that cooperative initiatives could improve the conditions to hold the initiatives accountable for their activities. Here, the underlying assumption is that cooperative initiatives could be submitted to peer or reputational accountability mechanisms through more transparency and publicity of their commitments. However, Widerberg and colleagues do not imply that cooperative initiatives are submitted only to horizontal accountability mechanisms. On the contrary, they conduct four case studies extracted from the CONNECT database. By conducting case studies of accountability mechanisms in four cooperative initiatives, Widerberg et al (2019) conclude that there are two accountability models for cooperative initiatives: certification-based approaches and disclosure-based approaches. They conceptualize the first model, certification-based approach, as having detailed safeguards ensuring that targets comply with certification standards, especially when there is a system of third-party verification. By contrast, the disclosure-based approaches model relies on disclosing information about behaviors and on the accomplishments of participating actors. Once again, the two models advanced by Widerberg et al. (2019) can be found among LPAA initiatives. For instance, “Airport Carbon Accreditation” can be categorized as a certification-based approach; and “Divest-Invest Global Movement” as a disclosure-based approach.

### **4.4- Cooperative initiative performance assessment**

There is a growing literature looking at ex-ante assessments of cooperative initiatives (Blok et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2015; Graichen et al., 2017; Höhne et al. 2015; UNEP, 2015). Hsu

et al. (2019) propose that the likelihood of implementation can be measured through direct metrics (such as percentage reductions delivered towards a quantified emission target) or by proxies (money invested, actions implemented to support a goal, institutionalization of the commitment). However, the authors note that several studies assessing non-state climate action utilize differing assumptions, methodologies, and data sources, which does not allow for accurate comparisons or global aggregation. The authors highlight that data about cooperative initiatives are often scarce and non-transparent (including ex-post data). The situation is further complicated by the diverse reporting requirements and multiple accounting methodologies used by reporting platforms.

While Hsu et al. (2019) argue for a reporting framework to aggregate the contributions of subnational and non-state actors to global climate mitigation, they acknowledge the importance of a literature focused on evaluating other aspects of those actors' contributions to climate governance, including experimentation, orchestration, capacity-building, information and knowledge sharing, and implementation.

Although they are difficult (if not impossible) to quantify, they may provide necessary catalytic linkages between actors, including linkages with national governments, to orchestrate and implement a range of climate actions. In moving towards a scientific evidence base for non-state and subnational climate actions to global climate change mitigation, adaptation, and governance, these critical functions should not be overlooked in favor of quantifying GHG emissions (Hsu et al. 2019, p. 12).

While agreeing with the argument advanced by Hsu et al. (2019) about the importance of other critical functions performed by cooperative initiatives, it is acknowledged the work conducted by Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016) on the potential of cooperative initiatives to contribute to GHG emissions reductions. Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016) offer a more nuanced assessment, positing that cooperative initiatives' ambition is way too low to close the emissions gap under the Paris Agreement. The authors conducted an analysis of 109 initiatives against four criteria: (1) existence of a mitigation target, (2) the provision of incentives for mitigation, (3) the specification of a baseline from which mitigation is determined, (4) and the existence of provision for MRV mitigation. Surprisingly, the authors conclude that about half of the initiatives do not fulfill any of these basic criteria, while about 13% meet the criteria. One of the study's main findings is that the main purpose of most initiatives is simply some networking. Moreover, they argue that cooperative initiatives tend to show a convincing design only in response to international regulation.

This approach has a conservative view of the role of cooperative initiatives and can be contrasted with the notion of providing political momentum for the engagement of actors in climate actions. This latter seeks to convey a positive vision of cooperative initiatives; and that was ultimately the main motivation for the establishment of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. Additionally, Chan et al. (2016) argue that climate actions that do not directly set out to achieve GHG emission reduction or adaptation could still have a significant indirect impact on global climate governance, for instance by influencing awareness and behavior.

As noted above, goals on adaptation should also be considered as part of the cooperative landscape goals. Scholars have looked at this particular feature of transnational initiatives. It is possible to observe a growing number of cooperative initiatives focusing on adaptation (Persson, 2019). However, they are underrepresented when compared to mitigation actions, and should have a renewed emphasis as the majority (85%) of NDCs, especially by poorer countries focus on the need for adaptation. (Chan and Amling, 2019). Regarding the LPAA initiatives, thematic areas such as resilience, agriculture, and forest gather initiatives with a focus on adaptation, such as the "4/1000 Initiative: Soils for Food Security and Climate", "Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems", "InsuResilience", and "Food Security Climate Resilience Facility".

Chan et al. (2016) draw attention to the fact that any assessment of performance is conceptually and empirically challenging. The authors consider that, given the relative novelty of most of the climate actions implemented by non-state and subnational actors, an assessment of effectiveness in terms of actual environmental or behavioral impacts is not possible. However, they point out that cooperative initiatives can produce relevant and tangible outputs relatively quickly. In this sense, they propose a method called "function-output-fit" (FOF) which focuses on the output effectiveness. It is built on Young's (2011) definition, that is: "outputs or regulations and infrastructure created to move a regime from paper to practice". The FOF method, applied by Chan et al. (2016) and used as the basis for the ClimateSouth Project, relies on Pattberg et al.'s (2012) analysis of partnership for sustainable development. The main goal of FOF is to measure whether the output delivered by cooperative initiatives is consistent with their main functions.

The underlying rationale of the FOF method is that cooperative initiatives that deliver specific and relevant outputs are more likely to achieve desired impacts in the longer term (Chan et al. 2016). According to the authors, outputs should be considered as part of a long chain of effects, as they constitute the precondition for achieving other forms of effectiveness. They


conclude by defending that output performance remains an important first step, as the absence of any outputs would raise questions about the cooperative initiatives' activities.

### **4.3- LPAA cooperative initiatives: descriptive statistics**

During my doctoral exchange period at the German Development Institute (DIE) under the supervision of Professor Sander Chan, I was a member of the coders' team responsible for updating the ClimateSouth Database for the 2019 outputs. This experience has allowed me to gain in-depth knowledge about the FOF method, from coding to the analysis of the results. Consequently, all the work in this chapter of the thesis, from data collection to FOF results, draws on this enriching research experience.


Before explaining the research design adopted for this chapter, it is fundamental to examine some governance features of LPAA initiatives. To this end, the ClimateSouth Database constitutes a major source, as it is a repository of information on cooperative initiatives encompassing governance arrangements, functions, and outputs. Most of the information presented in this section relies on the ClimateSouth Database.

As already stated, LPAA initiatives were categorized by the orchestrators into twelve thematic areas. Figure 11 shows that most initiatives are gathered under the thematic area 'resilience'. As for the other thematic areas, it is possible to state that there was a balance in terms of cooperative initiatives; except for three thematic areas (building, short-lived climate pollutants, and innovation) that together represent approximately only 7% of the LPAA cooperative initiatives.

**Figure 11: LPAA thematic areas**


Source: adapted by the authors based on the LPAA website

As shown in Figure 12, the majority of LPAA initiatives were launched in the run-up to COP21. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the LPAA orchestration process relied much more on “initiating” initiatives, as coined by Hale and Roger (2014), than “shaping” already existing cooperative initiatives. Here, it is also important to highlight that, as up to 2019, out of 78 initiatives only 13 were no longer active (ClimateSouth Database). For instance, all four LCTPi initiatives were finished in 2018. Despite the novelty that cooperative initiatives represented when the LPAA was launched, the majority of the initiatives have consolidated themselves in the transnational sphere of global climate governance.

**Figure 12: LPAA Initiatives Launch by year**


Source: adapted by the authors based on ClimateSouth Database

The LPAA initiatives are mainly headquartered in the United States of America and European countries (see Figure 13). As the headquarters' location corresponds to where the leading organization of each initiative is based and considering that international organizations embody this role for a great part of initiatives, it is plausible that the USA and Switzerland rank among the three most relevant locations. It is not surprising that France completes the podium, as the French government developed a great leadership role in the LPAA orchestrator Quartet. Finally, the United Arab Emirates rank can be explained by the fact that the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), a relevant international organization in the LPAA process, is headquartered in Abu Dhabi.

**Figure 13: LPAA Initiatives headquarter location**

Source: adapted by the authors based on ClimateSouth Database

Due to the orchestration design process, the great majority of LPAA cooperative initiatives' outputs are global (see Figure 14). Only approximately 15% of the outputs are specifically delivered in one geographic area. Considering that some initiatives were conceived with a specific geographical focus, such as “Adaptation of West African Coastal Area” and “African Clean Energy Corridor Initiative”, Africa ranks as the first geographic area for location outputs.


**Figure 14: LPAA Initiatives Location outputs**

Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database

To categorize the LPAA cooperative initiatives according to their member institutions, this thesis adopts the governance triangle conceptual model, proposed by Abbott and Snidal (2009) and picked up by Widerberg et al (2019). The governance triangle is divided into seven zones, which allows the mapping of which cooperative initiatives are public, private, CSO or hybrid. Zone 1 gathers all cooperative initiatives with members that are exclusively public, such as international organizations, states, and subnational actors. Zone 2 comprises private LPAA initiatives with companies and private financial institutions as members. Zone 3 contains all the initiatives with members from civil society organizations. Zones 4, 5, 6 and 7 comprise all the hybrid combinations. Zone 4 combines public and private members. Zone 5 captures the combination of public actors and civil society organizations. Zone 6 shows the combined membership of the private sector and civil society organizations. Finally, Zone 7 represents all cooperative initiatives gathering the three categories.

As shown in Figure 15, Zone 7 gathers the majority of the initiatives - 43,6%. This evidence demonstrates that the LPAA orchestration process fostered the consolidation of hybrid initiatives with public, private, and civil society collaborations. Furthermore, when adding Zones 1, 2, 3, it is revealed that only 20,9% of the initiatives comprise only one type of actor (public, private or civil society organizations). Surprisingly, public actors are very relevant to LPAA, as Zone 1 comprises 14,1% of the cooperative initiatives; the same percentage of Zone 5 (public and civil society organizations).

**Figure 15: Governance Triangle of LPAA initiatives**



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the governance triangle Abbott and Snidal (2009) and Widerberg et al. (2019)

#### **4.4- Research design**

The data presented in this chapter are among the first to examine the performance of cooperative initiatives as the dependent variable. The analysis aims to provide an overview of cooperative initiatives that are members of the LPAA in the period between 2014 and 2019, and their governance arrangements, such as accountability mechanisms. The new data, with the aggregation of independent variables, provide a critical first step in understanding how multiple actors perform in global climate governance.

The hypotheses of this chapter are tested for a total of 78 climate cooperative initiatives that are members of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. The database built for this chapter includes an adapted and updated dataset of the LPAA cooperative initiatives' annual performance assessment, from 2014 to 2019, based on the ClimateSouth Database (2019). Considering that each initiative has an annual performance assessment, there are 416 observations for the quantitative analysis. At the same time, the database comprises variables for categorizing (1) the members of the initiatives, based on the governance triangle definition developed in Abbott and Snidal (2009), and that were later applied in Widerberg et al. (2019); (2) the funders of initiatives, according to the latest information available on the initiatives' websites and official reports; (3) the type of orchestration, as presented in Hale and Roger (2014) and utilized by Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016); (4) the accountability mechanisms adopted by the initiatives, based on Widerberg and Pattberg (2019), and (5) the main focus of the initiatives regarding mitigation or adaptation climate actions.

##### **4.4.1 Research questions and hypotheses**

As a very recent phenomenon in global climate governance, there are gaps in the literature about what features affect cooperative initiatives' performance. Although there have been advances in the literature, for instance, regarding effectiveness (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2016,) and the impact of the NDCs (Hsu et al. 2019), questions remain unanswered. How can cooperative initiatives' output performance be assessed? To what extent do different types of internal governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives matter for their output performance? To what extent does the adoption of more stringent accountability mechanisms relate to the output performance of cooperative initiatives? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by testing three hypotheses.

H1: Cooperative initiatives with the participation of public actors have higher FOF performance.

Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016) built a model to test what features are related to the design of mitigation-oriented cooperative initiatives. The authors assume that mitigation-oriented initiatives would be more effective in global climate governance, as they would fill the remaining emissions gaps. That said, they find a negative correlation between cooperative initiatives comprising only private members and the establishment of mitigation-oriented initiatives. Moreover, the authors point out that government support in setting up an initiative is positively linked to a mitigation-oriented design.

One potential approach to advance the debate is to consider the effect of cooperative initiatives' members (public, private, civil society-based or hybrid) on other dependent variables, such as their output performance. The view advanced by Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016) seems consistent with the hypothesis that the participation of public institutions, be it an international organization, a state or a subnational actor, has a positive effect on the cooperative initiative's performance.

H2: Cooperative initiatives with certification-based approach accountability mechanisms have higher FOF performance.

Widerberg et al. (2019) conclude that certification-based initiatives have a more rigorous process and detailed standards for their members than disclosure-based initiatives. This suggests a general tendency of a more stringent compliance assessment of the members of certification-based initiatives towards the initiatives' goals and targets, possibly also with an effect on the FOF performance.

H3: Cooperative initiatives categorized as "shaped" by the orchestration process have higher FOF performance.

Hale and Roger (2014) argue that a potential orchestrator becomes interested in shaping or supporting cooperative initiatives when the initiative has already achieved a considerable degree of success or impact. In contrast, orchestrators will initiate a cooperative initiative if there is no focal point. In this view, it is expected that cooperative initiatives categorized as "shaped" will have a better FOF performance, as they have already presented tangible deliverables identified by the orchestrators.

## **4.5- Methodology**

This subsection introduces the methodology applied to this chapter. First, it explains how data was collected. Second, it introduces the FOF method for assessing the performance of cooperative initiatives. Third, it presents the operationalization of the variables for the t-test.

### **4.5.1 Data collection**

The database designed for this chapter offers a comprehensive picture of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda cooperative initiatives, and it allows us to present descriptive statistics about the initiatives. The universe of cases was easily determined, as only the initiatives part of the LPAA were considered. The official number of initiatives varies in the literature. For this study, all 78 initiatives mentioned on the website in December 2015 were coded in the database. Next, the challenge was to determine what is understood by 'initiatives' performance'. The departure point was the ClimateSouth database, as I was a member of the coding team during my doctoral exchange period in the German Development Institute (DIE). To build the database for this chapter, the coded information on the ClimateSouth database was triangulated by comparing it with multiple sources in the academic and policy literatures about cooperative initiatives (e.g. articles that are in-depth cases of one specific initiative). Additionally, the initiatives' website and social media accounts were reviewed to confirm the information coded in the ClimateSouth database. The same process of triangulating information from academic and policy literatures about cooperative initiatives and their publicly available information was applied to code the additional variables for this chapter.

### **4.5.2 Assessing climate cooperative initiatives performance: Function-Output-Fit Method**

Considering that not all cooperative initiatives deliver their promises on climate actions, it is critical to assess their performance over time and to compare their deliverables against their functions. Hence, this study aims to investigate the association between cooperative initiatives' governance arrangements and their performance, based on the ClimateSouth database and the Function-Output-Fit (FOF) method.

Hsu et al. (2019) argue that the FOF method provides an early signal as to whether an initiative is on track to deliver key outcomes that are often necessary to achieve climate impacts. According to Chan et al (2008), FOF assesses the consistency between functions and

attributable and tangible production (outputs). Moreover, Widerberg and Stripple defend that the FOF method measures both level and quality of cooperative initiatives' activities.

"Chan et al. use a measure called 'FOF,' which has been developed by Pattberg et al. to assess the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder partnerships. FOF matches a cooperative initiative's declared function with its observed outputs and assesses their 'fit,' that is, does the cooperative initiative do what it says it will do. It thus measures both level and quality of any activities emerging from the cooperative initiative. For instance, if a cooperative initiative claims to engage in knowledge production and dissemination, checks if there are publications, events, and homepages associated with the initiative." (Widerberg and Stripple, 2016, p. 494)

In this chapter's analysis, the assessment of cooperative initiatives' performance is based on the FOF method applied to build the ClimateSouth Database<sup>42</sup> and also applied to sustainability partnerships before that (Pattberg et al., 2012). The ClimateSouth Database contains data on cooperative actions registered in the Global Climate Action Portal (former NAZCA) and other high-level climate processes, such as the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, UN Climate Summit, and One Planet Summit. The database is divided into four categories of information regarding cooperative initiatives: actors; organizational characteristics; the geography of implementation; and output performance. The data collection relies on publicly available sources such as press releases, cooperative initiatives' websites and social media accounts, and information shared by the initiatives in the UN portals such as NAZCA and the Climate Initiatives Platform (CIP).

According to the FOF method, up to three main functions can be selected, then the outputs are coded (Chan et al. 2018). In a final step, FOF is determined by comparing whether a cooperative initiative's production, meaning its output activities, is consistent with its functions. For instance, it is expected that a cooperative initiative with a "funding" function would produce outputs such as "providing funding". Finally, the authors argue that cooperative initiatives with a higher FOF are more likely to achieve their intended impacts than those with lower or null FOF. The importance of analyzing a longer period is defended by the authors when affirming that a lack of output performance in the first life year of a cooperative initiative does not mean failure, as the initiative can take longer to deliver its outputs.

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<sup>42</sup> The project "Strengthening non-state climate action in the Global South" (ClimateSouth) is led by the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI).

As for the database built for this thesis, the FOF results for each cooperative initiative member of the LPAA were updated considering a review of the functions. During my period as a member of the ClimateSouth team, there was a debate on whether the function "training" could be merged to "capacity building". For this reason, when I built the database for this chapter, I merged the functions "training" and "capacity building". As illustrated in Table 8, the database developed for this chapter establishes that cooperative initiatives can be categorized into eleven functions.

**Table 8: Functions categories**

III.1	<b>Knowledge production</b>	Production of knowledge, information, innovation (scientific or applied)
III.2	<b>Knowledge dissemination</b>	Dissemination of knowledge, including dissemination of 'good practices'
III.3	<b>Technical implementation &amp; 'on the ground' action</b>	(e.g., local pilot projects, new installations, infrastructure) - Implementation of previously existing technologies, mitigation and/or adaptation plans and policies, including pilot and demonstration projects, building infrastructure and resilience driven-infrastructure, forest restoration, among others
III.4	<b>Institutional capacity building</b>	Developing and strengthening the skills, abilities, processes, and resources that organizations and communities need to survive and adapt, including training of social actors, employees or students.
III.5	<b>Norm &amp; standard setting</b>	Setting up new norms or standards, or spreading the use of such new norms, including the certification of products. Excluding internal (organizational) norm-setting and policies (ruling out corporate social responsibility).
III.6	<b>Campaigning</b>	Campaigns, including raising public awareness on a given topic and education of the public at large
III.7	<b>Lobbying</b>	Lobbying restricted to pressure applied on governmental actors from non-governmental ones
III.8	<b>Increasing participation</b>	Building new social institutions (with or without legal status, for instance, new partnerships) or expanding existing support organizations

III.9	<b>Funding</b>	Providing funds and/or financial services for climate-related projects or raising funds
III.10	<b>Product development</b>	Developing new or renewed climate-friendly commercial products and services. Excluding financial services
III.11	<b>Policy planning</b>	Facilitating policy planning at national or subnational levels (e.g., with the development of policy tools and instruments), including the production of large policy plans, development or planning of policy instruments

Source: elaborated by the author based on Chan et al. (2018)

According to the FOF method, up to three of the most relevant functions for each initiative can be coded. Afterward, data is gathered on 26 output categories for every initiative per year. In case it is not possible to attribute a year for an output produced by the initiative, the output should be coded as unknown.

**Table 9: Output categories**

1.Publication (Research, <i>PUB_RES</i> )	2.Publication (Advocacy, <i>PUB_ADV</i> )	3.Publication (Standards, <i>PUB_STA</i> )	4.Publication (Education, <i>PUB_EDU</i> )
5.Publication Policy ( <i>PUB_POL</i> )	6.Publication (Emissions Reports, <i>PUB_EMR</i> )	7.Publication (Reports, <i>PUB_REP</i> )	8.Data aggregator ( <i>DTB</i> )
9.Event Participation (Policy to Policy, <i>EPA_POL</i> )	10.Event Participation (Science to Science, <i>EPA_S2S</i> )	11.Event Participation (Science to Policy, <i>EPA_SCP</i> )	12.Event Participation (Popular, <i>EPA_POP</i> )
13.Event Organization (Policy to Policy, <i>EVO_POL</i> )	14.Event Organization (Science to Science, <i>EVO_S2S</i> )	15.Event Organization (Science to Policy, <i>EVO_SCP</i> )	16.Event Organization (Popular, <i>EVO_POP</i> )
17.Funding Raised ( <i>FUN_RAI</i> )	18.Funding Provided ( <i>FUN_PRO</i> )	19.Infrastructure /Project Development ( <i>ITT</i> )	20.Social Media ( <i>SOM</i> )

21.Institutions (Established, <i>INS_ORG</i> )	22.Institutions (Partners, <i>INS_PAR</i> )	23.Institutions (Tools, <i>INS_PIN</i> )	24.Commercial Services - Advice ( <i>COM_CON</i> )
25.Commercial Products ( <i>COM_PRS</i> )	26.Other ( <i>OTH</i> )		

Source: elaborated by the author based on Chan et al. (2018)

Finally, data on outputs and functions were combined to assess consistency between functions and outputs (see Table 10).

**Table 10: Function and outputs fitting**

<b>Function</b>	<b>Fitting outputs</b>
Knowledge production	PUB_RES; DTB; EVO_S2S; EPA_S2S;
Knowledge dissemination	PUB_EDU; DTB; EVO_S2P; EVO_SCP; EVO_POL; EVO_POP; EPA_SCP; EPA_POL; EPA_POP; SOM
Technical and on-the-ground implementation	ITT; FUN_PRO, PUB_EMR, PUB_REP
Institutional capacity building	PUB_POL; PUB_EDU, EVO_POL; EPA_POL; EVO_POP, EVO_POP PUB_REP;
Norm & standard setting	PUB_STA
Campaigning	PUB_ADV; EVO_POP; EVO_POL, EPA_POL, EPA_POP; SOM
Lobbying	PUB_POL; COM_CON; EVO_POL; EPA_POL
Increasing participation	INS_ORG; INS_PIN INS_PAR; PUB_REP; EVO_POP, SOM
Funding	FUN_RAI; FUN_PRO
Product development	COM_PRS
Policy planning	PUB_POL; EVO_SCP; EPA_SCP; EVO_POL; EPA_POL; INS_PIN

Source: elaborated by the author based on Chan et al. (2018)

Based on this assessment, output performance is designated a value that corresponds to the percentage of functions that is matched by fitting outputs.

**Table 11: FOF values/performance levels**

<b>No output</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium-low</b>	<b>Medium-high</b>	<b>High</b>
No outputs have been produced	For >0%-25% of the initiative's functions fitting outputs have been produced	For >25-50% of the initiative's functions fitting outputs have been produced	For >50-75% of the initiative's functions fitting outputs have been produced	For >75% of the initiative's functions fitting outputs have been produced
The initiative remains a promise on paper; it has not produced any output except for expressing a willingness to take action.	The first steps have been taken towards implementing the initiative. Outputs are produced, even when they fulfill few or none of the declared functions.	Significant steps are taken towards implementation. Outputs are produced, even when they are not enough to fulfill most functions.	Relevant outputs are produced for most functions that the initiative wants to fulfill. It is likely to generate some of the desired environmental and social impacts.	The initiative produces relevant outputs for nearly all declared functions. The initiative is likely to generate the desired environmental and social impacts.

Source: elaborated by the author based on Chan et al. (2018)

**Table 12: Coding example for one of LPAA initiatives**

<b>Name of the initiative</b>	<b>Functions</b>	<b>Outputs for 2015</b>
Adaptation of West African Coastal Area	Technical implementation, institutional capacity building, and Funding	Publication policy, event participation, funding raised and social media

Source: elaborated by the author based on Chan et al. (2018)

#### 4.5.2 Operationalization of the variables for the t-tests

As previously mentioned, this study is among the first to consider the output performance of cooperative initiatives. The t-test was used as a testing method for the following hypotheses.

H1: Cooperative initiatives with the participation of public actors have higher FOF performance.

H2: Cooperative initiatives with certification-based approach accountability mechanisms have higher FOF performance.

H3: Cooperative initiatives categorized as “shaped” by the orchestration process have higher FOF performance.

#### Dependent variable

- FOF Average

This variable is based on the ClimateSouth Database and was updated for this chapter, as explained in the last subsection. For the t-tests, an average of the FOF from 2014 to 2019 was considered as the dependent variable.

#### Independent variables

##### 1- Members of the initiative

According to the governance triangle, each initiative is categorized in one of the seven zones illustrating whether the members, including the leading organization and/or secretariat of the initiative, are public, private, civil society organization based or hybrid.

##### 2- Funders

Funding can be considered as a key feature to ensure that cooperative initiatives will fulfill their functions for climate actions. The majority of the initiatives have more than one funding organization to support their activities. Based on the information available in the ClimateSouth Database, the variable has five categories of funders: public, private, civil society-based, hybrid, and no funders. This last category, no funders, was applied especially for cooperative initiatives that are merely political statements such as the "Lima Challenge" and "Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders".

### 3- Accountability mechanisms

Based on Widerberg and colleagues' (2019) proposal for assessing accountability mechanisms of hybrid cooperative initiatives, the LPAA initiatives were coded as a "standard-based approach" and "disclosure-based approach".

### 4- Models of orchestration

Each initiative is coded as either "initiated" or "shaped", which is drawn on Hale and Roger's (2014) identification of orchestration models. This variable is operationalized by looking at the launch date of the initiative. In other words, if the cooperative initiative was launched in 2014 or 2015, they are considered initiated by the LPAA orchestration process. Cooperative initiatives launched before 2014 were coded as "shaped".

### 5- Adaptation or mitigation focus

Regarding the focus of the cooperative initiatives, the variables were coded based on the Climate South Database. The analysis of this chapter considers the main contribution of each initiative for the attribution of a adaptation or mitigation focus. For instance, initiatives aiming at energy efficiency were coded as having a mitigation focus.

#### **4.5.3 Limits of data collection**

There were a few limitations in the data collection for the database. The first limitation is the fact that all the information coded per cooperative initiative is not confirmed by the initiative itself. In fact, that is a limitation of the ClimateSouth Database that consequently echoes in the database built for this thesis. One potential argument to overcome this limitation is that ClimateSouth relies on at least one double-checks revision by another member of the coding team. Additionally, some information regarding the year of implementation was missing. Moreover, as Climate South's results analysis is conducted annually in middle of the year, the outputs regarding 2019 are partial, as the data collection corresponds to the cooperative initiatives' outputs until June 2019.

**Table 13: Variables description**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variable Description</b>	<b>Source</b>
FOF average	The average of the initiative performance assessment based on Function-output-Fit from 2014 to 2019	ClimateSouth Database (2018), updated and adjusted by the author
Actors	Actors of governance triangle	Author, based on Abbott and Snidal (2009)
Funders	Funders of the initiatives	ClimateSouth Database (2018), updated and adjusted by the author
Acc. Mechanisms: standard-based	Dummy=1 if the initiative has a standard-based accountability mechanism, otherwise=0	Author based on Widerberg. Pattberg, Brouwer (2019)
Acc. Mechanisms: disclosure-based	Dummy=1 if the initiative has a disclosure-based accountability mechanism, otherwise=0	Author based on Widerberg. Pattberg, Brouwer (2019)
Initiated	Dummy=1 if start of the initiative depends on the orchestration of UNSG Climate Summit 2014 or on the LPAA Quartet, otherwise=0	Author, based on Hale and Roger (2014)
Shaped	Dummy=1 if the initiative existed before 2014, otherwise=0	Author, based on Hale and Roger (2014)
Mitigation focus	Dummy=1 if the initiative focuses on mitigation, otherwise=0	ClimateSouth Database (2018), updated and adjusted by the author
Adaptation focus	Dummy=1 if the initiative focuses on adaptation, otherwise=0	ClimateSouth Database (2018), updated and adjusted by the author


Source: elaborated by the author

## 4.6 Results and discussion

### 4.6.1- Descriptive analysis of the FOF results

In line with the findings of Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016) that the main purpose of most cooperative initiatives is networking, this study reveals that LPAA initiatives' most recurrent functions are “knowledge dissemination” and “campaign” (Figure 16). This is an interesting finding when compared to the high-level ambition of climate actions expected by the Quartet for the LPAA orchestration. However, Figure 16 shows that functions such as “policy planning”, “institutional capacity building” and “norm and standard” are also relevant for the LPAA initiatives.

**Figure 16: LPAA cooperative initiatives' functions**




Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database

As illustrated in Figure 17, 2015 corresponds to the most productive year for the LPAA cooperative initiatives in terms of outputs. This can be explained by the fact that all initiatives joined COP21. Considering outputs such as publication, event participation, and event organization, it was expected that those would be produced before and during COP21. There is a slight decrease in the total of outputs produced by the initiatives after 2015. As the ClimateSouth coding team ends the data collection in the middle of year, and taking into

consideration that most of the cooperative initiatives publish their outputs during the COPs that usually take place at the end of the year, it is very likely that there is a growth for 2019 when all the outputs produced by the cooperative initiatives are added.


**Figure 17: LPAA cooperative initiatives' total of outputs produced**



Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database

Figure 18 shows initiatives' performance over the years. It is expected that they gain strength over time as they acquire more institutional robustness, such as budget, to implement their activities (GGCA 2019). As previously noted, FOF for 2019 does not capture all the outputs produced by the initiatives in that year. It is possible to notice a significant increase in the higher-performing initiatives in 2015 and reductions in 2016. However, the 2016 decline in FOF is not accentuated for the years 2017 and 2018. This could perhaps be attributable to the fact that the initiatives that have acquired the needed robustness to deliver their actions continue to perform well according to the FOF method.

**Figure 18: LPAA cooperative initiatives' FOF per year**




Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database

**4.6.2- Descriptive statistics of the variables**

To gain greater insight into the members of the cooperative initiatives, Figure 19 shows the breakdown of the members according to the seven zones of the governance triangle. As previously stated, hybrid organizations, comprising public and private institutions, and civil society organizations, represent the most relevant membership arrangement across the 78 initiatives.


**Figure 19: LPAA cooperative initiatives' members**



Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database


Figure 20 below depicts the funders of the cooperative initiatives divided into five categories. Although cooperative initiatives emerged as a new locus of authority in global climate governance, almost 50% of them rely on public actors for funding. It is noteworthy that all funding provided by international organizations, such as the World Bank and UNEP, as well as funding from the European Union, were coded as public.

**Figure 20: LPAA cooperative initiatives' funders**




Source: elaborated by the author

As expected, considering the most relevant functions of the initiatives are "knowledge dissemination" and "campaign", the disclosure-based approach is the most common accountability mechanism of LPAA cooperative initiatives. However, it is still surprising that less than 10% of the initiatives implement a certification-based approach as "norm and standards" are not ranked among the lowest functions of the initiatives. The results shown in Figure 21 are empirical evidence for the need to enhance accountability within the transnational sphere. Moreover, it can be argued that the intergovernmental sphere could play a key role by supporting cooperative initiatives to adopt more stringent accountability mechanisms for their pledged actions in orchestration processes.

**Figure 21: LPAA cooperative initiatives' accountability mechanisms**

Source: elaborated by the author


Approximately 75% of LPAA cooperative initiatives were initiated by the Quartet in the run-up to COP21. As already debated in chapter 3, some of the initiatives were directly orchestrated by the UN Secretary-General Office for the Climate Summit in September 2014. When the LPAA was launched during COP20 in Peru, those initiatives were already designed and showcased. However, in the course of 2015, new initiatives were orchestrated and launched before the COP weeks held in Paris.

**Figure 22: LPAA cooperative initiatives' orchestration type**

Source: elaborated by the author

Considering the most common functions of the initiatives, it is perhaps not surprising that approximately 40% of the initiatives do not have any officially stated climate actions quantified targets (Figure 23).


**Figure 23: LPAA cooperative initiatives' quantified targets**



Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database

Finally, and as already identified by the literature (Chan and Amling, 2019; Persson, 2019), the majority of the cooperative initiatives focus on mitigation actions (Figure 24). Almost all initiatives categorized with a focus on adaptation belong to the LPAA thematic area called “resilience”. It is, thus, possible to argue that orchestration processes could also play a role to foster the launch of or support adaptation climate actions.

**Figure 24: LPAA cooperative initiatives' climate focus**




Source: adapted by the author based on ClimateSouth Database

### 4.6.3 Associations

This subsection presents the results for the t-tests regarding the three hypotheses about how governance arrangements, such as membership of the cooperative initiatives and accountability mechanisms, and the orchestration model are associated with a better performance of the initiatives (assessed by the FOF method).

The boxplot below (Figure 25) displays the distribution of the FOF for the members of the initiatives divided into the seven zones of the governance triangle. The results are not conclusive. With the exception of cooperative initiatives that have exclusively civil society organizations, the results are not sufficient to support nor to reject the hypothesis that the presence of public actors is associated with better FOF results.

**Figure 25: Members - FOF**




Source: elaborated by the author

Regarding the results for accountability mechanisms, Figure shows that there is no significant difference between the certification-based and disclosure-based approaches. Moreover, the variation for the certification-based approach is quite peculiar. This can be explained by the fact that less than 10% of the initiatives adopted this internal accountability mechanism; and that this set of initiatives has two initiatives that are still active but have a low

FOF score in the years after COP21. In sum, the results do not allow us to support nor to reject the second hypothesis.


**Figure 26: Accountability mechanisms - FOF**



Source: elaborated by the author

Note that in Figure 27 there is also no significant difference between orchestration types “initiated” and “shaped”. However, in the average, the FOF of “shaped” cooperative initiatives is higher compared to the FOF of “initiated” cooperative initiatives. Even if the findings are not robust, the evidence found is consistent with the literature and with Hypothesis 3, that shaped cooperative initiatives tend to perform better. Models with a larger-n would need to be conducted to support or to reject Hypothesis 3.


**Figure 27: Orchestration type – FOF**



Source: elaborated by the author


As there were no conclusive results for the previous t-tests, this study is supplemented by an additional analysis regarding the variables quantified targets, funders, and thematic areas and their potential association with cooperative initiatives' performance. Interestingly, the empirical results from quantified targets and funders do not provide any evidence of association with the cooperative initiatives' performance (Figure 28 and Figure 29).

**Figure 28: Quantified Targets - FOF**



Source: elaborated by the author

**Figure 29: Funders -FOF**



Source: elaborated by the author

Table 14 presents the results from the t-test with a focus on the LPAA thematic areas and output performance of the cooperative initiatives. As the FOF result of each initiative was coded per year, from 2014 to 2019, the number of observations for this model is 416.<sup>43</sup> The number is quite lower than the expected 468 observations for 78 initiatives over 6 years, as some initiatives were launched only in 2015 and other initiatives were not active until second semester of 2019.

The variable "Forest" is the only significant variable in the model. It is negatively correlated with the FOF results. This is plausible since the majority of the initiatives in this thematic area are political statements with no outputs produced after 2015. This is the case for the following initiatives: "Latin American Protected Areas Declaration"; "Lima Challenge", "Protection of 400 million hectares of forests by Indigenous Peoples", "Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders". Nevertheless, it also important to highlight that two initiatives in this set, the "Bonn Challenge" and "The New York Declaration on Forests", are not only still active but also producing a considerable number of outputs.

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<sup>43</sup> Besides the association of thematic areas-FOF, t-tests with 416 observations were also conducted for our three hypotheses. Nevertheless, they do not show any correlation. In this view, it is presented only the boxplots graphs with the FOF average.

**Table 14: LPAA Thematic Areas**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	% FOF
Building	0.132 (0.123)
Business	-0.045 (0.079)
Cities and Regions	-0.031 (0.087)
Energy Access	0.055 (0.081)
Forest	-0.232*** (0.087)
Innovation	0.332* (0.187)
Private Finance	-0.067 (0.085)
Renewable Energy	0.084 (0.087)
Resilience	-0.076 (0.075)
Short Lived Climate	0.040 (0.119)
Transport	0.047 (0.079)
Constant	0.668*** (0.062)
Observations	416
R <sup>2</sup>	0.065
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.039
Residual Std. Error	0.354 (df = 404)
F Statistic	2.548*** (df = 11; 404)
<i>Note:</i>	<i>p</i> <0.1; <i>p</i> <0.05; <i>p</i> <0.01

Source: elaborated by author

The data presented in this chapter demonstrates how complex the landscape of cooperative initiatives is and provides a broader understanding of these initiatives' governance arrangements and relationship with the intergovernmental sphere. Regarding cooperative initiatives in global climate governance, it is difficult to determine a definitive trend over time. Given the fact that the majority of them were initiated by the Quartet orchestration, it is interesting to note that hybrid arrangements, comprising public actors, the private sector and civil society organizations, are the most relevant. This finding provides a preliminary indication that that type of arrangement is more encouraged by the intergovernmental sphere.

Additionally, the database also distinguishes between the "certification-based approach" and the "disclosure-based approach" for cooperative initiatives' accountability mechanisms. The descriptive statistics analysis captured that less than 10% of the initiatives rely on a "certification-based approach" that embodies more stringent standards for their members in terms of transparency and compliance. This shows that there is room for improvement in the accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives and in the way pledges made during orchestration processes are recorded and tracked by the intergovernmental spheres. That, however, does not necessarily mean that certification-based approaches should be regarded as the standard for all cooperative initiatives. In fact, this thesis argues that there is a need to identify and develop complementary accountability mechanisms for all cooperative initiatives.

As for the funding needed to ensure that cooperative initiatives deliver their promises, the prevalence of public actors demonstrates the key role of national governments or international organizations. Cooperative initiatives will not support the reduction of GHG emissions gaps in a vacuum or completely isolated from the public sphere. Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2016) argue that the magnitude of the financial incentives from the public sector must be proportionate to the severity of the problem to be solved. If this funding support is confirmed over the next years, public actors will work even closer to cooperative initiatives due to their capacity to provide funding. Consequently, the demand for the adoption of enhanced accountability mechanisms might be increased due to public opinion pressure.

Throughout all models (in all boxplot graphs and the association table), none of the governance arrangements or institutional designs seem to play an important role in the initiatives' performance. Overall, these results suggest that perhaps the FOF method, as an assessment of cooperative initiatives performance, is not a robust variable for a t-test. Regarding the independent variables, the variations were also extremely low for the "accountability

mechanisms" variable and low for the "orchestration model" variable. Certainly, this has also caused negative impacts on the models.

As previously mentioned, FOF has been recognized in academia due to publications in journals and mentions of the database academic articles. It is also recognized in the policy sector because the FOF results have been included in the UNFCCC annual publications called "Yearbook of Global Climate Action". ClimateSouth is perhaps one of the most comprehensive databases gathering time-series data of cooperative initiatives since 2013. However, variations from FOF, ranging from 0 to 1, are not sufficiently refined for a t-test. In this chapter, the conduction of the t-test can be justified to demonstrate that FOF can also be a limited variable. For instance, only ten (10) variations of FOF results were found among 478 observations in the database for this study. Objectively, most of the initiatives score 0.50, 0.75 or 1.00 for their FOF performance. Consequently, and as demonstrated by the t-test, the FOF variable does not capture all the nuances for an in-depth analysis of the performance of initiatives. One possibility to refine the FOF method could be the development of a weight system to differentiate functions such as "lobbying" and "technical implementation on the ground", as the latter could produce tangible GHG mitigation results. Another possibility would be to assign different weights according to the number of outputs produced by the initiative. For example, if one initiative with the function "knowledge production" participates in an event, the fit is already fulfilled. Besides, this initiative would have the same FOF score as another initiative with the same function, but that produced more types of outputs, such as publications and event organization.

In sum, the empirical results were not sufficient to support the hypotheses based on the adopted theoretical approach. There is no evidence for any kind of positive governance arrangement effect on the output performance of LPAA cooperative initiatives. In contrast, a relationship between the thematic areas and the initiatives' performance can be observed, as forest initiatives have a negative effect on FOF results. This in line with the fact that cooperative initiatives categorized as political statements such as the "Lima Challenge" and the "Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders" have produced very few outputs, or in some cases, none, after the statement is released.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

There are few studies in global climate governance literature associating the governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives to their performance. The data presented in this chapter can provide empirical information about cooperative initiatives. That said, this thesis seeks to

contribute to the literature in two ways. The first contribution is the development of a specific set of criteria that can be later applied to assess other cooperative initiatives in the field of global environmental governance. The second contribution is the empirical analysis of 78 cooperative initiatives member of the LPAA in the period between 2014 and 2019 by adding new criteria to the GGCA database, and by defining cooperative initiatives' performance as a dependent variable.

The data demonstrate key trends. First, LPAA initiatives are relatively new - the majority of them were launched in 2014 and 2015 in a process identified by the literature as an "initiating" orchestration model. Second, hybrid governance – including public and private actors - modes represent the biggest share of cooperative initiatives. Third, LPAA initiatives considerably rely on public actors' funding for their activities. Interestingly, the disclosure-based approach represents almost the totality of cooperative initiatives' internal accountability mechanisms. Finally, cooperative initiatives' most current functions are "knowledge dissemination" and "campaign".

None of the governance arrangement variables are linked to the output performance (FOF method) of the initiatives. This is in line with several strands of the literature discussing the challenges to assess the performance of the initiatives. In this context, what are the implications of these findings for academia and policymakers?

First, cooperative initiatives' pledges for climate actions in the intergovernmental sphere is a quite recent phenomenon in global governance. Consequently, research about how they have emerged, and their performance is also pioneering. Second, there are a great number of variations among the membership, functions, and outputs of cooperative initiatives. In this complex landscape, ClimateSouth is probably the most comprehensive database for climate cooperative initiatives. Furthermore, the FOF method has been extremely robust to evaluate the output performance of cooperative initiatives. However, in order to better capture the nuances of the transnational sphere, the FOF method could be refined, specifically to differentiate the initiatives that have produced a greater number of outputs.

Finally, another aspect that both academia and policymakers will need to address is the accountability mechanisms adopted by the cooperative initiatives regarding their pledged commitments in the intergovernmental arenas. Orchestrators, both international organizations and national governments, can provide incentives for and support the adoption of accountability mechanisms that would, at least, track the progress of the initiatives.

## **CHAPTER 5: THE NEW YORK DECLARATION ON FORESTS: ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES IN GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE**

### **5.1- Introduction**

The recognition that individual and cooperative non-state and subnational actors play a crucial role in climate action raises several questions regarding their legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability (Widerberg and Pattberg, 2017; Bäckstrand et al. 2017; Kuyper et al. 2018, Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017). This study draws on the accountability concept established by Grant and Keohane (2005), which is also picked up by Pattberg and Widerberg (2017) and Kramarz and Grant (2019), and establishes that “actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so”. It is assumed that the analysis of the different accountability systems to which non-state actors and cooperative initiatives are submitted, including internal accountability relationships, can contribute to a better understanding of their roles, functions, and interactions in global climate governance.

How does the architecture of the transnational regime complex influence the accountability procedures of cooperative initiatives? Are there different accountability relationships ruling cooperative initiatives? How can these different accountability relationships be distinguished? And how can these relationships be analyzed? This chapter develops an analytical framework for a qualitative assessment tool of internal accountability relationships in cooperative initiatives. The analytical framework is then applied to a cooperative initiative member of the LPAA: New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF). The initiative gathers multinational companies, civil society, indigenous peoples and governments in the effort to halt global deforestation, one of the major drivers of climate change. The analysis provided in Chapter 4 concludes that the LPAA thematic area forest is the only significant variable in the model with a negatively correlation with the FOF results. This is due to the fact that some of initiatives are political statements such as the Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders”. However, the NYDF can classified as one of the most active cooperative initiatives within the LPAA set. And, most importantly, it is a relevant case study due to its hybrid membership.

This chapter is structured as follows. The next two sections briefly summarize the literature on the role of non-state actors, subnational actors and cooperative initiatives in global climate governance, as well as the accountability challenges brought by the recognition of these actors as sources of authority. Next, an analytical framework is proposed for the assessment of

the internal accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives built on key indicator-questions part of the analytical framework. Finally, the analytical framework is applied for the assessment of a cooperative initiative member of the LPAA: the “New York Declaration on Forest”, as a descriptive case study.

## **5.2- Grasping the essentials of cooperative initiatives**

Chan et al. (2015) argue that there has been a groundswell of actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation from cities, regions, businesses and civil society organizations. The authors highlight the benefits of engaging these actors as they perform crucial functions that can help states gain the technology, expertise, and confidence to formulate and implement more ambitious contributions, and to build interest group support to pursue them.

Hale and Held (2011) define that transnational climate governance occurs when non-state or subnational actors from at least two countries adhere to rules and practices that seek to steer behavior towards shared, public goals across borders. Additionally, the arrangements among these actors can be crafted in a hybrid approach, for instance, with the involvement of national governments or even international organizations. Scholarship coined the specific term “cooperative initiatives” to refer to such hybrid arrangements (Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015). Overall, and as presented in the previous chapters, a significant literature has emerged to investigate the interactions between cooperative initiatives, states and international organizations through different governance modes, such as delegation and orchestration (Andonova, 2010; Green, 2014; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2017; Bäckstrand and Küyper, 2017; Chan et al. 2019).

As stated in the previous chapters, this thesis draws on the literature that states that the transnational and intergovernmental spheres act closely in global climate governance (Avant et al. 2010, Green, 2014; Chan et a. 2015; Hale, 2016; Bäckstrand and Küyper, 2017; Held and Roger, 2018). As explained by Green (2014), private authority does not occur in a vacuum as it is linked to public authority in different and complex ways.

“(…) we need to think more expansively about how nonstate actors are involved in world politics. They are not simply lobbying at the margins of intergovernmental forums. The evolution of the climate change regime—from centralized multilateral agreements to a more diffuse set of nonhierarchical activities—demonstrates how the landscape of institutions to produce global public goods is changing.” (Green, 2014, p. 25)

In line with the argument advanced by Green (2014), this research also argues that public and private authorities expand together, and that this is not evidence of a retreat of the state. The innovative governance arrangements of the LPAA cooperative initiatives reinforce these arguments. According to the GGCA independent assessment for the LPAA initiatives (2015), 146 national governments participate as active partners in LPAA initiatives. In addition, half of the UN Climate Summit actions, which are part of the LPAA dataset, are led by UN agencies and international organizations (Chan et al., 2016). In other words, Green (2014) states that the theory of private authority is a theory of institutional choice, as actors in world politics choose among myriad institutional arrangements to address transnational problems. One can go even further by arguing that the members of the cooperative initiatives of the LPAA demonstrate not only the multiplicity of actors in global climate governance, but also attest that private authority can be crafted in different arrangements such as a platform, a coalition, and the establishment of a new organization, among others. Private authority can also be crafted in partnership with public authorities, such as subnational actors, states and international organizations such as those in the cooperative initiatives part of the LPAA.

According to Widerberg and Pattberg (2017), cooperative initiatives are defined by several features, such as their collaborative governance arrangements, which can gather both public and private authorities engaged in climate action; their transnational nature due to their multiple members from different countries; their public policy objectives; and their networked organization. It can be understood that cooperative initiatives gather, in a volunteering approach, actors sharing the same vision for specific climate action, ranging from on-the-ground mitigation and adaptation projects to advocacy activities. However, even considering their structure as networked and opposed to a hierarchical one, members of cooperative initiatives and their leading organization and/or secretariat, when applicable, do have direct access to each other and interact towards the formulation of a shared vision and the implementation of jointly established climate pledges. This latter feature plays a central role in the development of the accountability framework proposed in the following sections.

Finally, in the context of the rise of multiple actors with authority in world politics, Avant et al. (2010) shed light on the importance of new research focusing on accountability. They make the case that the issue is not necessarily the lack of accountability, but the different accountability mechanisms that actors in global governance might adopt. The authors conclude by stating that a new analysis of accountability demands could reveal information about how actors exercise power and how to understand their responsibilities and missions.

### 5.3- Conceptualizing accountability in global climate governance

In the scholarship on global governance, a significant strand of scholars has debated accountability as a mechanism to control abuses of power in world politics (Grant and Keohane, 2005); from a perspective of making global governance more democratic (Hale, 2008; Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011); accountability regimes according to different types of actors (Chan and Pattberg, 2008); accountability for nongovernmental organizations (Ebrahim, 2003); accountability in the transnational regime complex (Widerberg et al. 2017); legitimacy and accountability (Bäckstrand et al. 2018); the accountability trap (Park and Kramarz, 2019).

Much of the accountability literature for global governance draws on the conceptual framework defined by Mashaw (2006). The author defines his framework as "a sort of grammar of governance for addressing accountability issues". In this view, Mashaw (2006) argues that there are six linked questions, also called as building blocks, that are the basic feature for an accountability regime, namely: who is accountable, to whom, for what, through what processes, by what standards, and with what effects. Moreover, the author affirms that an organization is not submitted to only one kind of accountability regime, be it public, market or social; but to different accountability systems that can be reinforcing or competitive.

In this research, Grant and Keohane's definition of accountability is adopted. It also assumes that actors can be submitted to more than one accountability regime in global governance.

"Accountability, as we use the term, implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met. Accountability presupposes a relationship between power-wielders and those holding them accountable where there is a general recognition of the legitimacy of (1) the operative standards for accountability and (2) the authority of the parties to the relationship (one to exercise particular powers and the other to hold them to account)". (Grant and Keohane, 2005, p. 29)

Ebrahim (2003) defines the concept of accountability as two-dimensional. The first dimension is the external, as actors should meet prescribed standards of behavior. The second corresponds to the internal dimension that is expressed through individual action and organizational mission. By adopting nongovernmental organization as a study case, the author defends that the literature on the accountability of these organizations has been centered on their relationship with funders and accountability mechanisms, such as annual project reports and financial records. However, Ebrahim notes that the debates have not looked at the multiple

accountability demands that NGOs are submitted to. The author, then, picks up on Najam's definition that NGOs are submitted to accountability mechanisms in relation to donors (upwards), to clients or beneficiaries (downwards), and to the NGOs themselves with internal accountability that involves the NGOs' responsibility to their mission and staff.

“It is apparent (...) that accountability is a complex and dynamic concept. It may be defined not only as a means through which individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions (e.g., through legal obligations and explicit reporting and disclosure requirements), but also as means by which organizations and individuals take internal responsibility for sharing their organizational mission and values, for opening themselves to public or external scrutiny, and for assessing performance in relation to goals.” (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 815)

Another interesting aspect of accountability is advanced by Hale (2008), who unpacks two components of the concept: answerability and enforcement. The author raises the question about the role of transparency, as it is the core idea of the answerability component of accountability. In the author's words: “transparency empowers stakeholders to use markets, internal norms, and discourse to enforce accountability upon global actors” (Hale, 2008).

In sum, accountability is a multidimensional and dynamic concept that can be understood as a functional mechanism to regulate the relations among global actors. The purpose of this study is not to investigate the linkages between accountability and democratic deficit in global governance. As stated by Ebrahim (2003), this debate shall encompass the dimensions of representation and legitimacy. These two dimensions are briefly debated throughout the next sections. The main focus of this study is to identify the multiple accountability relationships that cooperative initiatives are submitted to in global climate governance in order to propose an accountability analytical framework. Before presenting the framework, the next section will shed light on the debates about the challenges to assess the accountability of cooperative initiatives.

#### **5.4- Cooperative initiatives and accountability**

Global climate governance has evolved over the past two decades with the rapprochement between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres. Widerberg et al (2019) claim that “cooperative initiatives have moved from the fringes into the center of global climate politics”. This novelty raises two major issues with respect to accountability for the transnational sphere. First, how can the double relationship (accountability

holders/accountability wielders) of accountability in multilevel global governance be established? The UNFCCC Secretariat is not responsible for the monitoring and sanctioning of accountability mechanisms in the climate actions pledged by the transnational sphere in orchestration processes. Second, and specifically, when orchestration is employed as a governance mode, cooperative initiatives are not only legitimized by the intergovernmental sphere but also, in some cases, they are led and joined by international organizations. The recognition from the intergovernmental sphere reinforces the transnational sphere's role as an authority in global climate governance.

In this view, how do the different sources of authority interact in the international arena? To whom are those authorities accountable? As stated by Green (2014), there is a complex landscape of “multiple *loci* of authority” in the international system—some of which include private actors. Alongside Green (2014), a rich literature conceptualizes the private authority phenomenon in global climate governance. Furthermore, the fact that another *locus* of authority has emerged due to hybrid memberships in cooperative initiatives adds a further layer to an already complex landscape. On the one hand, hybrid can be understood as combinations of pairs: public-private, public-civil society, private-civil society. On the other hand, it can also be understood as a conjunction of the three spheres, such as an initiative gathering an international organization, companies, and civil society organizations. It is perhaps not surprising that hybrid arrangements are the most common within the LPAA initiatives.

Overall, and assuming cooperative initiatives are an extra *locus* of authority in global climate governance, to what extent are these initiatives submitted to accountability mechanisms? There is a research gap on the development and adoption of accountability mechanisms by cooperative initiatives. As previously presented, Grant and Keohane (2005) posit that there are different accountability mechanisms, such as peer and reputational, that could be applied for non-state actors. However, one can argue that these mechanisms are not sufficient to assess cooperative initiatives. This thesis aims to expand Grant and Keohane's proposition of horizontal accountability mechanisms by arguing that cooperative initiatives could also be assessed against vertical accountability mechanisms. However, this assessment would need to determine the pair accountability holders/accountability wielders within each cooperative initiative.

While making the case for the assessment of accountability with a focus on hybrid climate cooperative initiatives, this thesis draws on the theoretical framework proposed by Park and Kramarz (2019) that relies on the examination of two tiers of environmental governance.

According to the authors, the first tier looks at the design of environmental institutions where problems are framed, priorities identified, and solutions devised. In contrast, the second tier corresponds to the execution of environmental interventions where verification, measurement, and compliance are evaluated. Based on this comprehensive view, Park and Kramarz present a theoretical framework for evaluating three ideal governance institutions: public, private, and voluntary (civil society organizations).

**Table 15: Summarized version of Park and Kramarz accountability theoretical framework for public, private and voluntary governance institutions**

Tiers of accountability	Questions
First-tier accountability: constitutive goals	What is the primary purpose?
	Who is held to account?
	To whom is accountability owed?
	For what are they accountable?
Second-tier accountability: regulative means	What process demonstrates accountability?
	What standards demonstrate accountability?
	What sanctions when there is a failure to meet standards?

Source: elaborated by the author based on Park and Kramarz (2019)

Although the authors recognize the emergence of hybrid institutions in global environmental governance, they argue that the three ideal-types categories are useful for the mapping of which types of accountability hybrid arrangements adhere to. Moreover, Park and Kramarz (2009) point out that hybrid arrangements do not have a linear relationship. They give the example of a company that can be held accountable for joining one cooperative initiative to its shareholders, consumers, and the state in which operates. However, strongly holding on to those two assumptions – the three ideal-types categories are sufficient for accountability analysis and the lack of a linear relationship in hybrid arrangements - seems flawed for several reasons. First, considering global governance has a variety of authorities and functions on a

multilevel approach, all authorities are submitted to a variety of nonlinear accountability mechanisms. For instance, Grant and Keohane (2005) advance that, according to their theoretical framework, multilateral organizations and states are the only types of organizations in world politics consistently subjected to delegated as well as participatory accountability models. Second, the fact that cooperative initiatives are gaining more prominence in global climate governance, especially in high-level orchestration processes such as the LPAA and more recently the 2019 United Nations Climate Summit, requires that scholarship also consider them as pertinent units of analysis. Third, as hybrid arrangements can take different shapes, assessing them case by case according to different ideal types (public, private and voluntary) would make it harder to conduct comparative analyses among the initiatives. The authors even recognize that “the nature of hybridity in GEG is nuanced and transcend the institutional identities of the actors that comprise new governance initiatives.” (Park and Kramarz, 2019). In sum, cooperative initiatives, and their hybrid arrangements, should be considered as a specific level of analysis for accountability in global climate governance.

Park and Kramarz’s (2019) timid approach regarding hybrid initiatives contrasts with a chapter about hybrid governance institutions on the same volume. On their contribution, Widerberg and al. (2019) offer an analysis of the two-tier accountability theoretical framework for hybrid initiatives focusing on the three questions related to second-tier accountability (accountability processes, standards and sanctions). The authors also add a fourth question to evaluate the impacts that accountability practices can have on reshaping the goals of the governing institutions. Here, it is possible to argue that, even if not explicitly, the questions for the first-tier accountability are also considered. That is because the case studies presented in the chapter are grounded on a specific approach in which actors in the hybrid initiatives are assigned the role of accountability holders, the accountability wielders and for what they are accountable.

Widerberg et al (2019) recall that cooperative initiatives generate a considerable amount of data, studies, and reports. In their view, this means that cooperative initiatives could ameliorate the conditions for holding actors accountable for their activities. Here, the underlying assumption is that cooperative initiatives would be submitted to peer or reputational accountability mechanisms due to the higher level of transparency and publicity of their commitments.

However, the authors do not imply that cooperative initiatives are submitted only to horizontal accountability mechanisms. Au contraire, they conduct four case studies of

cooperative initiatives extracted from the CONNECT database. By conducting cases studies of accountability mechanisms in four cooperative initiatives, Widerberg et al (2019) conclude that there are two accountability models for cooperative initiatives: certification-based approaches and disclosure-based approaches. They conceptualize the first model, certification-based approach, as having detailed safeguards ensuring that their targets comply with certification standards, especially when there is a system of third-party verification. By contrast, disclosure-based approaches rely on the disclosure of information about behaviors and accomplishments of participating actors.

Widerberg et al. (2019) defend that some cooperative initiatives perform functions that are more relevant for accountability than others. In their view, an institution focusing on information and networking may be less interesting from an accountability perspective since, in theory, it does not suggest an accountability relationship between the members of the institution or accountability to an external constituency. There is, however, a counterargument. First, there are potential threats posed by free riders, as they could join cooperative initiatives only to benefit from public recognition. Consequently, there is a risk to jeopardize the legitimacy of the transnational sphere vis-à-vis the intergovernmental sphere as well as the international community. Second, and more specifically related to this thesis, LPAA initiatives were orchestrated to present ambitious targets. Initiatives may acquire more institutional robustness during their lifecycle, and evolve towards the development of other functions. Furthermore, as stated by Park and Kramarz (2019), accountability mechanisms should be considered from the design of governing institutions, independently of the functions they claim to adopt in the first place.

Noting the need to expand the research about accountability mechanisms in hybrid organizations, Küyper et al. (2017) also raise the question about the accountability of the targets pledged during orchestration processes. As for the LPAA, targets were pledged by cooperative initiatives. In this case, the double relationship of accountability could be understood as the “members of the cooperative initiatives-leading organization of each initiative”.

In fact, this understanding is also advanced by Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) when debating accountability in the transnational regime complex. The authors state that in a context of interaction between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres more actors assume responsibility for climate goals. And, consequently, this has implications from an accountability perspective. They argue that in addition to differentiating accountability regimes for actors, e.g., public, private and civil society organizations, the literature should also consider analysis from

a systems-level approach. On this account, Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) make three claims concerning the assessment of accountability in the transnational regime complex: the challenge to identify the borders of the transnational regime complex; and who should be accountable to whom; the need for more transparency, monitoring, and reporting from the transnational sphere; and the availability and utility of sanctions that are poorly understood. Furthermore, the authors highlight that the hybridization and expansion of the regime complex make it difficult to apply analytically ideal-type-based accountability regimes.

Even though Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) state that the transnational regime complex is their level of analysis, the authors also provide insights on accountability mechanisms for cooperative initiatives. For instance, they argue that membership in cooperative initiatives could render actors accountable for the initiatives they belong to. In a similar vein, this study proposes to unpack accountability mechanisms in the transnational regime complex but emphasizing only the cooperative initiatives. By adopting cooperative initiatives as the level of analysis, this study's main contribution is an analytical framework for the assessment of accountability mechanisms of those widespread governance arrangements in global climate governance.

### **5.5- Accountability analytical framework for cooperative initiatives**

Raggo (2014) proposes a comprehensive assessment of accountability views from leaders of transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs). One of the author's main findings is that despite the willingness to implement accountability, both TNGOs and their leaders struggle with their accountability strategies. In this regard, Raggo (2014) coins the term "accountability dissonance disorder" to explain the mismatch between the accountability ideas of leaders and audiences that are diverse, such as donors, board members, peers, and beneficiaries. The author suggests that a key component of the dissonance disease is communication. On this account, Raggo (2014) defends that accountability should be considered as consisting of four interconnected pieces: definition (understood as accountability goals), the audience (accountability holder), responses (accountability tools and processes), and communication. Subsequently, Raggo briefly introduces an analytical framework built on the analogy of a puzzle comprising the four accountability pieces introduced above.

While acknowledging Raggo's contribution to the challenges faced by TNGO leaders to communicate their organizations' accountability, it is critical to provide a more comprehensive analytical framework to assess non-state actors and cooperative initiatives' accountability


mechanisms. There are, at least, two potential approaches to overcome the communication challenge that are not addressed by Raggo's framework. First, more important than defining accountability (defined by Raggo as material, principled or regulative), it is crucial to establish what action and/or commitment actors should be held accountable for. The second potential approach would be to support leaders and their organizations in their accountability communication challenges by using a set of indicator-questions that would provide more clarity when formulating the messages.

Taking that into account, this study proposes an analytical framework to assess the internal accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives based on Ebrahim (2003), Mashaw (2006), Chan and Pattberg (2008), Bäckstrand et al (2017), Park and Kramarz (2019), and Widerberg et al (2017 and 2019). The proposed analytical framework has three assumptions.

First, it is built on vertical and compliance-based accountability mechanisms. This does not mean that other horizontal mechanisms of accountability, such as peer and reputational, do not influence the transnational sphere. Au contraire, they play a crucial role in the entire system and positively interact with any additional accountability mechanisms by bringing more transparency. In order to define indicators that can be applied to all cooperative initiatives (and considering peers and audiences of reputational accountability mechanisms that would influence the initiatives vary), the assessment framework considers exclusively the internal accountability mechanisms for each cooperative initiative. As for the compliance-based approach, it is considered that cooperative initiatives can develop a variety of functions, from networking to the implementation of high-level GHG emissions reductions projects (Chan et al. 2016). Further, not all climate actions delivered can be attributed to the pledges made by cooperative initiatives. For instance, and according to the UNFCCC Climate Action Portal, a company such as Unilever is part of 23 cooperative initiatives, but it also claims an extra 5 individual climate actions, among other corporate social responsibility policies and commitments the company can implement within its factories worldwide. The Unilever case shows that the company can be submitted to different accountability regimes. As stated by Mashaw (2006), these regimes could be complementary or competitive. Primarily, the company is submitted to a market accountability system that includes its shareholders and consumers. By taking individual climate action, the company is also submitted to a social accountability answering to its peers, other engaged global actors, and, ultimately, to the beneficiaries of its commitment. When deciding to integrate a cooperative initiative, the company is also submitted

to the internal accountability relationships of this governance arrangement. Indirectly, the company could also be submitted to accountability relationships that the cooperative initiative answers to. Such relationships could be horizontal, to its peers, or vertical, to donors and, potentially, to the UNFCCC. As defended by Park and Kramarz (2019), these are not linear accountability relationships, "rather, they are webbed, meaning that these accountability relationships overlap, and come from a variety of direction and compete in terms of demanding actor's attention".

**Figure 30: Accountability systems for cooperative initiatives**



Source: elaborated by the author

It is expected that during the orchestration processes cooperative initiatives pledge for measurable targets. In this sense, a compliance-based approach would be a sufficient condition for the assessment of the initiatives against their pledges for the orchestration. Regarding the double relationship of accountability, there is a clear need to understand what actors and/or institutions are the accountability holders and accountability wielders within the cooperative initiatives. To this end, the questions comprising the first tier of Park and Kramarz's (2019) framework should also be answered. Nevertheless, the limits of the framework must be acknowledged. This is because answering those questions is not enough to fully understand the underlying politics of choice, design or definition of goals of initiatives. This research proposed analytical framework should be understood as a prerequisite to unravel the accountability systems of cooperative initiatives.

The second assumption is that hybrid arrangements can be measured and compared against the same criteria and indicators. With that in mind, indicator-questions were adopted in order to provide a grid for cooperative initiatives to be assessed in comparative terms. The third assumption on which this framework builds is that a single analytical accountability tool cannot capture all the issues raised by the consolidation of cooperative initiatives in global climate governance. Rather, this analytical framework was conceived to be a supportive and complementary tool to provide a better understanding of the global actors' role in climate governance, the dynamics of hybrid governance arrangements, and to unveil accountability tools cooperative initiatives have adopted in their internal functioning.

The framework to analyze the internal accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives unfolds through the two-tiers approach proposed by Park and Kramarz (2019), which builds on Mashaw's (2006) conceptual framework, and consider the standard-based and disclosure-based approaches drawn from Widerberg et al. (2019). Before illustrating the analytical framework, the following subsections will present the underlying rationale for the elaboration of the indicator-questions.

### **5.5.1- Who should be held accountable?**

Park and Kramarz (2019) highlight the complexity of identifying who is accountable to whom in hybrid global environmental governance arrangements such as cooperative initiatives. This difficulty is also pointed out by Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) due to the engagement of new actors in climate governance. However, the authors stress that in the case of the transnational regime complex members of the cooperative initiatives could be considered actors to be held accountable.

As for the internal accountability mechanisms of cooperative initiatives, the actors that become members of the cooperative initiatives seem to be a fitting unit of analysis to answer the question regarding "who". Figure 30 shows that a cooperative initiative, as a single actor, is submitted to vertical accountability relationships to donors, and horizontal accountability mechanisms to other cooperative initiatives. However, a cooperative initiative can only pledge for a climate action due to its volunteering membership engagement. A cooperative initiative pledge can be only achieved by its individual actors' actions such as providing technical expertise. For example, on the one hand, the "Science Based Targets Initiatives", led in partnership by CDP, the United Nations Global Compact, the World Resources Institute, WWF and the We Mean Business coalition, has pledged to adopt science-based GHG emissions

reduction targets.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, members of the initiative, more than 700 companies, and investors have committed to set "science-based" emissions reductions targets. When analyzing the internal accountability mechanisms of this initiative, the unit of analysis of the "who" question should be its members.

***Indicator-questions for the analytical framework:***

- 1- Who are the members of the initiatives?
- 2- In which category can the members be classified: public (IO, States, and subnational actors), private (companies or business associations), civil society organization (NGO, foundation, think-thanks) or hybrid?

**5.5.2 - To whom are the members held accountable?**

By considering the internal accountability relationships of cooperative initiatives and that their members are the actors to be held accountable, cooperative initiative's leaders or secretariat can be considered as the accountability audience. Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) argue that members benefit from legitimacy, good-will, and knowledge exchange from participating in cooperative initiatives. In turn, the cooperative initiative secretariat could threaten to punish noncompliant behavior by withdrawing support to the member. The authors' example is based on the C40 initiative. In fact, C40 is an established organization leading two cooperative initiatives declared in the UNFCCC Climate Portal: "C40 Clean Bus Declaration" and "C40 Zero Waste Declaration". For example, the "C40 Clean Bus Declaration" has 39 participants and as a cooperative initiative it aims at "reducing emissions from the transportation sector and improve air quality through the introduction of low and ultimately zero-emission buses in fleets" (UNFCCC Climate Action Portal). In case one of the participants does not cooperate with the cooperative initiative's pledged goal, C40 could ask for the participant's withdrawal.

***Indicator-questions for the analytical framework:***

- 1- Does the initiative have a leading organization and/or secretariat?
- 2- Has a new organization or secretariat been set up for the initiative?
- 3- Does the initiative have a dedicated board?

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<sup>44</sup> Available on UNFCCC Climate Action Portal <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/cooperative-initiative-details.html?id=74> Access 22 February 2020

4- Has a new board been set up for the initiative?

### **5.5.3- What should the members be held accountable for?**

The literature suggests that the majority of cooperative initiatives perform functions, such as networking, that do not contribute directly to reducing GHG emissions (Chan et al. 2016; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2016; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2017). On this account, Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) state that: “if they are to be held accountable according to their own goals there is a large diversity of function they engage”.

While acknowledging this evidence, this research argues that the members of cooperative initiatives should be held accountable to their commitments when they voluntarily decide to engage in a cooperative initiative. Of course, such individual commitments vary in terms of climate change thematic area, from resilience to renewable energy, and also in terms of their nature. For instance, when considering cooperative initiatives with a standard-based approach, each member’s commitment is individual. One example is the "Airport Carbon Accreditation" cooperative initiative, that aims to support airports to reduce their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Airports that are members of the initiative are individually committed to reducing their carbon emission from their operations according to four progressively levels of accreditation.

The scenario is different for disclosure-based cooperative initiatives. Here, three different cases can be observed regarding the commitments of cooperative initiatives’ members. The first case is based on the public disclosure of the members' commitments, as is the case of members from the "Montreal Carbon Pledge" or the "Bonn Challenge". The second case is when actors and/or organizations collaboratively convene a cooperative initiative. In other words, some actors and/or organizations agree on the same goal and together they pursue this goal through the establishment of a cooperative initiative. One example is "The Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiatives (CREWS)". A total of 9 members, comprising international organizations, investors and states, launched this initiative in 2015 to mobilize funding to increase the warning systems in small-island and least developed countries. The third case can be observed mainly in cooperative initiatives categorized as "political statements". In this particular case, members can be considered as mere endorsers of a cooperative initiative’s pledges, the "Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity Producers and Traders" is an example. These would be classified as “endorsement-based initiatives”.

As the realm of cooperative initiatives is dynamic and builds on hybrid and complex arrangements, it is very likely that other cases of both standard-based and disclosure-based approaches among the commitments made by cooperative initiatives' members. The main purpose here is to argue that, for internal accountability relationships, the commitments of each member could be considered as a unit of analysis. One potential benefit of having this unit of analysis is to shed light on the overlap of commitments and/or double counting of emissions reductions. Finally, indicator-questions aim to shed light on the different arrangements on which commitments are anchored.

***Indicator-questions for the analytical framework:***

- 1- How can the cooperative initiative be classified as a standard-based approach or disclosure-based-approach?

For disclosure-based initiatives:

- 2- Does each member make an individual commitment to join the cooperative initiative? Is this commitment clear? Is this commitment measurable?
- 3- Is the cooperative initiative collaboratively convened by all members? In this case, is there any information about each member's commitment towards the cooperative initiative's pledge? Is this commitment clear? Is this commitment measurable?
- 4- 4-Is the initiative a voluntary declaration based on the endorsement of the members?

**5.5.4- By what processes actors are held accountable?**

Ebrahim (2003) emphasizes that disclosure, reports, performance assessment, and evaluations are widely used tools of accountability. Regarding performance assessment, the author distinguishes between external evaluations, based on the outcomes and impacts of the NGO intervention, and internal evaluations, in which NGO staff look at their progress or toward internal goals and missions. Furthermore, Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) defend that for the individual actors in the cooperative initiatives, processes and standards that demonstrate accountability are abundant, such as monitoring, reporting, disclosure, and information spread.

***Indicator-questions for the analytical framework:***

*For certification-based approach initiatives*

- 1- Does the initiative monitor the members' commitments?
- 2- Does the initiative have any verification system for the members' commitments?

- 3- Does the initiative have any reporting system for the members' commitments?
- 4- In order to receive the label, do members need a third-party audition?

*For disclosure-based approach initiatives*

- 1- Does the initiative monitor the members' commitments?
- 2- Does the initiative have any verification system for the members' commitments?
- 3- Does the initiative have any reporting system for the members' commitments?

#### **5.5.5- What standards demonstrate accountability?**

Park and Kramarz (2019) define standards as the outputs of the accountability relationships. For instance, in public accountability systems, legislation, conventions, and protocols are the standards. As for private accountability regimes, price as well as social and environmental benchmarks are potential standards. In the case of cooperative initiatives, Widerberg and Pattberg (2017) add technical benchmarks, such as GHG emission, and financial benchmarks for initiatives focused on investing in low-carbon climate actions. However, as the analytical framework emphasizes the internal accountability mechanisms, and based on Gordon's (2016) argument that internal accountability is oriented towards the actors forming the collective, the indicator-questions for this item should also encompass standards aimed at the members of the cooperative initiative.

#### ***Indicator-questions for the analytical framework:***

- 1- Are there internal mechanisms of communication and/or participation for the initiatives' members regarding the pledged targets?
- 2- Besides the pledges and/or commitments, does the initiative make other information, such as internal meetings, publicly available and transparent?
- 3- Does the initiative have a budget for stakeholders' actions?
- 4- Does the initiative publish annual reports about their activities?
- 5- Does the initiative publicize its financial reports?

#### **5.5.6- What sanctions exist for punishing noncompliance?**

The question regarding sanction is perhaps the most challenging one from Mashaw's (2006) conceptual framework to be answered in the context of a transnational regime complex.

The task is even harder when considering only voluntary and hybrid governance arrangements, such as cooperative initiatives. Widerberg and Pattberg (2016) propose that sanctioning is reliant on soft measures that could lead to reputational damage, such as naming and shaming or the removal of support. The authors illustrate the issue with the case of the company Royal Dutch Shell, which was forced to leave the Prince of Wales Corporate Leaders Group. In the case of standard-based cooperative initiatives, the sanctioning could be more explicit, as the member would lose the certificate or the label. But overall, the authors state that “there is little systematic knowledge on the role of sanctions for holding individual actors and cooperative initiatives accountable”.

***Indicator-questions for the analytical framework:***

For certification-based approach initiatives

- 1- Is there any sanctioning measure for the members?
- 2- What are the processes taken by the initiative before the certificate and/or label withdrawal?
- 3- Is there any case of a member losing the certificate for noncompliance with the cooperative initiative standards behavior?

For disclosure-based approach initiatives

- 1- Is there any sanctioning measure for the members?
- 2- Can members be excluded from the initiative? What are the processes for a member exclusion?
- 3- Is there any case of exclusion for noncompliance?

**Table 16: Analytical framework for assessing cooperative initiatives' internal accountability**

<b>Accountability Standard Questions</b>	<b>Unit of analysis</b>	<b>Indicator-questions</b>
Who should be held accountable?	Members of the cooperative initiative	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Who are the members of the initiatives?</li> <li>2. In which category can the members be classified: public (IO, States, and subnational actors), private (companies or business associations), civil society organization (NGO, foundation, think-thanks) or hybrid?</li> </ol>
To whom are the members held accountable?	Cooperative initiative leading organization, secretariat and/or board	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- Does the initiative have a leading organization or a Secretariat?</li> <li>2- Has a new organization or secretariat been set up for the initiative?</li> <li>3- In which category can the leading organization or secretariat be classified: public (IO, States and subnational actors), private (companies or business associations), civil society organization (NGO, foundation, think-thanks)?</li> <li>4- Does the initiative have a dedicated board?</li> <li>5- Has a new board been set up for the initiative?</li> </ol>
What should the members be held accountable for?	Pledges and/or commitments were taken by the members of the cooperative initiative.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- How can the cooperative initiative be classified as a standard-based approach or disclosure-based-approach?</li> </ol> <p>For disclosure-based initiatives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2- Does each member make an individual commitment to join the cooperative initiative? Is this commitment clear? Is this commitment measurable?</li> <li>3- Is the cooperative initiative collaboratively convened by all members? In this case, is there any information about each member's commitment towards the cooperative initiative's pledge? Is this commitment clear? Is this commitment measurable?</li> <li>4- Is the initiative a voluntary declaration based on the endorsement of the members?</li> </ol>

By what processes are they held accountable?	Standard-setting or disclosure-based initiatives	<p><u>For standard-setting initiatives?</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- Does the initiative monitor the members' commitments?</li> <li>2- Does the initiative have any verification system for the members' commitments?</li> <li>3- Does the initiative have any reporting system for the members' commitments?</li> <li>4- To receive the label, do members need a third-party audition?</li> </ol> <p><u>For disclosure-based initiatives?</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- Does the initiative monitor the members' commitments?</li> <li>2- Does the initiative have any verification system for the members' commitments?</li> <li>3- Does the initiative have any reporting system for the members' commitments?</li> </ol>
What standards demonstrate accountability?	Standard-setting or disclosure-based initiatives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- Are there internal mechanisms of communication and/or participation for the initiatives' members regarding the pledged targets?</li> <li>2- Besides the pledges and/or commitments, does the initiative make other information, such as internal meetings, publicly available and transparent?</li> <li>3- Does the initiative have a budget for stakeholders' actions?</li> <li>4- Does the initiative publish annual reports about their activities?</li> <li>5- Does the initiative publicize its financial reports?</li> </ol>
What sanctions exist for punishing noncompliance?	<p>Standard-setting: e.g. the members risk losing the label and/or certificate.</p> <p>Disclosure-based: e.g. exclusion from the cooperative initiative</p>	<p><u>For standard-setting initiatives?</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4- Is there any sanctioning measure for the members?</li> <li>5- What are the processes taken by the initiative before the certificate and/or label withdrawal?</li> <li>6- Is there any case of a member losing the certificate for noncompliance with the cooperative initiative standards behavior?</li> </ol> <p><u>For disclosure-based initiatives?</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4- Is there any sanctioning measure for the members?</li> <li>5- Can members be excluded from the initiative? What are the processes for a member exclusion?</li> <li>6- Is there any case of exclusion for noncompliance?</li> </ol>

Source: elaborated by the author based on Mashaw (2006)

## 5.6- The New York Declaration on Forest: a case study for the analytical framework

This section uses a case study approach to apply the accountability analytical framework to a cooperative initiative. According to Widerberg et al. (2019), case studies are appropriate to illustrate how initiatives engage in activities related to accountability and to investigate this process. The case selection for the assessment of the New York Declaration on Forest (NYDF) can be justified based on the social relevance and practical implication criteria. First, in 2019, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released its first report focused on Land. According to the IPCC Report (2019),<sup>45</sup> Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFLOU) activities represent 23% of total net anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. However, it is emphasized that land is simultaneously a source and a sink of CO<sub>2</sub>. Also, and as stated by Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, actions from the NYDF also contribute towards other agendas, such as poverty reduction, enhancement of food security, and rights of indigenous peoples.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, the forest thematic area allows us to capture more easily any overlaps in the realm of cooperative initiatives. For instance, the "Bonn Challenge", the "Lima Challenge" and the "New York Declaration of Forests" (NYDF) are aligned. However, the NYDF could be considered as an umbrella cooperative initiative as it combines goals expressed in the Bonn Challenge, climate and forest financing pledges, and supply chain commitments.<sup>47</sup> In sum, the case study can be defined as descriptive and exploratory. The narrative is built on secondary data collected from academic literature and research reports for a theoretical understanding of the NYDF as a cooperative initiative in the transnational regime complex for climate change, as well as reports published by the NYDF Secretariat and the NYDF Assessment Partners.

### 5.6.1- Overview of the NYDF

The NYDF has ten goals, including to halve the rate of loss of natural forest globally by 2020 and strive to end natural forest loss by 2030 (goal 1); the restoration of 150 million hectares of degraded landscapes and forestlands by 2020 (goal 5); to support the private-sector goal of eliminating deforestation (goal 2); and to strengthen forest governance (goal 10).<sup>48</sup> According to Hsu et al. (2015), the NYDF is the only cooperative initiative showcased in the

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<sup>45</sup> IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers.

<sup>46</sup> Available on <https://nydfglobalplatform.org/declaration/> Access on 30 January 2020

<sup>47</sup> Available on <https://nydfglobalplatform.org/declaration/> Access on 30 January 2020

2014 UN Climate Summit that includes both an explicit financial pledge and a measurable goal to halve global deforestation. Zarin et al (2016) state that the NYDF encompasses the confluence of interests of its multiple signatories: (1) the intergovernmental sphere, comprising forest commitments from the climate change, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable development agendas; (2) the corporate commitments to remove deforestation from agricultural commodity supply chains; (3) efforts to formalize land and resource tenure rights of indigenous and other traditional communities.

Launched at the 2014 United Nations Climate Summit, the NYDF can be defined as a voluntary and non-binding international declaration. Over 200 endorsers have committed to act towards the NYDF's goals and follow its accompanying agenda.<sup>49</sup> The set of endorsers encompasses national governments, sub-national governments, multi-national companies, indigenous communities, and non-government organizations. Overall, it can be stated that the adoption of the NYDF has precipitated movements – such as new commitments to zero deforestation and forest restoration - within the international forest community not only by its endorsers but also by the organizations orbiting around the Declaration, such as a Secretariat and the NYDF Assessment Partners. Although the two organizations operate separately, they have provided a vivid dynamic to this cooperative initiative.

On the one hand, the NYDF Assessment Partners, gathering 25 organizations from academia and civil society, have been providing annual progress data since 2015. On the other hand, the NYDF Global Platform, the official name of the initiative's Secretariat, was launched in 2017. According to information publicized by the initiative, the secretariat was established in response to the Declaration endorsers' request to perform three main functions: (1) increase ambition, (2) forge new partnerships, and (3) accelerate progress on the NYDF goals through a series of actions such as the organization of training and events, publications, facilitation of multi-stakeholder dialogue. The secretariat can also be described as hybrid governance arrangement as it comprises the following members: the United Nations Development Programme, the Meridian Institute, and Climate Advisers.

Wolosin (2014) also present interesting features of the governance arrangement of the NYDF that are critical for the assessment of the accountability analytical framework. First, it highlights that the Declaration is a political statement commitment "among signers to 'do their part to achieve' a set of outcomes 'in partnership' that are global in scope". This fits perfectly in the analytical framework's category of "endorsement-based" cooperative initiatives.

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<sup>49</sup> Available on <https://nydfglobalplatform.org/declaration/> Access on 30 January 2020

Additionally, the author states that it is difficult to define the scope for the assessment of the emissions reductions from such different sets of actors. For instance, it is questioned whether the scope of endorsing companies should include only land areas under their direct operation or land uses encompassing all their supply chain. He concludes defending that “It is neither technically nor politically feasible to draw these boundaries in a consistent way.” The author also recalls that the Bonn Challenge is restated in the NYDF. Even though the endorsers of these two cooperative initiatives are not completely overlapped, the contributions towards the Bonn Challenge would also benefit the achievement of the NYDF.

Overall, the technical challenges to determine each member's contributions to the cooperative initiative's pledges, specifically in the endorsement cases, reinforce the need to unravel the internal accountability mechanisms of the initiatives. If it is not possible to define a clear, measurable and verifiable commitment from the members, what are the other mechanisms in place to monitor the pledge made by the cooperative initiative? For instance, are there any collective mechanisms? The next subsection will seek to fit these questions into the accountability analytical framework applied to the NYDF.

### **5.6.2. Accountability analytical framework**

On the fifth anniversary of the NYDF in 2019, two reports were published. The first report was released by the NYDF Assessment Partners aiming at evaluating the global status of forests and the overall efforts to meet the NYDF goals. The Progress Assessment Report does not focus on assessing the individual or collective goals of NYDF endorsers. The second report was published by the NYDF Secretariat to present a perspective from the endorsers. It was built on an informal consultation with over 80 NYDF endorsers from March through June 2019 on four thematic areas: (1) challenges to progress towards the goals; (2) showcase for examples of endorser action and progress, and key enabling conditions; (3) identification of endorsers' needs; (4) endorsers' perspective on forest and climate goals post-2020.

The Progress Assessment Report's main finding, also mentioned in the NYDF Endorsers Report, is that there is little evidence that the NYDF's 10 goals will be achieved. The report states that is likely impossible that they will. Since 2014, tropical deforestation has continued to grow (increase by 44%) and the implementation of restoration action has been slow, as only 18% of the 2020 goal has been realized. The assessment report acknowledges the actions are being taken though they lack ambition, remain isolated, and are inadequate to catalyze a systemic shift. Finally, the report points to potential enabling conditions to foster the

implementation of the goals, such as dedicated and reliable financing from public and private sources, demand-side measures, good governance practices, and the recognition of indigenous peoples and local communities' rights to forest conservation.

If the overall status of forest conservation worldwide demonstrates that measures to overcome this critical challenge are not on track, it is equally valuable to look at individual actions taken by governments, companies and civil society organizations. The “NYDF Endorser Perspectives Report” fill this gap by examining the actions taken by this high-level and ambitious initiative. The Report highlights localized progress in multiple places and important qualitative milestones. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that “the time for further commitments without action and accountability has long passed.”

In light of those two reports and the literature reviewed, the table below presents the accountability analytical framework for the NYDF. As already pointed out, the cooperative initiative can be classified as both “disclosure-based approach” and “endorsement-based”. The endorser list comprises 41 national governments, 21 subnational authorities, 61 companies, 22 representations from indigenous peoples, and 66 civil society organizations. Within this set, 22 countries and 19 subnational authorities are located in the Global South. As for the location of companies and civil society organizations, even for those with headquarters on the Global North (such as Unilever or The Nature Conservancy), it is understood that their primary actions to halve deforestation should probably be conducted on tropical forest countries in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Even though there is not a formal monitoring system for the endorsers towards the goals, probably also due to the challenges for the establishment of such a system targeting different actors, the initiative is quite active in its internal accountability mechanisms. The launch of the Secretariat in 2017 has provided it with institutional robustness, and enhanced processes and tools for internal accountability mechanisms. However, those are not enough to catalyze endorsers' actions. As stated on the "Endorser Perspective Report", the operationalization of commitments requires (1) clear, measurable and time-bound targets, (2) a strategy for monitoring and accountability, including through a third-party verification; and (3) dedicated and consistent finance. These solutions are beyond the scope of the cooperative initiative's functions. Nonetheless, it should be stressed the Secretariat Declaration for the initiative's post-2020 vision will take into consideration strategies for strengthening implementation, addressing accountability, maximizing synergies, and supporting knowledge sharing. Finally, there is no record of any sanction towards the NYDF endorsers.

**Table 17: Accountability Analytical Framework for the New York Declaration on Forest**

<b>Conceptual Questions</b>	<b>Analytical Framework Questions</b>	<b>Answers</b>
<b>Who should be held accountable?</b>	1- Who are the members of the initiatives?	National governments, subnational authorities, companies, civil society organizations, indigenous peoples and local communities.
	2- In which category can the members be classified: public (IO, States, and subnational actors), private (companies or business associations), civil society organization (NGO, foundation, think-thanks) or hybrid?	Hybrid.
<b>To whom are the members held accountable?</b>	1- Does the initiative have a leading organization or a Secretariat?	Yes, a Secretariat called the NYDF Global Platform.
	2- Has a new organization or secretariat been set up for the initiative?	Yes, the Secretariat was established in 2017 (three years after the initiative's launch).
	3- In which category can the leading organization or secretariat be classified: public (IO, States, and subnational actors), private (companies or business associations), civil society organization (NGO, foundation, think-thanks)?	Hybrid: International Organization and think tank.
	4- Does the initiative have a dedicated board?	No.

	5- Has a new board been set up for the initiative?	Not applicable.
<b>What should the members be held accountable for?</b>	1-How can the cooperative initiative be classified as a standard-based approach or disclosure-based-approach?	Disclosure-based approach.
	2-Does each member make an individual commitment to join the cooperative initiative? Is this commitment clear? Is this commitment measurable?	No.
	3-Is the cooperative initiative collaboratively convened by all members? In this case, is there any information about each member's commitment towards the cooperative initiative's pledge? Is this commitment clear? Is this commitment measurable?	No.
	4-Is the initiative a voluntary declaration based on the endorsement of the members?	Yes. The cooperative initiative can be classified as "endorsement-based".
<b>By what processes are they held accountable?</b>	1-Does the initiative monitor the members' commitments?	No.
	2-Does the initiative have any verification system for the members' commitments?	Yes. The Recent Informal Consultation led by the Secretariat regarding the endorsers' progress towards the goals.

	3- Does the initiative have any reporting system for the members' commitments?	No.
<b>What standards demonstrate accountability?</b>	1-Are there internal mechanisms of communication and/or participation for the initiatives' members regarding the pledged targets?	Yes. There is a Forum called the “NYDF Community of Practice”.
	2-Besides the pledges and/or commitments, does the initiative make other information, such as internal meetings, publicly available and transparent?	Yes. The initiative provides information on the websites with reports from meetings, blog, and social media account.
	3-Does the initiative have a budget for stakeholders' actions?	Yes. Different actions are taken towards the participants including webinars.
	4-Does the initiative publish newsletters or annual reports about their activities?	Yes. There are regular newsletters.
	5-Does the initiative publicize its financial reports?	No.
<b>What sanctions exist for punishing noncompliance?</b>	1-Is there any sanctioning measure for the members?	No.
	2-Can members be excluded from the initiative? What are the processes for a member exclusion?	No.
	3-Is there any case of exclusion for noncompliance?	No.

Source: elaborated by the author

## 5.7 Conclusion

While conducting a complete debate of accountability in global climate governance is beyond the scope of this study – considering the multiple arrangements through which cooperative initiatives can be crafted and their interactions with the intergovernmental sphere – the analytical framework put forward provides significant benefits. First, it helps to map overlapping, diffuse and complex governance arrangements of the cooperative initiative. By taking each member of the cooperative initiative as a unity of analysis, the framework helps to identify individual commitments, thus supporting analyses seeking to overcome the double counting of emissions reductions. Second, the analytical framework provides several indicator-questions about the functioning of cooperative initiatives and the relationships between members and their leading organization, when applicable. This unveils cooperative initiatives' dynamics and mechanisms of decision making and implementation. Finally, and even considering the significant differences among the governance arrangements and functions of cooperative initiatives, the analytical framework allows for a comparative assessment of their internal accountability mechanisms.

Regarding the NYDF's accountability analytical framework, the presence of a vibrant community and the establishment of the Secretariat provided institutional strengths that are reflected in the initiative's internal accountability mechanisms. Considering the initiative's nature as a voluntary declaration built on endorsements, the accountability analysis is probably more positive than expected, with well-established processes and standards. However, the absence of a monitoring system for endorsers' contributions towards the NYDF goals should be noted. As the deforestation crisis has increasingly deteriorated since the NYDF adoption, new researches are important to ensure science can support effective non-state actions and public policies.

For the achievement of the NYDF goal 1 of halving deforestation, Zarin et al. (2016) designed a benchmark for average annual carbon emission from gross tropical deforestation. Based on the benchmark, the author subsequently outlined two scenarios. Their most interesting finding is that Brazil is critical to any scenario, even though the country did not sign the NYDF. From an internal accountability perspective, the evidence is not relevant. However, it is a considerable alert to the risks of only looking at the internal functioning and governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives. That evidence also demonstrates the relevance of public authorities, especially tropical forest national governments, in delivering

climate goals and also how their engagement on the transnational regime complex would benefit commitments established in the intergovernmental arena.

## CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

*“Net zero has become the guiding star for climate ambition, with net zero commitments growing exponentially from companies, cities, regions, investors and universities across the world. Our mission with Race to Zero is to maintain the integrity of these efforts, and firmly establish the minimum floor for climate ambition with rigorous criteria and a transparent process. Ensuring the credibility of climate action is crucial if we are to deliver a zero-carbon world in time.”*<sup>50</sup> Gonzalo Muñoz, Chilean High Level Climate Champion for COP25

According to the IPCC 2018 Report, in order to get the GHG emission trajectory on track to achieve the Paris Agreement 1.5 goal, there is a need to reduce by approximately 50% all the emission by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. This unprecedented and daunting challenge, and the required answers to face it, will shape the world economy, states’ development paths, and ultimately citizens’ behaviors. States are undoubtedly the leading actors in this endeavor and, most importantly, the public sphere should remain the central authority in this process. However, it is undeniable that local authorities, the private sector, and civil society organizations, including NGOs as well as social and youth movements, have also become critical actors and part of the social responses to climate change. Non-state and subnational actors can implement actions to raise awareness of the problem or act as watchdogs of states’ actions. Also, they can deliver climate actions that will concretely reduce GHG emissions, such as the adoption of renewable energies, and the reduction of deforestation in their territories or in their supply chains, among others. Building a resilient future will require a multilayered approach to the climate agenda. As stated in the quote from Gonzalo Muñoz – High-Level Champion from the Chilean COP-25 Presidency – the campaign led High-Level Champions, called Race to Zero, and backed by the UNFCCC Secretariat, is mobilizing non-state and subnational actors as well as cooperative initiatives to commit to net zero targets. The quote also highlights the need for the Race to Zero campaign to ensure the integrity of the pledges, meaning their credibility, in a transparent process. On this account, this research argues that consolidation of the orchestration as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat illustrates the formal rapprochement of the intergovernmental and transnational spheres. This process was institutionalized in the

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<sup>50</sup> Source: <https://racetozero.unfccc.int/the-race-to-zero-strengthens-and-clarifies-campaign-criteria/> Access on 30 April 2021

COP-21 Decision with the creation of the role of the High-Level Climate Champions, including their activities in the Race to Zero campaign, and the later establishment of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action in the UNFCCC Secretariat structure. Moreover, this new structure within the UNFCCC Secretariat catalyzed the establishment of a responsive orchestration technique to ensure the credibility of non-state and subnational actors climate actions.

This research had three main goals. The first goal was to analyze how orchestration was applied in the lead-up to the Paris Climate Summit in 2015 focusing on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. By unveiling the mechanisms that allowed the adoption of the COP-21 Decision institutionalizing orchestration as one of the governance modes of the UNFCCC Secretariat, chapter 3 provides a detailed narrative of the 2015 orchestration process implemented by the Quartet. The second goal was to investigate the performance of 78 climate cooperative initiatives part of the LPAA from 2014-2019. Chapter 4 seeks to understand the initiatives' performance, based on FOF method, in association with other variables such as governance arrangements and accountability mechanisms. The third goal was the development of an analytical framework that is advanced in chapter 5 to assess the cooperative initiatives' accountability and that relies on indicator-questions.

Three categories of primary sources were collected for the thesis. The first category is comprised by semi-structured interviews conducted with actors involved in the LPAA including members of the Quartet, representatives from the initiatives, Parties' negotiators and experts' members of the global climate action community. Additionally, the researcher conducted participatory observation in meetings of the Marrakech Partnership as well as negotiations and side-events at COP25. Finally, the data for the output performance analysis of the LPAA initiatives are mainly from the CIC-D database from 2019. The database is part of a project led by Professor Sander Chan. During the researcher doctoral exchange period at the DIE in 2019, the research was member of the CIC-D coding team responsible for annually updating the cooperative initiatives' outputs. Based on this dissertation's research design, the researcher added new variables to run the analysis to test the hypotheses on cooperative initiative's orchestration process and accountability mechanisms.

The research offers an analysis based on empirical evidence and it contributes to the literature by unveiling the institutional and political choices that have catalyzed the adoption of the orchestration as one of the UNFCCC Secretariat's governance modes. Additionally, it provides an empirical analysis of a heterogeneous set of cooperative initiatives and expands

the CIC-D database by adding new variables, such as orchestration and accountability mechanisms. Finally, the thesis contributes to the debate about the assessment of cooperative initiatives' accountability by offering a standardized analytical framework.

## **6.1 Main conclusions**

Non-state and subnational actors' individual and collective climate actions have been increasing steadily over the past decade. Additionally, the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the COP21 Decision launches a new avenue for the interactions of the transnational and intergovernmental spheres. In this regard, the establishment of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action provides a structured and formal space in the intergovernmental arena to galvanize the interactions between Parties and non-Party stakeholders. In this sense, this thesis argues that the launch of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda during the COP in Peru, an unprecedented endeavor gathering two COP Presidencies and comprising the engagement of the United Nations system at its highest level, constitute the initial cause of institutionalization of the orchestration as one of the governance modes that the UNFCCC Secretariat can employ in the global climate governance landscape. Alongside the analysis of the institutionalization of orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat, this thesis also argues that in the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement there is a need for the orchestrator, essentially the UNFCCC Secretariat, to broaden its orchestration techniques aiming not only to mobilize intermediaries - non-Party stakeholders' individual or collective climate actions - but also to build bridges between non-Party stakeholders and Parties by facilitating and systematizing the information and knowledge produced by both instances. On this account, the term "responsive orchestration" is coined to capture the expanded role international organizations might perform in global governance.

It cannot be affirmed that there are strict boundaries between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres. Au contraire, it is demonstrated that the rapprochement of the two realms is possible due to the support or neutrality of Parties in the negotiation process for the COP21 Decision and then the renewal of the mandate of the Marrakech Partnership in COP25. Empirical evidence in chapter 4 demonstrates that the negotiation process to include non-Party stakeholders in the COP21 Decision was not polarized nor contentious. The work conducted by the members of the Quartet throughout 2015 allowed them to get the Parties' buy-in, moving the critical states to a neutrality position. The analysis also revealed that this

remained the case for the first period mandate of the Marrakech Partnership from 2016 to 2020. Additionally, the willingness of the intermediary actors, with their individual or collective climate actions, to be part of the orchestration process, only benefiting from soft inducements from the orchestrator, highlights that the intergovernmental sphere is perceived as a legitimate arena for non-Party stakeholders.

Notwithstanding the lack of a direct principal-agent relationship between the orchestrator and intermediaries, this research concludes that the orchestration process of the UNFCCC Secretariat, including the Marrakech Partnership, along with other formal mechanisms for the engagement of non-Party stakeholders, such as the TEP and Talanoa Dialogues, contribute to the enhancement of non-Party stakeholders' accountability in global climate governance. It is argued that the intergovernmental sphere incentivizes the disclosure and tracking of progress of climate actions implemented by the individual actors and initiatives from the transnational sphere. Here, the two most relevant accountability mechanisms rely on peers and the market itself. For instance, CDP is the largest database gathering companies, cities, and states' disclosure on their climate risks, opportunities, and actions. Investors invite companies from their portfolio to disclose their information regarding climate change, and companies can ask their suppliers across the world to disclose their climate-related information. Even if such accountability mechanisms lack a potential sanction attribute, it should be noted that climate actions are also scrutinized by citizens (regarding subnational authorities' commitments) and by stakeholders and consumers (concerning companies and investors).

The global climate governance landscape - in which orchestration is one of the governance modes - can benefit from all its actors, including academic and non-governmental organizations collecting data from non-Party stakeholders, Parties supporting cooperative initiatives (including the development of tracking mechanisms), and the UNFCCC Secretariat providing a formal structure to convene Parties and non-Party stakeholders. This community will perform functions such as monitoring and transparency of climate actions for the entire landscape. However, there are several aspects to be improved in order to avoid green-washing, free-riders or even the announcement of unrealistic climate commitments that will be hardly delivered on the ground.

Also, the dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of the 78 initiatives that integrated the LPAA in chapter 4. The main goal was to investigate the association between cooperative initiatives' governance arrangements, including accountability mechanisms, and their

performance. A literature review was conducted on the theoretical debate about the accountability and performance of cooperative initiatives in global climate governance. Then, the research design adopted was introduced to investigate how governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives are associated with their performance. The chapter proposed an analysis associating the governance arrangements and performance of cooperative initiatives that draws on empirical evidence from the database developed for this thesis. Empirical evidence shows that almost 50% of LPAA cooperative initiatives have hybrid membership, comprising public, private and civil society actors. This provides additional evidence that the *loci* of authority are expanding not only to private authority forms but also in hybrid arrangements. Furthermore, the findings demonstrated that cooperative initiatives rely mostly on public funding for their actions.

Finally, chapter 5 introduces an analytical framework for the assessment of cooperative initiatives' accountability mechanisms. The framework helps to map the overlapping, diffuse and complex governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives. By taking each member of a cooperative initiative as a unity of analysis, the framework helps to identify individual commitments, supporting analyses seeking to overcome the double counting of emissions reductions. Also, the analytical framework provides several indicator-questions about the cooperative initiatives' functioning and the relationships between members and their leading organization, when applicable. This unveils cooperative initiatives' dynamics and mechanisms of decision making and implementation. Finally, and even considering the significant differences among the governance arrangements and functions of cooperative initiatives, the analytical framework allows for a comparative assessment of their internal accountability mechanisms.

## **6.2 Research limits**

The limits of this study are mainly due to a limitation of time and resources. The first research limit is related to the analysis of the post-Paris Agreement period regarding the employment of orchestration as a governance mode. The majority of the questions in the semi-structured interview guide focused on the emergence of the LPAA and its *modus operandi* throughout 2015. However, several interviewees provided additional information comparing the periods pre- and post-Paris Agreement. Thanks to the richness of the primary data collected and the participatory observations in COP-25 (mainly on the negotiation for

the mandate renewal of the Marrakech Partnership and the role of the High-Level Climate Action Champions), chapter 3 provides a brief analysis of the post-Paris Agreement period. Here, the limitation of time prevented extending data collection and analysis.

Another research limit concerns the data for the performance assessment of cooperative initiatives. Despite the innovative work of the GGCA and the CIC-D database, as stated by Chan et al. (2016), the assessment of performance is conceptually and empirically challenging. Moreover, due to the relative novelty of most of the climate actions implemented by non-state and subnational actors and their long-term goals, such as GHG emissions reduction, an assessment of effectiveness in terms of actual environmental or behavioral impacts is not possible. The research challenges were increased by the fact that the empirical results were not sufficient to support the hypotheses based on the adopted theoretical approach. There is no evidence for any kind of positive governance arrangement effect on the output performance of LPAA cooperative initiatives. However, the empirical evidence and analysis presented in chapter 4 demonstrate how complex the landscape of cooperative initiatives is and provide a broader understanding of these initiatives' governance arrangements and relations to the intergovernmental sphere. And, most importantly, chapter 4 constitutes a contribution to the few studies in the global climate governance literature associating the governance arrangements of cooperative initiatives to their performance.

### **6.3 Academic implications and further research**

The thesis advances a new concept of responsive orchestration and provides an analysis based on empirical data both of qualitative and quantitative nature. Although the concept was designed for global climate governance, it can be applied and tested in other orchestration processes on the environmental agenda, such as those in biodiversity conservation, and also in other global governance thematic areas that have a diverse landscape of non-state actors, such as health and human rights.

On the one hand, further qualitative studies can refine the concept of responsive orchestration by providing an analysis on the post-Paris Agreement era with a special focus on the Race to Zero campaign. Also, the analytical framework can be strengthened and refined in order to provide better indicator-questions to support the monitoring of cooperative initiatives. This could be achieved through the application of the analytical framework to assess other cooperative initiatives and the collection of primary data from those initiatives.

On the other hand, quantitative studies can rely on the exploratory findings of the thesis to refine variables such as the performance of cooperative initiatives.

Although this thesis did not intend to argue that the role of the UNFCCC Secretariat is to be a potential accountability holder of the transnational sphere, understanding how orchestrators advance accountability in the transnational sphere is relevant in order to understand how the intergovernmental and transnational arenas operate in the context of a hybrid multilateralism.

Another important debate that was not fully addressed in this study was the principal-agent relationship between Parties and IO. Orchestration can be understood as an entrepreneurial technique employed by agents broadening their functions. Further studies could explore the states' perception of the orchestration process.

In light of this, it is suggested that further research could focus on:

1- investigating the post-Paris Agreement period focusing on the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action and the Race to Zero campaign in the lead-up to COP-26.

2- analyzing the concept of responsive orchestration in other regimes such as health and human rights.

3- analyzing the potential accountability mechanisms that can be implemented in the intergovernmental sphere between the pair orchestrator – intermediaries.

4- Applying the analytical framework to the case of other climate cooperative initiatives to refine the indicator-questions.

#### **6.4 Policy implications**

The findings of this study can contribute to the analyses of policymakers when designing and implementing orchestration as a governance mode. Even if orchestration cannot be understood as a one-size-fits-all governance mode, the results from unpacking how the LPAA led to the institutionalization of orchestration in the UNFCCC Secretariat can support other international organizations in their processes. For instance, the UN CBD is leading a similar process on the biodiversity conservation agenda called the “Sharm el Sheikh to Kunming Action Agenda” - a clear reference to the LPAA, as the name of the cities of the platform represent the names of the CBD COP-14 and COP-15 cities in Egypt and China.

Lessons learned from the UNFCCC process are relevant to the orchestration theory and its practical implications. The relevance of having support from the highest level of the UN system, such as public endorsement from the Secretary-General and a dedicated team on the UNSGO, as well as the joint work of COP Presidencies and the international organization are critical to set the transnational agenda as one of the priorities for the intergovernmental process. Moreover, the orchestration process can rely on existing initiatives, but it should also promote the establishment of new ones. In both cases, it is critical that cooperative initiatives advance ambitious targets that will send a resounding and clear message to the Parties of the transnational sphere engagement to the thematic. All cooperative initiatives will benefit from being showcased in different intergovernmental arenas and negotiations, and in a public registry such as a website acting as Portal. Finally, the establishment of a community, gathering experts, practitioners and supporting states, will act as a support network for the orchestration process.

Furthermore, this thesis has argued that the adoption of the Paris Agreement and COP21 Decision launch a new avenue for the interactions between the transnational and intergovernmental spheres. In this regard, the establishment of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action provides a structured and formal space in the intergovernmental arena to galvanize the interactions between Parties and non-Party stakeholders. The UNFCCC Secretariat acts as a responsive orchestrator by not only showcasing intermediaries – non-Party stakeholders – actions to Parties but also by systematizing and facilitating the exchange of information between these two instances.

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## **APPENDIX 1 – Semi-structure interview guide**

1- What were the objectives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda? How was the conception process?

2- How was the strategy for selecting the initiatives that were part of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda defined?

3- What were the incentives provided by the French and Peruvian governments, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat and the United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General (hereafter referred to as the Quartet) for the LPAA initiatives?

4- What were the interactions between non-Party stakeholders and the Quartet in the run-up to the COP-21?

5- To what extent do you consider that accountability mechanisms from the LPAA and the Global Climate Action more broadly were taken into consideration for the design of the LPAA and the GCA in the UNFCCC?

6- How did those responsible for setting up the LPAA envision the continuity and durability of the GCA in the UNFCCC?

7- To the best your knowledge, in the mandate period of the GCA in the UNFCCC, how are accountability mechanisms of non-Party stakeholders taken into account by the UNFCCC Secretariat?

8- To what extent do you think UNFCCC Parties support the GCA mandate?

9- Could you please indicate other relevant names to be interviewed?

## APPENDIX 2 -LIST OF LPAA INITIATIVES

Name of the initiative	Thematic Area Under LPAA
4/1000 Initiative: Soils for Food Security and Climate	Agriculture
ACT – Assessing low Carbon Transition	Business
Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP): Small Farms, Big Impacts	Agriculture
Adaptation of West African Coastal Area	Resilience
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative	Renewable Energy
African Clean Energy Corridor Initiative	Renewable Energy
Airport Carbon Accreditation	Transport
Banking Environment Initiative (BEI)	Private Finance
Bonn Challenge	Forest
Buildings Efficiency Accelerator Platform (part of SEforAll)	Building
Business Alliance for Water and Climate	Resilience
Business Leadership Criteria on Carbon Pricing: UN Global Compact/Part of Caring for Climate	Business
C40 Cities Clean Bus Declaration	Transport
Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance	Cities and Regions
Caring for Climate	Business
CCAC Oil & Gas Methane Partnership	Business
CCAC Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs	Short Lived Climate
CEM Global Lightning Challenge	Energy Access & Efficiency
Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance	Cities and Regions
Climate Change Reporting and Fiduciary Duty	Private Finance
Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS)	Resilience
Collaborative Climate Action Across the Air Transport World (ICAO/ ATAG)	Transport
Divest-Invest Global Movement	Private Finance

en.lighten Initiative (part of SEforAll)	Energy Access & Efficiency
Food Security Climate Resilience Facility (FoodSECuRe)	Resilience
Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction (GABC)	Building
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves	Energy Access & Efficiency
Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy	Cities and Regions
Global District Energy Accelerator (part of SEforAll)	Energy Access & Efficiency
Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform (part of SEforAll)	Energy Access & Efficiency
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)	Resilience
Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI) (part of SEforAll)	Transport
Global Geothermal Alliance (GGA)	Renewable Energy
Global Green Freight Action Plan (part of CCAC)	Transport
Global Resilience Partnership	Resilience
Global States and Regions Annual Disclosure (former: Compact of States and Regions)	Cities and Regions
Global Water, Climate and Development Programme (WACDEP)	Resilience
Great Green Wall	Resilience
Industry Energy Efficiency Accelerator (part of SEforAll)	Energy Access & Efficiency
InsuResilience (former: G7 Climate Risk Insurance Initiative)	Resilience
International Solar Alliance	Renewable Energy
Latin American Protected areas declaration	Forest
LCTPi Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)	Business
LCTPi Cement Sustainability Initiative	Innovation
LCTPi Chemicals	Business
LCTPi Renewables/Rescale	Business
Life Beef Carbon	Agriculture
Lima Challenge / part of NYFD	Forest
Low Carbon Investment Registry	Private Finance
Low-Carbon Sustainable Rail Transport Challenge	Transport
Maritime Regions in Action against Climate Change	Resilience

Megacities Alliance for Water and Climate	Resilience
MobiliseYourCity	Transport
Montreal Carbon Pledge	Private Finance
Municipal Solid Waste Initiative: MEMBER OF CCA Coalition	Cities and Regions
New York Declaration on Forests	Forest
Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change and Call to Action	Transport
Paris Pact on water and adaptation to climate change in the basins of rivers, lakes and aquifers	Resilience
Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition	Private Finance
Promotion of Smart Agriculture towards climate change	Agriculture
Protection of 400 million hectares of forests by Indigenous Peoples /part of NYFD	Forest
Public Transport Declaration on Climate Leadership	Transport
R4 Rural Resilience Initiative	Resilience
RE100	Renewable Energy
Refrigerants, Naturally!	Short Lived Climate
Responsible corporate engagement in climate policy: UN Global Compact	Business
Save Food Initiative	Agriculture
Science-based targets	Business
SIDS Lighthouses Initiative	Renewable Energy
Smart Risk Investing (SRI)	Private Finance
Statement by Financial Institutions on Energy Efficiency Finance	Energy Access & Efficiency
The Blue Growth Initiative	Agriculture
Under 2 Coalition (Under 2 MOU)	Cities and Regions
United for Efficiency (part of SEforAll)	Energy Access & Efficiency
WWF Climate Savers	Business
Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders	Forest
Zero routine Flaring by 2030	Energy Access & Efficiency
Taxis4SmartCities Initiative	Transport

## ANNEX 1 – UNFCCC MEMORANDUM

Via pouch



**United Nations**  
Climate Change Secretariat

Executive Secretary

**Nations Unies**  
Secrétariat sur les changements climatiques

Secrétaire exécutive

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## Memorandum

To:	The Secretary-General	Date:	18 December 2015
From:	Christiana Figueres Executive Secretary	Page:	1 of 3
Subject:	<b>Report on the UNFCCC Climate Change Conference, 30 Nov – 12 Dec 2015, Paris, France, COP 21 and CMP 11</b>	Reference:	CF/DV/IAL

It is with great pleasure that I transmit to you my report on the Paris Climate Change Conference that you so generously attended. Please allow me to start by expressing my gratitude for your continuous support and commitment during your tenure as Secretary-General to the climate change process and, in particular, for your presence during the Conference which was crucial to its successful outcome.

The Paris Conference opened on Monday, 30 November with a Leaders Event which provided a platform for 150 heads of state and government to exercise their political leadership and to lend their support for an ambitious and effective climate change agreement. As you witnessed, it was the largest group of leaders ever to attend a United Nations event on a single day.

After two very intense weeks of negotiations, both under the ADP and under the auspices of the French COP Presidency in the second week, the Conference closed on Saturday, December 12, with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the text whereby Parties agreed to put the world on the path towards a sustainable future for all.

I believe that the Paris Agreement is ambitious and balanced and it is fully owned by Parties. Together with the decision adopting the Agreement (decision 1/CP.21), it contains a structure of provisions that will allow Parties to meet its objective: to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty by, inter alia, holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C.

The Agreement and the decision cover all the crucial areas that had been identified as essential to effectively address climate change:

- **Long-term goal** – the Paris Agreement sets a goal of reaching global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter to achieve a balance between global anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.

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- **Mitigation** –the Agreement establishes that the contributions of Parties, called nationally determined contributions (NDCs), will be no less ambitious than the already submitted ones. On the day of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 188 countries had submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. NDCs will be submitted every five years, thereby steadily increasing their ambition in the long-term.
- **A transparency system and global stocktake** – Parties agreed to periodically take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving its purpose and its long term goals including means of implementation (referred to as the “global stocktake”). The first global stocktake needs to be undertaken in 2023 and every 5 years thereafter.
- **Adaptation** – a global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change is established in the Paris Agreement. Parties acknowledged that adaptation action should follow a country driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach. United Nations specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged to support the efforts of Parties to implement the action on adaptation.
- **Loss and damage** – Parties recognized the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and decide to enhance and strengthen the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.
- **Support** – The Paris Agreement establishes that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect both to mitigation and adaptation. Decision 1/CP.21 establishes that prior to 2025, Parties shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.

**Pre-2020 Ambition:** Decision 1/CP.21 also seeks to mobilize and scale up climate action in the period before 2020. The decision urges Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify and implement its Doha Amendment; it resolves to strengthen, in the period 2016-2020, the existing technical examination process on mitigation, in which the United Nation organizations and agencies have been key contributors. It resolves to enhance the provision of urgent and adequate finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties in order to enhance the level of ambition of pre-2020 action by Parties and in this regard, strongly urges developed country Parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap to achieve the goal of jointly providing USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation.

**Lima Paris Action Agenda:** The Conference saw an unprecedented mobilization of action by non-state actors. Action Day on 5 December, and the twelve “Focus Events” held under the Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), demonstrated the massive and rising response by cities, regions, business and civil society. The initiatives showcased at the events have already become a major force in reducing emissions, improving energy efficiency, building resilient communities and economies and curbing destruction and waste in forestry, water and agriculture. During the conference, the NAZCA portal reached nearly 11,000 commitments from non-state actors including 2,255 cities, 150 regions, 2,025 companies, 424 investors, and 235 civil society organizations.



Page 3

I would like to conclude by asking you to extend my gratitude to the heads of the United Nations organizations and agencies that have so intensely worked towards the success of the Paris Climate Change Conference. I am confident that I count on their support while we open this new chapter in our endeavors to “*strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty*”.

cc: Mr. Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General  
Mr. Edmond Mulet, Under-Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet, EOSG  
Mr. Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary-General, UNDESA  
Ms. Helen Clark, Administrator, UNDP  
Mr. Achim Steiner, Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director, UNEP  
Ms. Cristina Gallach, Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information  
Mr. Janos Pasztor, Assistant Secretary-General on Climate Change

## ANNEX 2 – UN NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

### Note to the Secretary-General (through the Deputy Secretary-General)

17/12/15

#### Support to the Secretary-General on climate Change in 2016

The adoption of the Paris Agreement represents a major turning point in the global effort to respond to climate change. The agreement is ambitious and balanced, and rises to the challenge of climate change. The agreement sends a clear signal that the transformation of the global economy in a low carbon climate resilient direction is already underway and accelerating. The leadership of the Secretary-General made a decisive difference in the finalisation of the Paris Agreement and in catalysing multi-stakeholder climate action. This leadership is not only welcomed by Governments, the private sector, civil society and the global public, but is now demanded.

#### Political leadership


The Paris Agreement will be open for signature on April 22, 2016. The next step is for countries to express their consent to be bound by the agreement through a formal process of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. COP21 has given birth to an Agreement, but like all newborns, it will require incubation and nurturing. Further work will be needed in 2016 and beyond to elaborate essential details and strengthen certain elements.

On the political front, the leadership of the Secretary-General will be required in the following areas Post-Paris:

- Communicating the significance and value of the Paris agreement as an effective tool in the fight against climate change; and as an instrument to acceleration the transformation of the global economy in a low carbon climate resilient direction.
- Planning the 22 April 2016 high-level signing ceremony of the Paris Agreement as a key milestone for maintaining and mobilising political momentum. The Secretary-General should aim to secure signatures from as many Parties as possible on that date and by all Parties before he demits office in 2016.
- Continuing to advocate for higher levels of ambition on mitigation and finance in key countries. There are likely to be major domestic and internal political challenges in key countries including US and EU (Poland), which could have negative spill over effects in the wider international community. On the positive side, a number of major economies including Canada and some EU have signalled a willingness to raise their ambition level in the context of a Paris Agreement.

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- Nurturing the Paris agreement by providing high-level political oversight over the elaboration of key operational details of the outcomes in Paris.

### Climate Action

The 2014 Climate Summit resulted in the mobilization of leaders from governments, the private sector and civil society around transformative climate action to reduce emissions and build resilience. In partnership with Peru, France and the UNFCCC Secretariat, the Secretary-General has advanced the climate action agenda through the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA).

Member State interest in the LPAA and the action agenda remains high. Many have voiced the view that political momentum on climate action must be maintained post-Paris. At COP21 it was decided that the future role of non-state actors and the action agenda would be strengthened through the creation of a framework through which such action can be enhanced and scaled-up. The basis has been provided for Parties and interested organizations to build a lean and efficient support structure that enable the further growth of participation and development of new initiatives.

The role of the Secretary-General and his team in cooperation with the governments was highlighted in Paris. Current, incoming as well as outgoing COP Presidencies consider it important that the Secretary-General remain engaged in the lead up to the COP22 in Marrakesh – referred to as the “implementation” COP, but understandably, in a much less “operational” role. The CCST has been invited to stay connected and participate in the first stage setting meetings in January 2016. CCST is expected to provide insight and guidance to the design of the framework, primarily in the areas of increased ambition, promoting the relevance and link to other SDGs, encouraging UN engagement with the non-state actors in the action areas, focusing on supporting accountability functions and providing occasionally the convening power of the office to support the action agenda. With regard to an active focal point and substantive engagement role, the CCST can retire from most action areas. In most action areas the focal point role will be taken up by the new framework with at least one UN organisation being actively involved in the area.

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However, in a few areas transitional arrangements will be needed. This is particularly true for the resilience and cities/subnational action areas. Both areas have high political value. Important milestones for the action agenda include the Abu Dhabi Sustainability week, Davos and an event organized by the University of Maryland on climate action in May 2016.

### South-South Cooperation

With the support of Government of China, the Secretary-General is advancing South-South cooperation on climate change in a few key areas linked to the action agenda – energy, resilience, cities and the use of innovative approaches including big data. These efforts have helped to diffuse tensions in the formal negotiating process around the issue of how to apply differentiation on finance in the context of the new regime. Post-Paris, the leadership of the Secretary-General on South-South Cooperation on climate change should aim to :

- Demonstrate the value added of south-south cooperation;
- Continue catalysing concrete action to build positive momentum in 2016; and
- Ensure that the UN system is aligned and well equipped to support the aims of SSCCC2016.

### Recommendations

Given the above, it is recommended that a 10 person Team through 2016 would be the minimum needed to provide effective support the Secretary-General. This is approximately one third of the existing Team. This team would be in place by 1 April 2016.



Janos Pasztor  
17 December 2015

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## ANNEX 3 – FRANCE CONCEPT PAPER TO THE UNSGO

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Paris,



Dear Secretary-General,

29/12/15

On 12 December 2015, the international community adopted a historic, ambitious, durable, dynamic, balanced and fair agreement on the climate, which we can all be proud of. What we have achieved together is exceptional. In these times of crises, when the international community struggles to stand united, we have shown brilliantly that multilateralism and the spirit of compromise can still prevail.

This success owes a great deal to your personal, unwavering commitment to this subject since the outset of your term as Secretary-General of the United Nations. I would once again like to thank you most warmly.

We now need to prepare the decisions needed to implement this agreement straight away in 2020. I would like to assure you that France will remain fully committed, in order to prepare the next stage – the Marrakesh Conference – as well as the future beyond.

We also need to ensure that the announcements of financial and technological support and expertise made by many governments during the Paris Climate Conference for the pre-2020 period are acted upon rapidly. We need to encourage non-governmental actors to fulfil their commitments under the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, and beyond, and to make further commitments of this type in the coming years.

In this respect, in order to sustain momentum on pre-2020 action, the decision adopted during the 20<sup>th</sup> session of the Conference of the Parties provides for the Lima-Paris Action Agenda to be institutionalized, including through the nomination of champions appointed by the successive Presidents of the COP.

Beyond these very useful provisions, we feel it essential to establish an international team to support climate action prior to 2020, to play an organizing and mobilizing role, placed institutionally under your supervision in order to ensure it enjoys unquestionable legitimacy. It would, of course, work in close liaison with the successive Presidents of the COP, with the champions they appoint, and with the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC.

*Mr Ban Ki-moon*  
 Secretary-General of the United Nations

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This team, which could be made up of some fifteen people, would be based in Paris. France is prepared to provide some of the experts for this team and, if necessary, premises for it.

I would be extremely pleased if you were to appoint Laurence Tubiana, our Ambassador responsible for international climate negotiations, as Assistant Secretary-General or Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for pre-2020 climate action. She has vast expertise and experience in this area and great credibility with all the Parties and with non-governmental actors and foundations which would be prepared to support such action.

Please find attached a paper presenting the possible terms of these arrangements.

I hope this proposal to provide solid foundations for the post-Paris period will receive your approval. Please be assured, Secretary-General, of my highest consideration.

François Hollande

## Concept paper

### **Establishment under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General of a dedicated team for the coordination of international pre-2020 climate action (“Climate Action Now”)**

We need to aim to have established a new landscape of climate action by the time the Paris Agreement enters into force in 2020. National climate policies, strategies of private and institutional investors, available technologies and local policies need to demonstrate a new movement sparked by the Paris Agreement, even before it takes effect. That is the aim of the Paris Pledge for Action, which has already been signed by thousands of major actors.

To achieve this objective, it would be a good idea to establish a dedicated team, under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. **This team would be responsible for institutionalizing and uniting, under the authority of the United Nations Secretary-General, the coordination of all dimensions of pre-2020 action.**

Its work could be organized as follows:

#### **Mandate**

- **The scope of the team’s mandate should be very wide-ranging, including finance issues**, in line with the goal of raising \$100 billion dollars per year of climate finance in 2020 (paragraph 115 of decision CP/21), pre-2020 action, **and all initiatives on the part of State and non-State actors that contribute to combating climate change pre-2020** (such as the International Solar Alliance, CREWS, and the A2R initiative).
- **This team’s work should follow on from the 2014 New York Climate Summit and the Lima-Paris Action Agenda** (paragraph 117 of the decision). It should unite governments, businesses and civil society (paragraphs 134 and 135 of the decision).
- Such a team should be **operational as early as possible in 2016** (particularly following the signing of the agreement on 22 April) and until 2020 (entry into force of the Paris Agreement).

#### **Institutional and legal framework**

- **The head of this team could be appointed as Under-Secretary-General or Assistant Secretary-General.**
- The team would be legally attached to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, and **based in Paris.**
- **This mission is directly linked to the activities of the COP.** Legally, it comes under Part IV of the Paris decision (“enhanced action prior to 2020”) and particularly paragraphs 117 to 124 concerning the implementation of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda. Moreover, these elements should contribute to overall momentum and enable countries to progress towards more ambitious commitments prior to 2020.

#### **Composition and governance**

- **Its composition should represent the geographical balances of the United Nations and a gender balance,** as well as involving the countries that will hold the following COP Presidencies (Morocco, and Presidencies of COPs 23-25), **all countries that wish to contribute by providing experts, and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).**
- **The team could be made up of 10-15 people,** including staff from the UN, specialized agencies and programmes, and the team of the French COP21 Presidency.
- To enhance involvement of non-State actors, a **consultative body,** made up of NGO representatives, businesses, investors and civil society, could be created, with the role of expressing opinions on the major themes of pre-2020 action.

#### **Finance**

- In the framework of an appointment as Assistant Secretary-General, in the Executive Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, funding would come from the regular budget of the United Nations or extra-budgetary resources

(voluntary contributions); a trust fund could be created at the UN and dedicated to funding the expenditure of the team.

- United Nations agencies and programmes could provide staff or funding for the team. Private foundations could also be asked to contribute.

#### **Premises**

- France could provide this team with premises in Paris.