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**Brazilian Left-Right Ideology and Public Perception of China's
Rise: A Perspective of University Students**

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**Ideologia Esquerda-Direita Brasileira e Percepções Públicas da
Ascensão da China: Uma Perspectiva de Estudantes
Universitários**

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ABSTRACT

Left-right ideology has long been recognized as an informational shortcut for individuals to perceive and understand the political world both in the domestic and international realms. However, in Brazil, there is neither a definite answer to whether the Brazilian public possesses a coherent understanding of left-right ideology, nor any exploration of the relationship between ideology and public perception of foreign issues. China is Brazil's most important trading partner, and its rise has brought great influences over Brazil both economically and politically. To know whether left-right ideology is related to the way the Brazilian public perceives China's rise, a survey targeted at students from the University of São Paulo (USP) was conducted. Built on the OLM models, analysis results show that surveyed USP students demonstrate the ability to correctly identify themselves in the ideological spectrum and that the left-right position is significantly related to their trust in China's rise in different aspects.

Keywords: Left-right ideology, China's rise, Brazil-China relations, public opinion

RESUMO

A ideologia de esquerda-direita tem sido reconhecida como um atalho informativo para que os indivíduos percebam e entendam o mundo político, tanto no campo doméstico quanto no internacional. No entanto, não há no Brasil um estudo definitivo capaz de avaliar se os brasileiros possuem uma compreensão coerente da ideologia de esquerda-direita. Também não foram encontrados estudos que explorem a relação entre ideologia e percepções públicas sobre questões estrangeiras. A China é o maior parceiro comercial do Brasil e sua ascensão trouxe grandes influências sobre o Brasil, tanto econômica quanto em termos políticos. Para investigar se a ideologia esquerda-direita está relacionada à forma como o público brasileiro percebe a ascensão da China, foi realizada uma pesquisa de opinião junto aos estudantes da Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Analisando os dados da pesquisa a partir de modelos de regressão OLM, os resultados sugerem que os alunos da USP que participaram da pesquisa são capazes de se autoidentificar corretamente no espectro ideológico, e que a posição esquerda-direita está significativamente relacionada à sua confiança no crescimento da China em diferentes aspectos.

Palavras-chave: Ideologia de esquerda-direita, ascensão da China, relações Brasil-China, opinião pública

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1. INTRODUCTION

Left-right ideology has long been recognized among scholars as an information shortcut for individuals to perceive and understand the political world. However, despite the minimal definition proposed by some prominent theorists, the substantive concept of left and right is a “poor international traveler” (TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013), as it varies across time and space. In the Brazilian context where clientelism and personalistic politics persist, left-right ideology has developed its idiosyncrasies since political leaders used to embrace domestic policies not in line with their ideological labels (LUCAS; SAMUELS, 2010; TELLES; STORNI, 2011). Most of the ideology research in Brazil focuses on partisan identification (MACIEL; ALARCON; GIMENES, 2018; POWER; CESAR, 2009; TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013; TELLES; STORNI, 2011), domestic policy preference (OLIVEIRA; TURGEON, 2015), and voting behaviors (CARREIRÃO, 2002; HOLZHACKER; BALBACHEVSKY, 2007; IZUMI, 2019; MOREIRA, 2017; SINGER, 1999). Among them, there is a huge debate about whether Brazilians have a sound and coherent understanding of the left-right meanings, which remains unsolved until today. Also, the relationship between ideology and people’s perception of foreign affairs has not yet been unexplored in the Brazilian context.

China has gained increasing scholarly attention since its economic boom that benefited Brazil’s export economy and become its biggest trade partner globally. How China wields its influences over Brazil, from the economic aspect to the political one, has been largely discussed in the academic community (BLANCHARD, 2016; CARDOSO, 2013; OLIVEIRA, 2018; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011). With the ascendancy of far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency, Brazilian diplomacy has been subjected to a dramatic change as the ideological stand is reinforced by his pro-US and anti-China discourse. Although China has claimed itself with a “peaceful rise” strategy, how much do the Brazilian public trust the rise of China? Does

left-right ideology divide the public's perception of China? Do ideological values based on domestic issues group the opinions of Brazilian towards China in different aspects? These are questions that are going to be solved in this research.

Grounded on the theory that left-right ideology based on domestic issues is correlated with individuals' perception of foreign affairs, it is hypothesized that Brazilians with different ideological identification (left or right) have different levels of trust on the rise of China. University students are chosen as the target population of the survey research designed to test the hypothesis, considering the importance of their visions as future leaders in Brazilian society. This research attempts to provide a more complete understanding of how the Brazilian public, especially the well-educated, forms their foreign attitudes through the lens of left-right ideology that bases on domestic issues. More specifically, it reveals what are the values that define Brazilian university students' identification of the left-right position, and how this position is related to their perception of China's rise in different aspects. This research is expected to contribute to the literature of Brazilian ideological identification as well as to the literature on Brazil-China relations from a new perspective, filling the gap of research on the relation of ideology and public opinion about foreign affairs in Brazil.

In addition to the current chapter of the introduction, I will proceed in six more chapters in support of my contentions. The second and third chapter shows a literature review with two main parts: the ideology part and the China part. The ideology part contains the conceptualization of the left-right meanings, their idiosyncrasies in the Brazilian context, and ideology's function in filtering individuals' perception of foreign affairs. The China part introduces some prominent research on China's economic and political influence on Brazil in both domestic and foreign spheres, as well as the change of foreign policy orientation in Brazil under Bolsonaro's far-right government. The research methodology is specified in the fourth chapter, which includes data collection, the measures of variables of interest, and the data

analysis method. In the following chapter, preliminary results of data exploration are presented. The sixth chapter provides data analysis using statistic models to answer the question of whether left-right ideology colors the way people perceive the rise of China, as well as how students identify themselves with specific values on the left-right ideology scale. In the final chapter, I conclude the research findings and make implications and suggestions for future studies on similar topics.

2. BRAZILIAN LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ITS ROLE IN FOREIGN ATTITUDE FORMATION

2.1 The Left-Right Concepts: A Theoretical Perspective

Left and Right, according to Bobbio (1996), are two antithetical terms that characterize an ideological contrast concerning political thoughts and behaviors. This metaphor comes from the revolutionary era when status quo supporters sat on the right side while their opponents on the left side of the French Assembly, and it has ever since gained worldwide importance in mass politics until today.

The conceptualization of left-right ideology has been disputed over decades between two camps of methodology: the first is represented by theorists who study left-right concepts with a deductive approach based on philosophical thoughts, and the second is held by political scientists who conduct empirical research, usually by analyzing government's policies, party manifesto and public opinion survey, to find out the left-right meanings in specific countries and periods. Not surprisingly, these two camps with different perspectives cannot reach a consensus on whether the concepts of left and right are susceptible to temporal and spatial changes (BAUER et al., 2017; CARREIRÃO, 2002; MONTERO, 2014; TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013) or are stable and thus valid over time and context (BOBBIO, 1996; LUNA; ROVIRA KALTWASSER, 2014; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008). Nonetheless, the two arguments are not incompatible. Many scholars believe that, since the left-right term constitutes most of the political debate today, the minimal definition of left-right ideology is still valid in providing us with a starting point to understand the complex political world, and this at the same time can be complemented based on real-world policies that vary with different contexts (FUCHS; KLINGEMANN, 1990; JAHN, 2011; LUNA; ROVIRA KALTWASSER, 2014; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008)

Taking ideology as *a priori*, political theorists believe that the meanings of left and right are not restricted to the political agenda, rather, they represent a cleavage of two distinct values based on different perception of human nature and society, concerning not only interests but also human principles (NOEL; THERIEN, 2008). Their political connotations can date back to the end of 18 century when left and right symbolized two different sets of ideas about the French Revolution. The left represented ardent promoters of liberty who required restriction of the powers of government and respect for individual autonomy, and the right symbolized the royalist group who espoused the long-established social order held by the monarchy. By the end of the Napoleonic age, these two antithetical ideas took the name of liberalism and conservatism, despite the fact that these terms were only seen as technical vocabularies of parliamentary affairs, and thus had not yet been a ubiquitous social fact at that time (CASSELS, 2002; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008). The left-right metaphor, according to Noel and Therien (2008), only began to take on its contemporary meaning at the end of 18th century, along with the rise of socialism which brought up the critical “social question”—the issue of equality—to the debate. It was this pivotal change that pushed the previously non-socialist left, the *Laissez-faire* liberalism, to the right, and further consolidated in the 1930s when the emergence of Keynesianism and welfare states reinforced the opposition between market freedom and state intervention (TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013).

In the contemporary term, as Bobbio (1996) provides, the conception of inequality has become the key dividing issue of left-right ideology. For Bobbio (1996), the left and the right differ in that right conceives inequality as natural, thus difficult and unnecessary to eradicate, while the left believes it is socially constructed and is a target for progressive social change. By reviewing Bobbio’s work, Noel and Therien (2008) propose a different idea about the right. They believe that the right is not so much “inegalitarian” as “differently egalitarian”: Unlike the socialist left’s belief that equal opportunities should be assured by collective institutions,

the right holds it best to let individuals work their way forward, in a context guaranteeing them equal rights and fair opportunities. The debate between “equality of opportunity” and “equality of outcome”, as further discussed by Noel and Therien (2008), holds a mirror to two different views about human nature and life in a community. Debates among different ideologies based on inequality are further complemented by Jahn (2011): there are three principal viewpoints of equality that constitute classical ideologies, namely socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. The left, denoted by the socialist concern of equality, is attached to the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believes that men are born equal but made unequal by the civil society, and therefore inequality should be condemned and abolished. The right with the thoughts of classical liberalism is represented by John Locke, who regards the public intervention as a cornerstone of individual autonomy and at best ineffective, and thus should be restricted to give individuals the freedom to fulfill their potential. Another type of right-wing thought—conservatism, follows Nietzsche’s conviction that, contrary to Rousseau’s belief, men are born unequal, and this social nature places men and women in a hierarchical order necessary for an organic society where members live in social and physical harmony with each other.

In the modern political world, the debates between left and right anchored around the issue of inequality are reflected in the market-state divide, separated by those who favor social equality through government protection in terms of nationalization, redistribution, welfare policy, and those who believe it necessary to maintain incentives for the individual effort through market liberalization, encouraging competition and keeping taxes low (NOEL; THERIEN, 2008). The rise of post-materialism (INGLEHART, 1997) since the mid-twenty century had expanded people’s attention from economic issues to the normative system, articulated in the form of social movements by women, ethnic communities, sexual minorities, and other social groups who demand recognition, respect, and equality (BOBBIO, 1996; MACIEL; ALARCON; GIMENES, 2018; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008; WIESEHOMMEIER,

2010). Under these circumstances, leftists, usually self-identified as defenders of the weak, are more likely to embrace social inclusion policy such as the quota system and to support liberal policy in socio-cultural life such as same-sex marriage and abortion. While right-wings, in defense of social order and traditional (sometimes religious) values, usually demonstrate toughness against criminals, welfare recipients, illegal immigrants, and sexual minorities ((BOBBIO, 1996; MARQUES, 2019; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008).

2.2 Left and Right in Brazil: Idiosyncrasy, Historical Context, and the Right Turn

When applied the left-right concepts to a specific country, particularly one like Brazil characterized by the persistence of clientelism and personalistic politics (LUCAS; SAMUELS, 2010; TELLES; STORNI, 2011), historical contexts of that country should be taken into account (MONTERO, 2014; TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013).

By comparing left-right categories defined by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG)¹ and the policies of different Brazilian parties, Tarouco and Madeira (2013) offer an overview of left-right idiosyncrasies in Brazil: On the left side, due to the history of dictatorship and the recent democratic transition, Brazilian left-wing parties embrace what MRG identifies as right-wing ideas: freedom, human rights, and constitutionalism, while internationalism, categorized as a leftist claim by MRG, has never constituted a flag of the Brazilian left. This conclusion can also be found resonance among other scholars. Schwartzman (2009) finds that Brazil is one of the first countries where nationalism emerges as a left-wing ideology, out of opposition to North American's international strategy. These "anti-America" and "anti-liberal" discourses commonly adopted by Latin American left at the beginning of the century were considered by some researchers a backlash against market reform induced by Washington Consensus

¹ The Manifesto Research Group (MRG), linked to the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), was launched in 1979 with the purpose of studying manifestos of European parties and has provided a vast database currently maintained by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP).

(PECEQUILO, 2010; WIESEHOMMEIER, 2010). On the right side, contrary to the minimal state's principal, import substitution policy was adopted by the Brazilian right-wing government during the military dictatorship, wielding the state's power over national economy (TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013). Additionally, considering Brazil's high social inequality, right-wing parties tended to adopt pragmatic strategies to achieve electoral competitiveness (MONTERO, 2014). Singer (1999), one of the earliest scholars that systematically study left-right ideology in Brazilian electoral politics, contends that what divides left and right in Brazil is not so much the question of equality as the means to achieve it, for the right would guarantee the promotion of equality not harmful to social order by reinforcing state authority. This view resonates with Montero's (2014) finding that distributive policies, even though limited, were embraced by the right in Brazil to guarantee that property rights are not fundamentally challenged.

2018 presidential election witnessed Brazil's historical moment of "right turn" with the victory of Jair Bolsonaro. In Power and Silveira (2019)'s study on Brazilian right-wing parties, however, they argue that the Brazilian right today should not be assumed as monolithic. There are actually, as they propose, four camps of the political right in Brazil of the 21st century: in addition to the first camp which made up of weakly ideological, pragmatic, office-seeking parties inclined to *governismo* (opportunistic support for the government of the day), the three other camps are remarkably programmatic—they are the economic right committed to economic neoliberalism, the religious right with a moral and religious agenda, and the neo-authoritarian right that combines a radical law-and-order discourse combined with occasional nostalgia for the military regime. Therefore, the rise of the right-wing Bolsonaro should not be considered a renaissance of the traditional central-right parties, which belong to the first and had once governed Brazil for a long period, rather, the 2018 election marked their decline (BORGES; ALBALA, 2018). Bolsonaro's far-right agendas are much more programmatic,

usually denoted as *Bancada BBB* (three conservative parliamentary caucuses Bible, Bull, and Bullet): Bible represents the evangelical group which defends the nuclear, heterosexual families and moral traditions, opposed to homosexual rights as well as the legalization of abortion; Bull, also known as the ruralist group, represents agribusiness and defends agricultural interests, identified by its opposition to land reform and environmental agenda; Bullet signifies a political group that focuses on security issues, articulated through its advocacy of the repression of crime, reduction of the age of criminal responsibility and the repeal of Disarmament Statute (MARQUES, 2019; QUADROS; MADEIRA, 2018).

Though previous studies suggest that these right-wing conservative ideas had never ceased to influence the Brazilian political agenda (FAGANELLO, 2015; HUNTER; POWER, 2019; MARIANO; GERARDI, 2019; MARQUES, 2019; QUADROS; MADEIRA, 2018), the rise of the far-right this time was so overwhelming that the ever-persistent *direita envergonhada* (ashamed right)² is largely faded from today's political scenario (QUADROS; MADEIRA, 2018). Bolsonaro labeled himself as an *Anti-Petismo* (PT, Workers' Party) candidate, articulating a moral discourse that combines the condemnation of corruption and the advocacy of conservative agendas to redeem the alleged perversion of Christian values by PT and the left. With the help of media discourse and fake news, he successfully transformed the election into a cultural war by dividing the political space into two poles: those "good Christian citizens" implying the rightists versus the "corrupt, atheistic and perverted" leftists (BORGES; ALBALA, 2018; MARQUES, 2019). Besides the ideological polarization (HUNTER; POWER, 2019; MARQUES, 2019), another underlying impact of the far-right's ascension to Brazilian politics is the threat to democracy. Although theoretically, the cleavage over authoritarianism is orthogonal to the left-right divide (BOBBIO, 1996), the illiberal inclinations

² A phenomenon where right-wing parties tend to shift themselves to the left due to the stigma of the military dictatorship (PIERUCCI, 1987)

expressed by Bolsonaro and his supporters' nostalgia for the 1964–85 military regime refer to public security and combat to corruption as justifications, have shown worrisome implications for Brazilian democracy (HUNTER; POWER, 2019; SOLANO, 2018).

2.3 Ideological Filters on Public Perception of Foreign Affairs

Left-right ideology has been well recognized by scholars as an informational shortcut that serves as an orientation function for individuals and a communication function for the political system (CALIN, 2010; FREIRE; KIVISTIK, 2013; FUCHS; KLINGEMANN, 1990). Some researchers believe that, since information about politics and its implications for personal interests are usually costly to acquire and analyze, as a response, individuals adopt an ideological orientation to establish which issues to prioritize, integrating their attitudes and ideas about politics into coherent patterns (MIRILOVIC; KIM, 2017; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008). Besides, the left-right label is also believed to have provided a means of communication between politicians and the electorate by having its symbol used to differentiate among political parties (AMES; SMITH, 2010; POWER; CESAR, 2009). In this way, ideology is assumed to be able to offer us a clue to understand and predict individual's political attitudes and behaviors, and has thereby gained worldwide importance with the spread of electoral democracy (FUCHS; KLINGEMANN, 1990; GRIES; CROWSON, 2010; MARTINI, 2012; MIRILOVIC; KIM, 2017; NINCIC; RAMOS, 2010; NOEL; THERIEN, 2008; SINGER, 1999).

Taking ideology as a belief system, Nincic and Ramos (2010) argue that foreign policy preferences are in line with domestic political stances and priorities, as those ideas are embedded in a matrix of ideological referents characterizing two different world views and encouraging parallel patterns of reference in both realms. This theory has early been investigated by Holsti and Rosenau (1988), who identified among American elites a strong and consistent relationship between domestic and foreign policy beliefs, which was closely

associated with a conventional conservative-liberal scale, with liberals tending to be accommodationist and conservatives more hardliners or internationalists. A similar conclusion can be found in Calin's (2010) doctoral research: governments of left or right behave distinctly in terms of foreign policy: Hawkish style for the right and Dovish style for the left.

This pattern of beliefs seems to remain unchanged when applied to the mass public. Empirical studies that investigate ideology's impact on foreign policy preference at a mass level have shown that individuals' ideological categories based on domestic politics can be applied to the international realm without significant loss of meaning: the right (also recognized as Republicans or conservatives in the US) always leans toward hardline and belligerent foreign policy while the left (also recognized as Democrats or liberals in the US) tend to embrace accommodationist and internationalist policies (GRIES; CROWSON, 2010; MARTINI, 2012; MIRILOVIC; KIM, 2017; NINCIC; RAMOS, 2010). Cassels (2002) explains this phenomenon by taking account of ideology's communication function: since foreign policy attitudes are divided among political leaders by left-right cleavage, this can be transmitted to and perceived by a mass audience. While Rathbun et al., (2016) believe that individuals take foreign-policy personally as it reflects a universal value scheme that groups their beliefs on both domestic and international realms into similar categories.

Nonetheless, as previous research mostly focuses on consolidated democracies, a more careful analysis is needed when applied the theory to the Brazilian context, where party fragmentation, electoral pragmatism, and leader clientelism persist (CARREIRÃO, 2002; HOLZHACKER; BALBACHEVSKY, 2007; MACIEL; ALARCON; GIMENES, 2018). Apart from the lack of research on the relation between left-right ideology and the perception of foreign affairs, whether the Brazilian electorate possesses a clear and coherent understanding of the left-right meanings still remains an unsolved question for some researchers. Some studies have revealed that, despite the moderately high levels of left-right self-identification, a large

portion of the Brazilian electorate displayed ideological inconsistency over time, failed to attach their partisan identification correctly to the left-right labels, and voted based on affection for the candidate rather than ideology identification (AMES; SMITH, 2010; HOLZHACKER; BALBACHEVSKY, 2007; MACIEL; ALARCON; GIMENES, 2018; OLIVEIRA; TURGEON, 2015). Whereas the role played by left-right ideology in Brazilian politics is strongly recognized by other researchers. For example, Singer (1999) has early recognized ideology as an important voting predictor. He argues that Brazilian individuals possess an abstract knowledge of the meaning of left and right that allows them to position themselves on the ideological scale, which, even if unstructured, reflects their belief system. His idea is in line with the argument that individuals have some abstract view of how the world works and how individuals and governments should act within the frame (MARTINI, 2012), and this value scheme is universal and can work across cultures and contexts (RATHBUN et al., 2016). Another thing to notice is that previous studies that cast doubt on ideological identifications of the Brazilian public have made conclusions based on the data before the recent “right turn”. The increasing political polarization surges together with the rise of Bolsonaro may trigger a higher level of ideological identification among the mass, since a greater distance between political candidates makes the difference between poles starker, facilitating the identification of left-right categories (AMES; SMITH, 2010; IZUMI, 2019).

3. CHINA'S RISE TO BRAZIL: INFLUENCE AND NEW CHANGES UNDER THE FAR-RIGHT GOVERNMENT

3.1 China's Influence on Brazil in Different Aspects

The rise of China has gained worldwide attention since its economic reform in the 1980s. Although China has committed itself to the 'peaceful rise' principle, by which it plays as a responsible global leader in search of win-win cooperation rather than a hegemonic status, such commitment is not free from suspicion among media, policymakers, and academia over the world (BRADY, 2015; OSPINA ESTUPINAN; GERAGHTY, 2017).

Under Lula's administration, China's rise to Brazil was more positively viewed given Lula's adherence to the diplomatic principles of autonomy, pragmatism, assertiveness, and South-South cooperation (PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011). Since China's interest in Brazil and Latin American is mainly driven by its demand for natural resources to feed the world's largest domestic population (PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011; WISE; CHONN CHING, 2018), the literature on China's impacts on Brazil mostly focuses on the economic dimension.

Trade between the two countries is considered the most important part of their relations, since in 2009 China surpassed the US to become Brazil's largest trading partner. Many scholars note that under Lula's pragmatic foreign policy guideline, Brazil was able to seize the opportunities offered by the bilateral trade relation, given that China's huge demand for primary commodities such as iron ore, oil, soybeans, and meat had pushed the prices up to a record-high level, which largely contributed to Brazil's economic boom in the first decade of the century (BLANCHARD, 2016; BULL; KASAHARA, 2011; VIEIRA; BUAINAIN; FIGUEIREDO, 2016). Some scholars, however, question the seemingly win-win partnership, with a belief that the bilateral trade flows are beset by growing asymmetries between the two sides: While Brazil's exports are predominantly composed of primary commodities usually

plagued by cyclical price variations, its imports from China concentrate on manufactured goods that are more competitively priced and may eventually outcompete Brazilian manufacturing sectors in the domestic market (BLANCHARD, 2016; HIRATUKA; SARTI, 2016; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011; WISE; CHONN CHING, 2018). Besides, some studies also show the concern that Brazilian exports from both traditional industries and more advanced sectors are bearing a blow from the powerful “Made in China” exports in third markets, given the fact that Brazil has lost market share to China in the US, European Union and Latin America (CARDOSO, 2013; JENKINS, 2010; JENKINS; BARBOSA, 2012; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011). Moreover, tensions are increased by China’s perceived undervaluation of its currency, which has kept the over appreciation of the Brazilian currency (BLANCHARD, 2016; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011). Under these circumstances, quite a few Brazilian scholars worry that the rise of China may lead Brazil to the way of “deindustrialization” (BULL; KASAHARA, 2011; JENKINS, 2010; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011).

In parallel with the discussion of trade flows, much research also casts light on the investment side. There was a steep rise in Chinese FDI to Brazil since 2009, after the two countries signed a Joint Action Plan aimed to deepen their bilateral relationships (CARDOSO, 2013). Chinese investors in Brazil are largely state-owned enterprises linked to natural resource areas, particularly in energy, mining, agriculture, and steel (BLANCHARD, 2016). According to Cardoso (2013)’s analysis, the motivation of Chinese investment in Brazil is to guarantee primary goods supply, since most of its projects aim at supporting the production, extraction, and transportation of natural resources and commodities. On the one hand, Brazil’s infrastructure has benefited from Chinese investments in various industrial sectors such as steel (*Companhia Siderurgica do Atlantico*), gas pipeline (*Gasoduto Gasene*), and thermoelectric power plant (*Candiota*) (PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011). On the other hand, some domestic actors

are concerned with the underlying threat of such investments to Brazil's sustainable growth and to its sovereignty over national natural resources (BULL; KASAHARA, 2011).

Nevertheless, Oliveira (2018) finds that though the size and amount of China's agribusiness investments in Brazil are relatively small in comparison to the Global North, Chinese companies are singled out among major investors when it comes to local blames. According to Oliveira (2018), the discourse of "China as land grabber" was disseminated by biased domestic media (*O Estado de S. Paulo, Época, Valor*) backed by Brazilian large-scale landowners, industrialists, free-market economists and lawyers to generate fear of Chinese investors in Brazil, and thereby position themselves as necessary partners for Chinese investors seeking Brazilian farmland.. This phenomenon is also the result of a political compromise between the leading Workers' Party and the agribusiness elite under the context of social resistance to foreign land grabs, whereby government officials make it seem that they are undertaking measures to protect unspecified domestic interests from foreign land grabs. Thus, Oliveira (2018) claims that China, as a new foreign investor in Brazil, plays a role of scapegoat, which allows both domestic and established foreign agribusinesses to get away with the blame while continue expanding control over farmland and agroindustry.

Albeit not mainstream research, the political implications of China's rise to Brazil are studied by some scholars. Under the Lula administration, Brazil took advantage of the economic partnership with China and endeavored to promote a comprehensive bilateral relationship. The gain was that Brazil could acquire more autonomy from the US (BULL; KASAHARA, 2011; JENKINS, 2010) and have an increased degree of leverage in international institutions and negotiations to construct a multipolar world where developing countries have a bigger role in global governance (CARDOSO, 2013). With the South-South diplomacy guideline, Brazil's aspiration as one of the emerging powers was seen by its active participation in global issues such as IMF reforms and trade negotiations (e.g. Doha Round and

WTO), where the support of China was significant (BLANCHARD, 2016; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011; STRÜVER, 2014).

However, as some scholars argue, emerging countries' pursuit of a new world order doesn't mean they share common views in all aspects. By analyzing the structure of BRICS, Öniş (2017) points out that five countries' different stands on democratic norms blocked their path of evolution from a strategic community based on economic interests to a genuine political community based on common norms. In this respect, China and Russia consist of the authoritarian axis, while Brazil, India, and South Africa compose the democratic one. Several researchers believe that the fundamental difference in the political regime between Brazil and China is doomed to cause frictions when it comes to issues such as human rights, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and G4's permanent seats on the Security Council (BLANCHARD, 2016; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011). Although there are not a few worries from the Global North about Beijing Consensus threat to the liberal-democratic order, due to China's non-interference principle in terms of diplomacy and its pragmatic strategy in Latin America (JENKINS, 2010), there is rarely a similar concern in Brazil.

Despite the rapidly growing flow of trade and investment, there is insufficient mutual knowledge due to geographic and cultural distance between the two countries, making it difficult to develop comprehensive connections. Aware of the problem, Brazil and China have been promoting mutual exchange and cooperation in other areas like science and technology, nuclear energy, and culture and education (BECARD, 2011). The creation of the Confucius Institutes across 10 states in Brazil, which aimed at training a new generation of researchers, scientists, government officials, businessmen, university students, and technicians with knowledge of the Chinese culture and language, particularly meets the need for better communication among the two countries. According to MARTINELLI (2020), unlike the US and Europe where Confucius institutes have provoked skepticism, Brazil welcomes the

establishment of the Chinese language and culture institute. The author proposes that one factor that contributes to such a different attitude may be Brazil's attempt to escape from Ocidentocentrismo³, a certain resistance to the American world order, which had been made possible through South-South cooperation like BRICS.

3.2 Foreign Policy Changes under the Far-Right Government

Most literature discussed above studies the Brazil-China relations during the administration of the left-wing Workers' Party. As is pointed out by Hermann (1990) that foreign policy changes always follow domestic restructuring such as the shift of individual leader and bureaucratic entities, albeit not fully discussed, it is worth looking at some existing research on how foreign policy will change and how it will affect Brazil-China relations under the new far-right government.

If the critique of Lula's "left-lean" diplomatic policy is still disputable, then the far-right Bolsonaro administration's ideological bias on foreign issues is widely recognized. The most significant change of Brazilian foreign policy under Bolsonaro's team is displayed in their staunch alliance with the United States under Trump's administration in all aspects while alienating China (AZEVEDO, 2019; FUSER, 2019; SARAIVA; SILVA, 2019; SCHUTTE; FONSECA; CARNEIRO, 2019). Guided by the ideological line stems from the philosophy of Olavo de Carvalho, the controversial "guru" for most of the Brazilian extreme right, Bolsonaro and his team regard globalism as 'cultural Marxism' that will eventually lead to a decay of the Western identity rooted in Christian values. Amid this cultural war, Trump is viewed as a hero who defends the pure western culture in face of the threat of multiculturalism (AZEVEDO, 2019; FUSER, 2019). Under this view, China is not a trustworthy partner due to its ideology of socialism, and Bolsonaro had made it clear his position over his visit to Taiwan during the

³ See Europe and North America as center

election campaign (SARAIVA; SILVA, 2019), and his several aggressive discourses about China. During the pandemic of Covid-19, diplomatic tension had been further triggered by Bolsonaro's son calling coronavirus of "Chinese virus" and the education minister's implication of the pandemic as Beijing's "plan for world domination".

Nevertheless, despite the shift of ideological orientation, the fact that China is Brazil's biggest trade partner is undeniable (SARAIVA; SILVA, 2019). By applying the two-level game theory to Brazilian foreign policy, Schutte and his colleagues (2019) point out in their study that Bolsonaro has to keep the balance between two domestic lines: the Olavist line that aspires to subordinate the economic concern to the ideological one, and the pragmatic line which appeals to adopt pragmatic diplomacy that favors the domestic interest. While the economic ties may serve as a buffer from the ideological tension between the two countries, it is too optimistic to think that the image of China in Brazil will not deteriorate under the far-right government in the future.

4. METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY

4.1 Data Collection

To investigate Brazilian university students' ideology concerning left-right values as well as their opinions about the rise of China, an online survey targeted to students currently enrolled in the University of São Paulo (USP) was conducted. This research focuses on university students for the following reasons: first, university students are an important group in society as they may be the future elites who have a significant role in shaping public opinions of the country. Second, according to some studies (CARREIRÃO, 2002; FREIRE; KIVISTIK, 2013; FUCHS; KLINGEMANN, 1990; MOREIRA, 2017; OLIVEIRA; TURGEON, 2015), people with higher levels of education are expected to better understand sophisticated questions such as ideological labels and foreign affairs in a coherent way. The sample of USP students thus can serve as a test—if, a group most supposed to know the left-right meanings fails to provide satisfying results, let alone the general public.

It is also worth noting that the University of São Paulo is the largest Brazilian public university and the country's most prestigious educational institution. It is well recognized as a cradle of Brazilian elites who make great contributions to the country in diverse areas: the university represents more than 20% of national research⁴, has made 13 out of 45 Brazilian Presidents⁵, and is in the Top 100 of Global University Employability Ranking⁶. Public universities in Brazil have been questioned by some people as “a shelter of the leftist”, while during the 2018 election, ideological conflict was generated in the campus of USP between a

⁴ See <https://jornal.usp.br/universidade/relatorio-confirma-lideranca-da-usp-na-ciencia-brasileira/>

⁵ See <https://www5.usp.br/1704/conheca-os-presidentes-do-brasil-que-estudaram-na-usp/> and https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Temer

⁶ See <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/cn/student/best-universities/best-universities-graduate-jobs-global-university-employability-ranking>

right-wing group that supported the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro and an antifascist group organized by students of School of Philosophy, Languages and Human Sciences (FFLCH)⁷. The significant role USP plays in Brazilian society, the controversial role it assumes as a public university that embraces students from all social classes, as well as the ideological divergence among different study areas, make it an ideal place to conduct this research.

The first wave of the survey was conducted at the early phase of the Covid-19 pandemic during March 29th and April 19th (three weeks) in 2020, targeted to all the USP students. After taking account of the suggestions from the Qualification exam, I carried out the second wave of the survey between August 24th and September 7th (two weeks), this time targeted at students from the area of Health Science to increase the representativeness of this important area, especially during the period of a pandemic. I sent online questionnaires via two channels: student groups of social media (Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.) and student's emails sent by school offices and professors. A great advantage of offering a web-based survey is that the self-administered form of anonymous questionnaires should provide respondents with more comfort in responding to sensitive questions (considering the "ashamed right" phenomenon in Brazil which may make people unwilling to admit they are rightist), and thus may likewise reduce social desirability bias⁸ (PAULHUS, 1991). Since participation was voluntary, I offered a chance for respondents to leave their emails in order to receive the research results as a way to encourage responses.

After two waves of the survey, with a total duration of five weeks, I received 922 responses. Considering that this research will only focus on Brazilian students, responses from foreign students were declared invalid. As shown in the [Table 1](#), the final sample consists of

⁷ See <https://exame.com/brasil/usp-vive-temor-de-embates-entre-a-esquerda-e-os-bolsonaristas/> and <https://www.adusp.org.br/index.php/conj-pol/3152-ato-pro-bolsonaro-na-usp-junta-vinte-pessoas-enquanto-manifestacao-antifascista-reune-mil-estudantes>

⁸ A common response bias in survey research when people are not only motivated to convey more favorable images of themselves than is warranted, but possibly even to deceive themselves as well (see KROSNICK; PRESSER, 2010).

908 students (N=908) from 27 unities, where there are more males than females (N=492 & N=416), more undergraduate (N=702) than graduate (N=206), with age ranging from 17 to 62 years (M= 24.6, SD=7.4) and most of them came from São Paulo (N= 785). One may notice that students from Humanities and Social Sciences represent the largest proportion of the sample (see [Appendix D](#) for the full name of each school unity). This is because, since I use snowball sampling, which is sending questionnaires via my personal connection, those who I can reach out to are mostly students and professors from this academic area.

It is worth clarifying that random sampling techniques are not applied in the data collecting process due to the following considerations: first, the outbreak of Covid-19 made random sampling difficult, since classes had been suspended to obey social distancing policy; second, the internal validity of data comes was taken as a priority when it comes to data collection, as the primary interest of this research is not in the absolute numbers of those surveyed (the general situation of USP students' ideology and their perception of China's rise), but in the internal relationships among the variables of interest (whether and how ideologies are related to students' perception of China). Though I cannot claim the representativeness of the sample of the entire population of USP students, I did try to diversify the areas of academic studies as well as educational level during the data collection process.

Table 1. Relative Frequency of Sample Profile

Gender		Institutions		Educational level		Age	
Male	54.2%	FFLCH	33.9%	Undergraduate	77.3%	< 20	34.9%
		EACH	15.2%			20 - 30	48.0%
		IRI	13.2%			30 - 40	12.6%
		FD	8.3%				
Female	45.8%	Poli	6.1%	Graduate	22.7%	40 - 50	3.0%
		FEA	5.8%			50-60	1.4%
		FM	5.7%			>=60	0.1%
		Other	6.27%				

Source: Elaborated by the author

4.2 Measures

Ideology Measures

Although frequently used in public opinion research, the validity of the self-identification scale of left-right ideology is contestable (BAUER et al., 2017). In the context of Brazil, some researchers doubt that whether individuals who reported their left-right ideology possess a coherent understanding of the concepts, and this problem may subject research to the risk of response bias (AMES; SMITH, 2010; MOREIRA, 2017; TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013).

Following the suggestion from some researchers (BAUER et al., 2017; TAROUCO; MADEIRA, 2013; TELLES; STORNI, 2011), multiple questions rather than the single self-identified left-right scale are applied in this research.

Respondents' ideology is firstly measured by ideological values, which incorporate multiple questions concerning the government's role in the economy, social equality, social order, social inclusion of immigrants, support for democracy, and freedom of choice. With a scale adapted from Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB), all the items have two competing points of view with clear left/right valence, and respondents are asked to choose from a 0-10 scale according to the degree they agree on either side of the statement (see [Appendix B](#)). According to Krosnick and Presser (2010), this format can significantly reduce the acquiescence bias, where respondents incline to endorse an assertion made in a question, regardless of its content.

Then, an 11-point self-identified scale ranging from 0 (very left) to 10 (very right) is also applied, displayed only at the end of the questionnaire to avoid the confirmation bias that once respondents had reported their ideological identification, their following responses would probably be guided by it. The self-identified ideological scale is operationalized differently among public opinion research institutes: LAPOP employs a 10-point scale, Pew Research Center usually adopts a 5 or 7-point scale, and ESEB uses an 11-point scale. I finally chose to follow the ESEB standard, considering that it is one of the biggest post-electoral national

surveys aimed at academic research, which may better accommodate the Brazilian context. Also, according to Givon and Shapira (1984), response reliability increases with the length scale up to 11 points, as more potential information can be gained when respondents are allowed to make greater differentiation in the judgments. The offer of a midpoint permits an accurate mapping for those who have a neutral point of view (KROSNICK; PRESSER, 2010).

China's Rise Perception Measures

Perceptions of China's rise are measured by respondents' attitudes towards certain statements with a response format of a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7 ("strongly agree"). Different from the measure of the ideological values, the scale in China perception items are reduced from 11 to 7 points to keep the validity of response (GIVON; SHAPIRA, 1984) as well as to prevent point meanings from losing clarity (KROSNICK; PRESSER, 2010). All the questions are balanced in terms of positively and negatively worded items to reduce acquiescence bias (PAULHUS, 1991). Attitudes are measured in form of a trust degree in four aspects of China's rise: political, economic, military, and cultural. Given the context of the global pandemic when the survey research was conducted, the trust of China in relation to the outbreak of Covid-19 is also measured.

Additionally, questions about perceptions of the United States in each corresponding aspect are also included as controls (see [Appendix B](#) for specific survey questions). This is because only with questions about China, we cannot claim that students' positive/ negative attitudes are specifically linked to this country, or foreign countries in general—for example, there might be students who don't trust either China or any other countries in the world. Therefore, including questions about the US will help us solve this problem. The US is an ideal contrast since its influence over Brazil is equivalent to China. Economically speaking, the two countries are the largest commercial trade partners of Brazil, where China is in the first position. Politically speaking, the two countries are very different regarding their ideological positions,

since the US has been long leading liberal values in the democratic world, while China, risen with its socialist regime, has been trying to provide an alternative way of development and shaping the future international normative order (YAN, 2018). This ideological disparity between the two countries has been objected to an ideological dispute in recent years in Brazil with the rise of the far-right president Jair Bolsonaro (FUSER, 2019).

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the questionnaire is applied with a forced-choice form—no “Don’t Know” (DK) option is provided. DK option is supposed to be used by respondents who have no information on the related question. Nonetheless, many shreds of evidence indicate that a large proportion of DK responses are not out of lack of information and that DK filters may not only fail to improve measurement but also discourage people who do have information with which to generate a meaningful answer from expressing it (see the review of Krosnick & Presser, 2010). Under this trade-off, I believe that not offering DK choice will improve response efficiency.

4.3 Ordered logit model

In this research, survey data is analyzed using ordered logit model (OLM). This choice is based on the consideration that, when dealing with ordinal survey data, distances between respondent categories cannot be assumed equal, and thus traditional regression models are not applicable. As an alternative, OLM is widely accepted as a better option in analyzing ordinal response data, as it takes the ceiling and floor effects into account, avoiding the bias generated from subjectively chosen scores assigned to categories (GRILLI; RAMPICHINI, 2014; WILLIAMS, 2016).

In OLM, the ordinal dependent variable, denoted by y , is viewed as the discrete realizations of an underlying, unobservable (latent) continuous random variable, y^* . In this research, latent variables are our dependent variables that denote students’ opinions concerning

ideology, and their views towards China and the US. The categories are envisaged as contiguous intervals on a continuous scale. The unobservable y^* would satisfy a linear regression model: $y^* = \beta x + \varepsilon$, where x is a covariate vector (independent variables), β a vector of regression coefficients, and ε the error term. The observable categorical variable, y , is assumed to arise from y^* as follows: $y_i = j$ if $\alpha_{j-1} \leq y_i^* \leq \alpha_j$, $j=1,2,\dots,J$, where the α 's are unknown as thresholds in the distribution of y^* . [Appendix C](#) discloses the dependent variables (y), the variables of interest (a specific x_i or a subset of x), and the control variables (remaining x). OLM is based on the cumulative probabilities of the ordinal response variable: in particular, the logit of each cumulative probability is assumed to be a linear function of the covariates with regression coefficients constant across response categories.

5. PRELIMINARY DATA EXPLORATION

5.1 Ideological Self-Identification


On the ideological self-identification scale where 0 represents “very left” and 10 represents “very right”, it is shown in the figure that most of the respondents have their political orientation leaning to the left, which corresponds to the conventional wisdom that public university students in Brazil have more propensity to be leftist (See [Figure 1](#)). While since my sample is overrepresented by students from Humanities and Social Sciences, where students and faculties embrace more leftist ideas (KLEIN; STERN; WESTERN, 2005; WERFHORST, 2020), it is expected that the result shown here is more left-leaned than the general USP population.

To compare ideology among different schools, I firstly categorize them into five main study areas based on the criteria of CNPq (adjusted by the number of respondents, see [Appendix D](#)), and then divide ideological self-identification scale (0-10) into five categories: far left (0-1); left (2-4); center (5); right (6-8); far right (9-10). The table below shows the distribution of each ideological category in different study areas (see [Table 2](#)). Besides, I also create a diverging stacked bar chart to better visualize the result (see [Figure 2](#)). It is shown both in the table and the figure that, in most of the study areas there are more leftist than rightist⁹, except for the area of Engineering where the proportions of left and right are more balanced and there is even slightly more right than left. Another attention-getting result comes from the area of Humanities and Arts, where students are largely clustered at the low end of the scale (extreme left) compared to students from other areas, and it is also the only area with zero percentage of students who classify themselves as far right. Considering that this area has the

⁹ We should be cautious when dealing with the result of Biological and Agricultural Sciences, since the sample number is too small (N=7) to draw a meaningful conclusion.

largest sample size (N=441), such a result is quite meaningful. Also, it is worth noting that students from Humanities and Arts are less likely to display themselves as centrist than students from other areas. These results resonate with research conducted in developing countries, which show that in all academic fields, Humanities and Social Sciences are predominately leftist, while areas with more practical knowledge, like Engineering, have a more balanced in terms of the left-right proportion (CARDIFF; KLEIN, 2005; MARIANI; HEWITT, 2008; WERFHORST, 2020).

Figure 1. Distribution of Ideological Self-identification



Note: number=the number of respondents


Source: Elaborated by the author

Table 2. Self-Identified Ideology Proportion (%) by Study Area

Area	N	far left	left	center	right	far right
Humanities and Arts	441	39.9	46.7	5.4	7.9	0.0
Applied Social Sciences	273	17.9	50.5	10.6	17.6	3.3
Health Sciences	80	11.2	57.5	7.5	20.0	3.8
Engineering	62	8.1	33.9	12.9	33.9	11.3
Biology & Agricultural & Exact and Earth Sciences	52	19.2	51.9	9.6	15.4	3.8

Source: Elaborated by the author

Figure 2. Self-Identified Ideology Proportion by Study Area



Source: Elaborated by the author


5.2 Trust in China’s Rise and Covid-19

As shown in [Figure 3](#), on a scale where 1 represents “totally distrust” and 7 represents “totally trust”, most of the respondents’ attitudes toward China’s rise in economic, military, and cultural aspects are concentrated on the level of 4-5, which means that they believe China is moderately trustworthy. Surprisingly, on the political aspect, responses are mostly concentrated on the highest level of 7, which means students believe China’s political rise is very trustworthy.

Then I also categorize the ideological self-identification scale (0-10) into two categories: left (0-4) and right (6-10). Removing respondents who self-identified as the center (5), there are 836 observations (N=836), with 687 observations in the leftist group (N=687) and 149 in the rightist group (N=149). As shown in Table 3, by observing the mean of the trust score (1-7), we can find that left and right are divided by trust in different aspects of China. The most distinct divergence between the two groups is attitudes towards China’s political rise, where the leftist group demonstrates more trust than the rightist one, while when it comes to economic rise and military rise, China seems to gain more trust from the rightist group than the leftist one. However, given that we are dealing with the ordinal 7-point Likert data, results shown by mean should be interpreted with caution.

To visualize whether leftists have different levels of trust in China compared to the rightists, I also create an interaction plot based on medians and quartiles (see [Figure 4](#)). From the figure, we can see that the medians of political, economic, and cultural trust in China from both groups are the same (respectively 4, 5, and 5). However, within the rightist group, trust in the cultural aspect is more disperse than the leftist group, since they have more respondents who have a lower degree of trust, and the same pattern is shown in the trust in military rise from the leftist group. The most apparent difference shown in the graph is political trust—besides the rightist group’s remarkably lower trust than the leftist, there is a large dispersion within the group.

Figure 3. Trust in China’s Rise of Different Aspects




Source: Elaborated by the author

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Trust in China Divided by Ideology

Ideology	Trust	N	Mean	SD	Min	Q1	Median	Q3	Max
left	cultural	687	3.943	1.415	1	3	4	5	7
right		149	3.631	1.629	1	2	4	5	7
left	economic	687	4.453	1.505	1	4	5	6	7
right		149	5.161	1.529	1	4	5	6	7
left	military	687	4.408	1.702	1	3	5	6	7
right		149	4.564	1.698	1	4	5	6	7
left	political	687	4.997	1.699	1	4	5	6	7
right		149	3.262	2.028	1	1	3	5	7

Source: Elaborated by the author


Figure 4. Trust in China's Rise Divided by Ideology



Source: Elaborated by the author

Students' opinion about China in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic was also investigated. As shown in the graph, most respondents agree with the statement that China has acted efficiently in combating Covid-19. Different from some hate speeches that surged in Brazilian social media since the outbreak of the pandemic, a majority of respondents strongly disagree with the statement that the Chinese government should take responsibility for the outbreak of Covid-19 (see [Figure 5](#)).

Figure 5. Respondents' Attitudes towards China in Relation to Covid-19



Source: Elaborated by the author

5.3 Conclusion of Preliminary Data Exploration

The results of preliminary data exploration show that a majority of surveyed USP students define themselves as left-wing. Nevertheless, the variation among different schools and study areas is noticeable. This is prominently reflected in the comparison of students from Humanities and Arts and those who study Engineering: the previous group is predominately far-left leaning, while the latter has a more balanced proportion in regard to left and right. Data on students' opinions about China's rise preliminarily indicates that USP students in the research have a moderately positive opinion concerning China's influence in Brazil and in the world, whereas the left and the right are divided in their trust of China in different aspects: for example, China's political rise is viewed as less trustworthy by the rightists, while they have a favorable attitude towards China's economic rise. This also indicates the importance to divide the analyses of the perception of China into different aspects.

6. DATA ANALYSIS

6.1 Models and Variables

The subject of this research is to study whether Brazilian university students' trust in the rise of China is associated with their left-right ideology. To address this end, two questions were investigated using data analysis: first, what does the left-right ideology mean to Brazilian university students? And second, do different degrees of trust in China' regarding different aspects of China's rise vary with left-right ideology?

The first question involved the construction of an ideology model that helps us map out the specific values that denote left-right ideology for Brazilian university students ([Table 4](#)). In this model, the dependent variable is ideological self-identification ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right), and the independent variables of interest are a set of ideological values, also operationalized with a 0-10 scale.

To answer the second question, four China trust models were built to examine students' trust in China's rise in different aspects: politics ([Table 5](#)), economics ([Table 6](#)), military ([Table 7](#)), and culture ([Table 8](#)). Dependent variables are students' trust in China regarding the four aspects, operated by 7-point ordinal data ranging from 1 to 7, with a degree of trust increases with the number. In the analysis of each aspect's influence, equivalent models of the US were included as comparisons due to the reason mentioned previously. Here, the independent variable of interest is the self-identified ideology operationalized as right-wing (the dependent variable of the ideology model).

In all these models, several control variables are included (see [Appendix C](#)). First is the basic demographic information including age, gender (dummy of male), level of education (dummy of undergraduate), and the state where students come from (dummy of São Paulo). Second is the social status of students' families, which includes household income (dummies

of different social classes based on the comparison with class A), frequency of going to the cinema, and bathroom per person in one's house. Third is the religion variable operationalized by dummies of catholic, evangelical, and other religions, based on the comparison with atheists. Lastly, dummies of study areas are also added to the models in reference to the area of applied social sciences. All the variables used in the models can be consulted in [Appendix C](#).

6.2 Results and Discussion

Ideology Model

The model of ideology (see [Table 4](#)) unveils the corresponding ideological values university students possess as they place themselves in the left-right spectrum.

The results show that, in general, university students have a sound and coherent understanding of the left-right political system, especially when it comes to the socio-economic issues: a right-wing student tends to be less favorable to the government's role in national economy, protectionism under economic globalization, redistributive policies, and university quota system. These variables are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level and conform to the general definitions of the left-right position (see [chapter 2.1](#)). This finding is contradictory to Oliveira and Turgeon (2015)'s research using a national survey sample, whose results show that the more rightist a person is, the less probability he/she will favor private companies' role in the national economy. It indicates that university students do have a better understanding of left-right ideology in economic terms, implying the role of education in people's cognitive ability of ideology identification. Support for democracy is also significantly associated with a student being more rightist, which contradicts the discourse of Bolsonaro and his supporters about their nostalgia for the military dictatorship era (HUNTER; POWER, 2019; SOLANO, 2018). The right-wing ideology of students may thus be better interpreted as the liberal right—that is, liberal in two complementary senses: political in terms of loyalty to the democratic

regime, and economic demonstrated by support for individualism, free markets, and a smaller Brazilian state (POWER; SILVEIRA, 2019).

Table 4. Self-identified Ideology Model

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable	
	Right-wing	
Values		
Role of government	-0.344***	(0.035)
Protectionism	-0.109***	(0.033)
Redistribution	-0.230***	(0.046)
Quotation	-0.205***	(0.043)
Democracy	0.132***	(0.047)
Juvenile crime punishment	0.183***	(0.035)
Access to gun	0.029	(0.035)
LGBT Tolerance	-0.025	(0.051)
Abortion	-0.034	(0.042)
Migrant inclusion	-0.027	(0.019)
Demography		
Age	-0.024**	(0.012)
Male	-0.035	(0.133)
Undergraduate	0.141	(0.197)
SP	0.303	(0.194)
Social Status		
ClassE	-0.246	(0.275)
ClassD	0.050	(0.222)
ClassC	0.199	(0.218)
ClassB	0.299	(0.211)
Cinema	0.014	(0.073)
Bathroom	-0.162	(0.185)
Religion		
Catholic	0.611***	(0.174)
Evangelical	0.394	(0.252)
Other religion	0.309	(0.189)
Study Area		
Humanities & Arts	-0.064	(0.155)
Health Science	0.643**	(0.256)
Engineering	-0.171	(0.304)
Bio, Arig, Exact & Earth	0.463*	(0.255)
Observations	882	
Pseudo R-squared	0.267	
Wald Chi2	670.2	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Favoring punishment of juvenile delinquency significantly is a further characteristic of those who are right-wing. However, another issue that also belongs to the public security

agenda—the access to guns, is not statistically significant. According to previous studies, the possession of guns constitutes an important issue for political conservatism in the United States (JOST et al., 2003). In Brazil, gun liberalization is espoused by an interest group that made up Bolsonaro’s electorate (CIOCCARI; PERSICHETTI, 2018; QUADROS; MADEIRA, 2018), while interestingly, the issue not significantly associated with students’ right-wing stand. Similarly, LGBT tolerance, support for abortion legalization, and migrant inclusion policies are not statistically significant in the left-right divide. Based on conventional wisdom, this probably indicates that university students, regardless of being left or right, embrace liberal values in the socio-cultural aspect. Besides, the immigration issue not constituting the cleavage between left and right may be understood as an idiosyncrasy of Brazil: even though the current right-wing government’s attitude towards immigration has been directly influenced by anti-immigrant politics of the Global North (FILOMENO; VICINO, 2020; SAFARIK, 2020), the political and social conditions in Latin America do not allow Bolsonaro to focus on the rejection of immigration as a central issue of his agenda the same way as other right-wing populist leaders in Europe and the United States do (GOLDSTEIN, 2019).

Moreover, a few sociodemographic variables also show statistical significance in the right-wing model: those that are younger and are catholic or have other religions are more likely than atheists to be rightist. These findings contradict previous findings that the older generation tends to be more rightist (MOREIRA, 2017), and are not in line with the fact that evangelic group composed an important slice of far-right candidate’s constituency (MARIANO; GERARDI, 2019). The most probable cause of these discrepancies may again be attributed to the sample: there are too few respondents who are evangelic compared with catholic, and too few of them with age above 30. Besides, gender, state, educational level, and social status are not statistically significant in the association with self-identified ideology. Certain study areas also have a significant impact on students’ ideology: based on the

comparison with students from Applied Social Science, those from Health Science, Biology, Agricultural Science, Exact and Earth Science are associated with a higher likelihood of being rightist.

In sum, university students have a coherent understanding of the left-right system, which is shown in their consistency between ideological values and self-identification on a left-right scale. Idiosyncrasies of this group are demonstrated by their liberal views towards certain socio-cultural issues. These results diverge from the research conducted using the nationally representative sample, whose results always reveal that the Brazilian population possesses only at best a weak and incomplete comprehension of the left-right scale (OLIVEIRA; TURGEON, 2015). While they substantiate Carreirão's (2002) findings that Brazilians with higher levels of education are more likely to better elaborate political opinions as well as to correctly identify themselves on the left-right spectrum.

China Perceptions Models

The China perceptions analyses consist of four models based on students' trust in different aspects of China's rise, in comparison to the United States. All the China perceptions results are weighted by respondents' knowledge about China to check for the robustness of the estimates. Nevertheless, correlations of ideology and China perceptions are found to be almost the same with or without weights, despite slight differences among few control variables (see [Appendix E](#)).

From [Table 5](#), we can see that left-right ideology, with statistical significance, is oppositely correlated with students' political trust in China and the US: the more rightist a student is, the more possibility he/she will trust less in China's political rise while trust more in the political influence of the US. These results are consistent with the attitudes of different Brazilian government towards China: historically, left-wing governments tended to cultivate a

Table 5. Political Trust Models

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Political Trust			
	China		United States	
Ideology				
Right-wing	-0.380***	(0.038)	0.340***	(0.032)
Demography				
Age	-0.007	(0.011)	-0.000	(0.011)
Male	-0.083	(0.143)	-0.112	(0.127)
Undergraduate	-0.320	(0.211)	-0.244	(0.187)
SP	0.060	(0.215)	-0.076	(0.181)
Social Status				
ClassE	0.023	(0.294)	0.581**	(0.270)
ClassD	-0.045	(0.225)	0.148	(0.212)
ClassC	-0.292	(0.222)	0.040	(0.218)
ClassB	-0.069	(0.235)	0.192	(0.225)
Cinema	-0.151*	(0.084)	0.161**	(0.073)
Bathroom	0.259	(0.176)	-0.153	(0.155)
Religion				
Catholic	-0.117	(0.199)	0.430***	(0.165)
Evangelic	0.619**	(0.266)	-0.019	(0.260)
Other religion	0.467***	(0.169)	0.139	(0.178)
Study Area				
Humanities & Arts	-0.019	(0.180)	-0.462***	(0.153)
Health Science	-0.017	(0.265)	-0.367*	(0.215)
Engineering	0.491	(0.302)	-0.368	(0.259)
Bio, Agri, Exact & Earth	0.416	(0.279)	-0.829***	(0.273)
Observations	803		882	
Pseudo R-squared	0.0683		0.0603	
Wald Chi2	161.3		186.2	

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

better relationship with China, especially in the Lula era where the Brazil-China partnership was raised to a new level (PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011); while the current right-wing president Jair Bolsonaro had declared his political position of alliance with the US while alienating China (AZEVEDO, 2019; FUSER, 2019; SARAIVA; SILVA, 2019; SCHUTTE; FONSECA; CARNEIRO, 2019). Ideas from the political leaders are considered a crucial source of public opinion formation, as they can trickle down from the top to the mass public. Also, considering the ideology model where support for democracy is identified as a right-wing value, China's

lack of democracy and political openness may lead to rightist students' distrust in its political rise (ÖNIŞ, 2017; WU, 2018).

Among control variables, it is interesting to note that the frequency of visits to the cinema is significantly associated with political trust in both countries: a cinema fan is more likely to trust China less while trusting the US more. Considering the fact that American films make up a large proportion of Brazilian cinemas (ÁVILA, 2018), such a finding provides additional support for Nye's (2008) theory of soft power that a state can produce outcomes through persuasion and attraction rather than coercion or payment, and it is reasonable to suppose that Brazilian right-wing's political opinions are subtly shaped by American cultural industries. The model also demonstrates that being evangelicals and those that practice other religions are significantly associated with more trust in China's political rise, which is less expected since China is one of the largest irreligious countries in the world and the Chinese Communist Party is officially atheist.

Unlike the political aspect, in the economic trust models, being right-wing increases one's likelihood to favor the economic influence both from China and the US, when holding the rest of the variables constant (see [Table 6](#)). This may be explained by the profile of students who define themselves as rightists: liberal values allow them to hold a more pragmatic view when it comes to the economic issues: China, as Brazil's biggest trade partner and important investor, has benefited Brazil's economic growth for a long period (BLANCHARD, 2016; BULL; KASAHARA, 2011; PEREIRA; NEVES, 2011; VIEIRA; BUAINAIN; FIGUEIREDO, 2016). This result also coincides with the opposition from domestic free-market economists and lawyers when the PT government imposed restriction on China's agribusiness investment in Brazil (OLIVEIRA, 2018)—in front of the economic issue, Brazilian liberal rightists are even more likely than the leftists to have a friendly attitude

Table 6. Economic Trust Models

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Economic Trust			
	China		United States	
Ideology				
Right-wing	0.161***	(0.037)	0.427***	(0.034)
Demography				
Age	-0.003	(0.011)	0.003	(0.011)
Male	0.245*	(0.146)	0.113	(0.134)
Undergraduate	-0.082	(0.212)	-0.154	(0.190)
SP	-0.493**	(0.234)	-0.335*	(0.193)
Social Status				
ClassE	-0.078	(0.324)	-0.616**	(0.303)
ClassD	-0.341	(0.229)	-0.434**	(0.198)
ClassC	-0.056	(0.221)	-0.360*	(0.207)
ClassB	-0.220	(0.230)	-0.142	(0.211)
Cinema	0.156*	(0.084)	0.092	(0.076)
Bathroom	0.059	(0.202)	0.107	(0.159)
Religion				
Catholic	-0.108	(0.178)	-0.018	(0.158)
Evangelic	-0.160	(0.242)	-0.374*	(0.216)
Other religion	-0.119	(0.214)	-0.187	(0.191)
Study Area				
Humanities & Arts	-0.116	(0.179)	-0.235	(0.148)
Health Science	-0.656***	(0.238)	-0.402*	(0.222)
Engineering	-0.068	(0.289)	0.183	(0.263)
Bio, Agri, Exact & Earth	-0.624*	(0.360)	-0.431	(0.300)
Observations	803		882	
Pseudo R-squared	0.0235		0.0870	
Wald Chi2	49.72		245.8	
Robust standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

towards China. This attitude again provides proof for Power and Silveira's (2019) claim that Brazilian rightists are never homogeneous, since it is different from what Bolsonaro has advocated with regards to China and it is closer to the pragmatic line that places domestic economic interest over ideological disagreements, as pointed out by Schutte et al., (2019),

Additionally, gender and state are two variables significantly related to the perceptions of China's economic rise: males are more likely than females to trust China's economic rise, and students from São Paulo are less likely than others to have economic trust in China, as well as in the US. While the result of the state should be treated with more caution, since a majority

of the sample is from São Paulo, and the number of observations in other categories of states is too small to have confidence in this observed result. This time, the frequency of going to the cinema is found statistically significant in its positive relationship with the economic trust in China, rather than the US. To interpret this result, we may take into consideration the context of cinemas in Brazil: due to cinemas' distribution that mostly concentrates on highly urbanized cities as well as the tickets prices, going to cinema serves as a kind of elitist entertainment in Brazil (ÁVILA, 2018), therefore those who go to cinemas with more frequency may be people from the middle or upper class, whose profiles are more likely to be liberals valorizing economic cooperation with China for the sake of economic benefits. In this model, religion shows no statistically significant correlation with students' perceptions of China's economic rise. Besides, students from the area of health sciences trust neither the economic influence of China nor that of the US, in comparison with the area of applied social sciences.

In the military trust models ([Table 7](#)), rightists are found more likely to favor the US military powers rise in the global area, consistent with previous studies where conservative values are identified to be linked to militant internationalism, a general hawkish belief that strength best achieves peace in international relations (CALIN, 2010; RATHBUN et al., 2016). Nevertheless, there are no significant differences between leftists and rightists concerning their trust in China's military rise, which is very different from what I had anticipated that rightist students would distrust China's military power if they trust that of the US, considering the geopolitical tension between the two countries (SAUNDERS; BOWIE, 2016). Besides, there are only two control variables that are significantly correlated with perceptions of the military rise of China: being male increases the likelihood of having a positive attitude about the issue, while coming from the state of São Paulo decreases this likelihood.

Table 7. Military Trust Models

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Military Trust			
	China		United States	
Ideology				
Right-wing	-0.030	(0.036)	0.547***	(0.040)
Demography				
Age	-0.017	(0.012)	-0.026**	(0.013)
Male	0.502***	(0.143)	-0.083	(0.136)
Undergraduate	-0.114	(0.221)	-0.146	(0.214)
SP	-0.389*	(0.208)	0.055	(0.197)
Social Status				
ClassE	-0.110	(0.301)	-0.254	(0.308)
ClassD	-0.097	(0.247)	-0.304	(0.208)
ClassC	-0.029	(0.244)	-0.359	(0.219)
ClassB	-0.050	(0.248)	-0.179	(0.209)
Cinema	-0.049	(0.081)	0.021	(0.076)
Bathroom	0.159	(0.201)	-0.196	(0.180)
Religion				
Catholic	0.144	(0.182)	0.465***	(0.165)
Evangelic	0.126	(0.212)	0.243	(0.264)
Other religion	0.151	(0.203)	0.309	(0.207)
Study Area				
Humanities & Arts	0.193	(0.175)	-0.023	(0.161)
Health Science	0.188	(0.254)	-0.200	(0.265)
Engineering	-0.089	(0.293)	0.064	(0.263)
Bio, Agri, Exact & Earth	0.016	(0.255)	-0.334	(0.306)
Observations	803		882	
Pseudo R-squared	0.00846		0.134	
Wald Chi2	23.04		279.2	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Last but not least, ideology's correlations with trust in the cultural aspect follow the same pattern as that of the political models: right-wing ideology decreases the likelihood of people's trust in China while increases that in the US (Table 8). This result again indicates that culture is highly interrelated with politics, and this is revealed even more obviously by the variable of cinema—the more frequently one goes to cinemas, the more likely he or she will have a positive view towards US cultural influence. Nye (1990) had claimed that American popular culture, embodied in products and communications, has widespread appeal and can serve as a highly profitable and useful soft power resource in international politics. Hollywood,

worked with marketing tools, is selling not only American popular culture but also American values and ideology. In Brazil, the cultural prospection of American cinema is closely linked to political relations with the US (ÁVILA, 2018). In contrast, Chinese culture seems way less appealing to right-wing students. Wu (2018) points out that, while the Chinese government has

Table 8. Cultural Trust Models

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Cultural Trust			
	China		United States	
Ideology				
Right-wing	-0.087**	(0.039)	0.356***	(0.033)
Demography				
Age	-0.017	(0.011)	0.018*	(0.010)
Male	0.115	(0.147)	0.141	(0.129)
Undergraduate	0.005	(0.184)	-0.063	(0.175)
SP	0.084	(0.205)	0.068	(0.192)
Social Status				
ClassE	-0.190	(0.305)	0.010	(0.281)
ClassD	-0.397*	(0.236)	-0.060	(0.207)
ClassC	0.017	(0.231)	-0.099	(0.199)
ClassB	-0.036	(0.244)	-0.186	(0.194)
Cinema	0.075	(0.089)	0.171**	(0.073)
Bathroom	-0.042	(0.191)	-0.020	(0.181)
Religion				
Catholic	0.352**	(0.178)	-0.040	(0.164)
Evangelic	0.268	(0.275)	0.097	(0.233)
Other religion	0.438**	(0.208)	0.197	(0.191)
Study Area				
Humanities & Arts	-0.163	(0.168)	-0.349**	(0.159)
Health Science	-0.155	(0.281)	-0.241	(0.225)
Engineering	0.133	(0.329)	-0.139	(0.282)
Bio, Agri, Exact & Earth	-0.221	(0.393)	-0.831***	(0.245)
Observations	803		882	
Pseudo R-squared	0.00920		0.0632	
Wald Chi2	23.43		209.1	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

endeavored to promote soft power with cultural diplomacy, such as Chinese language projects, international mass media, and sports activities, Chinese soft power is nonetheless still in its “embryonic phase”. Despite great cultural resources, China’s marketing in cultural products is

no match that of the US: there are too few Chinese companies, cultural icons, movies, or brand names that have the ubiquity of Microsoft, MTV, Mickey Mouse, or Big Macs (GILL; HUANG, 2006). Additionally, as Keohane and Nye (1998) have pointed out, the projection of soft power will be more easily for states whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy. Thus, China's single-party system, controversial conducts on human rights issues, and Beijing's friendship with dictators in the developing world result in a lack of legitimacy where soft power exerts its influence (GILL; HUANG, 2006). This may explain why right-wing students, who staunchly embrace the value of democracy, at the same time perceive China's cultural influence negatively while positively for the US.

In summary, as shown in the statistical models, there are remarkable relationships between left-right ideology and the perceptions of China's rise in most of the dimensions, when socio-demographic variables and study areas are controlled for. A coherent pattern is shown in the political trust and cultural trust models, as rightists tend to trust less the political and cultural rise of China. The economic model tells us a different story since the more rightist a student is, the more likely he or she will hold a positive view of China's economic rise. Trust in military rise is the only aspect that shows no statistically significant result regarding the correlation with ideology. The comparison with the United States in each aspect further enhances the validity of the results—there is no effect of “general trust in foreign countries”, rather, attitudes towards the US concerning ideology yields results opposite to China in most aspects, except for the economic one.

7. CONCLUSION

From the perspective of university students, left-right ideology is found to have a powerful correlation over the perceptions of China's rise in nearly all aspects, supporting the theory that left-right ideology filters people's perceptions on foreign issues as it does in the domestic realm (CALIN, 2010; MARTINI, 2012).

Different from the larger Brazilian population, university students demonstrate the ability to correctly identify themselves on the left-right ideological scale, with specific values mostly correspondent with the conventional definitions of left and right. By constructing an ideology model, we can better understand specific values held by students which help them define their ideological position. In general, university students in this study are found to be more leftist than rightist. While even for those who identify themselves as right-wing, their ideological values seem closer to liberal than conservative. This can be seen from their attitudes favoring liberal policies both in the economic aspect—the minimal State principal and the free market, and the social aspect—abortion and LGBT rights. Their perceptions of China are likely to be guided by these liberal views, inferred from the research results that the only aspect where they demonstrate positive attitudes towards China is the economic one. This substantiates Power and Silveira (2019)'s claim that Brazilian right-wingers are never homogenous, and therefore researchers should be more careful in using the single left-right scale in their research.

When other variables such as the study area and socio-demographic factors are controlled for, the estimates suggest that left-right ideology is highly associated with the perceptions of China's rise in the political, economic, and cultural aspects: the right tends to distrust China's political and cultural rise, measured by negatively significant coefficients, and at the same time trust China's economic rise, which is demonstrated by positively significant coefficients. The disparity between the left and the right in viewing China in the political aspect

may due to the ideological affinity—as a socialist country, China gains more trust from the left. Chinese politics and policies also match more with the ideas of the left-wing, such as the significant role government plays in the national economy and the quota system in the entrance to universities; while the socialist regime may incite distrust from the right. Since rightists define themselves as the unconditional defenders of democracy, China, though promises a “peaceful rise” to the world, may reasonably impede itself from conquering the trust of the right-wing due to its one-party system and centralized political regime. Perceptions of China’s cultural influence has followed the same pattern as that of politics. Right-wing’s distrust of China’s cultural rise proves that culture is strongly related to politics, which resonated in Nye’s (1990) theory of soft power. The correlations between the cinema attendance and the perception of China are also worth noting—they are mostly opposite, and this appears to reveal the importance of cultural industries in building soft power in international politics. Different from the political and cultural aspects, rightist students’ favorable opinion towards China’s economic rise unveils their pragmatic attitudes regarding foreign issues related to the national economy, and may also indicate that right-wingers are more willing to embrace the free market and economic globalization, while left-wingers have more protectionist ideas. The inclusion of the US perceptions in each model, not only reinforces the robustness of the results about perceptions of China but also provide us with some interesting insights about the opposing views towards the two countries when left-right ideology is introduced into the equation.

Lastly, it is worth reaffirming that the results of this study show the views of university students, and as they mostly represent the highly educated middle-class group, their opinion is expected to be very different from the general Brazilian population. However, it is where the value of this research lies—investigating the opinions of Brazilian future leaders, since the University of São Paulo is where gathers the best students come from the most important state in the nation and, as it is tuition-free, it includes students from diverse social strata. Also, we

should also consider the potential geographical influence of the results, São Paulo is the most developed state in Brazil. Further studies are encouraged to adopt a national representative sample to see the differences, if any, in the results.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Original Questionnaire in Portuguese

Pesquisa de Opinião Pública de Alunos da USP sobre Valores Socioeconômicos e Políticos

O objetivo deste estudo é conhecer a posição dos alunos da USP sobre os valores descritos acima levando em consideração que representam os futuros formadores de opinião do país. Este estudo fornecerá dados para uma dissertação de mestrado em Relações Internacionais no IRI-USP e pedimos gentilmente que preencham todas as questões. O tempo estimado para a conclusão do questionário é de 6-8 minutos. Caso tenham interesse em receber o resultado do estudo, por favor, deixem algum e-mail registrado ao final do questionário. De nossa parte, agradecemos imensamente sua contribuição, muito valiosa para nossa pesquisa e para a ciência no Brasil, e confirmamos não haver nenhum tipo de identificação dos respondentes do questionário.

D1. Qual é sua idade em anos?

D2. Você é do sexo: 0 () Masculino 1 () Feminino

D3. Na Universidade de São Paulo, você é aluno(a) de:

0 () Graduação

1 () Pós-Graduação

D4. Você pertence a qual unidade da USP? Escreva o sigla da sua escola, faculdade ou instituto.

D5-1. Sua família reside em qual UF? ou mora no exterior? Escreva o sigla do UF se reside no Brasil, escreva exterior se reside no exterior. _____

Utilizando a escala de 0 a 10, quando 0 significa concorda totalmente com a afirmação localizada à esquerda e 10 significa concorda totalmente com a afirmação localizada à direita, avalie as afirmações abaixo.

E1.

Deveria haver mais iniciativa privada na indústria e no comércio	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Deveria haver mais participação do governo na indústria e no comércio
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E2.

É necessário ter mais proteção para as indústrias nacionais diante de globalização econômica.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Protecionismo impede o crescimento da economia nacional no contexto da globalização econômica.
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S1.

A renda deve ser distribuída de forma mais igualitária.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	As diferenças de renda incentivam o esforço individual.
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S2.

O ingresso nas universidades deve obedecer ao desempenho nos estudos e não sendo guiado por cotas.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	As cotas corrigem um erro histórico e proporcionam a possibilidade do ingresso de minorias ao ensino superior.
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O1.

Possuir uma arma legalizada deveria ser um direito do cidadão para se defender.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	A posse de armas deve ser proibida, pois representa ameaça à vida de outras pessoas.
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O2.

Adolescentes que cometem crimes devem ser reeducados.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Adolescentes que cometem crimes devem ser punidos como adultos.
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L1.

A Parada do Orgulho LGBT representa ganhos para a sociedade.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	A Parada do Orgulho LGBT traz riscos para a sociedade.
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L2.

O aborto deve ser proibido em todos os casos, ou em sua grande maioria, por respeito da vida.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	O aborto deve ser descriminalizado, dado que as mulheres e casais têm direito a escolher.
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DS.

Em algumas situações é melhor uma ditadura do que uma democracia.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	A democracia tem alguns problemas, mas é sempre melhor do que qualquer outra forma de governo.
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I.

O governo deve considerar a situação social de seus residentes e de imigrantes de maneira indistinta.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	O governo deve priorizar a situação social dos seus povos.
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Utilizando a escala de 1 a 7, quando 1 significa discorda completamente e 7 significa concorda completamente, avalie as afirmações abaixo.

ETa. O crescimento econômico dos Estados Unidos é favorável ao Brasil.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

ETb. O crescimento econômico da China é favorável ao Brasil.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

PT1a. A cooperação militar dos Estados Unidos com América Latina garante a segurança da região.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

PT1b. A capacidade bélica da China pode representar um contraponto de equilíbrio ao poder bélico mundial.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

PT2a. Os Estados Unidos têm um papel importante na sustentação do sistema democrático-liberal no mundo.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

PT2b. O sistema político centralizado chinês é uma ameaça ao sistema democrático mundial.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

CTa. A cultura dos Estados Unidos influencia a cultura brasileira em aspectos relevantes (modo de vida, valores culturais e comportamento), de maneira positiva.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

CTb. A cultura europeia influencia a cultura brasileira em aspectos relevantes (modo de vida, valores culturais e comportamento), de maneira positiva.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

CTc. A cultura chinesa pode vir a influenciar a cultura brasileira em aspectos relevantes (modo de vida, valores culturais e comportamento), de maneira positiva.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

VC1). A China tem atuado de maneira eficiente com o problema da Covid-19.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

VC2). O governo chinês é responsável pela pandemia global da Covid-19.

Discordo completamente	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Concordo completamente
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D5-2a. Em qual das faixas abaixo se localiza a sua renda familiar (incluindo a sua)?

- 1 () Até R\$ 1.045 (até 1 salário mínimo)
- 2 () De R\$ 1.045 até R\$ 2.090 (mais de 1 até 2 salários mínimos)
- 3 () De R\$ 2.090 até R\$ 5.225 (mais de 2 até 5 salários mínimos)
- 4 () De R\$ 5.225 até R\$ 10.450 (mais de 5 até 10 salários mínimos)
- 5 () De R\$ 10.450 a R\$ 15.675 (mais de 10 até 15 salários mínimos)
- 6 () De R\$ 15.675 a R\$ 20.900 (mais de 15 até 20 salários mínimos)
- 7 () Mais de R\$ 20.900 (mais de 20 salários mínimos)
- 8 () Não sei

D5-2b. Quantas pessoas compõem a sua família? _____

D5-3. Quantos banheiros tem em sua casa? Considere a casa de seus pais caso esteja morando com estudantes ou em casa de estudantes. _____

- 1 () 1
- 2 () 2
- 3 () 3
- 4 () 4 ou mais

D5-4. Com que frequência vai ao cinema por ano?

- 1 () Nenhuma
- 2 () 1-2 vezes
- 3 () 3-5 vezes
- 4 () Mais de 5 vezes

D6. Sobre sua religião e seu grau de participação, pode-se dizer

- 1 () Católico ativamente participante
- 2 () Católico pouco participante
- 3 () Evangélico ativamente participante
- 4 () Evangélico pouco participante
- 5 () Outra religião ativamente participante
- 6 () Outra Religião pouco participante
- 7 () Não tem religião

IS. Considerando os conceitos de esquerda e direita em política, qual seria sua posição? Utilize a escala de 0 a 10, quando 0 significa muito esquerda e 10 significa muito direita.

Esquerda	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Direita
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CK. Utilizando a escala de 1 a 7, qual o seu grau de conhecimento sobre cultura, econômica e política da China?

Muito pequeno	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Muito grande
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Caso queira deixar alguma observação use este espaço.

Obrigada por responder! Agora deixe seu e-mail caso queira receber os resultados dessa pesquisa (Opcional) _____

Appendix B. Questionnaire Translated into English

Public Opinion Survey on USP Students about Socioeconomic and Political Values

The objective of this study is to know the position of USP students on the values indicated above, considering that they represent the future opinion formers of the country. This study provides data for a master's dissertation in International Relations at IRI-USP, and we kindly invite you to answer all the questions. The estimated time to complete the questionnaire is 6 to 8 minutes. If you are interested in receiving the results of the study, please leave a registered email at the end of the questionnaire. For our part, we highly appreciate your valuable contribution to our research as well as to the social science work in Brazil, and we the questionnaire is totally anonymous.

D1. What is your age?

D2. You are: 0 () Male 1 () Female

D3. At the University of São Paulo, you are a student of:

0 () Undergraduate

1 () Graduate

D4. You belong to which unity of USP? Write down the abbreviation of your school, faculty or institution. _____

D5-1. In which Federal Unity resides your family? Or they live in a foreign country? Write down the abbreviation of Federal Unity, and if they live in a foreign country, write down the foreign country. _____

Using the scale from 0 to 10, when 0 means totally agree with the statement located on the left and 10 means totally agree with the statement located on the right, evaluate the statements below.

E1.

There should be more private initiative in industrial and commercial activities.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	There should be more government participation in industrial and commercial activities.
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E2.

It is necessary to have more protection for national industries under economic globalization.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Protectionism limits the growth of the national economy under economic globalization.
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S1.

Income should be distributed in a more equal way.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Difference of income encourages individual effort.
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S2.

Admission to universities must comply with performance in studies and rather than quotas.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	The quotas correct a historical error and provide the possibility for minorities to enter higher education.
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O1.

Owning a legalized weapon should be a citizen's right to defend himself.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	The possession of weapons should be prohibited, as it poses a threat to the lives of others.
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O2.

Adolescents who commit crimes must be reeducated.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Adolescents who commit crimes should be punished as adults.
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L1.

The LGBT Pride Parade represents gains for society.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	The LGBT Pride Parade brings risks to society.
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L2.

Abortion must be banned in all cases, or the vast majority, out of the respect for life.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Abortion must be decriminalized, given that women and couples have the right to choose.
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DS.

Under some situations, a dictatorship is better than a democracy.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	Democracy has some problems, but it is always better than any other form of government.
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I.

The government must look at the social situation of its residents and immigrants indistinctly.	0 ()	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	8 ()	9 ()	10 ()	The government must prioritize the social situation of its people.
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Using the scale of 1 to 7, when 1 means completely disagree and 7 means completely agree, evaluate the statements below.

ETa. The economic growth of the US is favorable to Brazil.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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ETb. The economic growth of China is favorable to Brazil.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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PT1a. The military cooperation of the US with Latin America guarantees the region's security.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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PT1b. China's military power represents a counterbalance to world war power.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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PT2a. The US has an important role in supporting the liberal-democratic system in the world.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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PT2b. China's centralized political system is a threat to the global democratic system.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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CTa. The culture of the US influences Brazilian culture in a positive way in relevant aspects (way of life, cultural values and behavior).

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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CTb. The culture of Europe influences Brazilian culture in a positive way in relevant aspects (way of life, cultural values and behavior).

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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CTc. Chinese culture can influence Brazilian culture in relevant aspects (way of life, cultural values and behavior), in a positive way.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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VC1). China has acted efficiently in combat to Covid-19.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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VC2). Chinese government should take responsibility for the outbreak of Covid-19.

Totally disagree	1 ()	2 ()	3 ()	4 ()	5 ()	6 ()	7 ()	Totally agree
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D5-2a. Which of the income bands below your family belongs to (including yours)?

- 1 () Below R\$ 1.045 (below 1 minimum income)
- 2 () From R\$ 1.045 to R\$ 2.090 (from 1 to 2 minimum income)
- 3 () From R\$ 2.090 to R\$ 5.225 (from 2 to 5 minimum income)
- 4 () From R\$ 5.225 to R\$ 10.450 (from 5 to 10 minimum income)
- 5 () From R\$ 10.450 to R\$ 15.675 (from 10 to 15 minimum income)
- 6 () From R\$ 15.675 to R\$ 20.900 (from 15 to 20 minimum income)
- 7 () Above R\$ 20.900 (above 20 minimum income)
- 8 () I don't know

D5-2b. How many people are there in your family? _____

D5-3. How many bath rooms are there in your house? Consider your parents' house if you live in student's dormitory. _____

- 1 () 1
- 2 () 2
- 3 () 3
- 4 () 4 or more

D5-4. How many times do you go to cinema per year?

- 1 () Never
- 2 () 1-2 times
- 3 () 3-5 times
- 4 () more than 5 times

D6. About your region and the degree of religiosity, you are:

- 1 () Active Catholic participant
- 2 () Non-active Catholic participant
- 3 () Active Evangelic participant
- 4 () Non-active Evangelic participant
- 5 () Active participant of other religion
- 6 () Non-active participant of other religion
- 7 () I don't have religion

IS. Considering the concepts of left and right in politics, what would be your position? Use the scale from 0 to 10, when 0 means very left and 10 means very right.

Left	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Right
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

CK. Using the scale of 1 to 7, how much do you know about Chinese culture, economics and politics?

Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Ver much
	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	

If you want to leave a comment, use this space.

Thank you for responding! Now leave your e-mail if you want to receive the results of this research (Optional) _____

Appendix C. Variables of Models

Ideology Model	
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Right-wing	Self-identified left-right scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 represents left and 10 represents right
<i>Independent variables of interest</i>	
Role of government	A 0-10 scale measuring support for government's role in the national economy, where 10 is the maximum score
Protectionism	A 0-10 scale measuring support for protectionism of national industries under economic globalization, where 10 is the maximum score
Redistribution	A 0-10 scale measuring support for redistributive policy
Quotation	A 0-10 scale measuring support for quota in the entrance of universities, where 10 is the maximum score
Democracy	A 0-10 scale measuring support for democracy, where 10 is the maximum score
Juvenile crime punishment	A 0-10 scale measuring support for juvenile crime punishment, where 10 is the maximum score
Access to gun	A 0-10 scale measuring support for citizens' access to guns, where 10 is the maximum score
LGBT tolerance	A 0-10 scale measuring support for LGBT rights, where 10 is the maximum score
Abortion	A 0-10 scale measuring support for legalization of abortion, where 10 is the maximum score
Migrant inclusion	A 0-10 scale measuring support inclusive policies of migrants, where 10 is the maximum score
China Trust models	
<i>Dependent variables</i>	
Political trust	A 1-7 scale measuring trust on the rise of China in the political aspect, where 7 is the maximum score
Economic trust	A 1-7 scale measuring trust on the rise of China in the economic aspect, where 7 is the maximum score
Military trust	A 1-7 scale measuring trust on the rise of China in the military aspect, where 7 is the maximum score
Culture trust	A 1-7 scale measuring trust on the rise of China in the cultural aspect, where 7 is the maximum score
<i>Independent variable of interest</i>	
Right-wing	Self-identified left-right scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 represents left and 10 represents right
Common Control variables of all the models	
Age	Respondents' age ranging from 17 to 62
Male	Dummy variable of gender, where male=1, female=0

Undergraduate	Dummy variable of educational level, where undergraduate=1, graduate=0
SP	Dummy variable of the state where respondents come from, where São Paulo=1, other states=0
ClassE	Dummy variable where class E=1, denoted by household income below 2,090 reais (below 2 minimum income)
ClassD	Dummy variable where class D=1, denoted by household income between 2,090 reais to 5,225 reais (from 2 to 5 minimum income)
ClassC	Dummy variable where class C=1, denoted by household income between 5,225 reais to 10,450 reais (from 5 to 10 minimum income)
ClassB	Dummy variable where class B=1, denoted by household income between 10,450 reais to 20,900 reais (from 10 to 20 minimum income)
ClassA (reference category)	Dummy variable where class A=1, denoted by household income between above 20,900 reais (above 20 minimum income)
Cinema	Categorical variable that measures the frequency to cinema per year. 0= “Never”, 1= “1-2 times”, 2= “3-5 times”, 3= “more than five times”
Bathroom	The number of bathrooms in home per family member: numbers of bathrooms/numbers of family members. This variable is to measure the financial condition of respondents’ families
Catholic	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are catholic
Evangelical	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are evangelical
Other religion	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents practice other religion
Atheists (reference category)	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are atheists
Humanities & Arts	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are from the area of Humanities & Arts
Health Science	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are from the area of Health Science
Engineering	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are from the area of Engineering
Bio, Arig, Exact & Earth	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are from the area of Biology, Agricultural Science, Exact science, or Earth Science
Applied Social Science (reference category)	Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents are from the area of Applied Social Science

Appendix D. Study Area Categorization

Study Areas	School Unities	Abbreviations
Applied Social Sciences	School of Arts, Sciences and Humanities	EACH
	Law School	FD
	School of Architecture and Urbanism	FAU
	School of Economics, Administration and Accounting	FEA
	Ribeirão Preto School of Economics, Administration and Accounting	FEARP
Humanities and Arts	School of Philosophy, Literature and Human Sciences	FFLCH
	Institute of International Relations	IRI
	Psychology Institute	IP
	School of Education	FE
	Institute of Brazilian Studies	IEB
	School of Communication and Arts	ECA
Engineering	Polytechnic School	Poli
	Institute of Biomedical Sciences	ICB
	São Carlos School of Engineering	EESC
Health Sciences	School of Medicine	FM
	School of Dentistry	FO
	School of Physical Education and Sports	EEFE
	School of Public Health	FSP
Biology & Agricultural & Exact and Earth Sciences	School of Pharmaceutical Sciences	FCF
	Institute of Bioscience	IB
	Institute of Energy and Environment	IEE
	Institute of Mathematics and Statistics	IME
	Physics Institute	IF
	Institute of Astronomy, Geophysics and Atmospheric Science	IAG
	Geosciences Institute	IGc
	Institute of Mathematical and Computer Sciences	ICMC
	Chemistry Institute	IQ

Note: Categorization based on the criteria of CNPq, adjusted by the number of respondents.

Appendix E. China Perceptions Models without Weighting

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables: Trust in China's Rise			
	Political	Economic	Military	Cultural
Right-wing	-0.373*** (0.034)	0.171*** (0.034)	-0.025 (0.033)	-0.060* (0.036)
Age	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.010)
Male	-0.091 (0.124)	0.292** (0.130)	0.405*** (0.129)	0.026 (0.127)
Undergraduate	-0.171 (0.187)	-0.126 (0.186)	-0.143 (0.188)	-0.120 (0.165)
SP	-0.130 (0.193)	-0.317 (0.195)	-0.342* (0.183)	0.194 (0.177)
ClassE	0.037 (0.251)	-0.242 (0.302)	-0.370 (0.268)	-0.250 (0.285)
ClassD	-0.064 (0.206)	-0.247 (0.206)	-0.088 (0.224)	-0.499** (0.223)
ClassC	-0.163 (0.201)	-0.133 (0.204)	-0.095 (0.221)	-0.128 (0.218)
ClassB	-0.000 (0.209)	-0.132 (0.202)	-0.009 (0.221)	-0.078 (0.221)
Cinema	-0.096 (0.076)	0.125 (0.079)	-0.059 (0.073)	0.072 (0.079)
Bathroom	0.233 (0.167)	-0.047 (0.184)	0.202 (0.178)	-0.053 (0.184)
Catholic	-0.048 (0.176)	-0.079 (0.154)	0.080 (0.162)	0.286* (0.161)
Evangelic	0.459** (0.220)	-0.046 (0.227)	0.035 (0.202)	0.231 (0.234)
Other religion	0.559*** (0.165)	-0.119 (0.184)	0.009 (0.188)	0.368** (0.186)
Humanities & Arts	-0.008 (0.157)	-0.031 (0.158)	0.151 (0.147)	-0.099 (0.150)
Health Science	-0.214 (0.230)	-0.524*** (0.198)	0.205 (0.217)	-0.012 (0.229)
Engineering	0.434 (0.271)	0.040 (0.236)	-0.121 (0.260)	0.154 (0.312)
Bio, Agri, Exact & Earth	0.366 (0.263)	-0.464 (0.291)	0.224 (0.232)	-0.062 (0.311)
Observations	882	882	882	882
Pseudo R-squared	0.0591	0.0220	0.00740	0.00711
Wald Chi2	173.4	66.15	26.05	21.23

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1