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Transnational Networks and civil society: the circumstances of success for policy contestation

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Transnational Networks and civil society: the circumstances of success for policy contestation

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ABSTRACT

What are the circumstances which allow for a civil society network contestation to be successful in changing international policy? What is the role of specific civic actors within these networks? Studies about transnational networks have often focused on impact and effectiveness – how a policy can be altered, how a country's international relations are influenced – but these analyses are still to some degree state-centric. They focus on the national and international conditions which allow for the success or failure of transnational civil society campaigns. My intention, with this dissertation, is to focus on the interaction between civil society and states, and the conditions within civic actors and networks which allow for a campaign to be successful. My focus in on the Brazilian civil organization FASE (Federation of Organizations for Social and Educational Assistance), which lent its expertise and contacts to Mozambican civil society in the contestation of the trilateral cooperation project ProSavana. The research questions ask: *What are FASE's internal, fundamental characteristics which allow for impactful transnational contestation? How has FASE contributed to the 'No to ProSavana' campaign?* The spiral model and boomerang effect, explored within the literature of transnational civil society, provide a fruitful methodology, as well as several hypotheses. The boomerang effect relates to the domestic civil society bypassing the state in order to acquire transnational support in their struggle, allowing for a contestation 'from below' and 'from above'. The spiral model is a five-phased process, with the success of each phase being depended on the gathering of information, relevance to the international agenda, strengthening of domestic civil society, and continuous pressure on the state. These frameworks are relevant when considering ProSavana and the attention gathered during the last ten years, as these three States – Brazil, Japan, and Mozambique – tried to justify and implement their controversial model of agriculture in the African country's underdeveloped lands. Evidence presented here, provided by reports, news articles and interviews, suggests that the strength and quality of FASE's role in the first steps of the contestation and assembly of the network can be explained by its institutional complexity and expertise, granted by its 60 years of existence. Its participation in the 'No to ProSavana' network was important to strengthen Mozambican civil society claims, which allowed for the significant end of ProSavana in 2020.

Key words: Civil Society; ProSavana; FASE; Transnational Networks; South-South Cooperation

OLIVEIRA, Giovanna Buttrós. **Redes transnacionais e sociedade civil: as circunstâncias para o sucesso de contestação de políticas.** 2021. 55p. Dissertação (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais) - Instituto de Relações Internacionais. Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2021

RESUMO

Quais são as circunstâncias que permitem que uma contestação de rede transnacional de sociedade civil seja bem-sucedida em influenciar a política internacional? Qual é o papel de atores cívicos específicos dentro dessas redes? Os estudos sobre redes transnacionais geralmente se concentram em impacto e eficácia - como uma política pode ser alterada, como as relações internacionais do país são influenciadas - mas essas análises ainda são, em certo grau, focadas no Estado. Elas se concentram nas condições nacionais e internacionais que permitem o sucesso ou o fracasso das campanhas transnacionais da sociedade civil. Minha intenção, com esta dissertação, é focar na interação entre a sociedade civil e os Estados, e as condições relativas à sociedade civil que permitem o sucesso de uma campanha. Meu foco é a organização civil brasileira FASE (Federação de Orgãos de Assistência Social e Educacional), que ofereceu sua *expertise* e contatos à sociedade civil moçambicana na contestação do projeto de cooperação trilateral ProSavana. As perguntas de pesquisa são: *Quais são as características internas fundamentais da FASE que permitiram uma contestação transnacional impactante? Como a FASE contribuiu para a campanha 'Não ao ProSavana?* O modelo espiral e o efeito bumerangue, explorados na literatura da sociedade civil transnacional, fornecem uma metodologia frutífera, bem como várias hipóteses. O efeito boomerang refere-se ao ato de a sociedade civil doméstica contornar o Estado para adquirir um apoio transnacional em sua luta, permitindo uma contestação 'de baixo' e 'de cima'. O modelo em espiral é um processo de cinco fases, com o sucesso de cada fase sendo dependente da coleta de informações, relevância para a agenda internacional, fortalecimento da sociedade civil doméstica e pressão contínua sobre o Estado. Essas estruturas são relevantes quando se considera o ProSavana e a atenção veiculada nos últimos dez anos, à medida que esses três Estados - Brasil, Japão e Moçambique - tentavam justificar e implementar seu polêmico modelo de agricultura nas terras subdesenvolvidas do país africano. As evidências aqui apresentadas, fornecidas por reportagens e entrevistas, sugerem que a força e a qualidade da atuação da FASE nos primeiros anos da contestação e da rede podem ser explicadas pela sua complexidade institucional e *expertise*, outorgada por seus 60 anos de existência. A sua participação na rede 'Não ao ProSavana' foi importante para fortalecer as reivindicações da sociedade civil moçambicana, o que permitiu o fim do ProSavana em 2020.

Palavras-chave: Sociedade Civil; Redes transnacionais; ProSavana; FASE; Cooperação Sul-Sul.

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1.Introduction

The establishment of Brazil as one of the main producers of many primary goods does not happen without heated, and, often times, uncompromisable discourse on the use of land. The model of conservative agriculture – that which is based on large extensions of land, monocultures, pesticides, and mechanization – is progressively stronger, with peasant agriculture and family farming trying to resist its pressures and co-optation. It is an issue historically inseparable from recent economic tensions, that inadvertently responds to the authoritarian and then democratic path that Brazil has embarked on for the last 60 years.

Agriculture pertains to the economic, the political, and the social, and, as such, it is vitally important to different segments of society. FASE (Federation of Organizations for Social and Educational Assistance) is a non-governmental and non-profit organization created with the initial intent of aiding and educating rural communities, being openly against the aforementioned conservative model. Most of its 60 years of existence have been dedicated to participating in the criticism of this model of agriculture – sometimes in the form of small seminars for rural workers, sometimes having a seat in government institutions and voicing their concerns (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

Since its creation in 1961, FASE has developed assistance projects towards rural workers, with a special emphasis on communitarian development. In 1967, the Movement of Creative Community (MCC) was established as an opposition to the charity model of aid, as an outlet for FASE's scientific expertise and assistance. In 1983, the Project of Alternative Tehcnologies (PTA) was created with the intent of disseminating different practices of agriculture, ones that challenged the conservative model's alleged desirability. This concern with the discussion on agriculture persists well into the twenty first century. In 2002, FASE participates in the creation of the National Agroecology Articulation (ANA), born from the first National Encounter of Agroecology (I ENA). The encounter itself was the culmination of several years-worth of study and practice of alternative and communal agriculture (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

Part of FASE's fight against this model of agriculture also happened internationally. Most notably, FASE lent its international connections and expertise to the campaign 'No to ProSavana' (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016). ProSavana was a trilateral turned bilateral project between Brazil, Japan, and Mozambique which had the common goal of improving the competitiveness of the African country's agriculture (IPEA, 2016). According to the contestation (Justiça Ambiental et all, 2013; UNAC et all, 2015), this trilateral project was

seeking to implement the previously mentioned controversial conservative model of agriculture on Mozambican lands. FASE was an important and vocal adversary to ProSavana because it established contact with Mozambican civil society, provided them with links into Brazilian governmental institutions, and gave weight to the network that arose for the contestation.

My research questions are: *What are FASE's internal, fundamental characteristics which allow for impactful transnational contestation? How has FASE contributed to the 'No to ProSAVANA' campaign?*

The conceptual and methodological approaches provided by Risse-Kappen (1995) and Risse, Romp and Sikkink (1999) will frame this analysis into FASE and the 'No to ProSavana' campaign.

Risse-Kappen (1995) investigates the circumstances which allow for transnational and domestic civic actors to have a successful influence on policies and regimes. He centres the analyses on 2 variables: one domestic and one international. The domestic one refers to the organizational qualities to the target State, how easily civil society can be activated within it. The international qualities refer to whether the issue-area in question (that which civil society is fighting against) has been explored and legitimized in the form of international agreements or regimes. I adapt this framework to analyse FASE's domestic and international qualities - institutional complexity, expertise, and transnational ties – to defend the hypothesis that these were FASE's internal characteristics which allowed for the success of the ProSavana contestation.

Risse, Romp and Sikkink (1999) will aid in framing the discussion around the contestation of ProSavana. These authors build upon Risse-Kappen's (1995) approach to investigate how Human Rights norms have been accepted and legitimized in countries with a notorious history of violating them. They examine civil society's role in this, and its connection with transnational networks and actors. They developed a 'spiral model', which accounts for 5 phases of civil society engagement and result on the incorporation of Human Rights norms in the target State. This approach allows me to observe the contestation of the ProSavana project, examining the strategies employed by civil society which allowed for a successful campaign, and to focus particularly on FASE throughout this process.

This dissertation is divided as such: (1) an exploration of the literature and its most relevant questions; (2) the research design and the justifications for this analysis; (3) FASE's history and

the expertise in agriculture; (4) An examination of the ProSavana case and the network itself; (5) Additional considerations into the spiral model. Finally, (6) concludes the dissertation.

2.On transnational civil society networks

2.1 Conceptual points of departure

A study on the interests and gains of an actor in the international system is one of the most common types of research within the discipline of International Relations. However, when the actor is a nonstate organization, and the interests and gains are relative to the socialization that this actor and others around it have suffered throughout their existence, the issue becomes more complicated.

Amidst the several works that touch upon civil society in the international system and transnational civil society or networks, authors have ranged from the presumption of rationality (Stiles, 2003), through the omission of a clear conceptual narrative (Jakobsen, 2003; Scholte, 2003; Stone, 2003), to an admitted constructivist perspective (Clark, 2001; Florini, 1999, 2003; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005).

The idea is to presume that not only are civic associations such as FASE important in the international system, but they have the power to possess and exchange a currency that is ignored by state-centred literature. Clark (2001) called it norms and principles, as she explained how they exist even in an anarchic world, showing how material power is useless without it. Keck and Sikkink (1998) called it the ability to transform discursive positions, procedures, and behaviour.

Clark (2001) challenges the realist view in order to assert the importance of civic organizations in the domestic and transnational sphere. She argues that not only can norms and principles still exist in an anarchic world, but also that both are instrumental against the degeneration of the wanted political system. She uses Amnesty International as an example of an organization that maintains itself by principles, objectivity, and information alone, needing no other currency to influence state behaviour. This constitutes a necessary fundamental step in assimilating the social transnational world into the discipline of International Relations.

Florini (1999) follows a similar argument in analysing the mutation of authority in a globalized world. She understands authority as the ability to provide public goods, and questions the assertion that states are the only ones that can do so. Not only that, but international interactions gave rise to new interests, capabilities, and demands. Her hypothesis is that authority will progressively shift from state to non-state actors.

Keck and Sikking (1988) assume a more constructivist approach to make the argument that transnational coalitions have the ability to change norms and behaviour. It is admittedly a perspective that makes itself to be a bridge between the rationalist recognitions of incentives and constraints, and the post-rationalist focus on social relations and intersubjective understandings. As per Finnemore:

> States are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest by international organizations (…) It reverses traditional causal arrows. We have usually taken states as the starting point for analysis and examined the ways in which they create and interact with the various bits of furniture in the international system international organizations, treaties, legal structures, multinational corporations, other states. This analysis looks at the way the international system, here in the form of IOs, changes and reconstitutes states (Finnemore, 1996, p.6)

The literature on transnational networks is extremely rich. Not only is it filled with case studies that point to the importance of civil society within the international scope, challenging traditional realistic and liberal notions of the discipline, but also in the sense of redefining what power is, and what types of power are relevant in the maintenance of practices and ideas. Price (2003) points out that, although civic organizations do not have a monetary or military power, they manage to exercise substantial financial power from boycotts or popular pressure (p.584). The relevance of this actor within the international scope has been systematically studied.

Risse-Kappen (1995), as well as all the authors in his book (Cameron, 1995; Chilton, 1995; etc), do not question whether transnational networks matter. Such a claim is a given. The tangibility of their impact has been observed and attested, particularly in the political changes of Western Europe of the 1980s. The question is, however, how can the variation of impact across countries be explained? (1995, p.4)

They observe actors and coalitions that were formed with the clear objective of influencing policies, methodologically building upon two theoretical approaches – domestic structures and international institutions. The interaction between these approaches determines how easily actors can promote policy changes. If a state is oppressing its civil society too rigidly, it may be harder for transnational coalitions to be formed, and thus harder for change to occur. However, if this issue-area is regulated by international norms or regimes, the state is more vulnerable against transnational action (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p.6-7).

Chilton's (1995) comparative work in chapter 6 helps to illustrate this framework. She examines the different ways in which regime transformation came about in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s – specifically in Hungary, East Germany, and Romania. The independent variables are: (1) how developed civil society in each country was; (2) how strong the transnational

coalition that each particular civil society formed was. She judges regime change on the basis of peacefulness and completion, with Hungary as the most peaceful and complete, and Romania as the least on both accounts.

The network that she examines is the Peace and Human Rights Transnational Coalition (PHR-TNC), which nurtured a wide social base and gave weight to smaller coalitions. This allowed for the empowerment of civil society, material and moral support, and national legitimacy, which ensured that their claims were heard by the state. When asking the contrafactual question – what would have happened if the PHR-TNC had not existed? – Chilton (1995) suggests that this coalition was instrumental in breaking the cycle of fear among people. Not only that, but trust, organization, and strength can all be associated with the legitimacy and complexity that the coalition provides to local social movements.

Can a strong civil society exist without a degree of transnational activity? Chilton (1995) suggests that it is unlikely. Hungary presented both a high degree of civil society and high degree of transnational activity. East Germany had the second, but not the first. Romania, on the other hand, had neither. The circumstances which allow for regime change are the degree and complexity of domestic and transnational civil society activity.

Sikkink and Risse (1999) also attempt to examine conditions of impact, but they do so while paying closer attention on the internalization of human rights norms in specific countries. They self-admittedly build upon Risse-Kappen's (1995) book:

> Risse-Kappen's book on transnational relations (Risse-Kappen 1995) argued that the policy impact of transnationally operating non-state actors on state policies varies according to differences in domestic institutional structures which determine both their access to political systems and their ability to link up with domestic actors. This book goes one step further and explores the conditions under which networks of domestic and transnational actors are able to change these domestic structures themselves (Sikkink and Risse, 1999, p.4)

They develop a framework more complex than that of their predecessor: a five-phased ‘‘spiral model’’, which should account for the variation among states in terms of human rights institutionalization. The model is not to demonstrate an evolutionary process, but to explain variation and the lack of progress in specific countries. Phase 1 is defined by the repression from the State. This is when civil society is too weak to be a challenge to the government. A first hypothesis that the authors present is that only through the gathering of information can a transnational network be assembled and activated, so they can place the Human Rights violating state on the international agenda, moving on then to phase 2.

Phase 2 is denial. There is international attention, but the 'target state' denies any and all violation, counteracting by accusing the international system of hurting its 'sovereignty'. In this phase, the government may even mobilize nationalists against foreign intervention, making it seem like it has grown even stronger. A transition to the third phase is the hardest, being dependent on the strength of the coalition and the weakness of the country in the face of international pressure. This is their second hypothesis.

Phase 3 is composed of tactical concessions. The state will strategically concede to some of civil society's demands, which will allow for international pressure to diminish. The only way in which phase 4 can begin is if the domestic-transnational network continues to pressure the government despite of the concessions, in a ''from above'' and ''from below'' attack. Phase 4 is, then, the prescriptive status, which comes after a regime change or a controlled liberalization. New institutions to protect human rights are created. However, the only sustainable phase is the last one, number 5, the rule-consistent behaviour.

Granzer (1999) builds upon the phase model developed by Sikkink and Risse (1999). The author makes a comparative study between the institutionalization of human rights in Morocco and Tunisia. In Morocco, there was an ongoing human rights struggle which resulted in significant change. In Tunisia, the process was halted in 1987 by an authoritarian government which provided reforms that had no real impact. The situation, in Tunisia, only worsened.

The similarities between the countries are important. They were both repressed under authoritarian regimes over the 1980s. The political actors which arose in opposition used as a reference the international human rights regime. They challenged the legitimacy of their respective governments. However, the mere existence of civil society does not guarantee a successful political campaign. Both these countries' civil societies actions had to be helped by transnational networks (Granzer, 1999).

Upon so many similarities, how can the differences in outcome be explained? Granzer (1999) explores the second phase of the spiral model: denial. The Moroccan state denied and repressed the human rights network for over ten years. In this time, the network was able to build experience, institutional complexity, and to develop strategies for a time after the institutionalization of the human rights reforms – which, by then, allowed for its continuity. In Tunisia, the government was able to halt this development by making initial concessions, effectively silencing and weakening human rights activists and networks. It seems counter-intuitive, but Sikkink and Risse (1999) suggest and Granzer (1999) attempts to prove that an

unwilling government gives rise to a more mobilized domestic civil society and transnational network. Non-compliance, therefore, is a political target.

These two books, which try to explain variation of impact and success, compose the conceptual basis of this dissertation. I want to build upon these works that try to understand under which circumstances transnational coalitions *can* be impactful, and the role of each individual organization in building and giving weight to particular campaigns. How, exactly, does one level interact with the other?

The works by Risse-Kappen (1995) and Chilton (1995) attempt to answer this question by way of assuming that state behaviour cannot be explained without it. The methodological focus is on the state, as the dependent variable is policy change and the parameters for impact are state bureaucracy and organization. Sikkink and Risse (1999) change the dependent variable – from policy impact and regime change to human rights institutionalization – and create a more complex framework of analysis. Not only that, but the focus is much less on the state, and more on the interaction between state and civil society. Civic organizations and transnational coalitions are at the forefront of policy debate, change, and accountability.

My dissertation will continue this trend. I propose to observe this interaction from the other side – the civil society organization – and have my dependent variable be the network's campaign itself. I want to observe FASE through its history, organization, and international ties in order to raise hopefully interesting points into the circumstances that allow for civic organizations to aid each other, and to perform successful campaigns against a policy or country. The interaction is still at the forefront, though I wish to explore a different way of looking at the framework.

2.2 Research design

The general difficulty when analysing civil society organizations such as FASE, or transnational campaigns such as 'No to ProSavana', is that it is hard to collect structured evidence. The campaign did not have a bureaucratic structure. Its actors mostly supported Mozambique's civil society in signing open letters or promoting conversations with farmers. FASE did not apply a systematic approach in its help to Mozambique's civil society: the organization was active in establishing contact and having domestic channels that could reach government officials. There is a literature, however, that suggests that this campaign was to some degree effective in altering the course of ProSavana (Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto,

2016; Funada-Classen, 2019; Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016; Lemos, 2017; UNAC et all, 2015, etc). This gives ample reason to assume that this case is important, just as the actors involved in it. How can one study it, however?

Placing this research object within the literature of transnational networks is a conscious choice. The several authors which I have presented previously have made great lengths in assessing the role of civil society in international relations. The lack of structured evidence means that I will not be able to test hypotheses, such as the ones that I will present shortly, but the argumentation through news articles, reports, and interviews can to some degree give strength to these arguments, or weaken them.

I am stating with the presupposition that the 'No to ProSavana' campaign was *at least to some degree* effective in altering the course of ProSavana, even if criticisms and additional considerations can and will be made on the matter. There is an extensive literature that supports this (Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto, 2016; Funada-Classen, 2019; Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016; Lemos, 2017; UNAC et all, 2015, etc). The question is not whether the contestation of ProSAVANA was successful, but what are the factors that allowed the network to be impactful, both as it pertains to FASE and the network itself.

My idea is to contribute to a literature that examines the **circumstances** that allow for the success or failure of civil society policy contestation. I will work with Risse-Kappen's (1995) and Sikkink and Risse's (1999) framework on trying to understand transnational relations' impact on state policies. The main question is:

> ''under what domestic and international circumstances do transnational coalitions and actors who attempt to change policy outcomes in a specific issue-area succeed or fail to achieve their goals?'' (Risse-Kappen, 2009, p.5)

My questions are: ***What*** *are FASE's internal, fundamental characteristics which allow for impactful transnational contestation?* ***How*** *has FASE* ***contributed*** *to ProSAVANA's contestation campaign?*

Risse-Kappen's (1995) main argument is that the impact of a network in policy varies according to: 1) *Domestic structure*, or the normative and organizational arrangements that link the organization or transnational network to the policy which needs to be changed. 2) *The degree of international institutionalization*, or how strong is the regime, bilateral agreement or international organization that supports and/or regulates the policy. The intent is to build upon structures of governance, both of which offer very clear empirical indicators on how to frame

an actor's actions. These parameters would determine how difficult it would be for a civil society coalition to have a tangible impact on policy.

Sikkink and Risse (1999) base their phase model on a 'boomerang effect' (p.18), a process coined by Keck and Sikkink (1998) which defined civil society action as a pressure 'from above' and 'from below'. The idea is a two-way street between domestic and transnational mobilization, in which civil society bypasses the state by integrating a network, and the network provides access, leverage, and amplifies the demands of the domestic groups. It follows Chilton's (1995) idea of transnational ties being necessary for the development of domestic social movements.

It is important to specify how each author structures their studies because they offer the framework for this dissertation. FASE's internal characteristics which allow for a successful civil society campaign can be explored in relation to its institutional, financial, and relational history, which resulted in the expertise and organizational skills fundamental for their fruitful participation in the 'No to ProSavana' campaign. I will observe FASE's interaction with the Brazilian state and the international system in the next section, giving weight to Risse-Kappen's (1995) hypotheses.

To consider how FASE contributed to the 'No to ProSavana' campaign we must first establish what the campaign was fighting against. Indeed, Sikkink and Risse's (1999) phase model may be ideal to explore this topic, as the behaviour of all the actors can only be understood in their relation with one another. Each phase of the model provides insight into how the network, the governments, and FASE behaved at any given time.

Phase 1 went from 2010 to 2012, when Mozambican civil society and FASE came together to gather information, assemble international partners, and activate the network. FASE made the first contact, offered its expertise, and developed new understandings into the ProSavana project. Phase 2, denial, came in the form of governments altering texts, overlooking any criticism of the civil organizations, and working to fragment the network. The Mozambican government even criticised FASE's involved, claiming that international organizations were infiltrating the state with their own agenda (Mello, 2021). Nevertheless, transnational civil society was strengthened, moving on to phase 3 – tactical concessions. This is when the ProSAVANA project was halted, and then terminated altogether in 2020.

This framework allows me to make a few more considerations, which will be in a final part of the dissertation. The reader will notice that the process of terminating ProSavana did not complete the 5 phases designed by Sikkink and Risse (1999). The explanation is simple: the target of the fight spearheaded by the transnational network was never ProSavana, but the model of modern agriculture itself. Could there be a bigger, still active, plan to transform Mozambican agriculture that FASE and the network were not able to tackle? No hypothesis or conclusive ideas will result from the section which explores these questions, only the considerations which coherently follow from the framework which was used.

3. Domestic structure

What are FASE's internal, fundamental characteristics which allow for impactful action and policy transformation? Risse-Kappen (1995) and Chilton (1995) provide us with not only a useful framework, but interesting hypotheses. The relationship between an organization and its domestic and international context is a determinant factor. The strength of civil society relates to the level of their institutionalization, their expertise, and their international ties.

I will start by examining FASE's history in relation to the domestic conditions that determined its mission and its interaction with the Brazilian government. Then, I will explore how it interacted with the international sphere through financing. Finally, I will analyse how it built its expertise in agriculture. Political persecution, financial problems, and the resistance of a problematic agrarian model come together to challenge FASE. As a result, these factors help consolidate an experienced, well-connected, and institutionally complex organization.

3.1 FASE and Brazil

FASE was created in 1961 by Father Leising, an American catholic priest. From this sentence alone it is possible to assert the importance that the international context and the catholic church alike had on the foundation and development of this organization. The initial purpose of FASE was to differentiate itself from 'welfare policies', mostly done by the United States, which FASE felt were inhibiting the development of the poor with its careless donations. Father Leising's philosophy was to offer scientific assistance instead of charity – a communitarian development grounded on educational and vocational courses (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

Despite a certain independence from the catholic church, it was this connection that allowed FASE to be established and legitimized in the years that were to come, particularly considering Brazil's political challenges in the 1960s. The military dictatorship (1964-1985) was initially unconcerned with a charitable, church-like organization, which allowed for FASE to be consolidated. Father Leising promoted, in these first years, a Motorization Campaign for the Clergy, with the intention of distributing cars to parishes, expanding social action, and strengthening the new directories that emerged (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

This campaign was important for two reasons: first (1), FASE acquired a large area of influence within the Brazilian state; and second (2), it allowed for ties to be established with different social bases, germinating what would become a highly diversified network of actors. This was

the institutional and social basis for the changes and challenges that FASE would endure in the decades to come (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

What is important to note is that the passage of democracy to dictatorship and back to democracy that Brazil faced from the 1960s well into the 1990s was important to FASE in a political, institutional, and financial way. To be sure, the established practices and social ties resulted from the Motorization Campaign for the Clergy were converted into more politicized actions in the 1970s, when the general civic goal was the return of democracy. The members were expanded and diversified, which resulted in an ideological crisis in that same decade (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

At that point, FASE was made out of people from different political orientations and social realities. Former priests were surrounded by Marxists, students, and professors. Father Leising's model of ‘community development’ was criticised by its apparent political apathy. From 1973 onwards, members of FASE suffered political persecutions. By the end of the 1970s, FASE acclimatizes itself with new social realities by incorporating teaching projects that intended to unionize workers, organize neighbourhoods, and allow for a ground-up political resistance (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

In the democratization process of the 1980s, FASE’s focus shifts into fighting for the political inclusion of different social segments. They fought for the acquisition of rights, the establishment of regional and/or minority leaders, and to promote debates around alternative economic practices. There were four target audiences: 1) urban union; 2) urban neighbourhoods; 3) rural workers; and 4) family farmers (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

The 1990s finds FASE more institutionally complex and politically experienced, evidenced by its foundational principles and axes of action. The production of knowledge gains more recognition and greater consistency. As a result, FASE is able to make a more substantial analysis of domestic and international contexts, and the scientific and practical systematization of more concrete thematic issues. The greater transparency from accountability and the maturity of the institutional identity of FASE are inevitably correlated (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

FASE was occupied with wide-ranging topics, as well as mediating activities. Its role, in this sense, was to form a bridge between financing agencies in Europe and the citizens in need in Brazil. It spoke for small farmers though it did not necessarily have them as its members. In an

interview with Dr. Pedro Cunca, a former director of FASE, in 2021, it became clear that for FASE, being a mediator was to become a problem in the new century (Cunca, 2021).

FASE faced in the 2000s an institutional shrinkage – several directories were extinct, regulated jobs either ended or were morphed into temporary contracts. FASE had to let go of several different political fronts, and the reason was simple: financing agencies preferred to aid specific groups, instead of a mediating organization. In other words, for example, it was preferable to finance a black community, and not FASE's project to help a black community (Cunca, 2021).

Sérgio Schlesinger[1] (2021), had a different analysis. He focused on the changes that the financing agencies suffered in the 2000s, particularly relating to political struggles and lobbying in their countries of origin. The competitiveness of certain products, such as agrarian commodities, was brought up as a debate problem in The Netherlands, for instance. Helping FASE here, under these conditions, could hurt Dutch farmers there. There was, therefore, a change in the conditions for financing: the projects would be much more controlled by financing agencies. FASE, then, chose to forego financing under these conditions, showing a strong ideological conviction.

Whatever the cause, the result was the same: FASE operates under much more limited conditions now. This is not to say that it has become obsolete. In fact, domestic networks and contacts, expertise, and political ties all factor in an organization that is respectable and reliable world-wide, as evidenced by the ProSavana campaign, and domestic struggles as well.

With the Covid-19 pandemic, for instance, FASE engaged in solidary actions with different social groups, trying to ensure their survival.

> After 100 days, since March 15, we have managed to support 9,100 families with the donation of basic food baskets, besides 5,661 masks, 1,200 half-litter bottles of water, 720 bars of soap and 3,210 doses of homeopathic medications. As we almost doubled both the volume of items and the number of families we supported, FASE's humanitarian action provided real support for families during this period (Barbosa e Gouveia, 2020)

> FASE is sure that none of this would be possible without the concerted action of all 74 of our direct partners (…) In just three months, we have raised R$ 668,605.00 through the solidarity and commitment of national and international institutions that support FASE's work in the fight for equality, access to rights and democracy (Barbosa and Gouveia, 2020)

It is clear that, as recent as 2020, FASE still has geographical and social reach and domestic and international support. Over its 60 years of existence, the most important conditions for successful social action are acknowledged by FASE itself: ''experience in popular education,

[1] Schlesinger has worked under contracts for FASE, writing analyses and performing field research. He has written several works on ProSavana, cited in this dissertation, and has given me an interview in March 2021.

our daily presence in the territories and our network of partners'' (Barbosa and Gouveia, 2020). In other words, expertise, presence, and contacts.

3.2 International cooperation

In ''Thinking with others: 50 years of FASE', Landin and Pereira (2011) organize a systematic view of FASE's history, contextualized by Brazil's political history and some analyses of the international system, particularly on how both these aspects affected the many 'avatars' that FASE took on over the years. Something similar happens when it comes to financing, as FASE takes an often times passive role of responding to the demands of international donors. In this section, I will map out FASE's history when it comes to financing, while also examining instances when it actively influenced its flow and thematic relevancy.

In its first decade, up until the mid-1970s, FASE was heavily supported by national financing. By 1967, it was in an advantageous position – for the first and last time in its history – to not need international aid for the continuation of its projects. Not only was this impactful when it comes to reports and studies regarding the projects – which FASE felt the need to do, as a form of gratitude and accountability towards their donors – but also in the formulation and management of the projects themselves. Indeed, ''local donations reflected the objectives and ideas of the projects being carried out[2]'' (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.21, my translation)

The political climate becomes progressively more unavoidable, however, and national financing diminishes. Even as it develops debates on agrarian reform, and the weight of the political fronts grow, FASE faces the need to sell and close directories, and lay off its workers. The international financing agencies became FASE's life-line. In fact, Latin-American NGOs and financing agencies in Europe and Canada were instrumental to the perpetuation of FASE into the 1980s and beyond. FASE had the chance to ''affirm their autonomy and establish other political alliances, from which a new project could emerge within the organization[3]'' (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.31, my translation)

> In 1971, therefore, within Fr. Leising's model and management, the entity's budget was composed as follows: 4% of charities and companies (including the multinationals Atlantic, Coca-Cola, Esso, Gilette, Sydney Ross); 5% technical assistance abroad; 34% of equity income; 38% of contributing members. And only 19% from international organizations. In other words, 81% of the entity's resources came from the country, including companies, individuals and the generation of own resources. In 1977, we have only

[2] ''as doações locais repercutiam nos objetivos e ideários dos projetos realizados'' (Landing, Pereira, 2011, p.21)
[3] ''afirmam sua autonomia e estabelecem outras alianças políticas, a partir de que se afirma na entidade um novo projeto'' (Landing, Pereira, 2011, p.31)

> 14.5% for taxpayers and own resources, combined; 11% for organizations in Brazil; and 74% for international entities[4] (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.38, my translation)

It is in 1977 that the so called 'International Cooperation' is created, where, before, only the terms '*aid'* and '*financing'* were used to describe these resources. What was necessary, at that stage, was defining exactly what FASE was, with the purpose of presenting a cohesive and organized institution to possible donors from within Europe.

It would be the introduction of the consortium (*consórsio*), which had the purpose of guaranteeing significant institutional financing. This was a new financing model, more focused on specific projects. Its goal was to be a political relationship, horizontal in its foundations, independent from the monetary and political strength of each part. There was to be flexibility, with each financing agency being able to choose which theme, area, project or group they would want to endorse. At last, the consortium would not have rigidity in members and resource flow: FASE would be able to gain financing from other institutions if needed, and other agencies could enter the consortium at any moment. These were the bases of this new form of institutional financing.

In the 1990s, however, FASE watched a progressively bleaker national and international climate. All around, international agencies stopped financing organizations of civil society in favor of focusing on themes. It is a change in criteria, essentially, where questions of environment, gender inequality, and the Amazonian Forest receive more attention than more 'political' endeavors. FASE was able to maintain itself through a very tight and strategic nucleus of institutional financing agencies. This change in criteria for international financing also meant a revision of internal structures and priorities (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

This implies some fluidity in FASE's behavior when it comes to the International Cooperation. In other words, the international context and availability of finance influenced FASE's identity and main concerns to some degree:

> The institutional design expresses the central questions accumulated in the history of its existence, but also in the capacity for assimilation and response to structural and conjunctural questions, both national and international. And, centrally, it aims to face this challenge of, starting from its new format, to build

[4] Em 1971, dentro, portanto, do modelo e da gestão de Pe. Leising, o orçamento da entidade era composto da seguinte forma: 4% de entidades beneficentes e empresas (contando as multinacionais Atlantic, Coca-Cola, Esso, Gilette, Sydney Ross); 5% de assessoria técnica para fora; 34% de renda patrimonial; 38% de sócios contribuintes. E apenas 19% de organizações internacionais. Ou seja, 81% dos recursos da entidade vinham do país, entre empresas, indivíduos e geração de recursos próprios. Já em 1977, temos apenas 14,5% para contribuintes e recursos próprios, somados; 11% para organizações do Brasil; e 74% para entidades internacionais (Landing, Pereira, 2011, p.38)

> integration between the different instances of the organization[5] (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.134, my translation)

However, as the excerpt above makes clear, FASE has also been active and somewhat autonomous in its development, its interaction with civil society in large, and with other civic organizations. The institutional complexity, for instance, that FASE developed for the consortium, was instrumental when other, analogous institutions or events were created in the 1990s. Financed by the same group of agencies[6], the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG) was created in 1991, and the International Conference of UNDP (United Nations Development Program), in 2002, was made (Landin and Pereira, 2011)

Another instance of active participation was with the Dema Fund, in 2003. FASE was entrusted by the social movements of Pará to receive a donation from IBAMA of six thousand logs of mahogany and create a permanent fund to finance projects of environmental protection.

The relationship between financing and projects reached a breaking point in the 21st century, as was noted in the last section. Cunca (2021), Fátima Mello (2021) and Sergio Schlesinger (2021) report an institutional shrinkage, leading to the extinction of several directories. Its numbers were halved, and many people could no longer be maintained by contracts. This occurred because both the financing agencies were no longer interested in mediating organizations such as FASE – choosing to help more specific social movements (as per Cunca's report) – and because they would propose projects which would mischaracterize FASE entirely (as per Schlesinger).

3.3 Definitions, practice, and alternative means of agriculture

Having examined FASE's relevance in juxtaposition with its institutional and financial challenges, it is useful to focus on its role on agriculture, and the narratives that permeate this debate in Brazil. Brazil's agricultural policies suffer influence and pressure by two different interests: that which profits from or endorses highly mechanized large farms, and that which

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[5] O desenho institucional expressa as questões centrais acumuladas na história de sua existência, mas também na capacidade de assimilação e resposta às questões estruturais e conjunturais, tanto nacionais, quanto internacionais. E, centralmente, visa enfrentar esse desafio de, a partir do seu novo formato, construir integração entre as diferentes instâncias da organização (Landing, Pereira, 2011, p.134)

[6] BfdW (Pão Para o Mundo), CCFD, Christian Aid, Desenvolvimento e Paz, EZE, Fastenöpfer (Ação Quaresmal Suíça), ICCO, Misereor, NOVIB, OXFAM GB, etc

depends on or supports smallholder agriculture. To associations such as FASE, these two perspectives lead to and come from very distinct and opposing conceptions of development.

One needs to look no further than to their reports or political/economic analyses to assess how FASE defines the 'wrong' type of agriculture, in order to teach the 'right' one. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, this distinction needs to be clear, political, and within the discussion of democracy, especially since FASE was trying to organize and unionize rural workers.

> ''During this period, the violent expropriation process of the peasantry in various regions of the country continued, affecting categories of rural workers in different situations (small landowners, squatters, partners, tenants, etc.). Agricultural interests, large projects that benefited multinational companies, speculative capital initiatives and other similar situations **threaten or affect** large numbers of people from the countryside to the cities[7] (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.60, my translation, my emphasis)

> ''United Lavradores Trade Union, from Santarém, and its work to raise awareness and politicize the action of union organization (…) by developing discussions on the ways of **exploitation** of the peasantry, on the land issue and the struggle for agrarian reform ("**Is it possible under capitalism?**")[8] (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.61, my translation, my emphasis)

> ''Empirically, the **inadequacy** of the agricultural model was verified by the reality of small production, as it was said then, and it affirmed the need to rescue the knowledge of the rural worker, according to the teachings of popular education. There was a general talk of the need to seek alternatives for small producers, although the dominant concern, in this moment of redemocratization, was with the organization of rural workers and not with the productive issue itself and specifically the technical dimension[9] (Leroy, 1998, my translation, my emphasis)

> ''As for the rural situation, the general framework for **conservative modernization** (technification) of agriculture is pointed out, with the permanence of an increasingly concentrated land structure[10] (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.56, my translation, my emphasis)

As we can see from the excerpts and emphasized words – *threaten, exploitation, inadequacy*, etc. – FASE has never shied away from a wider criticism on the agricultural process. Their idea

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[7] Continuava em curso, nesse período, o violento processo expropriatório do campesinato em várias regiões do país, atingindo categorias de trabalhadores rurais em situações diversas (pequenos proprietários, posseiros, parceiros, arrendatários etc.). Os interesses agropecuários, os grandes projetos que beneficiavam empresas multinacionais, as iniciativas do capital especulativo e outras situações análogas ameaçam ou tangem grandes efetivos da população do campo para as cidades (Landin, Pereira, 2011, p.60)

[8] ''Corrente Sindical Lavradores Unidos, de Santarém, e seu trabalho no sentido de conscientização e de politização da ação de organização sindical (…) desenvolvendo-se discussões sobre as formas de exploração do campesinato, sobre a questão fundiária e a luta pela reforma agrária ("é possível, no capitalismo?") etc (Landin, Pereira, 2011, p.61)

[9] Empiricamente, constatavasea inadequação do modelo de agricultura à realidade da pequena produção , como se dizia então,ese afirmava a necessidade de resgatar os conhecimentos do trabalhador rural, conforme os ensinamentos da educação popular. Falava-se de modo genérico da necessidade de buscar alternativas para o pequeno produtor, embora a preocupação dominante, nesse momento de redemocratização, fosse com a organização dos trabalhadores rurais e não com a questão produtiva propriamente dita e especificamente a dimensão técnica (Leroy, 1998)

[10] Quanto à situação rural, aponta se para o quadro geral de modernização (tecnificação) conservadora da agricultura, com a permanência de uma estrutura fundiária cada vez mais concentrada (Landin, Pereira, 2011, p.56)

of the best practice of agriculture to the Brazilian reality is reliant on the criticism of the conservative model, and both definitions are at the core of their educational projects. Since the beginning, FASE concerned itself with the problems of the rural workers, with emphasis on communitarian development. In 1967, the Movement of Creative Community (*Movimento de criatividade comunitária*, MCC) was established as an opposition to the charity model of aid, as an outlet for FASE's scientific assistance - its educational and organizational projects of agrarian help. By the end of the year 1970, 188 communities had been beneficiated by this project (Landin and Pereira, 2011).

This concern with education and 'creativity' began in a time where FASE was still not targeted by Brazil's authoritarian regime. However, after 1976, the democratic deficit was unescapable, particularly when it comes to the type of aid and assistance that an educational association can offer to rural works. This is when union work became the main concern (Leroy, 1988).

As Brazil transitioned back into a democratic regime, in the 1980s, the exchange of popular knowledge remained FASE's self-proclaimed prerogative. In 1983, the Project of Alternative Tehcnologies (PTA, *Projeto de Tecnologias Alternativas*) was created with the intent of disseminating these practices, and its relevance was such that by the end of the decade, it became a separate and autonomous non-governmental organization (Landin and Pereira, 2011, p.67)

> "It is true that people believed in alternative technologies and family farming and were convinced that **it was possible and necessary to oppose and change the model of conservative modernization** of the Brazilian countryside and agriculture. However, it is probably the existence of the PTA / FASE and its **radiating presence** that gave unity and collective consistency to the activities of raising awareness, training, rescuing technologies and experimentation[11]'' (Leroy, 1998, my translation, my emphasis)

This concern with the discussion on agriculture persists well into the 21st century. In 2002, FASE participates in the creation of the National Agroecology Articulation (ANA), born from the first National Encounter of Agroecology (*Encontro Nacional de Agroecologia* -I ENA). The encounter itself was the culmination of several years-worth of study and practice of alternative and communal agriculture, with the intent of interaction and mutual aid between networks. It is the accumulated expertise that FASE upholds as a respectable and reliable NGO among those organizations at ANA, that grants FASE a permanent seat at the National Consul of food

[11] "É certo que todas acreditavam em tecnologias alternativas e na agricultura familiar e tinham a convicção de que era possível e necessário se opor e mudar o modelo de modernização conservadora do campo brasileiro e da agricultura. Porém, é provavelmente a existência do PTA/FASE e sua presença irradiadora que deu unidade e consistência coletiva às atividades de sensibilização, formação, resgate de tecnologias e experimentação'' (Leroy, 1998)

Security (*Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar*- CONSEA), in 2005, to represent civil society.

It is inevitable that FASE criticizes contemporary and controversial national developmental agricultural projects to further its own arguments – especially considering that these rural communities have to live through the effects of such projects. Mato Grosso, one of FASE's areas of interest, has had an ongoing battle with pesticides:

> According to Franciléia de Castro, agronomist from the FASE-Mato Grosso who participated in the event, examples were given of how the abuse of pesticides causes damage to human health. The case of Lucas do Rio Verde is one such example. Situated in a soybean-growing area, the population of this place was sprayed by pesticides in 2006, because a small spray plane threw too many chemicals and recklessly. The wind was in charge of taking the droplets of the poison to people's homes, water tanks, springs, plants and soil. It didn't take long for people to start showing symptoms of contamination, sometimes severe. Almost four years later, Professor Vanderlei Pignati researched, in partnership with Fiocruz, this same case. And he found that the contamination continues: poisons are present in the urine and blood of residents, in water from artesian wells, in samples of air and rainwater. Lucas do Rio Verde is a municipality contaminated by pesticides. Franciléia says that in Mato Grosso there is a recent popular saying that states: "if you go to Lucas do Rio Verde, do not bathe or drink water"[12]. (FASE: Notícias, 2010, my translation)

Here, the experiences of the residents are being used to relay a health and safety argument, to further their narrative against the 'conservative modernization' and 'technification' of agriculture. Two years later, in a news article with the same theme, the target of the criticism is food security, more specifically the absence of a wider variety of production, since most of the fertile land is being used for the monoculture of soy.

> Through workshops and field research with local communities, the preliminary results show in this municipality a situation of great agricultural production combined with a picture of food insecurity. Lucas do Rio Verde is responsible for 1% of all grain production in the country. Of the city's 364,000 hectares, 266,000 are soybean crops. Almost 70% of the municipality is occupied by these monocultures, which belong to a few owners and consume large amounts of pesticides. The lack of diversity of food and the excess of chemicals - which make other agricultural production unfeasible because they contaminate the environment and degrade the soil - endanger the food security of the population[13] (FASE: Notícias, 2012, my translation).

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[12] Segundo Franciléia de Castro, engenheira agrônoma da Fase Mato Grosso que participou do evento, foram dados exemplos de como o abuso de agrotóxicos traz prejuízos à saúde humana. O caso do município de Lucas do Rio Verde é um destes exemplos. Situada numa área de cultivo de soja, a população deste lugar foi pulverizada por agrotóxicos em 2006, porque um pequeno avião de aspersão jogou químicos demais e de forma imprudente. O vento se encarregou de levar as gotículas do veneno para as casas das pessoas, caixas d'água, mananciais, plantas e solo. Não demorou para que pessoas começassem a aparecer com sintomas de contaminação, às vezes graves. Quase quatro anos depois, o professor Vanderlei Pignati pesquisou, em parceria com a Fiocruz, este mesmo caso. E descobriu que a contaminação continua: os venenos estão presentes na urina e no sangue dos moradores, na água de poços artesianos, em amostras do ar e da água de chuva. Lucas do Rio Verde é um município contaminado pelos agrotóxicos. Franciléia diz que em Mato Grosso há um dito popular recente que afirma: "se for a Lucas do Rio Verde, não tome banho nem beba água". (Desafio ao agronegócio: Mato Grosso debate agrotóxicos, 2010)

[13] Por meio de oficinas e pesquisas de campo com comunidades locais, os resultados preliminares evidenciam neste município uma situação de grande produção agrícola combinada com quadro de insegurança alimentar. Lucas do Rio Verde é responsável por 1% de toda a produção de grãos do país. Dos 364 mil hectares da cidade, 266 mil são lavouras de soja. Quase 70% do município é ocupado por essas monoculturas que pertencem a poucos

But there is an interesting development in this article. FASE concludes it by mentioning ProSavana, outwardly stating that the model of conservative agriculture being practiced in Mato Grosso, and the model which would be transferred to Mozambique, would be the same.

> ‘‘This large-scale agriculture, based mainly on soybean culture, which predominates in Mato Grosso, is the model of the ProSAVANA program that the Brazilian government - allied to Japan and Mozambique - intend to implement in the African country.[14] (FASE: Notícias, 2012, my translation)

The documentary from 2013, ‘The Hidden face of Prodecer'', furthers the comparison. The environmental and social consequences of the monocultures in Mato Grosso were documented, along with the extensive productions of sugarcanes or soybean, with the juxtaposition of images of the miombo woodlands from the Nacala Corridor. Scenes of the happiness of indigenous children, playing with the water, were shown before the footage of extensive irrigation and use of pesticides (Ram multimidia, 2013). Not only is this footage used in meetings in Mozambique to rally rural workers, but material made about ProSavana helped further FASE’s argument against the ‘conservative modernization’ in Brazil. It gives strength to the arguments in Mato Grosso, and in so many other rural communities.

The project that affected Brazil’s *Cerrado* – which spun the problems mentioned in the news articles cited above – was one called Prodecer. It is at the forefront of the documentary from 2013. The alliance between Brazil and Japan, in the 1970s, came to fruition with the purpose of increasing the supply of primarily soybeans, and the ‘development’ of the *Cerrado* biome (at the time, Brazil’s agricultural frontier) and the creation of holding companies both in Brazil and Japan. With Embrapa’s help, they were able to adapt practices to different soils and latitudes, making the project extensively successful, having reached even the Amazonian Forest. Today, *Cerrado* is the Brazilian region with the lowest labor density rates, and extensive livestock areas (Shankland, Gonçalves, Fareto, 2016; Almeida, 2016). As per FASE’s perspective:

> ‘‘we understand that the cooperation proposals that Brazil would have to contribute to the country's development process, given the Brazilian experience itself, should not be based on a project like Prodecer. This Project, in addition to being implemented for the expansion of commodities and agribusiness in the Brazilian Cerrado, brought with it a series of socio-environmental impacts for the region. In this sense, a South-South cooperation project to be promoted by Brazil, in a context such as that of Mozambique, **should be guided by policies aimed at family and peasant agriculture**. The adoption of Prodecer as a benchmark

proprietários e consomem grande quantidade de agrotóxicos. A falta de diversidade de alimentos e o excesso de químicos – que inviabilizam outras produções agrícolas por contaminarem o ambiente e degradarem o solo – colocam em risco a segurança alimentar da população (Estudos em MT mostram impactos do agronegócio, 2012).

[14] Essa agricultura de larga escala, baseada principalmente na cultura de soja, que predomina no Mato Grosso, é o modelo do programa ProSAVANA que o governo brasileiro – aliado ao do Japão e ao de Moçambique – pretendem implantar no país africano (Estudos em MT mostram impactos do agronegócio, 2012)

> for agricultural and agrarian development in Mozambique can result in much more serious problems from a social point of view, given the number of peasant families living in the region where ProSavana is being developed[15] (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016, p. 60/61, my translation, my emphases)

From these accounts, we can see that the agricultural aspect an important one in FASE's history. I have presented the basis of FASE's influence, relevance and expertise to give weight to the next section, which will focus on ProSavana, the contestation network and the strategies that FASE used create a link with the Mozambican civil society and to contest the project.

[15] Entendemos que as propostas de cooperação que o Brasil teria para contribuir com o processo de desenvolvimento do país, haja vista a própria experiência brasileira, não deveria se pautar em um projeto como o Prodecer. Este Projeto, além de ter sido implementado para a expansão de *commodities* e do agronegócio no Cerrado brasileiro, trouxe consigo uma série de impactos socioambientais para a região. Neste sentido, um projeto de cooperação Sul-Sul a ser promovido pelo Brasil, em um contexto como o de Moçambique, deveria se pautar pelas políticas voltadas para a agricultura familiar e camponesa. A adoção do Prodecer como referencial para o desenvolvimento agrícola e agrário de Moçambique pode resultar em problemas muito mais graves do ponto de vista social, tendo em vista o número de famílias camponesas que vivem nessa região em que o ProSavana está sendo desenvolvido (Aguiar, Pacheco, 2016, p. 60,61)

4.The Network

The ‘spiral model’ (Sikkink and Risse, 1999) will be useful to further the discussion of FASE. Through this framework, I will examine FASE’s interaction with the network, and the three countries that developed the ProSavana program. Part I will be an overview of ProSavana – what it stood for, what it set out to do, and how the literature has interpreted it. Part II will explore each of the phases of the ‘spiral model’. Part III will link it back to FASE, and expand on the organization’s role on the contestation.

This framework is important not only in terms of methodology, as it offers interesting hypotheses to the literature on transnational civil society. The ‘boomerang’ effect (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) - the process through which domestic civil society searches for international allies to resist their state - is particularly noticeable in each of the phases of the spiral model. Phase I is defined by an unjust state and a weak civil society, which can only be strengthened by transnational links. The transition into phase II relies on the gathering of information, which will then be placed on the international agenda.

Phase II is defined by international attention. The state denies any violations, and the international and domestic civil society pressure needs to be particularly strong to overcome this phase. During Phase III, the state makes tactical concessions in a strategic attempt to diminish international attention. Phase IV can only commence if pressure continues despite these concessions, which, in the case of Mozambique, remains to be seen.

To be sure, the object of analysis shifts. (1) This dissertation does not examine human rights violations, but a model of conservative agriculture. (2) The focus is not on Mozambican civil society, but on one particular Brazilian organization. (3) The process of assimilation of different agricultural practices by the Mozambican government – which would represent Phase 5 of the spiral model – matters only insofar as FASE’s participation can be perceived. However, in applying this methodology and these hypotheses we can assert the weight of FASE’s role, its behaviour in each phase, and its overall internal conditions which contributed to a successful campaign against ProSavana.

4.1 ProSavana: A trilateral cooperation

Signed in 2009, ProSavana is part of Mozambican’s policy plans for agrarian development. Productivity, market access, and sustainability were its main targets. It takes into account the

national economic and demographic reality, as agrarian transformation was deemed essential for the country's development (*Ministério de Agricultura e segurança alimentar*, 2015).

According to the official website, the main objective was ‘‘improving and modernizing agriculture with the objective of increasing productivity and production, and diversifying agricultural production’’ (ProSavana, 2015). As a technical cooperation, its basis was the exchange of knowledge and methods, specifically those developed by Brazil and Japan - the other two parts of the trilateral project.

The motivations for each country were different. Mozambique stood to gain a transformation of agricultural production into more profitable standards. Brazil and Japan would offer their expertise on the matter, based on decades-old practices that both countries have accumulated since the 1970s (IPEA, 2017).

ProSavana’s definition of development sought to put a focus on training small farmers in the Nacala corridor[16], while making production more competitive in the international market and contributing to the food security of their population (IPEA, 2017).

There are three documents which illustrate what ProSavana was intending to do in Mozambican lands: (1) the leaked version from 2013; (2) the Concept Note, also from 2013; and (3) the Zero Draft, from 2015.

The leaked version[17] (MINAG et all, 2013) implied that there would be three different axes of rural development. The first (1) was one based on international competitiveness. As Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto (2016) put it, ‘‘the very notion of a ‘corridor’ symbolizes a vision in which the structural axis is a flow of local products to dynamic external markets’’ (2016, p.16). The Nacala port was to be the point of outflow of products, as farmers and consumers were to be connected through a tight net of investments. The needs of the external market call for technological and structural developments, to which capital inflow is imperative.

The second (2), defined as ‘‘integrated rural development’’ (Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto, 2016, p. 17), had the objective to tackle different social problems associated with rural life, such as health and gender inequalities. Finally, the third (3) axis placed great emphasis on family farming, advocating for farmer autonomy and political participation – particularly when it

[16] The Nacala Corridor is at the North of Mozambique, from Nacala Port to Malawi and Zâmbia, in an extension of over 700 kilometers (Ministério de Agricrultura e segurança alimentar, 2015)
[17] The governments had no intention of releasing said documents, but they were made available at the farmland.org website, and are still available today, the link to which will be in the bibliography.

comes to the appropriate use of the land and its resources. These three perspectives were to be implemented as additions to each other, the insufficiency of only one of them to solve the rural problem of Mozambique going unsaid.

Following the leakage, the three governments published a Concept Note[18]. The note stressed the need to better the lives of the people residing in the corridor, which would be achieved through modernization and the consequent creation of jobs. The note also expressed the need for dialogue with civic associations, as this cooperation was the key foundation of the project itself (Yoshida et all, 2013)

Finally, the Zero Draft, from 2015, starts by placing ProSavana in conjuncture with the PEDSA (Strategic Plan for the development of the agrarian sector 2011-2020), as well as other programs developed by Mozambique's government to eradicate poverty. Sustainability, prosperity, and competitiveness are its key words. Food security and the participation in global markets are mutually important goals. The four pillars of ProSavana, as illustrated by this document, were: (1), productivity, (2) access to markets; (3) sustainable use of natural resources and (4); the strengthening of agrarian institutions (*Ministério de Agricrultura e segurança alimentar*, 2015).

This new agricultural model sought to enhance access to agricultural inputs, develop a better infrastructure for production, and strengthen farmers' organizations. The project also emphasizes the need for cooperation between the public and private sphere for development and agrarian modernization (*Ministério de Agricrultura e segurança alimentar*, 2015).

It is important to note that ProSavana became more than a technical cooperation project, given the various discourses and narratives that were circulating it. While the project was announced in 2011, it took four years for any sort of official document mapping out its intentions and prerogatives to be released. In the meantime, civil society had to debate with the government's public statements, with conjectures, and with speculations (Justiça Ambiental et all, 2013; UNAC et all, 2015). In the next sections, the dissertation will explore the strategies that each side made use of in this international boomerang effect.

4.2 No to ProSAVANA campaign

[18] The Concept Note has been erased from all websites, though it is possible to explore what it said in general terms with the response by Yoshida et all (2013).

4.2.1 Transnational civil society

Before examining, with the aid of the spiral model (Sikkink and Risse, 2009), how the contestation was made, it is important to establish: (1) who was part of the transnational network; (2) who were the most important members; (3) how the contestation was funded; (4) what the network was fighting against; and (5) what, exactly, the network did in the ten years it stayed active.

Table 1: The Network[19]

	Acronym	Name	Country	Year of involvement	Contribution
1	AAAJC	Support Association and Judicial Assistance for Communities	Mozambique	2013-2015	Signature. Research
2	ACOORD	Cooperation for Development Association	Mozambique	2013	Signature
3	ADECRU	Academic Action for the Development of Rural Communities	Mozambique	2013-2020	Signature Research
4	AENA	National Association of Rural Extension	Mozambique	2013	Signature
5	AKILIZETHO		Mozambique	2013	Signature
6		Associacao Mocambicana para o Desenvolviment da Comunidade e Meio Ambiente	Mozambique	2016	Signature
7	CaJuPaNa	Comissão de Justiça e Paz da Arquidiocese de Nampula	Mozambique	2016-2017	Signature
8		Caritas Diocesana de Lichinga	Mozambique	2013	Signature
9	CCM	Christian Council of Mozambique	Mozambique	2013	Signature
10	CDJPN	Nacala's Diocesan Commission of Justice and Peace	Mozambique	2016-2017	Signature
11	ESTAMOS	Communitarian Organization	Mozambique	2013	Signature
12	FACILIDADE		Mozambique	2013	Signature
13		Fórum Mulher (Woman Forum)	Mozambique	2013-2017	Signature. Research.
14		Fórum da Terra (Earth Forum)	Mozambique	2013	Signature
15	FONAGNI	Forum of NGOs of Niassa	Mozambique	2013	Signature
16	FONG	Forum of NGOs of Gaza	Mozambique	2013	Signature
17	JA!	Environmental Justice	Mozambique	2011-2020	Signature. Research.
18	Kulima		Mozambique	2013	Signature

[19] Sources: Justiça Ambiental et all, 2013; UNAC et all, 2015; UNAC et all, 2016; Schlesinger, 2013; Estevão et all, 2020; Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016; Lemos, 2017

19	LDH	Human Rights league of Mozambique	Mozambique	2013-2017	Signature. Research.
20	Livaningo		Mozambique	2013-2017	Signature Research
21	OLIPA-ODES	Organization for Sustainable Development	Mozambique	2013	Signature
22	ORAM - Nampula	Rural Organization for mutual help – Nampula delegation	Mozambique	2013-2020	Signature. Research.
23	ORAM - Lichinga	Rural Organization for mutual help – Lichinga-Niassa delegation	Mozambique	2013-2020	Signature, Research. Funding
24		Provincial Platform of Civil Society of Nampula	Mozambique	2013	Signature
25	RISC		Mozambique	2016	Signature
26	ROADS	Network of Organizations for the environment and sustainable development	Mozambique	2013	Signature
27	UNAC	National farmers Union	Mozambique	2011-2020	Signature. Research.
28	UPC	Provincial Union of Land, Nampula	Mozambique	2020	Research
29	ABONG	Brazilian NGOs association	Brazil	2013-2015	Signature
30	ADEREMG	Articulation of Rural Worker from Minas Gerais	Brazil	2016	Signature
31		Amigos da Terra Brazil (Friends of the Earth Brazil)	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
32	ANA	National Articulation of Agroecology	Brazil	2013	Signature
33	AV	International Articulation of the hurt by Vale	Brazil	2016	Signature
34	CIMI	Indigenous missionary council	Brazil	2012-2016	Signature
35	CONTAG	National Confederation of Agricultural Workers	Brazil	2013	Signature
36	CONTAQ	National Coordination of Quilomba Communities	Brazil	2012-2016	Signature
37	CPT	Pastoral Commission pf the Earth	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
38	CUT	Workers Union	Brazil	2013-2015	Signature. Research
39	FASE	Federation of Organizations for Social and Educational Assistance	Brazil	2011-2020	Signature. Research.
40	FBSSAN	Brazilian Forum of sovereignty and food and nutrition security	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
41	FDHT-MT	Forum of Human Rights and the Earth of Mato Grosso	Brazil	2013	Signature
42	FEAB	Federation of Students of Agroeconomic	Brazil	2013	Signature
43	Feraemg	Federação dos Empregados Rurais Assalariados do Estado de Minas Gerais	Brazil	2016	Signature
44	FETRAF	Federation of agricultural family workers	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
45	FORMAD	Forum for the environment and development of Mato Grosso	Brazil	2013	Signature

46		Fórum de Luta de Cáseres (Forum of fight of Cáceres)	Brazil	2013	Signature
47		Fórum de Mudança climática de Justiça Social do Brazil (Forum of climatic change and social justice of Brazil)	Brazil	2013	Signature
48	GEMAP/CPDA/UFRRJ	Study Group of Social Change, Agribusiness and Public Policy of the University of Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	2020	Research
49	GPEA/UFMT	Research Group of Environmental education, communication and art	Brazil	2013	Signature
50		Grupo Raízes (Roots Group)	Brazil	2013	Signature
51	Ibase	Brazilian Institute of social and economic analysis	Brazil	2013	Signature
52	iC	Snail Institute	Brazil	2013	Signature
53	INESC	Institute of socioeconomic studies	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
54		Justiça Global (Global Justice)	Brazil	2013	Signature
55	MAB	Movement of those hurt by Dikes	Brazil	2016	Signature
56	MMC	Movement of Women Farmers	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
57	MPA	Movement of small farmers	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
58	MST	Movement of Landless workers	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
59	MT	Pastoral Commission pf the Earth	Brazil	2013	Signature
60	PACS	Institute of Alternative Politics of the South Cone	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
61	REBRIP	Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples	Brazil	2013-2016	Signature
62		Rede Axé Dudu (Network Axé Dudu)	Brazil	2013	Signature
63		Rede de Mulheres Negras para Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Network of Black Women for food and nutritional sovereignty)	Brazil	2016	Signature
64	REMTEA	Rede de educação ambiental do Mato Grosso (Network of environment education of Mato Grosso)	Brazil	2013	Signature
65	SERRSMG	Articulation of Rural Worker from the South ofMinas Gerais	Brazil	2016	Signature
66	Sindercam	Carmo de Minas' rural worker's union	Brazil	2016	Signature
67		Sociedade, Fé e Vida (Society, faith and life)	Brazil	2013	Signature
68		Vida Brasil (Life Brazil)	Brazil	2013	Signature
69		Alter Trade Japan Inc	Japan	2013	Signature
70	AJF	Africa Japan Forum	Japan	2013-2016	Signature
71	APLA	Alternative People's Linkage in Asia	Japan	2013	Signature
72		Asian Farmer's Exchange Center	Japan	2016	Signature

73	ATTAC	Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens	Japan	2013-2016	Signature
74		Farmer's Union of Hokkaido	Japan	2016	Signature
75	FOE		Japan	2016	Signature
76	JACSES	Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society	Japan	2016	Signature
77		Japanese Federation of Farmer's Unions	Japan	2016	Signature
78	JVC	Japan International Volunteer Center	Japan	2013-2020	Signature
79	Mokai	Concerned Citizens Group with the Mozambican Development	Japan	2015-2016	Signature, Research
80		Mozambique Kaihatsu wo Kangaeru Shiminno Kai	Japan	2013	Signature
81		Network between Village and Town	Japan	2016	Signature
82		Network for Rural-Urban Cooperation	Japan	2013	Signature
83		No! To Landgrab	Japan	2016	Signature
84	NPANT	No-Pesticides Action Network in Tokyo	Japan	2013	Signature
85	ODA-Net	ODA Reform Network	Japan	2013	Signature
86	SUPA	Association of Support for People in West Africa	Japan	2013	Signature
87	WE21		Japan	2016	Signature
88	WRM	Global Movement for the Tropical Forests	Uruguay	2013	Signature
89		German Left Party's Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung	Germany	2012	Funding
90	KEPA		Finland	2016	Signature
91	CESTA		El Salvador	2016	Signature
92		Centre for Environment and Development	Cameroon	2016	Signature
93	REDAD	Centre for Environment and Development	Peru	2016	Signature
94	ATTAC		Argentina	2016	Signature
95		Woman Health Philippines	Philippine	2016	Signature
96	ATTAC		Morocco	2016	Signature
97	CADTM		Belgium	2016	Signature
98		Haburas Foundation / FoE	Timor Leste	2016	Signature
99	COECOC EIBA – FoE		Costa Rica	2016	Signature
100	AICD	Alternative Information and Development Centre	South Africa	2016	Signature
101		Groundwork	South Africa	2016	Signature
102	CSMM	Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos "Segundo Montes Mozo S.J."	Ecuador	2016	Signature
103	PIDHDD Regional	Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo	Ecuador	2016	Signature
104	CADTM		France	2016	Signature
105	ATTAC		France	2016	Signature
106		Action Aid		2012	Research. Funding
107	CADTM	(AYNA)		2016	Signature
108	FIAN			2016	Signature
109	GRAIN			2013-2016	Signature. Platform.
110		International Women March		2015-2016	Research

111	Oxfam			2011-2020	Signature. Research. Funding
112	NRAN	No REDD in Africa Network		2016	Signature
113	TNI	The transnational institute		2016	Signature
114		World Rainforest Movement		2016	Signature
115		Via Campesina		2013	Signature. Funding

In the table above it is possible to see all the actors that were involved in the 'No to ProSavana' campaign in one period or another, as well as the nature of their participation.

Out of the 115, 66 signed the first Open Letter in 2013. Out of these 66, 22 remained on the network and signed the second Open Letter from 2016. The 2016 one had 70 signatories in total, which demonstrates how the network branched out and continued to gather support throughout the contestation. It is a testament of how wide-reaching the discussion around ProSavana was in Mozambique, Brazil, and Japan alike. The third Open Letter, from 2017, was signed by only 7[20] organizations, all of which from Mozambique. Of the organizations that were a part of the network, 28 were from Mozambique; 40 were from Brazil; 19 were from Japan; 16 were from various countries; and 9 were international organizations.

Some organizations were more important than others. Such is the case of FASE, UNAC, JA, ADECRU, Oxfam, and ORAM. The first three can be credited for activating the network and placing the discussion on an international agenda. All six researched and gathered information throughout the 10 years of contestation.

The funding aspect is important as well. International organizations such as Action Aid, Oxfam, and Via Campesina were instrumental for funding in various stages of the contestation. This happened in terms of travels and visits from representatives of FASE and UNAC, as well as research and publications. Rosa Luxemburg, from Germany, as well as Oxfam, were responsible for the funding of the documentary 'The Hidden Face of Prodecer' (2013) (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016), which was shown at various meetings with Mozambican farmers to inform them on the potential dangers of ProSavana.

What exactly, however, was this network fighting against? There were specific aspects of the ProSavana project which concerned environmental or farming organizations, but could this campaign have a wider reach than the name 'No to ProSavana' would suggest?

[20] ADECRU, CAJUPANA, CDJPN, JA, LDH, Livaningo, and UNAC (Lemos, 2017)

According to Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto (2016), civil organizations' main concerns were in regards to (1) the total of 'unoccupied' lands that would be allocated to the program, (2) monocultures that would overwrite traditional agriculture, (3) how small farmers would be treated, and (4) the environmental consequences.

> The '*No to ProSavana*' Campaign is part of a broad process of joint mobilization by civil society organizations and peasant movements in defense of natural resources and **against aggression, usurpation, commodification and privatization of land and other natural resources**[21] (FASE: notícias 2017, my translation, my emphasis)

Their concerns are, it seems, imbedded in a much larger context. Richer countries turned their gaze to Africa following 2008 for various reasons, global food and fuel crisis notwithstanding. The idea was to own agricultural land in Africa, and such process gave rise to a new concept within the literature and the civil society discussion: land grabbing (Shankland, Gonçalves, Fareto, 2016). This was a type of power configuration where African countries became progressively more constrained by foreign capital and international decision-making.

Land grabbing relates to FASE's agricultural concerns as well. While JA and UNAC criticized the context in terms of land ownership and subsistence – small farmers being replaced by foreign companies (Matavel et all, 2011) –, FASE brought attention to the model of agriculture (FASE: Notícias, 2010). Each in their own countries started a debate on land use, and came together as allies in 2011.

The criticism, as such, was mostly circumscribed by these parameters: land grabbing and conservative agriculture. The network was able to gather international attention through Open Letters addressed to the governments involved with ProSavana, workshops, and conferences (Chichava, 2016, p.377). In the next section, the text will explore all the strategies that the network made use of in their contestation – their arguments and criticisms in fold –, and what allowed them to go from one phase of the spiral model to another.

4.2.2 A chronology of the contestation

Phase I

[21] A Campanha *Não ao ProSavana* é parte de um processo amplo de mobilização conjunta das organizações da sociedade civil e movimentos de camponeses em defesa dos recursos naturais e contra a agressão, usurpação, mercantilização privatização da terra e de outros recursos naturais (FASE: Notícias, 2017)

Phase I (2010-2012) is defined by the initial domestic revolt against state repression. Here, according to Sikkink and Risse (1999) it is essential that the domestic civil society gathers cohesive information on the violation at play, so that the transnational network can be assembled and activated.

The most important actors in this phase were Mozambican civil society organizations JA and UNAC, and FASE, from Brazil. For the Mozambican part, this gathering of information began in 2010, when JA and UNAC assembled the complaints from local communities and began to analyse the cases on land conflicts and land grabbing in Mozambique, launching a report by 2011 called ‘‘Lords of the Land’’ (Matavel et all, 2011). This was a study into the land acquisition by multinational corporations for large scale production (Matavel et all, 2011; Lemos, 2016).

> ‘‘The following factors contribute to the phenomenon of land grabbing; the communities’ poor knowledge of their rights and Land Law, the institutional weakness of local government, the corruption of authorities and community leaders, and the lack of awareness of the benefits of the formal process of land tenure. The most aggravating factor of this phenomenon is the vulnerability resulting from the numerous deficits characteristic of the poverty these communities are subjected to and which makes these people even more easily deceived by promises of better basic living conditions’’ (Matavel et all, 2011, p.57)

But the gathering of information did not happen only into the Mozambican agrarian reality. It seemed important to diagnose the role of other countries in this alleged land grabbing. FASE’s participation in this initial phase was twofold: it tried to (1) understand this model of agriculture, as well as (2) Brazil’s role in ProSavana. FASE shared its knowledge into Prodecer, the Brazil-Japan cooperation from the 1970s, responsible for altering the agricultural configuration of the *cerrado* biome, in Brazil. FASE also analysed Brazil’s foreign policy and South-South cooperation, criticising them in fold (Schlesinger, 2013).

FASE’s role within the contestation was based on a mirroring strategy. The similarities of struggle and fight were the foundation of the expertise which FASE provided in its criticism. As Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) appropriately put it, FASE made use of audio-visual – as well as written –materials to create comparisons between the farmers of the two countries.

FASE was able to host the visit of Mozambican civil society, represented by UNAC, while being funded by Oxfam and Rosa Luxemburg. This visit allowed for meetings and exchange of expertise, but it was also when the documentary ‘The hidden face of Prodecer’ was filmed. The documentary was shown at various meetings, strengthening the resistance in Mozambique. It also conveyed the urgency of the contestation, providing useful information for the transnational network (Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto, 2016).

After the establishment of this mirror, FASE could move on with other strategies, ones that would ensure that Phase II began: they reached out to their contacts in academia and the Brazilian government, as well as the international NGO's residing in Brazil, such as Action Aid and Oxfam. FASE also activated its links with Brazilian peasant organizations (Aquiar and Pacheco, 2016). These three actors – JA, UNAC, and FASE - formed the initial understanding into ProSavana, and were the reason this issue was placed in international agendas.

Phase II

This phase (2013-2016) is defined by the denial of the state. According to the spiral model, after the activation of the transnational network in phase I, the 'violation' has entered the international agenda. In the case of human rights violations, the role of other countries is significant – they may promote economic sanctions against the violating country, to pressure it to change its practices (Sikkink and Risse, 1999).

It is not the case with this dissertation, as we are talking about the criticism against a model of agriculture. While in Phase I FASE, UNAC, and JA perceived the problem and activated the network against it, in Phase II the three states became aware of the criticism and denied it. There are two key aspects in this phase. One (1) is how civil society continued its campaign alongside the network. The second (2) is how the countries promoting ProSavana were able to shape the narrative surrounding it, specifically how they defined agriculture and were able to dodge the criticisms from civil society.

There are three important moments that defined Phase II, all of which represented by official documents regarding the project: one in 2013, the second in 2015, and, finally, in 2016. The first was when civil society got hold of a 'leaked' version of the master plan. The second; when the official Zero Draft of the Master Plan was released. The third, when civil society was finally able to read the 'communication strategy', which had been devised and implemented as early as 2013.

Throughout the network's formation in Phase I, the atmosphere surrounding civil society was one of lack of information. As Funada-Classen (2018) put it, the governments constantly changed their arguments and focus, so as hinder the communication with civil society, and minimize their concerns. There were 'Quick impact projects' being implemented without a proper environmental assessment study, or communication with local farmers and civil society

(UNAC et all, 2013). The leak of the Master Plan (MINAG et all, 2013) in April 2013 solidified many of civil society's concerns, and prompted the first Open Letter, which was sent to the three governments in May 2013 (UNAC et all, 2013, Funada-Classen, 2018).

> ''we find that there are many discrepancies and contradictions in the sparse information and documents available, which are indications and evidence to confirm the existence of defects in the programme design; irregularities in the alleged process of public consultation and participation; **serious and imminent threat of usurpation of rural populations' lands and forced removal of communities from areas that they currently occupy**'' (Justiça Ambiental et all, 2013, my emphasis)

In the hype of the contestation in 2013, UNAC organized the 1st Triangular Peoples' conference in Maputo, bringing together civil organizations from all over the world, and attracting international media attention (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016).

Brazil's involvement in ProSAVANA stopped in 2014. Of course, this cannot only be attributed to civil society criticism, as Brazil was dealing with a governmental crisis in the form of President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, and, as a result, forewent the international cooperation to turn inward[22]. The impact on ProSavana, however, of this lack of involvement from the Brazilian government was twofold: (1) the trilateral cooperation became a bilateral one; (2) Japan and Mozambique seemingly doubled down on their efforts to make ProSavana work (Funada-Classen, 2019).

According to Funada-Classen (2019), Japan pressed for the continuation of the project because of bureaucratic[23] reasons, and also because it could reflect badly on JICA (Japan's International Cooperation Agency). The strategy was to promote a dialogue with local peasants and civil society movements to finally begin the implementation of ProSavana.

All of these efforts appeared to have worked: civil society in Mozambique was fragmented, as some believed that the project could be salvaged and humanized (Lemos, 2016). The segments that remained in the campaign demanded, in the 2nd Peoples Conference from 2014, that ProSavana was judged in the United Nations (Farmlandgrab, 2014)

April 2015 market the second important moment of Phase II. The Zero Draft was released to the ProSavana website, and its text tried to answer civil society's main concerns with the project. It placed food security as a priority, while ensuring that no land grabbing of any kind would be taking place. However, many points still remained dim and uncertain.

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[22] FASE's role on ProSavana diminished in 2014, following the political crisis in Brazil and the social climate which came thereafter, but did not stop completely. FASE continued to sign open letters and provide Mozambican civil society with research and support.

[23] The difficulty to stop public programs once approved by the government (Funada- Classen, 2019)

The Draft (2015) stated that their findings were based on studies, as well as inquiries and interviews with private and governmental institutions, alongside local communities, NGOs and civic associations. However, it is easy to question how appropriately these inquiries were made, given civil society's dissatisfaction (UNAC et all, 2015). In December, 2015, UNAC – along with other organizations, including FASE – released its remarks regarding the Zero Draft:

> Civil Society and the affected communities have strongly contested ProSAVANA, claiming that it is a very ambitious plan and **inadequate** to the national agricultural reality, in addition to denouncing their lack of knowledge, of course, of the elements that demonstrate the guarantee of sustainability and safeguarding land rights, environmental law, and safeguarding the practice of family farming by communities with the approval and implementation of ProSAVANA. The Master Plan does not show this guarantee, if not in an obscure, frivolous way, as if it were not a serious statement, which is equivalent to not putting in place the necessary mechanisms for this purpose, hence the marginalization and non-effective participation of civil society.
>
> (…)
>
> The real solutions appropriate to the Mozambican reality that Prosavana can offer for the development of agriculture with the security of the fundamental rights of communities, especially food and nutrition security, housing, access to land and the practice of agriculture are not noticeable[24] (UNAC et all, 2015, my translation, my emphasis)

Notably, there was still skepticism. Several issues went unanswered, such as the provisions for public sector subsidiaries and the extend of the involvement of private investment.

> There are huge potential environmental impacts. It will transform our peasant families into cheap labour. It will destroy small scale agriculture as we know it. And it will keep Mozambique and Mozambicans eternally **dependent on foreign markets, on foreign "aid" and therefore on foreign interests**. Our peasant agriculture and native seed systems face serious risks of disappearing. We cannot accept this. We cannot allow it! (Lemos, 2016, p.47, my emphasis)

It is important to note that this release was accompanied with a round of public consultation in the month of April (Shankland, Gonçalves and Fareto, 2016, p. 18). In June, 2015, Mozambican civil society released an appeal for the invalidation of these public hearings, having witnessed several irregularities, such as:

1) No legal basis to guide these conversations, which lacked ''broad democratic participation, availability and the access to adequate information, representation, independence, functionality, negotiation and responsibility'' (UNAC et all, 2015)

[24] A Sociedade Civil e as comunidades afectadas muito tem contestado o ProSAVANA, alegando ser um plano muito ambicioso e inadequado à realidade agrícola nacional para além de que denunciam não conhecimento, claro, dos elementos que evidenciam a garantia da sustentabilidade e salvaguarda dos direitos sobre a terra, o direito do ambiente, e salvaguarda da prática da agricultura familiar pelas comunidades com a aprovação e implementação do ProSAVANA. O Plano Director não evidencia esta garantia, se não de forma obscura, leviana, como se declaração não séria se tratasse, o que equivale a não pôr em prática os mecanismos necessários para o efeito, daí a marginalização e não participação efectiva da sociedade civil. (...) Não são perceptíveis as reais soluções adequadas à realidade moçambicana que o Prosavana possa oferecer para o desenvolvimento da agricultura com a segurança dos direitos fundamentais das comunidades, especialmente a segurança alimentar e nutricional, habitação, acesso a terra e a prática da agricultura. (UNAC et all, 2015)

2) Active obstruction of the participation of civil society organizations.

> ‘‘There was an incident where, to obstruct their participation, a representative of the Economic Activities District Services (SDAE, in its original Portuguese abbreviation) informed the representatives of these peasant and civil society organizations of a fake location for one of the meetings’’ (UNAC et all, 2015)

3) Unnecessary presence of armed security forces, which intimidated the people who raised concerns regarding ProSavana. ‘‘These peasants are being forced by district level government (who threatens to put in jail those who refuse to participate) to go door-to-door in communities to promote ProSavana’’ (UNAC et all, 2015)

As it would be revealed in 2016, these irregularities stemmed from a wider and more utilitarian denial strategy from the Japanese and Mozambican governments. In 2016, Japanese NGOs were able to obtain a contract called ‘ProSavana: Communication Strategy’, which had been signed in 2013. The document contained several recommendations on how to fragment civil society – both international and from Mozambique (Funada-Classen, 2019)

> ‘‘If one withdraws importance to civil society organizations in Mozambique, one significantly weakens foreign NGOs operating in Mozambique, as these reduce their contacts with the media and, consequently, their influence.
>
> (…)
>
> Questioning or criticizing (foster criticism by some Mozambican authorities) the role that foreign organizations are playing in Mozambique’’ (JICA, 2017)

Following the second recommendation from above, the Mozambican Agriculture Minister José Pacheco accused organizations such as FASE to be promoting a conspiracy to Mozambican civil society (Funada-Classen, 2019). This happened in response to the vast media coverage that the ‘1st Triangular Peoples’ Conference’ was getting. Provincial Agriculture Director of Nampula, Pedro Dzucula, went as far as to call international civic criticism ‘‘fallacious propaganda[25]’‘. Fátima Mello expressed, in an interview, how the Mozambican government continuously made the claims that FASE was spearheading the contestation in order to corrupt Mozambican farmers into revolting against their government.

Another revealing recommendation within the Communication Strategy (JICA, 2017) was on how to control the narrative around ProSavana, specifically on the similarities with Brazil’s Prodecer. Having noticed that the network was making use of a mirroring strategy, the Japanese and Mozambican government made sure to erode this connection, to devalue some of the main arguments from civil society (JICA, 2017). This strategy started in 2013 (Funada-Classen,

[25] The original news article has been deleted by the Mozambican government. Funada-Classen (2019) provided na english transnation of the text.

2019) and was perpetuated throughout Phase II. The fragmentation noticed by Lemos (2016) in 2014 is not a random occurrence.

Another Open Letter (UNAC et all, 2016) was released in response to this document. Aside from discovering the two aforementioned strategies, UNAC et all (2016) also concluded that the 'dialogues' promoted with Mozambican peasants were reserved to ''only those who demonstrate willingness and approved by JICA and ProSavana-HQ'' (p.2). Civil society observed that it had been intervened with and manipulated. They ended the Open Letter by demanding that ProSavana was stopped, and that the three governments disclosed their all of their documents to ''fulfil their responsibility and accountability'' (UNAC et all, 2016, p.3).

According to Granzer (1999), differences in successful assimilation of Human Rights norms (Phase V) relies heavily on the degree of state repression in Phase II. To put it differently, it relies on the institutional complexity that the domestic civil society reaches while trying to resist repression. The government's strategy of denial was ultimately unmasked with the discovery of the 'Communication Strategy', and the contestation was able to reach even more organizations all over the world.

It was the continuation of this discursive battle that eventually pushed the contestation further into Phase III: tactical concessions.

Phase III

This phase (2017-2020) is marked by tactical concessions from the state. In this phase, civil society yields enough strength to corner the State into allowing for actual change (Sikkink and Risse, 1999). To connect the spiral model framework with the research object in question, Mozambique and Japan were able to contain the campaign by appeasing to it: first in postponing application, then in ending the project all together.

By 2017, the campaign against ProSavana remained relevant. The release of the 'Communication Strategy' gave the network even more strength, as it revealed that the problem was not just land grabbing or a controversial model of agriculture, but the disrespect of democratic procedures within the Mozambican territory. The 'No to ProSavana' campaign sent its third Open Letter, this time directly to JICA, claiming that:

> JICA's interventions are destabilizing the transparent and democratic process in ProSavana, (...). These interventions have negative impacts on the human rights, the right to land and the food security of peasants

> and their way of life, including their culture, undermining the independence of Mozambican civil society and causing fragmentation (Lemos, 2017)

Seemingly stronger than ever, the Triangular People's Conference had its third instalment in Maputo, in which about 200 people could participate in the discussions as to Mozambique's development model (FASE: Notícias, 2017). The 2018 conference, in Tokyo, echoed these sentiments, going further by placing the ProSavana program as an action that would violate human rights. According to the social movements, it is important ''that all programs and investments that promote a predatory occupation of territories, compromise the integrity of peoples and systematically violate the human rights of peoples are stopped'' (Justiça Ambiental, 2018)

The governments provided no response to the network's accusations in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019. Finally, in July 2020, the end of the ProSAVANA program was officially reported, which was wildly viewed as a victory (JVC et all, 2020).

> ''Prior to this decision and announcement, ten Japanese parliamentarians shared their concerns over ProSAVANA with Mozambican peasants and civil society organisations, and strengthened their pressure on JICA to terminate the program **due to the above-mentioned resistance and the court verdict**.
>
> The presence of the Brazilian government in the programme has long been non-existent after the failure to kick off the Nacala Fund, because of local and international resistance in Mozambique, Brazil and Japan.
>
> This is a huge victory for Mozambican peasant movements and tri-national peoples solidarity'' (JVC et all, 2020, our emphasis)

In the table below, it is possible to see the strategies used by both sides throughout these 10 years.

Time-Table of the contestation

	Attack from the Network	Counter-attack by the governments	Reaction from the Network	Reaction from the Governments
Phase I *2010-2012*	• Mirroring Strategy; • Research into Prodecer; • Activation of the Network;			
Phase II *2013-2016*	• Dialogue with farmers; • 1st Open Letter; • 1st and 2nd Peoples Conference in Maputo;	• Insufficient dialogue; • Civil society repression; • Discrediting Brazilian Civil society; • Fragmentation of Mozambican Civil Society.	• 2nd Open Letter; • Broadening the Network;	

Phase III *2017-2020*	• 3rd Open Letter; • 3rd Peoples Conference in Maputo;			• End of ProSavana

The most relevant aspect of this entire campaign was the strengthening of domestic civil society into a more equipped, better informed, better resourced, and faster-responding network of organizations and individuals. If the Conventions and continuous research into the Mozambican agrarian reality are anything to go by, one may assume that the network itself has left the contestation more knowledgeable than before. After examining FASE's role in the network and the contestation, I will draw some considerations into what phases IV and V might look like to Mozambique and the network at large.

4.3 The circumstances of success: FASE's role

How has FASE contributed to ProSavana's contestation campaign? What are FASE's the internal, fundamental characteristics which allow for impactful transnational contestation? Having understood FASE's and ProSavana's history, lets answer both these questions.

To schematise what was explored in the last sections, FASE contributed to the contestation of ProSavana in six main ways:

1. The first contact was stablished in 2012, and UNAC along with other organization within Mozambican civil society were made aware of the possible dangers of ProSavana in light of Prodecer. FASE was able to acquire financing via its links with Oxfam and Via Campesina.
2. In this same year, members of FASE visited Mozambique, offered their expertise on Prodecer.
3. Also in 2012, FASE welcomed members of UNAC in Brazil. They were shown Brazil's *cerrado*, and what would potentially happen in their land were ProSavana successful. They activated they connections with Oxfam and Rosa Luxemburgo for funding.
4. In 2013, FASE provided a link between Brazilian governmental institutions and Mozambican civil society. UNAC went to meeting with CONSEA, Instituto Lula, and Itamaraty itself.

5. FASE signed 2 open letters, in 2013 and in 2016. It was also responsible with acquiring more signatures among Brazilian civil society.
6. FASE's continued to release material and information on ProSavana until 2020, when it ended.

To claim that the campaign was *only* successful because of FASE's role would be not only non-falsifiable (we can't know what would have happen if FASE wasn't a part of it), but also irrelevant. The point that the literature on transnational networks examines, is that a civil society contestation campaign is both agent and structure, with the power to alter the course of policies and interests (Sikkink, 1998). If we take the campaign as a structure, how has FASE, as an actor within it, been able to strengthen it? What are FASE's the internal, fundamental characteristics which allow for impactful transnational contestation?

As per Risse-Kappen's (1995) framework, FASE has two root properties which made its role in the contestation relevant.

1. *A complex and highly institutionalized domestic structure*. Its degree of institutionalization was built upon over, at the time, 50 years of existence, along with a continuous tension with governmental institutions and the political systems themselves. This time and tension allowed for FASE to acquire respectable expertise on agriculture, as well as to solidify a critical relationship of the Brazilian government which was seldomly not heard by it and other organizations. It allowed, in the case of ProSavana, for the expertise that FASE had on Prodecer to be transferred and believed. It was FASE's assessment of Prodecer, when it's all set and done, that made ProSavana into a threat. It was FASE's connections with the Brazilian government that gave UNAC a voice in Brazil.
2. *Connections with international networks and civic actors stablished trough time*, which allowed for the financing from the first visits, a wide-ranging network and the continuation of the contestation.

5. The Spiral Model and additional considerations

Sikkink and Risse (1999) sought to investigate under which conditions the internalization of Human Rights norms happen in a country, and what explains the variation between countries. They lay out, with the spiral model, causal mechanisms through which the process of socialization of international norms happen in a given country. The chapters in the book provided comparative studies to apply this model and these hypotheses, reaching interesting conclusions as to why these variations occur. Granzer's (1999) chapter is particularly interesting, as it shows how skipping one phase of the spiral model compromises the whole process: when the Tunisian government immediately responded to civil society criticisms, denying them the 'denial' phase, civil society was silenced and the transnational network was weakened. Phase III is precarious as well: if the state reverts back to hard repressions, the process if delayed. Tactical concessions, however, mean that the state cannot keep denying that violations are occurring: civil society wins not only a policy battle, but a discursive one as well (Sikkink and Risse, 1999).

The ProSavana contestation only covering 3 of the 5 phases is not a random adaptation of the framework. I have made the argument that the Network's struggle stems from a wider and deeper problem – one that could connect so many organizations in one single and concise fight, but that does not end once that particular battle is won. FASE found in Mozambique a mirror of their own struggles. This was the reason why it was able to help as much as it did, but it also reveals that this particular fight is older than ProSavana itself.

> Finally, the No to ProSavana Campaign remains united and will continue to struggle against environmental, social, economic and political injustice and inequality and for the defence of human rights and interests related to access and control of the land, water, forests, air, the common good and cultural and historical patrimony. (Lemos, 2017)

Following the end of ProSavana, FASE released a report which places the project as a larger process of transformation of the traditional Mozambican agriculture, with a focus on productivity and profitability. ''The narrative is centred on the defence of modernization of agriculture from a technicist and economist logic''[26] (Estevão et all, 2020, p.4, my translation).

Can the contestation, having only completed 3 of the 5 phases, continue on to revolutionize Mozambique's – and perhaps even Brazil's – model of agriculture? The combative strategies performed by FASE, by the Network, and by Mozambican civil society allowed for a deeper

[26] 'A narrativa é centrada na defesa da modernização da agricultura a partir de uma lógica tecnicista e economicista (Estevão et al, 2020, p.4)

discussion and reflection on alternative agrarian development models. Within this discussion, the wants and needs of the small farmer, peasant or indigenous communities, the use of pesticides, or even the issue of international intervention could be explored in the entire network – spamming years and countries alike. In other words, the campaign, made possible by the transnational network, put in contact different peoples with different prerogatives and realities, diffusing and expanding a knowledge which would have otherwise remained scattered and exclusive.

According to the literature (Sikkink and Risse, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1995), however, this significant change in agriculture models most certainly depends on many variables, and not only those which concern the strength of the domestic civil society, or the transnational network. Phase V can only be achieved by seeing agriculture as a systematic problem – rather than a problem limited by specific trilateral projects. This is the only way to prevent that another development project, like ProSavana, is introduced to the farmers of Mozambique again.

6. Concluding remarks

Risse-Kappen (1995) noticed that some transnational coalitions had more success than others in influencing meaningful policy or regime change across different countries. The idea of his book was to analyse the circumstances which allow for civic actors and networks to achieve their goals. Impact, for Risse-Kappen (1995) relies on domestic and international variables – the organizational structure of the state and civil society; the degree of international regulation that the issue has. I have made an adaptation of this framework to analyse FASE in the context of transnational policy impact. FASE's institutional complexity, expertise, and transnational ties were indispensable for the contestation of ProSavana, as it allowed for the gathering of information, supporters, and activation of the network.

These are some of the circumstances which allowed for FASE to be not only a powerful influence in the ProSavana campaign, but instrumental in its establishment. Born out of democratic pressures in Brazil, FASE was able to evolve and grow over time, questioning the definition of agriculture, and openly fighting against its conservative model. It fostered international ties over time, which helped the process of incorporating other international organizations into the campaign. These are some of the circumstances which allowed for an impactful participation in the contestation of the ProSavana project.

Sikkink and Risse (1999) provided a framework through which one can analyse the contestation of ProSavana: the strategies performed by the Network and its actors, the counter-measures from the states, and the overall progression of events. It was possible to see how the network and Mozambican civil society evolved through time, and FASE's role in this process.

Both Risse-Kappen (1999) and Sikkink and Risse (2009) allowed for a significant study into domestic and transnational civil society. As time passes, and the agrarian struggle continues, it will be interesting to see how UNAC and JA in Mozambique, and FASE in Brazil perfect their fighting styles and strategies to represent the interests of small farmers and peasants in both countries.

This framework has been justified by these encouraging results, but also by possible next researches to come. Observing FASE through Risse-Kappen's (1995) hypotheses allowed me to study an organization under three important criteria: (1) its relation with the State; (2) its financing and relational history; and (3) its definition of important debate topics. To see how

FASE continues after 2020, or even how other organizations might be seen through these lens, offers important research possibilities.

Likewise, the spiral model being used beyond its initial intent – human rights – provides the researcher with ample opportunities of analyses into the conditions upon which true institutional change may occur in a country. The agricultural field is one of many imbroglios and contestations, of vital importance to every single human or living being on the planet, and, as such, should be granted the significance it deserves. Studying it through the spiral model revealed how far civil society has come, and how far it still will have to go. The ProSavana case cannot be ignored if the object of study is Mozambican's civil organizations or agrarian disputes.

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Attachment – Interviews

Pedro Cláudio Cunca Brando Bocayuva Cunha

1. Your research area is very broad and multidisciplinary, but I noticed a common thread in urban planning, political ideologies and conflicts and social classes. From what I know of FASE, it is not strange that their paths have crossed – FASE has been very concerned with urban, union and neighborhood formation issues in its history. How did you come to know FASE?
2. How did FASE inform your research?
3. Coalitions between civic organizations are very important. Have you noticed any national partnership which improved FASE's action?
4. Have you noticed international partnerships made with this same purpose?
5. Have you noticed the formation of international coalitions? How have they behaved?
6. What has happened with FASE in the 21st century? How has its institutional and international procedures changed?

Fátima Mello

1. You have been a very important voice in the ProSavana case. From reports to international visits, you have had a very important role as a representative of FASE. Can you tell me what the start of the contestation was like?
2. Who made first contact – FASE, or UNAC?
3. What were FASE's concerns with ProSavana?
4. What were FASE's intentions in helping Mozambican civil society?
5. Did FASE stand to gain anything from this international contestation?
6. How were international civil society treated in Mozambique during the contestation?
7. Has the contestation been successful?
8. What has happened with FASE in the 21st century? How has its institutional and international procedures changed?

Sérgio Schlesinger

1. What has been your role within FASE?
2. What other international contestations has FASE engaged itself in?
3. What was ProSavana, in your opinion? And in FASE's opinion?

4. What were the first steps of the contestation?
5. How did this international coalition work?
6. What were FASE's intentions in helping Mozambican civil society?
7. How were international civil society treated in Mozambique during the contestation?
8. Has the contestation been successful?
9. What has happened with FASE in the 21st century? How has its institutional and international procedures changed?