UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO
INSTITUTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

LUAH TOMAS

Prejudice, Marriage and Motherhood: national and international perceptions on the 1938 prohibition of women in Brazilian Foreign Service

São Paulo, 2020

VERSÃO CORRIGIDA
A versão original se encontra disponível na Biblioteca do Instituto de Relações Internacionais (USP) e na Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP, documentos impresso e eletrônico.

LUAH TOMAS

Preconceito, Matrimônio e Maternidade: percepções nacionais e internacionais sobre a proibição, em 1938, de mulheres no serviço exterior brasileiro

Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo, para a obtenção do título de Mestre em Ciências.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Felipe Pereira Loureiro

Dissertação apoiada por uma bolsa do Convêncio FAPESP/CAPES (processo nº 2018/05057-4, Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)). As opiniões, hipóteses e conclusões ou recomendações expressas neste material são de responsabilidade da autora, e não necessariamente refletem a visão da FAPESP e da CAPES.

São Paulo
2020

Catalogação na publicação
Serviço de Biblioteca e Documentação
Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo

Tomas, Luah
Prejudice, marriage and motherhood: national and international perceptions on the 1938 prohibition of women in Brazilian Foreign Service / Luah Tomas ; orientador: Felipe Pereira Loureiro. -- São Paulo, 2020.
199 p.

Dissertação (Mestrado) – Instituto de Relações Internacionais. Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2020.

1. Gênero 2. Diplomacia 3. Administração pública 4. Ministério das Relações Exteriores 5. Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público 6. Getúlio Vargas I. Loureiro, Felipe Pereira, orient. II. Título.

CDD – 305.409

Responsável: Giseli Adornato de Aguiar - CRB-8/6813

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The past two and a half years have transformed my life. I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to study in a public university, where thought, excellence and community are stimulated at every moment. This research has also been possible thanks to the funding provided by the São Paulo Research Foundation (*Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo*, FAPESP) both at the national and international level.

Above all else, I have no words to fully thank my advisor, Dr. Felipe P. Loureiro, for the dedication and guidance throughout this process. His enthusiasm and openness to my topic from day one have been essential to the completion of this thesis. He has been a remarkable mentor, not only for the research process itself, but also on how to be a decent academic, a true teacher and a good person in the world. He has encouraged me to expand my horizons and my knowledge, providing full support in my endeavors, and has opened many doors for my future. Thanks to him, I have learned the positive impact a university professor can have and this now has become a possibility for me.

Furthermore, I wish to thank many other professors who have supported and assisted me in my journey. Dr. Katherine Marino, at the University of California, Los Angeles, has been an essential mentor in the field of women's history, and her availability and disposition to help has guaranteed the success of my research internship in the United States. Other professors I must mention and thank for their inputs and varied help to this research include Dr. Alexandre Moreli, Dr. Micol Seigel, Dr. Teresa Cristina Novaes Marques, Dr. Natália Félix de Souza, Dr. Rogério de Souza Farias, Dr. Janina Onuki, Dr. Daniela Schettini, Dr. Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, Dr. Miriam Dolhnikoff, Dr. Adriana Schor, Dr. José Flávio Motta, Dr. Luciana Suarez Galvão, Dr. Naredran Kumarakulasingam, Dr. Susanne Zwingel, Dr. Cameron Thies, Dr. Guilherme Casarões, Dr. Quynh Pham, among others.

I also would like to thank the always attentive and patient staff at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais (IRI-USP), and the fellow members of the Comissão de Pós-Graduação and graduate student body representatives from 2018 to 2020. I thank my colleagues who came together to organize the IRI Student Seminars in 2018 and 2019, and the many students who have contributed to make the Laboratory of Studies on Brazil and the World System (LabMundi FFLCH-IRI) a place of high-quality debate and intellectual exchange. Among the friends I have made along the way at IRI-USP, I specially thank Irma Dutra, Ana Paula Borges, Nathalia Stutz, and Fernanda Conforto for the continuous support and laughs, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Other IRI friends that have made the journey more fulfilling include Ana Carolina

Marson, Felipe Estre, Eunjae Kim, Leonardo Lameiras, Tiago Menegatti, Vinicius Dalbelo, Beatriz Azevedo, Cecília Mombelli, Jane Aparecido, Natali Moreira, Alessandra Beber, and many, many more.

This research would not have been possible without the archives and libraries that I had the privilege to visit. In each one of them, I have been assisted by competent and helpful staff, and their importance is not lost in my gratitude. I also thank friends who have hosted and helped me in the different cities I went to: Walter Mayer, Elly Bennett, Deepika Chandiramani, and my father-in-law Luis Muñoz.

Outside of academia, I have many friends to thank for the opportunities to relax and enjoy other aspects of life, even though they have always shown interest in my research and were willing to listen to me ramble about women in diplomacy. I thank Sarah Leister, Thalita Dominato, Flávia Ubiali, Elis Batina, Tiago Liberatori, the "Minas do Peito" group, my cousins and extended family, including my dear in-laws.

Last, but not least, I would not have been able to start, continue and complete this program without my family. Sou eternamente grata ao apoio incondicional e em todos os sentidos da minha mãe, Inês Cardoso, que além de sempre ter a geladeira e o coração cheios, é a minha melhor relações públicas. Ao meu pai João Tomas, e à Hong Tomas, agradeço pelas conversas, trocas, apoio, disponibilidade e entusiasmo, pois são também essenciais na torcida pelo meu sucesso. Agradeço à Dorinha, pelo carinho e suporte em *todos* os momentos. E à minha cachorrinha Sandy, agradeço por estar literalmente ao meu lado por horas intermináveis de leitura e escrita, sempre oferecendo sua doçura.

Finally, it is impossible to fully thank my husband, Carlos Muñoz, for his unconditional love and support. As my best friend for the past 12 years, his companionship in the last six months have taught me what love and partnership mean. As we quarantined together amidst a global pandemic, this final thesis is also his. Thank you!

São Paulo, September 22, 2020

“It was a good question. It’s been a long time since anyone cared enough to ask. A good question.”

Fahrenheit 451. Ray Bradbury.

ABSTRACT

This Master's Thesis explores why women were perceived to be unsuited for diplomacy in Brazil during Getúlio Vargas' *Estado Novo* dictatorship, particularly after an administrative reform in October 1938 prohibited women's access to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations. This decision stands out because women had already been allowed admittance into the Ministry starting in 1918, and female suffrage had just been granted in 1932. It also symbolizes a paramount change in Vargas' government (1930-1945), which instated the so-called *Estado Novo* (New State) regime in 1937 after a coup d'état. The objective is to uncover and comprehend the perceptions about gender of those against women's participation in diplomacy, which stimulated a sexual division of labor in civil service more broadly in which women's roles were limited to national, private, and supportive activities. The study interlaces primary documental sources from institutions and individuals connected to the 1938 decision, followed by a critical reading using feminist theories and gender as a category for historical analysis. The conclusion sees the Ministry's prohibition as part of two wider contexts: the ongoing process of rationalization of the Brazilian public administration that used entrance examinations as tools for implementing sexual divisions of labor; and the enabling conditions the government found in international diplomatic practices that presumed women's incapacity to obtain respect from peers, physical and emotional fragility, inability to discuss "hard politics", and a natural tendency for marriage and motherhood. The resulting understanding sheds light on collective meanings that helped shape norms of behavior and institutions with long-lasting impacts in Brazil's society – still today, only 23 per cent of the Brazilian diplomatic corps is composed of women.

Keywords: Gender, Diplomacy, Public administration, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Getúlio Vargas

RESUMO

Essa pesquisa explora por que mulheres eram percebidas como inadequadas para a diplomacia no Brasil, especialmente após uma reforma administrativa de outubro de 1938 que proibiu o acesso de mulheres ao Ministério de Relações Exteriores. Essa decisão é curiosa porque mulheres já vinham sendo admitidas no Ministério desde 1918, e o sufrágio feminino havia sido conquistado em 1932. A decisão também simboliza um momento de mudança significativa no governo de Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945), que instaurou o regime autoritário do Estado Novo em 1937 após um golpe de estado. O objetivo aqui é revelar e compreender as percepções sobre gênero daqueles que eram contrários à presença feminina na diplomacia, que estimulariam uma divisão sexual do trabalho no serviço público na qual o papel da mulher ficaria limitado a atividades nacionais, privadas e de suporte. O estudo cruza fontes documentais primárias de instituições e indivíduos conectados à decisão de 1938, seguido de uma leitura crítica das fontes usando teorias feministas e o gênero como categoria de análise histórica. Como conclusão entende-se que a proibição do Ministério é parte de dois contextos mais amplos: o processo de racionalização em curso na administração pública brasileira que usaria concursos públicos como ferramenta para implantar divisões sexuais de trabalho; e as condições facilitadoras que o governo encontrou em práticas diplomáticas internacionais que presumiam uma incapacidade da mulher em obter o respeito de seus colegas diplomáticos, uma fragilidade física e emocional, uma inabilidade de discutir "política dura", e uma tendência natural para o casamento e a maternidade. O entendimento aqui exposto ilumina os significados coletivos que teriam ajudado à configuração de instituições e de normas de comportamento, com impactos duradouros na nossa sociedade – ainda hoje em dia apenas 23 por cento do corpo diplomático é composto por mulheres.

Palavras-chave: Gênero, Diplomacia, Administração pública, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Getúlio Vargas.

LIST OF GRAPHS AND TABLES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

After putting away my belongings in a locker, the receptionist gave me my visitor's badge and directed me to the research room. It was my first day at the *Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty*, in the famous pink building called *Palácio do Itamaraty* that houses the former headquarters of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, in downtown Rio de Janeiro. I then entered a grand and imposing corridor with two rows of busts on each side. I knew most of the names and faces of those busts, for they were people respected and admired in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. People, no. Men. Men, after men, after men. Later that day, I asked one of the interns where the bathroom was. The intern got up and asked me to follow him. As we walked through corridors of the Palace, he told me the women's bathroom was far away because it was built in a rush after the first woman passed the Itamaraty entrance examinations in 1918, overcoming all expectations. The Palace only had men's bathrooms until then. One hundred years later, the women's bathroom still is in the same place, far away, the last door after a series of turns in long dark corridors. The intern was directing me there because people – women – sometimes got lost trying to find it. The men's bathroom is centrally located, one of the first rooms you pass after coming up the staircase, with a view to the Palace's internal lake and palm trees.

This research explores why women were perceived to be unsuited for diplomacy. Twenty years after Maria José de Castro Rebello Mendes entered the halls of Itamaraty and had a bathroom built for her, the Ministry of Foreign Relations (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*, MRE) decided to prohibit the access of women to the diplomatic career. Oswaldo Aranha's tenure as Minister of Foreign Relations began in 1938 with an important administrative reform that amalgamated the consular and diplomatic careers into one, following an international trend, and establishing the diplomat as the main formulator and executor of Brazilian foreign policy from then on.[1] The so-called Oswaldo Aranha Reform of October 1938 also determined that only candidates of the male sex were eligible to compete in entrance examinations to the diplomatic career.[2] According to the Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (*Federação Brasileira para o Progresso Feminino*, FBPF), the most important feminist organization of the time, this directive would be the first explicit restriction against women's

[1] For a detailed investigation of the normative changes in Itamaraty during this period, see Castro (2009, chap. 7). Also, this unification followed the footsteps of the United States, which had consolidated its foreign service careers in 1924, and the discussions in the United Kingdom that led to the same measure in 1943 (CALKIN, 1978, McCARTHY, 2009).

[2] Decree-Law n. 791, October 14, 1938, art. 30.

rights in a Brazilian legislative text since 1848.[3] The prohibitive measure would be kept in force until 1953, when Maria Sandra Cordeiro de Mello registered for the exams after filing a judicial injunction.[4]

This thesis' objective is to uncover, analyze and comprehend the common perceptions and assumptions about gender of the advocates for impeding women's participation in diplomacy, and in civil service more broadly, which would stimulate a sexual division of labor in which women's roles were limited to national, private, and supportive activities. In investigating the arguments and justifications presented by some key institutional actors against women's presence in certain civil service positions, we can grasp the "current thinking of the time about women's condition in [Brazilian] society" (KARAWEJCZYK, 2013, p. 84), particularly concerning what was recognized as appropriate places for women's work as well as for men's, mainly among white and middle- to upper-class individuals. This understanding, in turn, can shed light on the collective meanings that helped shape norms of behavior and institutions with long-lasting impacts in our society.

The fact that women were not allowed into careers in diplomacy in the 1930s might not, at first, seem shocking. Indeed, the doors of many other foreign services were closed to women and their political presence in international politics was more an exception than the rule. Striking about the Itamaraty decision is that women had already been allowed admittance starting in 1918, with much press fanfare, and that in the first half of the 1930s the Brazilian feminist movement had achieved significant civil rights victories – female suffrage in 1932, constitutional labor and maternal rights in 1934, and the presence of two congresswomen until 1937. When women lost their right to enter MRE in 1938, there were 18 female consuls, including two representing Brazilian interests abroad, one in Liverpool, Great Britain, and the other in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Although the decision is situated within a specific historical context, the analysis of its motivations brings forth aspects of the institutional development of the Ministry of Foreign Relations that would further explain why still in 2019 only 23 per cent of the Brazilian diplomatic corps was composed of women (MRE, 2019). This is also a worldwide phenomenon as only 15 per cent of ambassadorial positions from every country were held by women in 2017, reflecting until this day the "highly gendered" and the "decidedly masculine" character of diplomacy, making the examination of "the historical and institutional

[3] FBPF to Oswaldo Aranha, [1938], Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPDOC-FGV), Fundo Oswaldo Aranha (OA) cp 1938.06.21.
[4] See chapter 3 of Friaça (2018) for a detailed account of the 1938-1953 period.

scarcity of female diplomats" a crucial endeavor (CASSIDY, 2017, p. 2; AGGESTAM, TOWNS, 2018a, p. 1).

We should not lose sight that this research, although contemplating the past, is also a product of the present. If "gender" was not extensively debated these days, the topic of this thesis might have not encountered the same scholarly interest. According to Scott (1988, p. 2), "history's representations of the past help construct gender for the present", which says that looking at how gender was understood in 1938 is impacted by and also impacts how we discuss gender today. Indeed, if the justifications given in the 1930s against women in diplomacy had not sparked my personal outrage, this thesis would not exist as it does. The connection between past and present was clear to me throughout the research process, as I often felt depleted of energy after reproducing on these pages some of the insensitive arguments by advocates of the incompatibility of women and diplomacy – one male professor of the time, for instance, called women "our dear 'ribs'".[5] But I was continuously motivated to try to understand how certain perceptions might have impacted decision-making, institutions, and individual lives, in addition to "the ways in which such concepts as gender acquire the appearance of fixity" today, despite their dynamic and socially-constructed nature (SCOTT, 1988, p. 5).

Even though almost a century separates us from the 1938 Brazilian female ban, perceptions on gender in MRE have not evolved tremendously, despite advancements. For instance, a group of Brazilian female diplomats produced a documentary to tell the story of women in the career and their place in Itamaraty, combining personal testimonies and historical facts through an intersectional lens (EXTERIORES, 2018). The project, nonetheless, was not officially endorsed by Itamaraty, being fully financed by private means via crowdfunding, which might suggest an unwillingness on the part of the institution to address such delicate issues.[6] As another example of this reluctance, former diplomat Cecília Prada, who is now 90-years-old, has been unsuccessfully attempting for almost 40 years to be legally readmitted into Itamaraty after obtaining a divorce from a marriage that forced her resignation from the diplomatic career in the 1950s. The latest denial of her case was in March 2019.[7]

The current Brazilian administration of President Jair Bolsonaro (2019) has also made gender a significant aspect of its foreign policy. In the first half of 2019, as Brazil stood for

---

[5] Sergio D. T. de Macedo, "Comentário", *Gazeta de Notícias*, November 22, 1938, p. 2.

[6] This information was shared by a current female diplomat in the screening of the documentary at the University of São Paulo on March 15, 2019. It was also widely shared in news articles when the documentary was launched in December 2018.

[7] "A ex-diplomata de quase 90 anos que luta há décadas para ser readmitida no Itamaraty", *G1*, October 26, 2019. Available at <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/10/26/a-ex-diplomata-de-quase-90-anos-que-luta-ha-decadas-para-ser-readmitida-no-itamaraty.ghtml>. Access on September 22, 2020.

reelection at the United Nations Human Rights Council, newspapers alleged that diplomats received official instructions to reiterate in international negotiations that the Brazilian understanding of "gender" is that of the biological sex, men and women. According to one article, Itamaraty affirmed that it is merely resuming a "the traditional definition of gender".[8] This view is often sponsored by Brazil's current Minister of Foreign Affais, Ernesto Araújo, when he addresses the problem of "globalism", conceptualized by him as anti-national and anti-traditional global forces that would transform legitimate concepts into ideologies, such as "gender ideology", "racialism", and "ecologism" (ARAÚJO, 2019 p. 11-12; SARAIVA, SILVA, 2019). Therefore, the urgency of studying historical understandings of concepts of gender in Brazilian diplomacy and foreign policy speaks directly to our present time. The easiness that previously conquered rights were lost due to one-sided decisions made by men in positions of power in 1938, negatively affecting the lives and dreams of Brazilian women, shows that the ground on which we stand is precarious and the necessity of vigilance, constant.

The 1938 Oswaldo Aranha Reform in Itamaraty symbolized a paramount change in the Getúlio Vargas' rule. Ascending to power by means of the so-called Revolution of 1930, Vargas employed a critical rhetoric against the previous oligarchic regime, defying its corrupt and archaic practices and claiming to truly, and directly, represent the Brazilian people. After being indirectly elected president by Congress in 1934, he staged a coup d'état in his last year in office, instituting the *Estado Novo* (New State) regime in November 1937, and kept authoritarian rule until 1945, when he was deposed by the military.[9] As the government consolidated its authoritarian dictatorship amidst international bellicose tensions, the 1938 decision in Itamaraty to prohibit women's access to diplomacy should be read as part of a wider process of rationalization and modernization of the Brazilian state and public service, also finding enabling conditions in international diplomatic practices that favored sexual divisions of labor and homosociability, or spaces of same-sex social interaction.

In light of this, our study explores the perceptions on gender expressed by the leadership of two crucial bureaucratic institutions that played important roles for the 1938 women's ban. First, the Administrative Department of the Public Service (*Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público*, DASP) had the political ability to define women's accepted positions in public service via registration requirements of public examinations. After the establishment of Vargas'

[8] "Itamaraty orienta diplomatas a frisar que gênero é apenas sexo biológico", *Folha de S. Paulo*, June 26, 2019. Available at <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/06/itamaraty-orienta-diplomatas-a-frisar-que-genero-e-apenas-sexo-biologico.shtml>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

[9] For the literature on the Getúlio Vargas era, 1930-1945, see: Carone (1977); Fausto (1978); Gomes (1980); Levine (1980); Gomes (1996); Skidmore (2007); Fausto (2013); Gomes (2013).

Estado Novo, DASP inherited the work of the Federal Council of the Civil Public Service (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*, CFSPC), whose objective upon its creation in 1936 was to subsidize the modernization of the public administration in Brazil and to disseminate a trustworthy and impartial merit system in personnel recruitment. These two agencies are often used as synonyms in this study not only because DASP continued and expanded much of CFSPC's work and their documents are usually archived together, but also owing to the fact that both were highly centralized in the figure of their president at the time, Luis Simões Lopes, whose private archives hold an important and unsigned study about the admission of women to the diplomatic corps.

The second crucial bureaucratic institution is the Ministry of Foreign Relations itself, contributing expertise and acting as pioneer in the implementation of rationalization measures in the diplomatic field. The Ministry of Foreign Relations, as a fundamental institution in Brazilian public administration, had an influence on women's position in civil service.[10] The first woman to be admitted into Itamaraty via public examinations in 1918 ended up opening all public service jobs to female labor in the Brazilian government, whereas the 1938 prohibition brought a domino effect of female bans in subsequent years in the country's public service. Between 1939 and 1941, 18 other DASP-run examinations were closed to women, including for positions as Mail Carrier, Detective, Police, and Inspectors of all kinds.

Itamaraty, thus, executed the first executive order toward the implementation of a sexual division of labor in public administration under Oswaldo Aranha's leadership, also a significant fact as sources suggest that previous Ministers had a more positive view of female participation in diplomacy. Using the justification that nominating women to posts overseas would cause "harm to the greater efficiency of their representation abroad, creating embarrassments to their own government and to those of other nations, with no benefit to the interests of the State", Oswaldo Aranha employed a shared vision held by foreign government officials working in the international system at the time, which questioned "whether the normal women, admitted in identical conditions, (would be) as efficient as the normal men".[11] As a consequence of a diffuse supposition that the "representation of national interests abroad is the only career for which women are totally unsuited", according to a British ambassador in 1945 (apud McCARTHY, 2009, p. 286), Itamaraty chose to impede female access because it was not interested in

[10] On Itamaraty's importance see, for instance: Rosembaum (1968), Cheibub (1985), and Hahner (1990).
[11] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21; CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, Fundo Luis Simões Lopes (LSL) apu 1935.08.14, p. 17.

anticipating "a movement barely initiated" internationally, concerned about maintaining "the manliness values upheld by Brazil's international image" (FARIAS, 2017, p. 51).[12] In order to gain respectability, demonstrate autonomy and achieve national development goals, one of the shared perceptions fomented nation states that privileged masculine rather than feminine traits in international affairs.

Literature Review and Theoretical Perspectives

In the field of International Relations (IR), the 1990s established a group of U.S. feminist scholars as references in critiquing the lack of women and the role of gender in the discipline, which stimulated a series of subsequent studies applying a gender lens to traditional IR topics.[13] More specifically, the study of women in diplomacy and foreign policy is already vast internationally, embracing many disciplines although predominantly focused on women's experiences in North-American and European countries.[14] In Brazil there has been a growing interest on the topic over the past decade, with pioneer works conducted by diplomats themselves, a common trend in the study of Brazilian foreign policy more broadly.[15] The literature on the history of the Brazilian feminist movement, however, has already unveiled important contributions to the cause of women's rights globally, specially noting the work of remarkable personalities such as Bertha Lutz, who fought for the inclusion of the term "equal rights of men and women" in the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.[16]

While works in the field of gender and women's History rarely discuss the involvement or perceptions of Itamaraty and female diplomats, the area of International Relations seldom explores in depth the historical constructions of current norms and practices. Most of the Brazilian literature on the topic discusses current female diplomats and the existing obstacles they still face in public examinations and within MRE, recognizing it as a "masculinized space

[12] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21.
[13] The U.S. pioneers are: Peterson (1992); Tickner (1992); Elshtain (1995); Enloe (2004); and Sylvester (2004).
[14] See, for instance: McGlen and Sarkees (1993); Stienstra (1994); Denéchère (2004); Neumann (2008); Sluga and James (2016); Cassidy (2017); Aggestam and Towns (2018a); Bashevkin (2018); Nash (2020).
[15] Pinheiro and Vedoveli (2012) have discussed the academic production of Brazilian diplomats. On the topic of women in diplomacy, for instance, Friaça's book (2018) was originally produced in 2012 as part of Itamaraty's requirements for professional ascension. The same is true for Balbino (2011). Whereas Delamonica's piece (2014) is a Master's thesis, it was written on the first years of her diplomatic career.
[16] The literature on Bertha Lutz' international work is somewhat vast. See, for instance: Hahner (1990); Besse (1999); Soihet (2006); Marques (2013); Marino (2014); Marques (2016a); and Marino (2019). After World War II, the literature largely ignores Brazilian women acting internationally on behalf of women's rights, with attention given only the Beijing Conference in 1995. See: Haddad (2007); Sardenberg (2015); and Olcott (2017).

of power" (BRANDÃO et al., 2017, p. 281).[17] On the part of the literature that focuses on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it rarely discusses women's and gender issues, usually analyzing how the institution constructed an idealization of Brazilian diplomacy and *sprit de corps*.[18] Cheibub (1985), for instance, presents a pivotal analysis of the institutional development of Itamaraty as the main formulator of Brazilian foreign policy in the twentieth century, whereas Moura (2007) focuses on the role of the diplomatic school Instituto Rio Branco on the socialization and formation of new diplomats. Internationally, the perceived prestige of the Brazilian foreign service and its diplomats would be critiqued in the 1960s by Rosembaum (1968), with Fontaine (1970) discussing the involvement of a variety of government agencies and interest groups in the foreign policy-making process in Brazil.

More recent scholars that study Itamaraty and the Brazilian diplomatic corps have started to address women issues, even if generally. Lima and Oliveira (2018), for instance, analyzed the social profile of individuals accepted into the diplomatic career in the second half of the twentieth century, showing how women have maintained a participation of less than 25 per cent of the incoming cohorts of new diplomats over the decades. Similarly, Gobo (2016) studied the elitist aspect of Itamaraty's diplomatic *habitus*, which have limited and constrained the widespread access of women, blacks, homosexuals, and even individuals from different regions of Brazil, arguing that only in the 1990s the institution would take effective measures to diversify its diplomatic staff.

Finally, the literature preoccupied with the history of female presence in Itamaraty that addresses the 1938 prohibition is extremely limited. Brazilian diplomat Guilherme Friaça (2018), for instance, conducted a seminal work on the one hundred years of women in diplomacy, recovering archival documents and collecting oral testimonials to tell the most comprehensive story of Brazilian women diplomats to date. Despite its significant contribution to the field, Friaça's work prioritizes breadth instead of depth, not fully situating Itamaraty's many institutional changes within their broader historical context. On the same note, Brandão et al. (2017) examined past formal and informal barriers to women's presence in MRE to elucidate the current female underrepresentation in Brazilian diplomacy. Their study, however, see the 1938 female ban as an anomaly considering the government's previous support for

[17] Works that examine current issues of women diplomats in Brazil include: Balbino (2011); Delamonica (2014); Steiner & Cockles (2017); Gobo (2018).

[18] The symbolism of Barão do Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Relations during four consecutive presidential administrations (1902-1912), is often the underline subject mainly due to his important role in the peaceful and successful solution in frontier negotiations between Brazil and its South-American neighbors (BURNS, 2003).

feminist causes, overlooking the impacts of the gendered and rationalizing discourse promoted by the new *Estado Novo* regime.

This research seeks to expand on the literature, particularly expanding on Farias' (2017) analysis of the dynamic changes occurring in the interwar years that stirred debates on what constituted diplomatic practice. According to Farias, diplomacy was moving away from behaviors categorized as feminine – elegance, politeness, discreetness – towards a more rationalized, results-oriented, and consequently more masculine, vision of diplomacy. In light of these new perceptions, women's presence in diplomacy and international politics would be assumed to "effeminate", or weaken, state power (FARIAS, 2017, p. 41). This change might have contributed to the decision to prohibit women in the Brazilian diplomatic career, and this thesis seeks to expose other perceptions that converged so that the 1938 decision was possible. In this sense, the identity change that the diplomatic career was undergoing domestically and internationally – more masculinized – is inserted in a context of problematization of women's role in public life, particularly during a rationalization and modernization process in the Brazilian public administration, and in a moment of global tensions in which Brazil's government officials believed it could not make mistakes internationally.[19]

Reading the existing literature on the history of Brazilian foreign policy one could easily assume that "women are just not there" or even that women's rights were a neglected issue in Itamaraty (JAMES, SLUGA, 2016, p. 2).[20] Both suppositions are untrue, particularly in the Americas during the interwar years, as we show in this study through the conscious mentioning of many Brazilian women engaged in diplomacy and foreign affairs. The usual silence on this merely reflects that the "core historical narratives of international politics" are also a product of power relations and that "adding women" is required to expose their irrational underrepresentation (ibid., p. 9). In an attempt to unveil the social perceptions that converged to make the female prohibition in 1938 possible and considered natural for decision-makers in their social and historical context, this thesis relies on feminist scholars to help explain female exclusion, subordination, and the sustained "unjustified asymmetry" between the social positions of men and women (TICKNER, 2001, p. 11).

We start with the assumption that the decision to prohibit the access of women to the diplomatic career is not a random or trivial act, isolated of social meaning, as we agree with scholars who argue that "public policy is never 'neutral'", considering that the political choice

[19] For the literature on Brazilian foreign policy in the 1930s and 1940s see: Hilton (1977); Moura (1980); McCann (1995); Abreu (1999).
[20] See, for instance: Albuquerque (1996); Pinheiro (2004); Cervo and Bueno (2011); Ricupero (2017).

of who benefits from such policies are usually based on individuals' perceptions (CAULFIELD, 1993, p. 150, TICKNER, 2001). According to Duerst-Lahti (1987), an individual's perception is always biased, influenced by context, learning processes, socialization, and past experiences. Therefore, shared stories about the "nature" of women and men are inevitably filtered into one's choices, particularly when in positions of power and decision-making. In light of this, the scholar proposes that instead of believing what we see, "we tend to see what we believe", which justifies the importance of studying the perceptions of such individuals as they hold the power to shape the structures in which they belong (DUERST-LAHTI, 1987, p. 15).

As predominantly male institutions are likely to create a particular mode of masculinized behavior that becomes the norm, the norm consequently becomes associated with the institution and reproduces itself almost invisibly. The assumption of neutrality promotes a disguised patriarchal structure with certain gender, racial and class norms that serve the reproduction of male interests and power, based on the "abstract discourse on rationality, rules and procedures" (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 27). The reproduction of the masculinized "norm" in international relations is reflected both in the small number of women acting in international politics as well as in the prioritization of characteristics understood as masculine for state behavior and survival. The construction of an equality between what is masculine with what is human legitimizes an international order in which there is little space for women or traits understood as feminine, taken as inauthentic and less-valued (TICKNER, 1992).

Feminist scholar Tickner (2001, p. 31) claims that such structures are gendered and "socially constructed, historically variable, and upheld through power relations that legitimizes them", and that the goal of a feminist scholar is to "make strange what has previously appeared familiar". Similarly, scholars such as Scott (1986) propose the use of gender as a useful category of historical analysis to help identify and signify both social and institutional relationships of power. In her view, a gender analysis is able to "decode" the meanings instilled in the "complex connections among various forms of human interaction", especially in politics (ibid., p. 1070). For this decoding, researchers must examine how both explicit and implicit "understandings of gender are being invoked and reinscribed" in a variety of relations involving women and the state, laws, labor, institutions and social structures (ibid., p. 1074).

Gender, here, is understood as "the socially constructed roles that define the characteristics, appropriate behavior, realms of activity, and roles assigned to men and women, in relationship to one another, within a given historical, cultural, and sociopolitical context" (GARNER, 2018, p. 1). In Western societies, gender has historically been associated with the binary male/female, also usually referring to white, middle- and upper-class, and heterosexual

men and women from the global North (ibid., p. 1). In this study, as we discuss the perceptions of government agents, diplomats and leaders of organized social movements, we presume a white and upper-class (and likely colonized) discourse on gender perceptions.

The gendering process presented by Acker (1990, p. 146), a subtle procedure that institutes notions of gender into organizations, usually begins with the quickest and easiest action at hand: "construction of divisions along the lines of gender", or in other words, the creation of sexual divisions of labor, of clearly defined places and behaviors allowed for men and women. This process also results in a "gendered division of diplomatic labor" that has assigned the public and representational work to men, and the domestic and supportive roles to women, who found themselves invisible as "non-state actors in the field of international politics" (JAMES; SLUGA, 2016, p. 7-8; McCARTHY, 2016, p. 179).

Sources and Methods

The archival research began in Rio de Janeiro, at the Center for Research and Documents of the Contemporary History of Brazil (*Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil*, CPDOC) at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). There, I explored the personal papers of Oswaldo Aranha and Luis Simões Lopes, where I found the most relevant documents relating to women in diplomacy as well as letters, reports and drafts on themes associated with DASP, Itaramaty, public administration, and foreign policy. Followed by the Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty,* AHI), where I focused my attention on documents around women's issues, public examinations and ministerial administrative reforms. Beyond the importance of the papers collected, the personal experience of being in the place where it all occurred, and where the only woman I encountered was the receptionist, was significant by itself.

Finally, at the National Archives (*Arquivo Nacional*), I dove into the records of FBPF, DASP and the Presidency. Immediately, I faced two restrictions. First, a significant part of FBPF's records were closed for public consultation because the documents were being digitalized, but they luckily became available online in early 2020. Second, I was limited to consulting only five folders per day as per Archives' rules, which restricted my research scope considering the lack of complete information on some of the records' inventories. As Araújo (2017, p. 26) described, DASP's papers are composed of "1404 archivist units, distributed in 841 boxes of documents", counting with only a "summary in the description of the content of each unit". Because of this complexity and daily limitations, I chose to focus on folders that dealt with matters of recruitment and public examinations in areas where the literature

suggested possible female bans, such as the engineer and inspector careers. Furthermore, in order to fill information gaps on DASP's work, I later gave greater attention to the Civil Service Journal (*Revista do Serviço Público*, RSP), a publication launched by CFSPC in November 1937 – immediately after the establishment of *Estado Novo* – as an instrument to inform public servants as well as to foment an administrative culture capable of promoting an *sprit de corps* in Brazilian public service and an "adequate mentality" toward efficiency and rationalization.[21] Physical RSP editions were found at the Library of Economics and Administration at the University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).

After the Rio de Janeiro archival trip, I noticed a difficulty in finding documents that dealt directly with women's issues, comparatively. My search led to many empty roads, but the silence, despite its frustration, is common in women's history and indicates the historical imbalances of power imbued in the "fact creation and fact assembly" of archives (FLORES-VILLALOBOS, 2019, p. 36). Dias (1984, p. 14) has said that information about women "hides itself, sparse and fragmented, between the lines of documents", emphasizing that it hovers "outside the central corpus of explicit content". In an attempt to complement and connect scattered information, I relied on Brazilian newspapers – accessed through the National Library's (*Biblioteca Nacional*) digital database – not only to find women's voices but also to understand how the issue of women in diplomacy was being presented and discussed publicly. Additionally, I visited the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), in College Park, Maryland, where I examined the type of information that the U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro was reporting back to the Department of State, which gave an indication of the level of importance provided by US officials to certain Brazilian events. Given the good relationship between Oswaldo Aranha and the U.S. government in the second half of the 1930s, and as Luis Simões Lopes admired and was inspired by the U.S. civil service, I also looked for how women were perceived in the public administration of that country, especially through the documents and publications of the Women's Bureau at the Department of Labor.

This study is thus built upon the interlacement of primary documental sources from different institutions and fundamental individuals that are connected to Itamaraty's decision to prohibit the access of women to the diplomatic career in 1938 in order to comprehend the perceptions from diversified and complementary perspectives. The focus of the analysis is the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and its relations with the Brazilian public administration, more

[21] "Revista do Serviço Público", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 5; Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 65.

specifically with CFSPC and DASP, as well as with the international system, via diplomatic practices conducted mostly by foreign service officers. The temporal analysis of the study encompasses documents that, generally, reach all of the Getúlio Vargas government, between 1930 and 1945, with a substantially higher volume of documents referring to the 1936 to 1938 interval. The documents collected were written in a variety of languages, mostly Portuguese, and the citations reproduced here have all been translated into English by me to the most literal interpretation possible.

The collection of primary documents was followed by a critical reading and analysis of the sources using gender as a category for historical analysis, and elements of Political History, emphasizing conventional political actors and sources (KARAWEJCZYK, 2013, p. 18; SCOTT, 1986).[22] The focus is on the political history of two actors/institutions that represent *one* of the possible viewpoints within the Getúlio Vargas government, which the study also does not take as unique or homogenous. We also took "rhetoric seriously" in the analysis of the texts collected to "illuminate motivations, convictions, and calculations" of decision-making actors, examining the way understandings of gender "establish meaning and construct social relationships" (HOGANSON, 1998, p. 14; CAULFIELD, 1993, p. 147). In order to "find gender in history", we valued textuality, or "the ways arguments are structured and presented", and assume that meaning is shared both explicit and implicitly (SCOTT, 1998, p. 7). This process brought to light an understanding of the power relations in the production of masculine and feminine ideals through discourse, and how it would ultimately brew a gendered structure that made possible and acceptable a decision to exclude women from the diplomatic career.

The study does not intend to identify with precision who was responsible for the women's ban to Itamaraty in 1938. The lack of irrefutable evidence on the specific decision-maker – unsigned and unpublished documents, absence of reference to the decision in Itamaraty's public announcements of the 1938 reform, lack of official exposition of motives, and only reactive responses to civil society protests – is by itself an indication that the individuals involved might have been conscious of its possible controversy.[23] Our intention is to pursue "meaningful explanation" rather than "universal, general causality", thus

[22] A cultural approach to Brazilian society's perceptions is beyond the scope of this research, and therefore I recognize the context limitations of the wider discussion of women in Brazilian society. The cultural history of the 1930s, tangentially present, serves mostly to frame the views of selected actors and institutions.

[23] Some examples of sources are: CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14; Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21; Oswaldo Aranha to Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, Fundo Rosalina Coelho Lisboa (RCL) c 1938.10.00; "A reforma do Ministério das Relações Exteriores", *Correio da Manhã*, October 19, 1938, p. 1.

apprehending the social and institutional motivators that led key powerful (male) individuals in Brazilian public administration to consider and decide in favor of the female prohibition (SCOTT, 1986, p. 1067). In fact, it matters less who decided, and more the conditions that enabled the decision in that moment in history, as well as what the justifications presented indicate about how women were understood and seen in the Brazilian society at the time.

Initially motivated by the question of why women were prohibited to register for the diplomacy entrance examinations in 1938, the research naturally led me to a common and diffuse assumption that women and diplomacy were incompatible. As women were in fact considered suited for other activities, I sought a deeper understanding of the perceptions that would be instrumentalized by certain men in power to decide on women's position in diplomacy, in public service, in the labor market, and ultimately in Brazilian society. I was led to wonder what I could grasp, from the justifications used in favor of female bans in certain job positions, about the social definition of women at this time in Brazilian and – to some extent – international history, that prioritized women in national, domestic, private, supportive, and usually invisible, functions. Therefore, I suggest that Itamaraty's decision is an example of how social perceptions of appropriate behavior for both men and women can influence and permeate institutions, limiting women's possibilities to act or, in other words, how ideologies are put into practice through legal measures, similarly to what Scott (1996) proposed:

> "Debates about gender typically invoked 'nature' to explain the differences between the sexes, but they sought to establish those differences definitively by legal means. By a kind of circular logic, a presumed essence of men and women became the justification for laws and policies when, in fact, this 'essence' (historically and contextually variable) was only the effect of those laws and policies" (SCOTT, 1996, p. ix).

In this sense, the research was guided by a set of questions that have supported the objective to comprehend the common perceptions and assumptions on gender that favored a sexual division of labor that limited women's capacity for action within Brazilian public administration. Some of the accompanying questions were: who had decision-making power to define women's position in diplomacy and in public service in general? How and which gender beliefs affected decision-makers? What roles were women expected to play? How the quest for rationalization and efficiency impacted women's positions in government? How did the international system, the upcoming war, and Brazil's international position influence female prohibition? How did the women see themselves in general and in reponse to the female ban in particular?

The first line of my argument is that the 1938 decision to ban the access of women to the diplomatic career in Brazil was not an isolated incident in the Brazilian public administration. Itamaraty's prohibition was the first of a series of other female bans in public examinations for positions that required a more public, social and political role. Understanding that social perceptions are incorporated into organizational structures through actors' power in political decision-making, the relationship between domestic (private) and non-domestic (public) life influenced perceptions around female work, family and domesticity, affecting women and men's social role and segregating them into distinct work positions. In light of this, entrance examinations to civil service positions represented a significant tool in solidifying gender norms, sexually dividing the spaces in which men and women could occupy in public service, and reinforcing women's subordinating and private roles – also assigning diplomacy as a political and public activity. For instance, the study conducted by Brazilian authorities on the issue of women's admissions into the diplomatic career seemed to indicate that the debate initially was on whether women should be allowed to serve overseas.[24] Women employees, therefore, were not undesired as a whole, but only on activities that represented political functions in the Ministry and the representation of Brazilian interests internationally, given that these roles, as it was perceived by Brazil's officials of the Vargas regime, could also compromise the ongoing modernization process that would seek a specific international participation to promote national development. Therefore, at the end of the day women were stripped of the opportunity to act as diplomats in its entirety.

The second line of my argument is that Itamaraty's prohibition was also not an isolated case in international affairs. Opportunities for women in foreign services around the globe were fairly restricted, which provided a set of ideal conditions that were used by members of the Brazilian government to start implementing a sexually divided vision of civil service. In light of a supposed special aspect of diplomacy and international representation, justifications against women's participation included perceptions that female representatives would be inefficient abroad because of social prejudices and their supposed mental and physical fragilities, consequently risking bilateral relations between countries. Masculine spaces of diplomatic interaction – from cigar lounges to golf courses –, as well as subjects considered inherently masculine, such as high politics, security and economics, should continue to be the sole responsibility of men, even as many women thrived in international movements and conferences mostly dealing with issues associated with femininity though, such as humanitarian

[24] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.

and social affairs. Furthermore, the logical incompatibility between being a female diplomat and a wife was persistently and vigorously remembered by foreign officials in many countries, particularly in the United States and Great Britain – countries that, as it will be shown, played an important role in our investigation given how they influenced Brazilian officials. As a result, most foreign services implemented either a formal or an implicit marriage ban for those women who insisted in joining diplomatic corps. It is impossible to overlook that women were allowed to serve internationally as diplomats only when they were deprived of the main aspect that defined them as women in that society: marriage and children. Only as single women they would be allowed to act publicly in the name of their country – alternatively, they could be diplomatic wives, a highly valued, unpaid, asset in diplomatic circles.

Division of chapters

The following pages begin with Chapter 1, which defines the two main actors of our story, Oswaldo Aranha and Luis Simões Lopes, and how they relate to each other, as well as to the 1938 Itamaraty Reform. It follows with a historical context of the Getúlio Vargas government and Brazil's society at the time, exploring the Brazilian feminist movement and its connections around the world (especially in the U.S.); the domestic politics that led to the *Estado Novo* coup of 1937; and the Brazilian foreign policy at the brink of World War II. Then, the chapter analyzes more deeply the rationalization process occurring in Brazilian public administration, with a magnifying glass into DASP and the Ministry of Foreign Relations, including the formation of the enabling conditions that culminated in limiting the diplomatic career only to candidates of the male sex in late 1930s in Brazil.

In chapter 2, we begin with an overview of why the Brazilian feminist movement suffered a severe blow after the establishment of the *Estado Novo* regime, losing almost all of its accomplishments, while the government introduced a number of family-based social policies and incorporated into its bureaucratic structure a masculinity discourse that had a direct impact on women's role within public service. We analyze the phenomenon of the feminization of certain office occupations to explore the role of DASP in determining a sexual division of labor in Brazilian public administration via the merit-based recruitment system. The common perceptions presented here assume that women were not allowed to occupy positions that had a political function, being confined instead to positions of assistance. There also seemed to be an understanding that positions that demanded travel and activities outside walled offices were not suitable for women. Finally, the chapter wraps up taking into consideration that the 1938 decision might also have reflected an irrational (male) fear that women were becoming

interested in the diplomatic career on "alarming proportions", as well as the female higher approval rates in diplomatic examinations throughout the 1930s.[25]

Finally, chapter 3 begins with a historical and theoretical overview of gender issues in diplomacy, focusing on the changes occurring in diplomatic practice between the First and Second World Wars. We then present a discussion on how different understandings of the public/private dichotomy relates to women in diplomacy, which serves to orient the remaining sections of the chapter, always backed by comparisons between justifications against women's presence with the experiences of those few women that were already part of international politics, in order to examine the validity of official arguments. The first common perception was that women were considered adequate only for positions within the country – nationally and privately – that did not require representing overseas. Secondly, diplomacy was characterized by informal male-dominated spaces of interaction and masculine topics of discussions, segregating women into negotiating "women's issues". At last, the chapter ends with a study of the celibacy/marriage dichotomy, as women in diplomacy were ultimately seen as a potential risk for marital hierarchy and family formation. In sum, women would be judged as inapt to diplomacy because of their presumed incapacity to obtain respect from peers, physical and emotional fragility, inability to discuss "hard politics", and natural tendency for marriage and motherhood – in addition to the uncertain position of the diplomat's husband.

[25] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.

CHAPTER 1 - All the President's Men: the decision-making power of Oswaldo Aranha and Luis Simões Lopes

The decision to prohibit women's access to Brazil's diplomatic career, as part of the Ministry of Foreign Relations administrative reform of October 14th, 1938, is significant in many aspects. This episode symbolizes a moment of important changes in Getúlio Vargas' government and needs to be understood as part of a wider process of rationalization and modernization of the Brazilian state and public service. Ascending to power by means of the so-called "Revolution of 1930" and imposing a provisional government, Getúlio Vargas employed a critical rhetoric against the previous oligarchical regime to justify political centralization and reconstruction efforts, while claiming to truly represent the Brazilian people. After being indirectly elected president by Congress in 1934, he staged a coup d'état three years later, in November 1937, establishing *Estado Novo* (New State), an authoritarian regime loosely inspired by fascist European models that lasted until 1945, when the decision to support the Allies in the Second World War made domestic authoritarianism unfeasible.[1] Itamaraty's decision, thus, happened in a moment that the new regime was consolidating itself as an authoritarian dictatorship.

Gomes (1980) argued that strong political regimes, such as the one under Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945), would engage a democratization and rationalization discourse to give certain individuals just enough power "to draw the limits of the political space to be democratized", while simultaneously advancing institutional mechanisms to neutralize compromising tendencies in political and social life (p. 30). Applying the thought to this research, which focuses on the Brazilian diplomatic service, those in power during *Estado Novo* could and did control the space available for women to act in international politics, consequently also defining their role in Brazilian public service, with the help of a masculinizing rhetoric disguised as rationalization and efficiency. The state, according to Draibe (2004, p. 16), manifesting itself as a strong and modern bureaucratic apparatus, would incorporate and politicize social interests, such as women's rights, mediating how society understood and exercised them in practice. This process would frame the possibilities and limits of such interests in order not to compromise the larger framework of what was defined as "national interest". Within the state bureaucracy,

[1] Bethell and Roxborough (1992) discuss the similar experiences amidst Latin American countries in the post-World War II, characterized by "interrelated phenomena" that first saw a wave of democratization and resurgence of the left, directly followed by stricter government control and containment.

the Administrative Department of the Public Service (*Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público*, DASP), which claimed to hold "the interest of the Nation above all else", had the specific ability to define the positions in which women were allowed to serve in public service, particularly via entrance examination requirements, and, consequently, had an influence on the labor market.[2] The other crucial bureaucratic institution that reproduced DASP's vision and act as a pioneer in the ongoing rationalization process was the Ministry of Foreign Relations (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*, MRE, also known as Itamaraty), which found comfort in prohibiting women domestically owing to how the international system at the time perceived women diplomats as an oxymoron.

Whereas DASP had the power to define the role of women in Brazilian society, Itamaraty applied the first executive order toward the implementation of that definition. Thus, this chapter aims to uncover who were the small handful of powerful men that had the privilege to easily exclude women from an entire profession, and, with a single decision, were able to define gendered norms of behavior that would have a much larger impact on the position of women in Brazilian society. We look closely into the institutions and their respective leaders, Luis Simões Lopes and Oswaldo Aranha, to explain how they were involved in the decision-making process to prohibit the access of women into the diplomatic career.

The chapter starts by defining these main actors and the how they relate to each other and to the 1938 Itamaraty Reform. It follows with a historical context of the Getúlio Vargas government, exploring domestic politics, the Brazilian feminist movement and Brazilian foreign policy in international relations. Then, it analyzes more deeply the rationalization process occurring in Brazilian public administration, with a magnifying glass into DASP and Itamaraty and the formation of the enabling conditions that culminated in limiting the diplomatic career only to candidates of the male sex.

1 The power to decide – Actors and institutions

1.1 Oswaldo Aranha

Oswaldo Aranha was a lawyer from the state of Rio Grande do Sul who served as Justice Secretary in Getúlio Vargas governor administration of the same state (1928-1930). Considered

[2] "Discurso do Sr. Luís Simões Lopes, Presidente do DASP", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 8. As will be further discussed below, DASP inherited the Federal Council of the Civil Public Service's work (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*, CFSPC), after the establishment of *Estado Novo* in 1937. Throughout this research, these two institutions will be used as synonyms, taking into consideration that CFSPC initiated much of the projects and measures that DASP continued and expanded, and that historical documents for both institutions are normally archived together.

a young leader of the radical wing of the Revolution of 1930, Aranha was a personal friend of Vargas and immediately joined the new government as Minister of Justice, where he stayed for one year before being appointed as Minister of Finance (HILTON, 1977, p. 30). A politician rather than a career diplomat, Oswaldo Aranha joined Itamaraty in 1934, when appointed as Brazilian ambassador to the United States, achieving great prestige domestically and internationally during his time overseas. The Office of the U.S. Military Attaché in Brazil, for instance, reported to the Department of State in 1931 that Aranha was "to be regarded as one of the high lights of the present government", considered a "strong man" with great influence in the country's high administration, to the point that, when there were diverging opinions, "that of Oswaldo Aranha almost invariably […] prevailed".[3] The U.S.-Brazil cooperation was cultivated and strengthened during Aranha's tenure as ambassador, an "alliance that would be revealed as decisive" for the next few years as the world succumbed into another world war (ALMEIDA, ARAÚJO, 2013, p. 670). Aranha was also marveled by his U.S. experience. In a personal letter to Vargas, he wrote that he saw Brazil as a "tepid, sweaty and lazy" country, on top of prejudiced, in comparison with the U.S., where he saw Americans engulfed in "the spirit of justice, the sentiment of freedom, the inclination for pacifism, [and] the philanthropic breadth".[4]

Two years into his ambassadorship, Oswaldo Aranha also expressed to president Vargas his disgust toward the current Brazilian diplomatic corps, urging for its renovation. Reporting on a conversation with the Dutch ambassador to Cuba, "taken as one of the most beautiful women diplomats", Aranha commented that she lamented some "incident" involving the Brazilian ambassador on the island. As he failed to dismiss the fact, Aranha explained he had to "swallow with sadness this embarrassment for us". It is not possible to know from the letter whether the "incident" involved harassment, drunkenness, impoliteness or some minor mistake on the Brazilian ambassador's part, but, nonetheless, Aranha felt the need to point out the beauty of the Dutch ambassador firsthand as an important fact about the story.[5]

This anecdote served to introduce a section of the letter in which Oswaldo Aranha exposed his opinions about Brazilian diplomats more generally. Advocating that "it is not possible for us to continue to be represented by people that only demoralize the country",

[3] Office of Military Attaché, Brazil, n. 993, October 26, 1931. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, Central Decimal Files (CDF) 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 1, 832.00/760, p. 7. These statements were part of a one-page profile of Oswaldo Aranha that discussed his active involvement in resolving recent political crises in the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais.
[4] Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, November 11, 1935, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1935.11.11, p. 3-4.
[5] Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, March 10, 1936, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1936.03.10/1, p. 3-4.

Aranha suggested that any reform should attempt to "clean [the diplomatic corps] of this class of people". Pointing out that Brazil was "a new country, without international strength and prestige", the Brazilian selection process for new diplomats should be "the most rigorous and demanding possible", as diplomats often act completely alone abroad and could easily compromise the country's image. He continued to judge the current staff, breaking down his opinions by class categories, starting with the "precarious" Ambassadors, calling some of them *"miolo mole"*, "drunk", and "clown".[6] Next in the diplomatic hierarchy, he recognized that some First Class Ministers were good individuals, whereas the Second Class Ministers, on the other hand, were "much worse, with people who are deaf, with no shame, crazy and even blacks".[7] Even as he identified some two or three excellent diplomats – usually those who have "character", "political vision" and favor the public interests over personal affects – Aranha clearly seemed to favor administrative reforms aimed at changing the composition of the diplomatic corps, a group of "useless people", in order to achieve greater prestige abroad.[8]

Brazilian politics, however, would once again require Aranha's full attention. Prior to the establishment of *Estado Novo* in November 1937 there was a series of rumors circulating about the possibility of an Oswaldo Aranha presidential candidacy. The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported to the Department of State in early 1937 that Aranha, while publicly declaring he was not a candidate, had said he would "be glad to do his patriotic duty and return to Brazil in order to act as mediator, whatever that may mean".[9] Later in August of the same year, as political tensions in Brazil worsened, the Embassy noted rumors that "Aranha's friends will attempt to induce him to return to Brazil as a third [presidential] candidate".[10] There is no proof, however, that these rumors were indeed true.

Oswaldo Aranha, in fact, initially seemed dissatisfied with the political developments that led to the *Estado Novo* coup, having said to Sumner Welles, U.S. Undersecretary of State, that he believed "Vargas would not continue as President beyond his present term", and if some action were to be taken in that direction, he "would be obliged to oppose [Vargas], not

---

[6] The literal translation for "*miolo mole*" is "soft core", but metaphorically it could be used as "crazy" or "dumb".
[7] Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, March 10, 1936, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1936.03.10/1, p. 4. The question of race in Brazil in the interwar years is significant and complex, although beyond the scope of this thesis. For race in Brazil at this time see, for instance: Dávila (2003); Seigel (2009); and Weinstein (2015). For race in Brazilian diplomacy see: Fontaine (1970); Oliveira (2011); and Gobo (2018).
[8] Ibid., p. 4; Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, November 11, 1935, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1935.11.11, p. 3-4.
[9] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 1241, January 6, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 2, 832.00/1010, p. 3.
[10] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 15, August 28, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 2, 832.00/1048, p. 3.

personally, but on the principles involved".[11] Nonetheless, his loyalty to the Revolution's cause became clear as he accepted the position of Minister of Foreign Relations for the *Estado Novo* regime, saying that 1930 ideals were now "reinvigorated" and their failure "would be the death of Brazil".[12] Aranha would be an essential, respected and highly-influential member of the Vargas government, which ultimately led him to be appointed as chief of the Brazilian delegation at the newly-established United Nations in 1947, the same year that Brazil acted as president of the Security Council. As president of the UN General Assembly for two consecutive terms, Aranha gained a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize mainly for his leadership during the international negotiations that created the state of Israel, for which he would long be remembered. Oswaldo Aranha represents, up to this day, a valuable figure for the Brazilian diplomatic imagery (MOREIRA, 2010).[13]

1.2 Luis Simões Lopes

Entering public service in 1925 "as the majority of employees entered then, without taking examinations", Luis Simões Lopes joined the Ministry of Agriculture in a position created when his father, Ildefonso Simões Lopes, acted as Minister (1919-1922).[14] He became involved in the revolutionary campaign of the Liberal Alliance (*Aliança Liberal)* also following his father's footsteps, who was then the party's vice-president.[15] After the Revolution of 1930, Getúlio Vargas asked Lopes to help him handle the "hundreds of people" that suddenly wanted to reach the new president, working in his Civil Cabinet until 1936.[16] In a testimony in 1990, Lopes said that during those years, he discovered that "before 1930 there was no government", and that the situation of the Brazilian public administration was "pitiful", with terribly low levels of efficiency, credibility and honor, due to years of a "regime eminently political".[17] Lopes would begin to understand then the importance of an organized and competent civil service, capable of executing the ideas and orders of government leaders.[18] Influenced greatly

[11] NABUCO, M. *Reflexões e Reminiscências.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2001, p. 131; Sumner Welles, Conversation, October 18, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 2, 832.00/1065, p. 1.
[12] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 956, October 14, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 3, 832.00/1230, p. 2.
[13] At the virtual library of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), a branch of Itamaraty responsible for publicizing materials and research related to Brazilian foreign policy and diplomatic history, Oswaldo Aranha is subject of a two-volume biographical collection of speeches entitled "A Brazilian Statesman" (Lima, Almeida, Farias, 2017). Furthermore, a chapter in the series called "Brazilian Diplomatic Thought" is dedicated to Aranha under the title "Continuing Rio Branco's statesmanship" (ALMEIDA, ARAÚJO, 2013, p. 669).
[14] Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 1-2.
[15] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 2-4.
[16] Ibid., p. 12
[17] Ibid., p. 25; Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 1.
[18] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 15.

by the U.S. experience, Lopes attempted to "break suddenly and dramatically with the past", making use of the idea that "you cannot progress a underdeveloped country without a good government" (SIEGEL, 1978, p. 49).[19]

When appointed for membership at the Federal Council of the Civil Public Service in 1937 (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*, CFSPC) – later voted President of the Council – Lopes wrote to Vargas affirming he would work with enthusiasm for the rationalization of public service, later describing himself as a "young dreamer" who aspired to "give [the] country a commendable, competent and genuine civil service".[20] In his eight years heading DASP's efforts to achieve these goals, Lopes did not lose faith in the benefits of public examinations for personnel recruitment. However, he came to the realization that excellency in recruitment was complicated when the pool of able applicants was small due to the country's education system incapacity to form such individuals – he affirmed that DASP only approved around ten per cent of exam-takers throughout the years.[21] Lopes' next career move was to help improve the issue of incompetent and unprepared applicants and qualify individuals in matters of public administration, business management and economics. For this he founded the *Fundação Getúlio Vargas* (FGV), considered today one of Brazil's leading universities and think thanks, where he acted as president from 1944 until 1993, one year before his death.[22]

1.3 The Power to Decide

It was not possible, throughout the research, to identify with precision who was responsible for the decision to prohibit women from registering to the diplomacy exam. We can, however, assume a few significant and influential decision-makers. The lack of irrefutable evidence on the discussions around this measure is in itself a confirmation of the sensitivity of the topic. The individuals who suggested and allowed it might have been conscious of its controversy. Our search for documents led to many empty roads, but the silence, despite its frustration, is common in women's history. Dias (1984) called attention to the fact that information about women "hides itself, sparse and fragmented, between the lines of documents", emphasizing that it hovers "outside the central *corpus* of explicit content". The researcher must, therefore, "gather very scattered data and break down the implicit" (p. 14).

---

[19] Ibid., p. 28.
[20] Luis Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, January 15, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, GV c 1937.01.15, p. 1; Lopes, L.S., "Cinquenta Anos da Reforma Administrativa", July 28, 1988, CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L.S. 1988.07.28, p. 1.
[21] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 17.
[22] For more on Lopes' impressions on the creation of *Fundação Getúlio Vargas*, see LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, starting on page 52.

The search began with two main documents that were explored in previous studies on the subject (FARIAS, 2017; FRIAÇA, 2018). The first document is a Brazilian government report containing a translation of parts of a study from the British Foreign Office that in 1936 decided that "the case for admission" of women into diplomatic and consular services had not been "convincingly made" (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 309).[23] In addition to this Portuguese translation, the document also presents a summary of arguments compiled by the cabinet of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations on what would be the Brazilian understanding of the subject, greatly reproducing the arguments used in the British study, which is presented as a subsidy.[24] The second document is a letter exchange between Oswaldo Aranha, as Minister of Foreign Relations, and the feminist organization Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (*Federação Brasileira para o Progresso Feminino*, FBPF), headed by Brazilian suffragist Bertha Lutz, prior to the publication of the reform that banned women's access to Itamaraty in October 1938.[25] In Aranha's response to FBPF's protest against the rumors that women would not be allowed to serve abroad, he replicates much of the arguments seen in the first document, as we will further discuss in Chapter 3.

What is curious about the first of these documents is the lack of signature from any one individual when the Brazilian opinion is presented, and, even though it says it is a study by the cabinet office at MRE, the letterhead of the document is from CFSPC and it is archived in Luis Simões Lopes private papers. As no definite authorship can be assigned, it is viable to assume CFSPC and Itamaraty would have collaborated in this study considering the intertwined relationship between the two institutions, which will be detailed below. Although the subject of women diplomats was certainly in Itamaraty's interests, it seems natural that CFSPC would be consulted in any administrative reform being orchestrated at the time, especially one that touched upon the subject of public examinations, just as Siegel (1978) argued that "all personnel actions in the government either passed through DASP or were audited by it" (p. 64). Similarly, Simões Lopes highlighted in a 1938 CFSPC report that one of its purposes was to conduct studies about positions in each public career to evaluate the necessary abilities required of potential candidates.[26] On Itamaraty reforms, in fact, the Civil Service Journal (*Revista do Serviço Público*, RSP), a creation and production of CFSPC and later of DASP, mentioned

[23] As we will see in Chapter 3, in the U.K. women were allowed to enter foreign service only in 1946.
[24] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.
[25] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21.
[26] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 10.

explicitly, but with no greater detail, that the reform at the Ministry of Foreign Relations was among those that either "had its origins at DASP, or from it received efficient collaboration".[27] This can attest for one of the reasons why the study on women's access to the diplomatic career can be found in CFSPC's papers, in the same folder as a two-page document that presents a justification for another measure of the same reform, the unification of the diplomatic and consular careers – whose main argument was that "rare were the countries that do not possess the integral fusion of both these services".[28]

The fact that the document is archived with Luis Simões Lopes' papers also hints at his personal interest in the matter. As president of CFSPC, he might have at least read this document and agreed to it, since the measure came into effect, and the arguments presented were replicated by both Lopes and Aranha in later documents. When searching DASP's papers in the *Arquivo Nacional* in Rio de Janeiro, especially in folders containing documents related to Itamaraty or public examinations, we found nothing related to women's issues or access to the diplomatic career. We did find, however, a number of letters of complaints addressed to President Getúlio Vargas about other examinations also forbidden to women in later years of *Estado Novo*, such as for engineer and inspector careers. The responses to these complaints all offered similar justifications, with Lopes offering DASP's position in almost all of them. These justifications will be further analyzed in the following chapter.

Amidst the Historical Archives of Itamaraty we found a folder heavy with documents relating to the 1938 Oswaldo Aranha Reform. It includes many papers detailing the workings of chancelleries around the world, with greater attention paid to the U.S. Foreign Service, in addition to letters from consuls and diplomats offering suggestions, studies evaluating the previous administrative reform of 1931, and draft versions of sections for the new reform. Almost lost in this folder is a letter addressed to the Minister from July 1st, 1938, signed by ten women who at the time worked in Itamaraty as consuls demanding that their rights be guaranteed under the new reform as they had recently learned about a study prepared on the "convenience or not of the designation of [women] to exercise their duties abroad".[29] Here we wondered why the study mentioned – which supposedly is the one found in Lopes' papers – is not also archived in this folder that deals specifically with issues and debates on the 1938

[27] "As Atividades do DASP em 1938: Relatório apresentado ao Sr. Presidente da República", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. II, n. 1-2, April-May 1939, p. 99.
[28] CFSPC, "Justificação", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 2.
[29] Consuls to Oswaldo Aranha, "Memorial", July 1, 1938, Arquivo Histório do Itamaraty (AHI), DT-MRE, Code 300.13, Lata 866, Maço 13096.

reform. Furthermore, the women seemed to not have had access to the study, to which we could infer they were not consulted on the subject.

A common theme between this and FBPF's letter to Oswaldo Aranha is that both seemed to understand that the discussions were around whether women should be allowed to serve overseas, which is very different – although equally problematic – from what the reform ultimately imposed: the prohibition of women from entering the diplomatic career altogether. At which moment and under which circumstances did the conversation change and took that turn? Perhaps the men who decided to ban women might have found this to be the most convenient way to deal with the question of the suitability of women as foreign representatives, but we do not know how this came about.

We looked even further to try to find more information about this decision. We checked, unsuccessfully, the minutes of CFPSC meetings and explanatory statements of its legal acts throughout 1937 and 1938 to find any indication that the issue might have been discussed.[30] We examined Itamaraty's annual reports and also found silence on women's positions. On their note to the press about the reform, the Ministry completely ignored the new directive to forbid women, preferring to focus on the amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular careers.[31] With the help of newspapers, on the other hand, we glimpsed at the notion that the subject was indeed sensitive, even though there were no explicit criticisms of the measure. In the instances when the press reported on the reform, the female exclusion was often on the headlines, even if the article was short or solely informative.[32] Two days after the new regulation, nonetheless, the daily *Correio da Manhã* published a sarcastic editorial on the subject, demeaning diplomacy as a profession when saying that women would not be allowed into the diplomatic career because they must have failed recent tests of "bridge", "cocktails" and "chitchat".[33]

Additionally, the measure was not ignored by the U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro in its weekly reports to the Secretary of State. Ten days after the new directive, the report explained the Aranha Reform as similar to the 1924 Rogers Act in the American Foreign Service, which combined the consular and diplomatic careers, and explicitly mentioned that, even as there were

---

[30] Meeting minutes and explanation of reasons can be found in the last section of all editions of *Revista do Serviço Público* for those years.

[31] "A reforma do Ministério das Relações Exteriores", *Correio da Manhã*, October 19, 1938, p. 1.

[32] See, for instance: "Dada nova organização ao Ministério das Relações Exteriores", *Correio da Manhã,* October 15, 1938, p. 14; "Assinada a reforma do Itamaraty", *Jornal do Brasil,* October 15, 1938, p. 6; "Só homens e brasileiros", *A Notícia*, October 16, 1938, p. 14.

[33] "Pingos e Respingos", *Correio da Manhã,* October 16, 1938, p. 2. The U.S. Military Attaché said in 1934 that the daily *Correio da Manhã*, "although not outspoken in support of present government, appears to be favored in the giving out of official information" (Military Attaché, Brazil, Report Brazilian Press, n. 1253, March 26, 1934. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 48, 832.911/17, p.4).

ten women ranked as Consuls, "only male candidates are eligible to take the entrance examination". This report, once it arrived at the Division of Latin-American Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, was accompanied by a small note summarizing its main points, where once again the prohibition of "women candidates for the career positions" was highlighted, suggesting this was indeed a significant issue.[34] In the following year, when DASP opened registrations for new Itamaraty examinations, the U.S. Embassy once again noted that "women are no longer eligible to stand examinations as candidates" and attached a newspaper clipping from *Correio da Manhã* entitled: "Only for men, the examinations for diplomats".[35]

The quest for information, with very tangential results, is its own indication of how women were understood and treated as we enter the historical imbalances and the power structures imbued in the "fact creation and fact assembly" of archives. The "archival vacuum" not only reflects the silencing of women and their subjugation, but it is "an active strategy of power" of those in a position to make something a fact and save it for future generations (FLORES-VILLALOBOS, 2019, p. 36). Women clearly did not have enough power to make a political decision about their ambitions. Men would decide, exercising and confirming their power to do so, without consultation, based on their own social perceptions of women's roles – and they might have willingly decided not to record the process.

We will now further explore the role of Oswaldo Aranha and Luis Simões Lopes within their respective institutions and within the greater context of Brazilian history.

2 Historical Context

Getúlio Vargas ascended to power by means of the so-called "Revolution of 1930", which ended the 40-year First Republic and immediately installed a provisional government. The political change combined not only "internal dissensions" but also the economic pressure exerted by the Great Depression of 1929, which gave pulse to an urgent need to revise the government's *modus operandi* (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 26). Scholars of this period agree on the turbulent aspect of the following seven years, in which the Executive centralized its power, inflated the state bureaucracy, and switched economic directions.[36] Additionally, São Paulo revolted into a civil war, the country implemented a new Electoral Code and Constitution,

[34] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 972, October 25, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.021/51, p. 1-2.
[35] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 2179, December 7, 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.021/62. The attached newspaper clipping is dated December 2nd, 1939.
[36] See Gomes (1980); Levine (1980); McCann (1995); Skidmore (2007); Fausto (2013); and Gomes (2013).

extremist and violent movements surged left and right, and the international system was at the brink of a new world war. To end this bumpy ride, Vargas and his allies staged a coup in 1937.

The deposition of the previous oligarchic regime in 1930 was possible, according to Fausto (1978), as different interest groups came together and occupied the political space available, due to a hegemonic crisis within the dominating oligarchic class, mainly from the coffee-state of São Paulo (p. 103). Regional non-coffee dominating classes joined forces with a "considerable portion of the state military apparatus", as well as with social forces reflected in the growing urban middle class – and a "diffuse presence of popular masses" – and brought Vargas to power in 1930 (FAUSTO, 1978, p. 102-103). This "eclectic grouping", that Fausto (1978) called a "front constituted of forces of diverse natures", could not wield sufficient clout to offer a coherent basis for state legitimacy (p. 104; HILTON, 1977, p. 30). In what Weffort (2003) saw as a solution to compromise, the factions in power tacitly agreed that no one single group exclusively possessed the political power to make their own interest "serve as the basis for the political expression of general interests" (p. 53-54). As a result of this arrangement, the state gained autonomy from the dominating, but no longer hegemonic, political interests, and would exert "the role of arbiter between these interests", maneuvering an equilibrium and seeking legitimacy to govern from the urban masses (DRAIBE, 2004, p. 17).

According to Draibe (2004), this was the moment the Executive state rose as the main institution of political power, as the main driver of structural changes, showing itself "directly, with no mediations, to all citizens" as the only legitimate decision-maker on public policy, which was, in turn, presented as "national interest" (p. 17-18). With this understanding, Vargas said that the complexity of the nation's problems "enlarged the State's power to act" – the state being personified in himself –, viewing a more direct intervention in socio-economic matters as an obligation of modern life.[37] Because of its enhanced power and easiness to define socio-economic norms and implement a series of reforms, the U.S. Military Attaché in Brazil would seem comfortable with calling the new regime a "dictatorship" already in 1933.[38]

Nevertheless, Gomes (1980) and Skidmore (2007) saw two main groups emerge and compete for political dominance on those first years. One was the dissident oligarchy, which Skidmore called the "constitutionalists", who defended "classical liberal ideals", such as elections, universal, secret and direct suffrage, civil liberties, and federalism. Their greatest

[37] VARGAS, G. "Mensagem lida perante a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte", November 15, 1933. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. III. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 135.
[38] Military Attaché, Brazil, n. 1192, November 8, 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 10, 832.011/21, p. 1.

victory was the Electoral Code of 1932 and the direct election for a Constituent Assembly shortly after. The second group, called "semi-authoritarian nationalists" by Skidmore, was headed by the *tenentistas*. These young lieutenants and its followers called for greater centralization of power in the Executive, state intervention in social and economic matters, and a strong and rational government, characteristics that scholars usually associate with the Vargas Era more generally. The *tenentistas* also propagated preferences for non-democratic, elitist and antipolitical structures, luring "the emergence of Brazil as a modern nation" through the work of enlightened technocrats "bestowed with an inflexible sense of national mission". Their achievement was the introduction of an idea of "social democracy" into the new 1934 Constitution – a notion that assumed that social legislation could promote national development, carried out by the state as the legitimate representative of the Brazilian people (GOMES, 1980, p. 26-28, 36; SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 27-28; FAUSTO, 1978, p. 109-110).

Interestingly, during the provisional government, and perhaps because of the compromise between the forces aspiring for hegemonic power, the Brazilian feminist movement achieved some of its greatest successes and political concessions. The Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (FBPF), launched in 1922, would become the most important and well-known organization in the fight for women's political rights during the Vargas era.[39] It was led by Bertha Lutz, Brazil's famous suffragist who benefited from a network of international feminist contacts developed during her travels as a Brazilian representative in international congresses.[40] Certainly sympathetic toward the "constitutionalist" group, Lutz held a strong belief in the power of public policies to obtain universal and permanent benefits for women. While engaging in intense lobbying and political action, her liberal vision of equality between the sexes aimed to "persuade men that feminist demands did not constitute a threat to social order" (MARQUES, 2016a, p. 22).[41]

Bertha Lutz later recalled that, at the onset of the Revolution of 1930, when it seemed that the principles of "orderly and pacific political evolution" were to be dismantled, she proposed the non-interference of FPBF into political affairs and the maintenance of an observer status.[42] Nonetheless, Lutz and FBPF were soon after invited for an audience with Getúlio

[39] For the history of the Brazilian feminist movement, see: Besse (1999), Hahner (1990), Karawejczyk (2013), Saffioti (2013), and Soihet (2013).
[40] On Lutz' international work, see: Marques (2013); Marino (2014); Marques (2016a); and Marino (2019).
[41] Lutz would write that the feminist movement she led were guided by the following principles: "economic emancipation through work, intellectual emancipation through education, legal and political emancipation through the female participation in the formulation, application and judgement of the law" (Lutz, B. "O papel das mulheres no trabalho mundial", [n.d.], Arquivo Nacional (AN), Fundo FBPF, Q0.BLZ, PIN.TXT.21, p. 1).
[42] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 61-62. The Bertha Lutz recollections of the 1930-1937 period were for a future

Vargas, considered an unprecedented movement of his part although also testifying his abilities as arbiter of political interests. In that occasion, according to Lutz, the president promised them he would grant the women's vote.[43] Sometime later, the commission in charge of proposing the new electoral system seemed to be circling around whether single and married women could have the same civil ability to vote.[44] Carmen Portinho, one of FBPF's directors, manifested the position of the organization in a direct conversation with Vargas, saying that "what we want is all or nothing. And really what we want is everything: the vote for all Brazilian women".[45] At last, to FBPF's joy, the Electoral Code declared that any citizen over 21 years old, with no distinction of sex, would be considered a voter.[46] Vargas, in accordance with his frequent rhetoric of breaking away from the previous regime, publicly stated a few months later that the women's suffrage was among the measures that baffled election manipulators of the past as it had the potential to "mobilize new reserves of social energy".[47]

In the elections for members of the Constituent Assembly the following year, Bertha Lutz unsuccessfully campaigned for a seat and, in the meantime, published 13 principles to guide the Constitution, which included equality between sexes and a set of other liberal propositions (MARQUES, 2016a, p. 55). Even though Lutz did not win a seat, Marques (2016a) identified that the Federation had an influence in nine articles of the 1934 Constitution, including legal equality of men and women, equal access to positions in public service, universal suffrage, equality in salary and maternity leave.[48] Lutz was later elected as an alternate federal deputy, being inaugurated in 1936 after the death of the original seat-holder.[49] During

book on the Brazilian feminist movement. They can be found as an audio file (Projeto de livro sobre o histórico do Movimento Feminista Brasileiro (38 minutes), 1971, AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, APR.ELC.DSO.11) and also transcribed into a slightly more succinct and censored text ("A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 61-76). It is also recounted in Marques (2016a).

[43] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 63.

[44] For a more complete study about the Brazilian Civil Code and the conditions of married women under the tutelage of their husbands, see Marques e Melo (2008).

[45] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 64.

[46] Decree n. 21.076, February 24, 1932, Art. 2.

[47] VARGAS, G. "A Revolução e o Regime Legal", May 14, 1932. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. II. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 55.

[48] In 1934/1935, Brazil also ratified a series of conventions from the International Labor Organization that discussed women's work, including one on protecting maternity and another prohibiting night work for women. Also, some of these constitutional guarantees had already been incorporated into labor legislation via the Decree 21.417-A of 1932. See: Motta and Galvão (2020).

[49] However, Carlota Pereira de Queirós had already won the title of the first Brazilian woman elected to Congress in 1934. A professor and activist of the 1932 Revolution in São Paulo, Queirós did not share the FBPF's understanding of feminism, women's rights and the importance of women's presence in politics (MARQUES, 2016a, p. 60). Additionally, see Marques (2016a) for a comprehensive understanding of Lutz' mobilization campaign and work in Congress.

the little more than a year that Congress remained opened, Lutz fought to establish a Women's Statute and to create a "Department of Women's Labor, Maternity, Childhood and Home", preferably female run and based on the works of the Women's and Children's Bureau of the United States.[50] The entirety of her campaign in Congress was to ensure support for women's workers and, above all, for the recognition "that an adult woman is not [equivalent to] a child, but a citizen instead".[51]

2.1 Years 1934-1938

The year of 1934 brought into effect not only a new Constitution but also the indirect election of Getúlio Vargas as President for another four years. These developments happened at the same time as the weakening of the political groups that had emerged in 1930. As the revolutionary regime matured, *tenentismo* slowly began to lose its clout as an autonomous force due to its lack of cohesion and popular base; its ideals, however, lingered on (FAUSTO, 1978). Gomes (1980) argued that, for some members of the Vargas' circle, the new Charter was among the main motivators for the coup staged in 1937, as it was perceived as "too liberal for its time" (p. 25). Within this group was Francisco Campos, who had acted as Minister of Education and said that the new Constitution "frustrated" the Revolution and "was out of date when adopted", with its mechanisms making it "difficult to take any positive action".[52] The 1934 Constitution did not facilitate, according to this view, the direction on which the country should embark, and represented an obstacle in the intention to transform the state into the "only and legitimate heir of the Revolution of 1930", ideally through the elimination of extremists, political parties, Congress and autonomous representations of any kind (GOMES, 1980, p. 25). As defenders of rationalization, such individuals also claimed that the excesses of liberal constitutionalism were the root of inefficiency, mainly because of its lack of discipline, leadership, and national pride (LEVINE, 1980, p. 231).

The fading political groups, however, were soon eclipsed by "more ambitious" movements that successfully gathered a nation-wide support base and engaged in a radicalized discourse, both left and right (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 41-42).[53] The growing communist threat, in part fabricated by the government and also intensified by a failed revolt attempt in 1935 by the Brazilian Communist Party, offered the "ideal justification for the repression of the left",

[50] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 71; and Marques (2016a, p. 18).
[51] Ibid.
[52] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 186, December 10, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 3, 832.00/1138, p. 1-2.
[53] A thorough analysis of the extremist groups of this time can be found in Levine (1980).

which Vargas took as a way to consolidate its centralization and authoritarian efforts (SKIDMORE, 2007, p.43, LEVINE, 1980, p. 185). As a consequence, the Law of National Security was quickly approved, and the country would be governed under a State of Emergency for the next two years, making the newly-established Constitution inoperative (GOMES, 1980, p. 37).[54] Levine (1980) argued that Vargas flourished after 1935, fully assimilating the role of moderator of internal disagreements and identifying ascending forces in order to incorporate them into his political orbit. Simultaneously, he attempted to silence extremist oppositional groups, "sacrificing civil liberties in order to secure political stability and national unity" (ibid., p. 32). The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported on the apparent political disorganization in 1935, when "no authority or sense of official responsibility exist[ed]", except for Vargas' position as a "political fixer", capable of increasing the independence of the federal executive through "balancing the possibly dangerous forces one against the other".[55]

Bertha Lutz, for instance, even though clearly against the revolutionary movement of 1930 and the way politics were carried out in subsequent years, slowly started to show a personal appreciation for Getúlio Vargas' supposed commitment to women's rights, and would seem to disassociate her admiration for the dictator from his general politics. In letters to Carrie Chapman Catt, a U.S. senior feminist, Lutz often expressed deep sadness and criticism toward some political measures, but she fails to mention Vargas' name, only referring to actions of the "Government".[56] She would become part of his political orbit. Despite all of the feminist achievements of the first years of the Vargas Era, Lutz still described the 1920s as "much more important and worthy" for the Brazilian feminist movement, mainly because the political debate was held within "the frame of a democratic regime".[57] In an 1971 audio recording of Lutz' memories of the post-1930 period, she declared she was "entirely contrary" to the new revolutionary government and had to be convinced to work with Vargas by FBPF's members who sympathized with the new regime to "see what could be obtained in favor of women".[58]

---

[54] The Law of National Security gave Vargas the power to repress "subversive" activities with the police, layoff public servants, and control the military, among others (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 42-44).
[55] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 609, March 22, 1935, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 2, 832.00/931, p. 5-6.
[56] See, for instance, Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, April 15, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5. Carrie Chapman Catt was a leader of the U.S. suffrage movement and in 1939 was celebrating her 80th birthday. Catt and Lutz had forged a close relationship since they met in the early 1920s, as the U.S. feminist became a mentor to FBPF's creation, helping draft its Constitution when she visited Brazil in 1923 (MARINO, 2014, p. 69). In her letters, Lutz addresses Catt as "dear mother", as she represented to Lutz the matriarchal figure of a feminist "first and last" (Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, January 14, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 3).
[57] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 61.
[58] Projeto de livro sobre o histórico do Movimento Feminista Brasileiro (38 minutes), 1971, AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, APR.ELC.DSO.11.

Interestingly, her stance of being "entirely contrary" to the Revolution was watered down in the audio transcription – the text says she was merely "reluctant".[59]

Notwithstanding the anti-democratic tendencies of the 1930s, Bertha Lutz' personal opinion of the "dictator" – she often uses this term in the audio and written transcription – seemed to be of admiration.[60] In one occasion, Lutz recalled a conversation in which she honestly told Vargas the reasons she had not been a revolutionary and, at the end, they both agreed that, despite differences, they understood each other "perfectly". As the FBPF worked closely with the regime and obtained some victories during this period, Lutz later affirmed in her recorded memories that Vargas was truly a feminist and supported the feminist campaign for a "very simple reason: His Excellency was a man singularly devoid of prejudices and with the spirit completely emancipated from any way of thinking inherited from the past".[61] Lutz also often hints at the idea that the problems faced by women as workers and as an organized movement were not to be blamed on Vargas himself, because when it was up to him, she seems to believe he supported and promoted women's rights. Lutz points to the fact that Vargas often nominated one or more women – based on FBPF's suggestions – to international and inter-American conferences as part of the Brazilian delegation. She recalls that during the 1930s, after much struggle, women began their political accession, and, under the first seven years of the Vargas regime, they "enjoyed not only fundamental political rights, but even participation in diplomatic representation and in the highest scales of international politics". According to Lutz, no other president succeeding Vargas took such measures and there never was again the same "good will" toward "the feminine participation in diplomacy".[62]

However, the *Estado Novo* coup in 1937 brought an end to Bertha Lutz' congressional and political efforts. She later explained to Carrie Chapman Catt that all members of Congress were "forcibly removed" of their mandates "by the executive part of the Government", which had publicly declared that "the legislative power did nothing but advocate private interests". The move also silenced the organized women's movement in Brazil. Lutz confessed to Catt that she felt as if an opportunity was "taken away", sadly believing that "all my work in Brazil has perished", now that women had "full political rights, but there are no elections".[63] The *Estado*

---

[59] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 61-63.
[60] Marques (2016a) also noticed how Lutz seemed to have undergone a personal conversion in respect to Vargas, as their personal working relationship might have left a favorable image of the man.
[61] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 65-66.
[62] Ibid., p. 68-69 and 74.
[63] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, April 15, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 19-22.

Novo, Lutz wrote to a colleague, was a time in which "those who are feminists even on bad days" need to endure the "worst stretch of the feminist journey".[64]

2.2 Estado Novo, 1937-1945

The coup d'état of November 10th, 1937 – reported as a "carefully prepared plan for the continuance of President Vargas in office" by the U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro – instated the *Estado Novo* regime right before presidential elections, dissolved congress and promulgated a new Constitution, all "without the firing of a single shot".[65] The U.S. Embassy report to the Secretary of State would say that such dictatorial powers could be dangerous in the hands of any other Brazilian politician, but Getúlio Vargas was considered to be "extremely level-headed" and understood "his own people better than any other man in Brazil".[66]

Nonetheless, taking its name from Salazar's rule in Portugal, the *Estado Novo* was clearly authoritarian (LEVINE, 1980, p. 231). In addition to the military's support, part of the Brazilian press saw the coup favorably, classifying the "change as the final victory of stability over forces of dissension and subversion", which bore "a general air of relief at the outcome" for the general public.[67] Explaining the coup as an inevitable development against a threatening chaotic scenario, Vargas proclaimed on the radio that night that the presidential campaign had turned into a "whimsy competition of groups" merely representing old parties under new labels that were acting "in the shadows of personal ambitions or localist reigns". As a result of disorder and with "the unity of the homeland" under threat, the president saw no room for negotiations or compromises, positioning himself as the only savior conscious enough of his responsibility and duty "to restore the national authority".[68]

The Vargas state would increasingly acquire greater autonomy in its relations with Brazilian society and the president took it upon himself the "direction of social changes and of Brazilian economic growth" (McCANN, 1995, p. 47, GOMES et al., 1996, p. 95). With Congress closed and all political parties forbidden, Hilton (1977, p. 279) argued that post-1937 policies were mainly determined by what Vargas and his closest advisors perceived as the "national interest", and this group identified a necessity for a strong autonomous government capable of maintaining its sovereignty through the elimination of local "peculiarities" and

[64] Bertha Lutz to Edith da Gama e Abreu, 1938, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A938.24.
[65] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 152, November 20, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 2, 832.00/1111, p. 2-3.
[66] Ibid., p. 5.
[67] See Skidmore (2007, p. 50-53) and Levine (1980, p. 231); and also Embassy to Dept of State, n. 152, November 20, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 2, 832.00/1111, p. 4-5.
[68] VARGAS, G. "Proclamação ao Povo Brasileiro, November 10, 1937. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 20-23, 31-32. Also see Levine (1980, p. 229) and Skidmore (2007, p. 50-54).

"disintegrating influences" (GOMES et al., 1996, p. 97). Oswaldo Aranha, along these lines, was reported as having pleaded during a Cabinet banquet to "all currents and forces [to] forget their grievances and work patriotically and harmoniously for the aggrandizement of Brazil".[69]

Scholars have extensively argued about whether the new regime could be considered fascist or not. On the one hand, Levine (1980) listed some possibly fascists elements, such as the complete trust in authority and on national economic planning, the faith in a technical bureaucratic elite, the use of political repression and control, the distrust in open expression and the belief of a potential threat of political subversion (p. 232). Still, the lack of a unique "consistent ideological basis" is one reason why Levine (1980) also argued that *Estado Novo* was not fully a replication of European fascist models (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 54).

Some of its top members would have greater sympathies for fascism and tried to justify the regime's existence based on ideological motives, such as Francisco Campos, who is known to have drafted much of the 1937 Constitution inspired in Italian and Polish examples – but this group was not fully successful in implementing a state-wide fascist ideology.[70] As an example, the U.S. Embassy in Brazil saved one of Campos' speeches in which he claimed that, after the 1934 Constitution, the revolutionary ideals of 1930 had been "emasculated", and the nation needed saving from groups seeking their own self-interest as well as from the "average voter" who was no longer competent to understand the ever more complex problems of society. Therefore, he stated, "full responsibility" must be trust to Vargas.[71] Interestingly, the choice of the word "emasculated" to signify ideals that were supposedly being debilitated or made less effective because of loss of masculinity is significant, particularly as it shows the belief on the strength and quality of the masculine, whereas the opposite – the feminine – would be weak and devalued.

In Bertha Lutz' vision, the obstacles and limitations to the women's campaign seemed to be orchestrated by some individuals around Vargas not in favor of the women's cause. After the closure of Congress in 1937, Lutz cited, for instance, a conversation with Vargas where she pointed out that the new Constitution put together by Campos was not a feminist one and

---

[69] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 956, October 14, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 3, 832.00/1230, p. 2.

[70] That Campos was the main writer of the Constitution is not only an established fact in the literature – see, for instance, Fausto (2013, p. 101), Levine (1980, p. 231-232, 264), and Skidmore (2007, p. 49) – but it was mentioned by Luís Simões Lopes and Bertha Lutz in their recollections (LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 34; "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 12). Fausto (1978) would also discuss other top government agents that would flirt with fascism.

[71] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 186, December 10, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 3, 832.00/1138, p.1-2, 6.

"omitted everything [they] had gotten with great cost in favor of women", to which Vargas seemed to regret not paying greater attention and asked for some time to make changes. The changes, however, only worsened the situation. Lutz later said this meant the end of political participation for women and FBPF, which became mostly a private institution, holding lunches and lectures.[72] When discussing the *Estado Novo* with Catt in letters, Lutz called those in power "a small group of entirely unscrupulous men" who would "see no one and listen to no one". This group included the Ministry of Education, Gustavo Capanema, whom she called a "completely mad fellow, who dislikes me as I forced measures of education for women through the chamber [of deputies]".[73] In addition to Campos and Capanema, Lutz also mentioned Oswaldo Aranha as problematic and unfavorable to the feminist cause – she seemed to be hesitant toward him since her first meeting with Vargas after the Revolution. In her memories, Lutz reinforced that, from the original revolutionary group, of which Aranha was essential, Getúlio Vargas was really the only one helpful to women's demands.[74]

2.3 Brazilian Foreign Policy

In addition to the domestic turmoil of the second half of the 1930s, the international context reflected a political struggle as well, with the emergence of two new and opposite "power systems", competing among themselves for global hegemony amid increasing political tensions worldwide. The first system was headed by the United States and its liberal-democratic politics, whereas the second was led by Nazi-fascist Germany (MOURA, 1980, p. 62). For both countries, the dispute was not solely an ideological one, although also relevant, but it was mainly a commercial dispute, as international trade would be considered one of the fundamental tools to grant and secure hegemony. The United States privileged trade liberalism to restore economic growth after the Great Depression, and Germany, on the other hand, sought mostly bilateral trade agreements in an attempt to expand industrial production and rearm the country after the its defeat in World War I (HILTON, 1977; MOURA, 1980).

Latin America, in this context, readily became the target of a "savage fight" between the U.S. and Germany for strategical influence, supply of raw materials, and markets for their

---

[72] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, August 9, 1939, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 18. The *Estado Novo*, however, did not mean the end of Bertha Lutz' participation in the international women's movement. She was part of the Brazilian delegation to the conference in San Francisco in 1945, which created the United Nations, and was among the four women who signed the UN Charter. For Lutz participation in San Francisco see: "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, and Marino (2019). For more of Lutz' thoughts about the *Estado Novo* see Marques (2016a) and her letter exchanges with Catt throughout 1939 at AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5.

[73] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, January 14, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 19.

[74] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 67.

manufactured products (HILTON, 1977, p. 21, 39). The framework created by this international system would therefore require, according to top members of the Brazilian government, a realist pursuit of self-interest, guided in its essence by national development (ibid., p. 38). Brazilian trade policy, then, admitted two distinct schemes with the two global powers at the time: while employing bilateral trade with compensation mechanisms with Germany, Brazil exchanged with the United States based on trade liberalism via treaties containing the most-favorable-nation clause. Longing to develop the Brazilian industry, the Getúlio Vargas' government attempted to maximize economic and commercial gains within this context of dispute and chose to not restrict trade to any one bloc, on top of maintaining itself neutral amid the hostilities going on in Europe (ibid., p. 79).

Nonetheless, as European tensions worsened, Hilton (1977) suggested that the Brazilian foreign policy elite perceived "the idea of the precariousness of peace and of the probability of a great war" as one key element of the international system (p. 36). Bundled together were fears of European countries violating treaties, disrespecting the League of Nations, and invading neighboring and far-off countries, as well as the intensive military movements in next-door-neighbor Argentina (ibid., p. 36-38).[75] This image of deteriorating international relations was accompanied by a "conviction that power and open selfishness were the only determinants of international behavior", a view which the press corroborated at the time (ibid., p. 36). In a 1938 editorial written shortly after European countries had signed the Munich Agreement, which allowed Germany to keep the invaded Sudetenland territory in Czechoslovakia, the daily *Correio da Manhã* saw the risk for Brazil due to its territorial vastness and simultaneous incapacity to defend itself. With the threat of invasion fresh in people's minds, it claimed that countries should seek their self-interest and guarantee security from its own resources and powers since international law had failed "weak nations".[76]

Hilton (1977) also observed that power, for Brazilian foreign policy decision-makers, meant essentially military power, and they likewise shared the belief that only the "strongest" prevailed in international negotiations (p. 37-38). This constant focus on strength and hard power in Brazilian foreign policy is a significant detail for this research as women can be easily disregarded of international politics in this scenario because of their alleged physical weakness

[75] Argentina was considered a Latin American promise at the turn of the twentieth century, until a revolution in 1930 paved the way for political instability and military intervention that lasted for decades. After the economic blow of the Great Depression, the military took over the power for what became known as the "Infamous Decade" (1932-1943), characterized by government fraud, corruption and economic liberalism. According to Goldwert (2014), Argentine militarism rose and grew particularly after 1930.

[76] "O Perigo", *Correio da Manhã*, October 5, 1938, p. 4.

and emotional fragility. This will be further explored in the third chapter of this study when we relate gender and diplomacy. Summing up the contemporary mindset, Vargas declared in a New Year's Eve speech that Brazil continued to be a pacifist nation, but passiveness could leave the country's heritage defenseless, which required coordination to make the country stronger and more prosperous.[77] Hence, the ultimate purpose of Vargas foreign policy was to focus on "national interest" and "national security" – translated mainly as the intensification of the industrialization process and the modernization of the Armed Forces (MOURA, 1980, p. 109; HILTON, 1977, p. 41).

The institution of the *Estado Novo* in 1937, however, with totalitarian and antidemocratic characteristics, caused some initial discomfort to the United States, that wished to confirm whether this development meant the existence of a direct influence of fascist European countries in the Americas or if the new Vargas regime was "purely a Brazilian creation" (McCANN, 1995, p. 52). In a telegram to the Secretary of State, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Jefferson Caffery announced the change, after a conversation with Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mário de Pimentel Brandão, in which the latter would have said that the new Constitution was needed to "preserve the democratic institutions", to which Caffery expressed skepticism.[78] On the opposite side, German excitement and ideological sympathy for *Estado Novo* had a short duration. Soon enough, the nationalist character of the new regime extinguished any possibilities of Nazi influence in Brazilian parties and citizens (ibid., p. 70).

Itamaraty did make an effort to guarantee to international partners that its foreign policy continued as usual. In a gathering of foreign ambassadors in Rio de Janeiro, Minister Pimentel Brandão would have said that the change answered "fully and auspiciously to the wishes of the Brazilian people", as proved by the calm attitude of the population after the event.[79] In interviews with the press in 1938, Vargas expressed his belief that strengthening the president's authority was in fact a worldwide "tendency" of modern governments that were grasping at the importance of answering directly to the interests of its people.[80] Nonetheless, the United States was only appeased after the nomination of Oswaldo Aranha as Minister of Foreign Relations in March 1938. The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported to the Department of State that

---

[77] VARGAS, G. "No Limiar do Ano de 1938", December 31, 1937. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 127-128.
[78] Caffery to Dept of State, telegram n. 147, November 10, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 10, 832.011/47, p. 3.
[79] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 141, November 13, 1937, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 10, 832.011/52, p. 12.
[80] VARGAS, G. "Problemas e Realizações do Estado Novo", Abril 22, 1938. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 187.

Aranha's "long expected appointment" was "by far the most important political development" since the November 1937 coup, observing positive reactions not only from the U.S. and Brazilian press, but also from Aranha's "former political enemies, who feel that he represents the democratic principles of government".[81]

Although Oswaldo Aranha seemed to identify a "wide space of great possibilities" for Brazilian action internationally, augmenting the country's bargaining capability, scholars argue that the apparent ambiguous foreign policy was, after all, more a reflection of the domestic struggle for hegemony, characterized at the time by political disputes, "complete division" and "uncertainty" (McCANN, 1995, p. 108; MOURA, 1980, p. 62-63; CARONE, 1977, p. 276). Moura (1980) called this undefined foreign policy a "pragmatic equidistance", which would be a result of structural and circumstantial conditions that allowed Brazil to use neutrality as a bargaining tool between the two emerging powers as long as neither was overcome by the other (p. 63-64).[82] The Vargas regime attempted to employ, largely in the first moments of *Estado Novo*, an equilibrium between two opposites internationally and between different interests groups domestically (ibid., p. 105).

In Moura's understanding, this "equidistance" persisted until 1942, when Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the Axis as the weight of U.S. influence could no longer be denied in Brazilian foreign policy's calculations (MOURA, 1980, p. 63). For most scholars, Vargas' international bargaining did obtain concrete advantages for national development, and, some argue, fundamental factors for this included the domestic mechanisms for power centralization in the Executive and also the institutionalization process happening at Itamaraty (McCANN, 1995; CHEIBUB, 1985).[83] Also essential was the figure of Oswaldo Aranha, considered a leader of the "pro-Allies" and antifascist government wing, as his views often prevailed over those – especially in the military – which preferred to operate under German influence (MOURA, 1980; HILTON, 1977).

---

[81] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 404, March 11, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 3, 832.00/1176, p. 1-2; Caffery to Dept of State, telegram n. 56, March 16, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 3, 832.00.1174. See also: McCann (1995, p. 60); and Hilton (1977, p. 266-267).

[82] Other authors also coined similar slogans for this period. Hilton (1977) called it "*ad hoc* politics", Gambini (1977) said it was a "double game", and McCann (1995) considered this policy as "sitting on the fence".

[83] Scholars have outlined some successes of this equidistant policy. Among them are the simultaneous trade with both Washington and Berlin (up until the British continental maritime blockade of 1939 would harm Brazilian-German commercial exchanges), the purchase of German armaments, the military exchanges between Brazilian and U.S. Armed Forces and, mainly, the establishment of the *Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional* (National Steel Company, CSN), in 1940, thanks to a U.S. Eximbank loan (HILTON, 1977; MOURA, 1980). Abreu (1999), however, sees the concessions made by the United States to Brazil until 1942 more as a U.S. policy of patience in the interest to maintain Latin America stable and under its influence in the case of a global conflict rather than as Vargas "manipulative abilities" (p. 58).

A significant event would be responsible for turning the Brazilian foreign policy elite in the U.S. direction. In what was called the "Aranha Mission", Brazilian top agents visited the United States in 1939 for a set of negotiations proposed as an "opportunity to review as a whole the political and economic relations" of both countries, which, in turn, also encouraged the approximation between the two Armed Forces, and opened paths for improved economic communications (MOURA, 1980, p. 114-115). The mission, naturally headed by Oswaldo Aranha, was also accompanied by DASP president Luis Simões Lopes to study procedures and organization of the U.S. civil service and public administration.[84] A number of additional factors influenced the Brazilian government in breaking relations with the Axis in 1942, but the importance of Oswaldo Aranha as Minister of Foreign Relations, and his power within the close circle of foreign policy decision-makers surrounding Vargas, cannot be underestimated.

After the end of Brazilian neutrality, the *Estado Novo* dictatorship lasted until 1945, when measures of censorship and repression became incompatible with the decision to participate in World War II alongside the Allies, fighting for democracy in Europe (FAUSTO, 2013). Getúlio Vargas, according to Skidmore (2007), wisely accepted the dictatorship's impossibility of survival, meticulously giving up power in order to pave the way for his return as an elected president five years later (p. 62).

3 To govern is to manage – Rationalization and modernization processes

As we return our focus to the Itamaraty administrative reform of 1938, which determined the prohibition of women in the diplomatic career, we understand the change within a context in which the *Estado Novo* was gradually consolidating its authoritarian tendencies, as Levine (1980) explained that "the total impact of the change caused by the adoption of a corporativist dictatorship only became apparent at the end of 1938" (p. 250).

Scholars of the Getúlio Vargas era tend to agree that, particularly during the 1937-1945 period, the dictator succeeded in strengthening the role of the state as a promoter of national development.[85] Not only this, but his presidency skillfully conceived the idea of a "political myth" around his personal image. Embodying simultaneously the qualities of a statesman – "courage, wisdom, and determination" – and the sympathy and simplicity of a "common man", Vargas became known as the "father of the poor", and represented, for the first time in Brazilian republican history, the personification of the state and the mystification of the presidency.

[84] Sumner Welles to Harry Mitchell, February 7, 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.017/1, and Hilton (1977, p. 304).
[85] Carone (1977), Draibe (2004), Fausto (2013), Gomes et al. (1996), Graham (1968), and Skidmore (2007).

Getúlio Vargas, as a political myth, would be the incarnation of the Brazilian people, of the nation and of its interests, serving the role of a guide to the masses (GOMES, 2013, p. 29-30). For the creation of this myth, the administration often employed a critical rhetoric against the previous regime that begun with the Proclamation of the Republic in 1889, calling it *República Velha* (Old Republic) for its outdated and corrupt methods of governance (ibid., p. 30). Vargas and the 1930 revolutionaries claimed to have found a "calamitous heritage", an administrative structure full of "errors", "vices" and "reigning disorders", managed "without program and without a defined orientation", causing excessive expenditures for the country's finances with no attention to what they believed to be the nation's true necessities and aspirations.[86]

The *Estado Novo* coup would leave Vargas, at last, with "free hands to carry out Brazil's 'reorganization'" through a process of rationalization and modernization of the state bureaucracy (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 46). The process, Brazilian administrators understood, meant to cut costs, save time and universalize procedures, taking politics out of decision-making and implementing instead scientific "rational conduct" – secure methods resulting from studies, calculations, and forecasting. This not only elevated the relevance of administrative tasks for governance, but it also transformed those tasks into a dominant feature of political life for the new regime.[87] Because of this, "all characteristics of the political system and the public administrative structure were object of a reformist zeal", with Vargas attesting that his government was only to be judged by its efficient work toward the reestablishment of the nation (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 25).[88] A modern and rational government, they believed, would eliminate lethargy and inefficiency via quick executive decisions scientifically supported by specialized agencies, after all, in their view, "if there is no efficiency in administration, there is no good government" (GOMES, 2013, p. 31).[89]

Getúlio Vargas prioritized building a central Executive capable of enacting these changes that he and other members of his government viewed as essential to national development. For this, they accelerated bureaucratization processes, understanding that "along with the general growth of federal responsibility, it came the growth of the bureaucracy" (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 57; CHEIBUB, 1985). In one front, the national government absorbed

---

[86] VARGAS, G. "A Revolução e o Regime Legal", May 14, 1932. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. II. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 34-35.
[87] "A Racionalização dos serviços públicos: uma necessidade urgente", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, v. II, n. 3, June 1938, p. 83; "O Serviço Público e a Constituição de 10 de Novembro", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 2, January 1938, p. 4.
[88] VARGAS, G. "A Revolução e o Regime Legal", May 14, 1932. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. II. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 36.
[89] CFSPC, "Aspectos do Serviço Público Civil dos EUA através do Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito sobre o funcionalismo público", May 13, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 6.

tasks that were formerly carried out by local authorities, with the creation of federal institutes and a "unified, generic, and abstract" legal framework geared to the general interest. On another front, the Executive spread its influence and infiltrated new social and economic areas, intervening and controlling social relations and interests (SKIDMORE, 2007, p. 55-56; DRAIBE, 2004, p. 55-56). The enlarged state bureaucracy then filtered and unified these varied interests upward the hierarchical chain, using the civil service as "an instrument of political integration", until the last decision-making body could synthesize them into one "national interest" (DRAIBE, 2004; GRAHAM, 1968, p. 30).

With a reduced number of decision-makers at the top, the governing elite saw its power greatly expand in determining the country's direction. The rhetoric around the quest for efficiency, curtailment, and rationality – always based on scientific studies – was an added subsidy for centralization, creating as a result a "closed bureaucratic system at the service of a modernizing elite", in which the civil service became "both an object and an agent of modernization" (MOURA, 1980, p. 107; GRAHAM, 1968, p. 29-31). Under the impression that the state, via its elite decision-makers, was the central force in the rationalization process, actions such as the limitation on women's participation in civil service – from which diplomacy is not exempt – should not be assumed as random or devoid of intent. To achieve the ultimate goal of efficiency, Brazilian top officials would employ its power to determine, in the end, social norms of behavior; they made clear, through such prohibitive measures, the position allowed to women in the labor market, and in society more broadly.

3.1 Perfect bureaucracy – the Administrative Department of the Public Service

Authors such as Siegel (1978) and Graham (1968) argued that the Brazilian state recognized that, in order to create the idea of a politically stable country capable of formulating a universal and unified "national interest", it needed to replace old ways of favoritism and patronage, and take efficient governance as a paramount value in national development. Thus, the government intended to shape a modern, ordered and rational administrative bureaucracy, seeking the "perfection of public services" because only a "powerful technical-administrative machine" would endow strength to its people.[90] Mainly after 1935, state authorities would propose goals for the country's economic reorganization, with one of the objectives being a more professionalized and regulated public service as part of the "all-embracing work of national reconstruction initiated in 1930".[91]

[90] CFSPC, "Reajustamento", [1936/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.
[91] "Como surgiu o Reajustamento", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 73.

A major stepping stone toward this goal was the passage of the so-called Law of Readjustment in 1936, based on the Nabuco Report, a study that became known as "a remarkable work, of far-reaching administrative vision", conducted under the Commission of Economic-Financial Reform created the previous year.[92] Luis Simões Lopes was put in charge of adapting the Report to ensure its passage as a law in Congress, which he praised as a "modest law, but full of substance" responsible for organizing Brazilian public service.[93] One can grasp the government's intention with the Law in a typed document that, although unsigned, appears to be a draft of a Getúlio Vargas' speech praising its approval. In this document, the word "perfection" – and "perfect", and "*aperfeiçoar*" – appears ten times in five pages and a half of text, suggesting an almost obsession on the subject.[94]

Based on a previous evaluation of civil service experiences in different countries, the Law of Readjustment created the Federal Council of the Civil Public Service (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*, CFSPC) ultimately inspired in the Civil Service Commission of the United States. It initially hosted five presidentially-appointed members who possessed "specialized knowledge of public administration", who elected Luis Simões Lopes as president (GRAHAM, 1968, p. 26).[95] The CFSPC's work, in its two years of existence, was two-fold. First, its purpose was to subsidize the improvement of Brazilian public administration "under new and solid bases, giving it a rational structure and secure norms of operations", mainly through organizing public service jobs into well-defined careers, leveling positions and salaries throughout the administration, and creating a sort of "pyramid" hierarchical system to encourage employees' advancement and excellency.[96] Secondly, it was in charge of universalizing a trustworthy and impartial merit system in personnel recruitment, via public examinations (*concursos públicos*) based on rational and scientific measures – a work that was often featured for its quality in the coming years.[97]

---

[92] Law n. 284, October 28, 1936; "Como surgiu o Reajustamento", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 73.

[93] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 12-14; Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 3.

[94] "*Aperfeiçoar*" is usually translated as "to improve"; however, we chose to keep the Portuguese word because its root is derived from "perfect". For the purposes of this research, the translation "to make it perfect" would be more accurate. CFSPC, "Reajustamento", [1936/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.

[95] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p.33; Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 4.

[96] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p.17, 33.

[97] CFSPC, "Reajustamento", [1936/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14; Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 3; "O CFSPC e suas realizações", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. II, n. 2, May 1938, p. 81.

The Council also launched the Civil Service Journal (*Revista do Serviço Público*, RSP) in November 1937, immediately after the establishment of *Estado Novo*, as an instrument to inform and equip public servants as well as to foment an administrative culture capable of promoting an *esprit de corps* in Brazilian public service and an "adequate mentality" toward efficiency and rationalization.[98] The target audience of the journal was both civil servants and general scholars of public administration, and the main writers were crucial individuals responsible for changes in the 1930s and 1940s, with a number of editorial and opinionative essays that are often used as sources throughout this research. The articles published – ranging from theoretical to practical informative pieces – represented a "repository of the official doctrine of the ongoing administrative reform", always with the purpose of discussing and presenting ways to improve public administration (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 156).[99]

After the *Estado Novo* coup, the new 1937 Constitution established "the principle of efficiency in Civil Service as duty of the State to the country", creating the Administrative Department of the Public Service (*Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público*, DASP) as a bureau directly under the Presidency that absorbed CFSPC.[100] The new institution, with "immense responsibility", did not shy away from its efforts of turning the Brazilian administrative apparatus into "an efficient system of control and direction of the country's life".[101] From the words of one of DASP's Directors, Paulo de Lyra Tavares, the Department was designed as an agency of order and a technical powerhouse for the purpose of attracting those who wished a "greater Brazil, rich, sound and enlightened".[102] Its ideals would influence the content and purpose of institutional changes throughout the Brazilian public administration and also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[103]

The administrative reforms implemented by CFSPC and DASP were greatly inspired by established principles of administrative science, mainly sanctioned by U.S. thinkers of administrative and management theories known today as "classic or traditional" (WAHRLICH,

---

[98] "Revista do Serviço Público", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 5; Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 65.

[99] "Revista do Serviço Público", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 5.

[100] Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 5.

[101] Ibid., p. 6; Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 70. Draibe (2004) listed some of DASP's successes: defining merit-based rules for mandatory examinations, structuring civil service careers, establishing procurement standards, centralizing public purchases, and elaborating and controlling the government's budget (p. 77).

[102] Paulo de Lyra Tavares, "O DASP", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 19.

[103] For detailed analyses of CFSPC and DASP, see: Graham (1968); Siegel (1978); Wahrlich (1983); Draibe (2004); and Araújo (2017). For the influence of these agencies on Itamaraty, see: Cheibub (1985, p. 123); Castro (2009, chap. 7); and Friaça (2018, p. 80-81).

1983, cap. 9; GRAHAM, 1968). Highly influential for Brazilian administrators, the methods of U.S. engineer Frederick Taylor focused on the importance of a systematic and scientific administrative organization, seeking, through constant study and evaluation, the most efficient mode of completing any activity (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 301). This foundation induced the initial objective of CFSPC, as proposed in the Law of Readjustment, which contained terms such as "organize programs", "suggest", "present reports", "determine requirements", and "propose reduction", on top of the main objective to "study the organization of the public services and propose to the Government any necessary measure to its improvement".[104] Moreover, the Law itself was influenced by Weberian models of bureaucracy and by the U.S. experience in reforming its own civil service in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century (WARHRLICH, 1983, p. 127).[105]

3.2 The professional Civil Service

Encountering a "*clientelista*", "incompetent" and "wasteful" administration, in the words of Agamenon Magalhães, Minister of Labor from 1934 to 1937, DASP faced a herculean task and employed a "bold attempt at systematization […] not experimented by any civilized country" (apud WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 318). For this purpose, DASP's administrators cultivated a rhetoric of valuing public service, saying that governments could only execute their "role of governing" through public servants, who should be selected among the "country's best elements, those who will have the honorable responsibility to guide public affairs".[106] Magalhães also referred to the essential nature of the human factor for the success of any government institution, declaring that public servants were the soul, brain and arm of DASP's efforts, and their careers would be remembered as not only the "most noble", but also one to which the "greatest national interests" would be attached (apud WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 317).[107] Consequently, a professional and technical civil service would finally have the chance to act free of political interests, being able to truly "think the nation".[108]

According to Luis Simões Lopes, the Law of Readjustment had as primary directive the creation of a career system for public employees, allowing for salary and professional ascension

---

[104] Law n. 284, October 28, 1936, art. 10.
[105] Weberian values include hierarchization, authority and payment compatible with position within hierarchy; technical capacity and training of career employees; separation between public and private properties; rational set of rules and discipline; impersonality; and formality, among others (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 295; GRAHAM, 1968, p. 197).
[106] CFSPC, "Aspectos do Serviço Público Civil dos EUA através do Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito sobre o funcionalismo público", May 13, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14; Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, "Evolução da Administração Pública Federal", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 16.
[107] "Revista do Serviço Público", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 4.
[108] CFSPC, "Reajustamento", [1936/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1.

to be based on clear technical criteria, resulting in the professionalization of personnel.[109] The professionalization of public service is a procedure, according to Connell (1987), that would adopt technical knowledge and specialized abilities as means to assert competence, promoting masculinization as a result (p. 181). A "professional" would correspond to an individual with some advanced training pursuing a career, predominantly executing mental labor, a situation more closely associated with male ambition (DUERST-LAHTI, 1987, p. 3). The idea of professionalism would be supported, according to the Connell, by the necessity of esteem, loyalty, hierarchy, emotional distance, and full dedication free of non-essential tasks, such as domestic labor, along with "the simplest possible mechanism, the exclusion of women" (CONNELL, 1987, p. 181).

It is also possible to identify the development of a universal ideal around the type of individual desired for civil service – an ideal masculinized type that was stimulated as essential to the rationalization process. Because the Portuguese language is gendered – nouns and adjectives are usually inflected as either male or female –, it is common to see the use of the masculine to talk about public servants as a category, often with the term "men" as part of an adjective, such as "men of value", "vocation-man" or "man-enthusiasm".[110] Even as this can quickly be dismissed as normal, feminist scholars defend that the reproduction of a masculinized common sense is not trivial; they argue that the equality between what is male and what is human is a social construction that would reflect, legitimize and maintain power relations and gender inequalities (TICKNER, 1992).

The prohibition of women in the diplomatic career is not, therefore, apolitical, since the reformulation of the civil service would be "devoted to the common good as interpreted by a select number of individuals", with the purpose of establishing a coherent unit of state administration that, in turn, legitimized its own authority (GRAHAM, 1968, p. 184). The Ministry of Foreign Relations, as an essential institution in Brazilian public administration, was also highly influential in determining the position of women in public service (HAHNER, 1990, p. 177). In 1918, a woman registered for Itamaraty's entrance examinations and was nominated after she achieved first place in the tests, which, as a result, opened the doors of civil service to women – a feat soon followed by Bertha Lutz, the second woman public servant in Brazil at the National Museum in 1919 (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 76). After these two events, Lutz claimed

[109] Luis Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, December 30, 1939, AHI, DT-SPI, Code 502.9, Lata 1187, Maço 25709, p. 1; "Como surgiu o Reajustamento", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 74

[110] Fernando Lobo, "Funcionalismo público nos Estados Unidos da América do Norte", November 14, 1936, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 10, and apud WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 317.

that a woman's right to occupy civil service in equal conditions to men was "firmly established".[111] Then, in 1938 the male exclusivity in Itamaraty would be used as a paradigm to many other similar acts. As an example, the president of DASP used the restriction in the diplomatic career as a justification for a female prohibition in engineer careers at the Goiás Railroad in 1944, explaining the measure as natural because such "eminently technical" tasks would be more efficiently conducted by men.[112] This domino effect caused by the Itamaraty reform of 1938 is further explored in the following chapter.

3.3 The nation's common happiness

The Brazilian state, under *Estado Novo*, was to be considered as equivalent to the nation and as sovereign over society (DRAIBE, 2004, p. 53).[113] This meant the relationship between society and the state was direct, with no intermediaries, and also that every citizen had to work for the nation's "common happiness", or, according to Getúlio Vargas, to the "supreme law of the general interest".[114] As members of DASP worked to prepare the Statute of Civil Service, Luis Simões Lopes stated that its basic concept would be *saius populi suprema lex*, or that "the convenience of the collectivity anticipates individual interests, [and] is not limited by them".[115] This perspective, however, would close spaces for criticism, as questionings were readily labeled as private interests (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 279). Vargas, when calling for patriotism, affirmed that no sacrifice from its citizens would "be enough" to defend the Brazilian flag and traditions, and that the "firm and conscious" duty of all Brazilians to the nation was "greater than at any other period in our political history".[116] Because of this rhetoric, any measure required acquiescence, and, similarly, any demands in benefit of a group smaller than the entire nation would be deemed as private interests, and therefore unpatriotic. Hence, women who wanted careers were understood as pursuing their selfish interests and not fulfilling their rightful duty to the nation, as determined by the men in power.

---

[111] Lutz, B. [n.d.] AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, PIN.TXT.10, p. 4.
[112] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, June 19, 1944, AN-Gabinete Presidência da República (GPR), 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 3.
[113] VARGAS, G. "No Limiar do Ano de 1938", December 31, 1937. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 123.
[114] "O Discurso do sr. Presidente Getúlio Vargas", *Jornal do Commercio*, September 8, 1938, p. 4; VARGAS, G. "Estado Novo e as Forças Armadas", June 29, 1938. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 244.
[115] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 29.
[116] VARGAS, G. "No Limiar do Ano de 1938", December 31, 1937. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 123; "Nenhum sacrifício, nesta hora grave, será bastante", *Correio da Manhã,* November 10, 1938, p. 1.

The *Revista do Serviço Público* backed this thought in an article written by Urbano Berquió, listed as the journal's Editorial Director, promoting loyalty from public servants, who should be supposedly apolitical and dedicated to the national interest, without "putting himself in a hostile attitude to the course defined by the National Government".[117] In the occasions when women demanded to be permitted into public examinations or questioned their exclusion, they would be viewed as possessing this hostile attitude. The CFSPC study on women's access to the diplomatic career, as well as Oswaldo Aranha's response to Bertha Lutz' protests, displayed this exact argument, saying that the "true criteria […] needs to be the interest of the state, and not of private individuals".[118] Corroborating this thought, Simões Lopes later affirmed that women were the ones establishing the gender difference and creating the problem when they formed exclusively female groups and associations.[119] Women's attempt at individualization would be, therefore, contrary to the "sentiment of solidarity" – a noble and Christian value – aimed by *Estado Novo*.[120]

3.4 An efficient system of control: Luis Simões Lopes' DASP

In the rationalization and modernization process, the Getúlio Vargas government allegedly sought impartial citizens' access to public service and their subsequent professional accession, attempting to solidify a modern public administration exempt of "perverted purposes".[121] The CFSPC and later DASP, responsible among other things for recruiting public servants via *concursos* based on meritocratic principles, became important mechanisms of controlling this access in a context in which authoritarian tendencies were shaping the regime.

The Department would be an example of how the separation of administration and politics would be, in fact, more complex than the governing technical elite portrayed. Graham (1968) argued that, despite the influence of U.S. administrative policies characterized by a high degree of formalism, there was a "considerable discrepancy between norms and reality" in the Brazilian context (p. 6). On one side, there was a public commitment to neutrality and meritocracy; on the other, the top-down reforms implemented by a centralizing elite guaranteed political dominance, continuation of patrimonialistic practices, and, as we shall see, the subjugation of women through the definition of gendered norms of behavior (ibid., p. 6-17).

---

[117] Urbano Berquió, "Eficiência Administrativa a Sabotagem Burocrática", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. II, n. 1, April 1938, p. 5-6.
[118] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 3; Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21.
[119] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, June 19, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054.
[120] VARGAS, G. "No Limiar do Ano de 1938", December 31, 1937. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 126.
[121] CFSPC, "Reajustamento", [1936/1938]. CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, and also Graham (1978).

The DASP, even though originally created as a technical and neutral agency, was also used as a political mechanism and as "a convenient means for central control over the national administrative system", employing the quest for efficiency and rationalization as a pretext to form a state bureaucracy that acted according to its political interests (ibid., p. 8, 29).

Members of DASP repeatedly made efforts to explain that its purposes were wide and intrusive because of the extraordinary significance of its mission, which allowed the bureau to employ actions sometimes seen as "intolerant" by those who would "only approach the state to exploit it".[122] Luis Simões Lopes saw "cautious but important" intrusions as inevitable, particularly in the scenario of "complete anarchy" that the Brazilian public administration found itself before the 1930 Revolution.[123] Consul Moacyr Briggs – acting as DASP director of Organization and Coordination – justified the controlling behavior based on the necessity to "moralize the civil service, in the sense of obtaining the maximum efficiency". Additionally, he argued that the concentration of many tasks in a single institution was not a characteristic of authoritarian governments, as the United States and other democratic countries also had such agencies.[124] Nonetheless, a U.S. government report of 1937 did advise against the creation of autonomous regulatory commissions with both administrative and judicial activities – such as DASP –, which could "risk the emergence of a 'fourth power' in government" (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 306).[125]

When recounting the Constitution of 1937 in his Oral History testimony to FGV, Luis Simões Lopes believed DASP was able to reach another level of work with constitutional powers.[126] Lopes passed the idea that much of DASP's decisions were discussed directly between him and Vargas, given his easy access to the president and the latter's apparent complete trust in him for administrative matters. Lopes recalled that DASP's initial office was located inside the presidential Catete Palace, which allowed him to have "practically daily" meetings with Vargas, frequently eating lunch together or staying late when some more urgent

---

[122] "Discurso do Sr. Luís Simões Lopes, Presidente do DASP", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 8-9.
[123] Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 6.
[124] Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, "Evolução da Administração Pública Federal", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 17.
[125] Wahrlich, however, did not see DASP as this risk. Beatriz Wahrlich is an important reference on studies about Brazilian public administration, heading the School of Public Administration of *Fundação Getúlio Vargas* in the 1960s. Notwithstanding her important contribution to administrative history, especially on the Vargas years, she is not an impartial subject. In the book used in this research, she is visibly favorable of DASP's mission and behavior, justifying centralization in order to properly solidify the measures, which later could be decentralized (1983, p. 316). Because of this, the book is also analyzed with the attention required for primary sources.
[126] This entire paragraph is based on: LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 16-17, 21-22, 31, 45-46.

matter came up. Without Vargas' "unconditional support", which meant support for "measures, often, very tough", Lopes believed DASP would not be as successful as it was. From Lopes' perspective, Vargas showed his endorsement by accepting and adopting DASP criteria "in the absolute majority" of cases, particularly when Lopes explained his reasoning for a decision, which would quickly convince Vargas even if against the position of other Ministers. This close relationship of trust between Vargas and Lopes granted DASP the status of what Lopes called a "super ministry", a term also used in the literature to express the scope of DASP's responsibilities and influence (GOMES et al., 1996, p. 134; GRAHAM, 1968).

However, Luis Simões Lopes also recognized, when looking back, that Getúlio Vargas' full support was only one aspect of DASP success. Something just as important was that DASP operated under a dictatorship, and that without it "it would have been hard to win it all over". An authoritarian government allowed the bureau to operate freely, without political barriers, and to gather an "extraordinary concentration of attributes" that gave DASP an "exorbitant level of power" (DRAIBE, 2004, p. 77). Lopes even said that Vargas "only got all of that, that improvement in the public service, because he was a dictator".[127] This raises questions of whether he might have been aware, at the time, that some of DASP's decisions were, in fact, dictatorial, even as he believed they were necessary for the restructuring and improvement of public service, and consequently, of the nation. As an individual, Lopes most likely sympathized with the views and ideas of the *tenentistas* group of the early 1930s. His understanding of Vargas as a dictator would be in agreement with *tenentistas*' view, still in 1932, that the "permanence of the dictatorship" that clearly prioritized "technical standards of management" allowed for a "mean to cleanse habits and redefine the nations' ideals" (GOMES, 1980, p. 28). Lopes, similarly, interpreted politics as governance, and good governance would be achieved through a rational and efficient public administration.

Furthermore, Luis Simões Lopes close relationship with Vargas and position as DASP president seemed to grant him a high level of power within *Estado Novo*'s decision-making bureaucratic elite. His personal archives, to begin with, concentrate much of CFSPC's and DASP's papers – even as part of it can also be found at the *Arquivo Nacional* – and they are a reference for scholars that wish to study Getúlio Vargas.[128] Amidst his documents we found, for instance, a series of drafts of RSP articles that would suggest Lopes' personal interest in the

[127] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 17, 50.
[128] For an analysis of DASP's archives at the *Arquivo Nacional*, see Araújo (2017).

matter.[129] In one such draft, there is an introductory paragraph from Manuel Pio Correa Jr. addressed to the CFSPC president that is omitted from the RSP publication, saying that "according to the instructions received yesterday, I proceeded with due attention to study the attached documents".[130] Since Lopes mentions that Pio Correa Jr. was his secretary, we can infer that Lopes most likely gave the instructions for such pieces.

The president of DASP never authors an article in RSP and his name is only explicitly shown in special editions when his speeches are transcribed. Nonetheless, because the Journal states that "it does not endorse the concepts issued by signed articles", one can assume that non-signed pieces and editorials might have Lopes' input, notably after taking into consideration how he talks about his years as head of DASP at his Oral History testimony.[131] Throughout the interview, Luis Simões Lopes often uses the singular first person to discuss decisions made by DASP. For instance, when Vargas sent issues for DASP to resolve, Lopes affirmed that "**I** would send my exposition [of reasons]". On another occasion, Lopes said "**we** had some two hundred thousand people in examinations, but **I** could only approve ten percent", and then goes on to say that "**I** would conduct the examinations". In one instance, when recounting his later work at FGV, Lopes mistakenly said "here in the DASP".[132] These examples show how, in Lopes' perspective, the DASP and himself were one single unit.

This perception also seems to affect how Simões Lopes takes it personally an apparent lack of recognition from his Brazilian counterparts of what he called a "silent revolution". In a letter to Getúlio Vargas in 1949, he reported he was invited by the United Nations Secretary General to become a member of the International Civil Service Advisory Board. Contemplating how unknown his name was internationally and that the Brazilian government – then under President Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1950) – had not formally appointed him, Lopes believed that the invitation was a recognition of DASP's work, which was "thanks to the *Estado Novo* [and] the clairvoyance of [Vargas], impersonal and objective in his way to handle the public good".[133] Similarly when discussing the Law of Readjustment, Lopes claimed that he and his

---

[129] Drafts of a few articles can all be found under the same coding at: CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14. It is not clearly stated that these pieces are drafts of RSP articles, but, when going through the first editions of RSP, one can see the same texts published by different authors. See, for instance: M. Pio Corrêa Junior, "Organização da Comissão do Serviço Público Civil nos EUA e estrutura geral dos serviços", October 19, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, and M. Pio Corrêa Junior, "Organização da Comissão do Serviço Público Civil nos EUA e Estrutura Geral do Serviços", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 38.

[130] M. Pio Corrêa Junior, "Organização da Comissão do Serviço Público Civil nos EUA e estrutura geral dos serviços", October 19, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1.

[131] Copyright Page, *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 2, August 1938.

[132] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 17, 18, 22, 26. All highlights are my own.

[133] Luis Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, March 10, 1949, CPDOC-FGV, GV c 1949.03.10/2.

colleagues were misunderstood at the time, and that "in the future of Brazil, in one hundred years, when these people start to comprehend what is public service, they will have a lot of interest in this law".[134] He seems to imply that future historians and politicians will excuse mistakes, ignore critics and understand his struggle, once they grasped the magnitude of the good he aimed to accomplish.

Luis Simões Lopes, thus, did have enough powers to significantly influence the decision to prohibit women's access to the diplomatic career in Itamaraty 1938 restructuring. As this prohibition was only the first of a series of similar measures, DASP's jurisprudence on the issue becomes clear, as similar gender perceptions would be reinforced by Lopes in a number of future occasions. Still, this decision was not taken solely by DASP. Lopes explained that in order to recruit "the most advisable types" for a certain position, DASP would verify "the true technical and administrative necessities" of a department *in addition to* "the point of view of the leaders of these departments".[135] This conveys the impression that there needed to be a convergence of opinions between DASP and those wishing to adopt such measures, which did not always happen. The Ministry of Labor, for instance, presented a distinct, more positive, view about the benefits of female contribution to public service in discussions about the Goiás Railroad engineer *concurso* in 1944.[136] In light of this, we could not find any indication that the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and Oswaldo Aranha in particular, held a different position from DASP in relation to women in diplomacy. But let us look at this more carefully.

4 The useless living room – Itamaraty in Brazilian public Administration

It is not possible to look at Brazil's international relations and the formulation of its foreign policy at the time as separate from the greater effort to rationalize and modernize the state bureaucracy, particularly when Luis Simões Lopes said in 1937 that "in order to face the extreme danger that threaten us internally and externally, a solid administrative structure still is the best element of defense".[137] The Ministry of Foreign Relations, nonetheless, was already a pioneer and active contributor to the rationalization process: MRE was the first Ministry to fully transfer recruitment responsibilities to CFSPC and to create an internal Administrative Department replicating the Council's role; in a more subtle detail, one can find what appears to be a draft of comments on DASP's creation bill in Oswaldo Aranha's archives, with some of

[134] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 14.
[135] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, June 19, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 3.
[136] Alexandre Marcondes Filho to Getúlio Vargas, May 14, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2666.
[137] Luis Simões Lopes, "Primeiro Aniversário da Lei do Reajustamento do Funcionalismo Público Civil", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 76.

his own hand-written annotations on it, suggesting his personal involvement with the event; and, perhaps most significantly, a number of consuls and diplomats would become important figures in the administrative reforms of the 1930s.[138]

Luis Simões Lopes, in his testimony, remembered with great appreciation and pride three diplomats who were by his side in the journey through CFSPC and DASP. The first one was Maurício Nabuco, the man ultimately responsible for a report that originated the Law of Readjustment. The Nabuco Report would be remembered by Brazilian public administrators as a summary of "the best of so many experiences", representing years of research "conducted without hurry and in light of ample documentation".[139] Maurício Nabuco was the son of Joaquim Nabuco, an important Brazilian politician and abolitionist in the 1880s who was Brazil's first ambassador to the United States (1905-1910), and had already spread ideas of merit and efficiency for the civil service in the late nineteenth-century. Shortly after being admitted to Itamaraty in 1913 without taking examinations, Maurício Nabuco served as an advisor in Theodore Roosevelt's visit to Brazil after his presidency, and might have been influenced by Roosevelt's early works in the U.S. Civil Service Commission (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 125-126). Working at Itamaraty's Secretariat at the end of the 1920s, Nabuco found an opportunity to implement "instrumental services and a work routine in MRE" (CHEIBUB, 1985, p. 124). Nabuco also acted as Aranha's Chief of Staff, being described as both an administrator and a diplomat able to "consolidate Brazil's prestige" in international politics, eventually becoming Brazilian ambassador to the U.S. in the 1950s.[140] He continued to be interested and involved, alongside Lopes, in matters of public administration, presiding the *Fundação Getúlio Vargas* Curator Council.[141]

The second personality mentioned by Lopes was Moacyr Briggs, who Cheibub (1985) also pointed out as a diplomat with important DASP connections.[142] Briggs joined the diplomatic career in 1918 via *concurso* and became a constant figure in public examination boards for the Ministry in the following decade, in addition to working alongside Maurício

---

[138] DASP. *Relatório sobre as atividades do DASP em 1939.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940, p. 5; DASP. *Relatório 1940.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941, p. 99; "D.A.S.P", February 10, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.02.10/2.

[139] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 12-13; Benedicto Silva, "O Reajustamento do Funcionalismo", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 6-7.

[140] Oswaldo Aranha, "Por ocasião da posse do Secretário Geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Maurício Nabuco", September 25, 1939, CPDOC-FGV, OA pi 1939.09.25; and NABUCO, M. *Reflexões e Reminiscências.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2001.

[141] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 12-13

[142] Ibid., p. 33.

Nabuco in the early 1930s.[143] Expanding its work beyond the Ministry, Briggs also worked in the Nabuco Report and was appointed to the CFSPC, substituting Lopes as president on certain occasions, and later becoming a DASP Director.[144] In the following decades, Briggs would alternate positions between Itamaraty and DASP, acting as ambassador and DASP's President in a few occasions.[145] As Maurício Nabuco, Briggs' work within Itamaraty on administrative issues took him further than the boundaries of foreign service; he soon became an essential component in government-wide administrative reforms, certainly circulating its views back and forth between the two agencies.

The third person Lopes mentioned was Manuel Pio Correa Jr., who is reported as Lopes' secretary at CFSPC while simultaneously studying for the Itamaraty examinations.[146] Even as Pio Correa reached first place in the 1937 MRE *concurso*, he continued on at CFSPC writing articles for RSP about the inner-workings of the U.S. Civil Service Commission.[147] Pio Correa later was among the public employees sent by DASP to study public administration in the United States as part of a program called Hall of Nations – a partnership with a university in Washington, D.C., that trained U.S. government employees in matters of public affairs –, suggested and initiated by Oswaldo Aranha while ambassador in Washington.[148] This program became a central piece of Lopes' work to improve Brazilian public administration, as he later mentioned that he believed the U.S. administration was "the most modern" of the time, in comparison with the equally important, but more traditionalist, British civil service.[149]

4.1 The rational-bureaucratic development of Itamaraty

Itamaraty's proactive attitude in the rationalization process and importance within the Brazilian public administration strengthened, in return, its internal ability to combine the interests of the institution with those of the nation (CHEIBUB, 1985). Historically, Brazilian

---

[143] Embassy to Dept of State, August 16, 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.021/41, and Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs. In: Alzira Alves de ABREU et al (cords.). *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930*. Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010.

[144] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p.33.

[145] Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs. In: Alzira Alves de ABREU et al (cords.). *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930.* Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010.

[146] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 54.

[147] M. Pio Corrêa Junior, "Organização da Comissão do Serviço Público Civil nos EUA e Estrutura Geral do Serviços", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 38. In the same edition of RSP, Pio Correa is listed among the approved for Itamaraty examinations on p. 60. Correa's top qualification is mentioned by Lopes in an attempt to show the high quality of DASP's employees, a characteristic he seemed to have prized and employed all efforts toward. He proudly mentions that many DASP employees were hired by the United Nations after its creation in 1945 (Lopes, L. S., [n.d.], CPDOC-FGV, LSL pi Lopes, L. S. 0000.00.00/3, p. 11).

[148] Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, October 3, 1936, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1936.10.03/2; Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 63.

[149] LOPES, L. S. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 23.

foreign policy was conducted by the highest echelon of the country's governing elite. During the Empire of Brazil (1822-1889), diplomatic relations was carried out by men acting in both diplomatic and state-building capacities, which, according to Cheibub (1985), helped to create a homogenous governing elite (p. 118). Due to its strategic aspect for the country, the Brazilian foreign service tended to recruit among the traditional elite families, in what Cheibub called the "patrimonial period" (p. 114-117). The diplomatic corps thus formed a fairly consistent and homogenous group, with similar mentalities, interests and aspirations, which would facilitate the formulation and execution of foreign policy. The following period of MRE's institutional construction, according to Cheibub (1985), was the "charismatic moment", getting its name from the Barão do Rio Branco administration (1902-1912), represented as "the true foundation of the modern Itamaraty" (p. 120). Rio Branco became the most important figure in Brazilian diplomatic history, creating a special symbolism around the diplomat for the consolidation of the nation-state, which also heightened Itamaraty's prestige and sustained the diplomat's role as a foreign-policy decision-maker (ibid.).

The period after Rio Branco's tenure was characterized as "rational-bureaucratic" because it represented, especially until 1945, a restructuring of Itamaraty into a rational institution within the Brazilian public administration (CHEIBUB, 1985, p. 123). It is worth remembering that the first woman joined MRE in 1918, when public examinations became required for the recruitment of Secretariat officials (ibid., p. 120). According to Cheibub (1985), the reforms implemented particularly during the Vargas era aimed to further project diplomats as rational and versatile decision-makers of the highest quality – beyond the previous tendency to focus on the Ministers as so –, granting the institution a growing autonomy and also the Brazilian foreign policy a certain continuity for years to come. From the refinement of basic services such as the standardization of communication and reorganization of libraries and archives, to the restructuring of the foreign service careers – culminating in the fusion of the distinct branches –, Itamaraty tried to normalize an idea of an efficient and rational operation (ibid., p. 123-125). The influence of CFSPC and DASP in this modernization process cannot be underestimated. As mentioned, the 1937 *concurso* for the diplomatic career was the first examination conducted under CFSPC's mandate, which was also the first time it was executed outside of MRE's full supervision (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 133).

The main reforms of MRE's "rational-bureaucratic" period happened in the 1930s and, according to Cheibub (1985), they effectively modernized the institution, with the ultimate purpose of combining the Brazilian foreign service into a single diplomatic career, which had a direct impact on women's occupations. Originally, Itamaraty's career structure was divided

into three branches: the Diplomatic Service, the Consular Service and the career of Secretariat Officials – also known as the bureaucratic branch (CASTRO, 2009; CHEIBUB, 1985, p. 125). Only consular and diplomatic officers could serve the country internationally, whereas Secretariat officials were allocated domestically in Rio de Janeiro, responsible for operational and administrative activities, as well as for overseeing Brazilian officers abroad.[150]

Curiously, women employees only served in the administrative career, acting exclusively domestically, while their male counterparts could unquestionably serve in foreign posts (FRIAÇA, 2018). Farias (2017), accordingly, pointed out that this exclusivity of women as Secretariat officials also plays into the dichotomy of public/private roles for men and women, as only the former were allowed to act and be seen abroad, whereas women employees were relegated to domestic, in country, labor. We will explore more about these implications in the following chapters.

4.2 Mello Franco Reform of 1931

The first structural reform, carried out by Minister Afrânio de Mello Franco in 1931 – based on a previous report by Maurício Nabuco – eliminated the occupation of Secretariat officials, distributing its members among the consular and diplomatic careers in order to make foreign assignments indispensable for professional advancement.[151] Even though a 1938 Itamaraty report considered Secretariat officials a "zealous and competent staff", their efficiency was not deemed optimal specifically because of the lack of experience abroad. The intention was to give the foreign service greater interdependence and coordination, making the Secretariat more dynamic through a system of rotativity, in which diplomats and consuls would also handle domestic issues of their profession, enriching their experience acquired abroad and also allowing the Minister of Foreign Relations to meet them individually.

The measures hopefully would assist in forming diplomats with a more universal view of Itamaraty's operations and purpose, eliminating the perceived distance – and rivalries – between officials working in Brazil and overseas. There was a prevailing perception that diplomats and consuls were becoming "denationalized" and distant of Brazilian realities since they could serve abroad for many years, migrating from one post to another without returning home. Edwin Morgan, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil at the time, also pointed out that domestic

[150] "Secretaria de Estado", [1938], AHI, MRE-Atividade-Meio, Estante 135, Prateleira 2, Maço 5.
[151] The information contained in this paragraph is a complex combination of the following sources: Edwin Morgan to Dept of State, n. 3512, January 23, 1931, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.021/39, p. 2; "Secretaria de Estado", [1938], AHI, MRE-Atividade-Meio, Estante 135, Prateleira 2, Maço 5, p. 1-2; CASTRO (2009, p. 315-317); CHEIBUB (1985, p. 125-126); and WAHRLICH (1983, p. 47).

officers seemed more fully occupied than those serving abroad in less important posts, and he was under the impression they could "become indolent and uninterested". Soon after, in 1933, the political position of commissioned ambassador was also extinct, prioritizing the access to the highest position of the diplomatic career – First Class Minister – to those officers admitted through public examinations.

Around the same time that women were granted suffrage, the four female Secretariat officials at Itamaraty were transferred unquestionably to the consular service – already delimitating the diplomatic corps as an exclusively male space –, being dismissed from serving abroad or only allowed to do so for a maximum period of 12 months (BRANDÃO et al., 2017; FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 80, 98).[152] An opinion piece in the daily *A Noite* promptly declared this permission to serve abroad as a triumph for Brazilian women, assuming this was an experiment that would prove successful and eventually allow the full representation of women overseas.[153] Nevertheless, a few days later, the Brazilian consul H. Pinheiro de Vasconcellos – who was married to Maria José de Castro Rebello Mendes, the first women in Itamaraty back in 1918 – responded that the Mello Franco Reform was in fact an "unfortunate regression" that made individual rights uneven for women. Questioning the lack of logic and reason in the 12-month limit, the consul saw this as "the result of ignorance or otherwise as wickedness", advocating that once a right existed, "there is nothing else to experiment".[154]

President Getúlio Vargas, however, had a positive impression of the reform. He understood that Brazil's international position, in a context of global economic depression and escalating tensions in Europe, "asked for a more elastic [diplomatic] institution, endowed with personnel […] capable of adapting, when necessary, to the various contingencies of the service".[155] In a 1934 speech, Vargas affirmed that the Mello Franco reform was evidence that Itamaraty was, under his regime, "losing its old appearance of a useless living room, to convert it into a laboratory of serious and fruitful studies".[156] In one Itamaraty document, its organizational structure prior to 1930 would be judged as "old-fashioned" and "deeply impairing national interests". Because of this, the 1931 reform was necessary to "prepare in a definite manner the human element" at MRE, through entrance examinations and rigorous

[152] Decree n. 19.592, January 15, 1931, art. 22, § 2.
[153] "As senhoras e senhoritas que pela reforma dos serviços do Ministério das Relações Exteriores já ocupam postos consulares", *A Noite,* January 19, 1931, p. 3.
[154] H. Pinheiro de Vasconcellos, "Uma carta de um funcionário do Ministério das Relações Exteriors", *A Noite*, January 22, 1931, p. 7.
[155] VARGAS, G. "Mensagem lida perante a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte", November 15, 1933. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. III. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 61.
[156] VARGAS, G. "Voltando ao Rio Grande depois de quatro anos", November 23, 1934. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. IV. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 27.

trainings to offer a "complete vision of all problems connected to the operation and execution" of Brazilian foreign policy, in addition to promoting a "more intimate and profound contact with Brazilian life".[157]

4.3 Oswaldo Aranha and the 1938 Reform

On October 14th, 1938, within his first six months as Minister of Foreign Relations, Oswaldo Aranha put in place the second structural reform of the "rational-bureaucratic" period, a historical one, finally combining the diplomatic and consular paths into one.[158] In a note to the press, MRE affirmed that this step was merely an improvement "based on experience" from the previous reform and from "great countries" who had already conducted this fusion.[159] In fact, the unification of both careers followed an international tendency – the United States Department of State had consolidated the two branches in 1924, under the Rogers Act, and the United Kingdom Foreign Office would do so in 1943 (CALKIN, 1978; McCARTHY, 2009). The final goal of the reform was to "give employees abroad a specialized practice, in order to facilitate their missions, in any sector they might work", taking into consideration that the job was increasingly carried out "in wider and broader spheres, asking from those who exercise it a more complete sum of expertise".[160] The merger would provide diplomats political experience as well as "elements for dealing quickly, safely and efficiently in economic and commercial businesses.[161]

Even though the 18 women consuls were transferred to the now sole diplomatic career, the reform determined that, from then on, only male candidates were allowed to register for the entrance exams.[162] Registrations for the *concurso* that would be carried out by DASP in late 1938 were opened between April and July of the same year, counting 76 registered individuals, of which 18 were women. Five days after the new measure, however, DASP Director of Selection and Improvement Mario de Brito proposed in a memo the cancellation of the registration of 18 people "for being of the female sex", which had underneath the hand-written approval of Luis Simões Lopes.[163] The Brazilian press did not fail to notice that registered

[157] "Secretaria de Estado", [1938], AHI, MRE-Atividade-Meio, Estante 135, Prateleira 2, Maço 5; Jayme de Barros Gomes, "Exposição Sucinta dos trabalhos realizados pelo Itamaraty nos últimos doze meses", October 21, 1939, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.1, Lata 1042, Maço 18309, p. 6.
[158] Decree-Law n. 791, October 14, 1938.
[159] "A reforma do Ministério das Relações Exteriores", *Correio da Manhã*, October 19, 1938, p. 1.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Jayme de Barros Gomes, "Exposição Sucinta dos trabalhos realizados pelo Itamaraty nos últimos doze meses", October 21, 1939, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.1, Lata 1042, Maço 18309, p. 5.
[162] Decree-Law n. 791, October 14, 1938. Art. 30, *Parágrafo Único*.
[163] Mario de Brito, response to "Relatório do Secretario do Concurso", October 19, 1938, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso Diplomata, 2C. DASP 1177, p. 4.

women would see their educational and financial efforts lost with this cancellation, which happened right before exams started.[164] The prohibitive measure was kept in force until 1953, again with Getúlio Vargas as president, when Maria Sandra Cordeiro de Mello registered for the exams after filing a judicial injunction.[165]

During his years as Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, Oswaldo Aranha expressed a favorable opinion about the position of women in U.S. society. During a visit of Vargas' daughter, Alzira, to the United States in 1935, Aranha wrote to the president that she would benefit greatly from these ideas of equality between men and women. Somewhat enthusiastically, he said that a familiarity with U.S. culture showed him that great civilizations – like the U.S., Great Britain or the Nordic countries – are those who incorporate women, where they were "half of everything" and enjoyed "an equal role to men in private, public and business activities". Comparing Brazil with the United States, Aranha saw the latter as more open to women's participation because of widespread ideals of freedom of choice, whereas Brazil's Catholicism had reduced "the field of female activity in such a way, through law and through prejudice, that this force, complementary to men's, stayed at the margins, unused". He went further and recommended that Vargas should no longer ignore "the efficiency of women's collaboration" and should open the doors of public life to them, which could only bring "great results to our progress" and launch Brazil to the group of modern countries.[166]

After such a blunt support for women's equality, how did Oswaldo Aranha accept and defend female exclusion from the diplomatic career three years later? Bertha Lutz had already shown some reservations towards him in her memoirs, recorded and transcribed in 1971 for a potential book on Brazilian feminism. After the Revolution of 1930, when Vargas invited the FBPF for an audience, Lutz made it clear that her greater reluctance in attending it was meeting with Aranha, whose behavior "had left the impression of a lack of serenity indispensable to good government".[167] In the non-edited audio recording from which the previous passage was transcribed, Lutz went further to say that she doubted the "sincerity of his convictions".[168] Additionally, in the audio, she remembered that the feminist movement had "a lot of trouble" with Aranha, who often presented himself as "a fierce adversary of the [women's]

[164] "Concurso para cônsul", *Correio da Manhã,* September 12, 1938, p. 4.
[165] See chapter 3 of Friaça (2018) for a detailed account of the 1938-1953 period.
[166] Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, November 11, 1935, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1935.11.11.
[167] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 63.
[168] Projeto de livro sobre o histórico do Movimento Feminista Brasileiro (38 minutes), 1971, AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, APR.ELC.DSO.11.

campaign".[169] These passages are omitted in the written transcription, but Aranha is still remembered as doing "everything at his disposal to prevent the entrance of women to Itamaraty and to restrict their access to the highest posts" while Minister of Foreign Relations.[170]

There is also some indications to suggest that Oswaldo Aranha as Minister of Foreign Relations at the time of the decision is a significant factor for the decision. Previous Ministers, especially Felix de Barros Cavalcanti de Lacerda (1933-1934) and José Carlos de Macedo Soares (1934-1936), seemed to have been favorable to women's demands (FARIAS, 2017). On the occasion of Macedo Soares' inauguration, women consuls and the FBPF paid a farewell tribute to Cavalcanti de Lacerda for working in favor of feminism, notably for undoing an "environment of distrust" at Itamaraty that seemed to persist even though women were already performing with intelligence, responsibility, dedication and competence. As an example of his work, they thanked Lacerda for the designation of two women consuls to overseas posts – Zorayma Rodrigues and Leontina Cardoso.[171]

In honor of new-coming Macedo Soares, the FBPF praised his attitude in favor of women's demands during the National Constituent Assembly of 1932.[172] During his tenure as Minister of Foreign Relations, when women were still limited to the consular service, the Brazilian press noted that he was favorable to women's participation also in the diplomatic career. Reporting on changes that were occurring in MRE, where the work usually required "maximum description", a male consul would have said that the day when women could enter the diplomatic career was not far off, as there were plans to ask Congress for a declaration allowing it.[173] Unfortunately, we could not find any archival document that would endorse this claim, but this corroborates the idea found in other sources suggesting that Macedo Soares would be more supportive of women's demands than Oswaldo Aranha. We do not see tributes being paid to Aranha by feminists, or any indication of an easy relationship between the *Estado Novo* chancellor and FBPF, Bertha Lutz, or the female diplomats.

Maurício Nabuco, who became Oswaldo Aranha's Chief of Staff in 1939, after the reform, also seemed favorable to the compatibility of women and diplomacy. When consul Zorayma Rodrigues was leaving to serve in the Brazilian Consulate in Liverpool in 1934 – "one of the toughest posts in the career" where Barão do Rio Branco had once served – she mentioned

---

[169] Ibid.
[170] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 66
[171] "Tomam posse os Ministros das Relações Exteriores e da Educação e Saúde Pública", *Jornal do Commercio*, July 27, 1934, p. 5.
[172] Rachel Crotman, "Duas Manifestações Feministas no Itamaraty", *Diário de Notícias,* July 29, 1934, p. 21.
[173] "O Itamaraty, onde a reportagem poucas vezes entra", *Correio da Manhã*, January 24, 1935, p. 3.

in a newspaper interview that Nabuco assured her that she would soon be able to manage any other Consulate in light of Liverpool's complex and diversified demands.[174] In his memoirs, Nabuco saw women in diplomacy as such a natural concept that the Portuguese language was already adapted for it. While the term *embaixatriz* usually designates the wife of an ambassador, in Brazil there is the term *embaixadora*, unique to Portuguese, that means a woman "equipped with her own credentials" – diplomacy, therefore, would not require the creation of a new terminology to accept women into it.[175]

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the decision to prohibit the access of women to the diplomatic career in 1938 as an intersection between the Administrative Department of the Public Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas DASP had the power to define the role of women in Brazilian society, Itamaraty executed the first executive order toward the implementation of that definition. We have argued that the men in charge of both institutions, Luis Simões Lopes and Oswaldo Aranha, held enough power amidst the Brazilian governing elite to have a significant influence in the female ban at Itamaraty, although no certainty can be ascribed. Both actors had a personal relationship of trust with president Getúlio Vargas and were essential figures in the Revolution of 1930 and the *Estado Novo* coup of 1937, in addition to embodying the values promoted by their respecting institutions. Furthermore, the primary sources consulted indicated a highly collaborative attitude between DASP and MRE in the process of modernizing and rationalizing the Brazilian public administration.

Within Getúlio Vargas authoritarian regime, DASP had powers to conduct an overarching bureaucratic restructuring based on: a supposedly rational and scientific recruitment system; a professional, technical and apolitical civil service; and a prioritization of the national, collective interests. Itamaraty, in light of the growing political tensions in Europe and bargaining its neutrality between Germany and the United States, reformed its internal career structure to solidify the diplomat as the main formulator and executor of Brazilian foreign policy. Women, in both these scenarios, would have their available space for action limited along the way. As we see next, DASP and MRE would be in the process of implementing a sexual division of labor in public service.

---

[174] Rachel Crotman, "A primeira consuleza brasileira e as impressões que leva da sua missão", *Diário de Notícias*, April 10, 1934, p. 1.
[175] NABUCO, M. *Reflexões e Reminiscências.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2001, p. 44.

CHAPTER 2 - Readjusting the general mentality: implementing sexual divisions of labor through civil service entrance examinations

The female prohibition at the Ministry of Foreign Relations in 1938 was among the first visible steps in a *Estado Novo* redefinition of women's role in society. A revitalized system of gender relations became "one of the pillars over which the State's new organization was built and legitimized", in which men and women should act according to traditional notions of masculinity and femininity to avoid a "moral and gender catastrophe", characterized as "women's abandonment of the home and sexual deviance" (BESSE, 1999, p. 6; COWAN, 2016, p. 26). Getúlio Vargas, who proclaimed that Brazil was crossing a tough phase of "resignation and hardships", urged a patriotic spirit from its citizens as the state continued to work to "clean up, remove obstacles, [and] to readjust, at last, the general mentality".[1]

In this chapter we uncover the social perceptions that promoted the glorification of women's work as mothers, reverencing the family and sexual divisions of labor through a variety of social policies aimed to restrict – or "protect" – female labor into positions that would accommodate their supposed "natural" domestic-oriented qualities.[2] We explore the interconnections of perceptions around female work, family and domesticity, as they could not be examined apart from each other during this time period (MARQUES, 2016b). Furthermore, we study how the relationship between domestic (private) and non-domestic (public) life influenced the understanding of women and men's social role, segregating them into distinct work positions. Scholars have discussed this idea that the public and private spheres are not isolated concepts and need to be explored dialectically (OKIN, 2008). For instance, Okin (2008) explored the bond between the state – as the public sphere – constantly attempting to shape the meaning of family, as the private sphere, to suit its own needs, whereas norms of behavior based on the family's unequal gender structure gave the men in power a specific perception of reality that would also shape public policy. Similarly, family gender relations would also create

[1] VARGAS, G. "Problemas e Realizações do Estado Novo", Abril 22, 1938. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 168; VARGAS, G. "Estado Novo e as Forças Armadas", June 29, 1938. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 244.

[2] It is paramount to note that the analysis on female labor in this research focuses largely on middle- and upper-class, usually white, Brazilian women. This group would experience the challenges and limitations we describe and examine in the following pages because their entrance into the job market was the novelty event at the beginning of the twentieth century. For women of color and those of lower social classes, working was not a new phenomenon; on the contrary, their social position was defined by the subsistence aspect of their work (SAFFIOTI, 2013).

inequalities in access to opportunities in the labor market, such as the decision in 1938 to limit the Brazilian diplomatic career only to male candidates.

The lack of a precise division between public and private life is one of the reasons why feminists scholars claim that the personal is political, upon which Okin (2008) suggested that attempts to segment those two realms, particularly in divisions of labor, were ideological constructs (p. 315). Following this thought, Blachman (1977) found a general agreement among gender scholars that, despite the existence of biological differences between males and females, the social understandings of these differences would be "brought about by people", rather than naturally (p. 29). Furthermore, Pateman (1988) suggested that notions of sexual differences are constructed for political purposes, this being a central foundation to the story civil society tells about itself (p. 16). Those constructed meanings ultimately promote a somewhat universal phenomenon of a sexual division of the labor market across capitalist societies and activities, fixating women's main responsibility "around the home and the family" (BLACHMAN, 1977, p. 29). Women, thus, were only allowed to monetize and occupy extradomestic work that resembled the acceptable female core activities, those associated with maintaining a respectable, clean and stocked home, caring for children, elderly and the sick, and assisting, whenever necessary, the men/husband's work (PATEMAN, 1998, p. 128).

In studying gender notions in Brazil in the first half of the twentieth century, Blachman (1977) argued that the social definition of women at the time was "the biological female as wife and mother within the institution of the family", which provides insights into understanding the perceptions that culminated in the 1938 female ban in the diplomatic career (p. 31). The central focus of this chapter is based on Marques' (2016b) argument that Brazilian women's presence in the labor market in the 1930s was influenced by two main aspects: available access to opportunities and contemporary conceptions of motherhood (p. 670). The latter would greatly impact the type of work women were allowed to perform outside of the home, with Brazilian labor regulations following "symbolic representations" of masculinity and femininity, and the term *trabalho feminino* being used politically to suggest the "set of activities conventionally executed only by women" (ibid, p. 671). The former aspect, access to opportunities, will be further investigated in this chapter through the lens of civil service and public entrance examinations (*concursos públicos*).

The state, scholars argue, would be a major contributor in defining the social gendered norms of behavior, particularly in "preventing women from working in specific areas of the labor market" and reinforcing their subordinate domestic roles, through legislation and social policy (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 6). This chapter is also inspired on Duerst-Lahti's (1987)

idea that there is a need to examine more closely the "shared (stereotypical) assumptions" of members of organizations about proper gender behaviors in order to weigh how they "constrain and shape women's ability to function" in male-dominated institutions (p. 18). In this sense, we look into shared perceptions of femininity and masculinity amidst political actors at the time to uncover their influence in Brazilian civil service and women's role in it. Furthermore, following the author's understanding that perceptions are incorporated into organizational structures through actors' political decision-making, we examine how public examinations would be used politically to establish a sexual division of labor in public service and to reinforce women's subordinating roles.

We start the chapter with an overview of why the feminist movement suffered a severe blow after the *Estado Novo* coup of 1937, loosing almost all of its accomplishments while new social forces tried to reshape gender relations focusing on rationalization and sexual divisions of labor in all areas of social life. Introducing a number of family-based social policies, the Brazilian state would incorporate into its bureaucratic structure a masculinity discourse that had a direct impact on women's role within public service. We then analyze the phenomenon of the feminization of certain office occupations – a result of the transposition of rationalization processes from industries to firms – to later explore the role of the Administrative Department of the Public Service (*Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público*, DASP) in determining a sexual division of labor in Brazilian public administration via the merit-based recruitment system. With women restricted to domestic, supportive and private positions in public service, at the end we consider the irrational gender fears and perceptions that would also be motivators behind the state's rationalization discourse.

1 The Silence of a Feminist Movement

The *Estado Novo* coup of November 1937 put a brutal end to feminist discussions in politics, and the literature presents three possible arguments for the resulting demobilization of women's movements and achievements.[3] First, the elitist nature of the most well-known organization, the Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (*Federação Brasileira para o Progresso Feminino*, FBPF), might have contributed to its lack of mass societal support, possibly creating a gap between the political successes and daily lives of middle- and lower-class women. Alves (1980) affirms categorically that the Brazilian suffragist movement was composed of bourgeois women – also predominantly white – who mostly fought the juridical

[3] The literature on the subject includes: Alves (1980); Hahner (1990); Soihet (1997; 2013); Besse (1999); Pinto (2003); Saffioti, (2013); and Marques (2016a).

battles for female inclusion and emancipation on the base of class rather than sex, giving them "the possibility to enjoy more fully the benefits from their social position" (p. 156, 160).[4] From Bertha Lutz's perspective, women's achievements in Brazil had mostly depended on the efforts of a small dedicated group of individuals, recognizing a lack of "solidarity and cooperation spirit", while also complaining about women's inertia and "an almost absolute indifference from the people".[5]

Secondly, as a possible consequence of elitism, the changes proposed might have been rather superficial. The victories, crucial in their historical context to awaken women's consciousness, would have, at the time, merely contributed to a modernization of gender relations (BESSE, 1999; SAFFIOTI, 2013). The literature criticizes the fragility of the achievements, and the feminists themselves recognized it, although for different reasons. Referencing the Revolution of 1930 that brought Getúlio Vargas to power, Bertha Lutz wrote in 1939 that she now understood that "rights given to women by revolutions […] were not lasting".[6] Although feminists of the time could claim that women had never been as educated as they were in the 1930s, scholars argued that the vote, the legal reforms and the apparent open access to the public sphere had merely created an illusion of change, when in fact there had been no structural transformation in perceived gender obligations (SAFFIOTI, 2013; SOIHET, 1997).[7] The movement had not achieved true democratization of gender relations nor questioned women's complete and sole responsibility for domestic and caring activities (BESSE, 1999; SOIHET 1997). For instance, in 1938, a few days after the diplomatic career was closed to women, an opinion piece in *Correio da Manhã* argued that it was not fair to offer women all the "political advantages" that men possessed, given that men would never be able to compete with them "in those places that will forever be the female kingdom", the home.[8]

The consequential loss of rights for women in the 1937 Constitution and beyond was visible. The former 1934 constitutional permission of access to public positions for both sexes

[4] Alves (1980) interviewed FBPF top leaders, including Bertha Lutz, and also women workers that participated in the suffragist movement. The interviewees from the latter group would call Lutz' leadership rigid, authoritarian and even discriminatory (p. 160). A reflection of Lutz' racial discriminatory views can also be seen in some draft letters from 1942, in which she complained about her new maid's manners and Carnaval's "colored" dancers (for examples, see folder: AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, COR.TXT.A942.3, p. 1-3). Alves (1980) does present a more thorough class perspective of the organized feminist movement in her fourth chapter, but a racial study is largely missing in the literature. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this research.
[5] Lutz, B. [n.d.] AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, PIN.TXT.10, p. 14.
[6] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, April 15, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 2.
[7] Carrie Chapman Catt to Bertha Lutz, January 27, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5.
[8] Floriano de Lemos, "Os Direitos de Eva", *Correio da Manhã*, October 19, 1938, p. 4.

became implicit under the new Constitution, which generated ambiguous interpretations.[9] The also constitutional guarantee of equal salary was impaired in 1940 when a new law allowed for the reduction of the female minimum salary by ten percent.[10] Other measures included the female prohibition of practicing "sports incompatible with [women's] natural conditions" in 1941, and the sexual segregation of secondary education the following year.[11] Bertha Lutz, observing all that was being regulated and restricted, wrote to a friend in 1939 that "a relentless masculinism prevails everywhere" as no women had a place in the new government.[12] Lutz' consolation would be that FBPF members still believed that the year had been successful, "for we have managed to keep alive".[13]

The feminist victories were overcome under an authoritarian context in which "the power of political persuasion of other forces was infinitely superior to Lutz' and her collaborators" (MARQUES, 2016a, p. 144). Consequently, the third argument for the movement's demobilization suggests that these forces had created what Besse (1999, p. 219) called a "reactionary intellectual climate", or, according to Cowan (2016, p. 8), this moment would be part of a larger story of "culture wars" of forces reacting against "perceived threats to tradition, family, gender, and moral standards". One newspaper editorial analyzed Itamaraty's decision to prohibit the access of women to the diplomatic career in 1938 as part of this climate, initially recognizing that Brazilian political feminism had not "evoked the enthusiasm of the feminine 'mass'", mostly producing effects for the small circle of elite feminists. However, the article continued, other women had indeed ridden on the movement's achievements, entering public life through the consular and diplomatic career, from which they were now barred – "the first reverse sign" –, a blow that "must mean something" for the reach of feminist past victories.[14]

The discussions around "women's issues" of previous decades would have materialized the perceived existence of a "family crisis" (BESSE, 1999). Moral and cultural anxieties resulting from a perceived increase in deviant social behavior, particularly related to a "new womanhood", promoted a "moral panic" that used the anxieties as a "discursive fulcrum" to increase control over perceived threats (COWAN, 2016, p. 10, 15). Because of this, they would

[9] Art. 168 from the 1934 Constitution said that public positions were accessible to all Brazilians, with no distinction of sex or marital status, whereas art. 122, paragraph 3, of the 1937 Constitution omitted that last part. See Marques (2016a, p. 72-74) for a comprehensive analysis of struggles in defending access to public positions.
[10] Decree-Law n. 2.548, August 31, 1940, art. 2.
[11] Decree-Law n. 3.199, April 14, 1941, art. 54; Decree-Law n. 4.244, April 9, 1942, art. 25.
[12] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, April 15, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 3.
[13] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, December 13, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5.
[14] "Senhora Ministra...", *Diário de Notícias,* October 19, 1938. p. 4.

only accept female participation in the labor market insofar as it did not generate revolution, scandals, nor disturb women's fundamental role in the center of the family, and as long as women were in positions considered extensions of their biologically-defined maternal nature, which included traits such as fragility, modesty, and the predominance of affectivity over intellect (BESSE, 1999, p. 145; SOIHET, 1997, p. 10). While modern masculinity reflected hopes for society and its glorious future, women who acted outside of their prescribed roles would enter the category of selfish and "enemies of society" (MOSSE, 1996, p. 12).

Women thus became simultaneously the target of demographic policies promoting a more "healthy and diligent population" and "women's issues" were coopted by more conservative voices that preferred their permanence in the home (OSTOS, 2012, p. 337). This was supported by a presidential rhetoric affirming that the state should care for the new generations, protecting "childhood and motherhood and eugeniz[ing] our populations".[15] The Brazilian state had absorbed some of the conservative ideas interested in social harmony and more actively intervened in social relations to maintain order, basing its actions on the underwritten belief that a "gender hierarchy would help maintain the social and political hierarchies" of the regime (HAHNER, 1990, p. 176).

This perspective found eco in a variety of social forces that included the Catholic Church, which regained political strength during the Vargas years; intellectuals who used scientific and eugenic justifications to assign women the supposedly higher purpose of homecare and maternity; the feminists themselves who reinforced women's maternal role; and the Brazilian government, which, according to Cowan (2016), privileged "statist approaches to the critical issues of gender, reproduction, women's public roles, and education", favoring values such as "pro-natal eugenics, masculinization, militarization, the revitalization of youth, antiliberalism, and even fascism" (p. 15, 21). The state thus sanctioned social policies that fomented sexual divisions of labor based on notions of femininity and masculinity, hence assigning "domestic labor" to women. This term, as we will see later, was widely defined to include any type of work done by women that would happen "inside", within the four walls of the home as well as the office, made invisible both by its supposed "feminine" nature and by its confined location.

As the purpose of this research is to analyze perceptions promoted by government institutions and its leaders, focused particularly on DASP and Itamaraty, a cultural approach to

[15] Getúlio Vargas, "Nenhum sacrifício, nesta hora grave, será bastante", *Correio da Manhã,* November 10, 1938, p. 1.

Brazilian society's perceptions is beyond our scope. Nonetheless, it is important to quickly exam the main ideals circulating in Brazil during the 1930s, to which we now turn.

1.1 The Church, eugenics and feminist mothers

Despite setbacks caused by a Constitutional cut in government funding in 1891, the Brazilian Catholic Church went through an "intellectual and political revival in the 1920s", finding itself involved in any debate that discussed the family or women's role in society (HAHNER, 1990, p. 154; COWAN, 2016, p. 21). Its magazine *A Ordem* promoted the belief that the "main motivation of female existence was motherhood", claiming that futilities – such as extradomestic work – should not have space in the lives of good mothers (OSTOS, 2012, p. 320). Moreover, Bertha Lutz had already decided during the National Constituent Assembly of 1932 that FBPF would not risk confronting the strength of the Church's political power, opting on the occasion to not discuss divorce as a constitutional matter, and to focus their feminist demands solely on women's suffrage (MARQUES, 2016a). A few years into the *Estado Novo* regime, Mary Cannon, a U.S. Women's Bureau employee in an official visit to Brazil in 1943, reported confidentially to her superiors that FBPF's leaders were older and "unless new life and energy can be brought in, it has lost its real usefulness".[16] Alternatively, Cannon highlighted the many "church-inspired charity work" conducted in Brazil, where "Catholic women's associations have extensive educational, health, and welfare programs".[17]

Another intellectual force of the time was the eugenic movement, which had its greatest consequences in Germany under the Nazi regime (MASON, 1976). The influence of eugenic European thought in Brazilian society helped to promote an idea that the future of Brazil depended on each men and women working within the family and in society for the moral and hygienic improvement of Brazilian population (BESSE, 1999). Getúlio Vargas promoted this idea saying that the human factor was essential to Brazil's progress, and "those who love their land and their people, men of vision and of feelings" were encouraged to collaborate in the "cultural and eugenic preparation of new generations", through the support of motherhood and childhood in order to help solve the "problem of strengthening the race".[18] The supposedly universal "men of vision and of feelings" included men *and* women working within their sex-specific duties. Particularly middle- and upper-class white women were deemed responsible for

[16] Mary M. Cannon, "*Brief Summary of the Reports on Brasil*", August 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1943), Box 3, p. 12.
[17] Mary M. Cannon, "*Women in Brazil Today*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, November 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Publications, Box 15, p. 3, 5.
[18] "O Discurso do Sr. Presidente Getúlio Vargas", *Jornal do Commercio*, September 8, 1938, p. 4.

maintaining a morally and physically healthy citizenry and any activity that could threaten or divert their maternal focus, indirectly promoting small families or even celibacy, should be discouraged (CAULFIELD, 1993, p. 161). Therefore, "extradomestic women", acting outside of their "natural" roles, would unravel the cohese imagined social fabric of the Vargas regime (COWAN, 2016, p. 28; OSTOS, 2012).[19] The diplomatic career cannot be ignored as likely part of this group of "degenerative" activities for women, as it not only attracted upper-class women, but also promoted a lifestyle that supposedly made marriage and motherhood more complicated, as we shall further explore in the following chapter.

Although the main goal of the organized feminist movement was women's economic emancipation, its most prominent members never explicitly denounced their role as mothers. Hahner (1990) argued that this was a strategy of a well-behaved feminism to win over anti-suffragists, with feminists recognizing "the basic definition of a woman's sphere of interest as revolving about the home" to ultimately redefine it to include "far broader areas of concern" (p. 149). For instance, according to Bertha Lutz, the vote would not impair "the natural role of women in the home", since the real problem was Brazil's "growing economic pressure, that forces mothers to be absent for long hours to gain the subsistence of their little children" (apud ALVES, 1980, p. 157). Writer and poet Cecília Meirelles expressed a similar thought in an article glorifying a woman's maternal nature as the motivating force for her presence in the labor market, for which she would be "extraordinary" in positions requiring delicacy, refinement, sharpness, perspicacity and devotion.[20]

1.2 Family-based social policies: offspring, education and wages

One of the ways the state found to guarantee gender hierarchy, motherhood, and social harmony was through the Statute of the Family approved in 1941.[21] The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported to the Department of State in 1939 the creation of the Commission in charge of drafting the Statute, mentioning that this measure seemed to be "largely inspired by the Church" and also as part of "the anti-communist campaign begun in 1937". For U.S. officials, the project indicated a government interested in working "for the people from above".[22]

[19] This fearful sentiment would be well expressed by a magazine in 1930, which said that Brazil could become "populated by hybrids, by people without race, without blood, without character, monsters conceived no one knows how or where" (apud OSTOS, 2012, p. 319).
[20] Cecília Meirelles, "Trabalho Feminino", *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, n. 42, July 1939.
[21] Decree-Law n. 3.200, April 19, 1941.
[22] Embassy to Dept of State, n. 2080, November 17, 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 18, 832.401/9.

Scholars who have analyzed the development of the Statute suggest that its objectives were to maintain traditional and indissoluble family structures that could help promote population growth through higher fecundity and productivity (SCHWARTZMAN, BOMENY, COSTA, 1984; COWAN, 2016). The Statute promoted the protection of the family through a variety of measures: gratuity of civil marriages; credit opportunities for newlyweds, plus debt reduction when children were born; monthly tax deductions for large families; progressive reduction in school registration fees for families with more than one child; preference for married men with children in public service recruitment; and last, but not least, discouragement of female labor outside of the home (VILHENA, 1992, p. 51).[23] The directive concerning public service was further discussed in DASP's Annual Report of 1942 to clarify the criteria that would be used to not only recruit but also promote male employees. In the case of employees tied for promotion, the Report explained that the first preference should be given to married or widowed male employees with the greatest number of children, followed by a married male individual, then by a non-married individual with recognized children.[24]

The following year, with Brazil already engaged in World War II, DASP reported that a "policy of increasing the internal population" that focused on enabling socio-economic conditions for large families also benefited Brazil's national defense, considering the "distressing phase we are going through".[25] In a country facing both high birth and child mortality rates, it was necessary, in DASP's views, to value demographics so that Brazil's "vital space" would be fulfilled by Brazilians.[26] DASP thus recognized that the public administration should have a special role in "developing the family of the public servant", considering these were individuals closely integrated with the general objectives of the state.[27] Furthermore,

[23] In Mason's study (1976) of German women's social position under the Nazi regime, he outlined social policies of family procreation that are very similar to the ones proposed in Brazil, including: family monthly allowances paid for third and subsequent children; marriage loans granted for newlywed husbands, "provided that women withdrew from the labor market"; and reduced school fees for larger families. Additionally, married women were removed from public administration posts or informally persuaded to quit; infertility was treated free of charge; birth control measures became less accessible; and "Mother's Schools" were implemented for female training on the "sciences of motherhood and household management" (p. 92-100).

[24] DASP. *Relatório 1942.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1943, p. 176.

[25] DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 171.

[26] Ibid., p. 180. The concept of "vital space" comes from the German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who understood the state as a living organism in close relationship with the physical space it occupies, arguing that the state should not shy away from seeking better "vital spaces" to incorporate into itself, if necessary. This view implies some geographical determinism that promoted a control over the territory's natural resources and was also incorporated into political discourses of imperialism and territorial expansion at the turn of the twentieth century. For a much deeper analysis on the subject, see Castro (2005).

[27] DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 177, 182.

DASP highlighted the importance of protecting the public servant's family "given the low birth rates the group presents".[28]

Understanding the family as an institution in need of protection for the purpose of "fertility and demographic power", the promotion of large families reinforced the necessity of gender role differentiations, where women would be full-time mothers and housewives and men the providers and the representatives of the family in public life (COWAN, 2016, p. 37). Motherhood was thus included in the modernization process of Brazilian society. As any type of work had its most perfect and efficient way of execution, so did motherhood, and mothers needed to be offered the best and most modern education to honorably fulfill this job (OSTOS, 2012, p. 324). The educational system, in this scenario, was also structured around gender hierarchies. Discussions on women's education during the Vargas government, and mainly under Minister of Education Gustavo Capanema (1934-1945), were centered on the proper role of each sex, with boys prepared for "businesses and fights" and girls for "home life" and their "familial role" (SCHWARTZMAN; BOMENY; COSTA, 1984, p. 107-108). The Minister said in 1937 that the family was "the base of our social organization" and that "it is the woman who founds and conserves the family, as it is also by her hands that the family destroys itself", and because of this the state should "prepare her consciously for this grave mission" (apud SCHWARTZMAN, BOMENY, COSTA, 1984, p. 107). He aimed to establish a "domestic education" system that would provide girls with a "housewife certificate", qualifying them for a rational administration of the home, whereas boys would be instructed to laud their "willpower", "courage", and qualities such as "good heads of households and fair and good men of work" (ibid., p. 109). The sexual division of labor, thus, started early on.

Despite the widespread idea that women should primarily focus on their domestic roles, not all families could be sustained on a single member's income, particularly in a developing country such as Brazil. Hence having a housewife was considered a privilege and a sign of status – in addition to a reassurance of men's masculinity. In this sense, Pateman (1988) argued that all employment contracts presuppose the existence of a marriage contract as well, notably because the idea of a "worker" would be constructed to refer to a male individual, a husband and breadwinner, "who has a woman, a (house)wife, to take care of his daily needs (p. 131). Furthermore, a country's image could be improved if it guaranteed salaries for its male workers that were high enough to allow each sex to fulfill their expected gender roles (MASON, 1976).

[28] Ibid., p. 177.

In Brazil, the state attempted to socially construct a "honorable working-class masculinity" with the proposal of a "family wage", to be given to male heads of households to sustain the entire family (CAULFIELD, SCHETTINI, 2017, p. 14). In 1943, DASP claimed to have proposed to the President a family-wage for public servants, which would allocate an additional monthly amount per dependent, aiming particularly at larger middle- and lower-class families.[29] Considering that a married men with children had "fulfilled the social mission of building a family", DASP's family-wage proposal would be protecting an institution that they believed had been undergoing a series of threats – such as "child delinquency", "weakening of family ties", and "marriage instability" – in the twentieth century all over the world.[30] Nonetheless, as Mason (1976) would note, the major beneficiaries of such family-oriented social policies were in fact men, who enjoyed higher salaries, greater access to jobs and a hierarchically superior position in relation to women (p. 87).

Within FBPF archives we found newspaper clippings that exemplified the social anxiety that promoted some of the policy responses we have discussed. In an opinionative article, for instance, the author Aristides Magalhães claimed that when equal salary for equal work became regulated in the early 1930s, men were subjected to ever lower salaries, or what he called "hunger salaries", because "there are women who do the jobs for abusively low prices". He then followed his argument saying that men were naturally preferred for work because of their superior physical structure, but, instead, women tended to get the jobs exclusively because they accepted lower salaries. The author thus defended that men's salary should be raised so that they would not be compelled to send their daughters out to work.[31]

Some scholars called the social transformation process happening in *Estado Novo* as "conservative modernization", prompting Cowan (2016) to explore in greater detail the dichotomy between "conservative" and "modernization", affirming that the Vargas regime had cooperated with "conservatives only insofar as doing so was expedient" (p. 15).[32] The author argued that the *Estado Novo* regime, although influenced by some "right-leaning hard-liners", as we saw in the previous chapter, did not idealize the morally superior citizens commonly defended by Catholics, Integralists or increasingly marginalized "moralists" (ibid., p. 22-24).[33]

---

[29] DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 7.
[30] Ibid., p. 173, 179.
[31] Aristides Magalhães, "O Trabalho de Mulheres", *A Offensiva*, January 11, 1938, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.CDI, RJR.151, p. 52.
[32] Scholars mentioning a "conservative modernization" include Besse (1999), Draibe (2004), and Schwartzman, Bomeny, Costa (1984).
[33] The Brazilian Integralist Action (*Ação Integralista Brasileira*, AIB) incorporated fascists characteristics with conservative Catholicism in the 1930s. With a nationalist discourse, the party had a cultural purpose – instead of an economic one – that lauded the formula: God, Nation and Family. AIB intended to have a greater role in *Estado*

Instead, Getúlio Vargas was interested in fomenting a more "technical, developmentalist, and patriotic" form of nationalism that could materialize an "army of workers" ready to serve with discipline, sacrifice and efficiency, as exemplified by his emphasis on Brazil moving away from "a regime of fiction and waste to another of reality and work" (ibid., p. 22, 34).[34]

Under a moral code of "productive citizenship", members of the government reiterated that "masculinized 'men of action' and appropriately feminine, working mothers" should serve "the nation's material and productive progress" (COWAN, 2016, p. 34). Although women's lives and behavior were at the center of social anxieties, Cowan (2016) highlighted that promoters of modernization constructed the ideal Brazilian subject "envisioned as male" (p. 14). In this sense, it is not possible to discuss the perceptions around proper femininity without also noting the masculinity ideals. Vargas and his allies wanted perfect "citizen-workers", efficient and productive, based on a "moralistic masculinism" that divided labor into what they perceived to be sexually appropriated activities (ibid., p. 32-33).

The organized feminist movement quickly became mostly a private organization after 1937, with some members wishing to "resume participation in the public life, when the circumstances allow it". Indeed, some were active in protesting female bans in public examinations throughout the *Estado Novo* with letters and editorials.[35] However, conscious of the risks, U.S. feminist Carrie Chapman Catt wrote to her friend Bertha Lutz in 1939 pointing out that "governments that change their methods also change their will at times".[36]

2 Rationalizing Masculinities

In Cowan's (2016) understanding, the Getúlio Vargas regime co-opted "moralism and masculinization as engines of progress" (p. 24). The interwar years, according to Mosse (1996), represented the "climax of modern masculinity", reverberating the impact that World War I had on tying together nationalism and masculinity (p. 110, 133). At this time, hegemonic masculinity stereotypes were "institutionalized and firmly anchored within the modern state" via a militarized and rational discourse of encouraging citizens to serve and sacrifice for a higher national cause, a rhetoric often used by Vargas (ibid., p. 133, 156). The author said this happened particularly strong in fascist and authoritarian regimes, which used manliness as a national symbol to distinguish this "new man" from the passive and decadent bourgeois of the

---

Novo, but it was promptly ignored and made illegal by the new regime, and lost part of its political influence toward the end of the decade. For more on Integralists see Hilton (1972); Trindade (1979); and Deutsch (1999).

[34] "O Discurso do Sr. Presidente Getúlio Vargas", *Jornal do Commercio*, September 8, 1938, p. 4.

[35] Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, August 9, 1939, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5; Letter to FBPF's associates, May 6, 1938, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A938.24.

[36] Carrie Chapman Catt to Bertha Lutz, March 3, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5.

past (ibid., p. 155, 162). However, the idea of a "new man" rarely means a radical redefinition of the male stereotype, which encompasses a more consistent set of attributes over time. In comparison, the general symbol of women is often used in association with an innocent and chaste past, whereas the "new women" is always the subject of a drastic, often ridiculed and unwanted, change (ibid., p. 13).

Processes of nation-building also tend to create a "collective form of identity" populated by a range of masculinities, and DASP, as a bureau in charge of the Brazilian civil service organization, was at the forefront of forging and promoting an ideal hegemonic masculinity for public servants (HORNE, 2004, p. 36).[37] Members of DASP recognized that "each individual is endowed with physical and moral aptitudes different from the others", promoting the attraction into public service of those individuals who reflected an idealized masculine figure.[38] The process, consequently, also defined the roles allowed for women in public administration, in line with their "natural" abilities, so as to not disturb the desired perfection in government operations or the prevalence of the "national interest". But the process, most importantly, was conducted by men.

2.1 Masculine Organizations

Scholars who have studied the impact of gender on organizational structure and operations claim that no organization is gender-neutral, essentially because structures are drawn by "human agents in their social activities" (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 7). Similarly, Duerst-Lahti (1987, p. 16) suggested that members of institutions follow a perceived "ecosystem" of informal norms of behavior that they apply as rules and regulations into the "living organism" that is the organization to which they belong, for which Acker (1990, p. 140) would complement that "widely disseminated cultural images of gender are invented and reproduced" through organizational processes. Because of this, institutions that are predominantly composed of male bodies, such as DASP or Itamaraty, have a difficult time seeing their gendered character. Men perceive that their behavior corresponds universally to all humans, giving the appearance that the systems they create are gender-neutral, when in fact they represent merely men's experiences (ibid., p. 142). The male assumption of neutrality within bureaucracies promote a

[37] Connell proposed that there is an ideal type of masculinity constructed as superior, ascending to a hegemonic position through a "play of social forces". This would result in an ideological male figure that embodies the hegemonic traits, but it is mostly a "fantasy figure". The majority of men, even powerful ones, do not reflect this figure, but they are highly encouraged to promote and strive for it, as the quest itself sustains practices that would institutionalize masculine dominance and feminine subordination (CONNELL, 1987, p. 183-185).

[38] CFSPC, "Aspectos do Serviço Público Civil dos EUA através do Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito sobre o funcionalismo público", May 13, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 7.

disguised patriarchal structure with certain gender, class and racial norms that serve the reproduction of male interests and power, based on the "abstract discourse on rationality, rules and procedures" (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 27).

As an example of how this operated in reality, the Brazilian government Accountability Office (*Tribunal de Contas*) questioned in 1920 whether its regulations permitted the registration of three women candidates for the *concurso* to become *Tribunal* employees. At the time, only two other women had been accepted into public service by public examinations, Maria José de Castro Rebello Mendes in Itamaraty and Bertha Lutz at the National Museum. The men at the *Tribunal* concluded that, since there was no mention in the internal regulations of the possibility, "the law does not admit" female participation.[39] In FBPF's archives, where this document is found, there was also a newspaper clipping saying that the *Tribunal* had denied women's registration because the law required the showing of the military card as mandatory.[40] As Brazilian women did not have to serve in the military, they obviously had no card to present, but this was still used as an impediment for their participation in an institution that reproduced gendered rules and procedures. From women's point of view, thus, the state and its bureaucracy *are* male, in the sense that they represent "the standpoint of men", even when they call it "objectivity" (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 36).

The era of rationalization would have started when the systematization of industrial production – which had resulted in increased productivity while saving time, mental and muscular efforts – was transferred and applied to other forms of labor. In the first edition of the DASP-run Civil Service Journal (*Revista do Serviço Público*, RSP), Editor in Chief Azevedo do Amaral wondered why methodization – successful in industries – could not also be implemented throughout the economic sphere, particularly in public administration, and "as far as possible, in the social sphere", in order to "substitute disorder", reconstruct "civilized life" and avert "social dangers".[41] An article in the following edition declared that, for public administration, rationalization meant "ways of action and organization [that were] obedient to

[39] "As três candidatas ao concurso para funcionárias do Tribunal de Contas", *A Noite*, July 3, 1920, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1, p. 9.
[40] "Um contra no feminismo", *A Noite*, July 11, 1920, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1.
[41] Azevedo do Amaral, "Significação e Alcance do Reajustamento", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 11. Azevedo Amaral was a critic of liberalism and a defender of greater state intervention in the economy, as well as a sympathizer of eugenic and racist thought. "Technically modern and politically reactionary", Amaral would be RSP Editor in Chief in 1937 and all of his eight articles published in RSP would demonstrate his commitment to the regime and to the rationalization process. Shortly before his death in 1942, he would write a vindicating book on Getúlio Vargas (ARAÚJO, 2017, p. 228-230; CHAVES, 2010).

rigorously objective criteria", which should be applied after thorough study and "careful experimentation" to allow for "successive improvements".[42]

The concept of "rationalization", according to Duerst-Lahti (1987), would essentially be a male concept as it was often associated with the idea of creating order, organization and structure, which ultimately resulted in a greater control over institutions and processes. The author found in her study that "men tend to equate power with domination or control", so their attempt to rationalize organizations was equivalent to their desire to increase control and, consequently, their power. Women, on the other hand, would equate power "with accomplishments or effectiveness", preferring to have power *to do* something rather than power *over* something. Duerst-Lahti (1987) also argued that power, for men, seemed to be both a relational concept, or having the ability to influence or dominate in relation to someone else, as well as structural, when an individual would control the decision over "scarce resources or services" (p. 54-60). As we turn the discussion toward female work and the feminization of certain occupations, we can observe these ideas in practice.

2.2 Women in the Office

The establishment of sexual divisions of labor in office work would come as a consequence of Frederick Taylor's scientific management principles, transferred from the factory to the firm, attempting to curb inefficiency resulting from growing volumes work and to discipline an expanding staff (DAVIES, 1982, p. 100). Davies (1982) associated the quest for efficiency with a perceived necessity of greater control from office managers, who masked this need using slogans for "increasing productivity" and "improving efficiency" (p. 118). The sexual component of labor division would be just another dimension in the process of "office modernization" – a process that became essential to government and business management (ibid., chapter 6). Scientific management ideas, according to Strom (1992), was not merely a set of procedures for office organization; they were used as a political tool and as the "ideological rationale" for male managers' hierarchical dominance (p. 3). Rationalization processes promulgated "what they perceived to be masculine values and modes of thought", including the necessity of planning, an end to sentimentality, and the standardization of workers and materials (ibid., p. 3). The resulting management systems developed an office hierarchy based both on class differences and on what Davies (1982) called the "sexual stratification of

[42] Urbano Berquió, "O Estado Novo e a Eficiência Administrativa", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano I, n. 2, January 1938, p. 13.

the office labor force", with women concentrated at lower-level administrative positions (p. 94).

The phenomenon of women working in offices would begin for the same reasons that women started working in industries, out of women's necessity to complement family income, and because, for the employer, female labor was cheaper than men's (STROM, 1992; SAFFIOTI, 2013). By the 1930s in the United States, office work was "the most likely occupation" for urban and white working women, corresponding to almost 50 per cent of total women employees (STROM, 1992, p. 10; QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 18). According to Queirolo (2018), who saw a similar situation in Argentina at the time, the female incorporation into offices was a Western trend, with France's administrative sector absorbing two out of every three female workers, and England offering ten percent of office jobs to women by the 1930s (p. 18). In Brazil, Matos and Borelli (2013) found that between 1920 and 1940 there would be increasingly less women working in the industrial sector, while others sectors saw an increase, such as domestic service, commerce and offices, the latter greatly expanding particularly after the diffusion of the typewriter (p. 134). However, women's entrance into office work would create what Queirolo (2018) called the "female office worker paradox".[43] On one side of the paradox, women saw an advantage in those positions because they required some level of education and offered better conditions, comparatively to factory work. On the other hand, the eventual feminization of positions mostly occupied by women created an unequal playing field, as they became constantly devalued, limited and subjected to lower salaries, now in comparison with their male colleagues (p. 21).[44]

In the United States, the literature shows that women began entering the office workforce through civil service positions due to male labor shortages during the country's Civil War (1861-1865), in combination with the lower wage scale offered by female labor.[45] Not only were men away in combat, but also the office environment underwent a reorganization, with firms expanding and becoming more complex to manage, which required a more specialized departmental division, and greater amounts of paperwork and record-keeping (DAVIES, 1982, p. 51-55). For women who were educated, middle-class, mostly white and single, the available

[43] This is my own translation of the Spanish original: "*paradoja de la empleada*" (QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 21).
[44] Feminization processes of office positions seems to be common in Westerns societies during this time. Davies (1982) and Strom (1992) have focused on the United States, while Perrot (2005) and Queirolo (2018) found a similar process in France and Argentina, respectively. Germany's Weimar Republic also went through rationalization and feminization processes for office jobs (MASON, 1976). In the case of Brazil, one can look at Matos and Borelli (2013), Saffioti (2013), and Marques (2016b) for some guidance in this area. Later in this chapter, we also attempt to show that the Brazilian situation, at least in civil service, was not much different.
[45] McMillin, L. F. *Women in the Federal Service,* (3rd ed.). U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 4.

occupational options were narrow, and among the possibilities – becoming a teacher or nurse, for instance – clerical work offered higher salary, status, as well as better working hours and conditions (DAVIES, 1982, p. 64-65; STROM, 1992, p. 7).

For Davies (1982), the introduction of the typewriter into offices greatly facilitated women's entrance into the workforce and the consequent feminization of the stenographer and typist positions. The author argued that the association between women and typewriting came after their presence as typists was already massive, rather than because women were seen as naturally more "manually dexterous and tolerant of routine than men" (p. 55, 59). For Strom (1992), the feminization of such positions also happened because the "association between women and light manufacturing", already common in the industrial world, was appropriated into the office environment with new office machines such as the typewriter (p. 188).[46] The segmentation of employees into different positions based on class and status helped categorize routine clerical work as "light manufacturing" and associated it with "women's operative status in factories", distancing male-performed skilled work (ibid., p. 4-6).

The devaluation of women's labor was also the reflection of patriarchal social relations that mostly believed that "women were simply, and by the very nature of things, inferior to men" (DAVIES, 1982, p. 56). It was also assumed that women were naturally subservient to men, considering their subservience position in the family, as well as unfit for positions of leadership or independence since these were not qualities needed for married life (ibid., p. 174). Additionally, the general perception was that women who worked in offices were not family breadwinners and merely worked to complement their fathers' or husbands' incomes, to make "frivolous [female] purchases" or to entertain personal hobbies, making their salaries less significant to overall household maintenance (ibid., p. 56, QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 24). The argument that women's salaries was complementary rather than essential would, as a result, discredit women's work as superficial and ultimately unnecessary, both for the family and for the firm – a discourse that could easily be used to exclude women from certain positions (QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 66).

The alleged temporary condition of female labor also significantly impacted their professional experience, as it was socially expected that women would return "to an exclusively domestic life" upon marriage, or certainly after childbirth (QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 66). A satirical cartoon in a Brazilian newspaper shortly after the 1937 *Estado Novo* coup illustrated the temporary character of female labor while simultaneously mildly criticizing the

[46] Queirolo (2018) also highlights the outright association of the typewriter with the sewing machine, used on top of a similar table and even requiring the use of a pedal in its initial models (p. 111).

government. The image showed two male government bureaucrats implementing the mandatory retirement for public servants, saying that it had not been possible to find women over the age of 68 in public service; they suggested that, instead, the youngest of the women should be eligible.[47] On another example, in a report evaluating the 1935 entrance examination process at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, the author considered that women as diplomats did "not offer any guarantee of permanence", because marriage "withdraws them from their duties".[48] The very complex relationship between diplomacy and marriage will be further explored in the following chapter.

The assumption that female work was temporary, and therefore less important, would open space for professional discrimination of women workers, creating what Queirolo (2018, p. 24) called the "exceptional character" of female careers: a perception that women only worked in exceptional circumstances, either out of unforeseen financial necessity or during a specific time of their lives, preferably singlehood (SOIHET, 1997, p. 26).[49] This is exemplified in a Brazilian newspaper column in which a male journalist wrote that women's greatest utility was at home, focused primarily on being "a worthy and useful mother". However, the journalist said that women should be ready to honestly earn their living if necessary, and many had demonstrated great "mental education and useful knowledge" that granted them access to, for instance, public service positions through fairness and merit. Still, many women, according to the journalist, had decided to work simply out of vanity, wasting their earnings "in superfluous things, in detriment of fathers" and husbands that had families to support.[50]

This way of thinking implied that a woman's identity was not connected with her salaried work, and thus employers would not see the need to offer them competitive wages or to stimulate their professional accession through specialized training (QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 74). The positions they held, as a consequence, slowly slipped to the bottom of the hierarchical ladder and became excluded from promotional possibilities, and the position of a top (male) executive's secretary was the highest position a women who entered as typist could aspire for.[51]

---

[47] Caricatura de Théo, "Às Avessas", *A Noite*, January 10, 1938, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.CDI, RJR.151, p. 50. Bertha Lutz mentioned in a letter to a friend abroad that the *Estado Novo* government had started to "pension people off", particularly those who were considered to be "bad elements", communists, fascists, or "incurably lazy servants" (Bertha Lutz to Carrie Chapman Catt, April 15, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5).

[48] Fonseca Hermes, "Relatório sobre o Concurso para Cônsules de 3ª Classe, 1935", July 24, 1935, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 311.2, Lata 868, Maço 13120, p. 3.

[49] Other circumstances in which women's work was acceptable were when they were widows or abandoned by their husbands (QUEIROLO, 2018, p. 42).

[50] Oto Prazeres, "Consules com 'chaperon'", *Jornal do Brasil*, September 11, 1938, p. 5.

[51] Davies (1982) also discusses the feminization of the position of private secretary. Even though the process is much similar to the one described above, the secretary position had an extra layer of deference and outright

The U.S. Civil Service Commissioner Lucille Mcmillin noted in 1941 that society had a higher acceptance for the story of the male executive "who began [his career] as messenger boy", whereas women were caged within the "secretary complex" their whole careers.[52] Finally, scholars argue, low wages and lack of advancement possibilities would eventually, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, drive women to quit and return full-time to their domestic responsibilities (DAVIES, 1982, p. 56; STROM, 1992, p. 190-191).

A 1939 informative pamphlet from the Women's Bureau, part of the U.S. Department of Labor, would bring some illustrative numbers of female labor in the United States that both prove and contradict general perceptions. By the 1930s, around one-fifth of the total number of working age women were employed, of which 50 per cent were single and only 10 per cent married. Also a mere 10 per cent of working women registered as their family's sole breadwinner, although most of them reported having the double task of "taking care of the home besides contributing to support the family". The Bureau added that women workers received, generally, 50 to 60 per cent lower salaries in comparison to male colleagues. Finally, while in the capital Washington, D.C., 40 per cent of all federal office workers were women, in the country as a whole 95 per cent of stenographers and typists were female.[53]

The feminization and consequent degradation of certain office positions shaped the organization of clerical work based on "ideological assumptions about the natural characteristics of males and females" (DAVIES, 1982, p. 96). Brazilian scholars also saw the conquests of Brazilian women workers as limited. Even as large numbers of women entered the tertiary sector in Brazil at the time, Saffioti (2013) said this was not a full victory because the frequent linkage between women and motherhood ascribed them to subaltern occupations, badly paid and without promotion possibilities (p. 84, 95).[54] Furthermore, the Brazilian Consolidation of Labor Laws (*Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho*, CLT), approved in 1943, also confirmed gender perceptions and admitted sex-based labor differentiation, with women

---

subordination that was closely associated with women's positions as wives and housekeepers (chapter 7). See also Strom (1992), Perrot (2005), and Queirolo (2018).

[52] McMillin, L. F. *Women in the Federal Service,* (3rd ed.). U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 42.

[53] "La Mujer Trabajadora en los Estados Unidos", Oficina de la Mujer, Secretaría del Trabajo de los Estados Unidos, October 1939, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1932-1941), International, Box 1, p. 2-7; McMillin, L. F. *Women in the Federal Service,* (3rd ed.). U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 10.

[54] Something similarly happened in industrial female labor. In her study of industrialists perceptions in 1920s São Paulo, Weinstein (2004) found that "large-scale employment of women" would be associated with "all that was problematic about Brazilian industry". Because of large numbers of women workers, industry would be deemed as weak and its workers as immoral and uncultured, with the "very presence of women […] promoting the de-skilling of industrial labor", since there was no motivation for industrialists to invest in workers they saw as temporary (p. 277-282).

preferred for positions that constituted "extensions of conventional female social roles" (MARQUES, 2016b, p. 676). Finally, Strom (1992) argued that drawing the limit of where women could work based on essentialist justifications, male professionals succeeded in three aspects: a guarantee that "women would be confined to assisting, not directing men"; that some professions and the top of the hierarchy were for male pursuits; and that some positions would be rid of "feminine influence", promoting their own masculinity (p. 6).

In the case of Brazil, some information can be gathered on female office workers from documents produced by Mary Cannon, a U.S. government employee at the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor, who travelled to Brazil for four months in early 1943 to study "economic and social conditions as they relate to employed women", funded by and in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State.[55] A 1945 publication contained, as a "general observation" – since there were no official numbers –, that the proportion of women working in the 1930s was higher than in the 1920s, particularly in government office jobs, positions that offered "shorter working hours and higher rates of pay than those with private firms".[56]

A Brazilian economic magazine also gave a sense at how female work was perceived in the 1930s, employing the frequent combination between admiration and suspicion. The article started by recognizing that women had always been a valuable part of the labor market, being "seen and felt everywhere" although there were no statistical measurements of the reality of their work.[57] When the article turned its attention to women working in commerce and offices, however, the perception changed and became more critical. It considered women as more efficient and convenient than men "as long as it is [for] a perfectly organized and oriented task", implying that women were more reliable in repetitive tasks that did not require intellectual abilities or improvisations. The article also noted positively that women had been "*invading* all public offices", but would mostly "work only for their own luxury".[58]

---

[55] Mary Anderson to Division of American Republics, July 29, 1942, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2. For Mary Cannon's connection with Roosevelt's foreign policy towards Latin American, see Marino (2019).

[56] Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 1, 34. Cannon mostly visited Brazilian factories that typically hired women – textile, food processing and pharmaceutic –, finding that women were usually the sole wage-earners of their families. She also found women concentrated in "easy" positions and, because of this, their salaries were low and there were no opportunities for promotion or training. On a note of apparent frustration during the trip, Cannon disclosed a desire that "some one [in Brazil] would think about women in industry in jobs other than the low-paid unskilled jobs". See: Mary M. Cannon, "*Brief Summary of the Reports on Brasil*", August 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1943), Box 3, p. 3-4, 13-14; and Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, February 15, 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2, p. 2).

[57] "Trabalho Feminino no Brasil", *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, n. 17, June 1937, p. 62, 65.

[58] Ibid., p. 67-69. Highlights my own.

In her assessment of female office jobs, Mary Cannon claimed that the typewriter was indeed an emancipation tool for Brazilian women who wished to work just as it had been in the United States. During an interview with a group of "mostly typists" women she found that the majority lived with their relatives and contributed "heavily to the family budget", while still managing to "dress nicely" and travel on vacations. Cannon also estimated, based on her conversations, that around 60 per cent of women "work after they are married".[59] In meetings Cannon had with female professionals, she gathered that Brazilian women felt they had made progress in the last decades, as before World War I "it was contrary to all accepted custom for women to work", although they agreed that women currently did not have much space in politics.[60] The space for the political and public participation of women would indeed become more restricted, even as the space for supportive and routinized work seemed to expand for them, as we shall discuss below.

3 Public Examinations: exclusion as sexual division of labor

The gendering process presented by Acker (1990), a subtle procedure that would institute notions of gender into organizations, usually began with the quickest and easiest action at hand: "construction of divisions along the lines of gender", or in other words, the creation of sexual division of labor, of clearly defined places and behaviors allowed for men and women (p. 146). The subsequent steps of the gendering process involved the promotion of symbols that explain such divisions, reinforced in people's interaction until those stereotypical images become ingrained into individual identities and societal structures (ibid., p. 146-147). It is possible to observe this process unfolding more clearly in *Estado Novo*, particularly once DASP and Itamaraty allowed the decision to determinate the diplomatic career as a masculine field to come into effect.

We have seen in the previous chapter how DASP's sphere of action was highly political, despite coating administrative reforms in technical and scientific rhetoric. Supported by a President that favored "the formation of a stiffened structure in all sectors of thought and national activity", DASP's disciplinary methods found fertile ground to establish a more clear sexual division of labor in public service.[61] Starting with the impediment of women's access to

[59] Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil"*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 22; Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, January 9, 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2.
[60] Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, December 31, 1942, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2.
[61] Getúlio Vargas, "Nenhum sacrifício, nesta hora grave, será bastante", *Correio da Manhã,* November 10, 1938, p. 1.

the diplomatic career in 1938, public examinations (*concursos públicos*) would be a significant tool in solidifying gender norms and perceptions into public administration. In several of the primary documents consulted we noticed the importance given to public examinations as a fundamental piece in the rationalization process, certifying the recruitment system with merit-based principles. The improvement of bureaucratic selection was the first step in transforming the public administration, which depended on the success of a rigorous recruitment process to strengthen an image of equity and justice in government's actions.[62]

The Law of Readjustment, propeller of the administrative reforms and creator of the Federal Council of the Civil Public Service (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*, CFSPC) in 1936, promoted the establishment of careers "perfectly" defined and structured in a way to facilitate not only the professional accession of the most capable, but also a "more perfect selection" for each position.[63] According to Luis Simões Lopes, CFSPC's president, before 1936 public examinations were conducted by the Ministries themselves and, in his perception, "were all falsified", being negatively used to such a degree that "it was better to not have *concurso,* because it was the focus of gross debaucheries".[64] The allocation of recruitment responsibilities to CFSPC, considered an inflexible ally of the "public cause", intended to eliminate favoritism and to inaugurate a new era in which merit would prevail in candidate selection.[65] Recruitment would take into consideration the basic aptitudes and qualities needed for each post, in a process based on the principle of division of labor, in which each position would become more specialized to allow for greater output and time-efficiency, according to Lopes.[66]

In the 20 *concursos* that CFSPC conducted in its 20 months of existence – the first being for Itamaraty – the institution implemented a system that became largely respected for its prioritization of impartiality and objectivity, applying unidentified exams with objective questions that allowed for a statistical evaluation of results (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 134). The purpose was to reduce luck and obtain a "final classification corresponding exactly to the reality of the merit" of each candidate, which Lopes claimed was the case for the 1937 Itamaraty

[62] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 8; Azevedo Amaral, "Significação e Alcance do Reajustamento", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 15.
[63] Law n. 284, October 28, 1936; CFSPC, "Reajustamento", [1936/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.
[64] LOPES, Luís Simões. *Luís Simões Lopes II (depoimento, 1990)*. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 2003, p. 14, 49.
[65] "O CFSPC e suas realizações", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. II, n. 2, May 1938, p. 81.
[66] Luis Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, December 30, 1939, AHI, DT-SPI, Code 502.9, Lata 1187, Maço 25709, p. 1.

concurso for consul.[67] The government was no longer interested in "erudites"; instead, it sought technically competent individuals, via a "rigorous initial selection", to secure a public administration capable of serving "efficiently the high interests of the Nation".[68] The author of a RSP article demonstrated this relationship between quality and efficiency claiming that, in the United States, the implementation of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal had greatly depended on U.S. administrative public personnel. Similarly, England had a less difficult time adapting to new circumstances after the Great Depression due mainly to "the excellency of its Civil Service, especially the administrative class".[69]

Much of the inspiration for CFSPC and its successor DASP came from the United States Civil Service Commission, which had been established in 1883 to rid the U.S. public administration of the "spoils system" of political influences, and to implement a merit-based system of recruitment through public examinations.[70] Nonetheless, for some Brazilian administrators, the British Civil Service was seen as "the most perfect existing organization of administrative personnel in the world".[71] An editorial in RSP was impressed at how the British considered a civil service career as a profession that demanded complete dedication, attracting as a result only those who "aspire[d] to earn a living being useful […] to their country". The essence of British Civil Service, according to RSP, was the merit-based recruitment that selected the "true managing elite" of the British state among the best university students, developing a group of "authentic administrators" that were fully conscious of their responsibilities to "drive" the country.[72]

The merit-based public examinations system, portrayed as an instrument to abolish patrimonial and political practices of recruitment, would never be seen or desired by DASP's managing elite as a democratic tool. The *concursos* were equally understood as a conducive mechanism to pre-define and delimitate with almost surgical precision the pool of candidates eligible for access to public service. This idea seemed to be more an influence of the British Civil Service, often positively referenced by Brazilians administrators for its elitist recruitment structure, than of the U.S. system, usually assumed to be more egalitarian, even though equally

---

[67] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 9.
[68] CFSPC, "Aspectos do Serviço Público Civil dos EUA através do Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito sobre o funcionalismo público", May 13, 1937, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14; Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 8.
[69] Urbano Berquió, "Transformação do Estado e a reforma do Serviço Público Civil", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 20-21.
[70] Fernando Lobo, "Funcionalismo público nos Estados Unidos da América do Norte", November 14, 1936, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.
[71] "Serviço Civil Britânico", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. III, n. 1, July 1938, p. 115.
[72] Ibid., p. 115-116.

problematic when it came to women's issues, as we shall see. The British inspiration was specially felt in evaluating the compatibility between women and the diplomatic career. The Brazilian study on women's admission to Itamaraty only superficially mentions the United States because of the appointment of a U.S. female ambassador to Denmark in 1933, but it judges this as a failed experiment. On the other hand, the rest of the study is mostly based on the translation of a study conducted by the British Foreign Office a few years prior that supported the continuation of a female ban in the U.K. foreign service.[73]

The British Civil Service in general was worthy of attention a few times in RSP articles. One time, the journal brought a translation of a piece written by a British political scientist examining the Civil Service in England.[74] As mentioned, the structure of the British Civil Service was already clearly divided into hierarchical categories, each counting with its own selection process. At the bottom of the hierarchy was the "writing assistants", composed of stenographers, typists and jobs that were "purely mechanical", and as expected this category employed a large number of women (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 10). At the top of the hierarchical order was the "administrative class", considered the "brain of the service" that recruited individuals fresh out of the best colleges. The examination process for this class was compared to final university exams and the approved candidates would go on to work in the decision-making bodies within Ministries.[75]

A Brazilian consul in Washington, in a report synthetizing U.S. studies on public service improvement, signaled that the most interesting proposal of such studies, in his opinion, was the creation of management posts whose selection should be exclusively among candidates who were graduates from the country's top universities. He relied his explanation on the British system, which required for such positions a level of cultural knowledge possessed only by graduates from Cambridge and Oxford. The examinations, he believed, should be differentiated for subordinate or managements posts in a way to admit "men of value" for the highest levels. The Brazilian consul seemed to suggest a preference for restricting certain positions to certain individuals, especially for "lads of good culture and education", because the prestige of public service and a better government "production" depended on this profile.[76] In agreement with this thought, one of CFSPC's initial objectives was described as the "elevation of the cultural level

[73] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14. See also Calkin (1978) and McCarthy (2009).
[74] Harold Laski, "O Serviço Civil Inglês", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano II, v. II, n. 3, June 1939.
[75] Ibid., p. 63.
[76] Fernando Lobo, "Funcionalismo público nos Estados Unidos da América do Norte", November 14, 1936, CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 10-11.

of our public service", also understood as a guarantee of efficiency.[77] For such an objective, the *concurso* would be understood as a valid measure to attribute differences – in this case, using intellectual abilities as disguise for elitism – as a form of restricting who was eligible for admission, even within a self-declared rational and merit-based system.

The article translated and published by RSP, however, showed some concerns over the admission process for the British administrative classes, which usually recruited individuals with a "very narrow range of social experience" that descended from a limited pool of middle- and upper-class British families. This situation was especially more accentuated in the diplomatic and consular careers, for which around 50 per cent of members came from a single British school.[78] In 1919, as the United Kingdom had allowed women to compete for higher civil service positions, the Foreign Office, at the time undergoing reforms concerned with efficiency and professionalism, spent the following years passing regulations that would "exempt the overseas services" from such provisions. This happened even as women continued to be admitted for "writing assistant" positions, in a time when British women could not yet be diplomats (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 286-287).

3.1 DASP versus Women

After the *Estado Novo* coup in 1937, the new Constitution established that "public positions are equally accessible to all Brazilians".[79] This constitutional directive would be frequently used by women to protest government measures that excluded female participation from public service. Even if the sex equality guarantee was no longer explicit, as it was in the previous 1934 Constitution, feminists advocated that the universality of the term "all Brazilians" automatically included women.[80] On the other hand, the second part of the directive would complicate women's demands, because it required the observation of the "capability conditions prescribed in laws and regulations". Amélia Duarte, a Brazilian lawyer, defended in a 1938 RSP article that the "capacity conditions" to be observed should be "only those of an intellectual order", verified via public examinations, and should not use the biological sex as an excluding factor.[81] The Union of University Women (*União Universitária Feminina*, UUF) also argued in 1944 that there could be no other conditionality besides "those of an individual's

[77] "O CFSPC e suas realizações", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. II, n. 2, May 1938, p. 81.
[78] Harold Laski, "O Serviço Civil Inglês", *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano II, v. II, n. 3, June 1939, p. 65-66.
[79] Art. 122, Paragraph 3.
[80] Amélia Duarte, "A funcionária pública sob a Constituição de 1937", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. 1, n. 4, March 1938, p. 34.
[81] Ibid., p. 34. Duarte was appointed as public prosecutor in 1942, according to: Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, December 31, 1942, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2.

normal health, mental and moral capacity". Not only the female sex should not be used as an excluding conditional factor, but the Examination Instructions did not have the legal force of "laws and regulations", and, therefore, did not fit the Constitutional directive.[82]

The constitutional directive was also used by Iete B. Ribeiro de Souza, a lawyer graduate from the University of São Paulo that had her registration denied for a substitute judge *concurso* in 1944, "because of the circumstance of being a woman". In a rare instance of a woman directly advocating for herself, Souza issued an injunction to the president of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court demanding to know the reason for her registration denial. Explaining in excruciatingly detail why there was no reason for her dismissal based on the Examination Instructions, related regulations and the Constitution, she assumed "as absolutely certain that the sole cause for exclusion was to be a creature of the female sex". She reasoned that the judges that had voted against her registration were satisfying a "personal sentiment, that is, the prejudice that women do not have aptitude to be judges".[83] The copy of Souza's injunction would be, nonetheless, attached to a letter written by her husband to president Getúlio Vargas on her behalf. The couple might have thought that this could help her case by demonstrating she was a serious woman, married with children, as well as that her career aspirations were validated by her husband. He reinforced in the letter that Souza studied for many "sleepless nights", while helping her father's business, and "all of this without neglecting the upbringing and education of [her] children".[84]

In the year following the establishment of *Estado Novo*, a group of 26 women public servants – including four consuls, as well as managers, teachers, technicians, nurses, and clerks – wrote a letter to Getúlio Vargas, typed in FBPF's paper, adverting that the new Constitutional article could lead to "erroneous interpretations" by those who wished to restrict women's rights.[85] In fact, the possibility of applying conditionalities was cited in the CFSPC study on the admission of women to the diplomatic corps as a justification that the government now could "restrain the entrance of women".[86] Furthermore, a 1938 RSP article discussing administrative law affirmed that there was no legal justifications for recruitment distinctions based on sex; nonetheless, "service peculiarities" allowed some positions to be filled exceptionally by men

[82] UUF to Getúlio Vargas, February 17, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 3.
[83] Iete B. Ribeiro de Souza, "Cópia do Mandado Interposto", [1944], AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.3298.
[84] Ozilde Albuquerque Passarella to Getúlio Vargas, March 1, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.3298.
[85] União das Funcionárias Públicas to Getúlio Vargas, [1938], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1, p. 75.
[86] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 4.

only, particularly military ones. For the author, it was also important to consider the "incompatibility" of certain positions with "the organization of the family".[87]

The Brazilian public administration, therefore, used this conditional element to delimitate the space available for women in public service, based on the social and gender perceptions of its managing elite. As Graph 1 shows, the prohibition of women's access to the diplomatic career would be the first in a series of other restrictions on female participation in DASP's public examinations.

Graph 1 – DASP Public Examinations opened for men only, 1938-1941.



Source: Elaborated by the author, based on: Examination Instructions available at editions of *Revista do Serviço Público* from November 1937 until December 1941.

In this scenario, in at least two occasions women's organization would problematize DASP's actions toward women's participation in civil service. FBPF had also officially protested against the 1938 Itamaraty prohibition, but its complaints were directed solely to the Minister of Foreign Relations Oswaldo Aranha. As this was the first examination closed to women in *Estado Novo*, perhaps feminists still had not grasped the magnitude of the problem and thought it was an isolated event. A few years later, however, the objections would always reference DASP. For instance, in the occasion of a 1943 prohibition for women to register for the *concurso* of Assistant Naturalist at the National Museum, we found a unsigned typed document in FBPF's archives that seemed to be a raw compilation of facts and personal perceptions, some very critical, that would subsidize a FBPF letter to the Museum's Director the following year. The author of the document recalled that the 1934 constitutional directive that guaranteed equal access to civil service positions for both sexes had been "very fought

[87] Themistocles Brandão Cavalcanti, "A Função Pública e o seu Regime Jurídico (VI)", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 3, September 1938, p. 35.

against by the current managers of DASP". The document then went into a section indicated as not suited for publicity, discussing what the author considered to be the "psychological bases of the current prohibition" that included a "morbid spirit of tyranny" and "a little sadism on DASP's part".[88]

The second occasion that DASP's actions would be problematized was with a letter of protest from UUF. After a 1944 female ban on an engineer examination for the Goiás Railroad, UUF accused DASP of consecutively curbing "the entrance of women in […] *concursos* for public positions of technical character", calling the restriction "unconstitutional, anti-human, against the public interest and harmful to the war effort". As a country mobilized for war, the organization considered a mistake to not call on Brazilian women to occupy positions of greater responsibilities, while men were called to serve in the military. UUF suggested that DASP was wrongly assuming the incapacity of women and, as a result, would be "sacrificing the national interest, which call for the congregation of all elements for victory".[89]

This particular prohibition caused a wave of protest letters from a variety of professional associations that obtained government reactions not only from DASP, but also from the Ministry of Public Works and Labor, although DASP seemed to have had the final word in maintaining the female ban.[90] It is curious to wonder why this prohibition had what seems to be a larger and more explicit opposition than the diplomatic ban in 1938. One possibility is that the engineer prohibition happened in 1944, closer to the end of Getúlio Vargas' government, when *Estado Novo*'s ideals and censorship mechanisms were not as strong. Or perhaps it is because of the nature of the profession itself, which allowed the formation of a greater *sprit de corps* through socialization in universities and in the many professional associations that already existed.

The 1943 Labor Laws (CLT), however, prohibited women's work in mining and construction works, which Marques (2016b, p. 676) said limited women engineering careers.[91]

---

[88] Letter to FBPF, n/d [1944], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1, p. 83-84. The letter also had a section devoted to information eligible for publicity, presenting a list of many women associated with the Museum that had contributed to the advancement of science and women's rights, including Bertha Lutz and Princess Isabel, who had lived in the Museum building when she signed the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888 (p. 83).

[89] UUF to Getúlio Vargas, February 17, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054. The Union of University Women, according to this letter, was a 14-year-old cultural organization that brought together professional women and female students for exchange and orientation. The Union's President, Carmen Portinho, was also a former FBPF top director.

[90] Five professional associations wrote to Getúlio Vargas in protest: the Association of Brazilian Women Engineers and Architects, the Rio de Janeiro Union of Engineers, the Society of Engineers from the Federal District Municipality, the Institute of Brazilian Architects, and the Union of University Women. These letters and their government responses can be found in folders: AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2666 and AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054.

[91] Decree-Law n. 5.452, May 1, 1943, art. 387. This article would only be revoked in 1989.

Interestingly, this directive was not used as a justification for their exclusion from the Goiás Railroad *concurso*; instead, the CLT was used as a defense mechanism. In a demonstration that there was no unified government position about women's participation in civil service, the Minister of Labor Alexandre Marcondes Filho (1941-1945) mentioned that the CLT did not distinguish between intellectual, technical or manual labor, nor did it differentiate between sexes; instead, the CLT protected women in the name of the national interest, to secure their physical condition as mothers, "as perpetuators of the race". Although employing the common connection between women and motherhood, the Minister added that women had never experienced any restriction to exercise their chosen profession since they first obtained an engineer degree in 1919. Curbing their participation in public service meant, for Marcondes, to discourage women's "spirit of collaboration for the grandness of the nation".[92]

The analysis of these reaction letters to the 1944 engineer *concurso* provide great insights into perceptions disseminated in Brazilian public administration about women's roles that also help understand why women were excluded from diplomatic examinations six years before. For Luis Simões Lopes, the systematization of public service positions into well-defined and hierarchical careers would help draw the "real necessities" of each position, "so that the most advisable types for the job are recruited". In defending DASP's position, Lopes argued that the administration did not oppose either sex, after all, at play was the search for candidates with the best conditions to perform efficiently the required duties. Rather than explaining exactly why women were not suitable for the career, Lopes invoked the technical character, "sometimes even rude", of the position as well as the locality in central Brazil.[93]

The lack of a clear explanation would induce the reader to assume a supposedly common understanding that the exclusion of women was a normal event, perhaps implying that women were naturally too delicate for "rude" conditions or that men had natural abilities, or specific "capacity conditions", for certain functions. Assumptions happen when information is left out because they create ambiguity of understandings. According to Duerst-Lahti (1987), this is a strategy often employed when women's roles are discussed, because it enables "individuals to integrate their own experience and perspectives into views shared by society" (p. 21). Lopes, when avoiding to discuss the details of his affirmations, was relying on society's shared understandings of why women should not act in technical positions that are "rude".

As expected, UUF had a different understanding of women's role. According to their letter of protest, equality between the sexes was a right legitimately conquered through the hard

[92] Alexandre Marcondes Filho to Getúlio Vargas, May 4, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2666.
[93] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, June 19, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054.

work, intelligence and moral force of women, who already had full-time careers in a variety of professions and in civil service, showing no inferior capacity in relation to their male colleagues while simultaneously performing the "onerous family responsibilities".[94] The organization reminded Vargas that the directive to prohibit women engineers into the Goiás Railroad *concurso* did not correspond with the president's confidence in women, as he usually nominated them for positions of trust whenever the role was "independent from DASP's interference", as exemplified by the appointment of women prosecutors to the Ministry of Labor and to the Federal District government.[95]

Corroborating this thought, Mary Cannon, the U.S. Women's Bureau representative, also mentioned a few female lawyers working in the Federal Attorney General Office and another as National Director of Secondary Education.[96] According to her assessment, other women worked in leadership positions within the government service. Among them was the Director of the National Museum Heloisa Alberto Torres, the Ministry of Labor representative in Paris Heloisa Rocha, and two women engineers, one who was chief of the Water and Drainage Inspection Division in the Ministry of Education and Health, and another who was a member of a road-building commission.[97] She also added the case of the former female member of Congress Carlota Pereira de Queirós, who became the first woman invited and admitted to the Brazilian Academy of Medicine.[98] Cannon did not fail to mention the few women consuls that had already been appointed to overseas posts, such as Zorayma Rodrigues to Liverpool, Beatta Vettori to Buenos Aires, and Leontina Licinio Cardoso to Rome.[99] For the Inter-American Conference held in Lima in December 1938 – two months after Itamaraty prohibited women's access to the diplomatic career – the Brazilian government appointed, as it usually did under FBPF's suggestion, a woman to be a part of the official seven-member Brazilian delegation, Rosalina Coelho Lisboa.[100] This was in addition to the already appointed Flora de Oliveira Lima as the permanent Brazilian representative to the Inter-American Commission of

---

[94] UUF to Getúlio Vargas, February 17, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 2-3.
[95] Ibid., p. 1.
[96] Mary M. Cannon, "*Women in Brazil Today*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, November 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Publications, Box 15, p. 7-8.
[97] Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil"*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 34.
[98] Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, February 6, 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2, p. 2.
[99] Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil"*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 34.
[100] Jayme de Barros Gomes, "Exposição Sucinta dos trabalhos realizados pelo Itamaraty nos últimos doze meses", October 21, 1939, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.1, Lata 1042, Maço 18309, p. 9.

Women (IACW), which had been created at the 1928 Inter-American Havana Conference.[101] Finally, in a preparatory report for the Lima Conference, Itamaraty listed additional 16 Brazilian women whose action for women's right would have "already transposed the national frontier".[102]

In the official 1945 U.S. Women's Bureau bulletin on Brazilian women, Mary Cannon discussed that, although there was legal equality for men and women entering civil service, in practice things were different. Cannon had heard in conversations with "young women" that they would be "kept out of the competition for certain higher-paid positions" because DASP had "caused certain positions and agencies to be closed to women".[103] Among the departments listed as closing its doors to women was the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Police Department, the War Ministry and the Office of Sales Taxes Inspections, which we will see as true further below.[104]

In 1941, RSP published an editorial that could be called a defense of women's participation in civil service, supposedly in response to a group of male students who had requested the exclusion of women from all public service examinations. In an attempt to "affirm the principle of free competition", the editorial dismissed the group's intention to obtain for men a "hateful preference" within a merit-based system. With an interesting choice of words, it also claimed that "women's *intrusion* in activity fields previously reserved for men" was a growing phenomenon and their contribution was "large and valuable". The editorial then explained why some activities had sex restrictions, saying that it would be difficult to imagine a woman police, for instance, just as men would not do well in tasks that "required feminine ability", such as those of a typist, for which women had demonstrated a greater aptitude.[105] Following this argument, DASP members seemed to understand that some positions required either masculine or feminine abilities, and, therefore, should be executed by a person of the corresponding sex. Thus, positions subjected to sex segregation by DASP *concursos* could give

---

[101] José Roberto de Macedo Soares, "Relatório da Comissão Interamericana de Mulheres", September 29, 1938, AHI, MRE-Atividade Meio, Estante 135, Pasta 1, Maço 10.
[102] Ibid., p. 1-2. The women listed are: Bertha Lutz, Maria Eugênia Celso, Anna Amelia Carneiro de Mendonça, Carmen de Carvalho, Flora Cavalcanti de Oliveira Lima, Jerônyma de Mesquita, Joanidia Sodré, Maria Luisa Bittencourt, Maria Teresa da Silveira, Carmen Velasco Portinho, Alice Coimbra, Leontina Licinio Cardoso, Rosalina Coelho Lisboa Muller, Maria Soares de Andrade, Maria Teresa Vicente de Azevendo, and Zorayma de Almeida Rodrigues.
[103] Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, December 22, 1942, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2, p. 8; Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 35.
[104] Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 35.
[105] "A mulher e o serviço público", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. II, n. 3, June 1941, p. 3-4. Highlights my own.

us an idea of what was meant by masculine and feminine abilities, for which we argue that there is a correlation with the public/private dichotomy.

Inspired by Okin's (2008) discussion of the ambiguities in defining the public and the private "spheres", we opted to further explore what these concepts mean in the context studied in this research, particularly considering that perceptions differ across time and space (p. 307, 318). Okin (2008) chose to use the dichotomy public/domestic in her analysis, rather than public/private, to be able to identify the divisions of labor that assign activities revolving around domesticity and invisibility to women.[106] The public sphere, according to her, cannot be fully understood without a gender lens, because the "public" is constructed based on male superiority and on women's exclusive responsibility for the domestic sphere (p. 320). In this research, we explore three possibilities to understand the public/private dichotomy in Brazilian public administration of the 1930s, particularly in the implementation of the merit-based recruitment system.

First, there seems to be an assumption that women should not be allowed to occupy in great numbers positions that had a political function, being confined instead to positions of assistance that encompassed much of the problems we have discussed on female office work. This would give the public/private dichotomy a meaning equivalent to political/supportive, or ends/means. Here, jobs that required representation of the state, decision-making, negotiation or any sort of power over others, would be greatly closed to women. As usual, there were the few token women we have mentioned, who were frequently used as examples of how accepting the government was of female presence. Secondly, there seems to be an understanding that positions that required assignments in public spaces – or movements, travel and activities outside the four walls of an office – were also not suitable for women. Women apparently were not to be seen outside or interacting with random people, even if part of the job description. A woman's job would be those held in private, inside, in one location – or invisible to the public eye. The public/private dichotomy here would have a very literal interpretation.

Finally, when looking particularly at diplomacy and foreign service, the public/private dichotomy would acquire the third possibility of international/national. This follows the two interpretations discussed previously, in which women would be allowed to serve in foreign ministries insofar as their role was limited to national, domestic, supportive and private activities. This third possibility will be the focus of the following chapter, but let us now further explore the first two interpretations.

---

[106] For Okin, there can also be a confusion with the term "private", since it is also used in the concept of "private property", but this time to define a male realm (2008, p. 307).

3.2 Ends and Means

An important influence in DASP's thought was the studies of William Willoughby, an U.S. government employee who advocated for efficiency through a "sharp separation between politics and administration" (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 281). According to Willoughby's theories, the political function of public administration, also characterized as its primary activities, aimed at the finality proposed for a certain bureau. On other end of the spectrum, the administrative function, also called institutional or housekeeping activities, were the means necessary for the bureau to exist and operate (ibid., p. 282-284). Luis Simões Lopes classified in this last function the employees that executed orders and gathered information for policy decision-makers, which he would also call "executing tasks".[107]

Applying this understanding to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, we can define foreign representation, exercised by diplomats and consuls, as its political function, whereas the internal maintenance activities, mainly carried out in the Secretariat in Rio de Janeiro, would fall into the administrative category. This did seem to be Itamaraty's interpretation as well. An institutional document affirmed that, after the 1931 Reform that incorporated the career of Secretariat officials into the diplomatic and consular careers, the office in Rio would be better equipped to perform its "Chancellery duties", without losing sight of the administrative activities that "maintain the Secretariat in direct connection with the other governing sectors".[108] Administrative activities, therefore, were important to cultivate an alignment with the rest of the public administration, but Itaramaty's political function, the "Chancellery duties", would be, in fact, its overall purpose.

DASP employed much effort in valuing and improving the second group of activities – administrative –, particularly with the institutionalization of a merit-based recruitment system to make Brazilian public administration more efficient. Although such activities were less visible and privately executed, a DASP director reaffirmed that "even though they do not constitute the primary purpose of the State, they are extremely important, because everything else depends on their rational and efficient performance" (apud WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 282). This motivational rhetoric was very similar to the one the government used in valuing women's private role in the family. Above all else, the use of the word "housekeeping" to describe administrative activities already refers to private and domestic-oriented labor, where women were seen as having a fundamental role. Following Pateman's (1988) understanding that "the

[107] Luis Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, December 30, 1939, AHI, DT-SPI, Code 502.9, Lata 1187, Maço 25709, p. 3.
[108] "Secretaria de Estado", [1938], AHI, MRE-Atividade-Meio, Estante 135, Pasta 2, Maço 5, p. 3.

private sphere is typically presupposed as a necessary, natural foundation for civil, public life", the government would promote both the public servant in charge of administrative activities as well as the woman in her familial duty as fundamental, even within their delimited roles, upon which all else depended (p. 11). U.S. Women's Bureau representative Mary Cannon recalled that during a visit to the Minas Gerais Regional Labor Department she saw many women working, but none in high positions. Her experience there would highlight women's situation in public service – a supportive, but essential, position:

> "There are three women in the reception office who also have charge of all incoming and outgoing mail and the correspondence files. The registration and all the work with the Unions is handled by women, and a woman is the chief; [and] the book-keeper is a young woman".[109]

It was, therefore, crucial for efficiency that labor was clearly divided, both within public administration and the family. In public education, Minister of Education Gustavo Capanema defended that instructions for boys and girls should "differ since the destiny that Providence gave them also differs" (SCHWARTZMAN, BOMENY, COSTA, 1984, p. 107). Similarly, DASP members affirmed that administrative activities would be more efficiently executed if set apart from agencies with political functions (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 282). This idea would justify DASP's own existence and was aligned with its intention to "harmonize politics and administration, defining them more clearly", in a way to avoid political influence in technical public service positions.[110] On the other hand, this thought also admitted the exclusion of women from institutions whose main objective was political, such as Itamaraty.

As soon as the mostly bureaucratic career of Secretariat officials was eliminated in 1931 – the only position women were allowed to hold until then –, followed by the unification of the diplomatic and consular careers in 1938, the activities that were explicitly determined as administrative would be diluted and mixed with the political functions. Strom (1992, p. 184) observed that scientific management would never in fact reach all tasks within an office, and diplomatic work was nearly impossible to fully mechanize due to its highly political character. Because of this, it was harder to institute clear divisions of labor, particularly sexual, in diplomacy, freeing the career from extreme routinization, and consequently, from women. As women were more naturally associated with administrative functions – "housekeeping" activities – the end of a clear differentiation between those and the political functions implied

---

[109] Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, January 14, 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2, p. 1.
[110] Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, "Evolução da Administração Pública Federal", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 13.

a loss of their defined space within Itamaraty. Hence, those in charge would conclude in 1938 that the best solution was to prohibit women's access at the entrance door, in the *concursos.*

This did not, however prevent Minister Oswaldo Aranha from requesting in 1939 the fulfillment of temporary positions such as Archivists, Librarians, Clerks and Accountants within the Ministry. Interestingly, in the request for Typists, Aranha wrote the Portuguese word inflected in the female gender, "*Datilógrafas*", indicating that this position should naturally be filled by women, and that Itamaraty could hire them, but for subordinated positions. On the other hand, when requesting Cryptographers, Aranha explicitly asked for a male candidate, perhaps because the position involved dealing with crucial political secrets, and women were not suitable for political tasks.[111]

The political/administrative differentiation in Itamaraty would be seen not only in the nature of each activity, but also in the salary given to each corresponding position. In a personal letter to Minister Oswaldo Aranha about the future reform, the Brazilian representative in Athens mentioned the disproportional wages of overseas employees in relation to their colleagues in equivalent positions at the Secretariat. He highlighted this as a demotivational factor for post rotativity, signaling that employees' efficiency would fall "if they were obligated […] to make the excessive pecuniary sacrifice required to serve in the Secretariat". The disdain for the national post is something the consul raised as feasible of correction – considering "some 75 per cent [of posts] are less desirable than Rio de Janeiro" –, but he also suggested the creation of a career for employees who preferred to remain at the Secretariat permanently, rather than acquiring a "diplomatic title" out of vanity.[112] The perception he presented would indicate that women indeed held less prominent and prestigious positions within Itamaraty until 1938, likely tolerating the lower salaries offered to officers posted in Rio de Janeiro. The salary difference in Itamaraty had already been an issue at the time of the 1931 Reform. The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro saved a news clipping of that reform that pointed out that the domestic post indeed received a lower salary, "in some cases less than half than what they receive abroad".[113]

A similar thought would be associated with DASP's actions in a protest letter from the Union of University Women for the 1944 engineer *concurso*, in which they accused the bureau of disregarding women for positions that allowed "for subsistence through work", leaving

[111] Oswaldo Aranha to Secretaria de Estado, May 22, 1939, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Movimentação, Provimento de Cargos e Funções, 2C.DASP 780.
[112] J. Eulalio to Oswaldo Aranha, April 20, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA tt Silva, J.E.M. 1938.04.20, p. 4-5.
[113] "A Justificação Oficial da Reforma", *Jornal do Commercio*, January 18, 1931, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.021/39.

lower-salary positions to women, such as typists and clerk assistants.[114] The president of UUF was reported as saying to Mary Cannon that the Brazilian government was trying "to keep women out of jobs that pay good salaries".[115] A similar situation was seen in the United States in the previous decades. A 1920 Women's Bureau Report found that as the level of salary increased, the proportion of women in those positions rapidly decreased, with women concentrated in positions of stenography, typing, statistics and general office work.[116] In the following 1925 Report, it was found that while the highest paid man received a USD 6,000 annual salary, the highest paid woman would receive only USD 5,200 annually – an amount that only ten women earned, with eight of those working in administrative positions.[117]

At the onset of DASP's creation in 1938, the bureau listed five women among its employees, four of which were admitted under a temporary contract that did not necessarily require entrance examinations. They held positions such as Cabinet assistant, writing assistant, and archivist.[118] In a financial request to hire seven temporary employees for similar administrative positions, the top three highest-salary-earners would be men, with four women listed at the bottom (Table 1). Mary Cannon observed during a DASP visit that the bureau had sent in 1943 four women as part of a larger group of government employees to study public administration in the United States, as well as that a large proportion of DASP's now 500 employees were women, with some "in important positions".[119]

Table 1 – Proposed hiring for DASP, employee and salary (*mil-réis*), 1938.

Employee Name	Salary proposed
Paulo Lopes Correa	1:500$000
José Silvado Bueno	1:500$000
Oku Martins Pereira	600$000
Maria Luisa Dannemann	500$000
Graziela Travassos	400$000
Maria de Lourdes da Rocha Miranda	400$000
Jupira Ribeiro Schmidt	400$000

Source: *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 130-133

[114] UUF to Getúlio Vargas, February 17, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 2.
[115] Mary Cannon to Mary Anderson, December 31, 1942, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1942-1943), Box 2.
[116] Bertha M. Nienburg, *Women in the Government Service*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 8, 1920, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 3, p. 24.
[117] Bertha M. Nienburg, *The Status of Women in the Government Service in 1925*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 53, 1926, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 29, p. 41.
[118] *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. III, n. 2, August 1938, p. 130-133.
[119] Mary Cannon, "*Women Workers in Brazil*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 206, 1945, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 641, p. 35.

In the United States, the source of inspiration for many of DASP's reforms, the situation for women in civil service would not be much different from Brazil, even as the U.S. was viewed as more accepting of women in "all administrative functions".[120] Despite this perception, Strom (1992) discussed how the majority of women would also be limited to lower-level administrative positions, replicating the same sexual segregation as found in offices (p. 139). The first report on the status of women in U.S. civil service, elaborated by the Women's Bureau, was officially published in 1920 already causing a positive impact for women.[121] The Report noted, for instance, that the large amount of women who had joined civil service during World War I entered as stenographers, typists and clerks, with 91 per cent of women appointees "in the clerical service".[122] In the introduction it explained that the first part of the study had been finalized the previous year, concluding that "women were excluded from 60 per cent of the [260] examinations held in the first six months of 1919". Among those examinations with sex restrictions was one for the Bureau of Efficiency, whose symbolism cannot be overseen.[123] If a government agency that focused on investigating and improving organizational procedures did not allow women as staff members, what can we deduce from processes whose ultimate goal was to increase efficiency? Still, because of the findings of the 1920 Report, the U.S. Civil Service Commission passed a ruling ten days later "opening all examinations to both women and men".[124]

The U.S. Classification Act of 1923 standardized the entrance salary in U.S. public service for both women and men appointees, implementing a more scientific classification of occupations in order to make promotion opportunities more equal and rational.[125] However, such directives did not promote sexual fairness. Unlike the Brazilian system, passing U.S. civil service examinations did not automatically guarantee an appointment to a position. Approved

---

[120] Themistocles Brandão Cavalcanti, "A Função Pública e o seu Regime Jurídico (VI)", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 3, September 1938, p. 35.

[121] The U.S. Women's Bureau was established in 1918 as a department called "Women in Industry Service", to protect the interests of women workers during World War I, and would later serve to promote studies and policies on the well-being of working women. See: "U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Washington", 1941, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1932-1941), Box 1; "La Mujer Trabajadora en los Estados Unidos", Oficina de la Mujer, Secretaría del Trabajo de los Estados Unidos, October 1939, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1932-1941), International, Box 1.

[122] Bertha M. Nienburg, *Women in the Government Service*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 8, 1920, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 3, p. 16-17, 21.

[123] Ibid., p. 15.

[124] Ibid., p. 7. See also Strom (1992), chapter 3.

[125] Rachel F. Nyswander and Janet M. Hooks, "*Employment of Women in the Federal Government 1923 to 1939*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 182, 1941, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 524, p. 6.

candidates were added to a list, from which "appointing officers" at departments were free to choose any individual, and had the discretionary power to apply discriminatory sex criterium, undermining women's achievements in examinations.[126] As a result, qualified and eligible women could be neglected for male candidates, "even if [women] stood higher on the list and had been waiting longer for placement" (STROM, 1992, p. 137).

Situations such as these found echo in the U.S. diplomatic career, when, in the 1920s, it was proposed that entrance examinations could be used as an impeditive barrier to female access to Foreign Service. Judging that an explicit women's ban was not politically advisable, the director of the U.S. consular service proposed that "the most feasible way to deal with the question was to defeat them in the examination", applying low grades that would make their approval impossible (apud CALKIN, 1978, p. 69). Fortunately for the women, the measure did not go into effect, but the examiners would include interview questions to female candidates relating to marital status and intentions of marriage and childbearing. This offered tangible results in later years; from 1930 until the end of World War II, no U.S. woman "passed the oral examinations and was appointed" as diplomat, even though more than 200 women met eligibility criteria (CALKIN, 1978, p. 85).

Davies (1982) claimed that there was straightforward discrimination against women in professional positions and that the federal government, via civil service examinations, mostly hired women as clerical workers. The 1920 Women's Bureau study found that while only 15.9 per cent of examinations for "clerical service" positions were closed to women, on the other end of the spectrum, 100 per cent of "economic and sociological" positions were exclusive for male candidates, in addition to 87 per cent for "mechanical and manufacturing" and 75 per cent for "medical-science" positions. By 1940, a new Women's Bureau Report found that still few women carried out "technical or policy-making functions", while around 56 per cent served in "clerical occupations". Around 70 per cent of women occupied positions considered traditional women's jobs, such as nursing, teaching, office work and light manual work, and no women was found as professional engineers and in a series of "inspector" positions.[127]

In Brazil, DASP Annual Reports also paid attention to numbers of female participation and approval in public examinations (Table 2). In 1940, the DASP Report noticed that, up until then, the number of female registrations was kept below 30 per cent and would "present a

---

[126] Bertha M. Nienburg, *The Status of Women in the Government Service in 1925*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 53, 1926, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 29, p. 1.
[127] Rachel F. Nyswander and Janet M. Hooks, "*Employment of Women in the Federal Government 1923 to 1939*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 182, 1941, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 524, p. 1-4.

tendency to decrease".[128] This was soon proven incorrect as female registration rose to 35 per cent in 1941 and 39 per cent in 1943, very much driven by DASP's increase in the number of examinations held and of total registration in those years – an indication that women were normally participating in recruitment processes (Graphs 2 and 3).[129] The Annual Report of 1942 attempted to explain the growth in women's registration saying that in 1941 there had been particularly two *concursos* that were "inviting by its own nature to the people of the female sex": Clerk and Typist, counting respectively 37 and 45 per cent of registered women candidates.[130] DASP would finally recognize in the 1943 Report that women's participation "has been growing in a singularly extraordinary way".[131]

Even though female registration would grow, it did not mean that registrations were evenly distributed between the examinations opened. As we can see from Table 2, which shows data until 1940, a larger percentage of women flocked toward positions that were administrative, private, routinized and supportive – more commonly associated with feminine aptitudes. The top five occupations included: Museum Conservator, a position that entailed private and administrative "housekeeping" activities; Typist and Clerk, jobs that had undergone feminization processes, as we have seen; Assistant Statistician, which at the time mostly meant repetitive calculations and fact-checking, in a supportive character; and Education Technician, a realm in which women's supposed natural abilities as mothers would be more easily accepted. On the other hand, the examinations that had less than five per cent of female registration were mostly professions that had little association with femininity, such as Doctors, Veterinarian, Agronomist, and Meteorologist.

[128] DASP. *Relatório 1940.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941, p. 113.
[129] DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944.
[130] DASP. *Relatório 1942.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1943, p. 214-215.
[131] DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 239.

Table 2 – Women registered and approved in public examinations held by CFSPC and DASP, 1937-1940 (descending order of "% of Women Registered").

Position	Year	% of Women Registered	% of Women Approved
Museum Conservator	1939	71.43	80.00
Typist	1937	50.86	--
Museum Conservator	1940	43.75	50.00
Assistant Statistician	1938	32.36	--
Clerk (*escriturário*)	1938	32.05	50.00
Education Technician	1940	31.65	--
Clerk (*escriturário*)	1940	31.32	--
Education Technician	1938	26.32	18.52
Consul	1937	23.68	30.00
Administrative Official	1940	21.51	--
Assistant Statistician	1939	20.96	13.64
Student Inspector	1939	17.05	18.18
Accountant	1940	13.21	--
Accountant	1939	12.94	15.52
Computer (*calculista*) **	1938	11.71	33.33
Computer (*calculista*)	1939	10.00	0
Administrative Technician	1940	8.00	0
Sanitation Guards	1938	5.56	9.09
Meteorologist	1938	4.92	--
Construction Server	1938	4.32	--
Medical-Legal Specialist	1940	3.13	0
Agronomist	1939	1.68	2.33
Veterinarian	1939	1.39	0
Sanitary Doctor*	1938	0	0
Academic Assistant*	1938	0	0

Sources: Elaborated by the author, based on: DASP. *Relatório sobre as atividades do DASP em 1939.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940; DASP. *Relatório 1940.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941. Here we present only the examinations that were opened to both sexes for which we found registered data. The subsequent DASP Annual Reports brought changes in data presentation that omitted numbers of individual examinations.
* No directive prohibited women from registering for these examinations.
** This referred to people who did calculations by hand.

The year 1937 would be the first that CFSPC started conducting public examinations, with only three initiated processes that year, which resulted in a small amount of total registered candidates. The 1940 DASP Report claimed that the low registration in 1937 was also due to low publicity as well as a lack of trust from the Brazilian population on merit-based examinations. The Itamaraty *concurso* for Consul was among those held, which was the first exam conducted entirely by CFSPC and responsible for 85 of the total 140 registrations of that year.[132] By 1943, DASP affirmed that the success of its recruitment system could be measured

[132] DASP. *Relatório 1940.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941, p. 99-100, 103.

by the increase in the volume of registrations throughout the years, greatly due to "aspects of trust and morality in the system".[133]

It is possible to notice from Graphs 2 and 3 that the percentage of women registered between 1937 and 1943 – at an average of 25 per cent in this period – usually followed the tendency of total registration and examinations conducted, particularly after 1940. In the first year of CFSPC examinations, the percentage was comparatively high in relation to total registration most likely because of the nature of the exams conducted that year. Women were already marking their presence in Itamaraty *concursos* in the 1930s, but Typist was the other exam with registrations opened in 1937, a position that women were largely expected to apply. The following year saw the first limitation on women's placement in public service, with Itamaraty declaring the diplomatic career as exclusively male. Luckily for women, this would be the only examination closed to them in 1938, allowing them to choose between a number of positions that, according to perceptions, suited women – most involved administrative duties such as clerk, assistant statistician, computer and education technician (Table 2). The year of 1939, although with a low amount of total registration, was particularly difficult for women wishing to enter the civil service. A total of five *concursos* would be exclusive for male candidates, possibly inspired by Itamaraty's decision, including an exam for Construction Servers that had allowed women candidates the previous year, with four per cent female registration. Additionally, some of the other 1939 examinations were for positions not usually associated with femininity, such as Agronomist and Veterinarian, that had a low percentage of female registration (Table 2).

[133] DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 229.

Graph 2 – Total and women's registration for CFSPC/DASP public examinations, 1937-1943.



Source: Elaborated by the author, based on: DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 232.

Graph 3 – Conducted examinations and women's registration, 1937-1943.



Source: Elaborated by the author, based on: DASP. *Relatório 1943.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944, p. 228.

3.3 Public and Private

In a gendered social order, Caulfield (1993) argued that women's image would have a direct impact on how men perceived themselves, as well as on how the country perceived its own honor. Preserving women's virtue and honesty, therefore, would be essential because "an honest woman honored her superiors, whether fathers, brothers, and husbands or employers" (p. 161). When women's honor is questioned, the entire country's honors would also be questioned, making it more "vulnerable to domination (or penetration) by more powerful nations" (ibid., p. 166). In this sense, measures would be necessary to protect women's, and to prevent them from being put in situations that could raise suspicions, such as wondering the streets – or the world – alone, living by themselves, or engaging in relations with unknown people, among others. Because of this, scholars like Soihet (1997) associated the private sphere not only as a place of privacy and intimacy, but also as "the place of privation" from social relationships and from social and political decisions (p. 17). Women in the labor market and in civil service more specifically would be constantly deprived of public space for actions.

Defenders of rationalization processes based on Weber's proposal of a marked separation between the public and the private – the state and the personal –, through principles of impersonality and neutrality, shared the basic assumption that those spheres can easily be differentiated, which is a fallacy (WAHRLICH, 1983, p. 295; OKIN, 2008, p. 305). In reality, whenever predominantly male institutions attempted to create this division, women would be confined to a limited role defined by male perceptions of female abilities. For instance, in an evaluation report of the 1935 Itamaraty entrance examination, the author assessed which qualities the female sex could offer the Ministry. Not recognizing in women the "necessary conditions for the diplomatic and consular careers", the author proposed the creation of a position restricted for them, permanently allocated in the Secretariat in Rio de Janeiro as typists, archivists, librarian and clerks. Female qualities, thus, would not be suited for the political functions carried out abroad.[134]

In the U.S. Department of State, this public/private division was better institutionalized, although also clearly portraying the resulting sexual division of labor. The Department employed individuals both as Foreign Service officers and as clerks, with the possibility that clerks could be promoted to officers after examinations. In 1939, the Department indicated that it had 347 women clerks, which represented 41 per cent of the total, whereas the Foreign Service

[134] Fonseca Hermes, "Relatório sobre o Concurso para Cônsules de 3ª Classe, 1935", July 24, 1935, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 311.2, Lata 868, Maço 13120, p. 2-3

officer career included only eight women, six of whom had been recently transferred from the Department of Commerce. It is also interesting to note that while the entrance salary for officers was USD 2,500 annually, for clerks that amount dropped to USD 1,800.[135]

The intention to separate public and private tasks in Brazilian public administration was also seen back in the 1920s, when the Ministry of Finance discussed whether women could register to their general entrance examinations. Once approved candidates were appointed, one of the occupations available within the Ministry was for Customs Officer, which according to them was "incompatible with conditions of the female sex", perhaps because the position required interacting with foreigners and placement on distant frontiers. One of the suggestions to remove this difficulty was to appoint the approved women only for clerk positions, reserving the Customs Officer career exclusively for men.[136] Women would thus be allowed to serve in the Ministry of Finance, but would have their professional accession restricted due to their sex.

The discussion we mentioned earlier about the 1944 female ban for the Goiás Railroad *concurso* for engineers is significant to also understand how Brazilian administrators perceived the public/private dichotomy in public service. Luis Simões Lopes explained that the development of Examinations Instructions began with an analysis of the activity to be performed, followed by the "peculiar conditions" of the work, which finally resulted in limitations around age, sex, profession, etc. Lopes argued that the sex restrictions of some examinations only had the purpose of selecting individuals that gathered "the greatest and best conditions for the more efficient performance of eminently technical activities". It was the "special nature" of certain careers and of certain *localities* that advised against employing one or the other sex. For the specific case of the Goiás Railroad, DASP would be following suggestions from Railroad management as well as observing the "exceptional work conditions" of working in central Brazil – reasons why it restricted the position for male candidates only.[137]

The Ministry of Public Works, responsible for the Goiás Railroad, also had an input in the matter, making a very clear distinction between "field engineers" and "office engineers". Whereas the latter was in charge of calculations, project development, and mostly intellectual work done in the "office", for which "there would be, of course, no restrictions to be considered" toward women, the former – "field engineers" – required the command "over a large number of workers", in addition to being subjected to "liv[ing] in mobile camping sites",

---

[135] G. Howland Shaw to Science Research Associates, October 31, 1939, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 271, 120/295, p. 2. For more on female clerks at the U.S. Department of State, see Wood (2015).
[136] Justiça to Ministro da Fazenda, [1922], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1, p. 58-61.
[137] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, June 19, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 5.

without comfort, security, or good hygiene conditions. Moreover, because women were "physically and morally more delicate than men", the rudeness of a field engineer's life was inadequate for women-engineers. Finally, the Department said that since it was not possible to separate field and office activities, it would be "convenient" to maintain the sex restriction in entrance examinations.[138]

This letter is crucial to our analysis because it is one of the few cases in which the reasons for women's exclusion is so bluntly explained. The differentiation between field and office engineers hints at a larger perception also found in the literature and directly related to the Itamaraty case: women could do work that was domestic, internal, inside the office, rather than work that was visible, public, national or implied external relationships, as this could possibly cast doubts on their reputation. For instance, in another very short letter to DASP, the Ministry of Public Works in 1942 asked that the positions opened for Administrative Official be fulfilled "preferably by candidates of the male sex" because they would be assigned to posts "located in the interior of the country". Luis Simões Lopes forwarded the letter with a handwritten note that read: "accept, as much as possible".[139]

As Table 3 shows, a few other positions closed to women in the first years of *Estado Novo* were associated with this idea of having a more public, circulating and relational character, such as Mail Carrier, Detective and a variety of positions with "collectors" and "inspectors" in the title. Additionally, some of these positions had specific requirements that give other hints at why they had sex restrictions. For instance, the career of Detective required the use of firearms.[140] As for Immigration Inspector, the position probably followed the same discriminatory perceptions applied to the Customs Officer case we have discussed previously. The job requirements mostly likely involved working from remote locations and having contact with immigrants, meaning anything from touching, questioning, or escorting individuals.

[138] João de Mendonça Lima to Getúlio Vargas, April 5, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2666.
[139] João Maria Broxado Filho to Diretor da Divisão de Pessoal do DASP, September 12, 1942, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Movimentação, Provimento de Cargos e Funções, 2C.DASP 780.
[140] DASP. *Relatório 1940.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941, p. 132.

Table 3 – Public Examinations carried by CFSPC and DASP, 1937-1941.

Positions opened for men only (year that it became male exclusive)	**Positions opened for both men and women (years of examinations held)**
Consul/Diplomat (1938) **	Consul (1937)
Mail Carrier (1939)	Sanitary Doctor (1937, 1938, 1941)
Construction Server (*servente*) (1939)	Typist (*datilógrafo*) (1937, 1941) (1940)*
Detective (1939)	Academic Assistant (1938)
Immigration Inspector (1939)	Assistant Statistician (1938, 1939)
Civil Guard (1940)	Clerk (*escriturário*) (1938) (1940, 1941)*
Dactyloscopy Specialist (1940)	Computer (*calculista*) (1938, 1939)
Maritime Police Officer (1940)	Construction Server (*servente*) (1938)
Special Police (1940)	Education Technician (1938, 1940, 1941)
Collector (1941)	Meteorologist (1938, 1940, 1941)
Collector's Clerk (1941)	Sanitation Guards (1938)
Consumer Tax Inspector Agent (1941)	Accountant (1939, 1940, 1941)
Meteorology Observer (1941)	Administrative Official (1939, 1940)*
Police Clerk (1941)	Agronomist (1939, 1941)
Social Security Inspector (1941)	Museum Conservator (1939, 1940, 1941)
Storekeeper (*almoxarife*) (1941)	Student Inspector (1939, 1941)*
	Veterinary (1939, 1940)
	Administrative Technician (1940, 1941)
	Medical-Legal Specialist (1940)
	Actuary (1941)
	Archivist (1941)
	DASP Typist (1941)
	Dentist (1941)
	Engineer (1941)
	Nurse (1941)
	Postal Officer (1941)
	Psychiatrist (1941)
	Telegraphic Postal Officer (1941)
Unknown: Police Commissioner ***	

Source: Elaborated by the author, based on: Examination Instructions available at *Revista do Serviço Público*, editions from November 1937 until December 1941.[141]

* For the years in parenthesis, these examinations recruited candidates for a variety of Ministries at once. Because of this, they had an instruction saying that women would not be appointed, if approved, for positions located within the Ministry of War or the Navy.

** Both terms are used because when registrations opened in March 1938, the consular and diplomatic careers were still divided, and "consul" was the initial entrance position for both careers. The October 1938 reform changed that to "diplomat", and the exams happened after this event.[142]

*** The data is unknown because the Examination Instructions for this position is in a *Revista do Serviço Público* edition that was not found in the consulted library, or in any other library visited for this research. However, considering that zero women registered for it and it is a police position, the likelihood of it being closed to women is high.

[141] The research on subsequent years was interrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic that closed libraries by mid-March of 2020, but the available information is already very rich.

[142] "Relatório do Secretário do Concurso", August 9, 1938, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso Diplomata, 2C.DASP 1177.

As it becomes clear in Table 3, the Itamaraty prohibition of 1938 generated a domino effect in other public service positions that also closed its doors to women. The career of Mail Carrier was the second to apply a female ban, with the Examinations Instructions being released merely two months after Itamaraty's prohibition.[143] We can infer the reasons for this sex restriction based on the very public and relational character of this position, that would require women to wonder the streets alone, knocking on strangers' doors and being subjected to a variety of unexpected dishonorable circumstances.[144] Interestingly, the examinations for Postal Officer in 1941 was opened for both sexes. Although the difference between these two positions is unclear from the documents, we could speculate, based on the lack of sex restriction, that a Postal Officer was the person who worked within the office. Another intriguing fact is that the career of Construction Server, opened to women in 1938, would be closed to them the following year, perhaps realizing after Itamaraty's decision that this could be a possibility. Even so, the Construction Server *concurso* opened in 1938 had already registered a low proportion of female registration, only 4.32 per cent. Although there is no exact number presented for the number of approved women that year, the DASP Report of 1939 depicted a bar chart in which the male column for approved candidates nears the number 400, while the female column is just barely above zero.[145] Thus, some women were indeed interested in the career.

In referencing back to the discussions on the 1944 female ban for the Goiás Railroad *concurso*, Table 3 shows that in 1941 there was an engineer examination without a sex restriction. It may be that the exam was for an "office engineer" position or that the restrictions would become ever more common throughout the years, particularly in professional careers. The Union of University Women mentioned a few additional careers that were vetoed to women by 1944: Meteorologist, Medical-Legal Specialist, and Naturalist.[146] As we can see from Table 3, the first two positions mentioned were still opened to women in 1941, even though Meteorologist Observer was already restricted that year. Once again, we could not find further descriptions to identify the difference between that position and Meteorologist, but we can suppose that the former had a more public nature than the latter, therefore being easier to justify the female ban.

The Brazilian Ministry of Finance in 1942 wanted to create 150 Accountant positions in the Division of Income Tax and asked that registrations be opened only for male candidates.

---

[143] *Revista do Serviço Público*, ano I, v. IV, n. 2, p. 150.
[144] For a thorough exploration of perceptions of honor and virtue in Brazil on the first half of the twentieth century, see Caulfield (2000).
[145] DASP. *Relatório sobre as atividades do DASP em 1939.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940, p. 39.
[146] UUF to Getúlio Vargas, February 17, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 2.

In a letter to DASP's president, it explained that an accountant of this division needed to inspect tax payments "almost always in companies and in establishments of large movement", which made this function incompatible with women because of its "special circumstances". Finance Minister Artur de Sousa Costa used as examples other positions that also had inspecting activities and were prohibited to women. Some of them we can verify in Table 3, such as Inspector Police, Consumer Tax Inspector Agent, Collector and Collector's Clerk.[147] The letter also had a handwritten note by Luis Simões Lopes, directing it to DASP's Division of Personnel to comply with the Minister's request. Nonetheless, Lopes would respond to the Minister saying that, even as the consideration was valid, he advised against restricting the *concurso* to male candidates because of the current state of war.[148]

If the war was a concern, why would Lopes so enthusiastically support the Goiás Railroad engineer female ban in 1944, still during the war, for a position that required similar "special circumstances" of travel and circulation? Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that the Minister's intention was indeed, from Lopes' perspective, less noble than restricting women. Sousa Costa wrote directly to Getúlio Vargas arguing that the war justification presented by Lopes had not been used in the other positions that were also closed to women. However, the Minister clarified that there were already 150 temporary accountants, all male, that would certainly be approved in the upcoming examinations. In other words, the Minister of Finance wished to restrict women's registration so the temporary male accountants could be guaranteed a position after the mandatory public examination, particularly considering they already possessed the "career's technical course".[149] The Minister did not seem to be interested in undertaking a true merit-based recruitment process to select the best possible candidates, and Lopes possibly knew this and objected the female ban request.

DASP also received a war-related suggestion from the Ministry of Labor in the same year of 1942, recommending that women should be recruited because of the country's general war mobilization. As men would probably be called to serve, the public administration might be at risk of undergoing a mass departure of public servants and should consider measures to admit new employees to preserve the efficiency of public administrative services. For this purpose, the Ministry suggested the recruitment, in a "temporary and interim character", of

---

[147] Artur de Sousa Costa to Presidente do DASP, July 15, 1942, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso, Contador, 2C.DASP 1171.
[148] Luis Simões Lopes to Ministro da Fazenda, September 28, 1942, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso, Contador, 2C.DASP 1171.
[149] Artur de Sousa Costa to Presidente da República, October 9, 1942, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso, Contador, 2C.DASP 1171.

female workers.[150] The temporary aspect of the idea to recruit women attests to how they were perceived as useful, but only as secondary to men, and as long as they were not permanently withdrawn from their essential domestic role. Luis Simões Lopes' response to the Ministry's suggestion was short, merely acknowledging it.[151]

Similar restrictions and understandings were also seen in other American countries. In the United States, a Women's Bureau 1925 Report found a great concentration of women working in government bureaus "devoted to the service of women, children, and the home" – within the Women's Bureau itself, as well as in the Children's Bureau and the Bureau of Home Economics, all under the Department of Labor. Additionally, a very small proportion of women worked in offices that demanded more outdoor activities, such as the Bureau of Soils, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Weather Bureau.[152] In the 1940 Women's Bureau Report, the authors showed how men tended to be preferred for positions such as "Customs Patrol, Immigration Patrol Inspector, Narcotic Agent, [and] Post Office Inspector". The justifications for men's suitability for these occupations were based on the nature of the positions, on society's general preferences, and also on specific physical requirements.[153]

In parallel, the Inter-American Commission of Women reported in 1938 that, throughout the American countries, women tended to be excluded from occupations regarded either as "dangerous to their health" or to "their morals". Within this last category, the Commission found banned positions in: "sales of alcoholic beverages" or of "intoxicating liquors" in Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela; in "canteens and public houses" in Bolivia; in sales of "written or pictured material which is prejudicial to morality" in Mexico; in sales of "newspaper and flowers and other occupations *on the street*" in Peru; and in "reading gas and electric meters" or in "messenger service" in some U.S. states.[154]

---

[150] Samuel Felippe Domingues Uchôa to Luis Simões Lopes, October 2, 1942, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Movimentação, Provimento de Cargos e Funções, 2C.DASP 780.

[151] Unfortunately, a profound analysis of the situation of temporary and interim workers in Brazilian public administration is beyond the scope of this research. Because of this, we did not find any additional information on whether this suggestion was implemented or not.

[152] Bertha M. Nienburg, *The Status of Women in the Government Service in 1925*, U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 53, 1926, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 29, p. 6.

[153] Rachel F. Nyswander and Janet M. Hooks, "*Employment of Women in the Federal Government 1923 to 1939*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin n. 182, 1941, NARA, RG 86, Bulletins (1918-1963), Box 524, p. 10-11.

[154] Report of the IACW to the VIII International Conference of American States on the Political and Civil Rights of Women, December 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 3752, 710.F IACW/91, p. 195-196. Highlights my own.

4 "Sex Jealousy": Women as Threat

Although women have been constantly portrayed as an obstructing element to society's development and progress when acting extradomestically, Saffioti (2013, p. 66) said that, in reality, "it is society that puts obstacles to the full potential of women". The fearful apprehension that a large number of women would enter the diplomatic career via *concursos* in the 1930s led Getúlio Vargas Chief of Staff to say, for instance, that Itamaraty's female ban in 1938 "reeks of sex jealousy".[155] Jealousy or not, as men tend to associate their work abilities with their masculinity, Acker (1990) argued that they would start to feel threatened once women begun to show that they also possessed such abilities – that these were no longer a male exclusivity, and, therefore, could not be used as a tool for male domination. This association was similar to what Weinstein (2004) found in 1920s São Paulo, where industrialists linked "manly dignity" with their work skills, and these with "rationalized and modern methods" of operations. As a result, women became segregated to even lower-skill positions to protect "the value of manual skills" and men's position within industry (p. 279).

In the United States, Civil Service Commissioner Lucille McMillin presented a correlation with two variables of the supply of public service positions and women. First, there would be a connection with changes in public opinion regarding women, within a debate of "who has the 'right' to a public job" versus "who can best do the work". In periods when public opinion reflected greater anti-feminist, usually economically-based, public service saw a decrease in the proportion of employed women, usually because of perceptions that men had a greater "right" to work, earn a living, and support a family.[156] Secondly, and following this thought, McMillin saw a decrease in women's employment in public service during periods of economic depressions and higher unemployment, particularly if followed by a period of war that had meant an increase of women's access to jobs.[157] This was associated with an idea that U.S. feminist Carrie Chapman Catt expressed to Bertha Lutz, saying that men would be "quite sure" unemployment existed "because women have taken work away from men", usually followed by demands that women return to the home to let "men have all the work".[158]

Nonetheless, more often than not women's work would be discouraged for much less reasonable motives. In the United States, for instance, it was reported that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad considered women to be less efficient based on sayings such as "blondes were 'too

---

[155] Luís Vergara to Getúlio Vargas, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LV c 1935/1945.00.00.
[156] McMillin, L. F. *Women in the Federal Service,* (3rd ed.). U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 2.
[157] Ibid., p. 12-13.
[158] Carrie Chapman Catt to Bertha Lutz, March 29, 1939. AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, COR.A939.5, p. 2.

frivolous' and brunettes 'too chatty'".[159] In this sense, Saffioti (2013) argued that promoters of rationalization processes would believe that its implementation simply meant the substitution of "traditional behaviors" considered irrational, for "substantively rational behaviors" rooted on reason. This interpretation, however, was limited and did "not resist the slightest examination" (p. 399). Scientific knowledge, according to this scholar, can often be used for completely distinct purposes than originally intended, with science being used "rationally" for the execution of irrational purposes (ibid., p. 400). As we have seen, in Brazil the justifications used by DASP's managers and others to limit women's presence in civil service were not fully based on rational, studied scientific terms; on the contrary, it was broadly based on men's often irrational fears and perceptions of gendered norms of behaviors.

The decision to stop female access to the diplomatic career in 1938 fits here, because it also reflected a reaction from the administration to the challenge women candidates posed to perceived social norms when, in "alarming proportions", they became interested in the career.[160] Not only female interest seemed large, but women's approval rates in diplomatic examinations were also higher than men's throughout the 1930s (Graph 4). The unexpected achievement of these women had proved that they possessed the "essential attributes for a specialized career", especially considering that Itamaraty examinations were considered "the only serious one in Brazil" by 1935, prior to CFSPC's creation.[161] Women's success would make the modernizing elite fear that "soon half, or almost, of the Ministry's initial positions will be occupied by women", recommending "restrictive providences" in order to not find itself "embarrassed to find qualified staff for the performance of duties abroad".[162]

[159] McMillin, L. F. *Women in the Federal Service,* (3rd ed.). U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 16.
[160] The idea that women candidates were challenging social norms can be found in Farias (2017, p. 43) and in: CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.
[161] Ibid.; Fonseca Hermes, "Relatório sobre o Concurso para Cônsules de 3ª Classe, 1935", July 24, 1935, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 311.2, Lata 868, Maço 13120, p. 3.
[162] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.

Graph 4 – Percentage of women registered vs. approved in Itamaraty public examinations, 1934-1938.



Source: Elaborated by the author, based on: Presidente da Comissão Examinadora to Ministro de Estado, July 7, 1934, AHI, MRE-Atividade Meio, Estante 135, Pasta 1, Maço 11; Fonseca Hermes, "Relatório sobre o Concurso para Cônsules de 3ª Classe, 1935", July 24, 1935, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 311.2, Lata 868, Maço 13120; DASP. *Relatório 1940.* Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941, p. 103; Luís Simões Lopes to Minister of Foreign Relations, August 12, 1937, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 311.2, Lata 868, Maço 13120; Roberto de Vasconcellos, "Relatório do Secretario do Concurso", August 9, 1938, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso Diplomata, 2C.DASP 1177.
* The registration period for the 1938 Itamaraty examinations was between April and July of that year. Once the October 1938 Reform instated that women could no longer have access to the diplomatic career, the 18 women who had successful applications had their registration cancelled by DASP.[163]

In a report analyzing the 1935 Itamaraty *concurso*, the president of the Examining Commission pondered about why there was such a contrast between the total number of candidates registered, 64, and of those approved, merely ten. For him, the large number of failures was the result of the "lack of preparation of most candidates, rather than the excess rigor from the Commission". Annexed to the report was a news clipping from *A Noite* that called the exams "long and severe", with a result that demonstrated "convincingly the rigorous conduct observed in the competition", indicating the "value of the classified candidates".[164] Taking into account that five of the ten approved candidates were women – out of 11 female candidates, whereas 48 male candidates were disqualified – it could be implied that women were indeed prepared and capable of undergoing such an intense process. The same newspaper also commented that the number of women approved could be highlighted as "without exaggeration, the greatest triumph of feminism in Brazil", after the women's vote in 1932.[165]

[163] Mario de Brito, response to "Relatório do Secretario do Concurso", October 19, 1938, AN-DASP, Série: Pessoal, Sub-série: Seleção, Concurso Diplomata, 2C.DASP 1177, p. 4.
[164] Fonseca Hermes, "Relatório sobre o Concurso para Cônsules de 3ª Classe, 1935", July 24, 1935, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 311.2, Lata 868, Maço 13120, p. 9-11.
[165] "Ecos e Novidades", *A Noite*, July 5, 1935, p. 2.

The 1934 examinations also had a relatively large number of registered candidates, 59, whereas only eight were approved, with two women among them, placing third and fourth.[166]

If anything, women were proving the value of the merit-based system, competing equally and achieving success based on their knowledge and capacity. For Minister of Foreign Relations Oswaldo Aranha, however, women would have an unfair advantage. In Bertha Lutz' later recollections of the 1930s for a book project on Brazilian feminism, she remembered a conversation with Aranha after the 1938 prohibition in which he would have said that female candidates were "educated in convent schools, generally knowing more languages and having advantage over the boys". As a response, members of FBPF would have asked whether public examinations were meant to select candidates based on favoritism or on the most apt for the professions, for which we do not know Aranha's reaction.[167]

The rationalization process started in 1936 to promote merit-based rather political appointments for public service would have sparked the interest of middle-class white women who wished to make use of their newly conquered higher education, particularly considering the inauguration of liberal arts colleges such as the School of Philosophy and Letters at University of São Paulo in 1934.[168] Female intellectual achievements were indeed noticed in universities at the time, as women were supposedly surpassing men in academic competitions, which prompted writer Cecília Meirelles to call the government's attention to take advantage of their work force for the nation's progress.[169] The U.S. Women's Bureau representative Mary Cannon reported from her 1943 Brazil trip that liberal arts programs had been consistently admitting women for a number of years and there were "a surprising number of successful professional women" in Brazil encountering no "unusual obstacles" to practice their professions in the private sector.[170]

In the same protest letter about the 1944 engineer *concurso*, the Union of University Women said that DASP's attitudes of continuing sexual restriction of public positions were "strange […] in virtue of the approval coefficient of elements of the female sex in examinations", considering the frequency "in which females reach the highest grade".[171] This

---

[166] Presidente da Comissão Examinadora to Ministro de Estado, July 7, 1934, AHI, MRE-Atividade Meio, Estante 135, Pasta 1, Maço 11.
[167] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 67.
[168] Mary M. Cannon, "*Women in Brazil Today*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, November 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Publications, Box 15, p. 6; and see also Marques (2016, p. 72).
[169] Cecília Meirelles, "Trabalho Feminino", *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, n. 42, July 1939, p. 107.
[170] Mary M. Cannon, "*Brief Summary of the Reports on Brasil*", August 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1943), Box 3, p. 1.
[171] UUF to Getúlio Vargas, February 17, 1944, AN-GPR, 35.0.PRO.2054, p. 3.

was not the only observation of the kind. A news article saved in FBPF's archives, for instance, depicted the case of a 1938 *concurso* for typist in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in which a woman reached first place. The event stirred a discussion around whether men should have preference for public service jobs because the home's financial maintenance depended on them. The article, which seems to be an editorial, criticized those involved for not considering the merit factor, since men had failed the *concurso* "not because they were men, but because they did not have competence", which would be fundamentally proved by the examination. The piece then discussed a "more serious" matter, or the "inferiority of men over women, any time that both show up for a *concurso*", which was sarcastically explained by the fact that women could study more because they led a more private life, whereas men had many public commitments, such as sports, coffees, billiard games, etc.[172]

Mary Cannon also noted the female success in public examinations, reporting that Brazilian "women have done so well in competitive examinations for government jobs that men are protesting", a perception she observed when young professional women told her that men "resent women who threaten their security, resent them as competitors".[173] In a confidential report for "those responsible for the official policy and program on inter-American cooperation" in 1943, Cannon added that DASP allowed equal opportunities "at least theoretically", but Brazilian women had said that, as a result of their success rates in public examinations, "men are trying to close the better-paid jobs to women".[174]

However, it was not only men who resented women's success. In 1944, FBPF sent a protest letter to the National Museum's director, Heloisa Alberto Torres, pointing out how strange it was that the *concurso* for Assistant Naturalist was closed to women considering that the director herself was a "distinguished woman scientist". Knowing that other departments had banned women to "avoid that the intelligence, and the technical and professional preparation of women shadow male ignorance", FBPF claimed the Museum's prohibition was unexpected and a great "injustice and disdain" for all the service that women naturalists had provided country.[175] To further complicate matters, we found in FBPF's archives an unsigned letter written by someone who had inside information on the National Museum, with a special section entitled: "current situation at the Museum, confidential". The author explained that, because the Museum

---

[172] "O Trabalho Feminino", March 8, 1938, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.CDI, RJR.153, p. 2.
[173] Mary M. Cannon, "*Women in Brazil Today*", U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, November 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Publications, Box 15, p. 8.
[174] Mary M. Cannon, "*Brief Summary of the Reports on Brasil*", August 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1943), Box 3, p. 2.
[175] FBPF to Diretora do Museu Nacional, March, 1944, AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1, p. 86-87.

was mainly a research institution, the candidates for the Naturalist *concursos* were usually handpicked beforehand according to employees' research interests. For the Assistant Naturalist examination in 1944, it seems that the female ban was implemented because one of the candidates was a woman "of value, graduated as a Doctor in Anthropology", with higher qualifications and more scientific production than one of the other female managers.[176] The threat, therefore, was not only to men, but to other women as well, especially considering the limited political and public space they had at the time.

As the National Museum case showed, even though public examinations would be respected as impartial, technical and merit-based, the realities of their implementation were much different. Scholars have indeed discussed that patrimonialistic practices of recruitment lingered on in Brazilian public administration.[177] As an example, four months after Itamaraty prohibited women's access to the diplomatic career, the newspaper *Jornal do Brasil* published a decree signed by Getúlio Vargas authorizing the direct appointment, without *concurso*, of two grandsons of Barão do Rio Branco for the initial position of diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The decree established that Rio Branco was an "honorable citizen of the Nation for the invaluable services provided", and that the state must "translate in acts the popular cult for the memory of great servers of the nation".[178]

This was an indication of how DASP, through *concursos públicos*, would be used as a "scape goat", according to Graham's (1968) understanding, to call upon men "to serve the state [that] were essentially the same as in the past", part of a restricted privileged elite (p. 188). The Getúlio Vargas government, and DASP more particularly, engaged in a fierce discourse of moving away from past oligarchic ways, calling public employees of those times "disillusioned and careless", usually politically protected by "powerful men".[179] Luis Simões Lopes said that the old structure had allowed "merit [to] be outweighed by political efforts", which made their renovation work more difficult due to "impermeable elements".[180] Those elements, according to one RSP article, hindered reforms because these were a "threat to the comfort of places conquered by motives others than their own merit".[181] The old structure of public administration

[176] Letter to FBPF, n/d [1944], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, CPA.CPB.1, p. 85.
[177] See, for instance: Graham (1968); Levine (1980); Cheibub (1985); Draibe (2004).
[178] "Independente de concurso, dois netos do Barão do Rio Branco foram autorizados a ingressar na carreira diplomática", *Jornal do Brasil*, February 11, 1939, p. 12.
[179] "Revista do Serviço Público", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 4.
[180] Luis Simões Lopes, "Primeiro Aniversário da Lei do Reajustamento do Funcionalismo Público Civil", *Revista do Serviço Público,* ano I, n. 1, November 1937, p. 76.
[181] Urbano Berquió, "Eficiência Administrativa a Sabotagem Burocrática", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. II, n. 1, April 1938, p. 7.

was considered disorganized, "polycephalic", and deficient, corrupted by the "cancer of nepotism", resulting in the erosion of the quality and merit of public servants.[182]

It is worth remembering, as Araújo (2017) did, that DASP's top management was composed of men whose fathers were former members of the governing elite, all part of relevant Brazilian political families who had access to public service and to the central nucleus of power thanks to the inherited prestige of their last names (p. 251). As we saw in the previous chapter, Lopes joined the civil service through a position at the Ministry of Agriculture, where his father had previously served as Minister. Moacyr Briggs, who did pass the Itamaraty public examinations in 1918, was nonetheless the son of a former career diplomat, whereas Maurício Nabuco had been easily accepted into the Ministry of Foreign Relations in 1913 after his father's achievements (ARAÚJO, 2017). These facts do not diminish their intelligence, nor the importance of their work. However, as Araújo (2017) argued, top DASP management ascended to power via "criteria that were not those they would employ and profess" to the rest of public administration once in their position of power, a strategy that perpetuated the maintenance of the same homogeneous elite in government (p. 252). The new public employee they sought, at least rhetorically, should not be like the old type, or people like themselves, with political protection.

Conclusion

In attempting to understand why women were perceived to be unsuited for diplomacy, in this chapter we uncovered the perceptions about gender that permeated the Brazilian public administration. As the 1938 Itamaraty Reform that prohibited women's access symbolized a paramount change in Getúlio Vargas' regime, we looked at the decision as part of a wider process of rationalization, in which the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP) had the political ability to define the positions that women were allowed to occupy in public service via registration requirements of public examinations. Itamaraty, thus, executed the first executive order toward the implementation of a sexual division of labor in public administration, leading a domino effect that in the following three years closed an additional 18 DASP-run entrance examinations to women.

As the *Estado Novo* coup of November 1937 put a brutal end to feminist discussions in politics, we discussed the social perceptions that promoted the glorification of women's work as mothers, reverencing the family and confining female labor into positions that would

[182] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 2-3.

accommodate their supposed “natural” domestic-oriented qualities. This perspective found eco in social forces that included the Catholic Church, eugenic intellectuals and feminists who often reinforced women’s maternal role. Additionally, the Brazilian government promoted social policies that not only dismantled the women’s rights previously conquered, but that also lauded traditional family structures, higher fecundity and population growth, and the position of the husband as the main breadwinner. Motherhood was thus included in the modernization process of Brazilian society.

Understanding that social perceptions are incorporated into organizational structures through actors’ power in political decision-making, the relationship between private and public life influenced perceptions around female work, family and domesticity, affecting women and men’s social role and segregating them into distinct work positions. In light of this, entrance examinations to civil service positions represented a significant tool in solidifying gender norms and perceptions into public administration. It was commonly accepted that women were generally not allowed to occupy positions that had a political function, that required outside movement and travel, or that demanded intense contact with the public. The spaces left for female occupation reinforced women’s subordinating and private roles – also assigning diplomacy as a political and public activity. In the next chapter we explore the public/private dichotomy of sexual divisions of labor through an international/national lens.

CHAPTER 3 - "Vanity of men, terrible and cruel!": exploring why diplomacy was not a place for women

Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Oswaldo Aranha (1938-1944) confessed feeling that women would face a series of social prejudices if they were sent as representatives of Brazilian interests abroad. Among those prejudices were issues surrounding ideals of protection and formation of a family. Aranha believed that the only solution for a married woman "whose husband works in [Brazil] and cannot accompany her overseas" would be abdication from diplomacy in favor of family union.[1] Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, a Brazilian novelist and conservative intellectual, wrote to Aranha in protest against the rumors that Itamaraty would prohibit women from serving as diplomats. In his response, Aranha mentioned an extra dimension to the family problem: the social position of the diplomatic husband overseas and the non-definition of the official proper treatment assigned to him.[2] In Coelho Lisboa's reply letter, she emphatically dismissed this argument as "vanity of men, terrible and cruel!", pointing out that the husband should "have the position he deserves – equality, if he is of value by her side, and inferiority, if he is inferior". For her, the "best element" of a couple should "impose itself naturally", from the point of view of "human values only".[3]

The position of the husband was one of the justifications used against the participation of women in diplomacy internationally, being constantly referenced in the documents collected and in the literature on women diplomats. The main preoccupation was on the risk that a married woman diplomat could ultimately compromise masculinity ideals and masculine power within a variety of social institutions. This anxiety seemed to be shared by a Brazilian male professor of international law, who showed his support for Itamaraty's decision of October 1938 to prohibit women from entering the diplomatic career. In one of his daily columns at *Gazeta de Notícias*, the professor wrote that some "gracious little ladies" were now throwing "tantrums and pouting" because of the prohibition. Although he believed that women – whom he called "our dear 'ribs'" – would not succeed in obtaining a reversal of the measure, he feared the truth of an old proverb that said: "when a woman wants, the devil also does". The author seemed to show some discomfort that women were getting used to "entering [jobs] everywhere, to sticking their nose in all doors, to snoop at everything".[4]

---

[1] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 4.
[2] Oswaldo Aranha to Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, RCL c 1938.10.00, p. 1.
[3] Rosalina Coelho Lisboa to Oswaldo Aranha, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1939.00.00, p. 2-3.
[4] Sergio D. T. de Macedo, "Comentário", *Gazeta de Notícias*, November 22, 1938, p. 2.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Itamaraty's 1938 decision to prohibit women was not an isolated incident within the Brazilian public administration during the Getúlio Vargas *Estado Novo* regime (1937-1945), serving as the first of many other limitations that would sexually divide the spaces in which men and women could occupy in public service. In this chapter, we zoom into diplomacy and realize that the Brazilian decision was also not an isolated case in international affairs. The opportunities for women to act in foreign services and international politics around the globe were fairly restricted in the 1930s, providing a set of ideal conditions that were used by members of the Brazilian government to start implementing a sexually divided vision of civil service. This chapter is based on the justifications expressed by Brazilian actors that explore why diplomacy and international representation were not understood as a place for women. We found that such justifications considerably reflected opinions shared by many other countries, which might have served as additional domestic support and facilitated Itamaraty's implementation of the 1938 female ban.

In line with its mandate, the Brazilian Federal Council of the Civil Public Service (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*, CFSPC) examined the convenience of women acting as Brazilian representatives abroad, and, more generally, their presence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[5] The study was mostly based on a report from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which had decided in April 1936 to "maintain the exclusion of women from the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, for being convinced that female employees do not perform with advantage to the Public Service activities of this nature".[6] The available papers of the CFSPC study form a compilation of seven documents, of which five are translations of the British report. Although not all of them say so, we can infer this because they frequently mention facts that are unique to the United Kingdom, such as laws and references to the "British government" or "Your Majesty", as well as a "Translator's Note" explaining the formation of the British Commission in charge of examining the issue.[7] Furthermore, parts of the report accurately correlate with a document produced by the FCO in the 1990s on British

[5] As we have discussed in chapter one, we do not know who in fact conducted this study, although one of the documents is titled "Study conducted by the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Relations" – the shortest document, presenting summarized conclusions. The documents are unsigned, but are all typed in papers with CFSPC letterheads and were found in the personal archives of Luis Simões Lopes, CFSPC's president. Because of this, we have chosen to address the document in this chapter as "CFSPC report/study".

[6] Highlights from original text. CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 5. The diplomatic and consular careers had been officially prohibited to women in the United Kingdom in 1921, soon after the British public service had allowed women's participation in its higher rankings (McCARTHY, 2009).

[7] According to the Translator's Note, the British Commission was composed of nine members of different civil service divisions, two of which were women (CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 12, 24).

women in diplomacy, and with McCarthy's (2009) article focused on comparing the 1936 British decision to maintain women's exclusion with the later permission in 1946, after World War II.[8] The entire CFSPC document is 27 pages long, but only six of those are specific to the Brazilian section of the study, frequently paraphrasing British justifications.

International Relations feminist scholar Tickner (2001) endorsed a two-fold "investigation of politics" that alternates between the micro and personal levels shaping the global scales, and "how macro structures affect local groups and individuals" (p. 2). The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, as an agent of the international system, was not free of its influence, replicating foreign ideas on the incompatibility of women in diplomacy, but, simultaneously, reinforcing those practices when it decided to prohibit women's entrance. The Brazilian public administration and Itamaraty did not show an interest in anticipating "a movement barely initiated" internationally, as they could not see advantages in acting mostly isolated within an uncertain judicial and social context, amidst bellicose global tensions.[9] Considering the country's peripheral position in the international system, the condition of women domestically would be impacted by the hegemonic powers, both on the conservative side of favoring the confinement of "women to domestic patterns of existence", and on the feminist side of promoting "the need to emancipate economically" (SAFFIOTI, 2013, p. 42).

Taking into consideration the similarities between the justifications by Brazilian male authorities and other male-dominated foreign services on why women were unsuited for diplomacy, we explore Itamaraty's "policy of exclusion" as a reflection of the international system (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 286). We look to the Brazilian MRE as an agent of international relations, analyzing how the diplomatic career would be framed as special and, therefore, "off limits to women" (ibid., p. 287). Additionally, when referring to "diplomacy", we follow Aggestam and Towns' (2018a) definition that the concept means a gendered institution both in the sense that it represents "an established, formal organization", with rules, objectives and hierarchies, embodied in the Ministry, as well as a "less formalized […] set of practices, relationships or behavioral patterns", carried out consciously or not by diplomats, delegates and foreign representatives (p. 10).

Also as proposed by Aggestam and Towns (2018a, p. 3), the purpose is to unravel the "ways in which diplomatic culture may contain gender norms, rules and practices", and we do this by comparing the justifications against women in diplomacy with the experiences of those

[8] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999.
[9] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21; CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 3.

few women that were already part of international politics, in order to examine the validity of the official arguments. In the case of Itamaraty, since allowing female participation in 1918, 20 women had joined the Ministry, and their personal successes and struggles would be similar to those of other women diplomats around the globe.

For this, the chapter begins with a historical and theoretical overview of gender issues in diplomacy, focusing on the changes occurring in diplomatic practice during the years between the First and Second World Wars. We then present a discussion on how different understandings of the public/private dichotomy relates to the situation of women in diplomacy, which serves to orient the remaining sections of the chapter. The first understanding is aligned with the international/national dichotomy, as women were considered adequate only for positions within the country – nationally, domestically, privately – that did not require representing the nation's image and interests overseas, because of perceptions that women were fragile and would not be well accepted by host countries, potentially harming bilateral relations. Secondly, we explore the masculine/feminine dichotomy, as diplomacy was characterized by informal male-dominated spaces of interaction and masculine topics of discussions, segregating women into negotiating "women's issues". Finally, the chapter ends with a study of the celibacy/marriage dichotomy, as women in diplomacy were ultimately seen as a potential risk for marital hierarchy and family formation, often condemning women who wanted to be diplomats to celibacy.

1 Women's and gender issues in diplomacy

Historical studies of diplomacy tend to define Renaissance Italy as the "birthplace of modern diplomacy", with the formal establishment of long-term embassies and the creation of the diplomatic career. Scholars who study women in diplomacy at this time have helped to "open the field to a broader interpretation of diplomatic work", as women acted as agents of "information-gathering, alliance-building and networking", using marriage, fertility potential and dowries as instruments of diplomatic practice (JAMES, SLUGA, 2016, p. 1-2). The exclusion of women from "representing their male-governed nations" internationally, according to scholars, would be a modern era phenomenon resulting from the professionalization and bureaucratization of diplomacy at the turn of twentieth century, which constructed a diplomatic system based on a "traditional Western elite male perspective" (GARNER, 2018, p. 254-256; AGGESTAM, TOWNS, 2018b, p. 8). Diplomats, usually male, institutionalized diplomatic practice with international agreements, protocols and codes of behavior to govern interstate relations based on the "promise of a 'scientific' approach to

diplomacy […] characterized by reasoned discussions among men" (GARNER, 2018, p. 254; JAMES, SLUGA, 2016, p. 6). The power relations resulting from this process organized diplomatic work into gendered categories, "reserving the formal, official, remunerated business of representation to men alone" (McCARTHY, 2016, p. 179).

However, in spite of greater institutionalization, Kiddle (2015) discussed the perpetuation of a "shared diplomatic culture" based on a "patriarchal code of honor", in which interactions among male diplomats were guided not only by the "protection of their country's interests", but also by the sanctity of the nation's honor, positioning women as an object to be protected rather than an agent of protection (p. 26). Furthermore, informal venues of sociability continued to be essential for the conduct of diplomacy, being mostly arranged by women. This resulted in a "gendered division of diplomatic labor" that assigned the public and representational work to men, and the domestic and supportive roles to women, who found themselves invisible as "non-state actors in the field of international politics" (JAMES; SLUGA, 2016, p. 7-8; McCARTHY, 2016, p. 179). The situation only began to change after World War II, when the incorporation of women into professional diplomatic careers became the norm (McCARTHY, 2016, p. 179).

According to feminist scholars of International Relations, the sparse female presence in the international and diplomatic arenas throughout the twentieth-century helped establish masculine rules of behaviors that ultimately discarded the need to explain or justify, or even to question, the aptitude of men for diplomacy (TICKNER, 2001; KRONSELL, 2006). Women, on the other hand, always needed to validate their presence, indicating the power relations imbued in diplomatic institutions. Their participation was the subject of several government reports, commissions, and studies with scientific appeal, as if a woman's desire to be a diplomat was not natural. The British Foreign Office plainly affirmed in 1936 that "it is at least doubtful that women are perfectly apt to perform the functions of this [diplomatic] career".[10] As women's aptitudes were always assessed against the "norm" – defined by the normalized male experience –, the female body would always be the element of difference, never fitting what was expected of a diplomat. As observed by Friaça (2018), "the male presence is perceived as natural", whereas women "is seen as exception and always individualized" (p. 294).

To illustrate this, a U.S. Consul General in London wrote to a British consular officer in 1932 that, in theory, "the service is open to all women who desire to enter it, but while equality is maintained it is the opinion in the Department that the Foreign Service is not a

[10] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 5.

suitable place for women". According to him, "no one says this publicly, but it is a fact". This would mean that women's unsuitability for diplomacy was an accepted and shared social norm, since it did not require public confirmation. In Brazil, then, this norm might not have been as socially accepted, considering that Itamaraty decided to explicitly prohibit female participation in diplomacy – perhaps because women were demonstrating interest and success in the career, as we saw in the last chapter. In any case, the passage above was a response to a questionnaire from the British Foreign Office in which the U.S. Consul discussed women's suitability for the "shipping part of a consulate". He remembered that "no bad results followed" after a U.S. female officer worked in the shipping office in Valparaiso, Chile; however, he added that "I should never assign a woman to such a job and think few senior consular officers would".[11] Although the Consul seemed to respond with an uncharacteristic bluntness – and mostly representing his own opinion – this perception was generally shared because, among other reasons, so few women were diplomats at the time. As he noted, there were no "bad results" from the experience, but he still did not find that a convincing evidence in favor of women.

Expanding on the feminist idea that the "personal is political", Enloe (2014) proposed that private relations would indeed be both power-infused and international, as perceptions of "what it means to be a 'respectable' woman or an 'honorable' man" would be shaped by "colonizing policies, international trade strategies, and military doctrines" that traveled the world and helped maintain women as marginal and devalued actors in international politics (p. 348, 350). Going further, the scholar also indicated that "the international is personal" to foster the understanding that affairs between sovereign states are highly dependable on private relationships and on services usually offered by women, as well as on how nations interact and respect each other based on masculinity ideals of dignity and honor (ibid., p. 351). In turn, Mosse (1996) argued that masculinity ideals always require "an image against which it could define itself", with women embodying femininity to serve an "essential function" of mirroring the manly ideal so men could "become conscious of [their] own masculinity" (p. 56, 74). During the interwar period, this embodiment would be crucial.

1.1 The New Diplomat

The dynamic nature of changes occurring in the interwar years stirred debates on what constituted diplomatic practice. Using Farias' (2017) understanding of this period, diplomacy was undergoing an identity shift, moving away from behaviors that would end up being

[11] American Consul General to Dept of State, June 3, 1932, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 271, 120.1/214, p. 3.

categorized as feminine, towards a more rationalized, results-oriented, and consequently more masculine, vision of diplomacy. The author argued that, at this time, there were attempts, specially by women, to frame diplomacy as a "profession associated with traditional female values" to defend women's presence in Itamaraty, but often employing essentialist and "discriminatory gender stereotypes" such as elegance, politeness, and discreetness (FARIAS, 2017, p. 39, 45). For instance, a former Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs who often wrote in Brazilian newspapers said that diplomacy "is essentially a feminine function" and that women possessed "in a wider scale than men" some of the qualities for a "good diplomat", which included wit, sensibility, malleability, subtle intelligence, a "sort of sixth sense".[12] Another editorial piece similarly claimed that women, with their "elegance, subtleness, smiles, [… and] capacity to impress others", would be ideal diplomatic substitutes for old "rheumatic and paunchy ministers".[13]

Attempting to defend women's participation, journalist and Itamaraty's clerk Elisabeth Bastos declared that diplomacy would be "essentially a feminine art". She praised women as the "beautiful sex", and Brazilian women in particular as "educated, agile and attractive", highlighting feminine qualities – tact, ability, acuteness – that could be used in diplomatic practice. Bastos' general characterization of the diplomat also indicates the shift at the time, calling the old diplomat an obedient aristocrat who merely represented the sovereign ruler. Now, she said, diplomats needed to represent the collective interests of the country, acting as honest and instructed citizens with "extensive knowledge" of the nation's wealth and morals, with a "subtle power" to defend their compatriots. The diplomat needed to be orderly, have "personal issues in order", and combine a "strong personality" with intelligence and patriotism, defending "the honor and integrity of his nation".[14] This depiction of the new ideal diplomat, however, still perpetuated highly masculine, chivalrous, and European values, as Farias (2017, p. 45) noted. Bastos further claimed that women had the "advantages of the *savoir-faire*, of the refinement of manners, being therefore more capable than [men] to represent with ability the country's interests abroad".[15] This final description also insinuates a fairly elite and white category of woman, helping to maintain diplomacy as an aristocratic game.

Whereas some were attempting to connect diplomacy with essentialist feminine characteristics to promote women's participation in international affairs, the turbulent interwar

[12] Julio Dantas, "A mulher diplomata", *Correio da Manhã*, April 2, 1933, p. 4.
[13] "A mulher na diplomacia", *Correio de São Paulo*, January 15, 1937, p. 2.
[14] Elisabeth Bastos, "A mulher na Diplomacia", *Jornal do Brasil*, February 1, 1935, p. 6.
[15] Elisabeth Bastos, "A mulher na Diplomacia", *Jornal do Brasil*, February 1, 1935, p. 6.

years also generated a new diplomatic profile, based on a "new model of manliness" that sought a "more business-oriented approach to foreign policy" (FARIAS, 2017, p. 47). This new masculinity ideal refuted "the association with values considered feminine", grounded mainly in attempts to create clear-cut divisions between public/male and private/female spheres (ibid.). A Brazilian male ambassador, for example, assured that the idea of the diplomat as a "lady of society with pants", because of their tendency to be overly gentile, amiable and "useless", was in the past – now, he said, diplomacy meant "action".[16] With a similar reasoning, a newspaper highlighted that the greatest argument against a woman diplomat was the incompatibility between, on one side, the required diplomatic "coldness of calculation and serenity of objective analysis" and, on the other, the "formation of feminine spirits, emotional and sentimental".[17]

In light of perceptions such as these, women's presence in diplomacy and international politics was assumed to "effeminate", or weaken, state power (FARIAS, 2017, p. 41). The idea of a "new" diplomat in Brazil skewed away from a "purely representational" diplomacy – frivolous, vain and gallant – towards greater association with rationalization and international trade, which included efforts to abolish the usage of diplomatic uniforms, some requests to retire diplomats with "dubious masculinity", and the transfer of Ministry of Labor Commercial Attachés to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ibid., p. 47-48).[18] Newspapers also reported on a "radical modification of orientation" within Itamaraty in 1935, emphasizing that activities were now conducted "on a path more in line with the country's progress and needs, that of commercial exchange".[19]

Security tensions and insecurities in the global stage in 1938 also played a role in delineating the new diplomatic practice. A ministerial report ordered by Minister Oswaldo Aranha, assessing Itamaraty's work of the past year, reinforced the idea that the Ministry had begun acting, under Vargas' orientation, in a wider range of fronts, embracing not only political, but also economic and social issues. According to the report, Itamaraty had been able to act in an "objective and courageous" manner thanks to its intelligent and energetic diplomats overseas, who honored the nation, defended Brazil's interests and helped elevate national prestige.[20] Brazilian foreign policy had a strict foreign policy of neutrality at the time, a move

[16] Adalberto Guerra Duval, "A Diplomacia no Estado Novo", *Revista do Serviço Público,* v. III, n. 3, September 1938, p. 10.
[17] "O sentimentalismo exuberante das mulheres ante a fria discrição da diplomacia", *Diário da Noite*, February 9, 1935, p. 1.
[18] Decree-Law n. 791, October 14, 1938, art. 6; Decree n. 21.305, April 19, 1932, preamble.
[19] "O Itamaraty, onde a reportagem poucas vezes entra", *Correio da Manhã*, January 24, 1935, p. 3.
[20] Jayme de Barros Gomes, "Exposição Sucinta dos trabalhos realizados pelo Itamaraty nos últimos doze meses", October 21, 1939, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.1, Lata 1042, Maço 18309, p. 1-2.

that demanded “intense contact” between Rio de Janeiro and its representatives abroad as they handled the multiple and delicate issues of the moment “with prudence and tact, but with great firmness”.[21] Itamaraty’s “delicate mission” in such an uncertain moment was to maintain an open line of contact with other governments, demanding from its diplomats “certain vigilance, initiative and proactivity”.[22]

Brazilian diplomat Maurício Nabuco, despite noticing the incorporation of economic and commercial interests as key aspects of a diplomat’s work, mostly believed in the complementarity between the armed forces and diplomacy, arguing that the latter was the political administrative component to guarantee national prestige.[23] Interestingly, to achieve prestige, Nabuco saw that Itamaraty’s mission, although “the most brilliant amidst others”, needed to be executed with the maximum discreetness and pragmatism, because “any error, even slight, can take on gigantic proportions”.[24] Oswaldo Aranha, in his 1938 inauguration speech as Minister of Foreign Relations, also emphasized that any public servant would be judged “by the consequences of errors more than by the benefits of deeds”, but diplomats were under special responsibility as any of their acts abroad could “compromise Brazil’s honor, integrity or peace”.[25] President Getúlio Vargas similarly stated that, although pacifism and neutrality were pillars of Brazilian foreign policy, the nation could not appear “before the world as incapable of valuing its own wealth and defending it when necessary”.[26]

Scholars McGlen and Sarkees (1993) have argued that, historically, there has been a strong socially-constructed connection between the image of the soldier and of the diplomat, since war and politics became ever more intertwined and “the right to participate in the making of a country’s foreign policy has been conditioned by the ability to fight in a country’s wars” (ibid., p. 35-36).[27] In this sense, as Brazil did not wish to risk its prestige or appear weak at such

---

[21] ibid., p. 26.
[22] “Secretaria de Estado”, [1938], AHI, MRE-Atividade Meio, Estante 135, Pasta 2, Maço 5, p. 1, 4; "Por ocasião de sua posse no Ministério das Relações Exteriores", March 15, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA pi 1938.03.15.
[23] NABUCO, M. *Reflexões e Reminiscências.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2001, p. 9, 17, 22. Maurício Nabuco was the son of Joaquim Nabuco, an important Brazilian politician, abolitionist and diplomat. Maurício was admitted to Itamaraty in 1913 and became an essential figure in the administrative reforms of Brazilian public administration in the 1930s. His influence was further discussed in chapter 1.
[24] ibid., p. 30, 33.
[25] "Por ocasião de sua posse no Ministério das Relações Exteriores", March 15, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA pi 1938.03.15, p. 8.
[26] VARGAS, G. “Problemas e Realizações do Estado Novo”, Abril 22, 1938. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 174.
[27] The connection between soldier and diplomat would rest on the assumption of an antecedent “reciprocal relationship between militarism and masculinity” (GARNER, 2018, p. 40). Scholars argue that the state used hegemonic masculinity ideals to promote and justify its own war efforts, creating mythical images of women as “Beautiful Souls” and men as “Just Warriors”. In turn, war and militarism further reinforced masculinity ideals and further excluded women from war and politics (ELSHTAIN, 1995; TICKNER, 2001; GARNER, 2018).

a volatile global moment, women were thus seen as unsuited for diplomacy – or war, for that matter.[28] Widespread usage of gendered language in diplomatic and military practices associated women with passiveness and domesticity, portraying them as "non-aggressive", "peace-loving", and compassionate, traits believed to be incompatible with taking a strong stance and maintaining high-quality contacts and negotiations with foreign governments, or fighting them when needed (ibid., p. 35-36; FARIAS, 2017, p. 40).

During the interwar years, feminists around the world that defended the vote and greater female participation in public life would appropriate women's supposed essentialist tendency for peace – a sentiment growing naturally from women's concern with the reproduction and care of life – to demand a voice both domestically and internationally, also considering men's "natural" aggressiveness as a "liability to the continued existence of the world" (McGLEN, SARKEES, 1993, p. 4-7). This association between peace and women was a common trend amidst Brazilians feminists as well, who, working under the well-behaved feminism we explored in the previous chapter, used essentialist feminine perceptions to their advantage. Journalist Rachel Crotman, for instance, who often wrote about women's issues and international relations, reported on the League of Nation's 1931 Assembly saying that while "[male] diplomats sign treaties, women create the spirit of peace".[29] The idea would also be shared by lawyer Amelia Duarte, who wrote at the eve of the 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires that the event should spark the interest of "women of the World, pacifists by nature and by action".[30] Similarly, the vice-president of the Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (*Federação Brasileira para o Progresso Feminino*, FBPF), Maria Sabina, claimed that "the woman who is a mother, a daughter, a wife, a sister, feels an unstoppable revulsion at the useless horrors of war", further asserting that "the feeling of Peace is, thus, a postulate of Women".[31]

In the halls of Itamaraty, consul Leontina Cardoso published an opinion piece in 1938 assessing the delicate situation in Europe and how expansionist Germany could eventually turn its gaze towards the American continent. In light of this, Cardoso saw the "educated woman" as one of the forces – along with Pope Pio XI and Franklin D. Roosevelt – working against Hitler's advance, using powerful, "spiritual weapons".[32] As women were often victims of the

[28] Brazilian women were also not allowed in the Armed Forces. About this issue, see Marques (2016a).
[29] Rachel Crotman, "Colaboração feminina na construção da paz", *Diário de Notícias,* December 20, 1931, p. 21.
[30] Amelia Duarte, "As mulheres na diplomacia", *Correio da Manhã*, September 4, 1936, p. 6.
[31] "O almoço oferecido a S. Exa. e à Sra. Macedo Soares pela Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino", *Jornal do Commercio*, July 6, 1935, p. 3.
[32] Leontina Licinio Cardoso, "Progresso Feminino", *Diário de Notícias,* October 16, 1938, p. 3.

"violent means employed by men to solve international conflicts", Cardoso had high expectations that women could help obtain the "distant ideal of universal peace", being "unconditionally pacifist" and marked by the "conciliatory spirit".[33] Another consul Beata Vettori similarly thought that women had "a spontaneous aversion to any idea of war", because of a "maternal sentiment" or "for reasons of human solidarity". In light of this, Vettori believed that women in diplomacy would be a "great defender of universal harmony".[34]

This essentialist view of women's advantages, however, would lose the narrative battle for women's participation in foreign service. Enloe's (2004) perspective that the "international is personal" comes to life here, as governments seemed to mostly fear potential damages to their country's honor and prestige if a woman was sent as foreign representative, as she supposedly embodied less-valued feminine characteristics. A prevalent justification against women would be "on the practical difficulties of making use of their talents", usually because they might not be well received in host countries and would have a hard time executing their jobs in predominantly hostile and male spaces (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 300). Additionally, as personal as it gets, the constant mention of marriage and the situation of husbands suggests that the apprehension against women diplomats seems to be more strongly related to fears and anxieties around disturbing society's gender hierarchy than to perceptions on women's supposed peacefulness and non-aggressiveness.

Therefore, not only was the diplomatic career undergoing an identity change domestically as well as internationally – more masculinized – but the Itamaraty decision to prohibit women in 1938 also needs to be understood as part of a wider process of problematizing sexual divisions of labor and the role of women in public spheres, in its variety of meanings, as we discuss below.

1.2 Public/Private dichotomies in diplomacy

For this research, based on the literature consulted and on the primary sources collected, we propose a categorization of the justifications used at the time against women's participation in diplomacy, which also considers the discussion of the previous chapter on sexual division of labor and public/private dichotomies. Dichotomies are widely used in classical theories of International Relations, and have been criticized by feminists IR scholars as hierarchical and as highly gendered binary oppositions, usually associating the less-desirable concepts with

[33] "O sentimentalismo exuberante das mulheres ante a fria discrição da diplomacia", *Diário da Noite*, February 9, 1935, p. 1.
[34] Ibid.

femininity, as in the cases: realist/*idealist*, power/*weakness*, sovereignty/*anarchy*, and self-help/*dependency* (TICKNER, 2001, p. 34).

Based on the justifications given to define women's supposed incompatibility with diplomacy, the first and main understanding of the public/private dichotomy affecting foreign service at this time would give it the corresponding meaning of international/national. The first paragraph of the Brazilian CFSPC study of women's admission into the diplomatic corps clarified that women's collaboration in public service was not at stake and their rights were fully guaranteed in the national arena; the situation, according to the document, was different in "specialized services" carried out abroad, such as those of the diplomatic and consular careers.[35] The translated British report presented as part of the CFSPC study also noted that the foreign service was "profoundly different" from any other public service position.[36] In light of this special aspect of diplomacy, in which one individual was responsible for representing the entirety of a country's image, justifications against women's participation included perceptions that female representatives would be impeded to exercise their duties abroad efficiently because of social prejudices and their supposed mental and physical fragilities, consequently risking bilateral relations.

Nonetheless, not all women were excluded from acting as country's representatives internationally. Understanding the public/private dichotomy in a context of masculine/feminine spaces of sociability, certain women would be allowed to engage in international politics in discussions involving feminine or "women's issues". Masculine spaces of diplomatic interaction – cigar lounges, golf courses, etc. – and masculine topics such as disarmament, security or economics continued to be restricted to men. At the same time, many women thrived, either as informal or official country delegates, in international movements and conferences mostly dealing with issues associated with femininity.

The final categorization of justifications explores the public/private dichotomy as celibacy/marriage. The logical incompatibility between being a female diplomat and a wife was persistently and vigorously reminded, and foreign services would implement either a formal or an implicit marriage ban for those women who insisted in joining diplomatic corps. It is impossible to overlook that women would be allowed to serve internationally as diplomats only when they were stripped off of the main aspect that defined them as women in that society: marriage and children. Only as single women they were allowed to act publicly in the name of

[35] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1.
[36] Ibid., p. 17.

their country – alternatively, they could be diplomatic wives, a highly valued, unpaid, asset in diplomatic circles.

These three categorizations – international/national, masculine/feminine, and celibacy/marriage – guide the remaining of the chapter, with each section presenting an in-depth discussion of the justifications given against women's presence in foreign affairs. As we explore why it was generally understood that the term "female diplomat" was an "oxymoron", as proposed by Neumann (2008, p. 677), the reasoning behind this belief could be cleverly summarized as follows:

> "Foreign Office chiefs referred to women's incapacity for clear, unbiased thought, to the disruptive effects of their presence upon the smooth functioning of the (male) embassy workforce, to their 'natural' desire for marriage and motherhood, and to the horrified reception they would face from foreign officials when posted overseas" (McCARTHY, SOUTHERN, 2017, p. 26).

1.3 Female pioneers

Brazilian diplomat Guilherme Friaça (2018) has conducted a thorough research on the 100 years of female presence in Itamaraty, recovering a large volume of original archival documents and collecting a number of oral testimonials from diplomats, family members and government officials, to tell the most comprehensive story of the lives of these Brazilian women diplomats to date. A large portion of his book was dedicated to the personal and professional paths of what he called the "Group of 20", representing the 20 first women who joined Itamaraty between 1918 and 1945 (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 50).[37] Considering that the majority of these women passed examinations in the 1930s, prior to the 1938 prohibition, Friaça's accounts of their lives are explored in this chapter, as they serve both to reinforce and contradict the stereotypes and expectations of the time.

Amidst the "Group of 20", Friaça (2018) found biographies "that preserve greater coincidences than expected", resonating largely with our findings (p. 296). The first coincidence was that many of these women were responsible for the financial sustenance of their families, including caring for mothers, sisters or their own children (ibid., p. 256). As we discussed in the last chapter, the social perception at the time saw female labor usually as a temporary activity during singlehood to provide extra money for women's hobbies and luxuries, which seems far from the truth for these Itamaraty employees. The second coincidence was the

[37] Friaça divided the remaining years of female presence in Itamaraty into two additional groups. One was the "Second Generation", which included women admitted between 1953 – when they were allowed back into the diplomatic career – and 1988; and the "New Generation" group, embracing women diplomats nominated once Brazil transitioned back to democracy after the military dictatorship and the new 1988 Constitution (2018, p. 50).

frequency of celibacy, which was the case of 14 women of the "Group of 20" (ibid., p. 296-297). Concomitantly, women diplomats who did marry had their trajectories "marked by acts that denote a clear priority to the married and family life", resulting that "all had losses in their career" because of that choice, something observed in other foreign services as well (ibid., p. 298). The final coincidence was the consequent sexual division of tasks and divisions within Itamaraty that began to occur once women joined it (ibid., p. 299).

These aspects are further discussed along the chapter, as they relate to the discussions on dichotomies we presented above. Nonetheless, the path of the first woman to register for and pass the Itamaraty examinations in 1918 exemplifies almost all of the barriers women faced as diplomats in the early years, also illustrating many of the justifications that were later used to prohibit women's access in 1938. Maria José de Castro Rebello Mendes, a native of Bahia state, initially moved to Rio de Janeiro after her father's death in search of better economic conditions to support her ill mother (FARIAS, 2017, p. 41; FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 63). When registrations opened for the position of Secretariat official in Itamaraty, Mendes apparently consulted Ruy Barbosa – one of the most significant Brazilian politicians and a family acquaintance – regarding the legal possibility of women's application, to which Barbosa saw no incapacities (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 64).[38] Minister of Foreign Relations Nilo Peçanha (1917-1918) hesitated to affirm that "women [could] perform successfully in diplomacy, where so many attributes of discretion and competence are required", but he refrained from denying Mendes the right to sit at the exams, letting them determine whether she was apt. However, Peçanha indicated that it would be better, "certainly, for their prestige", if women remained at home, because of the "disillusions" of public life (ibid., p. 61-62).

Maria José Mendes became the first female public servant appointed from public examinations, the only woman amidst 235 Itamaraty male employees, and her move opened the doors of public service jobs to all women (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 76-77). Surrounded by press attention, she claimed she was not a feminist and indeed agreed with Nilo Peçanha that it would be better to remain at home, but this was impossible as she could not rely on a father or husband for financial sustenance. Her decision to apply for Itamaraty's exams "was a conscious effort to improve her 'reputation' and have a 'respectful' life", considering she previously worked as a private tutor traveling alone throughout the city (FARIAS, 2017, p. 43; FRIAÇA, 2018, p.

[38] Friaça (2018) commented that he could not find Barbosa's response in the archives, but the support to Mendes' cause became a famous event and is often referenced, including by Mendes' husband and children. See, for instance: Saffioti (2013, p. 361); Lutz, B. [1924] AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, PIN.TXT.10, p. 4; FBPF to Oswaldo Aranha, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 2; H. Pinheiro de Vasconcellos, "Uma carta de um funcionário do Ministério das Relações Exteriors", *A Noite*, January 22, 1931, p. 7.

68-69). Mendes eventually married an Itamaraty colleague in 1922, and, as her position as Secretariat official did not allow international allocation, she soon after requested a one year leave without pay to accompany her husband to the German Consulate of Bremen. As an Itamaraty employee, Mendes had five children and was initially offered a medical leave without pay for her first pregnancy. As would be the case for many other women, she had to demand a legal reconsideration to guarantee her due remuneration and benefits (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 80-81).

In 1931, the Mello Franco Reform in Itamaraty abolished the Secretariat official position and Maria José Mendes was transferred to the consular career, which gave the married couple the expectations of finally being able to serve together abroad. Unfortunately, because women consuls were only allowed to serve abroad for a period of 12 months, Itamaraty's legal advisors proposed that either Mendes take a leave without pay to accompany her husband for a longer period or the husband should choose to remain in Rio de Janeiro, "depriving the country of his services abroad", which he did until 1934 (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 82-83).[39] In Friaça's (2018) interviews with Mendes' daughters, they affirmed that their mother would end being "forced by Itamaraty to solicit her retirement" in order to join her husband at the Embassy in Brussels in 1934. Considering that some foreign services around the world had an explicit marriage ban for women, and that they often resigned after marriage even in countries without that rule, Mendes' 16-year career could be considered a success, even as she did not serve abroad on her own account. Unfortunately, after two years in Brussels the family returned to Brazil because of Mendes' health. She died in late 1936 (ibid., p. 80-83).

The presence of women in diplomacy worldwide was not a regular practice during the interwar years, although most countries began appointing them for foreign posts during this time. Itamaraty admitted its first woman four years before Lucile Atcherson became the first U.S. woman accepted as Foreign Service officer (CALKIN, 1978, chapter 4). Between Atcherson's entrance in 1922 and 1930, only six other women were nominated diplomats, and by 1931, there were only two active female officers – two resigned after getting married, one for health issues, and another for a broadcasting job opportunity.[40] In the 1930s, "no additional women passed the entrance examination", although there were a few transfers from the Department of Commerce and two non-career women were politically appointed by Franklin

[39] The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro would list both Mendes and her husband working together at Itamaraty's Map Library office in 1933 (Embassy to Dept of State, August 16, 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, M1472, Roll 11, 832.021/41).
[40] Herbert Wright, "Can a Woman be a Diplomat?", *The North American Review*, v. 248, n. 1, Autumn 1939, p. 100.

D. Roosevelt as ambassador to Denmark and Norway (NASH, 2016). The Soviet Union is recognized as the pioneer in nominating a woman for a leadership diplomatic position, with Alexandra Kollontai appointed as Head of Mission to Oslo in 1923, followed by the Chilean Olga de la Barra as vice-consul to Glasgow in 1927 (WILKINS, 2015, p. 115).[41] Brazil sent the first woman abroad to the Consulate in Paris in 1928 and the first woman consul left for Liverpool in 1934. The first Brazilian woman diplomat to reach the highest rank of the diplomatic career was the anti-communist Odette de Carvalho e Souza in 1956, who was at the time in Portugal and claimed to be the first career ambassador in the world (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 197, 200). This would precede in two decades the appointment of the first British woman ambassador, sent to Copenhagen only in 1976.[42] Table 4 below compiles a list of first women in a variety of countries.

A 1937 report produced for the League of Nations collected information on women's legal and political situation in 45 countries, highlighting the exceptional character of female participation in international diplomacy.[43] In the question relating to the presence of women in diplomatic and consular services, only five countries responded positively at that moment – Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and the United States – whereas other 13 countries had appointed at some point women delegates for international meetings at the League of Nations or at other international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization.[44] In spite of the apparent progressiveness of the American continent at this time – as the only region with countries allowing female diplomats – British ambassadors in Brazil and Argentina expressed the feeling that "feminists were not taken seriously in Latin America" (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 303). In France, on the other hand, the national press noted the country's conservatism in face of a perceived foreign modernism, particularly from the American continent where women seemed to have a greater "privilege". Beyond the five countries listed in the League of Nations

[41] SOUTHERN, J. "Woman and the Foreign Office", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 20, 2018, p. 13

[42] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 14.

[43] Société des Nations, "Statut de La Femme", August 24, 1937, AHI, DT-SPI, Code 602.63(04), Lata 970, Maço 15402. This report is most likely part of the League's effort in creating the Committee to Study the Legal Status of Women, to "undertake in-depth research on the legal, political, social and economic status of women around the world", which met officially between 1938 and 1939, before being suspended because of World War II (MACFADYEN et al., 2019, p. 270).

[44] The 13 countries were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Spain, France, India, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

report, the French press also mentioned Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay as countries accepting women as foreign representatives (MARBEAU, 2004, p. 44).[45]

Table 4 – Pioneer Women in Diplomacy, globally.

First Woman	Country	First Female Ambassador
1918 – accepted into Ministry	Brazil (prohibition 1938-1954)	1956 – career diplomat
1922 – accepted into Ministry	United States	1933 – politically appointed
1923 – sent overseas	USSR	1923 – politically appointed
1927 – sent overseas	Chile	--
1928 – accepted into Ministry	Ecuador	1987 – career diplomat
1930 – accepted into Ministry	France (prohibition 1931-1945)	1972 – career diplomat
1932 – accepted into Ministry	Turkey (prohibited from serving abroad 1934-1957)	1982 – career diplomat
1933 – sent overseas	Spain	1933 – politically appointed
1935 – sent overseas	Mexico	1935 – politically appointed
1939 – accepted into Ministry	Norway	1975 – career diplomat
1946 – accepted into Ministry	United Kingdom	1976 – career diplomat
1947 – accepted into Ministry	The Netherlands	--
1947 – accepted into Ministry	Canada	1958 – career diplomat
1948 – accepted into Ministry	Sweden	1955 – politically appointed
1949 – accepted into Ministry	Japan	1980 – politically appointed

Source: Based on Aggestam and Towns (2018b, p. 7), with additional information from: Calkin (1978); Huck (1999); Denéchère (2004); Wilkins (2015); Añazco Defaz (2018); Farias and Carmo (2018); Flowers (2018); Niklasson and Robertson (2018); Rumelili and Suleymanoglu-Kurum (2018); Erlandsson (2019); "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999; SOUTHERN, J. "Woman and the Foreign Office", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *History Notes* 20, 2018.

2 The International/National dichotomy

The study conducted by Brazilian authorities on the issue of women's admissions into the diplomatic career and the three letters of protest received from consuls and feminists seemed to indicate that the debate initially was on whether women should be allowed to serve overseas,

[45] For this research, we have found only tangential mentions to women diplomats from Uruguay, Nicaragua and Canada, but nothing substantial enough to confirm veracity. See: Aggestam and Towns (2018b, p. 7) and Calkin (1978, p. 10).

on the "convenience or not of the designation of [women] to exercise their duties abroad".[46] When the Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (FBPF) wrote to Minister Oswaldo Aranha in June 1938 – four months before the official prohibition – the organization asked the Ministry to maintain the rights already granted to women, in light of rumors that the upcoming reform would bring a restriction to women "aiming her representation abroad".[47] Aranha, in his response, explained that, domestically, women's participation in public service was unquestionable, but if "inside our frontiers, women's aspirations have expanded, […] in positions of representation abroad, they still could not overcome existing obstacles".[48]

Women employees, therefore, were not undesired in its totality, only on the activity that represented the political function of the Ministry, the representation of Brazilian interests internationally. This function was designated as the one that made Itamaraty a unique department within the Brazilian public administration, and the foreign service as essentially distinct from domestic public service.[49] According to Farias (2017), working at the Secretariat in Rio de Janeiro "would resemble the private and closed world of the house" and would be acceptable for women, whereas a "different social code dominated posts abroad" (p. 46). Ultimately it was decided that the most convenient way to deal with the dilemma of the suitability of women as foreign representatives was to prohibit their entrance to the diplomatic career altogether. Bertha Lutz and FBPF later called this prohibition an "unexpected blow", claiming it was the first time, since Brazil's independence, that in a "legislative text there is an explicit restriction to women's rights", associating the *Estado Novo* regime "to the most retrogrades states of the Old World".[50]

The uncertainty of using women as foreign representatives would also be shared by other foreign services at the time. The British Commission originally established in 1933 to assess the convenience of women's admission into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) emphasized that it was not questioning women's competence – instead, they wondered whether female participation in the diplomatic corps would bring advantages to the state.[51] Recently-formed Turkey, for instance, allowed the entrance of women in 1932, only to prohibit their allocation in foreign posts two years later. Because of this, the first Turkish female

[46] Consuls to Oswaldo Aranha, "Memorial", July 1, 1938, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.13, Lata 866, Maço 13096.
[47] FBPF to Oswaldo Aranha, June 21, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 1.
[48] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 2.
[49] Luís Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, "Breve exposição dos trabalhos do CFSPC", [1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 14; CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 25.
[50] FBPF to Oswaldo Aranha, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 1, 3.
[51] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 7.

diplomat, Adile Ayda, resigned in protest and only returned when the directive was lifted in 1957 (RUMELILI, SULEYMANOGLU-KURUM, 2018, p. 91). Similarly, in France, Suzanne Borel became the first woman to pass the diplomatic exam in 1930, but had her career immediately restricted to domestic posts, and was also prevented from accessing the political positions within the Quai d'Orsay (MARBEAU, 2004, p. 53).[52] The following year, the French Ministry decided to close its doors once again to women under justifications of economic constraints, only allowing them back after France's liberation from Germany (ibid., p. 55). In the United States, after the first woman was accepted into the Foreign Service in 1922, career diplomats suggested to keep her located in Washington "as long as possible and then appointing her to a post, such as in Scandinavia, which would prove the least embarrassing and difficult for her" (CALKIN, 1978, p. 88).

Using the justification that nominating women to foreign posts would cause "harm to the greater efficiency of their representation abroad, creating embarrassments to their own government and to those of other nations, with no benefit to the interests of the State", Oswaldo Aranha condoned the common vision shared in the international system at the time, which questioned "whether the normal women, admitted in identical conditions, is as efficient as the normal men".[53] As a consequence of a diffuse supposition that the "representation of national interests abroad is the only career for which women are totally unsuited", according to a British ambassador in Persia in 1945, women were judged as inapt to diplomacy because of their presumed incapacity to obtain respect (apud McCARTHY, 2009, p. 286).

The Brazilian CFSPC study included a document translated from the British FCO's report that presented a summary of arguments both in favor of and against women's admission to the diplomatic career, which is compiled in Table 5. The conclusions presented in this document explained that four members of the British Commission voted in favor of women's exclusion, two opted for an experimental period, and the two female members voted for women's admission.[54] The final decision, however, maintained their exclusion.

[52] Suzanne Borel married a diplomat colleague at the end of World War II and resigned from the diplomatic career, but she would be one of (if not) the only early female diplomats to write a memoir about her experiences and perceptions. See: Bidault (1972).
[53] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21; CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 17.
[54] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 19.

Table 5 – Arguments on women's admission to the diplomatic career, according to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Commission, 1936.

Arguments in favor of women's admission	Arguments against women's admission
Women are allowed to access public service positions regardless of sex.	Question whether women can be as efficient in the "specific conditions" of the foreign service.
Women have worked in similar positions, "amongst others for which they were previously judged incapable".	Different costumes, opinions and religions in other countries, complicating women's abilities to do their job and impairing foreign missions.
Women have worked in positions at the League of Nations.	Women's presence would cause difficulties in personnel relations, due to the intimate character of foreign missions' work.
Possibility of obtaining "the best elements" for the Foreign Service, widening the "recruitment field".	"The normal woman" would not be physically resistant to the different environments to which diplomats are subjected.
Women diplomats could "verify feminine or feminist influences" in foreign countries, in addition to possessing "certain qualities of tact and intuition peculiar to their sex".	Women would not be able to be sent to any location, creating a "privileged class", serving only on the most comfortable posts.
Women already served as diplomats in other foreign services, with "good performances".	The type of services women would be "more apt to perform", social and philanthropic, were already secured by wives and daughters of diplomats.
Exclusion of women would be based "in part on prejudices, in part on fear of innovations".	Women's entrance would cause initial "disturbance and inefficiency" that was not worth the effort.

Source: CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 16-19.

Even as some "more advanced" nations already experimented with female representatives abroad, such as the United States, the CFSPC study looked to the British for inspiration, which was "always at the forefront of feminine achievements" but it still did not accept women in its foreign service.[55] Brazilian diplomat Maurício Nabuco discussed the difference between being a Brazilian or a British diplomat, saying that the latter would always be well-received anywhere for the simple fact of being from England, whereas representatives from "newer countries are […] tolerated despite their nationalities and only when gifted of exceptional personal qualities".[56] Such perceptions imply that countries like Brazil needed extra care in its choice of foreign representatives. Here we recall a discussion from the previous chapter in which the British Civil Service seemed to exert greater influence in Brazilian public administrators when the issue involved personnel recruitment, particularly for its elitist and excluding aspects.[57] Brazilian female consuls, who appear to not have seen the CFSPC study, still learned that the British report might have "certain influence" on Itamaraty's "bosses",

[55] Ibid., p. 3.
[56] NABUCO, M. *Reflexões e Reminiscências.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2001, p. 33.
[57] "Serviço Civil Britânico", *Revista do Serviço Público*, v. III, n. 1, July 1938.

protesting that, in the case of Brazil, the rights to women had already been granted and it would be unfair to remove them now.[58]

2.1 Prejudice and distrust

The first problem presented by the CFSPC study to justify women's exclusion was that women "are not accepted in every country in perfect equal grounds as we wished".[59] Every Brazilian justification started from the premise that international affairs was a hostile and prejudiced environment to women diplomats. Sending women to serve overseas represented, ultimately, a risk: a risk for the country to be represented, as women would not be capable of exercising their duty efficiently facing a number of possible hostilities; and a risk to bilateral relations, in exposing the host country to a situation understood as uncomfortable.[60] Additionally, women, especially if single or away from their husbands, would fail to obtain respect internationally because moving "across oceans and continents unattended" clashed "with traditional notions of proper virtue" (FARIAS, 2017, p. 44).

In Oswaldo Aranha's response to FBPF in July 1938, before the final October decision, he indicated as one of the main "existing obstacles" to female representation abroad a presumed unpleasantness and "social prejudices" from other countries. According to Aranha, the Brazilian experience with women consuls overseas had produced embarrassments both to Brazil – with a supposed repercussion "on the ground of ridicule" in the Buenos Aires press – and to the host countries, because they "do not welcome such designations, although they accept them out of courtesy".[61] The CFSPC study also highlighted that not every government "will have due appreciation for the representative if it is a *Ministra*", exposing the woman to "mockery and ridicule".[62] This same apprehension was shown by the British government, which believed that "local sentiment" would be very different if a woman were sent as the British Head of Mission to that country, which might be considered "ridiculous" or interpreted as an "unfriendly act" by the host government.[63] A British ambassador in Berlin said that, in

[58] Consuls to Oswaldo Aranha, "Memorial", July 1, 1938, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.13, Lata 866, Maço 13096, p. 2.
[59] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1.
[60] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21.
[61] Ibid., p. 3.
[62] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1.
[63] Ibid., p. 18.

Germany, the appointment of a woman would be "implied as a lack of respect" or as a "sign of liberalist decadence", resulting in a "great handicap in the discharge of her duties".[64]

Because diplomacy's success depended on representatives being "well accepted" in host countries, unwelcomed women would have their utility "sensibly diminished", being "doomed to fail" in their duty and possibly harming "the influence of diplomatic missions accredited to those countries".[65] In light of distinct "social habits, [and] political and religious concepts", argued by the British Commission's report and replicated almost *ipsis litteris* by the CFSPC study, women diplomats would not be appreciated and all of their work, just as the country's representation abroad, would be hindered because of "embarrassments in the engagement of social relations and all others [relations]".[66]

In the United Kingdom, conditions for women to become diplomats were particularly unfavorable, as they were only allowed into the FCO in 1946 – with the war being a crucial factor in changing the mindset around female participation (McCARTHY, 2009). The British Commission in 1933 collected testimonials from British representatives abroad that reflected an "unenthusiastic" view of the issue, receiving few favorable responses, but most of them opposing "chiefly on the grounds that local conditions would not allow such an innovation".[67] The responses mentioned the difficulties women would find in "cultures unaccustomed to women holding positions of authority", as the female representative was potentially in contact with individuals intolerants to "the influence of modern ideas about women's situation".[68] As a result, women could become "an object of derision" and negatively affect "the prestige of His Majesty's Government abroad and the respect which the opinions and influence of [the government] at present command in international relations" (apud McCARTHY, 2009, p. 301).

In the United States, a year before the first woman joined the foreign service in 1922, a general-consul expressed the belief that women could cause "inconvenience and embarrassment" and "bring the whole arrangement into ridicule [and] destroy her usefulness", because "inevitably they would fail to command in the foreign communities […] that respect

---

[64] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 28.
[65] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 7, 18, 26.
[66] The British report stated that different "costumes, political opinions and religious beliefs" would make women's representation abroad complicated, whereas the CFSPC report wrote about "social habits, political and religious concepts" (CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1 and 17-18).
[67] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 7.
[68] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 21.

without which they could not effectively discharge their duties" (CALKIN, 1978, p. 60). Head of the Consular Service Wilbur Carr also noted in 1924 that a female foreign officer "would find herself hopelessly handicapped in the sense that she would be unable to overcome the practical disabilities which her sex would impose upon her […] in the face of adverse customs and social restrictions" (apud CALKIN, 1978, p. 68). The Department of State sent in 1930 a set of instructions to its diplomatic officers affirming that the establishment and cultivation of contacts was a "major function" of diplomacy abroad, as fostering "feelings of mutual confidence" was a "matter of first importance" to the "protection and furtherance of American interests". Diplomats who failed in this activity were compared to a mere message-carrier "clerk", a job that could be done "by lower salaried and less important persons".[69] The successful execution of a diplomat's job, therefore, required differentiating it from a job that, at the time, was mostly executed by women.

In light of all the social difficulties women could encounter, usually for reasons beyond her control and therefore impossible to be managed, the conclusion was that women's success as diplomats and consuls would be equally impractical. The general interests of the state would be at risk because of an interest understood as particular to women. Women's presence abroad "would threaten to compromise" the state's efficiency, "in order to answer only to the interests of a number, by the way limited, of capable women".[70] For Brazil, this could also compromise the ongoing modernization process that sought a specific international participation to promote national development.

2.2 Feminine fragilities

Constructing social meaning on existing biological differences between male and female bodies, one of the arguments defended that "unfavorable or unhealthy" climatic conditions, such as extreme weather – too hot, under British perspective – or high altitudes, would affect disproportionally the already inferior feminine resistance, because "the normal woman is not physically capable of enduring well life in such conditions".[71] However, the United Kingdom is known for historically allowing women to act overseas as social workers, teachers and nurses in the missionary field, but weather conditions were never used as an impediment for those workers, as well as for female clerks that already worked in foreign

[69] Dept of State, "Contacts - Making and Maintenance of", January 25, 1930, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 274, 120.2/17, p. 1.
[70] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 5, 25-27.
[71] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 7, 19.

locations or diplomatic wives that were expected to accompany their husbands across the globe (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 294, 306; WOOD, 2015, p. 5; CALKIN, 1978, p. 54). This argument also did not consider the women that already lived, survived and worked everywhere in the planet. For the Brazilian scholar Saffioti (2013), the use of "irrational" criteria, such as "physical weakness" or "emotional instability", was a frequent strategy to preserve the idea that women's jobs were subsidiary and to defend supposedly higher moral values associated to domesticity and motherhood (p. 330).

The justifications that assumed women's physical fragility had the purpose to raise awareness that the work of a consular or diplomatic representative abroad was not as glamorous as rumored. The tasks of a diplomat were varied, extenuating and irregular, involving delicate and even dangerous situations, in addition to unconventional working hours. British documents affirmed that women would have to endure severe preoccupations and pressures, low dignity and undefined tasks, isolation, loneliness, lack of comfort, as well as interact with "angry business men" and people "of every rank, race and color".[72] In some instances, female employees would have to circulate around the city in late hours, when local people "might be inclined to assault or rob her".[73]

The perception was, according to the CFSPC report, that diplomatic and consular activities were not "the most adequate to the physical constitution of women", and female's supposed inherent fragility would inhibit them to act in a concrete and effective way "when in contact with the public".[74] However, the anecdotes shared about a diplomat's life did not paint an interesting picture even for a man, who some remembered were also "unlikely to venture into dangerous places alone", but their suitability for the job was not questioned (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 306). The worldview presented in the British Commission report also indicate an eminently colonialist understanding of other countries. Whereas the U.K. recognized the advances that British women had conquered domestically, that was considered "irrelevant" for their potential work as diplomats because abroad they would interact with people from "all classes", in "less advanced" countries that did not have the same social standards as England (ibid., p. 300). Curiously, Oswaldo Aranha used a similar argument in his response to FBPF, glorifying the Brazilian domestic position of allowing women in public service, and lamenting

[72] Ibid., p. 20; "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 28, 8.
[73] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 29.
[74] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 2.

the existing obstacles abroad, "despite our efforts to eliminate them" – with no indication of what those efforts had been.[75]

Further expanding on the British colonial perspective, another difficulty for women were diplomatic missions in countries "semi-civilized or subjected to frequent disturbances of order", when women and children were traditionally the first to be evacuated. In such cases, "it is not possible to admit that a woman [consul] would stay in her post while other women would search for shelter", putting the female diplomat in a dilemma between protecting herself, because of her supposed fragility, and staying and fulfilling her duty.[76] Because of this, a British male official believed men were "simply better placed to deal with civil wars, revolutions and natural disasters" than women (apud McCARTHY, 2009, p. 301).

However, experiences showed that women indeed performed quite well under disturbances that happened not in "semi-civilized" countries, but in Europe during World War II. Brazilian consul Zorayma Rodrigues, head of the Consulate in Liverpool at the time, was praised in the Brazilian press for "fully complying with [her] duty", particularly when the Consulate, apparently destroyed, saw "its personnel, led by a lady, […] exposed to all dangers to save the archives held there" (apud FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 93). U.S. Women's Bureau representative Mary Cannon, in one of her speeches on Brazilian women, shared a tale of "the heroism of the woman consular officer in Liverpool who went alone to the office at 3 o'clock in the morning during one of the early bombings to make safe the essential papers".[77] Similarly, U.S. ambassador to Norway Florence Harriman stayed her post even after the German invasion in 1940, promptly communicating news about the situation to Washington, which later granted her an acclaimed photo in *Life* magazine (NASH, 2016, p. 227).

In spite of that, the understanding that women had a lower physical resistance combined with the inherent difficulties of certain posts led the CFSPC study to argue that women would, in the end, be limited to the best and most comfortable posts, creating a system of female favoritism – against efforts to base public administration under merit-based criteria.[78] The idea of women employees becoming a "privileged class" because of the physical and social limitations of certain posts mirrored the British Commission report, which claimed that this

[75] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 2.
[76] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 22.
[77] Mary M. Cannon, "Women in Brasil", October 1943, NARA, RG 86, GR 1919-1952, Cannon, Mary (1943), Box 3, p. 4.
[78] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 2.

favoritism would entail "certain perturbation and inefficiency" in the British foreign service, ultimately hindering the rotativity system and creating injustices to male diplomats.[79]

In response to such concerns, ten Brazilian female consuls in activity in Rio de Janeiro signed a memorandum defending that, as they were subjected to the same examinations as their male colleagues, it was an "absurd" injustice *to women* to not "enjoy the same advantages, or that, proved their efficiency, to be treated […] in an inferior manner". They believed that merit-based criteria should prevail in allocating diplomats, both men and women, to legations abroad, identifying, for each employee, "the most compatible posts to each person's moral suitability, competence and special aptitudes". Based on the experience they viewed as positive from Brazilian women consuls overseas, they claimed that individuals with the right skills would conquer their posts through merit, also considering that, in reality, "not <u>all</u> employees can serve with equal efficiency in <u>all</u> posts".[80] Oswaldo Aranha, however, was charged with saying to Bertha Lutz that if she and her FBPF colleagues were to ask "the women employees [at Itamaraty] if they want to serve overseas, [she] would see that they do not want to". According to Lutz' memories, FBPF responded that they had indeed asked, and "out of the fifteen or sixteen [women] at the Secretariat, only one does not want to serve abroad" because she had a "person very sick in the family", which, Lutz said, could also be the case for a male diplomat.[81]

Maurício Nabuco, who believed diplomats were extremely useful for weaker countries like Brazil, stressed the importance of guaranteeing that foreign representatives were "favorably received in all environments", always respecting the "morals" of host countries. This caution involved not sending "divorced diplomats to capitals where they will be, for that reason, less welcomed". As this text is claimed to be written between the 1940s and 1950s, Nabuco ignored, either purposely or not, the discussions on whether women represented a problem for Brazilian international representation, although he did mention in a positive tone that "people of the fragile sex" had been legitimately accepted into diplomatic posts, on their own merit.[82] Most importantly, his views touched upon the fact that not every diplomat, male or female, could indeed be sent everywhere. This was not an exclusive female issue.

---

[79] Ibid., p. 8, 19.
[80] Consuls to Oswaldo Aranha, "Memorial", July 1, 1938, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.13, Lata 866, Maço 13096, Highlights from the original text.
[81] "A Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino, Movimento Feminista de 1931-1937", [n.d.], AN-FBPF, Q0.ADM, EOR.ELV.1, p. 6. According to other primary and secondary sources, we believe it might have been exaggerated to mention 15 or 16 women working at that time in the Rio de Janeiro office. In addition to the female consuls letter above, see Farias (2017, p. 48) and Friaça (2018).
[82] NABUCO, M. *Reflexões e Reminiscências.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 2001, p. 36, 49.

2.3 Women abroad: failure or success?

Minister Oswaldo Aranha claimed that the recent appointments of two Brazilian female consul to foreign posts were "proof of our attempt and goodwill", which, in his opinion, had caused "annoyances and difficulties" to the host countries. One of the reasons for embarrassments, according to Aranha, was the decision to send a woman to Liverpool, in the United Kingdom, where the female ban had been recently discussed and maintained.[83] The Brazilian CFSPC study emulated this perception of failure, discussing the "weak, if not terrible, performance of female consuls currently part of the Ministry of Foreign Relations".[84] One case seemed to be Wanda Vianna Rodrigues, who was assigned to the Brazilian Consulate in Paris in 1928 despite being only a Secretariat official, and therefore restricted to the domestic career, which would make her the first Brazilian women to serve overseas (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 85). According to Aranha, Vianna Rodrigues "never demonstrated praiseworthy qualities to serve Brazil abroad", even though she was again serving in France when Brazil transferred its representation to Vichy during World War II (ibid., p. 86). Due to a terrible illness after her return in 1941, Aranha requested her retirement with the justification that she was "infrequent at work" and "constantly on leave for treatment".[85]

In contrast to these perceptions of failure, Itamaraty's female consuls and other feminist personalities all mentioned positive aspects of Brazilian women abroad. The group of consuls wrote that there were "no complaints about their job performance, or justified reasons for discontent", whereas Rosalina Coelho Lisboa mentioned that the female representatives were not at all "diminished by comparison with male elements", and FBPF members exalted the "competence, work capacity and duty consciousness" of the female consuls working both domestically and abroad.[86] FBPF added that Zorayma Rodrigues and Beata Vettori had distinguished themselves in their foreign posts "in the absence of the respective [head] consuls".[87]

[83] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 2.
[84] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 11.
[85] Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, August 3, 1943, CPDOC-FGV, GV c 1943.08.02, p. 27.
[86] Consuls to Oswaldo Aranha, "Memorial", July 1, 1938, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.13, Lata 866, Maço 13096, p. 2; Rosalina Coelho Lisboa to Oswaldo Aranha, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1939.00.00; FBPF to Oswaldo Aranha, June 21, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 1.
[87] FBPF to Oswaldo Aranha, June 21, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 2.

Zorayma Rodrigues had been allocated to the Brazilian Consulate in Liverpool in March 1934.[88] Before her departure, she conceded an interview to *Diário de Notícias* about her expectations and concerns on being the first Brazilian woman to serve abroad as a consul, agreeing that inherent feminine qualities were compatible with diplomacy. Rodrigues expressed a certain discomfort that she should receive so much focalized attention, considering that other male colleagues were also leaving for overseas posts along with her. She believed this happened because it was uncommon to see women "conquer by their own effort the well-deserved prize", although girls were educated to "earn a living". When mentioning her pioneering feat, Rodrigues said she had no special duties as a woman and hoped to be submitted to the same rules as her male colleagues. The responsibility of being the first woman was put upon her by others, Rodrigues said, and she was aware that she should live up to these expectations, although defending that "nothing indicates that my qualities are the same as the other [women], nor if I fail, that all [women] shall have the same luck". Furthermore, Rodrigues confessed that she would "fear starting [diplomatic] life in the land of Hitler or Mussolini", believing that England would be easier since women there had guaranteed rights.[89]

Zorayma Rodrigues was later praised by Liverpool's Brazilian General-Consul as "knowledgeable of the consular service and quite zealous", in addition to "enjoying good prestige" from contacts with the city and commerce authorities. In light of Rodrigues' good work, her supervisor suggested that she take over his position as Chief after his departure, which happened in November 1938, roughly a month after Itamaraty closed its doors to new women (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 91). The Brazilian ambassador in London evaluated that, due to Rodrigues' management, the Consulate in Liverpool "functions with perfect efficiency and general satisfaction", and a British reporter was "amazed by her vivaciousness and excellent command of the English language" (ibid., p. 93; FARIAS, 2017, p. 52).

Oswaldo Aranha also claimed that the Brazilian consul in Buenos Aires had suffered a ridiculed repercussion in the Argentine press.[90] According to Friaça's (2018) research, however, newspapers seemed to portray Beatta Vettori as discrete and "charmingly feminine", which perhaps was exactly the kind of repercussion that embarrassed Aranha. Nonetheless, Vettori had arrived in Buenos Aires in March 1938 accompanied by her journalist husband and

[88] The consulate in Liverpool was once headed by Barão do Rio Branco for 17 years, between 1876 and 1893. At the time, the consulate was considered one of the most important for Brazilian commercial relations (CERVO, BUENO, 2011).
[89] Rachel Crotman, "A primeira consuleza brasileira e as impressões que leva da sua missão", *Diário de Notícias*, April 10, 1934, p. 1.
[90] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 3.

discussed with a positive outlook the participating of women in Brazilian diplomacy (p. 114-115).[91] Friaça (2018), at last, affirmed the following:

> "the reiterated compliments on the work of these professional women, the evaluations of their trajectories, and the absence of criticism on their performance should serve to balance an affirmation that, when not accompanied by evidence, can be situated in the sphere of personal irritation or of gender prejudice" (p. 155)

Internationally, the case of the first Mexican woman appointed as ambassador to Colombia in 1935, Palma Guillén, is emblematic. In post-revolutionary Mexico, women's political participation was promoted by an "egalitarian ideology" supposedly endorsed by the national government, which on one hand promoted feminists causes to project an image of progressiveness, whereas on the other showed "reluctance and hesitancy" to fully integrate Mexican women into politics – they only attained the vote in 1953 (HUCK, 1999, p. 161). Guillén's appointment, thus, was a "calculated move" to indicate a "radical departure from the traditional social order of the past" (ibid., p. 161).

Once in Colombia, the conservative Catholic press published a series of protests against the ambassador's presence in the country – calling her a "bland delegate" – and her supposed feminist and socialist stance (HUCK, 1999, p. 164; KIDDLE, 2015, p. 45). Guillén, however, would represent "at best, a moderate voice" in Mexico's feminist movement, supporting a non-aggressive and non-competitive feminism and being indifferent to the suffrage cause (HUCK, 1999, p. 163-164). Considering her lack of identification with such causes, the Colombian religious opposition seems to be less a hostility toward Guillén as a woman and more an instance against Mexico's post-revolutionary supposed progressiveness, but it still serves as confirmation that women were not easily accepted anywhere (KIDDLE, 2015, p. 45). As attempts to respond to the press did not suffice to soften Guillén's image and position in Colombia, the ambassador was relocated to Denmark in less than a year, later representing her country as a League of Nations delegate (HUCK, 1999, p. 161; KIDDLE, 2015, p. 45).

The choice of appointing a woman ambassador was indeed sometimes used as a showcase "of modernity by new and post-revolutionary states", which never seemed to be the case in Brazil (McCARTHY, SOUTHERN, 2017, p. 25). Newly-established Turkey, for instance, used the status of women domestically as a tool in international affairs to "demonstrate its new identity as a modern, Western, and civilized state", even though barriers faced by

[91] Beata Vettori would have a successful career in Itamaraty, acting in a variety of posts and two as ambassador. After almost 40 years of service, she retired in 1971, continuing to be active in international relations. See Friaça (2018), p. 117-119.

women diplomats in the country represented the patriarchal norms of Turkish society ingrained within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RUMELILI, SULEYMANOGLU-KURUM, 2018, p. 88, 91). Similarly, Alexandra Kollontai, known for being the first woman ever appointed as Head of a Mission when the Soviet Union nominated her to Oslo in 1923, was also used as "evidence of women's equality […] under Communism" (McCARTHY, SOUTHERN, 2017, p. 25). The connection between sex equality and communism was noted by the Brazilian CFSPC study as an extra disadvantage for the female cause, saying that "this advanced feminism is part of the communism program, as it is publicly known", and calling Kollontai's performance overseas as "perfectly insipid" and "completely ridiculous" in both political and social matters.[92] Communism, according to the Vargas government, was "the most dangerous enemy of the Christian civilization", possibly representing the "absolute annihilation of all Western cultural achievements".[93]

The CFSPC report mentioned three specific examples from other countries – failed, in their opinion – of women ambassadors in international politics, with Alexandra Kollontai being one of them. These failed experiences, according to the report, had been "all terminated because of ridicule, if not demoralization, of the female employees".[94] However, Kollontai had a 23-year diplomatic career, serving in Norway, the League of Nations, Mexico and Sweden, where she stayed from 1930 until 1945 (MARBEAU, 2004, p. 45). This means her service was not yet terminated when the CFSPC report was written in 1937.

The second example of failed attempts given by the CFSPC study was the case of poet Gabriela Mistral, who acted as Chilean consul in Madrid between 1933 and 1935 (WILKINS, 2015, p. 119). Chile's first attempt to appoint Mistral as consul to Italy in 1932 did not come to terms because Benito Mussolini would not accept to recognize women's legal competence to act as notaries, one of the duties of a consul (ibid., p. 118). She was welcomed as consul in Spain the following year, finding a consulate deep in economic strain that pushed her to engage her literary European network to demand a better hierarchy and stipend from the Chilean government, which granted her a promotion to career consul receiving a formal government salary (ibid., p. 120). The Brazilian CFSPC report affirmed that Mistral's appointment had the sole purpose of "cultural expansion" rather than the specific functions of a consul, but it ignored

[92] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 3.
[93] VARGAS, G. "O levante comunista de 27 de novembro de 1935", January 1, 1936. In: *A Nova Política do Brasil,* vol. IV. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, p. 139.
[94] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 10.

that, besides Mistral, Chile had already appointed two women overseas, being considered one of the pioneer countries when it sent Olga de la Barra as Vice-Consul to Glasgow in 1927, and Inéz Ortúzar as Consul to Hill, Scotland, in 1928 (ibid., p. 115-116).[95]

In the last example, the CFSPC report ended up presenting an incorrect information, mixing two women ambassadors. The report said that the United States had not had a positive experience with their female ambassadorial appointment to Denmark, "Mrs. Howes", "already a grandmother", adding that she had married an official of the Danish guard and had to be administratively removed from her diplomatic post.[96] However, we found no indication of the existence of a "Mrs. Howes" in U.S. diplomacy at the time. Perhaps the report was referencing Florence Harriman, who at 67 years old – a "grandmother" – was the second U.S. politically-appointed female ambassador, nominated in 1937 to Norway. Harriman had been active in U.S. politics since Woodrow Wilson's 1912 presidential campaign, becoming an essential social and political gatherer in D.C. in the 1920s and 1930s (NASH, 2016, p. 226). On the other hand, the CFSPC report could also be indicating Ruth Bryan Owen, the first U.S. ambassador appointed in 1933, who indeed was sent to Denmark and married a Danish guard. Her post resignation in 1936, with great press attention, was attributed to a variety of factors, including her marriage, but also her participation in Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidential campaign.[97] In the end, it seems the CFSPC report confused these two women.

Both U.S. female ambassadors performed differently than expected for diplomats at the time, engaging in what Nash (2016) called "people's diplomacy", which included learning the local language, promoting "bilateral ties at multiple levels", communicating "beyond government elites", and traveling the country (p. 224-225). Owen, for instance, became the first ambassador ever to visit Greenland, whereas Harriman delighted the Norwegian press because she "so well understands our people and our country" (apud NASH, 2016, p. 226). Both women, however, found resistance to their diplomatic ways, as post colleagues reported that Owen "sought only self-promotion, […] lacked good taste, was too feminine", and Harriman "worked too little and traveled too much" (ibid., p. 225-226).

Although women diplomats acting overseas provided examples that in part contradicted the justifications presented mostly by male government officials against their presence in international diplomacy, the perceptions that women were fragile and would not be well

---

[95] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 3-4.
[96] Ibid., p. 4.
[97] "Ruth Owen quits her post as envoy: President announces her resignation to enter actively into campaign", *The New York Times*, August 31, 1936, p. 1.

accepted as representatives seemed to linger on. In spite of personal victories and success stories, women diplomats also accumulated a series of personal failures, particularly as they dared to circulate among male-dominated, or homosocial, spaces.

3 The Masculine/Feminine dichotomy

Owing to the nature of diplomatic practice, often carried out in "masculine spaces of chanceries, clubs, golf courses and less salubrious haunts where valuable information was to be had", women were assumed to be precluded from forming the necessary diplomatic relationships because they would not be "well accepted" in such social spaces (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 301).[98] Women were entering a homosocial space, defined according to Neumann (2008) as spaces that preferred same-sex company, mostly due to a history of single-sex socialization that would create a certain set of expected norms and behaviors. When women officially joined international affairs, the "homosocial male diplomat" resisted as much as possible in adapting to "heterosocial relations" (NEUMANN, 2008, p. 681).

3.1 Homosociability

Considering the predominance of men in diplomacy, the Brazilian CFSPC study presented as another justification against women's participation in Itamaraty the level of discipline and intimacy demanded from employees at posts, which was not befitting with "a lady".[99] Furthermore, the "assiduous collaboration" necessary between supervisors and subordinates in posts with little personnel was not compatible with "sex differences". The report did not explain whether the problem relates to a situation in which the supervisor would be a woman, going against society's hierarchical expectations, or because in small posts the relationships were too dependent on one another to the point of potentially threatening a woman's virtue and honor. The presence of a woman diplomat overseas, particularly if single, could also mean embarrassments, because, "forced to live alone", she would provoke "in some places, possible comments in detriment to the country's representation", an argument adapted from the British Commission report that said that a woman alone would "provoke unpleasant comments". Additionally, it was common in certain cases for single male employees to share accommodation, which would be "embarrassing for a woman".[100]

---

[98] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 5.
[99] Ibid., p. 18.
[100] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1, 18.

Frequently in diplomacy, the line that determines an interaction as professional or social is very thin and blurred, and women diplomats had to find creative ways to handle delicate situations, particularly considering that men were already accustomed to the behavioral expectations of foreign representation. Soviet ambassador Alexandra Kollontai, for instance, apparently confided to a colleague that she preferred to arrange lunches, rather than dinner, with male colleagues with whom she had to do business.[101] Lucile Atcherson, first U.S. female diplomat, when posted in Switzerland, arranged "temporary absences" from her post in order to comply with her supervisor's idea that "in certain circumstances, having no American representation at a social function would be preferable to representation by an American women" (WOOD, 2015, p. 7). Neumann (2008) recalled that one Norwegian female ambassador he interviewed would, after official dinners, join the ladies instead of her male diplomat colleagues in social interactions. Once the other women in the room realized she was an ambassador, they would put her in contact with their husbands, usually politicians and diplomats (p. 686). This meant, for Neumann (2008), that some female diplomats would self-ascribe a "role hierarchy: woman first, diplomat next" (p. 687).

In the United States, the Head of the Consular Service also expressed apprehension that women representatives would not be able to properly execute their jobs because much of the diplomat's work depended on "what they do when out of the office", usually gathering relevant information by "mingling freely […] either in clubs, general social or business circles" (WOOD, 2015, p. 5-6). As observed by Niklasson (2020), the problem seemed to be that women would not "have access to every type of contact" because of their sex and thus natural exclusion from homosocial spaces (p. 14). Nonetheless, the author argued that male diplomats also did not have access to every social circle, but in their case this puzzle could be solved by employing their wives as "another pair of eyes and ears" in information-gathering (ibid.).

Mentions of women's physical appearance and femininity were also strategies used to undermine women's presence in homosocial spaces. According to Soihet (1997), praising women's sensibility does not only exclude them from rationality, with implicit political intentions, but also illustrates a "modality of violence" (p. 16). To help reinforce ideals of masculinity, women needed to fulfill their "truly feminine" roles accordingly, including through physical attributes and proper behavior (MOSSE, 1996, p. 74). A male British Ambassador in Switzerland, for instance, "put it bluntly" saying that a "clever woman would not be liked and the attractive woman would not be taken seriously". This corroborates Alexandra Kollontai's

[101] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 9.

experience as ambassador in Sweden in the 1930s, when she was described by her male British counterpart as "very feminine and quite remarkably intelligent" – feminine did not necessarily mean attractive, and we can only speculate whether she was liked.[102]

In the Brazilian press, a Portuguese former male ambassador, who believed in a woman's capacity to become an "effective agent for world peace", wrote that he saw as a fundamental condition that "the diplomatic career be rigorously prohibited to ugly women". [103] As another journalist pointed out, a pretty woman diplomat alone and "without self-defense" abroad could potentially be forced or persuaded to exchange favors for "little kisses".[104] In light of this, Brazilian lawyer Amelia Duarte said that men feared employing female diplomats because they could spark "intrigues and passions" that would hinder their work effectiveness.[105] This line of argument, however, was not regularly used officially.

3.2 Feminine spaces

We discussed in the previous chapter the feminization of certain office positions that resulted in limitations for women's careers and in hierarchical degradation of positions occupied predominantly by female workers. Once women employees began circulating professionally within Itamaraty's ranks, there also was an identification of certain spaces as masculine or feminine, with women – the "strange element" – confined to a "subterritory" and segregated to "functions considered feminine", while men held the "more complex tasks" (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 299-300). According to Friaça's (2018) study, the first 20 women admitted to Itamaraty were mostly assigned to supportive and administrative activities, as well as consular, ceremonial and archival positions. Although seven of them would eventually lead embassies, merely two held positions "with capacity of political decision-making" (p. 300-301). Furthermore, some departments were sequentially managed by women diplomats, such as the Divisions of Passport, of Communications and the Archives, resulting in a feminization of these territories and implying less of a female victory and more of a "male withdrawal" (ibid., p. 301). This situation has not changed much over the decades, as scholars today have found that women continue to be "underrepresented in the most prestigious ambassador postings", but tend to be "over-represented in the less prestigious ones" (AGGESTAM, TOWNS, 2018a, p. 14).

---

[102] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 9.
[103] Julio Dantas, "A mulher diplomata", *Correio da Manhã*, April 2, 1933, p. 4.
[104] Oto Prazeres, "Consules com 'chaperon'", *Jornal do Brasil*, September 11, 1938, p. 5.
[105] Amelia Duarte, "As mulheres na diplomacia", *Correio da Manhã*, September 4, 1936, p. 6.

Another trend at the time was explained by Oswaldo Aranha, in his response to Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, indicating that women would still be appointed as international representatives even if they were not part of the diplomatic career.[106] Perhaps Aranha was referencing the frequent government appointments of Brazilian women delegates to a variety of international conferences during this time, with Coelho Lisboa being one of them as a delegate to the VIII International Conference of American States, held in Lima in December 1938.[107] The new diplomacy emerging in the interwar years, despite promoting a more masculinized diplomatic practice, also expanded the arena of international interaction and negotiation, requiring "larger diplomatic delegations and missions", opening spaces for women's participation (GARNER, 2018, p. 257). On this same topic, Herren (2016) discussed that these "turbulent" years were characterized by inconsistencies and ambivalence in how national governments used women representatives, banning them from foreign services but simultaneously employing them as delegates in international negotiations in light of their competence and expertise in certain areas (p. 183).

Brazil was a good example of this ambivalence. In a preparatory report for the 1938 Lima Conference, the author emphasized with "satisfaction" the participation of Brazilian women in inter-American women's rights efforts, in which they had an "outstanding role, which dignifies the glorious juridical culture of Brazil". Among the 16 Brazilian women listed whose action had "already transposed the national frontier" were Bertha Lutz, several of her colleagues at FBPF, female consuls, diplomatic wives and other experts in different fields, who were mostly assigned to international conferences on women's and labor rights.[108]

3.3 Feminine Spaces at the League of Nations

The League of Nations was the first international organization that guaranteed in its constitutional Charter the equal participation of men and women, stating in Article 7 that "all positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women" (apud MACFADYEN et al., 2019, p. 73). This new directive for the League's international civil servants helped to create a "new era of women's rights in

[106] Oswaldo Aranha to Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, RCL c 1938.10.00.
[107] The 1938 Lima Conference would be reported as among "the most significant ones so far", passing 110 resolutions and deciding on the collective defense of the Americas against external threats. See: Jayme de Barros Gomes, "Exposição Sucinta dos trabalhos realizados pelo Itamaraty nos últimos doze meses", October 21, 1939, AHI, DT-MRE, Code 300.1, Lata 1042, Maço 18309.
[108] José Roberto de Macedo Soares, "Relatório da Comissão Interamericana de Mulheres", September 29, 1938, AHI, MRE-Atividade Meio, Estante 135, Pasta 1, Maço 10, p. 1; Cecília Meirelles, "Trabalho Feminino", *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, n. 42, July 1939. For a comprehensive account of Bertha Lutz' inter-American feminist activism see Marques (2013) and Marino (2019).

diplomacy", offering not only maternity leave and equal salary, but ascribing a set of diplomatic privileges and immunities to all its employees that would spill-over to regulate women's international presence, which until then was surrounded by legal insecurities (MACFADYEN et al, 2019, p. 105; HERREN, 2016, p. 182). The "Geneva Spirit" of equality and openness to women, however, was seen in the U.K. "as the exception rather than the rule in diplomatic circles" (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 303).

Oswaldo Aranha had also mentioned that sending a woman overseas represented a legal risk because of the abnormal character of female presence abroad, which could never be "normal and universal" without "pre-established rules". The lack of consensus between domestic laws, internal laws of other countries and international norms – particularly relating to the nationality of women married to foreigners, the marital power of men over women, to passport issues, ceremonial procedures, and others – all stood in the way of women's participation in diplomacy, according to Aranha.[109] The Minister defended the need for greater studies, preparations and negotiations of international or bilateral treaties to deal with issues affecting women internationally, topics that were constantly on the agenda of Brazilian feminists fighting for treaties in Pan-American conferences (MARQUES, 2013).[110]

The League of Nations' bureaucracy, however, not only gave rise to international structures and regulations, but it also opened more opportunities for women activists to participate in international politics (GARNER, 2018, p. 106). Nevertheless, women's formal participation either as League's employees or as members of country's delegations "remained minimal", with "less than one per cent of the top-tier positions" held by women (ibid., p. 111). Although Brazilian journalist Rachel Crotman enthusiastically used the League of Nations as an example of women's success, claiming that there were one woman for every three men working at the office of the Secretary-General, the examples she presented mostly showed them acting in administrative and internal activities. Crotman also said that 17 countries in 1931 included women in their delegations, usually as alternates or experts – and a single "*latina*" –, but only one country, Lithuania, appointed a woman as an official delegate. These female delegates, she said, participated in discussions relating to "humanitarian measures", which did not seem to be a problem for Crotman, who viewed this as part of women's "work to build peace".[111] In the years of the League's existence, only 67 women served as country's delegates,

[109] Oswaldo Aranha to Bertha Lutz, July 11, 1938, CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1938.06.21, p. 4-5
[110] For instance, Bertha Lutz obtained a second degree in Law in 1932 with a thesis on the nationality of married women in international law. See also: Marques (2016a) and Bertha Lutz, *Nationality of Married Women in the American Republics,* Feminism in the Americas, Pan American Union, Bulletin n. 2, 1926.
[111] Rachel Crotman, "Colaboração feminina na construção da paz", *Diário de Notícias,* December 20, 1931, p. 21.

another 23 as experts or assessors in special Committees, and, within more than 100 committees, they participated in only 13, "mainly confined to the Fifth Committee dealing with social and humanitarian affairs" (MACFADYEN et al., 2019, p. 177). This participation reflected the general perception of the time "that there was in fact a 'woman's point of view' and a 'specific role for women' in international politics" (GARNER, 2018, p. 112).

The United Kingdom, which did not allow women as diplomats until 1946, still sent Helena Swanwick as a British delegate to the League of Nations in 1924. As expected, she was appointed to the Fifth Committee, although "she felt she was intellectually more prepared for […] the Third Committee that focused on disarmament" (GARNER, 2018, p. 258). The Fifth Committee was headed from its inception in 1920 until 1931 by another British woman, Rachel Crowdy, who was the only woman among the first round of senior level appointees to the League. Responsible for an "underfunded and understaffed" section, she used the expertise of international women's organizations to bring issues forth to Member States, building up a two-way support between her and organizations, and pioneering efforts to integrate civil society into intergovernmental institutions (MACFADYEN et al., 2019, p. 96, 139).

The League of Nations, therefore, replicated most of the problems that we have discussed for women in offices and in diplomacy. The majority of women employees were concentrated in routine and administrative tasks, many of them hired at lower level positions but executing the work of chiefs or heads of sections (MACFADYEN et al., 2019, p.93-95). Rachel Crowdy, for instance, although head of the Fifth Committee, had a rank within the League's hierarchy that gave her a 25 per cent lower salary than her male colleagues in the same position. When she left in 1931, her male substitute was appointed "at the higher rank and salary" (ibid., p. 93).

Overall, in spite of the great individual achievements of some remarkable women, breaking the initial glass ceiling of the diplomatic career did not mean immediate acceptance into the homosocial spaces of diplomatic practices. Women diplomats seemed to find a more difficult time navigating the informal relationships that were important for information-gathering and trust-building activities, as well as occupying positions of true political decision-making in matters of "hard" politics. We now turn to what would be one of the greatest barriers to women's ambitions in international politics: marriage.

4 The Celibacy/Marriage dichotomy

Expanding on the discussions of the previous chapter on motherhood and domesticity, and according to Enloe (2014), "the ongoing political history of marriage plays a decisive part

in opening or shutting doors to women in diplomacy" (p. 178). Based on the premise that "marriage is political", these unions often jeopardized a woman's diplomatic career, whereas a married men had his masculinity reassured, being supported by his wife's unpaid domestic labor – freeing him to fully pursue his public career goals – and sitting in a more prestigious scale in the workforce (ENLOE, 2014, p. 10).[112] In Enloe's (2014) pioneer feminist work, she asked "why should marriage *advance* a man's capacity to gain money, skills and influence, but *hinder* a woman's chance to acquire the same?" (p. 199).[113] For scholars McGlen and Sarkees (1993), one way to look at this was that "careers are ultimately more demanding for women" as they were expected to fulfill both their public and domestic role entirely and with equal efficiency, a particularly difficult situation in careers "highly taxing in terms of time and commitment" such as the diplomatic one (p. 160).

In the 1930s, women in diplomacy were seen as a potential risk for marital hierarchy and family formation, aspects that, in turn, were perceived as rivals to a woman's career efficiency and ascension. It was expected that women, after marriage, would resign from their professional role in favor of the family and of the traditional expectations of domesticity and motherhood. In 1938, the same year that women were banned from Itamaraty's examinations, a United States poll indicated that 75 per cent of women "did not approve of a married woman working if she had a husband capable of supporting her" (McGLEN, SARKEES, 1993, p. 32). Similarly, the U.S. 1930 Census found that 71 per cent of "gainfully employed" women were single.[114] Therefore, as it was understood that "sooner or later, the woman would have to leave her post in order to be with her husband", women were seen as not fully available to serve their government (CALKIN, 1978, p. 106, 126).

In Brazil, when Oswaldo Aranha responded to Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, he stated matrimony as one of the reasons that women and diplomacy were incompatible. Aranha wrote that marriage was the natural destiny of women, and diplomacy a complication in the fulfillment of this mission. He discussed Coelho Lisboa's proposal that her daughter become a diplomat asking "do you wish her not to marry? If so, your request is justified". Aranha then suggested that her daughter ought to be "what every woman should be, a mother", saying that Coelho Lisboa was "wrong, completely wrong" in her request, not "reasoning with wisdom". The Minister continued, seemingly implying that he would act in the same manner with his wife and

[112] Similarly, Pateman (1988) would say that "marital domination is politically significant" (p. 7).
[113] Highlights from the original text.
[114] McMillin, L. F. *Women in the Federal Service,* (3rd ed.). U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 24.

daughter. In his closing remarks, Aranha asked Coelho Lisboa, considering their close friendship, to forget such "bad ideas" and to allow her daughter to follow her destiny.[115] For Farias (2017), this section of Aranha's letter is indicative of the contemporary belief that "diplomacy was a male arena" (p. 39). Coelho Lisboa, in her response, did not address the motherhood issue, but would not accept being called "wrong" – she started her letter claiming that Aranha was the one "without reason".[116]

4.1 The "anomaly": diplomatic husbands

The first obstacle for the married woman diplomat in Brazil was the legal necessity to obey her husband. The Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 defined men as the head of the conjugal family, exercising tutelage over his wife, and the married woman, in judicial terms, was considered a legally unable person, taking "the condition of companion, consort and collaborator of the husband in the needs of the family, ensuring the material and moral direction of it".[117] Married women, additionally, could only have a professional career if authorized by her husband, whereas single women had the same civil standing as any men.[118] In this sense, it was perceived that women would face a dilemma in aligning the marital hierarchy of the Civil Code with her work as a diplomat (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 80). In what was viewed as a complex situation, how would a woman "subjected to the marital power" of the husband be able to exercise a position of leadership in a consulate or embassy? Another concern presented at the CFSPC study was the humiliation to which married women would submit their husbands, who would have a hard time finding jobs overseas and would be a "mere companion" to their wives, possibly bringing into question the feminine devotion to the family.[119]

A Brazilian male journalist expressed his opinion that women in diplomacy could bring "moral and material losses" to the country, as it allowed the husband to be in an "inconvenient situation" if supported by his wife. According to the journalist, a man "in the highest sense of the world" would not accept to stand jobless by his wife, as her love and respect for him could be lost. Women would feel "instinctively safe, protected, supported, by the arm that she is proud of", a pride obtained and maintained by the husband's natural position as the head of the family.[120] This journalist's view sheds light on the precarity of women's position in society, a

[115] Oswaldo Aranha to Rosalina Coelho Lisboa, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, RCL c 1938.10.00, p. 2-3.
[116] Rosalina Coelho Lisboa to Oswaldo Aranha, [1938], CPDOC-FGV, OA cp 1939.00.00.
[117] Law n. 3.071, January 1, 1916, arts. 6, 233 and 240. For a more comprehensive study on the Brazilian Civil Code and the condition of married women, see Marques and Melo (2008).
[118] Lutz, B. [1924] AN-FBPF, Q0.BLZ, PIN.TXT.10, p. 6.
[119] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 2-3.
[120] Oto Prazeres, "À Senhorita Consul", *Jornal do Brasil*, October 5, 1938, p. 5.

position with such a low level of respect and agency that the simple idea of a man in the same situation meant his ruin.

The idea of putting the husband in the same social position as the diplomatic wife – a figure who has always had a well-defined social position in diplomatic and foreign relations – was considered foolish. A Brazilian newspaper commented in 1934 on the "interesting question" of the husband's position, particularly in the context of the British Commission's evaluations on women in diplomacy. The piece wondered how husbands would fare within the "severe protocol of the [British] Court", and whether they would be placed along with the diplomatic wives or would have to "abstain from Palace receptions".[121] In interviews with U.S. women ambassadors in the 1980s, Morin (1994) found evidence that the husband was still frequently considered an "anomaly", because, unlike the wives, the diplomacy world did not know "how to occupy the husband's time, finding his position in the community, and where to seat him at formal dinners" (p. 28). Such apparently mundane complications had the potential to question the entire structure of how international politics was conducted. In the 1930s, it was understood that an unemployed and dependent husband "would become a potential menace to the embassy", and, as noted by a British ambassador, "[the husband] could wander into the Chancellery and make himself a perfect nuisance, and nobody could say anything to him" (apud McCARTHY, 2009, p. 304, 318).

This concern was not an issue when it came to diplomatic wives. Enloe (2014) reinforced that, as diplomacy and the conduct of international relations highly depended on cultivating trust between countries, governments relied on marriage, and more specifically, on diplomatic wives, as a confidence-building tool. The official title of diplomatic wife, *ambassadrice*, was instated back in the seventeenth century to name women who accompanied their husbands overseas (JAMES, SLUGA, 2016, p. 4). As "diplomacy and hostessing" became "tightly intertwined", the expected role of diplomatic wives included "creating an atmosphere where men from different states can get to know one another 'man to man'" (ENLOE, 2014, p. 183, 185).[122]

---

[121] "As mulheres e a Diplomacia", *Diário de Notícias,* August 23, 1934, p. 2.

[122] The study of diplomatic wives is extremely vast in the United States and in European countries. In Brazil, however, the topic does not seem to attract as much attention, either in the literature or in the archival documents we collected – the only wives ever mentioned were the women diplomats who resigned to accompany their male spouses, also diplomats. In light of this, we can only assume that the experiences of Brazilian diplomatic wives were similar to those studied in the U.S. and Europe for the purpose of this research. One exception is the case of Aracy de Carvalho Guimarães Rosa, married to Brazilian writer and diplomat João Guimarães Rosa, who through her husband's position at the consulate in Hamburg helped a number of Jews obtain Brazilian visas during World War II (HAAG, 2011).

In a set of instructions to U.S. diplomatic officers on the importance of making contacts, the U.S. Department of State recognized that the "active aid" of a wife was "essential to her husband's success in the discharge of his semi-official duties". The wife could, for instance, learn the local language and assist in efforts to make "calculated contacts with the people who really count, politically and economically".[123] Among the other unpaid activities expected from wives were: smoothing "adaptation to new posts"; making "their home attractive" for informal diplomatic gatherings; finding proper social circles for the couple's interaction; volunteering for the community; representing her country's morals and culture; and, finally, being "her husband's 'eyes and ears' at public functions" (FARIAS, 2017, p. 40; ENLOE, 2014, p. 184).

Although foreign services deemed female marriages a complicating factor and incompatible with state's interests, Enloe (2014) insisted that, in reality, governments "are for the sort of marriage that serves their own political ends", relying on the free labor of wives to smooth representation and diplomatic interactions (p. 182). The British foreign service, for instance, saw wives as a "professional doing a good job of public relations for her husband's sake", with one male ambassador arguing that women would have "far more opportunities" in the diplomatic service as wives than going at it alone.[124] In light of women's supposed greater capability to enroll in social and philanthropic activities – and also in the "surveillance of female elements" –, British male diplomats affirmed that those functions were already secured "with no charge for the State, by wives and daughters of employees".[125]

In sum, it seemed impossible for a married woman diplomat to "win". If appointed to serve overseas, not taking her husband along was "unthinkable" and would challenge her supposed feminine commitment to the family, whereas bringing the husband meant forcing him into unemployment, dependency, humiliation, and would cause "annoying complications" in diplomatic circles. The solution, thus, was either for women diplomats to resign upon marriage or to remain unmarried. The English language even has a particular derogatory word to designate older unmarried women: spinsters.[126]

---

[123] Dept of State, "Contacts - Making and Maintenance of", January 25, 1930, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 274, 120.2/17, p. 2.
[124] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 16-17.
[125] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 19.
[126] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 8, 29.

4.2 Resignation or celibacy

The concern over male dependency and misplacement in international relations seemed to be more a societal fear over social norms than a reality in female diplomats' lives, who either were mostly single or resigned after marriage. One Brazilian female diplomat wrote that, in fact, celibacy was the "norm among women diplomats", pointing out that "marriage and maternity could disturb good work performance" (apud FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 297). Among the first 20 women accepted into Itamaraty – between 1918 and 1938 – ten remained single, two were divorced at the beginning of their careers, one was already divorced when appointed, and another got married in her 40s, after 17 years of being a single diplomat woman (ibid.). Zorayma Rodrigues, who joined Itamaraty in 1928, married a fellow diplomat in 1946, which prompted an immediate retirement request from her part, denied because she had not yet served the required amount of time. Nonetheless, because of a new 1946 regulation, women public servants had to resign from their positions when marrying a Brazilian diplomat, which resulted in Rodrigues' dismissal the following year (ibid., p. 95).

At the end, only six Brazilian women seemed to have successfully managed marriage and careers, but some of them ended up resigning, as we have shown with Maria José de Castro Rebello Mendes, the first women to enter Itamaraty, who married a colleague and ultimately resigned in 1934 to accompany him to Brussels. Chiquita Marcondes was also a Brazilian consul who "gave up her career in favor of the husband's career". Joining Itamaraty in 1935, she resigned in 1942 after marrying another Brazilian diplomat who passed the examinations one year after her. The marriage lasted until 1966 and, by that time, her husband was already an ambassador, "having directed prominent posts such as the [Brazilian] Mission to the United Nations in New York" (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 130-131). A similar situation was observed in the United States as late as the 1980s. In her book, Morin (1994) interviewed 17 women who rose to ambassadors, the highest rank within the U.S. Foreign Service. Of those, only four were married, but only one married in her 20s and had children – three married in their late 30s and early 40s. She found that women had "deliberately chosen career over marriage, convinced they could not have both" from watching female colleagues resigning after marriage (p. 28).

The marriage issue was publicly discussed when Ruth Bryan Owen, first U.S. female ambassador in 1933, decided to marry a Danish Capitan she met during her work in Copenhagen. A Brazilian newspaper reported, somewhat alarmingly, that Owen had created a problem for U.S.-Denmark bilateral relations, as she would become a citizen in both countries and lose her diplomatic immunities and privileges. Calling out that this was Owen's third

marriage, the "ingenuous" ambassador – "enjoying the social life and satisfying her most insignificant whims" – would have received a "severe" word from the U.S. Department of State expecting her resignation immediately after the wedding, to which she would have responded: "I would not resign and there is no reason for such".[127] According to the *New York Times*, however, Owen's eventual 1936 resignation was announced "as due only to political reasons", as she entered "the active campaign for the re-election of President Roosevelt". The article mentioned that Owen's departure from the foreign service "solved a vexing question relating to her citizenship".[128] The following day, the same newspaper published an opinion article assessing that, while her work as ambassador proved that "a woman diplomat can serve her country as ably and acceptably as a man", her decision to marry a foreigner and eventual resignation showed that women had "several hurdles to cross before she enjoys equal status".[129]

In light of all the possible social and legal complications, the foreign services of some countries took extreme measures. When women in the United Kingdom finally became eligible to apply for foreign service positions in 1946, it only meant a partial triumph, as two important restrictions were imposed: "a marriage bar and a 10 per cent ceiling on female recruitment in any given year" (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 286). The second restriction was an attempt to control the influx of women in a period – after World War II – in which there were many open positions to be filled, while the first was justified on the grounds that the "Foreign Service presented 'special difficulties in the retention of women after marriage'" (apud McCARTHY, 2009, p. 318). The marriage bar not only enabled the FCO to avoid a "troubling and transgressive figure – that of the diplomatic husband", but the union between a woman diplomat and an employed man was seen in the U.K. as a conflict of interest for the state (McCARTHY, 2009, p. 304; McCARTHY, 2016, p. 179). The bar was only abolished in 1972, and the first married female British ambassador was only appointed, with her husband, in 1987 to Côte D'Ivoire.[130] Another country that imposed a variation of the marriage bar was Sweden, which asked its married female diplomats to choose between serving only domestically or quitting entirely (NIKLASSON, ROBERTSON, 2018, p. 70).

In the United States there was an unwritten, but widely recognized, rule that encouraged women to resign from their foreign service careers after marriage, in order to not "render the

---

[127] "Comentário social e diplomático em torno do matrimônio da ministra dos EU na Dinamarca", *Correio Paulistano*, August 9, 1936, p. 29.
[128] "Ruth Owen quits her post as envoy: President announces her resignation to enter actively into campaign", *The New York Times*, August 31, 1936, p. 1.
[129] "The Woman Diplomat", *The New York Times,* September 1, 1936, p. 20.
[130] "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 14.

position of her husband intolerable" (CALKIN, 1978, p. 60). Because all employees needed to be available for work worldwide, it was assumed that a married woman would not wish to be separated from her husband and, therefore, would find it impracticable to be available as required, and, therefore, "a marriage certificate required a letter of resignation" (CALKIN, 1978; GOOD, 1981, p. 48). Lucile Atcherson, the first U.S. woman admitted as a Foreign Service officer in 1922, got married and resgined only five years later, after many troubles obtaining her first overseas assignment – she eventually went to Switzerland and Panama – and receiving her rightful promotions (NASH, 2016, p. 223). The unwritten rule of resignation upon marriage was officially reversed in 1971, eventually allowing some 40 women to return to their careers (CALKIN, 1978, p. 144-146).

Marriage bars, at this time, were seen as normal and as "reinforcing societal expectations", as it was mostly assumed that work and motherhood were incompatible activities (STROM, 1992, p. 190). The idea that a woman would have ambitions to follow a career seemed an "incongruous sign of virility", dislocated in society at the time and implying for women "a certain renunciation, especially of marriage" (PERROT, 2005, p. 255). To reconcile professional and family demands, it was understood that women in diplomacy needed to "forsake one role for the other", an idea embraced by Oswaldo Aranha in his remarks about Rosalina Coelho Lisboa's daughter and also by a British male ambassador who considered "unthinkable that a diplomatic […] officer should produce babies and at the same time do her work properly" (McGLEN, SARKEES, 1993, p. 160).[131]

The choice between career or marriage was a concern in the Brazilian CFSPC study, which concluded that the presence of women in the diplomatic career could be a "paradoxical favoring of celibacy and infertility by the State, contrary to its superior interests and moral principles".[132] After all, women who remained unwed and childless were "viewed as incomplete" and lacked a "defined and accepted social place" (BLACHMAN, 1977, p. 31; PATEMAN, 1988, p. 132). Additionally, considering that the women with the capacity to study and pass the diplomatic examinations were usually those of a higher social class, they were ideal candidates for perpetuating the Brazilian race, which ultimately led to a more "strict control of their sexual activity" (CAULFIELD, 1993, p. 161). Celibacy, thus, meant complete dedication and availability. It also usually meant professional success, as it ultimately

[131] The British ambassador's quote is from: "Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes 6, May 1999, p. 28.
[132] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 3.

represented the adoption of male characteristics – "fulltime commitment" – in the workforce (SAVAGE, WITZ, 1992, p. 12). Finally, it was the price women would have to pay for their desire to work extradomestically in a society that expected them to follow their natural roles of mother and wives (PERROT, 2005, p. 225).

4.3 Legal barriers

For those women brave enough to choose a diplomatic career and a marriage, they encountered gendered institutions that would not easily adapt to or integrate their supposedly unique demands. In many ways, the woman diplomat was punished for being married, financially and career-wise, as they found that "the politics of husbands are not the same as the politics of wives", and that most of the benefits provided to (male) diplomats with dependents were not naturally offered to married women diplomats (ENLOE, 2014, p. 208).

Foreign services usually offered a series of inducements for officers leaving to an overseas post, providing greater incentives (financial and ascension opportunities) to posts with greater difficulties, especially when diplomats took their families along. Under the assumption of a sex hierarchy within a marriage, married women diplomats in the United States could not enjoy some benefits because husbands were not understood to be dependent on their wives, being "appropriate to recognize the legal and traditional custom that the husband is responsible for the support of the family" (CALKIN, 1978, p. 126). Thus, a married woman diplomat with a husband "mentally and physically capable of self-support" would not receive allowances normally given to (male) diplomats accepting job overseas – equal benefits were only provided after 1963 (ibid., p. 126). In Brazil, similarly, Beata Vettori, consul in Buenos Aires, requested the payment of the family allowance for her accompanying husband in 1942, to which Oswaldo Aranha made an opposing recommendation that it would create a precedent "inadvisable and inconvenient for the administration". DASP's president Luis Simões Lopes expressed the opinion that the allowance "shall be granted exclusively to the husband, being extended to women only when he is invalid" (apud FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 115-116).

Brazilian women diplomats faced a series of other legal barriers when married to other diplomats or public servants. Starting in 1934, one of the spouses had to go on a leave without pay, a situation that became more rigorous in 1946 when it was specified that the *wife* should resign from her public service position. Twenty years later, married women were allowed to maintain their jobs as diplomats, but if they wished to accompany their husbands overseas, they were put on a so-called "aggregate leave" during that period. Under this status, women received no payment and no time was counted towards their career advancement, within a field that much

prioritizes seniority. Many women, therefore, could not fully pursue their careers, reaching earlier "the age limit for retirement, which was lower in the less-advanced positions", being "forcibly put to inactivity without experiencing functional progression" (FRIAÇA, 2018, p. 206). According to Friaça (2018), at least 14 married women within the "Second Generation" group – those admitted between 1953 and 1988 – did not have "careers with a normal flow" because of "aggregation" (p. 299). This directive was overruled in 1986, when couples were allowed to serve together in the same or in nearby posts abroad, but only in 1996 both of them were able to receive their full salaries with all the benefits provided for post removals (ibid., p. 249). These legal barriers are summarized in the Table 6 below.

Table 6 – Legal barriers to married women in diplomacy in Brazil.

Year	Law	Barrier
1916	Civil Code	Men are the head of the conjugal family and exercise tutelage over their wives.
1934	Decree 24.113	• Brazilian diplomats needed previous Government **permission** to marry any Brazilian citizen; • Brazilian diplomats were **forbidden** from marrying foreigners; • In the case of marriage between two diplomats/consuls, one of the spouses went into "**unpaid availability**"
1946	Decree-Law 9.202	• Brazilian diplomats could only marry Brazilian citizens; • "When the **wife** is a public servant, she will have to **abdicate** from position".
1952	Law 1.542	• Brazilian diplomats **could marry foreigners** with previous Government permission.
1965	MRE Legal Opinion	• Wives no longer had to abdicate their position.
1966	Decree-Law 69	• "Aggregate Leave": **withdrawal** from position to accompany diplomat spouse abroad, without pay, counting of service time, nor promotion.
1985	Decree-Law 2.234	• Married diplomats could serve in the same post abroad; • For married diplomats appointed to the same post abroad "**only one** of the spouses will be entitled" to the overseas allowance.
1986	Law 7.501	• "Aggregate Leave" **ceases** to exist.
1996	Law 9.392	• For married diplomats appointed to the same post abroad, **both** spouses were entitled to the family overseas allowance.

Source: Farias and Carmo (2018, p. 111); Friaça (2018); and respective laws.

5 A diplomat tells it all

We conclude this chapter with the personal account of a former U.S. woman diplomat that summarizes and exemplifies much of what has been discussed in the previous pages. Pattie Field entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1925, the second woman to pass examinations, and

who acted mostly as Vice-Consul in the Netherlands for four years, after which she resigned to join the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) (CALKIN, 1978, chapter 4). In 1938, Field hosted a series of weekly radio broadcasts about her experience working for the U.S. Department of State, for which we obtained copies of her statements as she sent them for government revision. Initially, Pattie Field would send her drafts for revision only one or two days in advance, which proved to be problematic for the Department as the texts were considered not "carefully prepared", and potentially, according to a Foreign Service officer, they "might even not do us much good but a certain amount of harm".[133] With time, the tone of her broadcasts changed, becoming less spontaneous and dealing less with personal matters and more with official Department of State business, such as the Division of the American Republics and the then recently-finished Inter-American Conference in Lima.[134] This specific broadcast was highly dull, informative and detailed if compared to the initial shows, in which Field seemed to be speaking more from her own perspective and experience, suggesting that the Department might have eventually become much more involved in her preparation.

Nonetheless, the first few broadcasts offer a glimpse of the gendered perceptions and modes of thinking within the Department of State in the 1920s, including amidst its female officers. Patti Field noted that, when arriving in her first post in Amsterdam, she was told: "Miss Field, since you think a woman can handle shipping, that will be your job". Not knowing what shipping meant, she went to the port, and found a drunk and beaten seaman that she immediately sent to the hospital, later learning that shipping meant less personal dealings – it was mostly receiving the ship, getting signatures from the crew and resolving any disputes.[135] But rules such as these were never told, as they had been developed and shared by male officers and were expected to be known. In another occasion, a battleship Captain invited Field to "make some history by being the first" woman to engage in the naval tradition of piping on a ship. As Field recalled it, no crew member knew what the correct salutations should be as "the regulations [had] nothing to say about women", and even after the event the officers, she said, "could not agree whether or not I had done the correct thing".[136]

Pattie Field also discovered that her supervisor in the Netherlands was teased prior to her arrival, as he was to be in charge of the "strange Amazon who was invading the Foreign Service", and had in fact requested Washington to "send [Field] to any place but

[133] Mr. Messersmith to Mr. Butler, April 22, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/234.
[134] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", December 28, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/280.
[135] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", April 10, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/229, p. 9.
[136] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", June 5, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/243, p. 8-9.

Amsterdam".[137] At the time, she believed the supervisor thought she would "immediately try to run the whole place", but as she turned out to be "rather small and anxious to do as he said", he was positively surprised.[138] This indicates some of the anxieties and insecurities surrounding women's greater participation in the labor market, and in diplomacy more specifically as the career was highly based on homosocial institutions and expectations. In one occasion, Field confessed that she decided to not attend a dinner given to U.S. Consuls, as these type of events were naturally "attended only by men", and she thought that "one lone woman might spoil the party". She believed, more generally, that her "arrival in the [Consular] Corps created somewhat of a situation".[139]

The familial nature of diplomatic work overseas was also a subject of Pattie Field's commentary. During her years in the Foreign Service, she recalled that officers wishing to become ambassadors needed to have "some private means", as salaries only rarely sufficed for maintenance abroad. However, she said, some officers managed to serve "with very little outside income", usually "thanks to a careful wife, […] but it took a lot of careful planning".[140] For Field, happiness abroad was related to taking "your home with you", and for women "this probably means remaining unmarried as it is pretty difficult to find a husband who would be willing to pack up and go with you to Timbuctoo".[141] In her case, however, she brought her mother along, who embodied the role of a diplomatic wife and had them "installed in a Dutch house with a Dutch maid" in ten days after their arrival in Amsterdam.[142] It seems natural, according to Field's account, to expect that a second unpaid person should contribute to the work of a diplomat, and that without this help the diplomat had less chances of success. This must have likely influenced many women diplomats' careers.

In discussing the entrance examinations for the U.S. Foreign Service, Patti Field emphasized its merit-based quality, with appointments being "free of political pull", even as she recommended that candidates show a letter of recommendation from a Senator to help establish "you as a person of responsibility in the community". Additionally, married candidates should "send proof of [their] wife's citizenship", as a U.S. nationality was mandatory for spouses.[143] The interesting part of this comment is that Field assumed the gender of the

[137] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 1, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/235, p. 8; Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 8, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/237, p. 1.
[138] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 8, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/237, p. 2.
[139] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 8, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/237, p. 7.
[140] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", April 17, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/232, p. 7.
[141] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", April 24, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/234, p. 9.
[142] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 1, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/235, p. 8; Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 8, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/237, p. 5.
[143] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", April 24, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/234, p. 2.

spouse as naturally female, possibly because, in the 1920s, she had not yet encountered a married female diplomat. Finally, she also discussed how the oral examinations rated candidates on "personal appearance", in addition to intelligence, character and "ability to hold his nerve under rather trying circumstances".[144]

Patti Field then explained how an officer was appointed to a foreign post, clarifying that the host government is "first sounded out to be sure the officer is acceptable" in that country, considering matters of "religion or of political opinion that might make an officer unacceptable to a country".[145] In light of this detail, the justifications used against women in diplomacy that posed as a problem their inability to serve anywhere seem to be fallacious, as apparently many other circumstances could render a diplomat unsuited for certain posts. Because she had been told "that a woman might not be acceptable to all countries", she requested the Netherlands taking into consideration that the country was governed by a queen, and thus "couldn't refuse to accept a woman vice-consul". Still, she would need a special meeting only to determine the correct protocol to present a woman consul to the Queen.[146]

By this point, the Department of State was "rather discouraged" with Patti Field's material, believing it needed "complete rewriting".[147] It was suggested that she should send her drafts two weeks in advance, make a list of topics, and "come to the Department to discuss them", and to select those that "would cause comparatively little trouble".[148] In one instance, Field wrote in her draft about her experience as a woman diplomat, saying the Department of State "was frankly skeptical of how useful a woman would be in the service", for reasons such as whether women could "mix freely with their colleagues" or "be a drawback rather than a help" to the Foreign Service. She mentioned how Lucile Atcherson, the first U.S. female officer, had been kept "in the State Department doing research on Latin American history", despite wishing to serve abroad, and that out of the six women who had passed examinations since then, only two remained in a "career service of seven hundred members".[149] In this section, the Department proposed an alternative writing that accepted as natural the lower number of women interested in the diplomatic career, and blamed women for this, using marriage as the main issue:

> "The Foreign Service does offer a career for women, although there probably always will be comparatively few women in the Service. As I see it, the chief

[144] Ibid.p. 6.
[145] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 1, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/235, p. 7.
[146] Ibid.; Pattie Field, "America Abroad", June 5, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/243, p. 8.
[147] Mr. Butler to Mr. Messersmith, May 5, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/237.
[148] Mr. Butler to Mr. Messersmith, April 23, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/234.
[149] Pattie Field, "America Abroad", May 8, 1938, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 270, 120/237, p. 8-9.

> obstacle to women's success has been troubles with our world friend, the cupid. Three young women resigned to marry, as did our Minister to Denmark".[150]

Conclusion

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations determined in 1938 that only male candidates could register for the entrance examinations to the diplomatic career. Although Brazil was among the first countries to allow women into diplomacy in 1918, the decision twenty years later to ban further female presence was not an isolated incident within the Brazilian public administration as well as in international affairs. We saw in the previous chapter how, domestically, public examinations were used by the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP) to determine which spaces men and women could more adequately work, already assigning diplomacy as a political and public activity incompatible with women's supposed natural abilities for domesticity and motherhood.

In seeking to understand why diplomacy and international representation were understood as an unsuitable activity for women, we analyzed the justifications presented by Brazilian and foreign actors to find that the decision to send a woman representative overseas was seen as a risk. A risk for bilateral relations as women, supposedly more fragile, would not be capable of exercising their duty efficiently when facing a number of possible hostilities and adversities, even as numerous personal experiences of women diplomats showed otherwise. It was also a risk for years of establishing homosocial norms and behaviors in diplomatic practice that could bring a woman's – or the nation's – honor into question, segregating women's participation in international affairs to topics understood as feminine, such as social and humanitarian issues, where many women indeed thrived usually as delegates. Finally, it would be a risk to marital hierarchy and family formation, as women were naturally expected to exclude themselves from the labor market upon marriage, or either to remain unmarried and childless as the price to pay for their ambition. The alternative, to become a married woman diplomat, seemed ridiculous, as the men in power seemed particularly horrified with the idea of subjecting a husband to unemployment, dependency and humiliation, or in other words, to the same position as the esteemed diplomatic wife.

[150] Ibid., p. 9.

CONCLUSION

The decision to prohibit the access of women to the diplomatic career, as part of the Ministry of Foreign Relations' administrative reform of October 14th, 1938, is a symptom of larger phenomena. The decision, made during a moment of consolidation for Getúlio Vargas' *Estado Novo* (1937-1945) as an authoritarian dictatorship, is significant in two ways. First, it is paramount to the rationalization process happening simultaneously in Brazilian public administration that perceived each individual as naturally apt to certain jobs, implementing sexual divisions of labor via female bans to specific entrance examinations. Second, it is important in the context of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, which saw women as a risk to Itamaraty's international prestige – considering the small female presence in international politics more generally –, given that the Ministry did wish to appear weak before other nations at such a volatile global moment. Thus, a handful of powerful men during the *Estado Novo* were able to control the space available for female labor, and, with the help of a masculinizing rhetoric disguised as rationalization and efficiency, defined gendered norms of behavior that would have a much larger, and longer, impact on the position of women in Brazilian society.

We have explored the perceptions on gender expressed by the leadership of two crucial bureaucratic institutions that had important roles in the 1938 female prohibition. The first one is the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP), whose objective was to subsidize the modernization of public administration and to disseminate a trustworthy and supposedly impartial merit system in personnel recruitment, where it had the political ability to limit the positions in which women were allowed to serve. DASP presented a highly centralized administration in the figure of its president, Luis Simões Lopes, whose private archives hold an important and untapped study about the admission of women to the diplomatic corps. The second crucial bureaucratic institution is the Ministry of Foreign Relations itself, which, as a fundamental institution in Brazilian public administration and the country's foreign affairs, had an influence on women's position in civil service. The Ministry, thus, executed the first executive order toward the implementation of a sexual division of labor in public administration under Oswaldo Aranha's leadership, also a significant fact as primary sources suggest that previous Ministers had a more positive view of female participation in diplomacy.

Despite significant achievements of the Brazilian feminist movement in the first half of the 1930s, the consequential loss of rights under the *Estado Novo* was blatant. The new regime absorbed some conservative ideals interested in social harmony, and more actively intervened

in social relations to maintain order and gender hierarchy. This perspective found eco in social forces that included the Catholic Church, eugenic intellectuals, and feminists who often reinforced women's maternal role in society. Additionally, the Brazilian government promoted social policies that lauded traditional family structures, higher fecundity and population growth, and the position of the husband as the main breadwinner. Motherhood was thus included in the modernization process of society in a broad sense. In the 1930s, female presence in the Brazilian labor market was indeed influenced by conceptions of domesticity and motherhood, which greatly impacted the type of work women performed extradomestically, usually consisting of activities that were considered as extensions of female "natural" abilities as wives and mothers.

The merit-based public examinations system, portrayed as an instrument to abolish patrimonial and political practices of recruitment, was never seen or desired by DASP's managing elite as a democratic tool. Examinations were understood as a conducive mechanism to delimitate with almost surgical precision the pool of candidates eligible for access to public service. For instance, although the 1937 Brazilian Constitution established that "public positions are equally accessible to all Brazilians", the directive was followed by a requirement to observe the "capability conditions prescribed in laws and regulations".[1] The possibility of applying conditionalities was cited in the Brazilian study on the admission of women to the diplomatic corps as a justification for the government to "restrain the entrance of women (in foreign public service)".[2] The public administration, therefore, used this conditional element to delimitate the space available for women in civil service, based on the social and gender perceptions of its managing elite. In defending DASP's position, Luis Simões Lopes argued that the administration was not opposed to either sex, because at play was merely the search for candidates with the best conditions to perform efficiently the required duties.

DASP members, thus, seemed to understand that some positions required either masculine or feminine abilities, and we see here a correlation with the public/private dichotomy. First, there seems to be an assumption that women should not be allowed to occupy positions that had a political function, being confined instead to positions of assistance, that required routine and standardized activities, such as typist, stenographers, and clerks. Jobs that required representation of the state, decision-making, negotiation, or any sort of power over others were largely closed off to women, particularly diplomacy and military positions. Secondly, positions that involved assignments in public spaces, or movements and travels *outside* the walled office

[1] Art. 122, Paragraph 3.
[2] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 4.

(whose symbolic role was similar to the space of the house) were considered unsuitable for women, such as mail carrier, police officers, detective, and inspectors of all kinds. A woman's suitable job would be those held in private, inside a given closed space, and in just one location – in other words, invisible to the public eye. For instance, in one case the career of engineer was differentiated between "field" and "office" engineers, hinting at a larger perception also found in the literature and directly related to the Itamaraty case: women could do work that was domestic, internal, inside the office, rather than work that was visible, public, national, or that implied external relationships, as this could possibly cast doubts on female virtue.

The Itamaraty decision of 1938 also reflects a reaction to the challenge and threat that women candidates posed to perceived social norms. The fact that institutions tend to be structured based on masculine understandings and perceptions of reality because male bodies are predominant is one of the reasons why women are excluded from, segregated or have a difficult time incorporating into organizations and institutions. In the 1930s, not only female interest seemed larger than expected for the diplomatic career, but women's approval rates in Itamaraty examinations were also higher than men's throughout the decade. The unexpected achievement of these women made the modernizing elite fear that "soon half, or almost, of the Ministry's initial positions will be occupied by women", recommending "restrictive providences" in order to not find itself "embarrassed to find qualified staff for the performance of duties abroad".[3]

The opportunities for women to act around the globe were also fairly restricted, which provided a set of ideal conditions that were used by members of the Brazilian government to start implementing a sexually divided vision of civil service. The most important document that we analyzed in this regard is an unsigned report examining the convenience of women acting as Brazilian representatives abroad, and, more generally, their presence in the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The study was mostly based on a report from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which had decided in April 1936 to "maintain the exclusion of women from the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, for being convinced that female employees do not perform with advantage to the Public Service activities of this nature".[4] The available papers of the Brazilian study form a compilation of seven documents, of which five are translations of the British report. Out of the entire 27 pages, only six are specific to the Brazilian section, which also frequently paraphrases the British justifications.

[3] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14.
[4] Highlights from original text. Ibid., p. 5.

Whereas some individuals, including some women, were attempting to connect diplomacy with essentialist feminine characteristics to promote female participation in international affairs, the turbulent interwar years also generated a new diplomatic profile. Diplomacy was moving away from behaviors being categorized as feminine – elegance, politeness, discreetness – towards a more rationalized, results-oriented, and consequently more masculine, vision of diplomacy. Therefore, not only the diplomatic career was undergoing an identity change domestically as well as internationally – more masculinized –, but the Itamaraty decision to prohibit women in 1938 is also part of a wider process of problematizing sexual divisions of labor and the role of women in public spheres, in its variety of meanings.

The first paragraph of the Brazilian study on women's admission into the diplomatic corps clarified that women's collaboration in public service was not at stake, and their rights were fully guaranteed in the *national* arena. One of the issues was that women "are not accepted in every country in perfect equal grounds as we wished".[5] Oswaldo Aranha indicated as one of the main "existing obstacles" to female representation abroad a presumed unpleasantness and "social prejudices" from other countries. Because diplomacy's success depended on representatives being "well accepted" in host countries, unwelcomed women would have their utility "sensibly diminished", being "doomed to fail" in their duty and possibly harming "the influence of diplomatic missions accredited to those countries".[6] For Brazil, this could also compromise the ongoing modernization process that sought a specific international participation to promote national development.

Hence, sending women to serve overseas represented, ultimately, a risk. A risk for bilateral relations between countries given that women, supposedly more fragile, would not be capable of exercising their duty efficiently when facing a number of possible hostilities and adversities, even as numerous personal experiences of women diplomats showed otherwise. It was also a risk for years of establishing homosocial norms and behaviors in diplomatic practice that could bring a woman's – or the nation's – honor into question, segregating women's participation in international affairs to topics understood as feminine, such as social and humanitarian issues, where many women indeed thrived, usually as delegates. Overall, in spite of the great individual achievements of some remarkable women, breaking the initial glass ceiling of the diplomatic career did not mean immediate acceptance into homosocial spaces of informal information-gathering. Frequently in diplomacy the line that determined an interaction

[5] CFSPC, "Admissão das mulheres nos Corpos Diplomáticos e Consular", [1937/1938], CPDOC-FGV, LSL apu 1935.08.14, p. 1.
[6] Ibid., p. 7, 18, 26.

as professional or social was very thin and blurred, and women diplomats had to find creative ways to handle delicate situations, particularly considering that men were already accustomed to the behavioral expectations of foreign representation.

Finally, it was a risk to marital hierarchy and family formation, as women were naturally expected to exclude themselves from the labor market upon marriage, or either to remain unmarried and childless as the price to pay for their ambition. The first obstacle for a married woman diplomat in Brazil was the legal necessity to obey her husband in accordance with the country's 1916 Civil Code. In what was viewed as a complex situation, a woman "subjected to the marital power" of the husband could be restrained in a position of leadership in a consulate or embassy. Another concern was the humiliation to which married women would submit their husbands. The idea of putting the husband in the same social position as the diplomatic wife – a figure with a well-defined social position in diplomatic and foreign relations – was considered foolish. The concern over male dependency and husband misplacement in international relations seemed to be more a societal fear over social norms than a reality in female diplomats' lives, who either were mostly single or resigned after marriage for many decades to come. In Brazil, only in 1996 a couple of diplomats were able to serve in the same foreign post with both of them receiving full salaries and benefits.

Despite attempting to contribute to the literature on the subject of women and gender in diplomacy, international politics, and civil service, this thesis also opens many possible doors for further research and in-depth analysis. First, as it is often highlighted, we have dealt with a social conception of women that mainly sees them as white and upper-class, broadly ignoring issues of race that have bluntly appeared in primary sources of personalities such as Oswaldo Aranha and Bertha Lutz. Some scholars of Itamaraty have recently entered this realm of research, but it is still vastly incipient and limited, especially in History. Second, issues of gender relating to temporary workers in Brazilian civil service, particularly in Itamaraty, seems to present a vast potential for deeper analysis of sexual divisions of labor in public administration. Third, we have indicated that Brazil at the time, at the brink of World War II, was preoccupied with reflecting an international image of strength, unity, and sovereignty, which offers many opportunities for further exploration of the gendered discourse of diplomatic and military foreign policy decision-makers. Lastly, despite important works already conducted on Bertha Lutz' international importance for women's rights domestically and globally, many other Brazilian women were engaged in transnational feminist movements and in foreign-policy making during this time. Their voices still need to be heard.

REFERENCES

Abbreviations

CFSPC	Federal Council of the Civil Public Service (*Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil*)
CLT	Consolidation of Labor Laws (*Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho*)
DASP	Administrative Department of the Public Service *(Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público*)
FBPF	Brazilian Federation for the Advancement of Women (*Federação Brasileira para o Progresso Feminino*)
FCO	U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FGV	Getúlio Vargas Foundation (*Fundação Getúlio Vargas*)
MRE	Ministry of Foreign Relations – Itamaraty (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*)
RSP	Civil Service Journal (*Revista do Serviço Público*)
UUF	Union of University Women (*União Universitária Feminina*)

Archives

- Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (AHI), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
  - Dossiê Temático Ministério das Relações Exteriores (DT-MRE)
  - Dossiê Temático Situação Política Interna (DT-SPI)
  - Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Atividade Meio (MRE-Atividade Meio)

- Arquivo Nacional (AN), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
  - Fundo Q0, Federação Brasileira para o Progresso Feminino (FBPF)
  - Fundo 35, Gabinete da Presidência da República (GPR)
  - Fundo 2C, Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público (DASP)

- Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPDOC-FGV), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
  - Fundo Getúlio Vargas (GV)
  - Fundo Luis Simões Lopes (LSL)
  - Fundo Luís Vergara (LV)
  - Fundo Oswaldo Aranha (OA)
  - Fundo Rosalina Coelho Lisboa (RCL)

- National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park (MD), United States
  - Record Group 59, Department of State Central Files (RG 59)
    - Central Decimal Files (CDF) 1930-1939
  - Record Group 86, Women's Bureau (RG 86)
    - General Records (GR) 1919-1952
    - Bulletins (1918-1963)

Newspapers and Publications

- Biblioteca Nacional, Hemeroteca Digital (http://bndigital.bn.gov.br/hemeroteca-digital/)
  - A Noite

- A Notícia
- Correio da Manhã
- Correio de São Paulo
- Correio Paulistano
- Diário da Noite
- Diário de Notícias
- Gazeta de Notícias
- Jornal do Brasil
- Jornal do Commercio
- Observador Econômico e Financeiro

- Biblioteca da Faculdade de Economia e Administração (FEA), Universidade de São Paulo (USP), São Paulo, Brazil
  - Revista do Serviço Público, Nov.1937 to Dec.1941

- Biblioteca Mario Henrique Simonsen (BMHS), Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPDOC-FGV), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
  - Relatórios Anuais DASP 1939, 1940, 1942, and 1943

- Biblioteca Presidência da República (http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/publicacoes-oficiais/catalogo/getulio-vargas/)
  - Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil, vols. II, III, IV and V.

Legislation

BRASIL, Law n. 3.071, January 1, 1916. *Civil Code on the United States of Brazil*. Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/1910-1919/lei-3071-1-janeiro-1916-397989-publicacaooriginal-1-pl.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree n. 19.592, January 15, 1931. *Reorganizes the services of the Ministry of Foreign Relations*. Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/1930-1939/decreto-19592-15-janeiro-1931-560166-republicacao-82860-pe.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree n. 21.076, February 24, 1932. *Enacts the Electoral Code.* Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/1930-1939/decreto-21076-24-fevereiro-1932-507583-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree n. 21.305, April 19, 1932. *Transfer to the Ministry of Foreign Relations the attributions of the National Department of Commerce related to international trade*. Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/1930-1939/decreto-21305-19-abril-1932-503669-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree n. 24.113, April 12, 1934. *Regulates the diplomatic and consular services*. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1930-1949/D24113.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Law n. 284, October 28, 1936. *Readjust careers and salaries of the civil public service of the Union and established a number of measures.* Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/1930-1939/lei-284-28-outubro-1936-503510-publicacaooriginal-1-pl.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 791, October 14, 1938. *Reorganizes the Ministry of Foreign Relations.* Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/declei/1930-1939/decreto-lei-791-14-outubro-1938-350339-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 2.548, August 31, 1940. *Allows the reduction of minimum salary in the cases and conditions mentioned.* Available at <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/declei/1940-1949/decreto-lei-2548-31-agosto-1940-412576-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 3.199, April 14, 1941. *Establishes the country's organizational base in sports*. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/1937-1946/Del3199.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 3.200, April 19, 1941. *Regulates on the organization and protection of the family.* Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del3200.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 4.244, April 9, 1942. *Organic Law of Secondary Education*. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/1937-1946/Del4244.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 5.452, May 1, 1943. *Approves the Consolidation of Labor Laws.* Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/del5452.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 9.202, April 26, 1946. *Regulates personnel at the Ministry of Foreign Relations*. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/1937-1946/Del9202.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Law n. 1.542, January 5, 1952. *Regulates marriage of the diplomatic career employees with person of foreign nationality*. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/1950-1969/L1542.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 69, November 21, 1966. *Complements other laws*. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/1965-1988/Del0069.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Decree-Law n. 2.234, January 23, 1985. *Limits the payment and other benefits to married diplomats serving together abroad*. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/1965-1988/Del2234.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Law n. 7.501, June 27, 1986. *Institutes the judicial regime of Foreign Service employees*. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L7501impressao.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

BRASIL, Law n. 9.392, December 19, 1996. *Disciplines payment and other benefits to Foreign Service career employees, married and serving together abroad*. Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9392.htm>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

Bibliography

ABREU, M. P. *O Brasil e a economia mundial, 1930-1945.* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1999

ACKER, J. Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations. *Gender and Society*, v. 4, n. 2, p. 139-158, jun. 1990.

AGGESTAM K.; TOWNS, A. E. (Eds.). *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018a.

AGGESTAM, K.; TOWNS, A. The gender turn in diplomacy: a new research agenda. *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* v. 30, n. 3, p. 1-20, 2018b.

ALBUQUERQUE, J. A. G. (Org.). *Sessenta anos de política externa brasileira (1930-1990).* (4 vols.). São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, 1996.

ALMEIDA, P. R.; ARAÚJO, J. H. P. Oswaldo Aranha: Na Continuidade do Estadismo de Rio Branco. In: PIMENTEL, J. V. S. (Org.). *Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro: Formuladores e Agentes da Política Externa (1750-1964). Volume III*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2013. pp. 669-714.

ALVES, B. M. *Ideologia e Feminismo. A luta da mulher pelo voto no Brasil.* Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980.

AÑAZCO DEFAZ, G. M. *Presencia de la mujer en la diplomacia: Una perspectiva feminista de las relaciones internacionales, el caso Ecuador 2000-2017.* 2018. 90 p. Master Thesis. Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar, Quito, 2018.

ARAÚJO, E. H. F. Globalismo: uma visão a partir do pensamento de Nietzsche. *Cadernos de Política Exterior,* v. 5, n. 8, p. 5-14, Aug. 2019. Available at <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/CadernosNº8.pdf>. Access on September 22, 2020.

ARAÚJO, R. O. *Nas engrenagens do Estado Novo: a centralidade do DASP na reforma administrativa e na criação de redes organizacionais de produção (1938-1945).* 2017. 367 p. PhD Dissertation. Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, 2017.

BALBINO, V. R. *Diplomata. Substantivo Comum de Dois Gêneros: Um retrato da presença feminina no Itamaraty no início do século XXI*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2011.

BASHEVKIN, S. *Women as Foreign Policy Leaders: National Security and Gender Politics in Superpower America.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018.

BESSE, S. K. *Modernizando a Desigualdade. Reestruturação da Ideologia de Gênero no Brasil. 1914-1940.* São Paulo, SP: EDUSP, 1999.

BETHELL, L.; ROXBOROUGH, I. *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

BIDAULT, S. *Par une porte entrebâillée ou Comment les Françaises entrèrent dans la "carrière".* Paris, 1972. Available at:

BLACHMAN, M. J. *Eve in an Adamocracy: the politics of women in Brazil.* 1976. 225 p. PhD Dissertation. New York University, New York, 1977.

BRANDÃO, L. et al. As Mulheres no Itamaraty: As Reformas do Ministério das Relações Exteriores à Luz da Teoria Feminista. *Monções - Revista de Relações Internacionais da UFGD*, Dourados/MS, vol. 6, n. 11, pp. 281-301, jan.-jul. 2017.

BURNS, E. B. *A aliança não-escrita: o Barão do Rio Branco e as relações Brasil-Estados Unidos.* Rio de Janeiro: EMC, 2003.

CALKIN, H. *Women in the Department of State: Their Role in American Foreign Affairs.* Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978.

CARONE, E. O *Estado Novo (1937-1945)*. Rio de Janeiro: Difel, 1977.

CASSIDY, J. A. (Ed.). *Gender and Diplomacy.* Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2017.

CASTRO, F. M. O. *1808-2008. Dois Séculos de História da Organização do Itamaraty. Vol I.* Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2009.

CASTRO, I. E. *Geografia e Política: Território, escalas de ação e instituições*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2005.

CAULFIELD, S. Getting into Trouble: Dishonest Women, Modern Girls, and Women-Men in the Conceptual Language of "Vida Policial", 1925-1927. *Signs*, v. 19, n. 1, p. 146-176, 1993.

CAULFIELD, S. *Em Defesa da Honra: Moralidade, modernidade e nação no Rio de Janeiro (1918-1940)*. Campinas: Unicamp, 2000.

CAULFIELD, S.; SCHETTINI, C. *Gender and Sexuality in Brazil since Independence.* Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Latin American History, oct. 2017. Available at <https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-296?print=pdf>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

CERVO, A.; BUENO, C. *História da Política Exterior do Brasil.* (4 ed.). Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2011.

CHAVES. L. G. B. Azevedo do Amaral. In: ABREU, Alzira Alves de et al (coords.). *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930.* Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010. Available at <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/amaral-azevedo-do>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

CHEIBUB, Z. B. Diplomacia e Construção Institucional: O Itamaraty em uma Perspectiva Histórica. *Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais,* Rio de Janeiro, vol. 28, n. 1, pp. 113-131, 1985.

CONNELL, R. W. *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

COWAN, B. A. *Securing Sex: morality and repression in the making of Cold War Brazil.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016.

DAVIES, M. W. *Women's place is at the typewriter: office work and officer workers 1870-1930.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982.

DÁVILA, J. *Diploma of Whiteness: race and social policy in Brazil, 1917–1945.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.

DELAMONICA, L. B. S. *Mulheres Diplomatas Brasileiras*. Master's Thesis. Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2014.

DENÉCHÈRE, Y. (Dir.). *Femmes et Diplomatie: France - XXe siècle.* Bruxelles: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 2004.

DEUTSCH, S. M. *Las Derechas: The extreme right in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 1890-1939.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

DIAS, M. O. S. *Quotidiano e poder em São Paulo no século XIX. Ana Gertrudes de Jesus*. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984.

DRAIBE, S. M. *Rumos e Metamorfoses: um estudo sobre a constituição do Estado e as alternativas da industrialização no Brasil (1930-1960)*. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2004.

DUERST-LAHTI, G. J. *Gender power relations in public bureaucracies.* 1987. 445 p. PhD Dissertation. University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987.

ENLOE, C. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.* 2ª ed. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014.

ELSHTAIN, J. B. *Women and war.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

ERLANDSSON, S. Off the record: Margaret van Kleffens and the gendered history of Dutch World War II diplomacy. *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* v. 21, n. 1, p. 29-46, 2019.

EXTERIORES, Mulheres Brasileiras na Diplomacia. Director: Ivana Diniz. Production: Argonautas. Screenplay: Ana Beatriz Nogueira e Ivana Diniz. 2018. (52 min). Available at <https://vimeo.com/303550770>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

FARIAS, R. "Do you wish her to marry?" Brazilian women and professional diplomacy, 1918-1938. *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* v. 28, n.1, p. 39-56, 2017.

FARIAS, R. S.; CARMO, G. F. Brazilian Female Diplomats and the Struggle for Gender Equality. In AGGESTAM K.; TOWNS, A. E. (Eds.). *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

FAUSTO, B. *A Revolução de 1930. Historiografia e História.* 5th ed. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1978.

FAUSTO, B. A Vida Política. In: SCHWARCZ, L. M. (Dir.). *História do Brasil Nação: 1808-2010*, *Volume 4, Olhando para Dentro (1930-1964)*. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2013. pp. 91-141.

FLORES-VILLALOBOS, J."Freak Letters": Tracing Gender, Race, and Diaspora in the Panama Canal Archive. *Small Axe*, v. 23, n. 2, p. 34-56, 2019.

FLOWERS, P. R. Women in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In AGGESTAM K.; TOWNS, A. E. (Eds.). *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018

FONTAINE, R. W. *The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Brazil.* 1970. 410 p. PhD Dissertation. John Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1970.

FRIAÇA, G. J. R. *Mulheres Diplomatas no Itamaraty (1918-2011): Uma análise de trajetórias, vitórias e desafios.* Brasília, DF: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018.

GAMBINI, R. *O duplo jogo de Getúlio Vargas.* São Paulo: Símbolo, 1977.

GARNER, K. *Women and Gender in International History: Theory and Practice.* London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

GOBO, K. L. *Noblesse D'état: do campo ao habitus da diplomacia brasileira.* 2016. 272 p. PhD Dissertation. Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 2016.

GOBO, K. Da Exclusão à Inclusão Consentida: negros e mulheres na diplomacia brasileira. *Política e Sociedade.* v. 17, n. 38, p. 440-464, Jan.-Apr. 2018.

GOOD, B. Women in the Foreign Service: a Quiet Revolution. *Foreign Service Journal*, jan. 1981.

GOLDWERT, M. *Democracy, militarism, and nationalism in Argentina, 1930–1966: An interpretation.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014.

GOMES, Ângela Maria de Castro et al. História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, Tomo III, o Brasil Republicano, Volume 10, Sociedade e Política (1930-1964). Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 1996.

GOMES, A. C. Introdução. In: GOMES, A. C. (Coord.). *Regionalismo e Centralização Política: Partidos e Constituinte nos anos 30.* Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1980.

GOMES, A. C. Introdução: As marcas do período. In: GOMES, A. C. (Coord.). *História do Brasil Nação: 1808-2010, Vol. 4, Olhando para dentro (1930-1964).* Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Objetiva, 2013. pp. 23-40.

GRAHAM, L. S. *Civil Service Reform in Brazil: principle versus practice.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1968.

HAAG, C. A Guerra dos Rosas. *Revista Pesquisa FAPESP*, n. 189, nov. 2011. Available at: <https://revistapesquisa.fapesp.br/a-guerra-dos-rosas/>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

HADDAD, T. M. A. *Diplomacia Pública: A política externa brasileira e as ONGs na Conferência de Beijing (1995)*. 2007. 153 f. Master's Thesis. PUC-RIO, Rio de Janeiro, 2007. Available at: <http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=10180@1>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

HAHNER, J. *Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women's Rights in Brazil, 1850-1940.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990.

HERREN, M. Gender and International Relations through the lens of the League of Nations (1919-1945). In SLUGA, G.; JAMES, C. (Eds.). *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics Since 1500.* New York: Routledge, 2016.

HILTON, S. "Ação Integralista Brasileira: Fascism in Brazil, 1932-1938." *Luso-Brazilian Review*, vol. 9, n. 2, p. 3–29, 1972

HILTON, S. *O Brasil e as Grandes Potências. Os aspectos políticos da rivalidade comercial (1930-1939).* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1977.

HOGANSON, K. L. *Fighting for American Manhood: How gender politics provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

HORNE, J. Masculinity in politics and war in the age of nation-states and world wars, 1850-1950. In: DUDINK, S.; HAGEMANN, K.; TOSH, J. (Eds.). *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History.* Machester: Machester University Press, 2004. pp. 22-40.

HUCK, J. Palma Guillén: Mexico's First Female Ambassador and the International Image of Mexico's Post-Revolutionary Gender Policy. *MACLAS Latin American Essays*, n. 13, p.159-171, 1999.

JAMES, C.; SLUGA G. Introduction: The long international history of women and diplomacy. In: SLUGA, G.; JAMES, C. (Eds.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500* (pp.182-201). New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.

KARAWEJCZYK, M. *As Filhas de Eva querem votar: dos primórdios da questão à conquista do sufrágio feminino no Brasil (c.1850-1932)*. Tese, Doutorado em História, IFCH/UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 2013.

KIDDLE, A. M. In Mexico's Defense: dueling, diplomacy, gender and honor, 1876-1940. *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos,* v. 31, n. 1, p. 22-47, 2015.

KRONSELL, Annica. Methods for studying silences: gender analysis in institutions of hegemonic masculinity. In: ACKERLY, Brooke A.; STERN, Maria; TRUE, Jacqui (Ed.). F*eminist Methodologies for International Relations.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. pp. 108-128.

LEVINE, R. M. *O Regime de Vargas: Os Anos Críticos, 1934-1938.* São Paulo, SP: Nova Fronteira, 1980.

LIMA, R. C.; OLIVEIRA, A. J. S. N. Manutenção e mudanças no Ministério das Relações Exteriores: perfis do corpo diplomático e padrões na carreira. *Revista de Administração Pública,* v. 52, n. 5, p. 797-821, Sept-Oct 2018.

LIMA, S. E. M.; ALMEIDA, P. R.; FARIAS, R. S. *Oswaldo Aranha: um Estadista Brasileiro.* Brasília: FUNAG, 2017

MACFADYEN, D. et al. *Eric Drummond and his Legacies: The League of Nations and the Beginnings of Global Governance.* Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

MARBEAU, M. Une Timide irruption: les femmes dans la politique étrangère de la France dans l'entre-deux-guerres. In: DENÉCHÈRE, Y. (Dir.). *Femmes et Diplomatie: France - XXe siècle.* Bruxelles: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 2004.

MARINO, K. M. Transnational Pan-American Feminism: The Friendship of Bertha Lutz and Mary Wilhelmine Williams, 1926-1944. *Journal of Women's History,* v. 26, n. 2, p. 63-87, summer 2014.

MARINO, K. M. *Feminism for the Americas, The Making of an International Human Rights Movement.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2019.

MARQUES, T. C. N. Entre o igualitarismo e a reforma dos direitos das mulheres: Bertha Lutz na Conferência Interamericana de Montevidéu, 1933. *Estudos Feministas,* v. 21, n. 3, p. 927-944, set.-dez. 2013.

MARQUES, T. C. N. *Bertha Lutz.* Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 2016a.

MARQUES, T. C. N. A regulação do trabalho feminino em um sistema político masculino, Brasil: 1932-1943. *Estudos Históricos*. v. 29, n. 59, p. 667-686, sept.-dec. 2016b.

MARQUES, T. C. N.; MELO, H. P. Os direitos civis das mulheres casadas no Brasil entre 1916 e 1962. Ou como são feitas as leis. *Revista Estudos Feministas.* Florianópolis, v. 16, n. 2, p. 463-488, mai.-ago. 2008.

MASON, T. Women in Germany, 1925-1940: family, welfare and work. Part I. *History Workshop Journal,* v. 1, n. 1, p. 74-113, 1976.

MATOS, M. I.; BORELLI, A. Espaço Feminino no Mercado Produtivo. In: PINSZKY, C. B.; PEDRO, J. M. (Org.). *Nova História das Mulheres no Brasil.* São Paulo: Contexto, 2013. pp. 126-147

McCANN, F. D. *Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos, 1937-1945*. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1995.

McCARTHY, H. Petticoat Diplomacy: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service, 1919-1946. *Twentieth Century British History*, v. 20, n. 3, p. 285-321, 2009.

McCARTHY, H. Gendering Diplomatic History: Women in the British Diplomatic Service, circa 1919-1972. In SLUGA, G.; JAMES, C. (Eds.). *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics Since 1500.* New York: Routledge, 2016.

McCARTHY, H.; SOUTHERN, J. Women, gender and diplomacy: a historical survey. In: CASSIDY, J. A. (Ed.). *Gender and Diplomacy.* Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2017.

McGLEN, N. E.; SARKEES, M. R. *Women in Foreign Policy: The Insiders*. New York: Routledge, 1993.

MOREIRA, R. L. Osvaldo Aranha. In: ABREU, Alzira Alves de et al (coords.). *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930*. Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010.

MORIN, A. M. Do Women Make Better Ambassadors? Study of 50 years of female envoys shows gender can be an advantage. *Foreign Service Journal.* dez. 1994.

MOSSE, G. L. *The Image of Man: The creation of Modern Masculinity.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

MOTTA, J. F.; GALVÃO, L. S. Getúlio e as garçonetes: o Decreto nº 21.417-A e a regulação do trabalho das mulheres (Brasil, primeiro governo de Vargas). In: GRANDI, G.; FALEIROS, R. N. (orgs.). *História Econômica do Brasil: Primeira República e Era Vargas.* Niterói: Eduff; São Paulo: Hucitec, 2020, p. 238-275.

MOURA, C. P. *O Instituto Rio Branco e a Diplomacia Brasileira: um estudo de carreira e socialização.* Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2007.

MOURA, G. *Autonomia na Dependência. A Política Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942*. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1980.

MRE, Ministério das Relações Exteriores. *As mulheres na diplomacia brasileira*. Brasília, 2019. Available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/sem-categoria/14063-as-mulheres-na-diplomacia-brasileira>. Access on: September 22, 2020.

NASH, P. A Woman's Place is in the Embassy: America's First Female Chiefs of Mission, 1933-1964. In SLUGA, G.; JAMES, C. (Eds.). *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics Since 1500.* New York: Routledge, 2016.

NASH, P. *Breaking Protocol: America's First Female Ambassadors, 1933-1964.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2020.

NEUMANN, I. B. The Body of the Diplomat. *European Journal of International Relations*, v. 14, n.4, p. 671–95, 2008.

NIKLASSON, B. The Gendered Networking of Diplomats. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* v. 15, p. 13-42, 2020.

NIKLASSON, B.; ROBERTSON, F. The Swedish MFA: Ready to live up to Expectations? In AGGESTAM K.; TOWNS, A. E. (Eds.). *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018

OKIN, S. M. Gênero, o Público e o Privado. *Revista Estudos Feministas.* v. 16, n. 2, p. 305-332, May-Aug 2008.

OLCOTT, J. *International Women's Year. The Greatest Consciousness-Raising Event in History.* New York: Oxford, 2017.

OLIVEIRA, A. P. C. *Diplomatas Negros(as): Ação afirmativa no Instituto Rio Branco e trajetórias de diplomatas (ex)bolsistas.* 2011. Master Thesis. Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, 2011.

OSTOS, N. S. C. D. A questão feminina: importância estratégica das mulheres para a regulação da população brasileira (1930-1945). *Cadernos Pagu*, n. 39, p. 313–343, dez. 2012.

PATEMAN, C. *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

PERROT, M. *As mulheres ou os silêncios da história.* Translation Viviane Ribeiro. Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 2005.

PETERSON, V. S. (Ed.). *Gendered States: Feminist (re)visions of International Relations Theory.* Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

PINHEIRO, L. *Política Externa Brasileira (1889-2002).* Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2004.

PINHEIRO, L.; VEDOVELI, P. Caminhos Cruzados: diplomatas e acadêmicos na construção do campo de estudos de Política Externa Brasileira. *Revista Política Hoje*, v. 21, n. 1, set. 2012.

PINTO, C. R. J. *Uma história do feminismo no Brasil.* São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2003.

QUEIROLO, G. A. *Mujeres en las oficinas, trabajo, género y clase en el sector administrativo (Buenos Aires, 1910-1950).* Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2018.

RICUPERO, R. *A diplomacia na construção do Brasil: 1750-2016.* Rio de Janeiro: Versal Editores, 2017.

ROSEMBAUM, J. A critique of the Brazilian foreign service. *The Journal of Developing Areas,* v. 2, n. 3, p. 377-392, 1968.

RUMELILI, B.; SULEYMANOGLU-KURUM, R. Women and gender in Turkish diplomacy: historical legacies and current patterns. In AGGESTAM K.; TOWNS, A. E. (Eds.). *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018

SAFFIOTI, H. *A Mulher na Sociedade de Classes. Mito e Realidade.* 3a ed. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2013.

SARAIVA, M. G.; SILVA, A. V. C. Ideologia e pragmatismo na política externa de Jair Bolsonaro. *Relações Internacionais*, n. 64, p. 117-137, Dec. 2019. Available at <http://www.scielo.mec.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1645-91992019000400008&lng=pt&nrm=iso> Access on: September 22, 2020.

SARDENBERG, C. Brazilian Feminisms in Global Spaces: Beijing and Beijing+20. *IDS Bulletin*. v. 46, n. 4, p. 115-122, 2015.

SAVAGE, M.; WITZ, A. (Eds.). *Gender and Bureaucracy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992.

SCHWARTZMAN, S.; BOMENY, H. M. B.; COSTA, V. M. R. *Tempos de Capanema*. São Paulo, SP: EDUSP, 1984.

SCOTT, J. Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis. *The American Historical Review*, v. 91, v. 5, p. 1053-1075, 1986.

SCOTT, J. W. *Gender and the Politics of History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

SCOTT, J. W. *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French feminists and the rights of man.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

SEIGEL, M. *Uneven Encounters: Making race and nation in Brazil and the United States*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

SIEGEL, G. *Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP.* Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978.

SKIDMORE, T. *Brasil: de Getúlio a Castelo, 1930-1964.* 14th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 2007.

SLUGA, G.; JAMES, C. (Eds.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500* (pp.182-201). New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.

SOIHET, R. Violência Simbólica: saberes masculinos e representações femininas. *Revista Estudos Feministas,* v. 5, n. 1, p. 7-20, 1997.

SOIHET, R. *O feminismo tático de Bertha Lutz*. Florianópolis: Edusc, 2006.

SOIHET, R. A Conquista do Espaço Público. In: PINSZKY, Carla B.; PEDRO, Joana M. (Org.). *Nova História das Mulheres no Brasil.* São Paulo: Contexto, 2013. p. 126-147.

STEINER, A. Q., COCKLES, M. As mulheres na carreira diplomática brasileira: considerações sobre admissão, hierarquia e ascensão profissional. *Monções - Revista de Relações Internacionais da UFGD*, v.6, n.11, p. 250-280, 2017.

STIENSTRA, D. Can the silence be broken? Gender and Canadian foreign policy. *International Journal,* v. 50, n. 1, pp. 103-127, 1994.

STROM, S. H. *Beyond the Typewriter: Gender, class, and the origins of modern American office work, 1900-1930.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992.

SYLVESTER, C. *Feminist international relations. An Unfinished Journey*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

TICKNER, J. A. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

TICKNER, J. A. *Gendering world politics, issues and approaches in the post-Cold War era.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001.

TRINDADE, H. *Integralismo: O Fascismo brasileiro na década de 1930*. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Difel Difusão Editorial, 1979.

VILHENA, C. P. S. A família na doutrina social da Igreja e na política social do Estado Novo. *Psicologia USP*, v. 3, n. 1–2, p. 45–57, 1992.

WAHRLICH, B. M. S. *Reforma Administrativa na Era de Vargas*. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1983.

WEFFORT, F. C. *O Populismo na Política Brasileira*. 5th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 2003.

WEINSTEIN, B. Making workers masculine: the (re)construction of male worker identity in twentieth-century Brazil. In: DUDINK, S.; HAGEMANN, K.; TOSH, J. (Eds.). *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History.* Machester: Machester University Press, 2004. pp. 276-294.

WEINSTEIN, B. *The Color of Modernity: São Paulo and the Making of Race and Nation in Brazil.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2015.

WILKINS, D. B. Gabriela con valija diplomática. La génesis de la vida consular de Gabriela Mistral. *Contextos: Estudios de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales,* n. 33, p. 113-124, 2015.

WOOD, M. Wives, Clerks, and 'Lady Diplomats': The Gendered Politics of Diplomacy and Representation in the U.S. Foreign Service, 1900-1940. *European Journal of American States.* v. 10, n. 1, 2015.