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FRANCESCA MERCURIO

The hybrid operationalization of Brazilian maritime security cooperation in the South Atlantic: an analysis of the West African case between solidarity rhetoric and pragmatic interests

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FRANCESCA MERCURIO

A híbrida operacionalização da cooperação brasileira em segurança marítima no Atlântico Sul: uma análise do caso da África Ocidental entre a retórica solidária e os interesses pragmáticos.

Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo e do King's College London, para a obtenção do título de Doutor em Ciências.

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Orientador: Prof. Dr. Kieran Mitton

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*As you set out for Ithaka
hope your road is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians, Cyclops,
angry Poseidon—don't be afraid of them:
you'll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians, Cyclops,
wild Poseidon—you won't encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope your road is a long one.
May there be many summer mornings when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you enter harbors you're seeing for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind—
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to learn and go on learning from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you're destined for.
But don't hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you're old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you've gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey.
Without her you wouldn't have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka won't have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you'll have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.*

C.P. Cavafy. 1975. *Ithaka*.
In C.P. Cavafy: Collected Poems, Princeton University Press.
Translated by E. Keeley

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*“We depend on the other in order for us to be fully who we are. (...)
The concept of Ubuntu says: A person is a person through other persons.”*

Desmond Tutu, 2016
In The Book of Joy: Lasting Happiness in a Changing World

By addressing the main essence of humanity in affirming that every individual inextricably belongs to a whole, and that there is no human prosperity and progress, if not shared with others, I want to acknowledge all those people that have joined me during this intense experience and that have contributed to my personal and academic growth.

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Without any of you I would have been something less. I am because we are.

Abstract

The main objective of the research is to understand how Brazil operationalized its engagement in maritime security over the South Atlantic Ocean within the framework of the South-South cooperation and how this practice inserted in its Foreign Policy agenda towards West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, in the period between 2003 and 2014, when the domestic political transformations contributed to positively influence the international participation of the country. More specifically, and through the case study of the multilevel cooperation in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, the research theoretically analyses the insertion of this cooperation within the model proposed by the Global South as response to the systemic challenges of the new millennium. The hypothesis that this work is addressing is that the relaunched Brazil's African Policy has been driven by a hybrid posture, an overlapping of both *soft power* and *hard power* strategies, also reflected by other emerging powers. They have introduced themselves in many cases as an alternative to the Northern and Western hegemony, affecting the dominant rules and institutions, but that have also adapted themselves to the existing mechanisms and practices. Hence, Brazil has looked at Africa as a stage where to play a protagonist role of leader, by promoting and engaging in bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation, including the security sector. However, the lacking hard power and material capabilities, as well as the political unwillingness to fully assume the responsibility of its, have made of the international mechanisms of cooperation a Brazilian preferred instrument of power, to be projected over its strategic area. The South Atlantic is today an area highly affected by security threats affecting multiple sectors of global governance and for this reason attracting many external actors. Within these dual features and moved by the desire to relaunch its African policy and guarantee its place in the new reconfiguration of international partnerships with the continent, Brazil is operating within a hybrid theoretical (and empirical) context of solidarity rhetoric about symmetries of power and fair development, on one hand, and a more realist strategy driven by its own interests and projections of power, on the other hand.

Keywords:

Regional Maritime Security, Brazil- Africa, Brazilian Foreign Policy, South-South Cooperation, Hybridism, Emerging Powers

Resumo

O objetivo principal da pesquisa é compreender como o Brasil operacionalizou sua presença na segurança marítima do Oceano Atlântico Sul no âmbito da cooperação Sul-Sul e como essa prática se inseriu na agenda de Política Externa para os países da África Ocidental do Golfo da Guiné, no período de 2003 a 2014, quando as transformações políticas nacionais influenciaram positivamente a participação internacional do país. Mais especificamente, e através do estudo de caso da cooperação multinível em segurança marítima no Golfo da Guiné, esta pesquisa analisa a inserção dessa cooperação dentro do modelo proposto pelo Sul Global e pelos atores emergentes, como resposta aos desafios sistêmicos do novo milênio. A hipótese que este trabalho aborda é que a Política Africana do Brasil foi impulsionada por uma postura híbrida, uma sobreposição de estratégias de *soft power* e *hard power*, também refletida por outras potências emergentes. Em muitos casos, eles se apresentaram como uma alternativa à hegemonia do Norte e do Oeste, afetando as regras e instituições dominantes, enquanto também se adaptaram aos mecanismos e práticas existentes. Assim, o Brasil vê a África como um palco onde assumir um papel protagonista de liderança, promovendo e engajando-se em formas de cooperação bilateral e multilateral, incluindo o setor de segurança. No entanto, a falta de *hard power* e de capacidades materiais, bem como a falta de vontade política de assumir plenamente as responsabilidades que isso demanda, fizeram dos mecanismos internacionais de cooperação um instrumento de poder preferencial do Brasil, a ser projetado sobre sua área estratégica. O Atlântico Sul é hoje uma área altamente afetada por ameaças à segurança que tocam vários setores da governança global e, por isso, atrai muitos atores externos. Dentro dessas dualidades e movido pelo desejo de relançar sua política africana e garantir seu lugar na nova reconfiguração das parcerias internacionais com o continente, o Brasil opera em um contexto híbrido, tanto teórico quanto empírico, de retórica solidária acerca das simetrias de poder e desenvolvimento, de um lado, e uma estratégia mais realista movida por seus próprios interesses e projeções de poder, de outro.

Palavras-chave:

Segurança Marítima Regional, Brasil-África, Política Externa Brasileira, Cooperação Sul-Sul, Hibridismo, Países Emergentes

**THE HYBRID OPERATIONALIZATION OF BRAZILIAN MARITIME
SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE WEST AFRICAN CASE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY RHETORIC AND
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Introduction

Initiated in the XVI century and characterized by the colonial system, the interaction between Brazil and Africa was established upon inter-oceanic peripheral trade networks, in which the colony was occupying a submitted position to the metropolis in the international market (VISENTINI, 2014). These relations between Brazil and the African continent have included periods of alternating distance and rapprochement, that have been significant in the twentieth century and have assumed a more pragmatic feature in the Cold War years and since the millennium turn (SARAIVA, 2012; VISENTINI, 2014). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, while Brazil has strengthened its contacts with old African partners, whose relationship was based on linguistic, cultural and historical similarities, it has also established relations with new African countries and engaged into a more equal and horizontal cooperation with the continent. This horizontal model of cooperation is a reproduction of previous mechanisms and practices of international relations coined and implemented by Southern countries during the previous decades, and has been oriented towards economic and political aspects, envisaging the promotion of development and the offering of technical assistance to those African states that do not possess sufficient capabilities and can be therefore negatively affected by the international rules of world politics and the liberal and globalized economics, still dictated by the North (PECEQUILO, 2008).

The growing interests of Brazil for Africa, and the expansion over the maritime space between them- the South Atlantic, may be seen as a pragmatic and strategic step taken in the direction of a more global insertion of the country in the international system, not just as an emerging economic market or a regional and soft middle power, but also as a global player, a “driving force in a changing world order” (LOPES; CASARÕES; GAMA, 2013, p. 2). As Benzi claimed out, Brazilian political aspirations in the new millennium have aimed to transform the country into a significant international pole in the renewed global configuration (BENZI, 2015, p. 59), interpreting a role that is considered “natural” for the country (LIMA; HIRST, 2006). Given its large country’s

capacities in a peaceful region like South America, its independent stance and the recent international system as an influential global player, a more decisive international policy entrepreneur and decision-maker (BENNER, 2013), able to participate in and challenge the global governance and its mechanisms. Therefore, keeping in mind such high aims, Brazil has been aware of the importance of gradually achieving recognition of its leadership at a regional level first, including into the definition of region both the South-America and the maritime space in front of it, the South Atlantic Ocean (BRASIL, 2012; LIMA; HIRST, 2006; MALAMUD, 2011).¹

Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that, although the regional and global aspiration of the country in the new millennium has been quite significant, the desire to assume the leadership over the South Atlantic region (among others) has not been linked to any authoritarian or imperialistic posture. Brazil has instead assumed a benevolent and solidarity commitment towards the South Atlantic actors, for achieving development, cooperation and the establishment of a peace and security area. Its leadership has been understood and practiced by the country as a form of “cooperative hegemony” (PEDERSEN, 2002), that recognizes Brazil’s limited hard power and the need to focus on softer strategies and cooperative mechanisms of multilateral participation, to achieve global influence and legitimate its leadership.

The new millennium’s restructuring of the international system has gone hand in hand with the political, economic and diplomatic activism of Brazil, resulted from the renewed power configuration occurred with the emergence of economic and political actors (here considering the BRICS group, exclusively)² and often directed at challenging

¹ According to the White Book of Brazil’s National Defence (2012), the South Atlantic consists of the maritime broader area that extends from South America to the West African coasts, forming a region in which the implementation of a policy of cooperation and of strengthening the economic and political ties would contribute to Brazilian promotion of its political and economic interests, while also promoting the country’s international standing. Hence, since the new millennium, the South Atlantic has covered a major concern and interest within the Brazilian government, and mainly within the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE- also known as *Itamaraty*) and the Ministry of Defence, together with the Armed Forces of the country, and especially with the Navy of Brazil.

² In 2001, for the very first time the acronym of BRIC was coined by Jim O’Neill - chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management International- to group together international actors which economic growth had reached unprecedented and unexpected path of speed and extension. The acronym is an indicator of the extraordinary capabilities of countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China in achieving significant economic power and growth and strength their political and diplomatic presence in the challenging of the international system and in its restructuration towards a less asymmetric architecture and management, initiating from the subverting of the traditional models of cooperation and relationships among states.

the existing structures and mechanisms of governance. In this context, emerging powers have attempted to subvert the traditional models of cooperation and international relations, emphasising the need to promote development and independence of the Global South (PECEQUILO, 2008). They wished to abolish the South's accepted condition of underdevelopment and to destroy the vicious cycle of indebtedness and poverty that prevents it from being self-sufficient and detached from the centre (MUHR, 2016), while also to focus on geopolitical strategies, economic and trade interests and possession of territories and resources. The result of this engagement into the African continent has assumed the format of a "new great dispute for Africa" among emerging and traditional actors, as reported by the Financial Times, in 2008.³

The increased presence of emerging powers in Africa and the aggressive and self-interested policies implemented by China and India mainly (CHERU; OBI, 2011; KRAGELUND, 2010), have contributed to transform the continent into a commodity's market and field of extended agricultural production to cover the domestic supply of lands, resources and food security (STUENKEL, 2014). Their presence has also served strategic national interests related to trade and investments, infrastructure and defence, access to raw materials and energy opportunities- mainly oil and gas (VINES et al., 2009), as well as the achievement of international prestige (CHERU; OBI, 2011; NAIDU, 2009).⁴ Furthermore, the Brazilian engagement with Africa inserts within this competitive context, worsened by the invasive presence of traditional powers in African lands and waters, and stresses the Brazilian need to secure its strategic area, by containing those external forces (MOROSINI; SANCHEZ-BADIN, 2015), and their growing interest for the huge amount of the available natural resources of the African lands and of the South Atlantic waters (PENHA, 2011, p. 116).

Brazilian position in this context was not different neither, as South Atlantic-together with Western Africa- have been considered "Brazil's significant regional strategic environment in the 21st century" (FIORI, 2013, p. 44). The international power

³ Available at; <https://www.ft.com/content/a6a63200-cad7-11dc-a960-000077b07658> . Accessed in November 15th, 2016.

⁴ For the discussion about the presence and policies of China and India in Africa, see: CHERU, Fantu, and OBI Cyril. 2010. *The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions*. London: Zed Books. For the Chinese case see: TAYLOR, I. 2004. The 'all-weather friend'? Sino-African interaction in the twenty-first century. In Taylor, I. and Williams, P. (ed.). *Africa in International Politics. External Involvement on the Continent*. London: Routledge, p. 83-101. For the Indian case see: AGRAVAL, S. 2007. Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: the India case. *IDRC Report*. Canada.

configuration of the new millennium permitted Brazil to safeguard its national interests and global aspirations and strengthen its power, leadership and autonomy *vis-à-vis* the traditional Northern powers and other emerging actors, especially China (CHERU; OBI, 2011), which presence is growing significantly in the South Atlantic waters in last decade, and could have mined the Brazilian region building projects over the South Atlantic.⁵

In the new millennium, international actors looked back at the water spaces, recognizing the “enabling power of oceans” (SILVA, 2017, p. 238) and therefore refusing the idea that oceans and seas were representing a barrier to the power expansion of states. Instead, they were allowing for “the generation of wealth, projection of military forces, and the influence of the international politics in war or peace” (ibid. 2017, p. 237). Hence, the underwater wealth and relevant geographic position of the South Atlantic ocean have transformed it into a geo-strategic political, economic, trade and energy space and attracted the interest of multiple actors (CHERU; OBI, 2011; KORNEGAY; LANDSBERG, 2009). Furthermore, it has also favoured the emergence of violent threats and social tensions for access to, control and management of the area and its resources, especially over the African coasts and the instable Gulf of Guinea region (BASSOU, 2017; WEF, 2019).

⁵ The presence of China in the African continent is dated to the 1950s when the country was supplying food and medicines to the African states and intensified during the Cold War, as a form to gain votes and supports from the most of the international community in the Taiwan Quest and in the recognition of the “One China Policy” (ALDEN, 2007). In the new millennium, the African continent became a major priority in the Chinese Foreign Policy and the country-continent cooperation increased. As part of its Western expansion, China also engaged into global security and oriented its actions towards a broader area to secure, moving beyond the Asia-pacific region and focusing also on the security of the African continent, promoting ambitious programmes that challenges the models of governance, militarisation, technology and infrastructure (GLOBAL RISK INSIGHT, 2020). In 2018, the creation of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, within the framework of the FOCAC (Forum China-Africa Cooperation) has represented the highest moment of an already mature security cooperation, with China significantly contributing to the UN peacekeeping and police troops in operations within the African continent, the opening of a Chinese operational military basis in Djibouti to fight regional piracy, as well as to display humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, but also in playing a deterrent role and in controlling a strategic corridor for economic profits. Furthermore, China is increasing its security commitments by engaging in an expanded understanding of security (food, energy, maritime security and so on), partnering with the AU for technical and military expertise, for the creation of the African Standby Force, and for the capacitation of African forces and the strengthening of its security architecture. However, the expansion over the West Africa region and the Chinese operationalization of seven West African ports, due to the critical features of the strategically relevant Gulf of Guinea, is of course increasing the concern of other international actors, both traditional and other emerging ones (GLOBAL RISK INSIGHT, 2020), among which Brazil, that fears a military projection of the Chinese power in the South Atlantic.

Because of globalization, local security threats of this area have shortly assumed a transnational character, spreading into geographic proximities, overcoming borders and assuming global dimensions, requiring external interventions and multilateral joint actions to maintain stability and security into the African continent and also into the South Atlantic waters (GILPIN, 2004; RASHEED, 1996). Therefore, Brazil expanded its international engagement through bilateral and multilateral cooperation over the Ocean and with West African countries, while establishing a new foreign policy priority within the context of the “Global South” (CHRISTENSEN, 2012; VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007) and under the aegis of the South-South cooperation model for development.

This dissertation aims to understand how Brazil operationalizes the South-South Cooperation in its Foreign Policy towards the African continent and the South Atlantic, in the period between 2003 and 2014, when the continent, and the maritime space in the middle, returned to have a major strategic and pragmatic relevance with the election of Luis I. Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014) at the presidency. Their governments produced a political change in the domestic context that also affected the Brazilian foreign policy agenda towards a major international role and global aspirations, a diversification of partners and sectors and participation in multilateral mechanisms and variable geometry groupings, for the achievement of autonomy and development (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007) and the setting up of a region building process over the South Atlantic, through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of cooperation.

By focusing on the maritime security and defence cooperation, Brazil has been oriented towards the protection of the oceanic waters in cooperation with African countries and within international frameworks, aimed to guarantee its national interests (oil production, maritime control, defence industry among others) (AGUILAR, 2013), to enhance some benefits and advantages in the power competition with other international actors, and to secure its growing position as assertive global player (LEITE, 2011; VAZ, 2015) and the regional predominance in the South-Atlantic (MIGON; SANTOS, 2012). This seems to have contributed to shadow, in some cases, the declared South- South solidarity aspect of its African policy (KRAGELUND, 2010), and to guarantee its presence and power into the continent through a smart way of competing with other external powers (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; AGUILAR, 2013; KENKEL, 2013).

Given the current relevance that emerging countries and the regional integration processes have assumed in the last decade and how they have contributed to the transformation of the international system, this work considers the augmenting of the Brazilian presence in Africa as consequence of the systemic power distribution and the resulted states' competition (SCHWELLER, 2011). The focus of the dissertation is structured around a comparison between the Brazilian discourse and its practice, when related to relevance of the South Atlantic and the intensification of the African policy in maritime security field. The South Atlantic maritime space and the 'oriental frontier' of Brazil have represented a source of resources- mainly natural and mineral resources discovered in the Blue Amazon and on the African coasts of the South Atlantic (AGUILAR, 2013), as well as they have contributed to increase international power and development of the country. The increasing Brazilian presence in the South Atlantic would have also contributed to the protection of trade routes, to assist in the mapping international and delimitation of national waters, supporting African countries to advance with legal claims for the expansion of their continental shelf and to keep third parties' interests (both states and non-state actors, also violent ones) out from the "underwater mineral wealth" (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014c; AGUILAR, 2013; SEABRA, 2016).

This work aims to demystify the overstated concepts of solidarity cooperation among Southern countries, horizontality and the Brazilian mutual assistance for the development of the West Africa's coastal countries, recognizing the strategic perception of the oriental border as optimal to enhance national, regional (over the South-Atlantic) and international goals, and to achieve power, status and resources. However, by recognizing the intermediary position of Brazil (as middle and emerging power) in the international system, and the limited material capabilities it still owns to advance with a hard power strategy within the South Atlantic, on one hand; and by also focusing on pragmatism, diplomatic skills and multilateralism' preference of the country to achieve Brazilian strategic objectives, on the other hand, the following section attempts to highlight the hybridity of the Brazilian foreign policy in the international system. It analyses the Brazilian hybridism in the field of international security and in addressing security concerns over the South Atlantic and more specifically the Gulf of Guinea, focusing on the content analysis of its discourses related to the topic and stressing over

the overlapping of strategies that combine the aspirations of the country with its recognized limitations.

1.1 Research Question and Hypothesis

The main objective of the research is to understand how Brazil operationalized its engagement in maritime security over the South Atlantic Ocean within the framework of the South-South cooperation and how this practice inserted in its Foreign Policy agenda towards West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, in the period between 2003 and 2014, when the domestic political transformations contributed to positively influence the international participation of the country. The hypothesis that this work aims to verify is that the relaunched Brazil's African Policy has been driven by an overlapping of both soft power and hard power strategies aimed to achieve its global aspiration of emerging country and reformer of the systemic structure, while at the same time using multilateral security mechanisms to share the responsibilities and obligations that come with the increasing of power and leadership. This overlapping of practices and understanding of its political role, however, seems to have created a hybrid feature and position of Brazil, and more in general of the emerging powers of the new millennium, that have introduced themselves in many cases as an alternative to the Northern and Western hegemony, affecting the dominant rules and institutions, but that have also adapted themselves to the existing mechanisms and practices.

To achieve a comprehensive and satisfactory answer to this research objective, the following chapters have been structured to gradually approach the topic, by responding to more specific questions. First, is the reformulation of the SSC proposed by emerging powers in the new millennium, a hybrid solution, rather than an alternative, to the development of the Global South? Second, to what extent has the insertion of the Brazil's African policy into the framework of the SSC been strategic to the Foreign Policy objectives of the country to contain and limit the presence of external powers along the West African coasts, and mainly in its strategic area- the South-Atlantic? And finally, how has Brazil operationalized its maritime security cooperation within the Gulf of Guinea to keep peace and stability in the region and in the South Atlantic and to also promote the development of African partners?

The SSC model indicates a horizontal regional or inter-regional axis among developing and less developed countries (PECEQUILO, 2008). In the new millennium, the emergence of international powers from the South has favoured a reformulation of the boundaries and principles of this model, that is more actively claiming for the proposal of an alternative development model for the Global South. This latter wishes to distance itself from the traditional North-South models of cooperation (BROWN, 2000; MUHR, 2016; SAKSENA, 1985) and attempts to challenge the systemic power distribution in the international configuration, towards a fairer and more secure world (SCHWELLER, 2011). Indeed, under the aegis of the SSC, Global South states have internationally presented themselves as an unitary actor (BROWN, 2000), aimed to move forward their traditional submitted position, reduce the negative consequences of an unequal development process by ensuring a sustainable socioeconomic growth and advocate a more “multipolar and democratic world” (MARQUES; SPANAKOS, 2014; OLIVEIRA; LESSA, 2006).

However, rhetoric about solidarity, mutual assistance, complementarity may not be transformed into practice when economic and structural asymmetries exists among countries; neither when the political will of doing that is strong (VISENTINI, 2009). It seems that the concept of South-South Cooperation is refusing to deal with the existence of power and economic asymmetries among the Southern hemisphere and therefore, the possibilities of dependencies among the stronger and the weaker economies of the Global South that will reproduce once again the same traditional relation (CARLSSON, 1982). This criticism reflects Henrique Altemani de Oliveira observation and distinction of the two moments of SSC (during the Cold War and in the new millennium) that assume in the African continent a greater visibility:

South-South Cooperation does not have, nowadays, the same meaning it had in the Cold War period. Today it is selective and hierarchical, involving emerging countries that do not wish structural changes of the international order anymore, but a re-adaptation of the rules to allow for the realization of their own interests (DE OLIVEIRA, 2010, p. 89-translation is our).

By looking more closely at our case study, this work is analysing the Brazilian foreign policy, its insertion within the legal framework of the South-South Cooperation and the pragmatism of its action for the achievement of national interests and goals. It is looking at the perception of SSC’s principles of solidarity and mutual assistance,

horizontality and symmetric relations (PECEQUILO, 2008), as a strategy of Foreign Policy of Brazil and to the intensification of the relations with African countries, as a way to attempt to evaluate how the (sometimes overstated) idea of solidarity is working in practice and whether it differs from the expressed rhetoric of the country. Furthermore, it is also focusing on to what extent the Brazil's African policy may be seen as a reaction of the country to the increasing presence of other powers in the continent, and mainly in its strategic area: the South-Atlantic.

The understanding of the international cooperation for development as an instrument of foreign policy and international participation seems to be significant for those middle and emerging powers (like Brazil) that aspire to become influent over the international system, but that lack of material resources and coercive measures of power (KEOHANE, 1969). Indeed, despite the more prominent role in global affairs and the growing perception of its significant and necessary actorness in the regional context and sphere of action, Brazil seemed to have been strictly linked to, and in some cases limited by, its features of middle power, with great diplomatic skills but lacking of sufficient and necessary material capabilities to act more decisively than a “would be” great power (HURRELL, 2006). Therefore, the launching of cooperative mechanisms and the sharing of interests, responsibilities and duties, as well as the preference for smart power practices may favour those countries that otherwise will not be able to rise themselves and their voice within the systemic structure.

Furthermore, by recognizing the priority interests of Brazil and their evolution all over the last two decades, as well as the areas in which the country is investing within the framework of the SSC, it is possible to perceive a more active engagement of the country in what concerns the SSC, both in terms of expanding the bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries, as well as in expanding the cooperative sectors. Since 2008 the country has promoted a cooperation in defence and security with African countries, aimed to maintain the peace, the stability and the security into what has been considered- by the documents of defence and strategic policy-⁶ as the strategic environment of the

⁶ The main documents of the Brazilian Defence sectors (the National Defence Policy- PDN, *Política de Defesa Nacional*, of 2005; the National Defence Strategy – END, *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*, of 2008; and third the 2012 White Book of National Defence – LBDN, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*) look at and highlight the relevance of the South Atlantic Ocean for the Brazilian sovereignty and prestige and recognize the need of the country to increase its control capacities upon its maritime domain.

country, other than the South American region: the South Atlantic and the countries of the West African coast (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; AGUILAR, 2013; KENKEL, 2013).

This expansion of cooperative sectors is linked to the SSC's recognition of the reciprocity and link between development and security, being stressed further by the official discourses of emerging powers, like BRICS, and mainly by Brazil in the formulation of its foreign policy. Based on this interconnection between security and development and the cyclical need to address the former to achieve the latter (and *vice versa*), this work has stressed the attention on the military cooperation of Brazil into the maritime security field. Moreover, by cooperating with the African countries, it aims to evaluate the role of the South American country as security actor in the South Atlantic and consequently into the promotion of development of African countries of the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), a region that in the last two decades has witnessed a growing amount of security threats of any kind, that have transformed the region into one of the most insecure maritime space in the world (IMB, 2018; ONE EARTH FUTURE, 2020; OTTO, 2014).

Although the underwater wealth and the relevant geographic position have transformed the GoG into a geo-strategic political, economic, trade and energy space (CHERU; OBI, 2011; KORNEGAY; LANDSBERG, 2009), it has also favoured the emergence of violent threats and social tensions for access, control and management over the area's resources (BASSOU, 2017; WEF, 2019). Because of globalization, local security threats shortly assume a transnational aspect, spreading not only to geographic proximities, but overcoming borders and assuming global dimensions, requiring multilateral joint interventions to maintain stability and security (GILPIN, 2004; RASHEED, 1996).⁷ Therefore, through the military soft power strategies in the maritime security field, the overseeing of alliances with West African countries and the participation into multilateral mechanisms of intervention in the Gulf of Guinea, Brazil attempt to secure the Ocean and its natural resources from the growing threats to international security and third parties' interests. The analysis of the overlapping of these multiple practices and mechanisms is contributing to shape the Brazilian agency in the field of maritime security over the South Atlantic and to create a basis for the evaluation

⁷ The increasing cases of piracy, armed robbery, crude oil theft, illegal oil bunkering, illegal unregulated fishing, marine pollution, illicit drug and human trafficking and smuggling, targeting mainly oil vessels and kidnapping ships and crew have become a major security concern not just in the region, but worldwide (ICG, 2012).

of the Brazilian instrumentalization of the SSC and the achievement of both security and development.

The external presence of international actors into the South Atlantic seems to have affected the regional aspirations of Brazil of exerting its influence and leadership over the oceanic region. In addition, the increasing engagement of other emerging powers, into a space that Brazil aims to control, and the intensification of global threats that would have worsened the stability, peace and development of the African countries and consequently of the neighbourhoods, pushed Brazil to cooperate also into the maritime security and defence field. However, we understand that the broadening of the areas of cooperation of Brazil with West African countries and the inclusion of a matter of hard politics also respond to the desire of the country of being a more proactive and exemplar partner for the Global South (LEITE, 2011; VAZ, 2015), based on the historical similarities, the common experiences of underdevelopment and dependence from the North and the inclusion within an identity group of Southern countries (Global South), aimed to strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* the hegemonic and asymmetric structures of the international system (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; KENKEL, 2013). Of course, the need to safeguard national interests, both political and diplomatic, as well as energy ones, other than just economics, continue to be considerable factors (AGUILAR, 2013).

This research attempts to demonstrate that the Brazilian choice for inserting its African and South Atlantic strategy within the boundaries of a horizontal cooperation model and the strength of political, economic, social, cultural (among others) ties with the neighbour continent, has been dictated by Brazil's structural limitations and weaknesses in the international system and its diplomatic action oriented toward positive, respectful and non-coercive intentions related to other countries. Brazil has extensively accumulated soft power through the increased international profile and the attractiveness of socioeconomic policies at home, complemented by the inhibition of Brazilian diplomatic body and government in using traditional measures of hard power-based strategic influence toward the strategic region of the South Atlantic (KENKEL, 2013). By stating that "[...] it is possible to help without interfering in other nation's internal

affairs”,⁸ and preferring a diplomatic and affirmative attitude in dealing with other international actors, the country has attempted to participate to the global game as a normative power, a benevolent leader and as representative of the concept of cooperative hegemon (PEDERSEN, 2002), in the pursuit of a “cooperative and inclusive multipolarity” (CERVO, 2010).⁹

Therefore, between 2003 and 2014 the Brazil’s African policy seems to have been driven by an overlapping of both soft power and hard power strategies aimed to achieve its global aspiration of emerging country and reformer of the systemic structure, while at the same time using multilateral security mechanisms to share- or to fully avoid- the responsibilities and obligations that an aspiring regional leader and global player should engage with (HIRST, 2011, p. 32). This *overlapping* of practices and understanding of its political role, however, seems to have created a *hybrid* feature and position of Brazil, and more in general of the emerging powers of the new millennium, that have introduced themselves in many cases as an alternative to the Northern and Western hegemony, affecting the dominant rules and institutions, but that have also adapted themselves to such mechanisms and practices. It seems that, in short time, emerging powers have challenged the architecture of world politics, both regionally and in their hemispheric context (COOPER; ANTKIEWICZ, 2008; NOLTE, 2010), by assuming a double and “schizophrenic” character of *system- affecting* and *system- adapting* actors (AYOOB, 2002). Randall Schweller (2011) goes further into this schizophrenia, by claiming that emerging powers may play different roles, assuming the features of "spoilers, supporters or shirkers" of the "new international disorder", depending "on the issue and the audience" (2011, p. 287).

Hence, despite the more prominent role in global affairs and the growing perception of its significant and necessary actorness in the extended regional context (the South Atlantic), Brazil seemed to have been strictly linked to, and in some cases limited

⁸ Discourse released by the President Luis I. Lula Da Silva, at the 4 th IBSA Summit in Brasilia, April 15 th 2010. Available at: http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/images/stories/President%20Brazil%20Speech_4.pdf

⁹ Faria and Paradis (2013) affirmed that the ‘non-interference’ of Brazilian Foreign Policy, as well as the one of non- intervention in defence of the self-determination of the countries were not meaning “indifference” toward the problems and experiences of other states and people. This last principle came to justify the interventions made for humanitarian assistance (i.e. peacekeeping operations), but also debt relief of developing countries and the establishment of cooperation with Third World countries to promote social development and the “for a more equitable international system, but also for social justice” (FARIA; PARADIS, 2013, p. 13).

by, its features of middle power, with great diplomatic skills but lacking sufficient and necessary material capabilities to act more decisively than Hurrell's "would be" great power (2006). Interested in the benefits in terms of global power deriving from the participation in existing hegemonic structures, emerging powers, like Brazil, accept to be co-opted by the dominant rules and institutions and to agree with the *status quo*, rather than being completely critical to it.

The analysis of the Brazil- Africa relationship and cooperation for development of the new millennium, is proving Brazilian beneficial returns in terms of trade and investment sector, as it has offered the possibility to explore new markets, export manufactured goods and guarantee energy security (STUENKEL, 2014). This attitude, not exclusive of Brazil, seems to have shadowed the solidarity aspect of SSC, in favour of a soft imperialism at least in economic, trade and business areas, or a "colonialism by invitation" (CHERU; OBI, 2011, p. 107), in which African states choose for giving up their own autonomy, resources and independence, in exchange of development, growth and the truly trust in the rhetoric of solidarity, mutual assistance and common prosperity (ibid. 97). As Gosovic (2016) questioned:

Are not all the BRICS countries, inspired by their rising power, size and importance, aiming to 'graduate' and be admitted to the select club of Western powers? Are they not keen to take part in carving their own spheres of influence in the South and worldwide, driven by the ineluctable logic of global capitalism and the inertia of power? (GOSOVIC, 2016: 742).

Moreover, the establishment of bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation with African countries, as well as the significant investments made in security, defence, peace operations and humanitarian assistance, show the interests of emerging powers in cementing its international role and reducing the power gap among themselves and the Northern and developed actors, as it happens in the case of Brazil (KENKEL, 2013). Nevertheless, emerging powers have also contributed to create other asymmetric configurations of forces that have distanced the most proactive countries of the Global South from those practices of democratization and social justice within the international system. Indeed, the largely accepted principle of non-conditionality for providing assistance from South to South (derived by the principle of non-interference)- that was supposed to represent an instrument to challenge Western development rules (STEPHEN, 2012)- is halting the changing of rooted African problems, like lack of human rights, political and economic instability, conflict and social injustice and unrepresentative

institutions, and therefore the achieving of development itself. Hence, it seems that by cooperating, Africa and Brazil were working to deter other countries (both emerging and traditional powers) to interfere in local questions into the South Atlantic (MOROSINI; SANCHEZ-BADIN, 2015, p. 11). Despite all, this non-interference of other countries in the African territory looked like it would have been more beneficial to Brazil (and the other emerging powers, individually) rather than to the entire continent.

1.3 Relevance of the Research

The choice for analysing Brazil's African policy within the framework of the SSC and the maritime security cooperation with West African countries as main object of this paper is related to few features, that contribute to make this work relevant, both in theoretical and empirical terms and that stress over the need to further engage with this discussion in future research projects.

Therefore, among the reasons that have motivated and driven the elaboration of this dissertation, it is firstly necessary to highlight the role covered by the specialized literature about Brazilian foreign policy and Brazilian international role, especially when compared to works addressing the participation of other emerging powers in the international system. A vast majority of the academic literature is describing the Brazilian engagement with the Africa as benevolent and altruistic, interested in the promotion of an universal idea of solidarity and development of the global South, held on mutual reciprocity, assistance and learning, as well as responsibility, respect and recognition among countries (DOELLING, 2008; HARSCH, 2004; KRAGELUND, 2010). This naive and cooperative role of Brazil seems to be overstated by both academic and diplomatic discourses that rely exclusively on the idea of solidarity of SSC, ignoring those factors that influence a more pragmatic, and self-interested role of Brazil in the international system, and that might have somehow supported the creation of a new asymmetric configuration of forces within the international system, with Brazil attempting to assert its growing global position (LEITE, 2011; MIGON; SANTOS, 2012; VAZ, 2015).

By referring to the motivations caused by the changing international context in the new millennium, the research inserts into those analyses addressing the transformation of

the systemic polarity towards the dominance of a multipolar structure of international relations. This latter has been intensified by the emergence of international actors from the South, aimed to create a Global South identity and to subvert the hegemonic rules and mechanisms of the international system dictated by Western powers. The more active engagement of those actors, always subaltern and silent in the elaboration of conceptual understandings and practical mechanisms, has questioned the *status quo* of the IR discipline and contributed to expand its discussion within a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist approaches.

Despite all, this dissertation opted for a theoretical framework that spaces between mainstream theories of the discipline of International Relations – Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism- put in conversation among themselves on the basis of similar epistemological issues, and the inclusion of analytical approaches and elements borrowed from the Postcolonial and the Security Studies. Whether rationalist approaches sometimes omit and bypass the more domestic and individualistic aspects in the analysis of specific phenomena; exclusive constructivist and post- modernist approaches may produce a naive analysis, a “genuine” rhetoric that does not converge into the practice nor, in the case of this paper, reflect the desire of emerging powers’ acts of being seen as promoters of alternatives, forgetting about the reality and the system in which those actions took place and the limits that the structure imposes.

Hence, the proposal of a theoretical connection and complementarity of domains, that attempts to explain as much as possible of the empirical facts under observation, can contribute to a better understanding of emerging phenomena and situations. In addition, it is also relevant in this work the expansion of the IR focus from exclusive Western/ Northern paradigms and parameters of thought. It attempts to overcome the global imperialism and colonial affirmation of the context within which knowledge and power have been developed and spread around and considers non-western discussion (but also- and above all- practices) into its borders, distancing this latter from the colonial ideologies that the Western world has given it and integrate non-Western thought into the study of the global system (SHILLIAM, 2011, p. 3).

The transformation mainly occurred in the last decades, when the international system has turned towards a less state-centric structure and the analysis of world politics came to include the appearance and the actions of societies and individuals as well as

non-states actors (including the violent ones). Related to the security field of the discipline, states started to share with other actors both the being the subject and the object of security and the same security concept has expanded into a more human and societal approach, consequence of the multiple insecurities (KALDOR, 2006) impacting upon interconnected sectors, like states' economics, politics, society, environment and human beings (BUZAN; WAEVER; WILDE, 1998; KALDOR, 2006). The spread of globalization and the growing interdependence among states have also contributed to those transformations into the global security governance (DAVIS, 2004), mainly because locally caused and developed threats can easily spread to other countries, affecting the security, economic, social and political interests. By reducing the distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and lowering the state borders (BRANDÃO, 2015), as well as by interpreting any issue as a possible security threat, many features of the Global South and in particular of the African continent have been subjected to exceptional security practices and policies. Among these features, some authors remind the pejorative significance given to African poverty and underdevelopment (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005; AIMÉ, 2013).

The connection between security and development started to be clearer in the international agenda; and nowadays, the nexus is assuming growing relevance in the fields of International Relations and Security Studies, being used as main justification for international actors' interventions outside their sovereign domain, to guarantee security, that will eventually promote development (CHANDLER, 2007). This holistic approach to security and development has driven the growing international action into the Western Africa waters and the advancement of the ongoing process of African securitization, that has witnessed a switch in the international aid structure, from the development and humanitarian intervention to the stress on military and security solutions, that have fed the rhetoric about the existentialist threats represented by problems like underdevelopment, political and economic weakness, poverty and social issues (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005, p. 58) and contributing to a securitization of development, used to justify any further expansion of security approaches to guarantee security objectives and foreign states' interests, rather than development. Therefore, it seems necessary to expand the literature about this nexus and to advance further research evaluating how and whether the security-development nexus has been manipulated by strategic interests of still more predominant states in the international system.

In the period between 2003 and 2014, Brazil seemed to have recognized the importance of the African continent in the new millennium. It has expanded its cooperation with the neighbour across the Ocean focusing not only in economic and political fields, trade interests, agriculture,¹⁰ training of human resources, assistance aid programmes and health and social policies (STUENKEL, 2014), but also oriented towards geopolitical strategies, analysing those aspects of cooperation, like security and its nexus with development, that have for long been overlooked. These latter topics are nowadays constituting a priority in the literature, which seeks to show how the redefined focus of Brazilian national defence strategy on the South Atlantic region has been pushed forward by national interests, bettering of material capabilities and the transformation of Brazil into an international actor or a broader regional power (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; AGUILAR, 2013; KENKEL, 2013).

In the last decades, the growing recognition of the enabling power of the oceans (SILVA, 2017) and how maritime security issues impact on state and societal development (COELHO, 2013) is promoting a major attention to the growing security perils coming from the sea and affecting the peace and the development of states and the international community. As Alfred Mahan claimed about Oceanic Basin, the South Atlantic represents a maritime space in which trade, economic and cultural fluxes depend on political and strategic factors that form the agenda of coast countries aimed to transform the maritime element in a feature of the agenda of SSC for the security and the economic development in the region (PENHA, 2011; VISENTINI, 2016). Indeed, the discovery of natural and mineral resources on both sides of the South Atlantic, and the political and military weakness and instability of the West African coast has intensified the presence of external international actors, both state and non-state ones (among which

¹⁰ The Brazil-Africa cooperation in agriculture is based on the technical assistance of the Southern giant in agricultural programmes in African countries (VAZ, 2015) and the engagement in and the development of “tropical agriculture”, that has received more attention from scholars. This sector has met in the African continent a significant recipient market, given the understanding of the role played by agriculture in the development of countries and peoples, also recognized by the NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) (CABRAL et al., 2013). The sharing of expertise and technology in the agriculture area is desirable for African countries and considered easily transmittable among actors owing similarities in culture, climate, ecosystems and agricultural practices. However, the reality of the Brazilian-Africa cooperation in agriculture is differing from the rhetoric of SSC based on mutual benefits, and results being oriented toward self-interested attitudes and efforts to promote Brazilian private investments in Africa (CABRAL et al., 2013).

also violent actors) and has contributed to originate an insecure environment over the maritime space.¹¹

The dissertation is therefore looking at topics that are currently discussed into the security agendas of states and international organization as affecting the global peace and state and human development. The interconnection with different sectors of governance and the reciprocal correlation among these threats has resulted from the complexity of the new millennium world, at the same time that the global interdependence has transnationalized these local threats over the South Atlantic, affecting the security and the development of countries, requiring for multilateral joint interventions to maintain security and stability (GILPIN, 2004; RASHEED, 1996).

The Brazilian participation into this trouble context and in investing into the maritime security field over the South Atlantic and in cooperation with West African countries is highlighting the transformation of the Brazilian foreign policy during the presidential mandates of the Worker's Party representatives. In those years, the re-approximation to the South and to the African continent seemed to have been influenced also by exogenous causes: the global crisis, that had turned the North in a weaker partner; and the contested regional leadership of the country in its primary geopolitical and strategic space (South-America) that forced the country to meet abroad (and mainly on the other side of the Atlantic) the necessary support for its global aspirations.

Furthermore, the relevance of the work also consists in recognizing the role of the African continent as main protagonist of the twenty-first century's world politics, moving from a systemic marginality, to the African Renaissance and its recognition as part of the international processes and structures, "[entangled] in the ebb and flows of events and changing configurations of power" (TAYLOR; WILLIAMS, 2004). The low levels of development, still rooted into the colonial period and worsened after the independence and the Northern structural adjustment programmes, together with the great amount of natural resources (mainly oil), density of population and territory, have made of Africa "a source of new growth in a highly competitive yet interdependent world" (CHERU; OBI, 2011, p. 93). Africa is seen as the "last frontier of exploitation" where traditional

¹¹ The Gulf of Guinea is suffering from a growing illegal activity of piracy and robbery and kidnapping of ships, cargo and crews, oil theft, money laundering, illegal arms and drugs trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, environmental disasters (like toxic waste and pollution of the maritime domain), destruction of oil infrastructure, as well as illegal and unregulated fishing (PACHECO, 2015)

and emerging powers compete in finding their place in the transformation of the global politics and economics, which appears as having much to do with the systemic transition of power and the post-western phenomenon (KORNEGAY; LANDSBERG, 2009, p. 172). But, notwithstanding the still persistent negative representation of the continent as a place of conflict, diseases, poverty among other negative features (DAVIS, 2004; SCHMIDT, 2013), the 2000s have been characterized by systemic challenges that have affected the perception of African states' capability to more actively and autonomously play in sustaining peace and security, as well as political, economic and social development, while also promoting these issues within the regional and continental organizations and integration mechanisms and in relationship and partnerships among equals with external powers ((DAVIS, 2004; SCHMIDT, 2013; SIRADAG, 2012)).

1.4 Delimitation of the Study

To advance with the elaboration of this dissertation it has been necessary to delimitate the time, the space, the field of interest and the systemic levels of the analysis.

Firstly, the temporal period lasts little more than a decade (between 2003 and 2014) being characterized by deep transformation in the Brazilian domestic and international political spectrum. The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the presidency of the country for two mandates (2003-2006 and 2007-2010) and the successive election of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014) also reconfirmed for a second mandate, but prematurely ousted by a political coup in 2016,¹² marked an historical change in the Brazilian recently arose position in the global governance and also in the relation with the African states. Indeed, the victory of the Worker Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*- PT) contributed to address domestic negative issues by attacking the roots of those problems affecting the country, its institutions and the population. Furthermore, the changes brought in by the new millennium and the more active global role of Brazil in international relations have contributed to the vision of the country as an example to be followed by other countries with similar features and past experiences. This is particularly appropriate in the case of Brazil with its African

¹² The re-election of Dilma in 2014 and the first year of the second mandate, were already marked by some complications and difficulties, mainly coming from the opposition, from the weak majority base supporting the government and from a worsening of the economic, social and political situation in the domestic context.

counterparts, and highlighted by a political discourse softly tied to historical and cultural legacy (CARMODY, 2013a; DOELLING, 2008; HARSCH, 2004), of a colonial past and a continuous condition of underdevelopment and dependence from the Northern powers, and also by the inclusion within an identity group of Southern countries, aimed to strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* the hegemonic and asymmetric structures of the international system.

The importance and interest that, in last decades, Brazilian stakeholders have relaunched over the African continent for the country's global aspirations, have assumed the form of an expansive cooperation that has included new sectors (STUENKEL, 2014) and has extended its presence over the territory, by strengthening ties and relationships with old and new African countries. This seems to have been oriented towards the guarantee of the continuum of Brazil's interests in the continent (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; KENKEL, 2013), in its development and in the control over the strategic area of Brazilian Foreign Policy, represented by the South-Atlantic region.

Secondly, the connection between the two coasts of the South Atlantic Ocean, in which Brazil is the major actor, has assisted to the perception of common features among the two continents, mostly in what concerns the national development of each country of the area. The similarities concern the vast amount of natural and mineral resources upon which their economies are based and the vulnerability derived by the exporting sector characterized by a single commodity, as well as the launching of cooperation and practices of agro-production, mineral and natural exploration, investments in infrastructures, science and technology, aimed to subvert the position of poor and underdeveloped countries and allow for their development (LALBAHADUR; GROBBELAAR; DU PLESSIS, 2015). Based on those structural economic features, the researchers Lalbahadur, Grobbelaar and Du Plessis (2015) claimed that the collaboration between the two sides of the Atlantic can be potentially reinforced and advanced by the sustainment and renewing of the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation (referred to as ZOPACAS). This proposal englobes the consideration of the security and development nexus and the role of international cooperation in achieving it, within a maritime security situation over the Southern Ocean that has suffered rapid changes in last decades. Therefore, the analysis of the Brazilian foreign policy for Africa here presented is geographically limited to the cooperation with countries of the South-Atlantic coast and to the setting up of a region building process over this space

(WIESEBRON, 2013, p. 108). The analysis is going to focus on the cooperation in the maritime security field within the Gulf of Guinea, understood as case study.¹³

Notwithstanding the many recent research on Brazilian Foreign Policy and South-South Cooperation, a still relatively shy treatment has concerned the involvement of the country in matters like peace and security, this latter analysed in its maritime aspect. This is linking us to the third delimitation related the field of engagement and interest, the maritime security, that is nowadays becoming a priority in the specific literature. Indeed, the role of the ocean in the different sectors of development and security (economic, energy, trade, human and so on) and the importance that in recent years the sea came back to assume are going to be the driving line in the observation of Brazil- Africa cooperation.¹⁴ Through the adoption of the concept of *Blue Amazon*, Brazil has committed itself to the responsibility to guarantee the peace and security in the South Atlantic, from all those maritime international threats and interested actors, while also safeguarding the natural resources discovered all long the national coasts, of Brazil but also of Africa (LALBAHADUR; GROBBELAAR; DU PLESSIS, 2015).

Threats to maritime security of countries and of international waters have been considered all those criminal activities at sea that have negative impact on economics, geopolitical interests and strategies, stability, peace and development of a country or a region. The definition has not been commonly accepted yet, contributing to increase the difficulties in implementing mechanisms and procedures to face with this problem (BUEGER, 2015b). Despite all, many multilateral (international and regional) institutions have been set up in the last decades, worldwide and in the South Atlantic, aimed to overcome the insecurity promoted by piracy, transnational criminal organizations and

¹³ According to Pacheco (2015), today the Gulf of Guinea denominates a geographic area that extends over the West African coasts and includes the Atlantic African countries and their maritime domain from the archipelago of Cape Verde in the North to the coast of Angola in the South. It comprises countries like, Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea (Conakry), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé & Príncipe, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and Angola. This area's waters hold offshore oil and gas fields that have made of the region one of the major oil producers of the world. The region is also characterized by political fragility and instability, poverty and underdevelopment and asymmetric economic and social conditions, as well as high levels of criminality and an expanding presence of international security threats (PACHECO, 2015).

¹⁴ Brazil has perceived the continent as an opportunity for its interests and an autonomous role in the South Atlantic as peace and security keeper, but also as coordinator of resources' exploration (concerning assistance in delimitation of the continental shelf and removal of external forces from the African coasts' maritime resources) and developer of human and military capabilities (AGUILAR, 2013; BRASIL, 2012; SEABRA, 2016).

illicit trades, exploitation of natural resources,¹⁵ armed robbery and terrorism among others, that in recent time appeared as increasing in the Gulf of Guinea, mainly along the Nigerian coasts, making of the South Atlantic a space of risky waters (BASSOU, 2017; ICG, 2012; IMB, 2018; ONE EARTH FUTURE, 2020; OTTO, 2014, 2019; WEF, 2019). However, these established laws and mechanisms still lack effectivity and general recognition among the international actors engaged in many aspects of maritime domain,¹⁶ and difficult the promotion of order, peace and security and the stop of the African “resource curse” that will continue to worsen the development of the continent and be a sufficient root of insecurity (Gelb apud. YATES, 2009, p. 5).¹⁷

Finally, the last delimitation we need to make is about the level of the analysis, that is focusing on a country-continent and country-region structure and that is therefore going to consider the African continent, and the Gulf of Guinea region, as unitary actors in the international system, not considering and not dealing with the specificities and the

¹⁵ The resource exploration and exploitation witness the action of both states (traditional and emerging) and non-state actors, also violent ones, in the “resource course” over the African continent and in the Gulf of Guinea waters. Their interest is linked to the divergences encountered in making a comparison among the richness and great amount of natural resources (the “*latest frontier in global oil*”, (VINES et al., 2009), density of population (high rate of human resources) and territory (cultivable lands), as well as the low level of development that many years of North-South models and mechanisms of cooperation have not been able to eliminate, neither to reduce. Scholars use to define the continent as a “*paradox of plenty*”, to highlight the richness of natural and mineral resources (mainly oil and land) and at the same time, the poverty, underdevelopment, insecurity and dependence of the countries of the continent (YATES, 2009). See: Gary I & TL Karl, *Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor*. Washington DC: Catholic Relief Services, 2003. Further suggestion of reading: Karl TL, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

¹⁶ With the word ‘maritime domain’, the Centre for Oceans Law and Policy (2005) described “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances” (apud. OSEI-TUTU, 2016, p. 6). Thus, maritime domains include what is on as well as what is under the surface of any water space, considering in this way also the natural resources presented in it.

¹⁷ With the term “resource curse”, scholars aim to describe the troubles and negative outcomes that a huge amount of minerals may produce. Gary and Karl (2003) declared that countries economically dependent on oil production and exportation are among the most “troubled, the most authoritarian and the most conflict-ridden states in the world today” (apud. YATES, 2009, p. 5). Scholars agree that when oil or any other resource is discovered, the expectations about its boom and the profits derived from that increases allow for more country’s spending, mainly believing that those costs will be recovered soon by the entrances from oil exportations. But the volatility of oil prices leaves the oil-economy countries in an intense vulnerability and their development, growth and stability end being more affected by the global market for that product. Oil-producer states are therefore subjected to the non-controlling of oil prices and consequently of inflation, worsening the domestic economic and social context, and weakening states’ capability to guarantee the security of their territories, populations and institutions. Countries rich in natural and mineral resources experience poverty, instability and insecurity, both internal and in facing with external actors (both state and non-state actors), rather than perceive, in those resources, a blessing and a way to establish a long term peace and development (LE BILLON, 2001; ROSS, 2015).

differences existing within them. In particular, the consideration of the Gulf of Guinea as a political space that is differentiated by its geographic borders of the area around the delta of the Niger river and that includes different regional institutions and communities is also representative of this need to look at the African partners in a one grouped structure. Although we recognize that this unitary actorness of the African continent is deviant to a proper understanding of Africa in the international relations and to the relationship with Brazil, this vision is mainly shared by Brazilian stakeholders in the formulation of its African policy, mainly the Minister of External Relations, *the Itamaraty*. The brotherhood of Brazil with Africa- reinforced anytime in the official discourses of the President Lula da Silva and his successor, Dilma Rousseff- shows how the cultural and historical legacy shared with some specific African countries is expanded to the whole continent as justification for gaining African societies' hearts and guarantee the entrance of Brazil into the continent.

Despite all, we recognize that this comprehension is mistaken and is reproducing a hegemonic discourse about Africa. As Rita Abrahamsen stated (2017) the inclusion of Africa in IR studies is very rarely neutral, rather it is "already over-determined and embedded in diverse struggles": subservient to the interests of the powerful actors, and the African knowledge was "produced, utilized, and mobilized in the service of dominant states" (ABRAHAMSEN, 2017, p. 131). Although we strongly believe that it is time to start looking at the specificities of the African continent as a way to understand and explain the contemporary changes and challenges at global level, and to substitute hegemonic interpretation with plural interpretations, mirroring the current global reallocation of power and resource (WOOD, 2017), in this work we have been forced by the same Brazilian elaboration of its African policy, to stuck over a generic and generalized look of the continent. To conclude, the analysis of the Brazilian cooperation in maritime security field is going to be rooted on the concept of bi-multilateralism of "the one and the many": one major non- African state and a multiplicity of African states, as well as on the analysis of both the bilateral and the multilateral mechanisms and structures of partnership and engagement within the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea.

1.5 Methodology

This dissertation proposes the examination of the Brazilian involvement in South-South Cooperation towards the African continent as part of the relaunched African policy during the presidencies of Luis I. Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and continued by the following President, Dilma Rousseff (2011- 2014). More specifically, it is analysing the cooperation in maritime security with the countries and the regional and international organisms engaged into the Gulf of Guinea in the last two decades, motivated by the desire of setting up a region building process over the South-Atlantic. In order to answer to the main research question about the Brazilian operationalization of its maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea within the framework of the SSC and the systemic challenges proposed by emerging powers of the Global South, the dissertation is going to address few issues.

Firstly, it is going to trace the evolution of the Global South identity and the changes occurred in the SSC model of international development by looking at the role of emerging powers in engaging in it and proposing alternative models by redesigning the main principles of the cooperation. Secondly, it is investigating the nexus between security and development, both at a more general level, by looking at this conceptual understanding among the emerging powers and its implementation within the boundaries of the SSC, as well as at a more specific level, by analysing the relation between maritime security and development in the GoG and how Brazil operated to address this connection. Thirdly, it is mapping the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and practices undertaken by Brazil to face the growing insecurities in the South Atlantic and in the Gulf of Guinea waters; and finally, it is reviewing the existing literature and its theoretical approaches to overcome the Northern and Western domination of knowledge production and practices and give voice to the unheard South, aimed to insert the Brazilian action in the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea within an hybrid comprehensive framework of analysis.

The study has opted for a qualitative method of collecting and elaborating information, as the most suitable given the object of the analysis and the proposed goals. Qualitative methodological approaches are more descriptive, as they are more interested and focused on the process rather than in the results. They demand the researcher to choose a problem or case to be analysed within its total complexity, offering a more detailed comprehension and interpretation of the subject. Furthermore, the research is also based on the analysis of a case-study, represented by the Brazilian maritime security

cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea region and applies a Process Tracing method of the evolution of the SSC and the Brazilian role in it, together with a "multiple within-case comparisons" type of Congruence Method that analyses the bilateral and multilateral axes of participation of Brazil in the West African waters.

Case studies are useful for generating hypotheses (GEORGE; BENNET, 2005; RAGIN, 2004), and exploring causality, due to their richness of details that allows for plotting the sequence of variables and facts, detecting their reciprocal interactions and indicating the causality direction (GEORGE; BENNET, 2005). The study addresses West Africa region and the Gulf of Guinea region as space where the case study occurs, being represented by the Brazilian operationalization of its South-South cooperation in maritime security field. West Africa represent a unique case for being a major hotspot of maritime insecurity in Africa, in the South Atlantic and in the world, so concerning the Brazilian security and political actors. Furthermore, the area covers a strategic geographical position in the middle of international trade routes and that reaches out to the Americas and Europe, becoming therefore representative in the analysis of the current application and understanding of the security development nexus.

Brazil, together with the international community became aware of the relevance of the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain, rich in natural and mineral resource, with a huge marine biodiversity and hydrocarbons, as well as affected by growing security threats that are mining the regional potential in trade, economic, energy and strategic fields and affecting the state and human development. Furthermore, given the strong dependence of the external actors on African land, labour force and energy resources, as well as the economic weight of some African regions for global markets, and the relevance of the continent for international trade, of which almost 90% occurs by sea and passes within the Gulf of Guinea waters (VREĚ, 2009), the insecurities threatening the continent and its regions are consequently affecting the economic interests of many other states, becoming an urgent global issue. Moreover, the case study is also relevant for the peculiar domestic context of regional states, that although weak and corrupted, still presents a state apparatus that is not yet failed (differently from the Somali coasts) and that need to be taken into consideration by external actors operating in the region.

Indeed, despite the limitation of their resource and the political difficulties to fight maritime insecurity, West African states are present in the regional maritime security dynamics and other states need to cooperate with them in this field. Furthermore, this case

study is relevant for presenting a significant augmenting of maritime insecurities in the new millennium and various regional responses and international involvement to face with those security threats, among which Brazil inserts itself. The West African states represent some of most affected countries by maritime insecurities like drugs and human trafficking, piracy and armed robbery, kidnapping, transnational criminal organizations among (OTTO, 2019).¹⁸

The Process-Tracing, instead, intensively analyses sequences of events over a defined time, that in our case is represented by the period 2003-2014 when looking at the Brazilian role in the maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea and in the elaboration of its African Policy of the new millennium. Moreover, the method is also used to offer a general tracing of the evolution of the SSC in the previous century and the role covered by emerging powers- like BRICS- to restructure and redefine it in last decade. This method “is particularly well suited to the task of uncovering intervening causal mechanisms and exploring reciprocal causation and endogeneity effects” (George, 1979 apud. LEVY, 2008).

Through the “multiple within-case comparisons” type of Congruence method, selected causalities and observations are analysed within the case (VAN EVERA, 1997). The comparison results in the observation of the multi-level mechanisms, policies and practices implemented in the West Africa region, and in the evaluation and understanding of the reasons that have promoted it, as well as the results achieved in guaranteeing and promoting security and development. This comparison between the Brazilian official rhetoric towards the bilateral (country-continent or country-region) and the multilateral axes (Brazilian engagement under the aegis of multilateral security structures) aims to show the overlapping of security practices and to explain how the structural features of this emerging and middle power influence its participation in the global and regional security governance, located in a third space between the overstated idea of solidarity among Southern partners and national interests. Both methods represent indispensable

¹⁸ “The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted that several countries in the Gulf of Guinea along the stretch from Cape Verde south to Benin are a transit point for cocaine between Latin America and Europe, while Nigeria is said to be the main country through which methamphetamines transit. Where migrant smuggling and human trafficking is concerned, the region contains several routes, both land- and sea-based, with the destination often being Europe. The UNODC highlights that the majority of irregular migrants from West Africa are of Nigerian and Senegalese nationality” (OTTO, 2019).

tools, given their capability to generate numerous observations within a case and to constitute explanations of them (GEORGE; BENNET, 2005, p. 169). They are therefore moving from empirical and historical facts to an "analytical explanation" which mainly converges in testing our hypothesis.

To advance with this analysis, the research will review existing specialised literature (i.e. secondary sources) about theories, concepts and analytical frameworks of the disciplines of International Relations and Security Studies. The theoretical outcome presented here would be a synthesis between two of the main backgrounds in the International Relations theories, rationalist and constructivist approaches that appear to be the most suitable theoretical explanations when dealing with concepts like cooperation, competition, power, resources and territorial possessions, leadership, multilateral identity, solidarity aspects of international relations, among others; and which has, in some cases, validated and offered more credibility and legitimacy to the approach we have opted for. Therefore, the revision of the mainstream literature of International Relations, principally Realism and Constructivism, is seen as necessary. (A broader and more exhaustive introduction of the theories used can be found in the next section, "*Research Structure*").

Furthermore, we will proceed with a Qualitative Content Analysis of primary sources (official and semi-official documents), oriented to give an interpretation to the meanings and purposes of a text (HALPERIN; HEATH, 2017, p. 310). The interpretation will require an attentive selection of the documents that will be analysed and the establishment of analytical variables and categories to be analysed and compared (ibid.). The documents have been selected to cover three main categories, or grouping of significant content (BEZERRA CAVALCANTE; CALIXTO MARTA MACEDO KERR PINHEIRO, 2014) and manifestation of analytical variable or units defined a priori (BARDIN, 2011): first, the Brazilian consideration of the South Atlantic as strategic for its national interests and as an area to be transformed in its regional space; second, the documents about the Brazil's African Policy and the consideration of the African continent and the West Africa for Brazil; and last, the documents about the specific bilateral and multilateral actions undertaken within the Gulf of Guinea and in cooperation with West African countries or with external actors. At this purpose we selected the Brazilian national documents of security and defence – *Livro Branco, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa e Política Nacional de Defesa*; signed agreements, political

discourses of presidents, politicians, diplomatic bodies (Minister of Foreign Affairs-MRE and Minister of Defence) to improve the objectivity of our work and enrich the case-studies. While some of these documents are available online and are open access, some others have required a documental research in the MRE archives, in Brasilia.

The documents analysed of course do not represent the effective whole number of documents elaborated by Brazil and related to the maritime security in the West Africa region, but they are aimed to represent a first satisfactory sample for the analysis. The still very recent period of analysis (2003-2014) has represented a strong limitation in accessing to more detailed and still classified documents, generating some restrictions to the range of the analysis we pretended to realize. However, and notwithstanding the obstacles, the limited analysed documents have been able to offer a general perspective of the dynamics in the region building project in the South Atlantic and the operationalization of the official discourse.

The Qualitative Content Analysis has also been applied to observation of the official documents of BRICS summit (from 2009 to 2014- see the list in Annex I) aimed to trace the evolution of BRICS from an acronym coined by a private financial institution (Goldman Sachs) to an international actor with a discourse oriented to subvert the traditional and hegemonic structures and meaning of the international system. The BRICS Document have been analysed by looking at the presence and relevance occupied by global security issues in their agenda and the way how security was linked to development. Furthermore, we also look at the recent transformations of the SSC proposed by the Global South (through the reform of its principles and mechanisms as elaborated in three main documents: the Paris Declaration, the Accra Action Plan and the Busan Document).

The research also recognizes the strategic relevance of conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Brazilian security and diplomatic agency with West African countries, like in the case of Brazilian Navy officers and other military representatives of the country who deployed a role in the Brazil- West Africa security cooperation, as well as with diplomatic representatives and some political personalities (mainly Ministers) of External Relations and Defence Ministry of the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Due to the changed domestic context of Brazil and the transformation of its Foreign Policy towards a rapprochement with the North and the relative abandon of the role covered in and for the Global South and towards the African

continent, the number of interviews realized has been extremely limited and subjected to non-publication or divulgation of their content. The interviewed preferred and explicitly required to keep their identities secret, scared of any possible political repercussion that their critical words and opinion could have had on their careers. For this reason, and for the impossibility to find further data (already published) to sustain what they were saying during the interviews and the informal chats, most of the information collected had to be omitted by this study.

Furthermore, we are aware that this research would have benefited from the realization of a field work in the West Africa region, to better understand the perception of the maritime domain and the insecurities existing in the Gulf of Guinea and the way how local authorities were looking at and considering the Brazilian engagement in their waters and in the maritime security cooperation. This African perspective would have represented an additional variable to be analysed, and that would have added major credibility to our perception of Brazilian hybridism in the operationalization of its cooperation with Africa, by giving us information about the reception of Brazilian security agency from recipient partners. The lack of financial resources (caused by the dismantlement of the Education and of the Science and Research sector of Brazil since the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 – when this investigation started) made impossible any research on the field and any trip outside the country. Moreover, the attempts to overcome such financial obstacles by establishing online contacts with the African side, failed a priori, due to specific features of African contexts about which we were not aware in a first moment, but that we have learnt as consequences of unsuccessful attempts, wrong contacts and long waits for responses and that will be considered in future projects. All these limitations have forced the author of this study to always restructure the research, to find alternative solutions to the rising problems. This has meant a waste of precious time all along the years and a strong personal and academic frustration related to the impossibility to realize the work. In conclusion, the spread of the COVID all around the world and the forced lockdown have worsened the previously explained picture, making of this research the best we could, based on all these negative factors and feelings.

1.6 Structure of the Work

The dissertation is structured into three main chapters, that together with this introduction and a general conclusion, are oriented to explain and debate the role of emerging powers into the international cooperation for development and the engagement into security issues. More specifically, the research has aimed to analyse the operationalization of the international cooperation of Brazil into the maritime security field over the South Atlantic Ocean and therefore in coordination and engaging with the West African countries, recently affected by growing maritime insecurities that are affecting the development of the continent and the role of Brazil in contributing to such an achievement. Furthermore, the new millennium's transnationality of insecurities is also (directly or indirectly) mining the stability and the growth of other international actors, among which Brazil itself that has being challenged in its aspired role of regional leader over the South Atlantic and in the pragmatism of its African policy during the mandates of the Worker's Party (2003-2015).

This first introductory chapter has aimed at giving a general overview over the object of the study and the main objectives around which the whole research resolves. We attempted to define the object and its relevance for the field of International Relations and International Security Studies, as well as to delimit the study both in time and space, focusing our attention principally on the new millennium, to combine the domestic transformations affecting Brazilian politics and its international agenda with the challenges and the changes witnessed in the international system. The delimitation of the study wanted to clarify the range of the analysis, contributing to delineate also the conceptual and content borders of the study and so defining what is going to be included and why, and consequently what has not been approached into the next pages. By talking about the delimitations of the research it seemed opportune to discuss also the many difficulties faced in the realization of this work, not to sound as an excuse but to make the reader aware of the limits and obstacles that this study had to face with and the sometimes impossible, sometimes non-existent solutions we had to deal with. Finally, the methodological section of this first chapter has highlighted the ways how the research has been realized, turning around those previous limits and obstacles, and indicating the way how data and sources have been combined and analysed.

The second chapter reviews the state of the art related to the topic of International Cooperation within the discipline of IR and the evolution of the nexus between security and development promoted by the emergence of new powers in the international system and the evolution of the security understanding occurred in the new millennium. This work presents an IR rationalist- constructivist synthesis, explaining to what extent Brazil-Africa relations are nowadays consequences of a process of hybridity between the sometimes-overstated intentions of solidarity cooperation reproduced in the Brazilian official discourses, on one hand, and a more realist strategy driven by national interests and projections of power that seems occurring in the Global South, on the other hand.

By borrowing the concept of hybridity from Post-colonialism, the paper aims to indicate not a coexistence of different practices and mechanisms (North vs. South), but a simultaneous and mutually constitutive response, of both Brazil and the Global South, to different ways of conceiving power, systemic rules, imagining spaces and their presence in that space. The literature review offers us a broader vision and perception of development studies and dependency theory in International Relations, while also providing a strong criticism of the current capitalist structure of the international system. This latter continues reaffirming those asymmetric mechanisms and relationships, typical of the colonial period and unequivocally resulting in exploitation of the ‘periphery’ and in a dependent development. By considering the African continent as the main stage where emerging powers aimed to intervene to augment their international influence and prestige, the dissertation is proposing an analysis based on the postcolonial concept of hybridism to describe the attitude of those countries, among which Brazil, in restructuring the architecture of the international cooperation for development and in engaging in security issues under a new understanding of the security-development nexus resulted from the changing contexts of the new millennium and the challenges posed by new threats to the global order.

The theoretical dialogue presented here will aim to demystify the concept of solidarity cooperation for development that the Global South has introduced in the global system and that has witnessed the commitment toward less developed countries of South. It attempts to demonstrate how thin is the line between the overstated idea of solidarity cooperation and the hidden power competition that, *de facto*, seems to occur in the Southern hemisphere and more specifically in the African continent. In the case of African countries, their difficult and dependent development has been mainly related to the huge

presence of oil and other resources, and to the link between conflict, insecurity and resources abundance that have negatively impacted in the continent and been the cause of many domestic and international conflicts. Despite all, it is necessary to keep in mind that “the presence of a valuable natural resource is not, by itself a ‘curse’ destined to incite conflict. Rather, the central issue is how such resources are used and the money they generate is distributed” (Alao apud. AFRICA RENEWAL, 2007). As emerging powers have engaged into security cooperation with the African countries, the literature review is also including a discussion about security mechanisms and region building processes focused on security matters.

The third chapter is focusing specifically on the role played by the Global South in international relations and the evolution of the SSC and its fundamental features, as solidarity, reciprocity, horizontality and mutual assistance, that are supposed to strengthen the vision of SSC as an alternative to the traditional North-South model implemented for achieving development. This chapter is looking at the changes proposed by the emerging powers, aimed to take advantage of their double position as intermediary states between the developed and developing world, threatening to challenge the system and at the same time trying to join it. Moved by the desire to be representatives of the Global South and rise the voice of the recipients of aid, by demanding for a fairer and more symmetric international development architecture, it seems that emerging powers are taking advantages of the cooperative benefits achieved through grouping themselves together and with supportive actors like the rest of the Global South, to exert influence and achieve credibility in the international system. By analysing the official documents of the BRICS Summits (2009-2018) and the new millennium’s agreements and declaration about a reformulation of the SSC, the chapter discusses the role of emerging powers in the international relations, in restructuring the mechanisms and practices and understandings of global governance and international cooperation, as well as in stressing the attention over the existing nexus between security and development and the need to guarantee the former, also to achieve the latter and vice versa. It presents the emerging powers as intermediary actors oriented to create a hybrid third space of action in the case of the international cooperation for development, where to insert their ambivalent position of reformers and “want to be part” of the *status quo*. This hybridism is an attempt to match the growing aspirations of these countries, with some structural

limitations they present that still make them too weak to assume full responsibility of any systemic transformation.

The fourth chapter presents the case study, looking at the Brazilian cooperation in maritime security with West African countries into the Gulf of Guinea, to secure the strategic space of South Atlantic from a major expansion of maritime transnational threats. It considers the role of Brazil as emerging country in the new millennium, combining its domestic transformation with the foreign policy agenda that looked at the African continent as a space where to achieve influence, legitimacy, support and credibility. Through the analysis of documents collected into the Documental Research Centre of the *Itamaraty* and the content analysis of interviews realized along the research, the chapters aims to offer an understanding of the operationalization of the international cooperation of Brazil with West African countries within the framework of the SSC and into the field of maritime security, showing the hybridism of action and how structural conditions and lack of will have limited the role of Brazil in the South Atlantic. The chapter explores the relevance of the African continent and of the South Atlantic for Brazil of Presidents Luis I. Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. The natural, mineral and human resources existing in the GoG region, made of Africa a very appetible conquer, while the recognition of the enabling power of oceans in the international relations and for the strategic political and economic interests, security and development of the countries, made the South Atlantic extremely attractive for many actors. Brazilian perception of this geographic space as relevant for increasing its power and autonomy has projected the country into a maritime security cooperation with the oriental border over the South Atlantic. It has established security mechanisms and practices to protect the resources and keep peace and control over the ocean, looking for the establishment of its sovereignty over the space, through the building of a regional structure.

In the conclusion, the research will explain how Brazil operationalized its maritime security cooperation with West African countries within the framework of the South-South cooperation. It will focus on the hybrid position assumed by the country along the new millennium, as emerging middle power with a growing international recognition and influence but, at the same time, as an actor lacking hard power and recognized for its diplomatic and cooperative position towards other international actors and issues. The structural limitations of a middle country have convinced Brazil to look at the international mechanisms of cooperation as an instrument of power and to keep an

eye over its strategic area, the South Atlantic, everyday more affected by threats and the presence of interested external actors. At the same time, successful Brazilian achievements among the Global South in the new millennium have strengthened the self-perception of the country and its international role, augmenting its global aspiration and its conviction to challenge the systemic structure for the good of the “rest”. Within these dual features and moved by the desire to relaunch its African policy and guarantee its place in the new reconfiguration of international partnerships with the continent, Brazil is operating within a hybrid theoretical and empirical context of solidarity rhetoric about symmetries of power and fair development, on one hand, and a more realist strategy driven by its own interests and projections of power, on the other hand.

State of the Art

The theoretical framework adopted for the elaboration of this dissertation spaced between the different approaches of the discipline of International Relations, moving from its main and central group of theories, like in the case of Realism and liberalism, as well as Constructivism, aimed to establish a dialogue among those analytical frameworks, to include into the analysis elements borrowed from the Postcolonial studies and the Security Studies. It aims to offer a review of the state of the art related to the topic of International Cooperation within the discipline of IR and the evolution of the nexus between security and development promoted by the emergence of new powers in the international system and the evolution of the security understanding occurred in the new millennium.

When talking about South-South models of cooperation for international development, and discussing concepts like cooperation, competition, power, resources and territorial possessions, leadership, multilateral identity, solidarity aspects of international relations, ideas and discourses, the most suitable theoretical explanation appears to be a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist approaches, mainly focused on: structural realism,¹⁹ power transition theory,²⁰ emerging regional architectures,²¹

¹⁹ The choice for Structural Realism is based on the theoretical complementarity that this approach offers to integrate both Neorealism and Neoclassical Realist theories and scholars. Buzan, Little and Jones (1993) developed a vision of this theory that enables Realism to adapt itself and overcome the criticism linked to its exclusive centrality upon systemic features as explanation of international politics, in detrimental of the domestic ones (BUZAN; LITTLE; JONES, 1993). The Agent- Structure logic of Structural Realism offers an internal answer to states' action, without excluding the structure's role and implications (JOAQUIM, 2012), showing the connection to liberal and constructivist approaches.

²⁰ See A.F.K. Organski, A.F.K. 1958. *World Politics*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1997. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press; and Kugler, J. and Organski, A.F.K. 1989. 'The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation', in: Manus Midlarski (ed.) *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston: Unwin Hyman; pp. 171-94; as well as Tammen, R.L. 2000. *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*. Seven Bridges Press. For a theory of power transition and hierarchies at the regional level, see Lemke, D. 2002. *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²¹ See A. Acharya. 2007. The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics. *World Politics*, 59(4): 629- 52.

hegemony²² and leadership²³- both at global and regional level,²⁴ rhetoric and norm diffusion, among others. This theoretical dialogue concerns about and is focused on emerging Southern powers' role in the international system and the relevance that international cooperation among the global South may have in promoting an alternative international system. Furthermore, and to reach this objective, it seems necessary to understand where those claims and global aspirations of Southern powers rest on.

Many scholars have engaged themselves in the study of concepts like solidarity among countries and horizontal relationships (GOSOVIC, 2016a; GRAY; GILLS, 2016; MARQUES; SPANAKOS, 2014; MAWDSLEY, 2017; NEL; TAYLOR, 2013; QUADIR, 2013) allowing to the Global South and the themes related to it to jump among the top topics of IR researches and debates. On the other side, an argumentative literature about SSC has shyly been developed, criticizing the reforming role of emerging powers (BOND, 2016; GRAY; GILLS, 2016), and emphasizing their double acting play, which means that while acting as challengers of the existing order and builders of an emerging architecture of politics, both regional and hemispheric, they are also adapting themselves to it and, in certain circumstances, working to preserve the *status quo* (COOPER; ANTKIEWICZ, 2008; NOLTE, 2010; SCHWELLER, 2011). Hence, the overlapping and dialogue among theories will contribute to present and strengthen a critical position based upon the concept of solidarity in SSC, and it will expand the vision of IR theories for further than the dominant axioms. By opting for this conversation, we convey that it is necessary also to establish points of contacts, connection and similarities among mainstream theoretical frameworks, handling these latter with humility and recognizing their limited role. In other words, none of them appears as accounting for all the empirical facts that the other approach can explain, plus other additional instance: there was no way to prove that one approach would have prevailed over the other and then reshaped the International Relations' discipline (WÆVER, 1998).

²² Hurrell, A. 2006. Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?. *International Affairs*, 82(1): 1-19, and Hurrell, A. (2005) 'Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas', in Louise Fawcett and Monica Serrano (eds.) *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas. Continental Drift*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 185- 208.

²³ See Nye, J.S. 2008. *The Powers to Lead: Soft, Hard and Smart*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Flemes, D. 2010. *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

²⁴ See Womack, B. 2007. 'Teoría de la asimetría y poderes regionales: los casos de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica', in Juan Gabriel Tokatlian (ed.), *India, Brasil y Sudáfrica: el impacto de la nuevas potencias regionales*; Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal; pp. 15- 34.

Whether rationalist approaches sometimes omit and bypass the more domestic and individualistic aspects in the analysis of specific phenomena; exclusive constructivist and post-modernist approaches may produce a naive analysis, a “genuine” rhetoric (MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014, p. 31) that does not converge into the practice nor, in the case of this paper, reflect the desire of emerging powers’ acts of being seen as promoters of alternatives, forgetting about the reality and the system in which those actions took place and the limits that the structure imposes. Therefore, proposing a theoretical connection and somehow complementarity of domains that attempts to explain as much as possible of the empirical facts under observation can contribute to a better understanding of emerging phenomena and situation.

Through an IR rationalist-constructivist synthesis, this work aims to demystify the concept of solidarity cooperation, horizontality and mutual assistance for development of Brazil in the Atlantic coasts of Africa and to highlight Brazilian strategic perception of the oriental border to enhance national, regional and international goals of power, status and resources, so producing an hybrid process between the sometimes overstated intentions of solidarity cooperation reproduced in the Brazilian official discourses, on one hand, and a more realist strategy driven by national interests and projections of power that seems occurring in the Global South, on the other hand.

Indeed, the theoretical background is benefiting from the borrowing from Post-colonial Studies of the now interdisciplinary concept of hybridity, to propose an overlapping of both theoretical frameworks and concepts, as well as the transformation and changing of fixed identities. The moving away from conceptual fixity and rigidity may allow for a theoretical and practical interaction between different and dynamic perceptions, without imposing the primacy of one explanation over the other (KUORTTI; NYMAN, 2007) but rather by establishing different ways of conceiving power, systemic rules and imagining spaces.

Moreover, the analysis of the official discourses of Brazil and its SSC agencies and actors, and the practices and motivations upon which the African policy has been structured, will contribute to show the double systemic role of Brazil into the international system, the Global South and the African quest for development (GOSOVIC, 2016a) and the debate between power searching and solidarity.

This chapter of literature review is going to offer us a broader vision and perception of development studies and dependency theory in International Relations, while also providing a strong criticism of the current capitalist structure of the international system. This latter continues to reaffirm those asymmetric mechanisms and relationships, typical of the colonial period and unequivocally resulting in exploitation of the 'periphery' and in a dependent development (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010). The dissertation is proposing an analysis based on the Post-colonial concept of hybridism to describe the attitude of those countries, among which Brazil, in restructuring the architecture of the international cooperation for development and in engaging in security issues under a new understanding of the security-development nexus. Furthermore, the structural limitations of emerging countries in terms of material powers have forced them to not consider an autonomous action in the security fields of the international cooperation with the African continent, but to strength the action throughout and the creation of multilateral security mechanisms and regional processes.

This chapter revises the existing literature by analysing secondary sources. It is structured into five sections, following this general overview. Firstly, it introduces a discussion of the international cooperation in the discipline of IR aimed to find similar epistemological structures that would ease the theoretical dialogue and the synthesis. Secondly, it looks at the hybridity discussion in Post-colonial Studies and the application to the role of emerging powers in the international structure and global governance of the new millennium. Thirdly, the chapter is advancing on the analysis of the changing international dynamics in the twenty-first century and the challenges posed by the emergence of powers from the South and the relaunching of the Global South identity, as well as by the appearance of new global threats (KALDOR, 2006) and the process of securitization implemented in the African continent, relaunching at the same time the focus on the security-development nexus that seems to represent the motor of the international cooperation in the new millennium. Lastly, before the conclusion, the literature review is addressing the framework of security engagement of emerging powers, looking at the theoretical approaches about security region building processes. Furthermore, and given the structural limitations of these actors in terms of hard power, the final section is inserting the concept of hybridity into the analysis, to explain the overlapping of security mechanisms proposed by emerging powers. This literature review is building the foundations upon which this study of Brazilian operationalization of its

maritime security cooperation with West African countries is occurring, within the framework of the South-South Cooperation model for international development.

2.1 The International Cooperation in the discipline of International Relations

The academic debate developed around the concept of international cooperation has been analysed through fruitful scholars' attempts to establish a most likely synthetic dialogue, and the one between Realism and Liberal- Institutionalism is, of course, one of the most significant. Kenneth Waltz (WALTZ, 1979) considered the international cooperation as an exception within the anarchic international system (and states' interaction as weak), because actors are rationally pushed toward achievement of their own interests and the guarantee of independence of action and survival. On the basis of a calculation of utility, states will cooperate only when their own gains are greater than the others' ones (GRIEGO, 1988) and when, in the distribution of capacities, they are able to increase their power. On the other side, Neoliberal scholars like Keohane and Nye affirm that cooperation is possible, although fragile, and is the most likely option when states converge in terms of interests and when bilateral and multilateral interaction mechanisms are established (1988). States' interests are based on states' preferences (STEIN, 1990) and the convergence or divergence of interests among the actors is working as a determinant factor in the perception of the others and therefore in the definition of their disposition to cooperate or not.

Furthermore, Stephen Krasner (1985) adopted the Structural Realism to explain how Third World countries' action in the global system is much more oriented by their structural features (vulnerability and political weakness) than economic interests. As developing countries are generally posed in a weaker position in the international system mechanisms of governance and decision-making process, as well as being strongly dependent by or linked to external donors, their successful adhesion to multilateral institutions of cooperation is linked to the possibility of raising their voice, despite their systemic vulnerabilities and weakness. In the specific case of South-South cooperation, Southern states are subjected to external pressures in their decision-making process, due to the asymmetric distribution of power that represents the real cause of interference in its international attitude and in the formulation of its interests and preferences. Moreover,

the establishment of a coherent common ideology and identity, built around the concept of dependency, favoured the formulation of political proposal and at the same time of political coordination (LEITE, 2011).

However, power, is here perceived in a less material way, indicating not only the amount of resources a country owns, but also the behavioural, ideational and relational aspect of it (NOLTE, 2010; NYE, 1990). Power seems to have lost its exclusive 'hard' (military) essence, which has been complemented by economic, cultural and also political means, and analysed as “the ability to shape what others want”, resting in this way on the capacity of attraction and manipulation of the political choices “in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic” (NYE, 1990, p. 181–182). Power came to indicate both the *stick* and the *carrot*, the coercion and the influence, the hard and the soft version of the concept.

As the distribution of power within the international system is not immobile, rather it is asymmetric, the current international structure is characterised by a power transition that is slightly declining from hegemonic player toward rising middle powers, or emerging regional ones, dissatisfied with the legitimacy of the established order and their own role within it, and attempting to challenge it (SCHWELLER, 2011, p. 288). According to Keohane, a middle power is a state that “cannot act effectively alone but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through an international institution” (1969, p. 296). Institutions and multilateral mechanisms of decision making are then considered, for middle (or regional) powers, as sites of power that can be instrumentalized to balance major powers, as well as instruments of domination upon other powers and international participation (HURRELL, 2006).

For developing countries, and mainly in the globalization context, the achievement of independence and autonomy (so dear to the realist approach) seems to not be a priority anymore. Indeed, the joining of multilateral and bilateral institutions, and advancing in forms of cooperation and regional integration, is welcomed as a way to achieve firstly, a major access to development than what it might be able to reach by acting alone in the current globalized and interdependent world; secondly, the possibility to participate in world politics and in the balance of power, on the basis of both their material capacities and national interests (BHAGWATI, 1993), and lastly, the guarantee of their own autonomous decisional capacity.

Therefore, Southern and emerging powers “depend on cooperation to assert their interests” (NOLTE, 2010, p. 892), at the same time that international multilateral mechanisms, together with the creation and diffusion of norms and structures, may influence other actors and challenge the *status quo*. Influence, from its side, requires emerging countries to accept the role of leader of the challenge, first by recognizing themselves as playing this role, and then by demonstrating their abilities to re-establish and maintain the order through the use of co-optive power resources (soft power-NYE, 1990) over those other countries that recognize their influence (NOLTE, 2010, p. 890).

The constructivist theoretical paradigm attempts to explain the establishment and the management of international system's order through the distributions of norms, values and ideas among actors (FINNEMORE; SIKKINK, 1998). Hence, the creation of a broader regional area over the South-Atlantic, represents an attempt of Brazil to "develop rules with a view to preserve [its] autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation or abuse by more powerful central actors" (ACHARYA, 2011, p. 96). Constructivism has challenged the previous theories by claiming that what may determine and shape the behaviour of actors are mainly the "intersubjectively shared ideas", which constitute the identities and interests of states (COPELAND, 2000). Therefore, on the premise that "anarchy is what states make of it", Alexander Wendt (1999) affirmed that international actors are not condemned by the systemic structure to worry about power and conflicts. Rather they can "act by solidifying the non-egoistic mind-sets needed for long-term peace", based on discursive social practices created from a shared culture and idea that can reconstitute interests and identities, both national and international (COPELAND, 2000)

Moreover, Constructivism also accepts the idea that "norms creation and compliance need not to be inconsistent with self-interested (instrumental) motivations [...] and behaviour" (ACHARYA, 2011, p. 116). As Thomas Muhr claimed, in accordance with constructivist thinking, "social relations and, therefore, social realities are discursively (re)produced and interests strategically promoted" (2016, p. 632), reaffirming once again the co-constitutive role of discourse and ideas in the social transformation and in the redesign of the international system. In Goldstein and Keohane (1993) ideas- defined as beliefs held by units, as well as interests, may help to explain political outcomes, mainly those related to the foreign policy of states.

By looking at the case study of this study, Brazilian attempts to subvert the old models of cooperation may be seen as examples of this "norm subsidiarity" process realized among actors that share common historical, political and strategic conditions, as well as a way to develop local (hemispherical) mechanisms to challenge the great powers dominance (ACHARYA, 2011, p. 113). Over the decades, the African policy of Brazil has always glimpsed the possibility of setting up strong relationships between the two sides of the Atlantic, especially the southern part of it, "where the national interest has been posed in a priority position among all the other elements of the country's external action" (RIZZI, 2010, p. 2)

2.2 The Hybridism of emerging powers in the power transition of the new millennium

The successful adhesion of countries of the Southern hemisphere to multilateral institutions of cooperation is linked to the possibility of those weaker actors to raise their voice internationally. Amitav Acharya has argued that "regions are constructed more from within than from without" and that "power matters, but local responses to powers may matter even more in the construction of process of regional orders" (ACHARYA, 2007, p. 630).

By introducing themselves as reforming actors of the systemic structure and its mechanisms, emerging powers have in a noticeably short time posed the first stone of an emerging architecture of world politics, assuming a dual character of *system- affecting* and *system- adapting*. As Ikenberry argues (2011), rising powers are co-opted within the existing dominant system because of the benefits that it is offering them to reinforce their global position, so they will prefer to join existing institutional framework and made their escalation to power from within other than subvert it and build their own. It derives from that the vision of emerging powers as *status quo* states, rather than critical: "while they may not agree with the totality of the 'liberal/neoliberal peace system', they will find benefits to working within, rather than seeking to overturn, the system" (CALL, 2019 p. 2275).

This recalls Ayoob's perspective of emerging countries of the current world system as "schizophrenic" actors: that simultaneously attempt to challenge and adapt

themselves to the "system of states" (AYOOB, 2002). Or, as in Randall Schweller terms, emerging powers may play different roles, assuming the features of "spoilers, supporters or shirkers" of the "new international disorder", depending "on the issue and the audience" (2011, p. 287). If from one hand we believe that this emerging behaviour is resulting from the limited capabilities of the countries to embrace the systemic transformation by themselves, on the other side, we also perceive them as unwilling to assume such kind of responsibilities, regarding the whole system of states.

Although the Southern mechanisms of international cooperation may respond to the need of "protesting" against the asymmetries and the unfair and not democratic features of the existing institutions and international regime (established in most of the cases by hegemonic powers, responding then to the dominant logic and interests of that specific configuration of power); it is important to remember that emerging powers are still dependent on the North, both directly and indirectly in terms of investments, cooperation and political support. While attempting to challenging the *status quo* (Western domination in all sectors), emerging powers (like Brazil) are also adapting themselves to it. While offering cooperation to other countries, they still receive cooperation from the North, and in some cases both things are happening within the same (trilateral) cooperation. While discursively promoting a new understanding of the International Relations in a more horizontal way, they are practically reproducing old mechanisms of power competition and resources curse.

Although the recent attempts of the discipline of International Relations to transcend the divide between the West and the Rest (the South), the acceptance of the diversity of knowledge and culture and norms outside the universalized paradigm, has posed serious difficulties to societies in "building shared norms [and] has hampered the ability of states to solve collective action problems", like might be the protection of human rights or the safeguard of environment, as well as deal with new security threats and offer common responses to the challenges faced by states in the international system and by the global governance too (NAKANO, 2011 p.125).²⁵ It seems relevant and necessary to expand the focus of the discipline of IR from the exclusive focus on Western/

²⁵ The Western universalization of values, principles and norms, means the "unilateral imposition of values on other states (in both the West and non-West) and eventually hinder cross-regional and intra-regional cooperation", consolidate some cultural particularities as universal valid and as a way of marginalizing external others (NAKANO, 2011).

Northern paradigms and parameters of thought and overcome the global imperialism and colonial affirmation of the context within which knowledge and power have been developed and distributed. It seems necessary to start including non-Western discussion and practices into its borders, distancing them from the colonial ideologies that the Western world has given it and integrate non-Western thought into the study of the global system (SHILLIAM, 2011).²⁶

The dialogue between these theories will also be possible through the establishment of a hybrid understanding of the international system's complexity and of the dynamic and processual relations among its actors.²⁷ So, the concept of hybridity became seminal in the Post-colonial and in the Culture Studies, while also came to analyse globalization as a dynamic concept moving between the local and the global, the tradition and the modernity, or to observe the political and cultural relation as two fields "mutually constitutive" (KRAIDY, 2002). The concept has also been criticized for being political suspicious, and also dangerous and emancipative, by legitimating a rhetoric of interaction and mixings (of subjectivities or agencies), while maintaining some forms of domination and imperialism (of some subjectivities or agencies) (Ahmad, 1995 apud. KRAIDY, 2002); as well as, by being the continuation of the same, but by other means (Shih and Ikeda, 2016). Nowadays, the criticism appears as losing its potential mainly if considering that, everywhere, subjectivity and agency are mutually mixed and in a dynamic interaction, and "no one is not hybrid anymore" as Chih-Yu Shih and Josuke Ikeda stated (2016, p. 454). However, a more political use of the term hybridity has occurred in recent years, as a temporal progress of the concept, "to supplement the overly spatial sensibility registered in the quest for a synthetic kind of sitedness in post-Western International

²⁶ By citing the work of Dussel (1984) and its dividing of the world into centre and periphery, Shillam affirms that the periphery as always had to defined itself against an established (central) civilization, at the same time that- as outsider- the peripheral subjects seems to be "better placed to interrogate the reality" of this established picture and propose a critical thought of it (SHILLIAM, 2011, p. 15). Shillam also continues by affirming that in this attempt to reorientate the IR discipline towards non-Western thought is not free from epistemological difficulties, once the contact and the "engagement with non-western archive of thought [...] at least in part has been constructed through colonially induced forms of representing 'others'" (SHILLIAM, 2011, p. 12) based on imperialist and colonialist ideas and perceptions that have shaped the way how West and non-West are considered, with this latter always seen as the object of the legitimate knowledge and the former as the exclusive subject.

²⁷ The debates on hybridity, far from the studies conducted in biological and anatomical sciences, formerly appeared in the nineteenth century and spread over after the World War II, particularly related to the processes of decolonization of peoples and to the creation and establishment of a national identity of those subjects, that was contemplating both the indigenous populations as well as the descendants of the colonizer, "by positing the new nations as hybrids of both worlds" (KRAIDY, 2002, p. 5).

Relations theory” (SHIH; IKEDA, 2016, p. 455). In an international system, where many mainstreams of IR have been challenged by the presence of new actors, emergencies and contexts, there are some non-Western understandings and self-consciousnesses of sitedness existing “in between” that are going to critically reshape and reformulate the discipline (ACHARYA; BUZAN, 2009).

By looking at the International Security Studies (ISS), this discussion about hybridism enters recently into the conversation, with a postcolonial debate on the security field and concept. The discipline of security studies is characterized for its homogeneity and for its reproduction of “Western-centrism” understandings and practices over the non-West, that has historically kept this latter out from the theoretical and practical construction of the discipline (BILGIN, 2010). The absence of the Rest can be linked to the reproduction of mainstream paradigms of the International Relations, that keep the non-West to a role of subalternity, and therefore subjected to resistance, annihilation or on the other side to protection, saving and education. Furthermore, by focusing on the subalterns of the capitalist and imperialist global system (NAIR, 2017), Postcolonialism is stressing the criticism on the dualism of the IR and the ISS and of their strong distinction in the security field between “high politics” (concerned with national security) and “low politics” (concerned with human rights, environment, gender issues and development) (BILGIN, 2010; NAIR, 2017; TICKNER, 2003).

Postcolonialism is therefore interested in giving space and voice to all those issues that are not considered by mainstream theories and all those subjects and objects not included into the analysis, by promoting an intersectionality of point of views to redesign the international system in a less hierarchical and colonial structure (NAIR, 2017), less geopolitically constructed on the Western and hegemonic order of “us” and “them”, “friends and enemy” (ibid. 2017). The reformulation of IR and ISS should therefore move forward a not acceptance of the existing asymmetries of power and influence, that produce a neo-colonial context, and in favour of a “postcolonial rupture” of the dominant and mainstream understanding and practices, aimed to emancipate the others.

We believe that the use of the hybridity concept may be useful in analysing the emerging powers participation and engagement (and more specifically the Brazilian case) in the African continent and in the South Atlantic Ocean. Brazil, as emerging power of the new millennium, together with the other rising actors is inserted in a project of change

the structure of the international system to give more impetus to the Global South and to non-developed countries. However, such a change delineated by emerging powers has not occurred through the dismantling and the challenging of fixed categories, nor through the implementation of a new sited identity of the South within a binary model of world politics. Instead, emerging powers like Brazil are acting in a “third space”, that reduces the categorical differences while establishing a continuity and a permanent ambivalence in the identities involved in it (BHABHA, 1990).²⁸

Looking at the role of the emerging countries, and mainly focusing on the Brazilian policy toward Africa, we can perceive how the political discourse and the practice of SSC have converged in a third space and in an identity different from any of the former ones (North vs. South). This overlapping of instruments, ideas and practices characterizes the Foreign Policy agenda of Brazil and of many other actors in the international system, highlighting that their dispositions and expectations can adhere and respond to binary and different “systems of rule, [...] ways of conceiving power, [...] sets of practices - which may be distinguished not only analytically, but also, normatively - and to two different ways of imagining space” (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 62–63).

2.3 The challenges to the security- development nexus in the changing dynamics of the twenty-first century

In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the Soviet Union dissolution, the Western-led mechanisms and institutions and principles of foreign aid started to spread and in the late 1990s a new agenda emerged, more focused on the aid effectiveness and on a growing participation of actors into the architecture of global aid. Further reasons leading to a changed understanding of foreign aid and international cooperation for development concerned the re-articulation of the nexus between development and security, that became extremely relevant in the post 9/11 events (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005; MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014). In this context, foreign aid started to be oriented towards the reduction of poverty and the promotion of good governance in the countries

²⁸ Nevertheless, hybridity does not reduce nor delete the asymmetries existing in the actor’s power relations, neither it indicates a syncretism of identities. As Bhabha stated “even though the West and non-West have come to be radically opposed in colonial discourse (and the struggle against it), the boundary between them is a site with broad shoulders” (apud. Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006:4).

to create the foundations for future stability, peace and progress (MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014).

2.3.1 The security-development nexus between evolution and criticism

The security-development nexus addresses and explains the existence of a link, a complex reciprocal connection (MILANTE, 2016) between these two concepts and their capability to influence each other, resulting in positive or negative outcomes and impacts on the many domain of the international system, as well as on the different levels and actors playing in it.²⁹ Mark Duffield (2010) explains the nexus by stating that traditional aid donors have agreed that underdevelopment and poverty cause conflicts, and consequently the development of countries is the desired structure to guarantee the security. Stewart states that the promotion of security is a substantial part of the societal progress because insecurity and conflicts have huge costs on development, so that “[...] promoting security is instrumental for development and that inclusive patterns of development are an important element in avoiding conflict, so that development is instrumental to the achievement of security” (STEWART, 2004, p. 277–278).

Although the many connections, development and security have been for long considered as separate fields (BEALL; GOODFELLOW; PUTZEL, 2006, p. 53), belonging to two distinct discourses in which the former was connected to the liberal view of economic domain and therefore oriented to perceive development as the exclusive economic growth and increasing state capabilities and opportunities, while the latter was addressing its concern exclusively on the feeling and perception of safety and the guarantee of existence and survival of state (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010). However, and as a consequence of a difficult settling of parameters to define what development and security are, and what constitutes the nexus, the definition of these concepts as always

²⁹ As Milante, Jang and Burton stated (2015), by proposing an understanding of the security and development nexus through a system approach framework, the reciprocal relationship between these two domains is extremely complex given the many forces operating in the international politics and the many causes that lay behind a problem or a success at the national, regional and international level. For them, given the interconnection among the different domains (citing the economic, political, social, cultural, environmental, gender domain among others) composing a system (state, society, region, international, for example), any solution or action undertaken in any of these domains, must be “internally consistent with the rest of the system” and therefore result in an improved performance of the other domains, reached by a possible spillover effect (Milante et.al. 2015:299-300).

changed over the time, influenced by the international and domestic context (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010), but it has always been defined around a compromise between the “chosen development strategy [and] (the perception of) a particular and necessary security ‘arrangements’- usually[...] between states- as a given backdrop” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 35).³⁰

During the Cold War period, development returned to indicate what a country was ‘supposed to be’, indicating with this specification the need to spread Western and liberal values all around the globe, modernizing the postcolonial state (Ruggie, 1998 p. 72 apud. HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 40). On the other hand, security was characterized by those conventional rivalries and wars, related to politics of balance of power (as well as on the balance of terror of mutual destruction) and regional security complexes, offered by the international context of bipolar competition between the two superpowers and their two different socio-economic systems (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010).

The realist security paradigm reinforced during the Cold War, was able to maintain the order and the predictability of the international relations and the understanding of security as principally linked to the survival and sovereignty of the state (in this case of the blocs). The new independent states were seduced to join the blocs through development policies and practices would have guaranteed their consensus and political support. Furthermore, the superpowers’ offer of security to the developing and less developed countries was aimed to establish and maintain alliances and increase the sphere of influence *vis-à-vis* the other bloc (ESTEVEZ; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014). However, in this same period also characterized postcolonialism, a different perspective of the nexus between development and security was proposed by the periphery of the world. It was influenced by the Wallerstein’s World System Theory (of 1974) and the absorption of

³⁰ In offering an historical overview of the origins and the evolution of security and development as a nexus, Bjorn Hettne (2010) highlights how the nexus already started to be shaped formerly as connected to industrialization of Europe during the nineteenth century, where the concern for development was focused on the state need to be secure and keep security in order to achieve modernization and progress. In this same context security was more linked to the definition of keeping the order, rather than the current understanding of it as freedom from violence, needs and threats (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 32). The twentieth century, characterized by the spread of violent world conflicts, witnessed the establishment of war economies and industrialization imperatives in Germany and in the Soviet Union, showing how development and security had switched their places (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 39): if previously, order and predictability (i.e. security aspects) enabled development, then, wealth was used and served to reinstate order and economic development was for aggression, defence or territorial conquest (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 40).

development not as modernization (understood as Europeanization and Westernization, impregnated of the colonial logic) and imposition of external values (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010, p. 11), but as independence of the periphery from the centre of world politics, that started with the creation of alternative and relatively neutral groups (like the NAM) and the attempts of demanding for a new international economic order (resulted in the NIEO- introduced in the next chapter) (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 41).

This contesting vision produced by the periphery was highlighting the “structurally exploitative nature of the capitalist world system and its negative impact on Third World development” (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010, p. 11), and therefore security was seen as dependable on modernity march and vice versa. The developing world’s criticism to the mutual reinforcing feature of development and security was based on the dysfunctional application of the nexus to its specific context. Focused on the Postcolonial Studies, both development and security are spatially and temporally located within specific boundaries and in relation with external contexts (HUTCHINGS, 2011; JABRI, 2007). The nexus is then developed within dualistic structures bridged together, demonstrating how the (in)security and (under)development of one state (or of the developing South) is implicated in the security and development of other states (developed North) and can reproduce usual structures and mechanisms of powers and asymmetries among the involved actors, fulfilling the interests of the latter and reproducing inequalities and violence in the former (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010, p. 18–19). As Catherine Gegout criticized, the development offered by traditional donors is not just an altruistic and humanitarian gesture (GEGOUT, 2018), but it has also a “neoliberal and utilitarian rhetoric” that uses the “solidaristic gloss” to guarantee and achieve national (self) interests (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005, p. 62). In fact, the only development assistance provided by these countries is the liberal economy and the progress to be achieved through and “according to appropriate standards and civility” (ibid.: 70).

Realist scholars have been pioneering in advancing a possible interaction between security and economy at the international levels (GILPIN, 1987; KRASNER, 1985), and in recent time, with the advancing of globalization it has become clearer that the calculation of conflict among states has changed and that the economic and financial interests among states have a strong influence over the states’ war propensity (WOHLFORTH; ZUBOK, 2017). Liberalism recognizes the role of trade among states in the reduction of conflicts because promoter of shared interests and interdependence

among states. However, it has to be highlighted that interdependence is not always symmetrical (KEOHANE, 1988; KEOHANE; NYE, 2001) and some states may be more vulnerable than others to stay into a relationship that “exploit(s) weaknesses and manipulate(s) behaviours” (WALKER; ROUSSEAU, 2017, p. 26).

The conflict arose between the North and the South “led to the rise of the dependency paradigm [...] reflecting the subordinate economic position of the non-European areas in the world system as well as the limited political sovereignty implied in bipolar domination” (HETTNE, 2005). The security-development nexus was moving from the European narrative to the one of a European World System (of the colonization period) and reaching a “globalized world order where a ‘global south’ exists everywhere alongside a ‘global north’” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 33). Destroying the dependency from the capitalist world was also meaning a more human conceptualization of security, as not just addressed to the state, as main referent object, but at the empowerment and the bettering life of the excluded people (FRIEDMANN, 1992). In this context, the nexus started to assume different shapes and meaning, restoring the concern of underdevelopment as a threat to the new world order, this latter still understood as just the Free world order (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 41).

Dani Rodrik (2009) criticizes the way how development has been conceived and pursued in the international system along the decades, affirming that instead of allowing countries to have better living standards, the international system and its institutions, and consequently main actors, have been more concerned about how to maximize trade and market access.³¹ He continues adding that there has been an inversion between the means and the ends, in which the latter is representing by trade rather than by development, that is what we should aspire to, and with ‘trade’ he is meaning the global economy and interconnection among states, markets and production, the industrialization and the growing competition necessary to it (RODRIK, 2009). He claims that is therefore necessary to move from a market-exchange mindset to a development one, that will not

³¹ A common accepted definition of development is today still lacking in international relations, therefore being still strongly subjected to its link to economic growth, progress and modernization, industrialization and the exclusive role of the state in the global finance, less space has been given to the social transformations concerning and deriving from development, as well as the connection to human progress that the concept started to include recently within its definition.

sacrifice the developmental goals in the bargaining process among international actors and market forces.

Nowadays, we are into a new paradigm called global development that is looking for the “improvement in the quality of international relations towards a global world order and ultimately global sustainable security” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 33). Both security and development are conceived to be sustainable, meaning their necessary capability to be efficiently response to the present needs, without compromising neither the needs of future generation, nor affecting their capabilities to meet their own needs. In the current context, “development is contested and multidimensional, and the defining of security is a far more complex endeavour” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 35). Furthermore, distinctions between what is internal and external have blurred (BRANDÃO, 2015), reducing the territoriality of a state control and influence and creating a general “durable disorder” with conflicts, development problems, crises, no longer stopping at borders (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 44), but assuming global and transnational features, rapidly spreading elsewhere and initiating vicious cycles of insecurities, harms and suffering. The security-development nexus assumes then a more holistic approach (STERN; ÖJENDAL, 2010). At the same time, development policies returned to consider and relaunch the role of state over the independent and overestimated neoliberal capability of the market to achieve progress, growth and deliver development and stability to those countries where the neoliberal package of policies of the Washington Consensus was applied.³²

Attempting to create a link between security and development, strong visibility of the connection is offered by the development aid and humanitarian emergencies and interventions, in which the security-development nexus is repeated as a mantra, being impossible to ignore the high development costs carried on by violent conflicts, as well as the preventive role of development in promoting conditions for peace, by dealing with

³² At the end of Cold War, a non-interventionist approach became predominant, highlighting the economic neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus and the need for less governments in order to achieve a good governance and achieve development, this latter understood as freeing the market from political and bureaucratic obstacles aimed to regulate the economic sector (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 42-43). In security terms, the globalization transformed the state into a protector of external markets and economic forces, forgetting of its role as protector of domestic society and therefore as nation-builder, becoming isolated from societies and creating exclusion of some groups and the inclusion of others, and questioning the state role as provider of security for its citizens (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 43).

structural root causes of conflicts (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2010, p. 34) and violence. For Frances Stewart (2004), security has a direct impact on well-being and on the achievement of development, this latter meaning something that goes further the economic growth (although this condition still remain a valid way to describe and evaluate development) and reach the betterment of human life conditions. Coming to the role of state and in particular to what he calls the “failure of the social contract” established between the governments and its people, Stewart recognizes the security threat derived by an incapacity of the state to deliver economic benefits or social services, allowing for an economic stagnation or decline of the country in question, the rising up of poverty and unwell conditions for people and the breakup of violence (2004, p. 273)

The author promotes a three-way connection between the two fields that assume the format of “security/development/security” and observes: the role of *security as objective* of development, while also recognizing the role of *security as an instrument* to development and the *development as instrument* to achieve security (STEWART, 2004, p. 261). Hence, by looking at state and societal insecurity in the developing countries and specifically in the Global South and in the African continent, it is perceivable how this nexus works and how “vicious cycles of lack of development leading to conflict leading to lack of development can readily emerge” as well as virtuous cycles can also result in the opposite way (STEWART, 2004, p. 278). Hence:

“promoting security is a substantial part of what we mean by societal progress. [...] conflict has heavy development costs, so that promoting security is instrumental for development and that inclusive patterns of development are an important element in avoiding conflict, so that development is instrumental to the achievement of security” (ibid. p. 277-278).

2.3.2 The securitization of development in the new millennium

It was already during the Cold that developed countries of the Global North realized that to achieve a sustainable domestic security, it was necessary to achieve and guarantee the development of the developing and less developed countries, and therefore to use their foreign policy as a tool for increasing security abroad, through an international cooperation made of technical assistance and also engaged in economic, investments and

also in military and humanitarian aspects (BEALL; GOODFELLOW; PUTZEL, 2006; ESTEVES; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014). As Beall et al (2006) have highlighted:

“[...] a re-emerging development-security nexus is increasingly evident. This is hardly surprising given the international context of the past few years, but it poses a serious danger [...] security has been a focus of development cooperation since the 1990s and there are positive elements to the concomitant concern with fragile states, humanitarian action and peace-building. However, the sudden reappearance of Northern security or ‘global security’ as a primary objective of development is quite clearly a response to the insecurity felt by the developed North in the post 9/11 environment, and the effect of this shift is that development itself becomes increasingly instrumental to the security agenda.” (2006, p. 53)

These humanitarian interventions, also deemed ‘military humanism’, ‘liberal imperialism’ or ‘humanitarian imperialism’ (BEALL; GOODFELLOW; PUTZEL, 2006, p. 44), have been seen as a form of coercive involvement/ engagement of external powers into the domestic context of crises aiming to prevent anarchy, punish human rights violations, promote democracy and guarantee and achieve good governance (ibid.). This indicates that “development became securitized”, and after 2001, the discourse changed from humanitarian intervention to pre-emptive intervention or war against terrorism – even though a post-conflict reconstruction as new development experience also appeared (ibid. 2006, p. 44).

In the new millennium Africa has been posed at the core of the international security agenda, addressing threats that are not African born, but that have found in the continent a fertile ground to flourish, due to weak political, economic and cultural institutions, internal problems and weak capacities (DAVIS, 2004).³³ It has become clear that weak states can represent a great threat to the national interests of stronger states, not because poverty turns poor people into terrorists, but because poverty, state weakness and corruption make poor states vulnerable to terrorism, drug cartels, and so on, within their borders (HERBST; MILLS, 2003). Therefore, the connection between security and development became clearer in the international agenda; and for the bulk of the international community, the African continent, still underdeveloped in most parts,

³³ Among the internal problems, Davis (2007) listed famine, civil wars, HIV/AIDS epidemics, genocides, underdevelopment, poverty and corruption as well as issues of political (failed states) and economic institutional weaknesses in a region full of natural resources, needed by terrorist groups to survive; authoritarian regimes exerting violence over their people, religious issues (Islam), and political, ethnic and religious tensions that create a favourable environment for the penetration of terrorist organizations (p. 2-5).

became the source and the main stage of insecurity and conflictual dynamics that could potentially spread to other parts of the world (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005).

Based on the global influence of local problems, traditional actors in international relations (states and organizations) intervene in matters happening outside of their sovereign domain as a way to guarantee security, that will promote development, even though this may “[...] have been hailed as a way of cohering national and international policy-making interventions in non-Western states” (CHANDLER, 2007, p. 362). For the scholar, the joint understanding of security and development has contributed to the creation of policies addressing this union, that contribute to the implementation of preventive and intervenient measures of security of the states within non-Western and less developed states (CHANDLER, 2007). Indeed, the strengthening of a holistic approach related to the security-development nexus and the expansion of its influence and impacts worldwide, on the basis of the globalized narrative of Stern and Öjendal (2010) seems to drive the growing action of the international community into Western Africa waters and to advance the ongoing process of securitization of Africa (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005, p. 62) therefore establishing an equation between war on terror and war on poverty.

There was a coincidence between African interest in building continental political, economic and security initiatives, with Western objectives to fight global terrorism, by capacitating states for this mission and increasing the military presence of external powers in Africa. Hence, the securitization process initiated and imposed by external countries over the African continent and the West Africa region ends up showing the predominant power of Northern states in establishing issues that need to be treated under a sphere of exceptionality and existential threat. The power asymmetries that still exist in the international system have supported these actors with an audience that recognizes and interiorizes the speech act of securitization and responds to public issues in an extreme securitized way.

The securitization of Africa has witnessed a switch in the international aid structure, from development and humanitarian intervention to a stress on military and security solutions, feeding the overstated rhetoric about the existentialist threats represented by issues like underdevelopment, political and economic weakness, poverty

and social conditions (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005, p. 58).³⁴ Buzan et al (1998) and Buzan and Waever (2003) stated that a securitization process occurs “when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is “normal politics” (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003, p. 491; BUZAN; WAEVER; WILDE, 1998, p. 24). The result of the securitizing process depends on and is influenced by the power of actors in making effective their claim about the threat, transforming an issue into an existential threat. Therefore, the power relations among actors helps to explain what security is and how it works (BALZACQ; LÉONARD; RUZICKA, 2016, p. 501). For Ole Waever, the security logic that moves the securitization process is structured around a discursive act (*speech act*) that makes of security a social construction, and that assumes different meanings reflecting who constructed it and in which social structure (BRANDÃO, 2011).

For an issue to be securitized, the existence of an *audience* is seminal as it empowers the securitizing actor or any other appropriate authority to act, providing him with moral and formal support (BALZACQ; LÉONARD; RUZICKA, 2016). Audience provides moral and formal support, supplying the securitizing actor with a formal mandate to implement a policy that will address the threat. For Waever (1995) "something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so" and "power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it". The securitization process then "enables certain elites to increase their power as a consequence of being granted special privileges in dealing with a security issue or, in other words, breaking free from the procedures and rules that actors ‘would otherwise be bound by” (BALZACQ; LÉONARD; RUZICKA, 2016, p. 501). As Balzacq et al. (2016) claims, while agreeing with Buzan et al. (2008) and recognizing the context as an intervening variable that exerts an influence over the actors in the securitization process, “certain actors will be exceptionally well positioned to articulate a security discourse” (BALZACQ; LÉONARD; RUZICKA, 2016, p. 504). Hence, a problem becomes a security problem when it threatens the state and its power, and the issue in question is declared as a security problem by the state and its elites. It seems that what is occurring

³⁴ For Balzacq (2011), securitization corresponds to "an articulated assemblage of practices, whereby heuristic artefacts [...] are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor" who works to build a perception of vulnerability of the referent object (who has to be keep secure- the community of the securitizing actor, for example) by investing the referent subject (of the securitization practice) with "an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion", immediately requiring a specific policy to address and lock it (BALZACQ, 2011, p. 3).

might correspond to a securitization of the development, this latter used in the rhetoric of states to justify any further expansion of security approaches to guarantee security objectives, and not development (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005; AIMÉ, 2013)

The end of the Cold War contributed to a change in the understanding of security, deeply influenced by the constructivism and the idea that security is mutable and constructed through social practices, at least in part. So, Keith Krause (1998) included into the agenda of Critical Security Studies the understanding that security threats, responses and objects are a social construction, moving towards a transformation of the way how security was practised (MUTIMER, 2017, p. 56), that was in relation with the kind of discourse and knowledge production that was promoted to create fears and performatively constitute a security identity and action, implementing a regime of beliefs- later assumed as truths- about what is representing security and what is not (ibid. p. 59).

This post-structuralist approach to security emerged in 1990s (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2010) aimed to question not the essence of security, but its being a form of productive power to understand the reality. It recognizes that security and security threats define the relationship between the self (state, individuals, IOs among others) and the other (usually perceived as antagonist), the friend and the enemy. Therefore, in name of security of the self, some policies and practices are implemented and justified, no matter whether they might be violent or extremely restrictive in relation to the “other”, who is not considered as subject, but only as object of security. Hence, the theory of securitization has recognized the performative power of security itself and “how issues acquire the status of security through intersubjective socio-political processes” and therefore being recognized as threats to the existence of referent objects and requiring a political action that is structured on the acceptance of the security exceptionality of the issue (VUORI, 2017). Security is extremely subjective, meaning different things to different actors, being the security threats related to the uniqueness of each state, society, group or individual and to the historical experiences they live and that have made them vulnerable to certain issues more than to others.

Furthermore, the same disciplines of international relations and security studies, have been structured on a conceptual binarism that eliminate the differences, the heterogeneity and the complexity of the world. Adler and Greve (2009) stresses further this recognition of the strict paradigms upon which International Relations and Security

Studies are structured, claiming that in the attempt to homogenize the analysis within binary and mutually exclusive divides, mainstream theories are lacking the capacity to explain the great variety of ideas, practices and mechanisms existing and operating nowadays in the security governance at different levels (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 60). Post-structuralism, however, is attempting to move from such an exclusionary dichotomy of relations, revising the existing practices of security (ARADAU; MUNSTER, 2017).³⁵ It has attempted to recuperate the space of the other, not as a space of negation, rejection and abjection where the other is excluded, invisible and subjected, but as a space of resistance and challenge, to promote the inclusion, the audibility and visibility of the other subjects.

This move is oriented to provoke ruptures and to challenge the order promoted by security practices within the international system, by focusing on concepts of representation, performativity and power, that question the concept of security together with the international structure of power and propose alternative political practices (ARADAU; MUNSTER, 2017). The following theoretical analysis is observing the variety of regional security systems of governance adopted by states (in our specific case, Brazil) in a coexistence and overlapping of political discourses and practices in the field of regional security (ADLER; GREVE, 2009).

2.4 Region building processes and the overlapping of regional security mechanisms

In the current world, where globalization has strengthened the interdependence among states and has lowered the national borders, facilitating the contact and the spread of transnational threats, the security must be achieved within regional contexts, because no state can efficiently defend itself by acting alone.³⁶ Regional integration and regional

³⁵ In Giorgio Agamben (1996) *"Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life"* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), the power of security lies in the capability of security practices to organize political communities by defining the subjects belonging to the binary division between friends and enemy, us and them, self and other. It establishes limits, separations, differential treatments and hierarchies among the members of a system, that in this analysis are going to be the states within the international system.

³⁶ Ideas expressed by the Portuguese Army Lieutenant- Colonel, Luís Bernardino, during a conference organized by the Centro de Análise Estratégica of the CPLP on May 25th of 2020 and entitled *"O paradigma da Cooperação de Defesa na CPLP. Contributos do Bi-Multilateralismo para a Segurança"*

mechanisms of participation in the different fields of the international relations are key to achieve or maintain power and for the improvement of social and economic development (ECA & ECOWAS, 2015).

The creation of regional structures has been thought as an intermediary level between the state and the international system, reproducing a more accurate redistribution of forces and more appropriate responses to the challenges of the new millennium (FUCCILLE; REZENDE, 2013). When related to security aspects, regional structures are identified and created within a limited geography through a dynamic of “we and they”, or also “friends and enemies”, aimed at solving problems concerning borders delimitation, ideological orientation and alignment, historical and cultural roots, population and national interests. The process of region building responds to the basic assumptions of the constructivist approach of international relations and contributes later to the promotion of realist and liberal-institutional objectives (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003).

Indeed, the literature about regions claims that regions are socially and politically constructed and built all over the time by actors with specific interests, and with spatial dimension. Van Lagenhove (2011) uses a constructivist approach to affirm that regions are always built through a discourse that contributes to the further institutionalization of the region itself. The geographic proximity and the interaction among actors of the same space is *per se* not sufficient to advance a region-building process on its own. Instead, it is necessary the existence of an “idea of region” (ACHARYA, 2011) that is strengthened through diplomatic discourse and implemented through the development of foreign policy (DODDS; INGIMUNDARSON, 2012). Neumann (1994), calls for a more realist analysis in an attempt to establish a connection between region-building and international and regional power dynamics, affirming that the actor assuming the role of region-builder is actually the one dictating and shaping the diplomatic discourse that will contribute to define the regional members and the outsiders. Therefore, other than by geography or shared cultural and identity roots, regions are political projects established among actors for the pursuing of their specific strategic interests (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014c).

Marítima". Bernardino is currently serving NATO at the Joint Force Command Brunssum, in the Netherlands.

They might appear as responding to a logic of balance of power, where the members of this cooperative security mechanism act based on power competition within an anarchical system, dominated by the desire of survival and the mistrust about other actors' intentions (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 67).³⁷ Hence, states adhere to alliance mechanisms to respond to some external threats causing insecurity, but at the same time, the uncertainty about other states' will and actions is also causing an internal security dilemma, where states are unaware about the intentions and the real interests of other states that joined the alliance. They might so fear the possibility to be abandoned by the allies or be involved in conflicts that do not respond to their own interest, but that benefits other states with relative gains (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 68). Balance of power is therefore a security mechanism that is stressing a kind of rational mistrust that produce competitiveness in the international system, but at the same time contributes to keep the order, as it is based on a constant rational calculation of the threats and risks coming from other states (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 69)

Stephen Aris and Andreas Wenger (2014) question whether these security regions and their practices are the product of processes occurring in a “inside-out” or “outside-in” way, meaning whether the formation of the regional security structure has a local contextualization (bottom-up) or a systemic-level perspective and reason of being (ARIS; WENGER, 2014). The latter case is stressing the attention over the impact of the dynamics and facts occurring at the global level, and the influence and penetration they have on and within the regional context, as already presented by the majority of scholars (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003; KATZENSTEIN, 2005; LAKE; MORGAN, 1997); while the former is focusing on internal reasons of the actors taking part into the regional project and therefore approaching in a more realist way the creation of alliances, seen as temporary and to balance the possible power projections of some rival states (MEARSHEIMER, 1994). Aris and Wegner (2014) continue by affirming the “inside-out” perspective recognizes a more post-structuralist approach and a strong criticism to the Western-centrality of IR discipline, that is also reflected into the creation of regional mechanism, hiding the role played by local issues and features in shaping the region.

³⁷ The power over which states compete consists of material and coercive capacities of the actors to threat other states to do something that otherwise they would not have done, because they did not want to. So, within the balance of power mechanism, although war and conflicts are theoretically considered as possible and available tools for keeping the multilevel order within the international system, in practice they are seen as obsolete, given the growing interdependence among states in the globalization era. (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 67)

However, they concluded that regional mechanisms respond to both internal and external influences and that it is the negotiations among these two levels of influence that defines the region (ARIS; WENGER, 2014).

They highlight therefore those regional security mechanisms (like regional security communities) (ADLER; BARNETT, 1998) that are structured mainly on shared norms, practices, ideas and interests of the members, rather than on external factors (ARIS; WENGER, 2014). Security communities refer to a group of states refusing war as a possible practice among them, because they have peacefully overcome the security dilemma among them and have established frequent interactions and shared identity values and culture, leading to the emergence of this idea of security community that exist through the creation of practices based on a shared understanding of security (ADLER; BARNETT, 1998)³⁸ and being therefore strictly linked to the process of securitization.³⁹ Indeed, for a security community to exist, members must securitize together (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003) and commonly respond to threats occurring in their regional space, like in the case of piracy (BUEGER, 2013) and other threats present in the South Atlantic. Furthermore, the power competition still exists among members of the security community, but it is transcended and not based on material capabilities and force, rather on the power of identity and representation for the maintaining of the collective narrative of the “we-feeling” that contributed to feed a perception of trust (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 70–71).

Barry Buzan defined Regional Security Complexes as groups of states worried with their national security and extremely interconnected among each other in a way that, the worries and insecurity perceptions of one state are interconnected to the national security of the other states, that they could not be treated or even considered in an adequate way when separated (BUZAN, 1983) and therefore representing an hybrid between positivist and post-positivist approaches (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003).⁴⁰

³⁸ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) defined a security community as ‘a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ – where peaceful change means ‘neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes’. (Adler and Barnett (eds), *Security Communities*, pp. 30, 34).

³⁹ As stated by Adler and Greve (2009), “[w]idening the community that practices peace may follow a ‘logic of securitization’ where sustaining the security mechanism is predicated on its spread (through formal or informal inclusion of the periphery).” (p.72).

⁴⁰ In Buzan and Wæver (2003), a Regional Security Complex came to be structured upon four variables, that join together elements of the Realism and others of the post-positivism: first, a well

By sharing implicit or explicit principles, norms and rules, and by establishing common decision-making processes to converge expectations and responses to some phenomena in space and time, states are constrained to cooperate with other members of the regional project and to not defect (KEOHANE, 1988). They establish the behavioural standards of actors based upon a given and accepted identity (FINNEMORE; SIKKINK, 1998). However, these rules do not necessarily need to be universally accepted and practiced, recognizing the most important role that some norm-takers. When norms are internalized by major international (in this case, regional) actors, they became the authority rule governing the specific domain to which they refer, regulating and constraining the action of other actors (BIERSTEKER, 2017).

The power competition and the national interests are also determining factor is the definition of which actors are going to assume a further role in the region. In the case of the South Atlantic and the role of Brazil within it, the realism of international relations is used to explain the phenomenon through the elements of conflicts and alliances, that repeats all over the history and contributed to construct the interactions among the defined members (keeping out who is not part of it) and their interests (PENHA, 2011). This rapid revision of the literature about region building processes, is going to improve the following analysis related to the understanding of the process of region building as a political phenomenon for the achievement of some interests for those states lacking enough material power. Furthermore, by focusing on the regional projects established through the South Atlantic and therefore connected to the maritime space, the theoretical background is going to expand the literature contributions on a security cooperation field that in last decades has been covering growing relevance and also, by stretching over the Southern hemisphere and seeking for the participation of Southern actors, it is favouring the production of Southern perspectives about relevant issues (both regional building processes and maritime security) and is highlighting the agency of the Global South in the new millennium. This theoretical approach about the creation of regional security

delimited area which borders are clear, that will be able to differentiate the Regional Security Complex in question from external actors and subsystems; second, the composition of the regional complex made of two or more autonomous units of the anarchical international system (the states); third, the polarity among units of the regional complex in the distribution of power; and fourth, the social construction referred to that pattern of socialization of friends and enemies, we and others.

mechanisms is representing the background of the analysis of Brazilian role in the regional security over the South Atlantic and towards the West Africa region.

When analysing the security mechanisms and practices, scholar of the IR and ISS discipline have tended to be exclusivist and to find explanation within dichotomous lines (VILLA, 2017). Indeed, mainstream theories have seen the international system as always structured upon strict paradigms, attempting to homogenize the international relations within binary divides that have excluded the diversity and the variety of ideas, practices and mechanisms (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 60). Today, we are more aware that in a post-modern world of states we lack the necessary vocabulary to describe current dynamics and established orders (ibid. p.61).⁴¹ The theoretical proposal of these scholars is therefore going to be structured upon the analysis of the current security governance at regional levels, aimed to contribute to the “multiperspectival vision” of Ruggie that highlights the coexistence of security mechanisms that have always been presented as theoretically distant and normatively opposite, but that actually present a possibility of overlapping in the practices they adopt and that define their nature as regional security mechanisms.

The work of Adler and Greve (2009) is going to show that regional boundaries of mechanisms of security governance are not just limited to criteria based on the geographical and geopolitical features, neither to the exclusive identity boundaries established among the members of the regional structure, but they also take into consideration the practices that the regions adopt, implement and that constitute the region (called by the authors, the "practical" boundaries), and how these regional mechanisms overlap and coexist in the political discourse and practice (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 60).

They define as mechanisms of security governance, those “set of rules, norms, practices and institutions, that coordinate security relations between actors in the

⁴¹ Indeed it is common to see how much of the evolution occurred in last years in actualizing the discipline, has actually made use of already existing concepts and has readapted them to the new phenomena to be described (ADLER; GREVE, 2009). This is the case of the extensive production of academic work on concepts like “soft balancing” or “hard balancing”, or “bandwagoning for profit” as it is possible to see in: Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 2005. Hard Times for Soft Balancing. *International Security*, 30:72–108; Pape, R.A. 2005. Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, 30(1): 7-45; Schweller, R. 1994. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. *International Security*, 19(1): 72-107; Wohlforth, William C. 1999. The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security* 21(1): 1–36.

international system”, in a mutually constitutive way (ibid. p.65). In their analysis they assume as security mechanisms of governance both the balance of power and the security communities, refusing the comprehension of these two mechanisms as alternative systemic outcomes of the states’ interaction and as alternative analytical units for describing the role of states in the security governance. They claim that actors can and do act based on security practices and performances coming from different security mechanisms and that respond to the state security discourse (elaborated for example within the Foreign Policy agenda of the national security documents) (ibid. p.66).

In conclusion, by inserting the analysis of the regional security practices of Brazil during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff within the idea of Adler and Greve (2009) about the overlapping of security practices, this work aims to show how the Brazilian maritime security action in the South Atlantic and regarding to the cooperation with West African states is actually characterized by ambivalent and hybrid mechanisms of both balance of powers and security community, that mix together the motivations and aspirations of the emerging power with its structural (both domestic and international) limitations in terms of capabilities. During the presidential mandates of the Worker’s Party, Brazil engaged into the building of regional projects both within the South American neighbourhood, as well as with African countries (although with a weaker range of influence and action) and therefore through the South Atlantic space, so promoting “high politics” fields, like security and defence, in the establishing of regional cooperation and integration (VILLA, 2017, p. 2). The regional process built over the South Atlantic, however, seems to respond to the coexistence of the previously indicated different security mechanisms, that however are not mutually excluding, neither competitive among themselves. Based on the theoretical overlapping of security practices, proposed by Adler and Greve (2009), this work is going to observe a possible empirical application of this hybrid security, over the strategic region of the South Atlantic.

2.6 Conclusion

The revision of the state of the art presented in this first chapter has been structured in order to follow a comprehensive process that was moving from the general debate

about international cooperation in international relations, to later advance into a more detailed analysis of the theoretical approaches and concepts that would have improved the understanding of the main objective of this study. Therefore, it has proposed a dialogue between the mainstream theoretical approaches of IR, like Realism and Liberalism, as well as Constructivism, and the Post-Structuralist approaches that better complement the understanding of the Global South international cooperation and of emerging powers in the international system. Rather than simply debating Realism and Constructivism, the chapter has also opted for opening a space to the listening of the Global South's voice and the peripheral world, moving between the Theory of Dependency and the Structural Realism and including the Postcolonial studies. It has been considered relevant to expand the focus of IR discipline over Western and Northern mainstream paradigms and parameters of knowledge and to contribute to include non-Western discussions and theorizations within the discipline borders, or at least to show this possibility.

Indeed, in an international system challenged by the rise of the South and strongly characterized by the emergence of actors from the South, the overlapping and dialogue among theories will contribute to present and strengthen a critical position based upon the concept of solidarity in SSC, and it will expand the vision of IR theories over the dominant axioms. Indeed, by introducing the Post-colonial studies' discussion on the concept of Hybridity, the chapter has offered the theoretical and conceptual background to analyse the role of emerging powers in the international structure and global governance of the new millennium in the field of maritime security cooperation.

This discussion about hybridism has also contributed to the theoretical expansion of the discipline of International Security Studies, to refuse the homogeneity and the reproduction of "Western-centrism" conceptual understandings and practices of security over the non-West, keeping this latter in a role of subalternity and passivity and missing any possible Southern security analysis, that better knows the local space to promote a more sustainable peace and stability. The use of the hybridity concept has been introduced as useful to later analyse the emerging powers participation and engagement (and more specifically the Brazilian case) in the Global South and in the international system. Indeed, given their structural limitations when inserted within the global power architecture, but being also the major actors if looking at them from a Southern perspective, these powers have been acting in a "third space", an hybrid category of

challenging the *status quo* and at the same time of accommodating in it, attempting to reform the existing international institutions, practices and mechanisms, while also competing to join them. In the analysis of developing and less developed countries in the system, cooperation became a necessary strategy for survival and for the achievement of short-term gains. At this purpose, the idea of cooperation as pragmatic option for those countries is also introduced, aimed to demystify the exclusive solidarity of their cooperation model.

The focus on the changing context of the international cooperation for development has been therefore oriented to evaluate the cooperative attitude of this emerging powers in the Global South and their role in addressing the changes occurring in the international system and mainly affecting the security and development sectors. The changing context of the new millennium, stressed by the globalization and the transnationalization of local threats has contributed to an increased focus over the security-development nexus and the consequent securitization of the development, mainly in the countries of the Global South, by the production of an existential threats' speech, spoken by the North and reproducer of asymmetric structures of power and relationships.

The process of securitization implemented in the African continent, has relaunched at the same time the focus on the security-development nexus has the core driver of the international cooperation, connecting different domains and also expanding the definition of security and development, towards a more interconnected and sustainable conceptualization. As local threats can easily spread worldwide, regional and multilateral projects seem to have become the most efficient and preferred responsive action to keep global security. Therefore, by looking at the theoretical approaches about region building processes in the security fields and englobing them within the hybrid framework of the emerging powers' action, the literature review has advanced to explain the proposal overlapping of regional security mechanisms. To conclude, this literature review is building the foundations upon which this study of Brazilian theorization of its maritime security cooperation with West African countries is occurring, within the framework of the South-South Cooperation model for international development.

The South-South Cooperation Model for Development of the New Millennium: the *revisioning* of the security-development nexus

The end of Cold War and the advancing of globalization resulted in some transformations in the international system and relations. First, the ceasing of the horizontal power confrontation between the Western and the Soviet bloc; second, the victory and prevalence of liberal values, models and politics all over the globe; and last, the collapse of the socialist economic model of international development. The accumulation of economic, military and cultural power in US and West hands, contributed to the submission of international actors to traditional Western powers' rules, about international development, trade, political and economic relations and military interventions. These rules were defined by a selected and limited number of states within the walls of what have been claimed as unfair, undemocratic and unrepresentative institutions,⁴² in which the capabilities of developing countries to play a more strategic game of alliances and bargain, allowing for the achievement of some relative gains and the promotion of national interests, almost vanished. Notwithstanding the attempts to homogenise the world around Western values and practices of international development, the vertical distribution of material power and influence of the world (structured into a North-South or into the core-periphery divide) have remained unaltered, if not worsened. The imposition of Northern (also understood as Western) aid projects, models and practices of development seemed to have stressed even further the already difficult conditions of developing countries, entangled into vicious cycles of dependence, poverty, indebtedness and political, economic and social weakness (MAWDSLEY, 2019a).

At the rise of the new millennium a further reconfiguration of power seems to have occurred, as consequence of the emergence of regional actors and the increasing

⁴² See John Glenn (2008) Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit: stifling the voice of the South, *Third World Quarterly*, 29:2, 217-238, for a more detailed analysis of the three main international institutions about trade and finance (respectively the World Trade Organization -WTO, the World Bank-WB, and the International Monetary Fund- IMF) and their democratic and therefore legitimacy deficit, which means unrepresentativeness of the Global South actors and needs.

economic power they have achieved and that allowed them to have a greater international presence and influence. Aimed at reforming the multilateral institutions, practices and values and at influencing the international balance of power, these emerging powers coming from the Global South have advanced the proposal of an alternative model of international cooperation for development. They have claimed to challenge traditional rules and rulers, looking for their place in the global politics and for leaving their footprint into the global decision-making processes, as well as into the main features of international cooperation for development (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012). Their growing capabilities seem to have established a counterbalance to the US predominance in world politics and to Western main role over both practices and policy implementation in multilateral institutions.

As stated by Esteves and Assunção (2014, p. 1776), the engagement of new actors rising from the South in the international cooperation for development has contributing to a decentralization of the decisional process, the implementation of different plays and the legitimization of alternative practices. Moreover, the redefinition of the debate around international cooperation and development has also boosted a redesign of the existing international multilateral architecture (made by OIs like IMF, WB, OECD and UN agencies) and bilateral agencies that started to be posed under contestation since the end of the twentieth century (ibid. 2014, p. 1775). The emerging powers of the new millennium (here considered as BRICS, but that also cover the other many acronyms created in the last decades) have then engaged into the creation and promotion of a horizontal model of cooperation (structured upon a South-South format) among developing and less developed countries, by focusing on concepts like solidarity, reciprocity and mutual assistance (GOSOVIC, 2016a; PECEQUILO, 2008). Since 1950s, these concepts have attracted and interested many developing states of the Global South. Moreover, South-South cooperation is also “a political project” aimed to free and emancipate countries, making them independent, both politically and economically from the North and more in general from the consequences of the past events of submission and colonization, allowing them to gain influence, act collectively and raise their voices in international affairs (GOSOVIC, 2016a).

Divided between a discursive and in some cases also desirable cooperative attitude based on solidarity as well as on the competitive relationship in the Global South and in the international system, these emerging and middle powers have been affected by

their intermediate identity in the international power structure. Indeed, being in the middle between the group of developed powers (to which they aspire to join) and the developing ones (to which they might belong), emerging powers from the South are perceived as example of development and right implementation of independent mechanisms or well managed Northern practices that have contributed to overcome the vicious cycles of underdevelopment, dependence and violence, guaranteeing political stability and independence, rule of law and human rights, the improvement of human lives and the emerging of an alternative world politics' architecture, both in their own regions (NOLTE, 2010) and within their hemispheric context (COOPER; ANTKIEWICZ, 2008). This vision is criticized by Gladys Lechini (2007) who, in her analysis of SSC and in order to encounter some causes of the failure of a previous model, states that the assumption that all southern developing and underdeveloped countries would have similar experiences and contexts, and that similar solutions could have been applied uniformly to all, expecting the same successful resolutions of problems seen somewhere else in the Southern area, was actually an overestimation that led the first attempt of SSC if not to the failure, at least to a kind of frustration. It was just in the new millennium that the relaunching of SSC occurred in a more selective and less generalized trend (LECHINI, 2007).

In this chapter, we pretend to evaluate the presence of emerging powers in the international system, by analysing their quest for development in the Global South as an alternative to the traditional North-South model of cooperation (BROWN, 2000; MUHR, 2016; SAKSENA, 1985). Furthermore, we also aim to highlight the resulted systemic distribution of power in the international configuration, derived by the emerging and traditional actors' competition for power, prestige and resources (SCHWELLER, 2011). The analysis considers the double and contradictory assumption of emerging powers as *system- affecting* and *system- adapting*, relating it to the engagement with the Southern hemisphere and the model of international cooperation for development. The definition of system-affecting states is taken from Keohane's idea of middle powers (KEOHANE, 1969) considered as states that do not possess enough power to be able to affect the international system and systemic relations of power by acting alone, but rather they might exert a significant influence and impact, by cooperating among themselves, creating small groups or alliances or adhering to multilateral or regional mechanisms and projects of cooperation. Milhorange (2014) added that middle powers represent that

category of states owning limited resources and power when compared to major powers, but aware of their condition, they have a very assertive action on the international multilateral arena, recognizing the strength of grouping together to exert influence and achieve credibility in the international system.

For Soulé-Kohndou (2012) it has been this double identity, located on the border between North and South, developed and developing world, with a rapid economic growth, but still many domestic challenges and problems, that has contributed to a proliferation of groupings of Southern countries (like in the case of BRICS, IBSA, BASIC and so on) (SOULÉ-KOHNDU, 2012). These emerging economies playing the international politics from the semi-periphery position, have entered the international structure also aimed to challenge the structure of the international development cooperation and therefore to question the legitimacy of previously existing models (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014b). Their action has been favoured by the changing context of the post war, Post-Cold War and the new millennium that have contributed to the appearance of numerous new actors (both states and non-state) and transnational institutions and forums of new emerging economies that are challenging to the North-South relations and the global architecture and politics, now characterized by three main groups: the OECD states, the emerging economies and an heterogeneous group of 'the rest' (COOPER; ANTKIEWICZ; SHAW, 2007).

By changing their position from peripheral and developing states to stable and credible economic powers, these emerging powers have used the growing recognition and consideration to promote a reform of the international architecture aimed to democratize the international system and challenge the Western domination (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014, p. 40). Given their double identity these emerging powers have aimed to achieve their objectives by working within the multilateral mechanisms, norms and framework (of the UN and other international organizations), while at the same time they have asked and pressed for a reform of the same, raising their voice from outside those institutions where their leadership is not recognized and proposing alternative models and mechanisms based on plurality and democracy (AMORIM, 2011; MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014).

The engagement of emerging powers into the development of the Global South (not just considered on geographic terms, but mainly on identity terms) also recognizes the importance of both development and security for the wellbeing and the progress of

the Global South, its states and people and for a generalized peace all over the world. The security-development nexus recognizes the complexity of the current world and the interconnection among different systems in international relations, may these be the social, political, economic, security, environment, ethnic and humanitarian, among others (MILANTE, 2016). As affirmed by the SIPRI report of 2016, there may be no development without guarantee of security conditions and environments for people, societies and states. Both domains are strictly connected, especially in not developed countries in which threats to security and the fulfilment of needs spread and can be rooted and addressed to economic and social inequalities, as well as contentious about natural resources that in many cases lead to environmental degradation and to which are connected a spiral of negative outcomes affecting individuals and states (SIPRI, 2016). Therefore, by restructuring the model of international cooperation for development, emerging Southern powers might have further contributed to the discussion about the existing link between security and development, aimed at promoting national and human development and state independence, as well as political stability and security of people, state and consequently of the whole international context.

The next sections aim to present a critic evaluation of the role of emerging actors in proposing alternative mechanisms of international cooperation for development, by advancing a South-South Cooperation model. By revising the literature about SSC and highlighting the positive outcomes that this model should guarantee, in terms of sharing of responsibilities and successes and mutual assistance, and to make the international system more symmetric, representative, secure and democratic, this chapter will look at the changes brought into the international system and the proposal of a different SSC by emerging powers. Furthermore, it attempts to demonstrate how thin is the line between the overstated idea of solidarity cooperation among political and diplomatic bodies of Southern states and the hidden power competition that, *de facto*, seems to occur in the Global South among emerging powers and between them and traditional powers, within an international system still very anarchic and competitive. By analysing the behaviours and official discourses of emerging countries, when related to the Global South, the question to be answered is to what extent SSC is differing from the traditional model of aid and assistance that has worked in the Southern hemisphere for long time.

The chapter is structured into three main parts. First, it is conceptually and historically tracing the process of creation of the Global South and SSC, underlying the

main features of this model and the alternative ideology lying behind it (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014b). The next section is offering an overview of the changing international context occurred in the new millennium and how the emergence of powers from the South has contributed to challenge the dominant structures of international power. The third section is analysing the role of emerging powers (here considered BRICS) in the development of the South. This section offers a content analysis of the official declarations of emerging powers following the realization of BRICS Summits (from 2009 to 2017),⁴³ aimed to evaluate the evolution of the SSC in the new millennium and to codify the position of BRICS, mainly related to international development and to this latter's connection with the security. It will then show if the changes occurred since the rise of the new millennium have contributed to a revisited security-development nexus, proposed by the South. In the conclusion, the idea of cooperation as a pragmatic and necessary strategy for survival and for the achievement of short-term gains is also analysed, aimed to demystify the concept of solidarity, horizontality and mutual assistance in the Global South and to highlight the emerging powers' pragmatic perception of the developing world to enhance national, regional and global goals, and to achieve power and resources useful to participate and compete in the world politics of the new millennium.

3.1 The rise of the South

The introduction of the 2013 Human Development Report entitled “The Rise of the South” presents this phenomenon as something peculiar, with no precedents registered in other historical moment and geographical location, indicating that their rapidity and

⁴³Although the temporal analysis of this research has been delimited within a period of almost ten years, corresponding to the governments of the Brazilian Workers' Party (2003-2014) that has best represented the global aspirations of the country as an emerging power of the new millennium, the analysis of the BRICS official documents is expanding over this delimitation, looking at the meetings realized between 2009 and 2017. As this chapter is analysing the changing role of the emerging powers (in the grouping of BRICS) into the South-South cooperation model, we preferred to offer a broader vision of the role of these actors in the transformation of the international system and its mechanisms, that is not linked to specific domestic contexts but that analyses the attempts of the BRICS countries to implement a common agenda of international engagement, despite the many differences they present. As Brown and Ainsley (2005) highlight, despite the many common features between Brazil and India, based on their being “large industrializing countries” and on the democratic level of their institutions and some common positions regarded world politics and affairs, the two countries have very little in common; at the same time that China is the most difficult piece to fit into this big puzzle called South (BROWN; AINSLEY, 2005).

broadening in growing and spreading has been unusual (UNDP, 2013). While previous great powers took many decades to finally be able to entrepreneur and achieve a systemic power transition, like in the case of UK and USA, emerging countries like Brazil, China and India seem to own all the needed features to challenge the *status quo* and promote the inclusion of the South into the global governance in less than two decades (THAKUR, 2014). The international power transition occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as the decolonization process and the formation of new independent and sovereign countries resulting from the gradual collapse of the European colonial system, constitute the context within which the Global South started to emerge and to more or less actively participate into the world politics (UNDP, 2009, p. 1). Over the decades, the participation has been structured upon alternate moments of adaptation or opposition to the dominant Western rules and models. The emergence of new actors as new centres of power has challenged the bipolar and unipolar configuration, establishing a multipolar order with poles decentred in both the Northern and Southern hemisphere.

The concept of ‘Global South’ (or South) defines those developing economies of the international system (BRACHO, 2015), as well as those countries who, although their differences, had shared common experiences of previous colonialism and imperialism (ALDEN; MORPHET; VIEIRA, 2010), dependence and marginalisation from the decision-making centre of the international relations (DA SILVA; SPOHR; DA SILVEIRA, 2016). In the 1960s, different and separate national identities were grouped together into a transnational and unified identity actor (ALDEN; MORPHET; VIEIRA, 2010), created in a relational ‘subalternism’ to (SPIVAK, 1988), but also distinction and dependence from the developed North (also called through the word “West”- BRACHO, 2015). Global South has then been used as an identity category to attest and maintain “the representation of the South as a distinctive political and intellectual space” (ACHARYA; BUZAN, 2009), subordinated to the North and represented as “mostly poor, mostly non-European in population, mostly recent de-colonized, mostly non-aligned” to neither the Western capitalism and the Soviet Bloc (BROWN; AINSLEY, 2005, p. 151). Pádraig Carmody addresses the Global South as an imagined space of political interaction based on shared past of underdevelopment and dependence and values of solidarity, horizontality and equality and oriented towards common goals of a more democratic and fair global relations, however this new space is not free of hierarchies and asymmetries and selfish interests (CARMODY, 2013a).

Although the use of the term ‘Global South’ (or ‘South’) has most of the time been interchanged with the one of ‘Third World’, it has been understood as a “collective political coordination” opposed to the colonial struggle and emerged in the aftermath of colonial period and as a genuine representation of global modernity and a counterbalance to the hegemonic Eurocentrism as well as counter-hegemonic epistemological nativism (DIRLIK, 2004).⁴⁴ Emerged in the global bipolarity and in contrast to a First and Second World (the West and the Soviet bloc respectively), the Third World indicated those developing countries that, independently from their economic model, they were sharing some features: low per capita income rate, derived by an economic system that was not achieving growth and development, because exclusively dependent on the agriculture sector and the exportation of raw materials (GILLS, 2016; RAPLEY, 2007). By relying on not very profitable economic sectors, countries continued to be extremely vulnerable in the international system and dependent on importation from developed countries. Furthermore, they were also experiencing high poverty rates, low life expectancy, high infant mortality and illiteracy; an intense demographic growth and political weakness and structural underdevelopment resulted from the then recent past of colonization and imperial submission (RAPLEY, 2007, p. 18–19).⁴⁵

In his “dependency Theory”, Krasner (1981) adopted the term “Third World” to describe states of the international system that, given their vulnerabilities and weaknesses, have been exposed to the systemic pressures and to the general acceptance of their position of dependence. However, this systemic condition and its main features have contributed to reinforce a coordinated action of Third World countries, to demand for changes and reforms of many international regimes and mechanism, among which the financial and economic regime, the political and security one, but also of mechanisms and practices and policies of international cooperation for development (KRASNER, 1981).

⁴⁴ For Arif Dirlik (2004), the configuration of the international system into three Worlds was a product of the European attempt to deal with the resulted configuration of states in the aftermath of the decolonization process. However, the idea of a global modernity is representing the global homogenization and unification that is finally breaking both with the hegemonic Eurocentrism (also seen as imperialism) and the opposition to it, proposed by liberalisation movements through their postmodernist discourses based on nativism (DIRLIK, 2011).

⁴⁵ The work of John Rapley (2007) *“Understanding Development. Theory and Practice in the Third World”* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), is impressive and relevant in its attempt to address the way how development has evolved over the time, within the underdeveloped space of the international system and how the systemic structure of the world economics and politics has actually contributed to maintain and reproduce a permanent asymmetric structure.

Indeed, by using their meta-power to alter the mechanisms and practices of international regimes, institutional arrangements, norms and values, as well as the structure and the environment in which decisions are made), less developed and developing countries (the Third World) would have ameliorated their condition in terms of material capabilities and influence in international decision-making processes and arenas.

The implosion of the Soviet Union meant the expansion of European and western borders and values towards the ex-Soviet states. At the same time, the economic growth of some Asian countries during the 1990s, the economic and financial crises experienced by Russia, Latin American countries and the local conflicts and tensions emerged within the old spheres of influence, made the Second World group thinner if not contributing to its definitive disappearance. Furthermore, it is still arguable how the globalization might have increased the differences of and distanced the First World from the Third one, in which the former became richer and stronger and the latter even poorer, insecure and unstable. If the Cold War period served to transmit the hegemony of European empires into the periphery of the world to the two superpowers, the end of the Cold War marked by an apparent unchallengeable US domination worldwide. However, it was in this period of US supremacy and hegemony that a “[...] more rapid development of local capitalist elites in the former Third World and China, as well as to the growth of an industrial proletariat” occurred (GILLS, 2016, p. 745), even if within the framework of a neoliberal order led by the West and mainly the USA.⁴⁶ Notwithstanding all the changes that the international system claims to have occurred after the Cold War period and in the last decade of the twentieth century, Andrew Hurrell stated (2013) that so many things have remained uncontested, like the continuous marginalisation, subordination and inequality among international actors and also the negative and asymmetric results of the liberal globalized finance and economics and the aggressive presence of the US, that we might observe as a replication of imperialism and colonialism, in both political, economic and social fields.

⁴⁶ As affirmed by Boris Kagarlitsky in an interview published by Barry K. Gills in the *Third World Quarterly* journal in 2016, the concept of Global South would have been more adequate in the past, although in the new millennium, is not fully representative of the current reconfiguration of the powers relations within the international system, in which the periphery of the world has not its address exclusively in the Southern hemisphere anymore, but a new periphery, a new poor world is emerging within the North, where countries are not fully achieved the development standards and are not able to fully integrate the capitalist system of the geographical regional blocs to which they belong (GILLS, 2016).

The definition of 'Third World' can be understood as a broader analytical category, more consistent with the essence of underdevelopment that it contains (DA SILVA; SPOHR; DA SILVEIRA, 2016, p. 169), while the definition of 'Global South' has maintained its identity aspect and its strict links to a geographical delimitation and determinism of what it represents (and therefore in contrast to what it is not- the North). The term 'Global South' seems to be better representative of the reality it aims to describe and its identity values which have also served as necessary conditions for the implementation of a strategy of mobilisation against the systemic asymmetries about state power and material capabilities (ALDEN; MORPHET; VIEIRA, 2010). This understanding of Global South as a category of action (and not just of analysis) appears to be oriented toward an acceptable contestation of the subaltern realism (AYOGB, 1998) and also of the old-fashioned debate about the North-South divide (ACHARYA; BUZAN, 2009). This contestation is moved by the difficulties in analytically grouping together, states that have very little in common, and that if previously were generalized as poor, insecure and underdeveloped, today are characterized by many differences and lack of uniformity (BROWN; AINSLEY, 2005; GILLS, 2016). However, despite the still interchangeable use of both Third World and Global South terms in recent days (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a; DIRLIK, 2004), this academic contribution prefers to use the latter concept, aimed to achieve coherence with the phenomena in analysis: both South-South cooperation model for international development and the proclaimed role of emerging powers of the new millennium as Southern actors embedded into and representatives of a Global South identity and ideology (ALDEN; MORPHET; VIEIRA, 2010).

At the rise of the new millennium, new actors have emerged. Given their limited material capabilities those actors have both agreed on cooperating with Northern powers or within North-South designs of cooperation, aimed to achieve better results for themselves teaming at the game with the rules' creators and judges, as well as converging into the creation of coalitions within the Global South, on the basis of those same principles that in the 1950s promoted the creation of the Global South mechanisms and institutions (DA SILVA; SPOHR; DA SILVEIRA, 2016). Those Southern mechanisms of participating into the world politics seem to have responded to Krasner's frameworks of relational power and meta-power, where the former indicates the acceptance of existing regimes, with its rules and in this cases some of the asymmetric differences still existing

in current world politics, and the latter indicates, the behaviour to alter those existing regimes and rules (KRASNER, 1981, p. 122).

3.2 The South-South Cooperation and its evolution

The creation of coalitions and mechanisms among Southern states would have allowed them to compete and challenge the oppressive and unfair political, economic and cultural relations imposed by the North. These formations have been incentivized since the post-war period due to the Southern reduced material capabilities and power asymmetries in the practice of international relations (DA SILVA; SPOHR; DA SILVEIRA, 2016). However, the North itself was still perceived as an ally in the task of building a more symmetric world order, recognizing the limited self-capability of the South to deal with this transformation, without relying on aid and resources from the North.

It is to the Bandung Conference of 1955, which “[...] spirit is one of demand in both senses of the word: as a complaint and as a claim. Both are linked: the oppression is denounced, and the compensation claimed (aid) is supported” (BRACHO, 2015, p. 7) that scholars used to link the birth of an international cooperation model for development created among states belonging to the Global South (DA SILVA; SPOHR; DA SILVEIRA, 2016; DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a; ESTEVES; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014; GRAY; GILLS, 2016; MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014) Occurred at the beginning of the Cold War period and in the decolonization period, when the Third World group was emerging on global stage as an independent force (RAPLEY, 2007), the Bandung Conference was marked by the convergence of developing countries from both Africa and Asia into a first mechanism (or attempt) of cooperation among Southern states. This moment stressed the focus over the achievement of mutual interests, the promotion of human rights, peace and self-determination, the fight against colonialism, domination and exploitation of colonial people, the respect of national sovereignty and the strengthening of economic and cultural mechanism of cooperation to overcome states’ asymmetries in the international system and the economic dependence of the South from the North , and all the other constraints derived by the influence that global capitalism has on the political and economic system (BESHERATI; MACFEELY, 2019; BOGUES, 2011; BRACHO, 2015; GRAY; GILLS, 2016; MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014).

Upon those same principles, further processes and mechanisms appeared from 1950 to present days (GRAY; GILLS, 2016), like in the case of the Non -Aligned states Movement (NAM- created in 1961)⁴⁷ that, within the Cold War bipolarity opted to maintain a detached and neutral position from both East and West. Despite all, this premise of distancing themselves from the bipolar rivalry was not meaning to avoid any contacts and relationships with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Contrarily, and by being strategically impartial and uninvolved into the competition, NAM countries were able to keep their sovereignty and political independence in their national and international affairs. Indeed, both superpowers were globally competing for power, alliances and areas of influence achieved through foreign assistance to mainly recent independent developing countries, whose served themselves of it to bargain pretences, advance goals and strengthen capabilities (ESTEVEES; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014, p. 1778).

Therefore, this Southern coalition of states converged into the idea that it was necessary to distance themselves from the global asymmetries and economic dependency perpetuated by the hierarchical structure of development cooperation proposed by the North (including both DAC and western OIs as exclusive decision-making actors) and implemented through the Official Development Aid (ODA). Hence, they proposed an alternative model that would have ended the silent acceptance and surrender of the South not just in economic sector (ESTEVEES; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014, p. 1778; GRAY; GILLS, 2016), On the contrary, they would have created a political group that was sharing similar experiences, mainly of marginalisation (HURRELL, 2013; MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014) and emphasizing the cooperation also in cultural issues, human rights and promotion of peace (GRAY; GILLS, 2016), as well as in developmental, societal, geopolitical and cultural issues, that have formed their common history and the past action against colonialism and underdevelopment (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014) and later have been absorbed by emerging countries from the South in the new millennium (HURRELL, 2013).

⁴⁷ Formerly promoted by the presidents of India (Jawaharlal Nehru), Indonesia (Sukarno), Egypt (Gamal Abdel Nasser); Ghana (Kwame N’Krumah) and Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito), the main aims of the Non-Aligned Movement were concerning once again the end of decolonisation and North imperialism, the independence of all African and Asian countries still under foreign/Northern domination and the quest for Palestine. The fight against colonialism in the African continent and the adhesion of Latin American countries gave more strength to the Movement that in short time achieved a position within the UN system (BOGUES, 2011, p. 207).

In 1964, the UN required NAM intervention in the drafting of a proposal that would have reformed and reduced the hierarchical structure of the organization and its decision-making processes. It was in this context that, at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a group of 77 developing countries (the G77) joined to mainly discuss about the reduction of economic asymmetries worldwide and promote the South-South Cooperation for Development (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014; GOSOVIC, 2016; GRAY; GILLS, 2016). At the Fourth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Algiers in 1973 (September 5th-9th) the economic development of countries became a central matter also connecting the fair and equal global economics to the achievement and maintenance of peace. It was at the Sixth Summit of the NAM (1979), however, that the movement detailed a plan in which South-South economic cooperation was proposed as a form of the South to be independent from the former colonies and traditional powers and create the basis for their own independent economic strategy (BOGUES, 2011, p. 207–8)

In his chapter, entitled “*Radical anti-colonial thought, anti-colonial internationalism and the politics of human solidarities*”, Bogues (2011) highlights the role of these institutions and these moments of anti-colonial thought in the twentieth century in proposing the emergence of the idea of human solidarity and in addressing questions of human, equality, and social and distributive justice and introducing the “radical/reformist Third World thinking” (2011, p. 200). However, the desired independence of Southern powers from Northern domination and imperialism and their recognition among the actors integrating the international system was more a cognitive act than a real equality with consequent symmetrical relations of power (BOGUES, 2011, p. 198) that have continued to exist despite the attempts of Southern countries and powers to change it, and that continued to keep the South as dependent from Northern policies and practices of cooperation and foreign aid (ibid. 2011, p. 205).

By following the political, economic and social revendications of those two previous moments, the plan converged into the proposal of a New International Economic Order- NIEO (1974) that would have fought for the revision of asymmetries and dependency of the existing economic order (represented by Bretton Woods) and the

implementation of a new one, centred on the “*promotion of international economic cooperation on a just and equitable basis*” (UNGA, 1974 apud. GRAY; GILLS, 2016).⁴⁸

The 1970s’ international context was characterized by significant economic and political changes among states, coming to question the legitimacy and impartiality of the international institutions created by the West and reflecting their hegemony and the hierarchical power. Within this context, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) advanced the creation of a special unit with autonomy of decision and action to promote technical cooperation among developing countries and strengthen their capabilities *vis-à-vis* the developed North (BRACHO, 2015). At the *Global South Conference on Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries* (held in Buenos Aires in 1978), the proposal converged into a document entitled the *Buenos Aires Plan of Action* (BAPA) that became one of the most significant political documents into the field of South-South Cooperation, introducing for the first time the term of “horizontal cooperation” into the debate, in opposition to the vertical/hierarchical model that had worked previously (ESTEVEZ; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014, p. 1779) and in the effort to establish a more equal dialogue between North and South (GRAY; GILLS, 2016, p. 558).

Notwithstanding the BAPA attempted to offer an initial definition of what SSC is, the model today remains vague and with no common acceptance among states and scholars. The BAPA defined the South-South Cooperation as both “flows and policies”, explaining with the former the “technical cooperation, technology transfer, knowledge exchange and capacity development”, and meaning with the latter, more political and abstract principles upon which the horizontal model of international cooperation operates, recognizing among them the value and idea of solidarity, equality, trust, reciprocity and mutual benefits (BESHERATI; MACFEELY, 2019, p. 6). According to Gray and Gills (2016), South-South cooperation is a concept and a set of practices aimed to cause a transformation in the international relations based on principles like mutual benefits and solidarity among states with less systemic privileges. They believed that the reciprocal assistance among poor countries could promote development and consequently transform the world order, giving a louder voice to their interests and aspirations *vis-à-vis* traditional

⁴⁸ The New International Economic Order aspired for the strengthening of a symmetric relationship in trade balance and the respect of states’ sovereignty over the control of natural resources and the eventual nationalization of key industries in Southern countries, to dismantle the colonial legacy-still reproduced under the capitalist order- and implement some Southern national development approaches (GRAY; GILLS, 2016).

powers of the Global North (GRAY; GILLS, 2016). The UN Office of South-South Cooperation defines this model as

“[...] a broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. [...]taking] place on a bilateral, regional, intraregional or interregional basis. Developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts. Recent developments in South-South cooperation have taken the form of increased volume of South-South trade, South-South flows of foreign direct investment, movements towards regional integration, technology transfers, sharing of solutions and experts, and other forms of exchanges” (UNOSSC, 2012).

For Emma Mawdsley (2019), SSC refers to the “transfer and exchange of resources, technology and knowledge” within a set of shared colonial and post-colonial identities and experiences, and “anchored within a wider framework of promoting the collective strength and development of the global South” (MAWDSLEY, 2019a). Moreover, she also completed the definition of SSC as “a complex, porous and multidimensional phenomenon, highly diversified in terms of countries, sectors and activities” and being analysed within different disciplines, in order to study its implementation and impacts in different fields, and recently also coming to include the military and defence sectors in the analysis of SSC (ibid. 2019b, p. 260) .

This more recent definition recognizes the lack of homogeneity existing among members of the SSC and the non-complementarity of their interests and capabilities, that has limited the potentiality and the range of action of Southern mechanisms of international cooperation for development and that has maintained the South dependent from Northern aid (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a), although in new schemes of trilateral engagement.⁴⁹ In the aftermath of the Cold War, development assistance was mainly oriented to the fight against poverty, as a consequence of the growing criticism against the economic and financial globalization and the negative impacts that it had over

⁴⁹ The SSC is traditionally based on the North-South divide, where the Northern powers have structured their cooperation with Southern actors on a framework of rights and responsibilities, while the South has horizontally acted on the bases of solidarity and voluntary, therefore, not imposing any conditionality to their assistance. However, this has created a international development structure where the narrative of the Southern actors is very generalized and does not move from a political discourse, so relying on the perpetuation of a same geo-economic structure, in which the North has the responsibility to offer aid, and the South has the right to receive it (BRACHO, 2015, p. 1–2).

different states and people, and that required a major and renovate intervention of the international community to rebalance the situation (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 496).

In this same period, characterized by and known for the neoliberal globalisation, the promulgation of the ten points of the Washington Consensus as standard measures imposed by the (northern) international financial institutions to the developing countries to assist them in achieving growth, development and stability, contributed to the weakening of the developmental role of the state and of the public sector, giving major space of action to the “privatisation of public services and enterprises, the discrediting of economic planning, the withdrawal of the state as a driving political and economic force of SSC, and the ascendance of pragmatism and opportunism in the policies and actions of individual developing countries” (GOSOVIC, 2016, p. 734). With the implementation of the Washington Consensus, the survival of the SSC, its principles of unity and solidarity and its projects were at risk.

Furthermore, the difficulties in finding a common definition about what SSC is and how it should operate and consequently the almost impossible task to evaluate its results, quantifying and monetising its flows and the sharing and perception of principles among the states involved in it, contribute to make SSC vulnerable and less tangible (BESHERATI; MACFEELY, 2019). Notwithstanding the difficulties, Chin and Quadir (2012) claimed that the intensification of the amount of cooperation has occurred, although not in such a significant way to promote more than a slightly change of the traditional system of international aid. Instead, they suggest that the analysis of the emerging powers’ role into the international cooperation should be qualitative and look at the differences they have promoted and implemented and how effective they could be in promoting a real international development paradigm shift, rather than just continue to claim for a change of old practices and a distancing from the traditional models (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012).

It seems clear that the incongruence among the principles and practices of the SSC are still very connected to the limited comprehension of development as strictly focused on economic growth and modernization, trade maximization and market access (RODRIK, 2009) as well as to the absorption of Western principles and set of rules among non-Western actors. The missing perception and inclusion of development as betterment of living standards of states and their communities is confusing the evaluation between means and ends, distorting the understanding that development should be the outcome of

any economic and modernization activity. Gray and Gills (2016), by agreeing to this criticism, claimed that development indicates the human betterment of global population, historically engaged for the liberation of the people and nations from the rests of colonialism and oppression that have also contributed to the maintenance of a condition of poverty and underdevelopment. Therefore, for the authors, the model of South-South cooperation proposed by the Global South is looking to change these negative elements and create a mechanism and a model of action based on solidarity and mutual benefits among the “disadvantaged of the world system” (GRAY; GILLS, 2016, p. 557).

At the rise of the millennium, the implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – signed in 2000- witnessed the Northern countries and the international and regional multilateral institutions (like the WB, regional development banks, the OECD-DAC) address poverty as the main focus of their agenda and engagement in international development cooperation and stretching the cooperation over social and human development, while also pursuing greater economic openness (interaction) and integration for development (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 496). The new millennium was being approached with a final distancing from the economic and development measures of foreign aid of the 1950s and 1960s, when the main receipt for development consisted of autonomous national growth, industrialization and modernization of economics, centrality and intensification of the role of the state to achieve the country’s growth and redistribute it (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 497). However, the commitment of DAC countries to move away from practices oriented to promote their interests more than to not harm people in developing countries, as based on the Monterrey Consensus (2002) did not last due to the engagement of traditional donors in the War on Terror. The high costs derived from prioritization of security objectives, in terms of resources’ redirection from the development assistance to developing countries, to the fulfilment of security at multiple levels, resulted in the alignment between development and security (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 498).

This period favoured the growth and the growing aspirations of developing countries that entered the new century with good economic levels and a strong motivation and self-credibility to challenge and change the international system, strongly dominated by Western and Northern rules (ARMIJO, 2007; COOPER; ANTKIEWICZ, 2008; HURRELL, 2006). Furthermore, in this complex context of power shifts, declining and emerging of international actors, the global aid architecture existing until that moment

came to experience what Chin and Quadir have defined “signs of breakdown” (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 497) and the SSC reappeared on the scene from the neglecting past in which it was shadowed by the traditional North-South model.

For emerging powers, SSC was representing not just the transfer of aid from one country (donor) to the other (recipient), but the effort to make of the cooperation among Southern countries a partnership among equals, based on mutuality and mutual assistance, on the respect of national sovereignty of the other states, on the national ownership and recognition of the partner’s independence in the elaboration of the horizontal cooperation, on the non-interference in domestic affairs, upon which the SSC launched its recognition and respect for the principle on non-conditionality. This latter was actually representing the major challenge to the Northern architecture of aid, as emerging powers and actors of the SSC have not linked their international cooperation for development to the achievement of objectives in other fields, relevant for the North (STEPHEN, 2012). Furthermore, this participation of the emerging powers and the positive reception received by the Global South have caused a reaction in Northern powers (GOSOVIC, 2016b), that became more aware of the need to reformulate their play and vocabulary related to the international cooperation for development, so approaching it through a new discourse and practices of mutual assistance, solidarity and partnerships among equals.⁵⁰

3.3 The South-South Cooperation in the new millennium

The new millennium has witnessed the emergence of intermediary/middle actors from the South, achieving growing recognition and power within the structures and the mechanisms of the international system, and presenting themselves as an alternative to the traditional powers and the Northern dominant architecture, here considered in the field of the international cooperation for development. However, and given their growing power achieved at the turn of the millennium, that is matching with their global

⁵⁰ The South-South cooperation is based on principles of mutual assistance and partnership, solidarity and reciprocity. The discourse of Southern actors engaged into the alternative model of cooperation has also changed, substituting the term “donors” and “recipients” with the more democratic one of “partners”, showing the reluctance towards a hierarchization of the states’ relations and presenting themselves as delivers of a deeper and more solidarity cooperation, based not exclusively on assistance and aid linked to conditionalities, but rather on a process of building development together, mutually sustaining and reinforcing each other. The word partnership became therefore seminal in the language of emerging powers and as a way to introduce their alternative model (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012).

aspirations of more influence and fulfilment of their strategic interests, these actors from the South have presented some ambivalent “in-between” features that have made them respond and coexist simultaneously within the identity and the practice of both the “North” and the “South”.

This border walking has fed that schizophrenic vision of Ayoob (2002) about the role of emerging powers, as both challengers of the *status quo* and dreamers of joining it. Therefore, by analysing the role these actors played in the international cooperation for development of the new millennium, the next sections of this chapter aim to analyse the transformations that emerging powers proposed in the field, by relaunching the SSC under a new format, and simultaneously, addressing their strategic needs of power and influence in the international system. According to Milhorange (2014) emerging powers are currently located on the identity and spatial margin of the West, demanding, though a change in their foreign policy, for a major status, recognition and major power, while also recognizing their need to address poverty and inequality, two of the major problems still affecting the countries (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014). Furthermore, the analysis will look at how, in a changing context of growing insecurities, the cooperation for development framed by emerging powers for the South was responding to the implementation of a more secure environment in the Global South and around the world.

Once it had become clear and recognized that the North-South model of development needed a transformation, alternative arrangements started to emerge, especially among developing countries, mainly pushed forward by some actors (non-DAC countries) achieving high levels of economic growth, political influence and global recognition, that allowed them to compete for the systemic distribution of power (MANNING, 2006).⁵¹ The creation of the G20 (in 1999)⁵² and the following grouping of

⁵¹ Scholars of South-South Cooperation divide themselves into two main groups. On one hand there are those who see the emerging coalitions of Southern countries (as for instance, the BRICS or the IBSA among others) as a direct consequence and the natural evolution of Bandung and the NAM, and as a further application of the NIEO objectives and principles; while on the other hand, a greater number of scholars believe that these new configurations are actually representing something different, in a changed historical, political, economic and social context of the international system (DA SILVA; SPOHR; DA SILVEIRA, 2016; ESTEVES; ASSUNÇÃO, 2014; STUENKEL, 2014).

⁵² The establishment of the G20 and the moving of the Development Agenda to this broader and more participative forum that the G7 or G8 to discuss the global economy and international development is a remarkable phenomenon indicating the systemic changes in terms of power shifts and influence in global aid development agenda (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 184). Furthermore, also the inclusion of a discussion about international development into the, at that time, initial BRICS summit was significant in expressing the (fast) growing role of emerging powers in the international development agenda-setting (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 501). Kharas recognizes the importance of the G20 and its Development Agenda,

emerging economies in 2001, the BRIC (later BRICS, in 2010 with the joining of South Africa to the group), as well as the creation of IBSA in 2003,⁵³ the Africa and South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF in 2006), among many others, reflected the growing and active role of developing countries in asking for a reformative action of the global governance (WORLD BANK AND IPEA, 2011, p. 2). This reformative action has mainly consisted in changing the global trade and other significant issues of world politics, as it might be the Southern development through a more articulate and institutionalized SSC (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 502), and growing international participation of developing actors, as in the case of the African continent (CARMODY, 2013b).⁵⁴

to finally demand for a paradigm shift in the definition, understanding and implementation of development, achieved at the G20 Seoul Consensus in 2010: no longer focused on fighting poverty or saving the helpless and hopeless Africa, but centred on the needs of developing and emerging economies and therefore on growth, employment, investment, and making of infrastructure development one of the central points of the new agenda (KHARAS, 2010a e 2011).

⁵³ The India, Brazil and South Africa's creation in 2003 of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, in Brasilia, and the IBSA Trust Fund in 2006 to provide development assistance through projects and grants to Southern partners and the BASIC, a coalition formed by Brazil, South Africa, India and China in 2009 soon after the international climate negotiations represent a further example of Southern emergence in the new millennium (SOULÉ-KOHNDU, 2012). For Lyal White, the IBSA is distinguishable from BRICS and maybe more successful, because the former has made of development cooperation and social equity among Southern countries its major sign of recognition, also given to the success that the development has unexpectedly achieved. India, Brazil and South Africa have grouped together moved essentially by their desire of reforming of the international organization (especially the UNSC) (WHITE, 2009). Their limited number in terms of members derives from this common interest that they share and that is not felt and requested in a similar way by other countries that have over the years attempted to join the group of three and have been refused by the member states (SOULÉ-KOHNDU, 2012, p. 138).

⁵⁴ The relevance of the African continent in the Southern multilateral coalitions of the new millennium is visible by observing the growing role of the different organisms created, like in the case of the FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) which first meeting has been held in 2000; ASAFOC (the Africa-South America Forum of Cooperation) established in 2006, and the IAFS (India-Africa Forum Summit) in 2008. The growing relevance that Africa started to cover for the BRICS countries- individually speaking- has expanded over new sectors of cooperation and came to cover issues of hard politics, like security. On September 3rd of 2018, during the FOCAC Summit, the Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the creation of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, to be included within the framework of the existing forum. This new mechanism will reinforce the cooperation between China and the African continent in the consolidation of security, by addressing continental threats, regional insecure hotspots and by building the security capacities of the continent, to make it independent from external security (GLOBAL RISK INSIGHT, 2020). South Africa, on the other side, is engaged into the development of the African continent not just for mirroring the role of other BRICS, but also because Africa represents South Africa's regional context. So, the country is operating mainly within the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) context, also given its limited material power- if compared with other BRICS- and the difficulties in overcoming other aspiring African leaders, like Egypt and Nigeria. However, a strong criticism to the role of South Africa in the SSC in the African continent has been linked to the possible "sub-imperialist" (rather than anti-imperialist) role it will play (BOND, 2013; GRAY; MURPHY, 2013). However, for a more recent and alternative vision of South Africa as not a sub-imperialist state, see the chapter of William G. Martin, entitled '*South Africa and the New Scramble: The Demise of Sub-imperialism and the Rise of the East*' in Moyo, S.; Chambaty, W. and Yeros, P. 2019. *Reclaiming Africa*. Singapore: Springer. The security role of Brazil in the African continent will be addressed in the next chapter, preferring to let this space to the engagement of other emerging powers. Furthermore, a further excluded

Gray and Murphy (2013) recognized in the financial crisis of the new millennium the systemic hole through which the Southern powers passed to challenge the international systems and the existing regimes of global governance. Indeed, the capabilities of the South to experience positive outcomes from the international financial crises has meant a change in the “moral authority” of the North to impose models and norms on how to regulate economies, dictate politics and participate in the international relations ((GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 184) and initiate what has been defined the “expansionary phase” of the SSC (MAWDSLEY, 2019a, p. 261) towards an “emancipatory multipolarity” (Pieterse, 2011 apud. GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 185). In the new millennium, the SSC seems to have assisted the South to achieve international affirmation and recognition and the listening of its voice within multilateral organisations (SOULÉ-KOHNDU, 2012) and has contributed to propose a valid alternative to the conventional international aid architecture (KRAGELUND, 2008, p. 556).

The change of the international aid structure has had many causes, differing among scholars, and complaining the decline of effectiveness of traditional donors, the failure of the “Washington Consensus” or a decline and fracture in the global aid architecture and the mechanisms OECD DAC countries used to implement aid (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012). Therefore, the emergence of BRICS countries and other non-DAC actors as donors of international aid corresponds to a big shift in the economic order and consequently of the global distribution of power, from West to East and from North to South, giving space to what analysts have called as the epilogue of the "post-American world" (ZAKARIA, 2008), or of a "post-Western world" (SERFATY, 2011).

Cooper and Flemes (2013) affirmed that the emerging powers from the South have reversed the past mechanisms of the Third World countries (like the G77, the NAM and the NIEO in the 1970s) of participating at the international politics through grouping mechanism to advance a positive collective action related to the postcolonial context and demands. Today, the emergence of these states and their respective regions in the globalized world has been more successful than previous experiences in alter the global capitalism and the order supporting it, mainly because of its being less attached to strong

from this brief overlook is the Russian case, due to its past of superpower in the bipolar world that has made of Africa a strong partner, aimed to increase its influence vis-à-vis the US and the West. Russia is therefore joining the BRICS group based on different motivations and a lot of criticism, mainly based upon the still preference to cooperate on vertical structures and relationships and by participating into Northern coalitions (BREZHNEVA and UKHOVA, 2013).

theories and ideologies but more based on concrete fact and denounces related to the unrepresentative and unequal multilateral system (COOPER; FLEMES, 2013, p. 948).

Fahimul Quadir (2013) claimed that, although those countries have remained faithful to the basic features and foundation pillars of the South-South Cooperation, some differences have been highlighted, showing distinctiveness in the conceptualisation of development and difficulties in the promotion of a common agenda for South's development. Indeed, notwithstanding the commonly accepted idea of challenging traditional donors and implement a "silent revolution" in the international development cooperation (WOODS, 2008), emerging powers and non-DAC countries have been significantly affected by their structural differences and domestic features, impacting over their collective coherence and the sustainability of their ambitions as transformers of the international aid machine (ROWLANDS, 2008).

It seems that the influence of traditional DAC donors and the OECD-DAC regime will continue to be in charge of most of the development cooperation structure, although still maintaining its declining features and being negotiated within the changing context of the new millennium and towards a more plural distribution of power and development influence (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012). Hence, it might be naïve to address, in this case, to the world "revolution" all its overstated meaning of significant change and abrupt transformation. Indeed, the traditional donors have been evolutionary experiencing and have negotiated their changing existence and role in the global aid architecture, and gradually are being challenged also in their hierarchical understanding of the global governance and eroded in their dominant role and influence in the international system (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 500). The shift of power is not happening in a drastic and abrupt way, substituting traditional donors with emerging powers. On the contrary, it is passing through a moment of coexistence of both groups (the Northern and traditional ones, from one hand and the Southern donors from the other hand).⁵⁵

⁵⁵ As Chin (2012) highlighted, Brazil, India China and South Africa have joined the group of donors, without *a priori* achieving the status of middle-income countries, instead preserving their Southern identity and their categorization as developing states, receptors of ODA by traditional donors, while also providers of a growing amount of development assistance to other developing countries (CHIN, 2012). This means that these Southern rising donors are not really interested in subverting and undermine the traditional economic, financial and development institutions (Bretton Woods system) as they continue to drink from these latter's resources for a guarantee of support (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 501).

At the turn of the millennium, traditional donors started to orientate and harmonize their actions in the field of international cooperation for development towards better results that were framed within the narrative and the new paradigm of “aid effectiveness” and that was looking for a logical restructuring of aid programmes and its multilevel institutions (national, regional and international) from a focus on inputs to a new one more centred on the outcomes (OECD-DAC, 2008), also interested in including and respond to the claims coming from the Global South. Therefore, the new established guidelines of this renovate way to do development assistance were contemplated within the signature of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005,⁵⁶ the Accra Action Agenda in 2008,⁵⁷ and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, in 2011.

They have been structured upon the inclusion of principles like “local ownership”, ‘donor–recipient alignment’, ‘harmonization of donor practices’, ‘results orientation’, ‘mutual accountability’ into the international cooperation for development, to be respected by both donors and recipients in guiding their practices, instruments and coordination (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 497) and to intensify the efforts in meeting and achieving their development goals as internationally agreed. Furthermore, all these agreements were celebrated by traditional donors and international institutions as steps forward in a final harmonization of the global aid architecture, and in a general agreement between DAC and non-DAC countries, the achievement of his result had to pass through

⁵⁶ The Paris Declaration of 2005, established the principle of “*aid effectiveness*” as new driver of the international development cooperation, and started to measure and monitor the progress based on indicators like: ownership, harmonisation, alignment, outcome-based strategy and mutual accountability, establishing targets to be achieved by 2010, and signed by both DAC and non-DAC countries, some multilateral organizations and organizations of the civil society (OECD-DAC, 2008). A further great success of the Paris Agenda was the growing inclusion and legitimacy of non-DAC countries an of the civil society in the global aid governance, although the presence of the Western hegemony over the aid architecture has continued to be significantly influent.

⁵⁷ In 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) ⁵⁷ was meant to boost forwards what was agreed in Paris, by deepening the implementation of the Aid Effectiveness to promote development, peace and prosperity through the creation of stronger and genuine partnerships between developed and developing countries. The Accra Action was adding further steps to way how to promote and achieve aid effectiveness and consisting of: first, (recipient) country ownership over development; second, a more inclusive and effective partnership among different actors, based on a coordination of their actions and on the integration (not fragmentation) of their efforts; and third, major accountability and transparency, as well as development results orientation (OECD-DAC, 2008). Furthermore, the AAA was changing “the nature of conditionality to support ownership” and therefore mutually establishing not just the sectors in which and the way how to promote development, but also the conditions to which aid is offered and the assessing of donors and developing countries performances in achieving these commitments, these latter adapted to the different circumstances of each country (OECD-DAC, 2008).

difficult episodes in which the traditional donors started to lose their capacity and leader capabilities and the South was not feeling represented and heard its development needs (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012).⁵⁸

From Paris to Accra became evident that the SSC was being seen as complementary to the traditional and vertical model of international cooperation, encouraging Southern countries to engage in the Paris principles (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a). In 2008, the Accra Action Agenda finally converged into the idea of including the civil society into the count and to stress over the idea of country ownership when promoting and implementing development cooperation. However, at the time of Accra Action Agenda, the world was further changing, due to a global financial crisis and the domestic political transformation of many traditional donors. The vacuum left by traditional donors into the aid structure was filled more intensively by emerging and re-emerging development partners, offering a broader set of opportunities for poorer countries and more challenges to DAC ones (MANNING, 2006). Hence, although the OECD-DAC structure and the mechanisms it has created and modified along the years have continue to be the main framework of the global aid architecture, the OECD-DAC power is being limited, due to the appearance of other actors that are aimed to propose alternative models to development, that even if without completely subverting the existing structure, were proposing changes and a transition and were giving more voice to the recipient countries (MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014).

The Busan Conference that occurred in 2011 was reflecting these changes and further stressing the focus over issues like transparency, accountability, results management, sustainability, and fragile states. Busan was meant to represent a moment of transition between two eras in the development governance, where the world “aid” would have finally become obsolete, then the aid effectiveness agenda would have finally been substituted by a broader and more accepted *development effectiveness agenda*, and

⁵⁸ Gregory Chin and Fahimul Quadir (2012) highlight the case of the 2002 Monterrey Conference which resulted in a Consensus among states and international institutions about the obligations of signatory states of the agreement, including “*new partnership between developed and developing countries’ and ‘6 areas of action’ for increasing financing for development: (a) mobilizing domestic financial resources for development; (b) mobilizing international resources for development (especially foreign direct investment and other private flows); (c) international trade as an engine for development; (d) increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development; (e) external debt (including debt restructuring); and (f) addressing systemic issues, especially enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems in support of development*”, all within a framework of mutual accountability among the signatory states (CHIN; QUADIR, 2012, p. 498)

the former asymmetric definitions of the development actors would have been altered with a more democratic and equal concept of “partners” (OECD-DAC, 2011).⁵⁹

The core of the *aid effectiveness* paradigm was structured around two main features: first, the recipient countries’ ownership and responsibility of their own development, understood as the donor’s alignment to recipients’ needs and necessities and their working within existing structures and in coordination with other aid actors and policies (harmonisation and coordination among donors and practices will also be a further major point of the aid reform), and second, an outcome-based approach linking the global commitment to tangible development results targeted in the MDGs, rather than input-based, and so focused on the amount spent. The architecture of international development was not structured upon top-down agendas trying to fit the recipients’ realities anymore, but it was witnessing a major recipients’ engagement into their own development. The concept of development itself expanded broader, being not just focused on poverty reduction and economic growth, but also including health and wellbeing, gender issues, education, good governance, democracy, environmental protection and sustainability and many others, understood as seminal for achieving sustainable, systematic and coherent results (MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014; OECD-DAC, 2008).

However, in Busan, the role of the major emerging (or re-emerging) development partners was extremely critical. Brazil, India and China were important actors for transforming the development governance, and their endorsement of the changes proposed in there was fundamental for a successful outcome. Brazil, in particular, assume a very assertive role, “claiming to represent a ‘genuine South-South cooperation’” (MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014, p. 31). Therefore, with the endorsement of China, India and Brazil of the Busan Policy Document, (BPD) the South-South cooperation came to be located within the norms and architecture of global aid and development cooperation, allowing from the pursuing of same outcomes, but applying different

⁵⁹ The Busan Partnership Agreement advanced further into the inclusiveness related to development cooperation, by establishing its agreed principles and the creation of the Global Partnership. In 2014, at the 1st High-Level Meeting of the GPEDC occurred in Mexico the effective development cooperation was linked to the post-2015 agenda and therefore connected to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the Agenda 2030. After two more years the Nairobi Outcome Document of the 2nd High-Level Meeting of the GPEDC (2016) has indicated the path that all actors should follow to complementary contribute to the achievement of the SDGs (GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION, 2016).

parameters of accountability (MAWDSLEY; SAVAGE; KIM, 2014, p. 32). Finally, the models of NSC and SSC were posed on a same level of an integral and more democratic and inclusive development agenda (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a, p. 1863).

3.4 BRICS countries and the development of the South: the revised security-development nexus in the analysis of the BRICS Summit's official documents

In the attempt to describe the role of emerging powers at the turn of the millennium and in the reconfiguration of the international system and structures of power, Kevin Gray and Barry K. Gills (2016) reported the words of Karl Polanyi in “The Great Transformation” saying:

“Countries...which, for reasons of their own, are opposed to the status quo, would be quick to discover the weaknesses of the existing institutional order and to anticipate the creation of institutions better adapted to their interests”(apud. GRAY; GILLS, 2016).

Naively, because of the not consideration of the rising powers' structural limitations to challenge the international system when proposing their own model of development cooperation, this previous discourse has been pushed forward by a rhetoric about the practice of an alternative cooperation for the South, that would have “meaningfully alter the current DAC-dominated aid architecture” (QUADIR, 2013, p. 321). As the author continues, these limitations consist both of reduced capabilities to increase the provided amount of overseas aid, as well as of the lack of group coordination, necessary to build a unified platform of action based on a shared vision and agenda of development (ibid. 2013). Few points need to be included into the discussion, consisting mainly of the diverging scholars' production about the role of emerging powers in the new millennium's international development architecture and of the rhetoric they promoted around the idea of solidarity of the SSC and alternative to the North-South model of cooperation.

Recalling to the ambivalent action of emerging powers from the South in their engagement and participation with the existing dominant international system, many scholars have disagreed in seeing the exclusive potential role of emerging powers in representing an alternative to the *status quo* and an emancipation of the countries from

the South in the global distribution of power (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013; QUADIR, 2013). As Gray and Murphy claimed, rising powers have been located and engaged "within the Western-centred neoliberal world order" (2013, p. 183) as consequence of their different levels of potentiality to challenge the systemic distribution of power and displace the US from its global hegemonic position. So, these countries seem to do not show "any inclination to overtly challenge the global position of the USA" (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 186), so rhetorically claimed.⁶⁰

Gray and Gills (2016) appears to be, despite all, still very sceptical about the substantial capability of these countries of the South to challenge the Northern dominant global governance, with its rules, models and institutions, and whether this capability of the Southern countries is really real and efficient enough to overcome the stress posed over the rhetoric of solidarity (GRAY; GILLS, 2016, p. 560). Thomas Muhr (2016) stresses its analysis over this misperception of the role of rhetoric, when related to the Global South and the SSC, to discredit the challenging essence of this movement in the international system. As the author affirmed, the idea itself of BRICS, born from an acronym spoken out by a financial analyst and later resulted in a more or less political unit, is representative of the capability of the discourse itself to construct collective identities that then advance political actions of transformation (ibid. 2016). Muhr believes that through concepts like solidarity, the SSC and its actors own the potential to challenge the world-system and substitute it with a symmetric order of power and relations. However, solidarity is not opposed to national interests, forcing the world and its interconnections to not be fixed in binary categories and dichotomies. Contrarily, within the SSC, the mutual gains are not necessarily expressed in the same currency, therefore, if for someone the advantages may come in terms of trade balance, or visibility, for the other partners it may be in terms of experience, capacity building, and shared knowledge (MUHR, 2016). Mostly interested in fulfilling their strategic interests instead of caring for less developed countries, as they claim when introducing themselves as regional leaders, what appears to occur is a tension between the claimed solidarity and the national interests of emerging powers (GRAY; GILLS, 2016, p. 560)

⁶⁰ Neither China, the most powerful country among the ones inserted in the BRICS acronym, might have experienced some delays due to the late industrialization that has caused it "structural imbalances, financial instability, deep social inequalities and endemic unrest", nor India has experienced growth in a context of poverty and geopolitical dependence and contacts with the US (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 186).

For Gray and Murphy (2013) the challenge and the changes proposed by the rising powers of the new millennium to the rhetoric of the South-South cooperation are different from the experiences of previous decades (2013, p. 184). Although the objectives and the need for a fairer global economic and trading system might continue to be the same, the global context in which their requests are made is today completely different. In the new millennium, it seems impossible to achieve development exclusively on a national scale, without taking part to the global flows and links, as well as to the international institutions managing and governing them, and that emerging powers aspire to reform because of the many constraints imposed to developing countries (GRAY; GILLS, 2016).⁶¹ However, and notwithstanding the slightly negative analysis of rising powers into the world of development cooperation, their presence and effort have contributed to boost a change into the practice sector of this world, taking off the monopoly of cooperation for development from the control of multilateral institutions and bilateral aid agencies (QUADIR, 2013, p. 321).

Created in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, an analyst of the investment bank, Goldman Sachs, the BRIC group was meant to represent a group of emerging economies that by the 2050 would have overcome the financial and economic power of the current leaders. The addressing to these countries through the concept of “emerging powers” had to do with the exclusive economic phenomenon that they were representing in the new millennium, when the investment bank forecasted that the BRIC economies would have surpassed European larger states’ ones in few years (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014). However, the successful economic growth for itself does not represent a sufficient condition to advance a transformation of the international institutions; it is necessary that the economic features are used to push forward the diplomatic and influential character of the country, and these latter depend on a defined and agreed foreign policy aimed at the reform of the global governance and at inserting these Southern countries into the

⁶¹ In response to the developing nations’ demand of agricultural and governance concessions posed at the 2003 Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, and lately discussed at the Doha Round, the emerging powers have been critical of the Northern protectionist policies and practices, not because of any idea of solidarity among the Global South, but because they recognize that without fairer WTO’s mechanisms, the inequalities and asymmetries between North and South would have been maintained, favouring the North. Gray and Gills (2016) highlighted the positive role of Brazil in advocating for the free-market globalization that would have benefited its exportations in the very competitive agri-business sector, contributing in this way to strengthen the national economy, more than the Southern solidarity. The same discourse and motivation is reproduced by the other emerging powers, most interested in fulfilling their national interests (GRAY; GILLS, 2016, p. 560)

team of influential global players (MILHORANCE; SOULE-KOHNDOU, 2017), stressing the emergence of not just their economic features, but also political, social, diplomatic and identity ones (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014). When the group first appeared, many scholars started to highlight its heterogeneity and therefore the difficulties, if not impossibilities to analyse it as an analytical category (ARMIJO, 2007; BRÜTSCH; PAPA, 2013; DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a; LAÏDI, 2012; SPARKS, 2014). However, in just few years the countries started to move toward a major politicization of their existence and the realization of annual meeting contributed to challenge the more sceptical scholars (GRAY; GILLS, 2016), but the internal inequalities and divergencies of the groups and the sometimes conflictual pursuing of strategic national interests and aspirations of global power and projection appear very often (NAYYAR, 2016; THAKUR, 2014).⁶²

For Thomas Renard, a research fellow at Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, the international financial crisis of 2008 experienced by traditional economic powers seemed to have created the condition for these emerging economies to group together and ask for changes, notwithstanding, the transformation of the group into a political entity would have delayed to come, as Brazil, Russia, India and China where still an informal group, commonly defending positions over agreed issues, but still presenting differences and divisions among them (DW, 2009; HURRELL, 2006).⁶³ On

⁶² Given the major power and capabilities owned by China, the country has established uneven patterns of trade that, by exporting manufactured goods to the rest of the Global South and importing primary commodities into its domestic economic balance, is reproducing neo-colonial structures of commercial relations among these actors (NAYYAR, 2016). A similar discourse might be made for India and its manufactural sector made for exportation and for the strengthening of its own industrialization in detrimental of the industrial development of the Southern partners, these latter used exclusively for primary commodity production and for the extraction of natural resources (NAYYAR, 2016). For Thakur (2014) Chinese and Indian rivalries may push the latter government to support the USA against the military growth of the Asian Dragon, while in some other circumstance, China and India may collaborate and join forces and capabilities against the USA and the North in other issues, not so strategically relevant to their national needs, but significant for the Southern hemisphere (THAKUR, 2014)

⁶³ Politically, India and Brazil are strong democracies during the last two decades (with Brazil suffering from some moments of uncertainty and doubts), contrasting strongly with China and Russia as the other two members of the group, which are authoritarian regimes (Stephens 2011). Furthermore, in terms of international values of global governance, while Brazil is a non-nuclear state, India is not signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NTP) and possesses nuclear weapons as well as Russia and China (STUENKEL, 2014). Furthermore, these countries still present some conflictual issues, related to their national and strategic interests, like in the case of border issues (an example might be the one among China and India), related to national strategic issues or in the idea of international reforming they share, mainly when it comes to a change of the *status quo* that is actually benefiting some of them, and therefore making difficult a further alliance and a more institutionalization of them as a political group. Related to these latter issues, an example may be offered by Brazil and India's request for a reform of the main institutions of the global governance, in order to make them more democratic and better

the other side, a more optimist consideration of the political unitary of emerging powers in the twenty-first century was focusing on the growing international power and status (STUENKEL, 2014), the multilateral participation aimed at change the norms and practices of the system (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014) and their growing international recognition useful for the consolidation of a multipolar order (CARMODY, 2013b; Hirst, 2013 apud. MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014).

The BRICS have then been defined as a diplomatic club of emerging states, a “political forum of industrialised, large, fast-growing economies with significant influence in regional and global matters”(MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014, p. 37); an informal grouping with an evolving and flexible agenda, that is reproducing and representing the voice and the image of the South in the international system, justifying their essence and action within the political and rhetorical discourse of the Third World, while gaining credibility through the positive economic performances of the last years, but still maintaining a certain degree of competitiveness among them, for the achievement of international status and regional leadership, the access to resources and institutional advantages and claim (COOPER; ANTKIEWICZ; SHAW, 2007; MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014).

Finally, Fahimul Quadir alerts that when enthusiastically analysing the role of BRICS as boosters of a change in the international cooperation architecture, and stressing over their emerging features and condition in the international system, what is being neglected is a long and significant past in which these countries- together with the other non-DAC countries- have been involved in development assistance of the South (DE RENZIO; SEIFERT, 2014a; KRAGELUND, 2008; QUADIR, 2013). Some scholars have questioned the absence of the study of South-South cooperation and its historical evolution among the different disciplines and within the academic community of international development, as well as among the political discussion and the general knowledge of the North (GOSOVIC, 2016b; MAWDSLEY, 2019a). What has been put under the lens has been the exaggerated idea of development studies as international, when actually and once again being exclusively limited within Northern/western and modern borders, shadowing and neglecting the institutional models, advances and steps

representative of the changing times, China and Russia, already sitting as permanent members of the UNSC and holders of the *status quo* power are more reluctant to such a significant reform of the governance (STUENKEL, 2014).

made by the South (MAWDSLEY, 2019a). Indeed, erasing this part of the history of South-South cooperation can be problematic, even because it will present as new and sparkling, something that is not, as well as their proposal of an alternative model and structure to the traditional one (QUADIR, 2013, p. 323). Based on Fourcade's statement (2013), the common feature linking these countries should be found into their resilience and coherence in looking for the collapse of US and European models, domination and rules, and in the fact that this group has in common the exclusion and the continuous questioning of its role within the international system and mainly the global governance structures (Fourcade, 2013:261 apud MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014).

3.4.1 BRICS and the Security-Development Nexus revisited

The 2000s were characterized by deep transformations in the international system. The end of the Cold War posed a curtain over the bipolar competition and the tension among the divided worlds. However, the supremacy of the United States as only superpower and hegemonic actor in the international system did not last, and stronger and deeper integration mechanisms, following the successful example of the European Union, contributed to balance the US hegemonic position and to shake a world order based on Western values. At the turn of the millennium, the rise of emerging countries from the global South contributed to a shift of power that resulted in a major ideological diversification of the international system and the world politics (SCHWELLER, 2011), and the events occurred in this period have deeply attacked the economic, financial, political and military structure of the international system.

The 9/11 terroristic attack marked the emergence of new kind of international actors, which main features regarded their being non-state entities, and to present themselves in many cases as violent ones, and the following US intervention in the Middle East, justified by the legal framework of the War on Terror, stretched to the limits the US military power. The international credibility and legitimation of the superpower was also under attack, as it was losing status, this latter caught up by the rise of the rest (SCHWELLER; PU, 2011, p. 41) and transforming the US in "[...] one among many global actors" (US National Intelligence Council 2008, 2); so greeting the BRICS appearance in the international system as a progressive, anti-imperialist, anti-systemic and "new" bloc from the Global South (ROBINSON, 2015).

When the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 hit, the perception of the beneficial role of the globalized neoliberal economy started to vanish, together with the faith in the material progress achieved through the strong industrialization, modernization, technology innovation, as well as the asymmetric flows of production and consumption (GRAY; GILLS, 2016). Since then, emerging powers have attempted to challenge the global order and governance, mainly in issues like politics and economics and finance, trade and international aid, as well as by being engaged in climate change, poverty reduction, reduction of nuclear proliferation and more recently security and defence issues, mainly based on the new millennium's search for a sustainable development, achievable through the understanding of its deep connection with the security and the stability of a society, a state, and consequently of the whole international system, on the basis of a globalized narrative and practice of the current times. Therefore, the next pages are going to analyse the main documents of BRICS meeting, to evaluate their evolution and engagement in the international system they wish to transform, by focusing on the promotion of an alternative model of development that, by looking at the security sector would offer the BRICS understanding of the nexus (see Annex II).

The first BRIC summit was realized in 2009 in the Russian city of Yekateringburg and witnessed the participation of the representatives of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, and the People's Republic of China. During the meeting, the short-produced document was mainly introducing the new group and listing the main issues of engagement. The BRIC Summit of 2009 was looking at the sector of finance and economics in the post 2008 financial crisis, highlighting the "*central role played by the G20 Summits in dealing with the financial crisis*" – BRICS, 2009 par. 1) and the need to propose a fairer, more transparent and more democratic architecture, as well as a more stable and diversified international monetary system (BRIC, 2009 par. 4). Further topics promoted into this meeting were stressing the need to address cooperation in energy, science and technology, the achievement of the MDGS and the sustainable development, as well as the protection of multilateralism and international institutions (BRIC, 2009 par. 5-11). Related to the security sector, the first Summit proposed a connection between security and the support to democracy and multilateralism, recognizing into the principles of equality, cooperation, mutual respect, international law and collective peaceful efforts the basic features for peace, stability and then security (BRIC, 2009 par.12). Finally, the Summit condemned any terrorist act

happening worldwide, calling for an urgent UN response (BRIC, 2009 par. 13), that should- of course- be democratically representative of the multilateral system of the new millennium and efficient towards the global changes (BRIC, 2009 par. 14). The first Summit therefore introduced the BRICS as a possible unitary group, aimed to challenge the hierarchized structure of the international system. However, the first document produced, does not move from a very generalized list of existing problems and in some cases very cliché solutions.

In 2010, the same BRIC countries met in Brasilia, for the second Summit, and once again, due to the still focus on the international financial crises, the produced document focused mainly on the advertisement of the G20 as the main forum to find financial and economic solutions, because more representative and inclusive than other smaller grouping of countries (BRIC, 2010 par. 3). Economic and financial issues continued to be prominent, as well as the desire to reform the existing international institutions (mainly the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, as well as the UN- BRIC, 2010 par. 4-14) towards a major multilateralism, democratic representativeness (that would have also included Brazil and India in the international affairs' decisional process), and major stability. The document also sustained the relevance of the MDGs in a financial crisis context that was affecting directly and indirectly the poorest countries of the system. Therefore, by providing development assistance, BRIC were recognizing that: *“An inclusive process of growth for the world economy is not only a matter of solidarity but also an issue of strategic importance for global political and economic stability”* (BRICS, 2010 par. 16). It was an international call in the fight against poverty, inequalities, social exclusion, unemployment, focusing on the fulfilment of the needs of developing countries, small islands and the African continent (BRICS, 2010 par. 18).

The broader idea of development was here defined, furthering it from the exclusive economic, financial and modernity's centrality. Development, to be achieved multilaterally, was being linked to other sectors of state and addressed also to societies and people, more specifically. The spotlights were also on the agricultural, energy and climate sector, recognizing the strong impact and connection between the development of this latter and the promotion of food and energy security. Furthermore, a parallel document on security issues was produced (BAUMANN, 2017), condemning the many violent and insecure episodes occurring around the world and calling once again for a multilateral UN comprehensive approach to respond to security threats (BRICS, 2010

par. 23-24). Furthermore, and following the earthquake episode in Haiti, the document was expressing its solidarity and reiterated the international community's need to assist in the country's rebuilding and in the establishment of stability (BRICS 2010, par. 26).

The Summit of 2011 was realized in Sanya (China) and was stressing the focus over a coordination and cooperation on common regional and international issues, both in the intra-BRICS format as well as with non-BRICS countries, international and regional organizations (BRICS, 2011 par. 6). The focus over economic, trade and financial issues was maintained, as well as the commitment towards the multilateralism, the international law, and the global governance in the different sector, to which they continued to demand for a major inclusiveness of emerging and developing countries (BRICS, 2011 par. 7), upon which the reform of the UNSC (par. 9)⁶⁴ and of the IMF (par. 15-17) should occur.⁶⁵ However, this Summit stated the role of BRICS in contributing for peace, security and stability also, together with economic growth, multilateralism and democracy (BRICS, 2011 par. 5):

“It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries [...] contributing significantly to the development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fairer world” (BRICS, 2011 par. 3).

The security actorness of BRICS was therefore structured upon principles of No coercion nor use of force, but use of peaceful and diplomatic means, respect for independence, self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each nation (BRICS, 2011 par. 9-10), reminding to the seminal principles of the SSC, defined in Bandung and maintained along the decades and the many evolutions of the Global South mechanisms. However, their concern was more recent, addressing terrorism (par.11), cyber security, international transportation safety and specific regional crises, like in the case of Middle East, North Africa -Libya (par.10); and West Africa- (par. 9), but the

⁶⁴ For the first time they openly talked about a reform of UN and of the UNSC (BRICS, 2011 par.8). This occurred because, at that moment, all BRICS countries were sitting in the Security Council, making of the 2011 the great opportunity for a further coordination on peace and security issues, to achieve stability, prosperity, dignity and progress (BRICS, 2011 par. 9).

⁶⁵ The document is also adding to the previous topics of discussion, the cooperation and the engagement in social protection, gender equality, health and fight against HIV/AIDS (BRICS, 2011 par. 20-21 and 24), infrastructure development and industrialization in Africa through the NEPAD (par. 25), science, technology and innovation and the peaceful use of space (par. 28); pharmaceutical industry, culture, education, sport and green economy (focusing on climate change and sustainable development).

response was always looking for a “coordinated action under UN control and in accordance with international law” (BRICS, 2011 par. 11).

Security became a major concern together with stability and peace, recognizing their capability to influence the whole international community and its actors. However, the interest of BRICS countries for the financial and economic sectors remained and expanded with the projects for the creation of a BRICS Development Bank (BRICS, 2012 par. 13), as well as for the infrastructure, agriculture, and the promotion of the MDGs. In the following BRICS Summit in New Delhi (India) realized in 2012, the listed of local, regional and international sources of insecurity and instability, fed the need to find solution for these security problems and to address long dated conflicts, under the aegis of the international law and the resolution of the UN- with a growing engagement of the UNSC and the regional organizations (BRICS, 2012 par. 20). The document furthermore also stresses the focus on sustainable development, to be achieved also through the engagement in food and energy security, that will also promote the economic development, eradicate poverty and hunger in developing countries. The sustainable development is seen as a responsibility for future generations (par. 28).

In 2013, at Durban, in South Africa, the BRICS countries met once again to discuss about their changing role in the international system and specifically in this case, to address the Partnership with the African continent aimed to achieve Development, Integration and Industrialization (also called, Declaration of e-Thekwini). The news presented during this summit recognized the growing intra-BRICS solidarity and shared goals to “contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation” (BRICS, 2013 par. 1), committing themselves to support the UN multilateral system to advance such an objective and to guarantee a lasting peace and prosperity (BRICS, 2013 par. 20-22). For being the Summit that addresses the African continent and its issues, Ramos et al. (2018) has defined this meeting as the milestone of the BRICS relations with African partners (RAMOS et al., 2018).

Indeed, the BRICS have recognized the centrality of the AU and its Peace and Security Council to work in conflict resolution in Africa and call for a multilateral and collective approach to the security of the continent including the UNSC, the AU and its PSC (p.24). The engagement in other sectors is maintained, continuing to give preference to the financial and economic sector, with the even more structured project of a New Development Bank, to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects

(RAMOS et al., 2018), especially in Africa, within the framework of the NEPAD to advance further with the industrialization of the continent and the infrastructure investments (BRICS 2013 par. 5). This moment of growth in terms of cooperation, as well as the understanding of the relevance of sustainable solution and inclusiveness of those international actors that have for long time remain unheard, continued in the following Summit, realized in Fortaleza (Brazil) in 2014. Aimed to create a link between the economic growth, the social inclusion and the sustainability, the Summit maintained its focus over previous sectors of cooperation, objectives and goals (BRICS, 2014) and came to address more specifically the relationship with and the situation of some third-party countries to address the existing instabilities over there and highlight the occurring regional crises, among which a position was covered by the West Africa region (Brics, 2014; (DAMICO, 2017; BAUMANN, 2017). A further engagement in the security issues was also discussing the reform of the UNSC, once again, and the new security threats affecting spaces not always tangible, like the cyberspace and the outer one (BRICS, 2014).

Although the temporal space of this analysis ends with the year of 2014, for Ramos et al. (2018) the expansion of the BRICS objectives occurred between 2009- 2017 was structured around a growing focus on international development and security and on the institutional densification of the group itself, started in 2006 at the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations, realized in September 23rd, with the “beginning of a collective work” among the member states. From then, the group has advanced through a broader institutionalization aimed to join forces to actively assume a more influential role in the world order, restructuring the international mechanisms and power structures in a less hegemonic or Western way. Furthermore, and due to the transformation in the geopolitics of contemporary capitalism, international security issues gained more importance and voice within multilateral fora, like among the BRICS issues of discussion and concern (RAMOS et al., 2018, p. 2).

However, if from one hand the strong focus on the economic and financial sector, resulted into the institutionalization of the BRICS Development Bank, represents a coordinated challenge to the economic western supremacy (DESAI, 2013); on the other hand, the strong dependence on the existing multilateral architecture, and the calling for a UN intervention when the topic moves to security, seems to be representative of the

BRICS difficulties in acting alone and therefore requiring the strong engagement of the multilateral institutions, to which they are attempting to be accepted.

Over the years, the group started to move from very general and global issues, attempting to flatly denounce the asymmetries of the global governance without presenting concrete and constructive responses to challenge it, to the recognition of the need to establish a development agenda for the Global South itself. The idea of Quadir (2013) of BRICS as challengers of the North-South model of cooperation for development by proposing an alternative architecture cannot be overstated. Although BRICS countries have in recent years increased the participation in development cooperation, and contributed to the evolution of the vocabulary about international cooperation for development (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013), some of the main principles (like the one of non-conditionality, derived from the principle of non-interference) seemed to have harmed even more countries and people in already difficult conditions rather than promoting the betterment of their conditions, and have actually limited the direct engagement of BRICS countries in some sectors of the international cooperation.⁶⁶ They have been limited to engaging through already existing multilateral mechanisms, that they have aimed challenge.

To conclude, Nayyar (2015) recognizes that the lack of homogeneity among BRICS countries is not positive for the challenging and reforming of global governance institutions, due to the lack of coordination of interests among them, that will reinforce economic and political rivalry and the disunity, rather than the spread of solidarity, as everybody would have expected and hoped for (NAYYAR, 2016). Robinson (2015) believes that the BRICS should be understood in terms of systemic struggle for more power and prestige in a highly competitive international system, showing this way that the logic of the realist paradigm is still strong, characterized by asymmetric relations of powers and possession of resources and capabilities that have not been reduced with a capitalist globalisation (ROBINSON, 2015).

⁶⁶ The benevolent and solidarity discourse of untied aid is actually just rhetorical, as aid “[...] serve to provide economic opportunities for the countries involved and serves foreign policy goals” as well as to serve national interests: like in the case of a permanent seat at the UNSC, the recognition of territories under disputes and the recognition of leadership (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 191)

3.5 Conclusion

The resurgence of the Global South and of the South-South Cooperation in the new millennium has divided the debate between those who believe in the promotion of a “contemporary neo-Third Worldism” and a “project of liberation from Northern domination”, and, on the other side, the pessimistic scholars who criticize the success of the Global South and Southern emerging powers, as occurred and been fed by the existing capitalist paradigm of international development that they pretend to challenge (GRAY; GILLS, 2016, p. 559; MILANI, 2018). As Hurrell claimed (2013), the formation of the Third World/ Global South in the international system was a combination of previous experiences and events that influenced the late development of emerging powers, like cultural and political imperialism and colonialism, the industrialization and modernization of the West and the dependence, submission and peripheral condition of the Rest. For the author, the same idea of Global South exists at the margins of (and simultaneously to) the idea of a Global North, and the global issues and the functioning of the international system, as well as the interests and aspirations of emerging countries, have been understood in binary North/ South terms, and inserted in that (HURRELL, 2013).

A third group has also joined the debate, to include those scholars believing in the possibility of an intermediate space of action and being of the Global South, mainly based on the growing role and predominance of emerging powers in challenging the political, economic and financial *status quo*, while also supporting and reproducing the existing structures that have assisted them in enhancing global influence and achieve more power into the international system. Being in that intermediary position of middle and emerging powers, the BRICS have participated and responded to the identity and the practice of both the “North” and the “South”, that co-exist simultaneously within the BRICS countries identity (HURRELL, 2013; MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014). Emerging powers are currently located on the identity and spatial margin of the West, demanding, through a change in their foreign policy, for a major status, recognition and major power, while also recognizing their need to address poverty and inequality and other issues, representing problems still affecting themselves too (MILHORANCE DE CASTRO, 2014). The third option, or the hybrid strategy might result in the double capability of those countries to economically and financially rise, achieve good levels of industrialization, and use these gains to reform and restructure the global governance, its

institutions, norms and rules, as well as the international power relations, through a Global South's counterstrategy of co-optation.

“We are committed to further strengthen and support SS, while emphasizing that SSC is not a substitute but rather a complement to NSC, which continues to be the main channel for international development cooperation” (BRICS 2015, par. 66).

Notwithstanding the SSC is introduced as an alternative to the traditional programmes and models of development, the substance of its idea continues to be connected and to describe features of modernization, industrialization, progress and economic growth. Therefore, no matter whether BRICS countries have different (state-led or more progressive) development models implemented into their own countries, they continue to share with the West the focus over trade, finance, industrialization, exports, investments and growth (GUDYNAS, 2016). In addition, the role of the state as relevant in the development was re-established, going far beyond the neoliberal experience of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s and returning into institutional and ideational hybrids that actually combine the search for economic growth, stability, industrialization and liberalization with the redistribution and the state inclusion and control in the economy, intervening to avoid the free action and negative impacts of the financial markets and to match the national policy goals (BAN; BLYTH, 2013, p. 246). By claiming that “current SSC in development is functional at strengthening the core components of development, while paradoxically weakening a truly southern alternative”, Gudynas affirms that SSC is not actually debating and challenging the concept of development in itself, being in this way unable to implement a real conceptual alternative, that he considers to be the *Buen Vivir*, to “[promote] a type of SSC detached from development goals and, paradoxically, open to alternatives that are critical of development: a form of cooperation that moves beyond development” (GUDYNAS, 2016, p. 722 and 730).⁶⁷

⁶⁷ The concept of *Bien Vivir* (living good) emerged from different sources and connecting the indigenous values with the critical reaction to modernity and western values. It is not considering the idea of “predetermined historical linearity”, so that is rejecting the idea of growth and progress based on the following of specific paths. Furthermore, it is aware of the existence of different forms of knowledge, criticizing the idea of the Western knowledge and traditions as superiority. Gudynas (2016) highlights that the concept is both post-capitalist and post-socialist, focusing on approaches that the author defines as biocentric or ecological feminist (GUDYNAS, 2016, p. 728). For further readings about the concept of *Buen Vivir*, see: Acosta, Alberto. 2012. *Buen vivir – Sumak kawsay: Una oportunidad para imaginar otros mundos*. Quito: AbyaYala; and Gudynas, Eduardo. 2015. “*Buen Vivir*.” In *Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New*

However, and by readapting the critical words of the Cuban writer, Roberto Fernández Retamar, about the invoking the idea of hybridity as a way to challenge Western rules and vocabulary, but without really distancing from the “coloniser” language and tools of conceptualization (apud. LOOMBA, 2015, p. 172), the idea of South-South relations and the politics of the Global South pose themselves into the position of differentiate and renovate themselves by using a same set of concept and practices of what they pretend to alter, hybridising what has been borrowed, by mixing it with “indigenous” (or local) interpretations, without really challenging them and provoking a net division. Homi Bhabha (1994) recalls the Frantz Fanon’s image of *black skin/white masks* to explain this double position of the being simultaneously in two places, defined by Bhabha as the “being *different* and therefore being one of *us*” (BHABHA, 1994, p. 117).

To conclude, although emerging powers have not completely committed and achieved a reform of the international system, they have contributed to impose a change in the way how Northern powers where addressing their international affairs and implementing their cooperation, through a challenging competition that has emerged among the old and emerging donors and that has given recipient states more options and possibilities of choice, allowing them to look for the commitment that most likely addresses their national interests and real development needs. It seems that a possible alternative to the current international inequalities, underdevelopment and asymmetries of power may only come from the bottom and rising to face with the hegemonic groups, interested in pursuing imperialist as well as sub-imperialist means (BOND, 2016).

All around the Global South, then, new spheres of influence have emerged, in part related to the creation of regional economic blocs and projects, sometimes led by emerging powers, too. However, the globe continues to be strongly and transnationally entangled, transcending borders, spaces, geographies and influences. We believe that the transformation of the international system is not exclusively linked to the rise of Southern powers, or to the decline of others. The continuous instability of the economic and financial system, the challenges posed by anti-politics actors and their unregulated political management of domestic and international affairs, as well and the deep

Era, edited by Giacomo D’Alisa, Federico Demaria and Giorgos Kallis, 201–204. New York: Routledge; For the application of this concept in Latin America see: Schavelzon, Salvador. 2015. *Plurinacionalidad y Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir: Dos conceptos leídos desde Bolivia y Ecuador post-constituyentes*. Quito: AbyaYala.

transformations and revolution that the world is suffering in terms of threats, coming from the nature and from the microsystems, are questioning the world we are living in and the system we have created and that has governed us for long time. How will emerging powers, but also traditional ones, respond to these challenges will depend on how able and fast they will be to understand the new phenomena and readapt themselves to them, and to the world that will exist after them.

Brazil-Africa relations in the South Atlantic: the maritime security cooperation with West African countries in the Gulf of Guinea

The events that occurred worldwide, at the turn of the millennium, have contributed to transform the international system, that has since then witnessed a reallocation of power and the emergence of the Global South and its major actors, as previously seen. However, the new millennium has also assisted in the rapid rise of the African continent and the augmentation of its agency in the world politics, mainly to face the many challenges that have affected its economic, social and political development (MOYO; CHAMBATI; YEROS, 2019).

The growing relevance of Africa and its more protagonist presence in the global governance has aimed to subvert a long history of external presence and engagement over its territory, with different international actors (both states and international organizations) controlling its economic, political, social and security sectors, and its institutions (ADEBAJO, 2003; GEGOUT, 2018). This external presence, that has always characterized the continent, has caused more harms than goods to the African states and people, mainly oriented to accomplish external powers interests and aspirations and calculated on the utility and benefits offered or able to offer to the European colonial powers, at expenses of African needs, stability and security (SCHMIDT, 2013).⁶⁸ At the same time, the growing US presence in Africa during the bipolarity (together with the Soviet Union) to achieve a sphere of influence and allies for their respective bloc, has made of Africa an object of power, taking from it any identity and subjectivity (DAVIS, 2004). Therefore, the almost fixed presence of European and Northern powers into Africa has contributed to create a structure of African fragility and dependence, that in some

⁶⁸ For Bernardino (2015) the EU-Africa relations, made of imperialism, colonialism and post-independence interventionism, (and to which it could be added also the economic, political and military dependence, the imposed structural adjustments, as well as the continuum of external assistance and foreign aid combined to conditionalities), should be seen as the root-causes of insecurity and underdevelopment of African states and people, limiting and weakening their authority and sovereignty in their own territories and in the international community (ibid. 2015).

cases have fed the belief of the continent incapability to address geopolitics and face conflicts over its territory, and to establish security and promote development.

The increasing African agency in different field of global governance and therefore its major participation in world politics in the new millennium seems to be the consequence of a changing (self)perception in contemporary international relations (MOYO; CHAMBATI; YEROS, 2019; TAYLOR; WILLIAMS, 2004) and a reaction to those historical accomplishments of external powers' interests (GHIMIRE, 2018; SCHMIDT, 2013). Hence, Africa has started to recognize itself no more as passive, submitted and a silent object, but in control of its actions and decision-making processes and in sustaining peace and security, as well as political, economic and social development. African countries have matched African problems with integrated regional and continental solutions that consider the relationship with external powers among equals, leaving with Africa the ownership of its own development, security and stability (SCHMIDT, 2013), reflecting in this way the principles of the South-South cooperation and strengthening the role of Global South, its mechanisms and actors in the global governance.

This chapter introduces the Brazil's African Policy of the twenty-first century, positioned within the framework of SSC and motivated by the strategic role covered by the South Atlantic, among other reasons. By exploring the historical Brazil-Africa relationship that dated back to the century of transatlantic flows and traffics and that has evolved along the history, witnessing alternate moments of distancing and rapprochement, the focus relies on the analysis of the Brazil's African Policy of Presidents Luiz I. Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2003-2014). In this decade, Brazil showed a growing interest for the South-Atlantic resulted in the expansion of security cooperation over the maritime area to the coasts of Africa. This move of the South American country may be considered as a strategic step oriented towards a more impacting global insertion, not just as an emerging economic market or a regional and soft middle power, but also as an intermediate state (LIMA; HIRST, 2006); a rising power, a global player (FLEMES; SARAIVA, 2014), a significant pole of the renewed global configuration (BENZI, 2015, p. 59) driving for a change of the world order (LOPES; CASARÕES; GAMA, 2013, p. 2).

The choice for inserting Brazil's African and South Atlantic strategy within the boundaries of a horizontal cooperation model that has expanded to include significant

sectors of hard politics, has been dictated by the country's structural limitations and weaknesses in international power distribution and by the recognition of its international participation structured upon principles of diplomacy and multilateral actions oriented toward positive, respectful and non-coercive intentions related to other countries. If the choice for a soft power strategy has been conditioned by and bounded within the state's relative fragilities when compared to other international actors, Brazil has been able to make of its limitations a further strength, and therefore to extensively accumulate influence and prestige among countries, increasing its international profile and attractiveness by affirmatively engaging with other international actors and in different sectors of global governance, however without being perceived as invasive in domestic matters of other states (Da Silva, 2010).⁶⁹ Brazil's preference for diplomatic, affirmative and cooperative attitudes in dealing with other international actors and its inhibition in using traditional measures of hard power-based strategic influence toward the strategic region of the South Atlantic (KENKEL, 2013), contributed to consider the country as a normative power in participating to the global play, as well as a benevolent leader and as representative of the concept of cooperative hegemon (PEDERSEN, 2002).

This Brazilian cooperative understanding of international relations is here analysed within the institutionalization of an alternative identity and model of action and interaction built upon the strengthening of horizontal ties, mutual learning, partnership and equality, converging into sub-hemispheric and regional mechanisms of engagement and collaboration among states. Indeed, since the rise of the new millennium, and aimed to augment its position in the power competition with other states and to be finally perceived as a global actor, Brazil has been aware of the importance of achieving regional support regarding its global aspiration of a rising power and "would be" great power (HURRELL, 2006). The regional space upon which Brazil was counting for support and for the recognition of its leadership, has been indicated as consisting of both the South-American region (MALAMUD, 2011) and the maritime area that extends over the South Atlantic and towards Western Africa (BRASIL, 2012).

The preference for regional initiative to engage in the world politics is linked to the changing context of the new millennium, characterized by globalization and the

⁶⁹ Discourse released by the President Luis I. Lula Da Silva, at the 4 th IBSA Summit in Brasilia, April 15 th 2010. Available at: http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/images/stories/President%20Brazil%20Speech_4.pdf

understanding of the multisectoral interdependence among states and emerging international actors (non-state ones). Furthermore, the trans-nationalization of old and new security threats caused by the growing global interdependence, that has lowered the national frontiers, and the impact that security has over other sectors of global governance, has reduced and questioned the capability of the state to individually solve those new security problems. A new hope seems to have been set in the possibility of strengthening regional and global security relations and alliances, that will expand their area of action as well as their capabilities and responsibilities (BERNARDINO, 2013, p. 101). Indeed, in the context of globalization, regional integration is the key to achieve or maintain power and for the improvement of social and economic development (ECA & ECOWAS, 2015).

Hence, by looking at Brazilian role in this changing international context and aiming to support its global aspirations and to strengthen its international status, this chapter analyses the Brazilian initiatives in establishing its influence and power over its strategic regional environment of the twenty-first century: the South Atlantic (FIORI, 2013). It highlights the engagement of Brazil in bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of cooperation in the security field over the South Atlantic maritime domain, reaching the West African countries, and perceives it as a response to the growing insecurities arising into the Gulf of Guinea region in the last two decades and that have challenged the stability, the peace and the development, not just of the West African countries, but of the whole globe, overpassing borders and impacting states and their societies. The lowering of state borders in the globalized world and the negative interpretation of African instability and underdevelopment as both regional and global security threats, have indicated that underdevelopment can threaten strong states' national interests, because poverty, state weakness and corruption make poor states vulnerable to terrorism, drug cartels, and other threats (DUFFIELD, 2010; GAMBARI, 2005; MAIANGWA, 2017).

The research also recognized the importance that in recent years the sea has once again assumed in International Relations and its centrality in the analysis of Brazil-Africa cooperation and the Brazilian regional mechanisms of maritime security cooperation, looking for the establishment of sovereignty over the space (WIESEBRON, 2013, p. 108). As Alfred Mahan claimed about Oceanic Basin, the South Atlantic represents a maritime space in which trade, economic and cultural fluxes depend on political and strategic factors that form the agenda of coast countries aimed to transform

the maritime element in a feature of the agenda of SSC for the security and the economic development in the region (PENHA, 2011; VISENTINI, 2016). Brazil has perceived the continent as an opportunity for its interests and an autonomous role in the South Atlantic as peace and security keeper, but also as coordinator of resources' exploration (concerning assistance in delimitation of the continental shelf and removal of external forces from the African coasts' maritime resources) and developer of human and military capabilities (BRASIL, 2012; SEABRA, 2016).

The Brazilian region building process and the implementation of regional security mechanisms over the South Atlantic and with the West African actors (both states, regional and continental ones) react to the need of securing the strategic space of South Atlantic from further maritime insecurity and instability, affecting development and the economic growth of countries, so addressing the security-development nexus in the twenty-first century engaging with the African continent. The overlapping of different security practices responds to the hybrid position of the country in the international system and its distribution of power, reflecting how the structural features and the country's international principles have conditioned the operationalization of its maritime security cooperation within the framework of the SSC, and therefore made of the international cooperation and instrument of Foreign Policy. At the same time, the global aspirations of Brazil have contributed in some cases to shadow the overstated solidarity aspect of the Southern model of cooperation for development and to adopt security mechanisms that better respond to a realist logic of balance of power, rather than to an institutionalized security community one; inserting this analysis into the theoretical framework offered by Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, in "When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance" (2009).


4.1 Growing insecurities at the sea: an overlook of the South Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea region

The increasing cases of piracy, armed robbery, crude oil theft, illegal oil bunkering, illegal unregulated fishing, marine pollution, illicit drug and human trafficking and smuggling, targeting mainly oil vessels and kidnapping ships and crew have become a major security concern not just in the region, but worldwide (ICG, 2012), making of the

Gulf of Guinea (GoG) one of the most insecure maritime space in the world (IMB, 2018; OTTO, 2014).⁷⁰ In the period between 2003 and 2015, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) recorded that almost 31% of piracy attacks occurred in African waters, and mostly in the Gulf of Guinea region, affecting the international maritime trade, the oil and natural resources business and the development, and therefore creating a vicious cycle of insecurities that undermines the sustainable and autonomous development of the African continent (apud. PIEDADE, 2016) (Annex III). These interconnection among the many insecurities existing in the Gulf of Guinea shows that there is not a real priority in the listing of the threats operating in the region, so needing responses that will simultaneously approach this multiplicity of sectors (BUEGER, 2015b).⁷¹

⁷⁰ As claimed by Otto (2014) Western Africa coast's proliferation of violence at sea in the new millennium has transformed the region into a major hotspot of insecurity and violence, with cases of piracy attacks, illegal fishing, crude oil theft, crew kidnapped, transnational organized crime working into money laundering, traffic of arms and drugs, armed assaults of crews, maritime terrorism, traffic of human beings, illegal migration, environmental crimes, cyberattacks (BUEGER, 2015a; OTTO, 2014), but also state weakness and lack of capabilities like in the case of a vulnerable judicial system, or scarcity of resources, instruments to check and guarantee and assist the navigation, and the actions of patrolling and defence (AFRICAN UNION, 2012).

⁷¹ For example, threats to fishing activities have a huge impact on the economy of local communities, which see their food security threatened, as well as the environmental security of their maritime domain, contributing to a lasting insecurity and reduced capabilities of their maritime spaces and biodiversity. Moreover, IUU fishing activities have also a strong impact on the economic and social sector of local states, increasing the rates of unemployment, and consequently the migration of local populations and the criminality in local communities but also broader in the region. More than 46% of African people was still living in poverty, while fishing and fish-culturing contribute to the food security of about 200 million of people and to the sustainment of more than 10 million, and the development of the energy sector, as well as most of the energy offer from African states to the Northern traditional powers is extracted by the sea (AfDB, 2014). The Gulf of Guinea is also recognized for being entangled into the routes of illegal immigration, trafficking of people and of drugs, being a point of passage between or of departure directed to Europe and Latina America. In the case of drugs trafficking, the UNODC has also recognized the growing role of the Gulf of Guinea region not just as stopover, but also as producer itself of drugs, also influencing the stability and the governance of many states, as well as directly affecting the health, societal and economic security of states and their citizens (see the case of Guinea Bissau) (UNODC, 2013).



(Maritime Security Matrix- Bueger, 2015: 161)

Therefore, in the new millennium, the relevance of the water spaces in the understanding of the security-development nexus has become significant, showing how maritime domains have double features and so be able to generate both positive and negative outcomes. Sea has been considered as the main promoter of trade and economic growth (VREĚ, 2010). The Gulf of Guinea itself has received more than 90% of trade to and from Africa, on statistics elaborated by the African Development Outlook 2014 (AFDB, 2014). The Atlantic Ocean came to have a significant role in the international relation, mainly because its position in the middle and its connecting function among important continents, like the European Union, the Americas (from North to South) and Africa. Furthermore, the sea has contributed to the development of states, through the access to trade routes, the movement of people and ideas, the availability of food and the energy supply, through the exploration of natural and mineral resources, that also promote innovation, as well as scientific and technological research, and therefore favouring their political and socio-economic sectors (SILVA, 2017, p. 237).

At the same time, these maritime space have also favoured the communication and military operations, mainly to secure or expand the state's territory and to project country's military forces and sea power influence in the international relations and world politics, both in times of peace and war respectively (SILVA, 2017). However, notwithstanding the underwater wealth and the relevant geographic position have transformed the GoG into a geo-strategic political, economic, trade and energy space (CHERU; OBI, 2011; KORNEGAY; LANDSBERG, 2009), it has also favoured the emergence of violent threats and social tensions for access, control and management over the area and its resources (BASSOU, 2017; WEF, 2019).

Because of globalization, local security threats shortly assume a transnational aspect, spreading not only to geographic proximities, but overcoming borders and assuming global dimensions (BERNARDINO, 2019), requiring multilateral joint interventions to maintain stability and security (GILPIN, 2004; RASHEED, 1996). Hence, the process of securitization of Africa and its development,⁷² occurred since the rise of the new millennium, was structured upon the recognized security-development nexus and came to implement preventive and intervenient measures of international actors into the continent “[...] as a way of cohering national and international policy-making interventions in non-Western states” (CHANDLER, 2007, p. 362), to tackle the new common security threats (KALDOR, 2006), reduce the transnational criminal activities in the region, as well as their spreading abroad, and embrace the benefits of a regional governance and coordination among external powers (here considered the case of Brazil) and African regional and continental actors (i.e. ECOWAS, AU) to promote the maritime security in the region.

Although a proper definition of what maritime security should mean is still lacking international consensus, the concept at least presents some international coordination of actions (BUEGER, 2015b). Indeed, defined as “security of the maritime domain or as a *set of policies, regulations, measures and operations* to secure the maritime domain” (GERMOND, 2015, p. 137), what is clear is that the maritime security is understood as a transnational task (BUEGER, 2015b).

“The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report stresses the importance of international cooperation and coordinated responses, and stresses that maritime security is a shared responsibility and requires a new vision of collective security” (BUEGER, 2015b, p. 163)

Geoffrey Till (2007) claimed that the globalization, by attempting to interconnect and universally homogenise the world, offering mutual benefits for all, has reduced the capacity of states to act independently and autonomously. This individual incapacity is also reflected into the maritime domain and the sea power, where seas have represented routes of trade, flowing of capital and goods through continents ignoring national borders, and the same has been done by the threats of the new millennium. It was in the aftermath

⁷² Soon after the 9/11 and within the framework of the War on Terror, concerns about the transnationalization of security threats started to rise and resulted in the promotion of a process of securitization (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003) of Africa and its development (ABRAHAMSEN, 2005; AIMÉ, 2013).

of the 9/11 that the interest for a coordinated action grew, related also to the fear of maritime terrorism and other threats at sea, like piracy and its negative impact on international trade that soon transformed this security issue into a global concern, addressed in any policy agenda all around the world (BUEGER, 2015b, p. 159; GERMOND, 2015).

In 2012, the UN acknowledged the growing number of attacks in the West Africa and issued a resolution (2039) entitled “Peace Consolidation in West Africa” in which the need of regional patrols, mechanisms and centres of coordination of policies, actions and information was required to reduce the insecurity and the threats in the Gulf of Guinea. This concert of action was to be deployed both by local and regional actors, as well as by those external actors with interests in the region, mainly US,⁷³ EU,⁷⁴ China⁷⁵ and Brazil, that will be analysed more in details in the next section, addressing the

⁷³ The United States presence in the African continent and the operationalization of new schemes of security in the South-Atlantic, like the relaunching of the African Command -AFRICOM- and the many military operations and joint exercises realized in the region and in cooperation with African states of the Gulf of Guinea region, as well as with other Northern and Southern partners, have been fundamental to strengthening its presence and safeguard its geoeconomics and geostrategic interests in Africa, mainly oil and energy (CARGILL, 2010; PEREIRA, 2019; PLOCH, 2009). At the same time, many other international actors (France, United Kingdom, Spain, but also Argentina and South-Africa) showed a growing sympathy for the huge natural resources of the African lands and the Atlantic waters. In the case of the European states, their preference to engage individually or through multilateral frameworks that are not the EU (like the NATO or the United Nations) ended up creating a competitiveness and jeopardization among EU interests in the region (PEREIRA, 2019; SIRADAG, 2012).

⁷⁴ The European Union security actorness emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 events and consisted in a multisectoral securitization of the world and its politics and an interconnection of the securitising nexus (BRANDÃO, 2015). However, the attempted securitizing move of the EU towards the new threats to the international security and in regard to some specific geographical areas is linked to the safeguard of European interests ambition to keep an international strong presence (GEGOUT, 2018; PEREIRA, 2019; SCHMIDT, 2013), capitalizing its actorness in the global sphere by promoting a holistic approach to security issues, able to understand the interconnection and the continuum that (in)security has with phenomena like: development, poverty, migration, energy, environment, terrorism, organized crime, proliferation and so on (BRANDÃO, 2015, p. 5). Gegout (2018) critically highlights the realist approach of EU to African security by preserving its own interests and the international prestige, and showing how the EU is distancing itself from the institutional-liberalism and is reducing its commitment to international law, rules and institutionalized mechanisms, skipping completely the approach with Africa through the humanitarian and solidarity via (GEGOUT, 2018).

⁷⁵ The presence of China in the African continent is huge and multidimensional, and in the last decade, the country has also assisted to a growing interest and engagement in the security section within the West African coast and the South Atlantic Ocean (SIRADAG, 2012). Related to the maritime domain of the African policy, the Chinese White Paper affirmed, once again the sea is challenging the very diffused idea that the land power outweighs the sea one, and recognizes that it is time for the (emerging) power “to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security” that will allow China to show its global presence, not just limited to its territorial waters and regional seas, but increasing its action and competitive power in more distant waters (CRS- CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2020; MCCOY, 2018). For further details about the Chinese presence, see “*China’s International Partnerships: Pan-African Cooperation*” (GLOBAL RISK INSIGHT, 2020).

relevance of the African continent and the South Atlantic and the insertion of the country's growing engagement in maritime security field, using the international cooperation as instrument of Foreign Policy.

In conclusion, it seems clear that despite the diverging reasons and the difficulties to elaborate a common understanding and definition of maritime security among the many actors operating in the Gulf of Guinea region, collective actions in the maritime security occur, and both the power search and the consolidation of national interests are also relevant factors in the strengthening of this collective mechanisms. It responds to the globalized and interdependent logic of the international system and the transnationalization of security threats, in which security must be achieved within regional contexts, because no state can efficiently defend itself by acting alone. For Bernardino (2013) the interdependence of the globalized world causes a major vulnerability of occurring phenomena and existing systems while also disturbing the balance of power dynamics among (BERNARDINO, 2013, p. 87)

Hence, by proposing a strategy that combines the traditional and the postmodern competitive understanding of the sea power, Geoffrey Till recognizes that states still have strong Westphalia tendencies (state centrality, national survival and sovereignty, national perspectives and preferences, power projection), the consequences of which impact on the system that is now global, and keep the maritime domain and the sea power still in a modern environment, rather than in a collaborative and postmodern one, complicating the effective response against growing global threats at sea (TILL, 2007, p. 574).

4.2 Brazil's African Policy: the cooperation for development as instrument of Foreign Policy

The Brazilian relationship with the African continent and mainly with the West African countries goes back to the sixteenth century and structures itself around the inter-oceanic peripheral trade networks of people and goods occurred during the colonial system (VISENTINI, 2014). These relations have been characterized by a continuous alternation between periods of distance and rapprochement, that have been significant in the twentieth century and have assumed a more pragmatic feature in the Cold War years and since the turn of the millennium (SARAIVA, 2012; VISENTINI, 2014), when the end of the European colonialism in Africa reopened the space for a return of Brazil

(SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019). The African policy of Brazil has inserted itself into the struggles of the Foreign policy of the country, divided between its “*americanism*”, which indicates the moments in which Brazil was in an exclusive relationship with the US and mainly oriented towards the closer neighbours, the Latin American countries; and on the other side a more “*globalist*” approach aimed to project the country on the international scene and to increase its economic, political and diplomatic partners and supporters (Pinheiro, 2000).

Seibert and Visentini (2019), however, stated that the Brazil-Africa relationship has assumed a significant relevance in just three specific moments of the history and have witnessed a serious and sincere interest of the Brazilian governments and diplomats towards the African continent. First, in the 1960s (between 1961 and 1964) during the *Independent Politics* of the governments of Jânio Quadros and Jango Goulart, the African continent was experiencing its most significant period of decolonization and independence movements. In that period, Brazil was adhering to the Non-Aligned Movement and engaging into the development of less developed countries, as well as for the independence of many African and Asian countries. Then, the interests of Brazil in Africa were based on the need of a major international projection of the country and the access to new markets, as well as to the intellectual and diplomatic desire of supporting the new independent nations of the continent, with whom Brazil was sharing cultural roots, by creating an international development grouping joining together the peripheral countries (LEITE, 2011, p. 98).⁷⁶

Second, in the 1970s, despite the instauration of the dictatorship in Brazil, the military governments were interested in strengthening the relationships with African oil producers to pragmatically supply the domestic energy demand during the oil shocks of the decade (SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019). It was the period of the “*Pragmatismo Responsável*” of President Ernesto Geisel, when the military regime gave major relevance to the security-development nexus in its external agenda, focusing on the development and the economic growth as a way to keep the country secure and not threatened by Communism (LEITE, 2011). Furthermore, in the same period, the strong relationship with African countries was characterized by the imminent Brazilian recognition of the

⁷⁶ For further reading suggestions, see: Bezerra De Menezes, A.J. 1961. *Ásia, África e a política independente do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar; and Rodrigues, José H. 1961. *Brasil e África. Outro horizonte*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Portuguese colonies' independence, marking a final break up with the Portugal of Salazar, and the economic growth derived by the intensification of economic and trade relations, and the growing cooperation in different fields, like infrastructure, education, health and agriculture, among others (SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019).⁷⁷

Furthermore, it was in the new millennium that the Brazil-Africa relationships achieved their greatest moment, after a previous decade of abandonment of the African policy in which the continent was struggling between internal conflicts and problems and the returned presence of traditional actors. However, the governments of the new millennium have not completely restructured the foreign policy of the country, but have maintained a certain degree of continuity with the previous moments.⁷⁸ Seibert and Visentini (2019) also highlight that it was in 1990s that the creation of the CPLP (the Community of Portuguese Language Countries)⁷⁹ occurred, giving a new significance to Portugal- Brazil relations and relaunching the Brazil-Africa re-approximation, mainly based on cultural and linguistic features, but not exclusively. Indeed, despite that much has been studied and written about Brazilian engagement with Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa in the most different sectors of cooperation, the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC- created in 1986 to structure and check the international cooperation of the country and coordinate the engagements of specific Ministers into the agenda) has also been very cooperative with mainly West African countries rich in oil and gas and natural resources, like Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa, aimed to continue to supply the Brazilian energy needs (INOUE; VAZ, 2012; SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019).

The presidential election of Lula da Silva was celebrated as a great news in the domestic and international context and his governments are considered as the most prominently engaged in the world affairs, although the country maintained its classical principles of international participation, based on peaceful and diplomatic responses, strengthening of the multilateralism and multipolarity and solidarity toward the

⁷⁷ For a more detailed analysis, see: Sombra Saraiva, José F. 1996. *O lugar da África: a dimensão atlântica da política externa brasileira (de 1946 a nossos dias)*. Brasília: Editora da UnB.

⁷⁸ For a better understanding of the continuity of the Brazilian foreign policy, see: Cervo, Amado. 2003. A política exterior: de Cardoso a Lula. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 46(1):5- 11; Vizontini, Paulo F. 2005. De FHC a Lula: uma década de política externa (1995-2005). *Civitas*, 5(2): 381-397.

⁷⁹ The Community of Portuguese Language Countries was created in 1996 among Portugal, Brazil, the former Portuguese colonies of Africa (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe) to which later, also East Timor and Equatorial Guinea joined, after the end of the civil war in the former case and the changing of the official language to Portuguese, in 2014, for the latter one.

developing countries and the creation of cooperative mechanisms with emerging powers and African countries (AMORIM, 2011, p. 14). In an interview realized with the former Minister Celso Amorim, he stated that during President Lula's government there was the need to move from being just friends with the African continent to a deepening of the relationship and a celebration of what should have been a brotherhood, with Brazil playing the role of the older brother, the one that first achieved development, independence, autonomy, international power or, in other words, maturity. There was a strong perception of the continent as "thirsty of Brazil", because African scholars and policymakers profoundly believed that "for any African problem there is a Brazilian solution", as Celso Amorim proudly claimed.⁸⁰

The Brazilian Foreign Policy of the new millennium was then characterized by some elements of innovation and continuity, as Lula's governments adopted a strategy of global insertion characterized by the "autonomy through diversification" of its partnerships and sectors of engagement (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007), through which the country was adhering to international norms and principles through the promotion of South-South relations, regionalization processes and strategic partnerships and agreements with non-traditional partners, although previous strategy of "autonomy through participation" of the President Cardoso era (1995- 2002) was maintained through the forms of Brazilian continuous participation in existing international liberal institutions (VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA; CINTRA, 2003). The Brazilian Foreign Policy of the new millennium could be defined in terms of Pragmatic Institutionalism, as stated by Leticia Pinheiro (2000), meaning the capability of the country to achieve through institutional arrangements (alliances, cooperation, region building processes or coalitions, among others) its autonomy, power capacities and the pursuing of its strategic domestic interests.

Related to the African continent, the Brazilian foreign policy was imbued with the logic and the principles of the South-South cooperation, taken from Bandung and readapted to the recent times and needs of the Global South, influenced also by the action of emerging Southern coalitions, to which Brazil participates, and by the Brazilian desire to coordinate the joint action of the countries of the periphery, attempting to converge the general interests of the Southern hemisphere with its national interests (BENZI, 2015; LIMA, 2012). So, Brazil's African policy, was restructured upon specific action oriented

⁸⁰ Information collected during a formal conversation with the Minister Celso Amorim, realized in date July 1st of 2020.

to change the bilateral (here analysed in the idea of state-continent relations, more than in a more appropriate format of state-state ones) and multilateral relations (within international and regional mechanisms) and to contribute to a major global inclusion of both Brazil and African countries (SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019).

Brazilian policy for Africa has then covered significant areas of the cooperation among Southern countries, focusing mainly on sectors like agriculture⁸¹, health,⁸² education, technical cooperation, energy,⁸³ infrastructure, among others (CABRAL et al., 2013; DAUVERGNE; BL FARIAS, 2012; YEROS; SCHINCARIOL; DA SILVA, 2019). This multisectoral engagement of Brazil during the Lula government aimed to stress the solidarity dimension of the Southern relations, while also contributing to export successful domestic policies and initiatives (like the anti-hunger initiative, *Fome Zero*) and to sponsor national entrepreneurs in the implementation of this projects (PEREIRA, 2019; SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019). Such policies would have allowed for the South American country to present itself as a proactive norm setter in the international system, making the African continent its trampoline for a major international projection

⁸¹ Brazilian experiences in agriculture have been largely admired within Africa. The country was able to transform its agriculture from a dependent from external assistance sector to one of the most competitive in just few decades, promoting its “green revolution” overseas. The application of scientific and technological knowledge to transform the acidic and tropical soils with low fertility in very productive lands, made of the tropical agriculture of the country a success worldwide, through the development of the PROSAVANA programme in Mozambique (SHANKLAND; GONÇALVES, 2016). The technical cooperation in agriculture has been expanding considerably across the continent, mainly as consequence and faithful belief of the role of the country as “a source of cutting-edge expertise on tropical agriculture for Africa”, to be enhanced through the work of the EMBRAPA (Portuguese acronym for *Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation*) (VISENTINI, 2011).

⁸² The cooperation in health was aimed to fight the high rates of child mortality and spread of diseases, as well as to support the African access to medicines for free or for cheaper price, investing into the exportation of Brazilian generic drugs, as well as in Brazilian technology for such production in African countries itself (RUSSO; CABRAL; FERRINHO, 2013).

⁸³ In the decade of 1980, after the international oil crisis and to reduce the dependence on oil imports, Brazil strategically invested in the national production of ethanol fuels derived from the cultivation of became therefore an exporter of renewable energy and agricultural policies in Africa. “Nigeria and Ghana imported respectively 97.8 and 19.7 million litres of ethanol from Brazil in 2008” and Brazil has pledged to assist the continent in the production and export of agriculture and biofuels, through trade, cooperation, technology, and skills transfer (AFDB, 2011). Based on the Africa Economic Brief, “Ethanol is set to become Ghana’s fourth major export after cocoa, gold, and timber” as the country has been developing energy agriculture to promote the development of biofuel crop production as important alternative and removable energy source. Further deals in biofuels were also signed between Angola’s oil company Sonangol and the Brazilian construction company, Odebrecht, for a US\$ 220 million project of sugar and ethanol production, and with Nigeria, aimed to build a ‘Biofuel Town’ in Nigeria (ibid. 2011:4).

(ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b) and of the international cooperation and instrument of foreign policy (FRAYSSINET, 2011).⁸⁴

For Pádraig Carmody (2013), the reproduction of successful domestic policies in the African countries has not been linked to the same objectives of societal development and progress, as they were in the Brazilian context. For the author, the solidarity vector of the country's global engagement and mainly within the African continent was interacting with the promotion and accumulation of economic interests and the increasing of its international status, contributing in this way to establish an ambivalent relation between the globally spread idea of solidarity and the pragmatic interests of the country in terms of power, influence and legitimation of its status (CARMODY, 2013a), consisting of a "drive for prestige" (BURGES, 2009) and aspirations to gain a permanent seat at the UNSC and access to significant markets for national companies, as further reasons lying behind Brazilian role in development assistance.

The new millennium and the changing international system have meant great transformations in the Brazil's African Policy. In this period, the aspirations of Brazil have become more global and its foreign policy has moved between bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of international and regional participation, divided between a more active engagement and voice in the Bretton Woods and San Francisco institutions (WB, IMF and WTO and UN respectively), and the building and participation in Southern coalitions (like in the case of BRICS and IBSA, previously discussed) to spread the voice of the unheard, demanding for reform of and representation among the listed institutions and a more equal dialogue about sensitive issues of world politics (BURGES, 2008; SWEIG, 2010). Brazilian diplomacy of the new millennium was then investing in different fields, but always seeming to be weakening its power within multilateral and intergovernmental structures. Indeed, by using its soft power and the choice for soft balancing strategies as preferred foreign policy tools (Celso Amorim apud. HURRELL, 2008), Brazil has attempted to influence and limit the space of action of recognized great power (HURRELL, 2008) and to reinforce its autonomy of choice and systemic position.

⁸⁴ However, the Brazilian engagement in development assistance and the use of it as an instrument of foreign policy was not meaning to interfere in the political issues of the other countries receiving its aid, but on the contrary the country was ignoring political and governmental matters, working in conjunction with the recipient partner to deliver the kind of aid needed by these latter, aimed to develop states and people and help them to achieve autonomy through a technical work, and therefore not oriented to strengthen the governments, but to do "good towards people who are suffering" and assist them to overcome inequalities (Marcos Azambuja apud. FRAYSSINET, 2011).

The country has then established multipolar mechanisms of soft power use, that have been grouped within the Fledes and Saraiva's networks of diplomatic action (2014).⁸⁵

The Southern countries' groupings of the new millennium can be considered as part of these networks oriented towards an advocacy action. Indeed, among the most representatives of the Global South institutionalization, it is possible to cite the IBSA, established in 2003 from the Brasilia Declaration, and the BRICS (institutionalized in 2006, from an acronym coined in 2001 by Jim O' Neill, economist of the Goldman Sachs, to group together those emerging economies of the new century than in less than 50 years would have overcome the economic predominance of the Northern powers). However, the role of BRICS countries in the African continent, under the aegis of the South-South Cooperation, has been criticized for being more concerned to responding to their specific political, economic and diplomatic needs, than to the sustainable and general growth of the African states, contributing so to what has been defined as the new great dispute for Africa (Financial Times, 2008),⁸⁶ this time occurring also upon an horizontal line and witnessing to a competition among emerging powers themselves (CHERU; OBI, 2011; KRAGELUND, 2010; NAIDU, 2009; STUENKEL, 2014; VINES et al., 2009).⁸⁷

For Patricia Soares Leite (2011), the three moments of Brazilian Foreign Policy represented a renegotiation of Brazilian dependence from the North and a major universalization of the country in the international relations, that however did not mean a

⁸⁵ Fledes and Saraiva (2014) introduce three networks of diplomatic action to describe the Brazilian strategic use of soft power mechanisms in the structuring of its foreign policy and the realization of its global aspiration: first, the advocacy network, established among actors sharing common interest and cooperating together, like in the case of the Southern coalitions created in the new millennium; second, the mediation network that witnesses the mediator role of Brazil within international structures usually led by great powers and aimed to debate and solve global issues, usually related to the security field; and last, the substitution network, established among states aimed to reform the international system through alternative proposal.

⁸⁶ Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/a6a63200-cad7-11dc-a960-000077b07658>

⁸⁷ Those scholars recognize that aggressive and interested policies implemented by emerging powers like China and India (CHERU; OBI, 2011; KRAGELUND, 2010) have transformed the continent into a significant market of commodities and field of extended agricultural production, to cover the domestic supply of lands, resources and food security (STUENKEL, 2014). Furthermore, the growing presence over the territory has also served their strategic national interests related to trade and investments, infrastructure and defence bases and the access to energy opportunities (VINES et al., 2009), as well as the run for influence and international prestige (CHERU; OBI, 2011; NAIDU, 2009). Moreover, the Brazilian competitiveness exists also *vis-à-vis* the invasive presence of traditional Northern powers in the continent, interested in the huge amount of natural resources available on land and in the South Atlantic Ocean (PENHA, 2011, p. 116), and to the perceived need for Brazil to contain those external forces into the South Atlantic Ocean (MOROSINI; SANCHEZ-BADIN, 2015), this latter considered a strategic area for Brazil where to establish its expanded regional leadership (MALAMUD, 2011)

rupture of contacts with great powers, but that was more oriented towards an autonomous economic development and political projection of Brazil that would have made use of its full potential as middle power, and later emerging one. By responding to its features and analysing them within the international context of the time, the position of Brazil in those three specific moments responded to the dualistic attitude of a middle power, searching for a double insertion in the international system (KEOHANE, 1969) aimed to balance the distribution of power and affect and reform the *status quo*, while also adapting themselves and participating (LEITE, 2011). Located in the middle, powers like Brazil, hold a major freedom in participating in world politics, derived by their possession of enough resources, strength and authority compared to the smaller powers, that facilitate their engagement and influence in regional and local issues, and the their attempts to balance the order, on one side (WIGHT, 1982); while also opting for a participation with great power and collaboration in the existing institution, so sharing responsibilities and power in dealing with issues that require major state capabilities (LEITE, 2011).

So, the participation of middle powers in the international system is focused upon the role they deploy in the regional and international dimensions, and in the space in between, where they become relevant actors: players and reformers of the international system (FONSECA JUNIOR, 1998; KEOHANE, 1969; LIMA; HIRST, 2006; SENNES, 2003), and is particularly visible in the role covered by Brazil in its international action within the framework of the South-South Cooperation (LEITE, 2011). Carlos Milani (2018) recognizes the international cooperation for development as a political field and therefore an instrument of foreign policy of states (both from the North and from the South) to structure power relations through this institutional practice.

When analysing the Brazilian engagement in the alternative cooperative structure built around the Global South, the international cooperation serves the main interests of the country and of its haughty and active foreign policy. Indeed, in its discourse, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, affirmed that the country would have pursued its protagonist role in the international system and its decision-making processes, by looking for the fulfilment of its national interests and refusing the submission to strategies and agendas defined by external and hegemonic actors. Brazilian Foreign Policy of the new millennium was than reacting to the structural limitations that had imperatively affected the country and acting towards its strategic global insertion (AMORIM, 2003).

In the interview with Minister Celso Amorim, it was repeatedly stressed the perception of the international cooperation as instrument of Foreign Policy and at the same time, the centrality of the *Itamaraty* as promoter and pulse of this very enthusiastic entrance and recognition of Brazil among the Global South actors and political mechanisms. The former chief of the Foreign Policy agenda of the country, strongly believed that the *Itamaraty* was holding the closest and most accurate vision and understanding of Africa, also recognizing that any limitation in a further advance of the cooperation was linked to financial issues. For him, the new ideas are born within the *Itamaraty*, given its exposition to the rest of the world, and are then repassed to other actors for the practical implementation in a very cooperative attitude among the parts (as in the case of the cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, when discussing the cooperation in security and defence issues with the African continent).

Nevertheless, these perceptions sound naïve, mainly when compared with the declarations made by few representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deployed in the African embassies and much more concerned of the reality of Africa, and of Brazilian relations with the continent. This latter, indeed, continues to remain quite obsolete and not considered, while the formulation of the Brazilian Foreign Policy agenda has been strongly influenced by the interests of some specific sectors and agents. In addition, anonymous representatives of the Armed Forces (mainly from the Army and the Navy) also claimed their major understanding and comprehension of the African states, considering themselves as actors in the (African) field, and therefore their relevance in the promotion of cooperation in security and defence. Furthermore, there is also a strong rivalry among the three groups of the Armed Forces, with the Army owning much power of pressure within the political decisions of the country, and the Navy highlighting its looking abroad and to what is in front of Brazil, without giving its back to Brazil anyway.⁸⁸ However, and despite all the rivalries and incomprehension, these efforts have been beneficial and complementary to the expanding cooperation agenda of the country also along the African coasts of the South Atlantic.

⁸⁸ Interviewed realized between September and December of 2019. Representatives of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces asked for not being identified in this research, concerned about some possible political repercussions in their careers.

Monica Hirst (2011) agreed with the idea that the SSC was intertwined to the Brazil's agenda and principles of Foreign Policy that, through the use of soft power (seen here as the SSC itself), is looking for its own internationalization and the promotion of its economic and political interests (2011, p. 32). Furthermore, the use of soft power mechanisms and practices highlights the difficulties of Brazil to assume the responsibility of its actions and more in general of leading the transformation of the international system, as the country and other emerging powers claim (ibid. 2011). These difficulties rely on the structural limitations of Brazil and its middle position in terms of international power, that would have been better solved within multilateral mechanisms made to strengthen the political, economic, social and cultural ties with Africa, guaranteeing the security-development nexus of both parts and the autonomy and independence of their actions (CERVO, 2010), and mirroring the diplomatic tradition and the inhibition of the country and its diplomatic body to use traditional measures and strategies of hard power to exert influence (KENKEL, 2013).

4.2.1 An overview of the Brazil's African policy during the governments of Luiz I. Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2003-2014)

The African policy of Brazil was since previous decades positioned in the external agenda, together with the compromise towards the development, multilateralism, pacific resolution of conflicts, regionalism, cooperation and the horizontality of the relationships with other countries (RIZZI, 2010; VISENTINI, 2003). The new government of President Lula da Silva (2003-2010) made SSC an unprecedented priority, deepening ties with South American and African countries, as well as strategic partners outside the region, including China, Russia and India. Nevertheless, the region assisted Brazilian development and its global power projection, re-signifying the priorities of the South American emerging power from the cooperation within its region to the one with the Southern hemisphere and within the multilateral international projects of the South, making necessary for traditional Western powers to negotiate with the rising powers about issues concerning, global governance about politics, economics, and also security (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 189).

For Quadir (2013), the Brazilian development cooperation of the new millennium has witnessed an evolution in the country's engagement in international cooperation: from a restricted presence and participation in the area of technical cooperation (that was

dominant in Brazilian agenda of the 1960s and 1970s) to the expansions towards areas reflecting not just the need to achieve and secure Brazilian foreign policy objectives, but also representative of the understanding and promotion of a broader and more institutionalized idea of development that recognized the interconnection among different sectors and the need to contemporarily address them in order to achieve durable results (QUADIR, 2013, p. 324). This attitude towards the development of the Global South aimed to contribute to Brazilian self-representation of its benevolent, altruist and genuine role in the cooperation for development and in the transferring of technical knowledge and skills to Southern countries (mainly of Africa and Latin America), witnessing in the SSC “a political tool that creates an opportunity for partner countries to work together to achieve mutually agreed [and autonomous] development goals” (ibid. 2013, p. 324).

According to the (IPEA, 2014), at the end of the first decade of the new millennium, Brazilian major partners of cooperation were located within the Southern Hemisphere and mainly belonging to the Latin American region and the African continent. Among the major African partners of Brazil, in 2010, most of the cooperation was directed and addressed to Portuguese Speaking countries.⁸⁹ With Africa, in particular, the president reinforced the ties by signing agreements with countries like Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria and Cabo Verde, among others (AGUILAR, 2013), doubling in less than ten years the amount of agreements signed between the country and the continent in the previous period of 1960-2002 (LECHINI, 2012, p. 141). Throughout these agreements, Brazil aimed also to strengthen its domestic technological capacity, reduce the dependence of the military and defence sector, an promoting and launching defence industries that will contribute to Brazilian development, by increasing the mutual trade and allow for Brazilian investments in Africa (BRASIL, 2008). The cooperation with Africa has, in this period, moved from a cultural identification (for example with PALOP countries) (MILANI, 2017; PEREIRA, 2019, p. 137) to a strategic

⁸⁹ During the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, the restructuring of the international relations and cooperation, looked for an intensification of the relationship with African countries. Bases on the data of IPEA (2014), Cabo Verde in first position among the African countries, receiving projects of cooperation amounting to US\$ 9,953,437. Cabo Verde first position among the African partners, however, was not reproduced in the general ranking, where the country was occupying a 4th position, after Haiti, Chile and Argentina. Guinea Bissau was coming soon after the other Portuguese speaking country of Africa with an amount of US\$ 7,804,779 invested by the Brazilian government in projects of cooperation, followed by Mozambique (US\$ 4,901,040) in the 7th position of the general ranking, Sao Tomé e Príncipe (US\$ 3,812,296) in the 9th position and Angola in 14th one, with a Brazilian expenditure of US\$ 2,643,276 (IPEA, 2014).

analysis of partners and fields of engagement (as in the case of cooperation with strong energy actors) (SEIBERT, 2009).

At the political and diplomatic level, since 2000s Brazil has relaunched the Brazilian presence in the African continent, making of this latter a priority of its foreign policy agenda and acting through the creation and re-openness of Brazil's embassies and the "travel diplomacy" of political and economic representatives of the country (PEREIRA, 2019). These latter trips contributed to open the path for Brazilian business associations that internationalized their services and found in the African continent a great market of infrastructures (as in the cases of Odebrecht, Camargo Correa) or energy and minerals (the most important of which is Petrobras). The West African lands, on the other hand, have also offered Brazil some advantages like oil coming from Nigeria and Angola, but also the establishment of associations of African countries with Brazilian entrepreneurships, given the technological deficit of the former. Through joint ventures with local African companies, Brazilian entrepreneurships have expanded their presence in the continent and reached the energy sector, but also sectors that may be considered as instrumental to it, like services, infrastructure (routes, bridges, ports, among others) and technology. This has strengthened the internationalization of big national groups, like Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Mendes Jr, Camargo Correa, among others and the intense presence of Brazil in Angola, Cameroon, Zaire, Gabon, Nigeria e Algeria and all those countries abundant of natural resources and unexplored potentialities (CAMPOS, 2014; PENHA, 2011; VISENTINI, 2016). Brazil has recognized to promote mechanisms of protection of territory and key resources there located, to contribute to national socio-economic development.

While most of the official discourse of Brazil stresses the rhetoric of Brazilian engagement in international cooperation for aid as a way to express solidarity and support to countries of the Global South by adhering to an alternative model than the North South one, Brazilian scholars have claimed that it is not possible to distance and separate the national interests, as well as the sub-national and sectorial from the main interests and objectives of Brazilian foreign policy and therefore expressed through the South-South cooperation agenda (INOUE; VAZ, 2012). These interests are mainly economic, commercial and political, as analysed empirically by the Cristina Inoue and Alcides Costa Vaz. However, our focus on the military and security aspect of the cooperation is also showing a convergence of Brazil into economic, trade and political goals of the country.

Hence, since 2003, the Brazilian agenda of Foreign Policy started to actively engage into the achievement of a growing global influence and presence and participation in sectors of the global governance usually not touched: economics and security. By strengthening the cooperation in these two seminal sectors, “[...] Brazil has sought to defend its own autonomy, strengthen its economy, gain more influence in the global political arena and develop South–South cooperation in order to further these aims” (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013, p. 189).

The country has perceived the continent as an opportunity for its interests and an autonomous role in the South Atlantic as peace and security keeper, but also as coordinator for the exploration of resources (concerning assistance in delimitation of the continental shelf and removal of external forces from the African coasts’ maritime resources) and developer of human and military capabilities (BRASIL, 2012; SEABRA, 2016). In addition, by actively engaging in security and energy sector, Brazil has been oriented towards the development and protection of national interests (oil production, maritime control, defence industry among others) in the African continent (AGUILAR, 2013), contributing to shadow in some case the declared solidarity aspect of its African policy, and to guarantee its presence and power into the continent through a smart way of competing with external powers (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; KENKEL, 2013).

Under Lula's administration, Brazilian thinking about the South Atlantic defence strategy changed toward a "diversification" of political interests and partnerships (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007), aimed not only to boost the trade between the two coasts of the maritime corridor, but also to gain support in the country's international and political bids. Furthermore, he manifested a revisionist stance of the systemic polarity and of the “models imposed from abroad” (Da Silva, 2009 apud. FARIA; PARADIS, 2013), an ambivalent behaviour towards the major multilateral institutions, an increasing mistrust regarding intervention and the turn into variable geometry groupings, such as G20, BRICS and IBSA (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014a; LOPES; CASARÕES; GAMA, 2013).

The following leader, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014), attempted to continue the previous Foreign Policy agenda and to guarantee the persistence of national strategic interest. She governed in a less emotional and more pragmatic way, and whether she travelled less to Africa, she made it in a more strategically planned way: selecting primary

investments destinations' countries and promoting the creation of mechanisms that would have assisted the continuum of the Brazil-Africa relations, at governmental, inter-ministerial, private and public entrepreneurs level (CABRAL et al., 2013). The commitment of Brazil with Africa continued to be as strong as it was in the previous government, although the President was attempting to establish a balance between the interests of the various agents and actors involved in it (both ministries, entrepreneurs and more recently the civil society too) and the practices and norms of the South-South Cooperation: showing a solidarity action and attitude while expanding the national interests in the continent.

The emphasis was put on the returns of the cooperation in economics, trade and investments, aimed to initiate projects and create opportunities for Brazilian private and public enterprises and companies (particularly those involved in mining, construction, agriculture and oil sectors). This different vision of foreign agenda proposed by Dilma was motivated by endogenous (domestic) development challenges, that required the solution of the existing problems within the national borders, and therefore the looking to Africa (the most coveted actor of the twenty-first century) for new markets to invest, to strengthen the innovative sector, as well as to export Brazilian high value products (LEITE, 2011). Those programmes, initiatives and cooperation mechanisms represents a limited part of the intense Brazilian foreign policy for Africa, that is "justified" both in terms of strategic international insertion of Brazil, as well as in terms of African Renaissance (SARAIVA, 2012; VISENTINI, 2009).

Hence, the choice for African continent as Brazilian partner of SSC, to be analysed here, is linked to the divergences encountered in making a comparison among the richness and great amount of natural resources (mainly oil) (VINES et al., 2009), density of population and territory, as well as the low level of development that many years of North-South models and mechanisms of cooperation have not been able to eliminate, neither to reduce. These features have made of Africa a very "big prize" for international powers, who see the continent as "a source of new growth in a highly competitive yet interdependent world" (CHERU; OBI, 2011, p. 93). The continent is considered the "last frontier of exploitation" and an emerging unexploited market where traditional and emerging powers compete in finding their place in the transformation of the global politics and economics and where greater opportunities for rapid growth and expansion lie (KORNEGAY; LANDSBERG, 2009, p. 172). Thus, the understanding of Africa in

world politics has changed, moving from the idea of a marginal actor, extraneous to the world, to the recognition that the continent is linked to international processes and structures, being "entangled in the ebb and flows of events and changing configurations of power" (TAYLOR; WILLIAMS, 2004, p. 1). As Taylor and Williams claimed:

Decolonization may have occurred, but this has not meant that external powers no longer have commercial interests in Africa [...] Africa's pockets of oil (notably in Sudan, Nigeria and Angola) and the discovery of new offshore deposits along the Gulf of Guinea are likely to assume a greater degree of prominence in the world's corridors of power (ibid. 2004, p. 5)

Despite all, the growing relevance of security and defence matters, commodities (linked to both agriculture and energy sector) for the investment and economic sectors in South Atlantic and toward Western Africa represents an area where the "neo-mercantilist" economic force of Brazil participates in an exploitative repartition of resources and power (FIORI, 2013, p. 43).

4.3 The relevance of the maritime space for Brazil: "securing" the South Atlantic

During the mandates of Luiz Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2003-2014), the Southern relations served the regional and global insertion of the country, contributing to expand the range of action of some Brazilian domestic actors, mainly political, economic (entrepreneurs of significant sectors of development) and of the civil society. However, following the international growth and influence of Brazil, the bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the African continent expanded economic and political fields, trade interests, training of human resources, assistance aid programmes and health and social policies (STUENKEL, 2014), but also focused on geopolitical strategies, analysing those aspects of cooperation, like security, that have for long been overlooked (MILANI, 2018). These latter topics are nowadays constituting a priority in the literature, which seeks to show how the redefined focus of Brazilian national defence strategy on the South Atlantic region has been pushed forward by national interests, bettering of material capabilities and the transformation of Brazil into an international actor or a broader regional power (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b; AGUILAR, 2013).

Between 2003 and 2014 Brazil acted as a security player in Africa, by increasing the security and defence capacities of several key actors and offering military training, technical and scientific assistance, and private- public investments in defence hardware (SEABRA, 2016). Seibert and Visentini (2019) also highlight the preference of Brazilian security relations with Africa through the creation of institutional arrangements at global and regional level. They also stress over the understanding that regional arrangements, mainly proposed or strongly influence by Brazil, have assisted the country in strengthening its international projection and therefore the promotion of national interests, in a realist logic of balance of power (SEIBERT; VISENTINI, 2019). All those bilateral and multilateral initiatives proposed by Brazil helped to create a partnership among Brazilian Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and Armed Forces, that was also supporting the internationalization of Brazilian entrepreneurships of military industry, like EMBRAER and EMGEPROM (BRASIL, 2012). Indeed, security, when talking about the African policy, is related to development, meaning the looking for trade, energy and investment partners able to supply Brazilian economic and political needs, and the conquer of new markets to expand its influence and increase its growth (PENHA, 2011).

As already noted in the previous section, the Brazil-Africa relations increased and intensified during the governments of Lula da Silva and the Brazil's African policy assumed a more strategic and realist feature. As wished by Saraiva (2004) the relationship of Brazil with Africa should have moved from that common looking at and understanding of the continent as poor, marginalized and needing of assistance to finally reach a more concrete comprehension and a more equal and symmetric relationship, based on the idea of together creating a "more plural, pacific, socially fair, predictable and multipolar world" (SARAIVA, 2004, p. 307- translation is our). However, a representative of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Itamaraty*), who asked for the identity do not be revealed, claimed that this vision of the African continent based on the recognition of the African potentiality, has not reflected the real perception that runs over the *Itamaraty*'s corridors. Indeed, the interviewed affirmed that during the Lula's government, the rhetoric about the African policy was very affirmative and proactive, but not matching with the real elaboration of the agenda for Africa. Although more money was injected in the African agenda, something that did not change the essence of the comprehension about the African continent, but that

continued to reproduce the interests of the classic actors defining the Brazilian Foreign Policy (and mainly the Brazilian entrepreneurs looking at Africa for major profits). When the money investment reduced, also the Brazilian cooperation stepped back (MILANI, 2017; PEREIRA, 2019, p. 137).

The dynamic agenda of Brazil for Africa of the new millennium then aimed to strengthen the diplomatic and economic bases, through the opening of new Brazilian embassies in African territory and vice versa, the intensification of presidential and ministerial travels to the continent and the increase of economic and trade links with the African continent, aimed to boost the trade partners of the country and reduce the Brazilian vulnerability from the North. The financial crises hitting the North in 2008 was not drastically perceived by Brazil exactly because of this diversification of commercial partners and a less dependence on the EU and U.S. markets. Furthermore, Brazil claimed through its president Lula da Silva that the rapprochement with Africa was not

“[...] to atone for the guilt of a colonial past. Nor do we see Africa as an immense reserve of natural resources to be exploited. Brazil wants to be a partner in development projects. We want to share experiences and lessons, join efforts, and unite capabilities. So, we will become actors - and not mere victims - in the transformation of the current world order” (DA SILVA, 2009).

The Minister Celso Amorim claimed that, from the other side, the African countries perceive Brazil as a cooperative partner “with no negative emotional weight” coming from previous historical moments, but as a partner, with a developing character and similar experiences of stability and growth. Therefore, by reaffirming the Brazilian commitment to the principles of the South-South cooperation, in various occasions the Minister has stressed the difference between the Brazilian engagement in the African continent from the one of traditional powers: a contrasting vision and attitude that is reproduced also within the framework of multilateral initiatives (like in the case of the UN), where the Brazilian action is not oriented to address a specific situation by adding conditionalities related to many other issues (AMORIM, 2013). The Minister affirmed that, “they [traditional powers] seem to want to purge their own guilt by discovering other evils”,⁹⁰ while the Brazilian approach was more oriented to accept and celebrate

⁹⁰ Translated by the author from the original text: “*O Brasil acompanha, segue resoluções da ONU, tem muita preocupação com esses fatos. Mas a nossa ótica não é necessariamente a de países*”

the achievement that African states reached (although eventually not fully achieved) and mainly to address the main roots of the problems, recognizing the need for longer term projects and a major flexibility in expected results (AMORIM, 2020).⁹¹

The new millennium had therefore witnessed the expansion of cooperation to the areas of peace and security and occurred through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. This intensification of cooperative initiatives was looking at the achievement of national interests of global power, influence and prestige, as well as to impose over the South Atlantic the first steps for a recognition of Brazilian leadership from the countries of the area.

The Ocean indicates the strategic area over which Brazil wishes to expand, through the extension of its Navy and sovereignty over the waters of the “Blue Amazon” (WIESEBRON, 2013) and the enhancing of a partnership with Africa (PENHA, 2011). According to the White Book of Brazil’s National Defence (2012), this maritime broader area extends from South America to the Western Africa and towards the South Atlantic, thus forming a region in which the implementation of a policy of cooperation and of strengthening the economic and political ties would contribute to Brazilian promotion of its leadership, political power and economic interests, while also promoting the country’s international standing as a global player and a “driving force in a changing world order” (LOPES; CASARÕES; GAMA, 2013, p. 2). The main documents of the Brazilian Defence sectors (the National Defence Policy- PDN, Política de Defesa Nacional, of 2005; the National Defence Strategy – END, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, of 2008; and third the 2012 White Book of National Defence – LBDN, Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional) look at and highlight the relevance of the South Atlantic Ocean for the Brazilian sovereignty and prestige and recognize the need of the country to increase its control capacities upon its maritime domain.

To recap Abdenur and Marcondes (2014), almost 95% of Brazilian trade is transported by sea and passes through the Atlantic, and the Brazilian oil imports come

desenvolvidos. Vejo muitas situações em países específicos em que, às vezes, a visão de países desenvolvidos, ricos, sobretudo ex-potências coloniais, não é a mesma da nossa. Às vezes (eles) têm uma visão muito particular da situação e querem expurgar as próprias culpas descobrindo outros males” (AMORIM, 2013). Available at: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/bbc/2013/05/08/pirataria-e-terrorismo-na-africa-podem-afetar-brasil-diz-amorim.htm>

⁹¹ Information shared by the Minister Celso Amorim in an informal conversation with the author, in date July, 1st of 2020.

from the Gulf of Guinea region. The abundance of oil, natural and mineral resources in the South Atlantic maritime domain is attracting the explorative interests of external powers in the African coast, mining the Brazilian sovereignty and national profits over its strategic domain and resources (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b). Further the economic enabling power of the oceans, Brazil has also been aware of the insecurities occurring in those waters and the risk that the growing threats affecting the West African coasts and the Gulf of Guinea, could start affecting the trade routes and the economic interests of Brasilia over that region and sooner or later reach the Brazilian waters too (AMORIM, 2013) through the expansion of the area of realization of piracy attacks and the occurrences of other terroristic activities against oil platforms and vessels transporting Brazilian cargo.

This has changed the way how Brazil engaged in the area and with the other hemispheric actors, by strengthening the military partnership with African countries, broadening the role of the Brazilian Navy and demanding for a more decisive and hard power engagement of the country into security issues, rather than stressing its diplomatic skills mainly used to overcome its middle power position in the international system. Despite all, a representative of the Brazilian Armed Forces, who wished to remain anonymous, when questioned about the Brazilian presence in the Gulf of Guinea to tackle with piracy attacks and other threats affirmed that it was not a proper interest of the country to deal with some insecurities that were not directly impacting the country. The interviewee was suggesting that as Brazil does not own enough military capabilities, it was more strategic for the country to just step back from something that would have been too big for it, and that somehow was not considered a problem for it, at least until the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea were not threatening the Brazilian economic interests and its population. However, recognizing the global impact of local and regional instabilities and insecurities, the interviewee continued by claiming that Brazil was doing its part through multilateral mechanisms (mainly the ONU and more discretely through the ZOPACAS) and through softer and less visible initiatives in the military field (as in the case of military training and personnel capacitation).

A representative of the *Itamaraty* in an African country believes that, given the growing insecurities emerging in the Gulf of Guinea and their impacts in the interests of the country in its strategic environment (the South Atlantic), Brazil should consider a change of dislocation of its military presence from Lebanon to the West Africa region.

The nomination of some Military Attaché for the most significant military partners of the country seemed to represent already a turning of direction towards the Southern Ocean, that is witnessing a growing presence of countries like United States, Russia, China and Turkey, maturely engaging in military exercises and cooperation in the South Atlantic waters. The representative of the *Itamaraty* also alerts about the changing attitude of African actors, derived from their recognition that nowadays “everybody is interested in *assisting* Africa”. And whether the continent is therefore playing in a very pragmatic and smart way, taking the advantages deriving from their remaining opened to all the proposals; our interviewed thinks that Brazil should engage in a more aggressive cooperation, to not lose its spot. Indeed, we also agree that the country should play different games at the same time, stressing the cooperation with other actors (both traditional and emerging ones), while also risking more individual strategies, especially when it is becoming clearer that also the big five of the Global South are competing among each other.

Indeed, together with bilateral formats of cooperation with African multilevel actors, Brazil also contributed to the peace and security of the continent through actions deployed within multilateral frameworks, like in the case of ASA,⁹² CPLP,⁹³ IBSA,⁹⁴ UN,⁹⁵ and ZOPACAS. With President Lula many multilateral initiatives were also

⁹² The cooperation in peace and security within the ASA structure initiated in 2009 when the two regions engaged into deeper contacts, sharing information about peacekeeping operations, defence strategy and fight to organized crime, and the recognition of the importance of such a cooperation for the peace and security within the two regions and worldwide (ESCOSTEGUY, 2011).

⁹³ Within the CPLP, Brazil participated to the military exercises among member states to train the military capabilities of the armed forces in peace operations and humanitarian assistance missions. Among the operations deployed and the training realized the most famous one is the FELINO operation joining together all 8 members of the organizations, of which 5 are African and 4 of them are in the Gulf of Guinea area and affected by the growing insecurity of this region. Since 2006 the CPLP extended its cooperation on the Defence area with the signature of a Protocol aimed to ease the cooperation among member states.

⁹⁴ In the case of IBSA, created in 2003, the first security and defence approach occurred in 2008 when the first joint exercise of the navies of Brazil, India and South Africa was realized, and called IBSAMAR. The group of Southern and democratic emerging powers was also concerned about the need of a multilateral commitment toward peacekeeping and a strengthening of the efforts of their military excellence centres.

⁹⁵ In cooperating with the UN in establishing the peace worldwide, Brazil also contributed to the evolution of the theory and the practice of collective security, recognizing the need of focusing also on the improvement of the political and socio-economic development of countries, and therefore adopting a broader definition of security itself to be achieved through the betterment of different sectors of society in the respect of the security-development nexus, to which they added the institutional strengthening, which reached the highest representativity in the MINUSTAH mission (ESCOSTEGUY, 2011). Brazil believes in the need to act preventively to avoid conflicts and to attack and address the root of the problems.

initiated, as the Brazilian contribution in the “Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050” (AIMS 2050) IBSAMAR and AFRICA 2010 (AMORIM, 2013; SEABRA, 2016) or relaunched (as in the case of the cooperation within the ZOPACAS and the strategic plan for the oceans promoted by the CPLP) (ABDENUR; MATTHEIS; SEABRA, 2016; AGUILAR, 2013). Indeed, when analysed under the security aspects, Brazil recognizes the importance of international solutions, capable of “[establishing] an equilibrium between peace, solidarity and development” (HIRST, 2011, p. 32).

The same relaunching of ZOPACAS and the major commitment in the security of the South Atlantic are also driven by economic reasons and mainly linked to recent oil and gas discoveries in the Ocean. Aimed to guarantee peace and security, fight against drug trafficking and other illicit activities, in 2007 after a long period of stalemate, the countries reunited in Angola to sign a Plan of Action that would have relaunched the cooperation in security and defence field, in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Furthermore, the return of the ZOPACAS was also meaning a major awareness regarding the geopolitical importance that the South Atlantic covers for the international system and the eventuality that the South Atlantic is no longer an exclusive Brazilian political project if it ever was. Since 2000, the fear of a militarization of the Ocean increased again, as declared by Monica Herz, in the opening speech of the event over the thirty years of ZOPACAS in 2016, as consequence of the many external threats to the resources of the South Atlantic, as well as the presence of great powers and military organizations like the NATO (North- Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the augmenting of illicit activities. Furthermore, in the same event, the Almirant Ruy was stressing the relevance covered by political and economic instability and weaknesses of African countries in being incapable of guaranteeing the security of their national maritime domains and the non-interference from other external forces (France, China, United Kingdom, India and United States, mainly).⁹⁶

At the Montevideo meeting in 2013, when ZOPACAS was breathing again, the Brazilian Defence Minister Celso Amorim recognized the need to expand the defence cooperation also with other regional actors, among which the ECOWAS, the AU and the

⁹⁶ Details of the event are available here: <http://bricspolicycenter.org/eventos/zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-30-anos-de-desafios/> .

CPLP to address the growing insecurities in the African continent.⁹⁷ The relaunching of the ZOPACAS was so reacting to their engagement in a competition for natural resources and influence: the European Union, motivated by the need of guaranteeing security and free circulation over the sea but also because of its economic and energy dependence from the ocean resources; the NATO and its member states, mainly United States who re-established its Fourth Fleet in the South Atlantic, but also United Kingdom, France and Spain; and China, who occupied Brazilian positions as security logistical supporter (i.e. in Namibia and Angola) to secure its growing national need for energy resources (PEREIRA, 2019).

Brazilian security and defence cooperation is moved by its limited resources and structural weaknesses that see, in the framework of institutions and agreements, the best option for securing the South Atlantic, strengthening its domestic technological capacity, reducing the dependence of the military and defence sector, and sponsor defence industries that will contribute to the national development (BRASIL, 2008). Moreover, in the current geopolitical context, where oil and gas are becoming scarce (hold by few) and valuable, the new competition of international (state and non-state) actors is for natural resources (ONUOHA, 2013). It is therefore, of extreme importance for African countries being able to secure this richness and maintain the control over that, to reduce external dependence, avoid the spread of violence and illicit possession and initiate the development of the continent by themselves. Whether those goals come as independent capability of Africa, or within the framework of a bilateral and multilateral cooperation, it is another matter that does not concern this research.

Despite all, if from one hand Brazil has assisted the African continent in capacitation processes, both bilaterally and internationally to Africa, and has worked for a relaunching of the South Atlantic project of the ZOPACAS- created in 1986 to defend the South Atlantic from the militarization and to guarantee the area as a region of peace and cooperation (PEREIRA, 2019) to face with the external presence of countries, on the other hand we want to put some emphasis on the many agreements and proposals signed by Brazil in cooperation with those same external actors. It is the case of agreements in research activities over the South-Atlantic together with the European Union and South

⁹⁷ Defesanet, 'ZOPACAS – Amorim propõe ações para fortalecer cooperação em Defesa', 16 January 2013, www.defesanet.com.br/geopolitica/noticia/9322/ZOPACAS---Amorim-propoe-aco-es-para-fortalecer-cooperacao-em-Defesa

Africa; as well as the Protocol of Cooperation of Portuguese Speaking Countries on Defence, signed in 2006 from CPLP members with the main objective to facilitate the cooperation, share information, capability and knowledge and create a common policy as an instrument of peace and security maintenance.

The Navy of Brazil is also participating in operation of capacitation of military sectors and patrolling of Gulf of Guinea waters, like the *Obangame Express* operation conducted by US, that reproduces in large scale the same objectives promoted by the bilateral cooperation of Brazil with Angola, Cabo Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and South Africa, of combatting the maritime piracy interests in the oil and gas industry. However, when in 2010, the NATO proposed the *Atlantic Basin Initiative* that was allowing for its intervention in the South Atlantic, recognizing the unicity of the Ocean from North to South, the then Minister of Defence, Nelson Jobin, reacted to the proposal addressing the structural differences between North and South Atlantic and the fact that the ABI would have allowed the intervention of external actors in the South Atlantic and the militarisation of the area, going against the founding principles of the ZOPACAS and challenging even further the stability and the development of regional member states (PEREIRA, 2019).

4.4 The Brazilian overlapping of security practices to address the Gulf of Guinea growing insecurity

The increasing insecurity in its strategic regional area- the South Atlantic- required Brazil to intervene and to put into practice an overlapping of different practices of security action that respond to the hybrid position that the country is occupying in the international system, of middle and emerging power, aimed to assume a major prestige at the international system and aware of the need to gain regional support and recognition of its leadership, due to the lack of capacities within the systemic distribution of power.

The idea of overlapping of security practices comes from the text published by Adler and Greve in 2009, in which the authors claim that although distinct in the world of theoretical assumptions, in practical contexts, security mechanisms like the balance of power and the security community coexist, dialogue and mutually influence with each other. It aims in this way to overcome the academic restricted binarism that although functional for theorization of phenomena, result in a missing and difficult empirical

application. Therefore, the idea of overlapping proposed by Adler and Greve (2009) is going to show that the idealization and implementation of regional mechanisms of security governance are not just limited to criteria based on the geographical and geopolitical features, neither to the exclusive identity features established among the members of the regional structure (and consisting of mechanisms of amity- enmity; cooperation-conflict; association- dissociation), but they also take into consideration the practices that the regions adopt, implement and that constitute the region itself (called by the authors, the "practical" boundaries), and how these regional mechanisms overlap and coexist in the political discourse and practice (ADLER; GREVE, 2009, p. 60).

First of all, and by looking for the existence of these regional boundaries within our space of analysis, the South Atlantic is itself presented as a space with a geographical boundary, extended from the coasts of Senegal to the Cape, including the archipelago of Cabo Verde and the Islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, to the coast of North East of Brazil until Terra del Fuego Cape, and going South to reach the Antarctic (PEREIRA, 2019). The geographical space includes countries of two continents, the African and the South America, and some territorial expansions of Northern powers. The delimitation of the physical boundaries serves to define the location of the region, and to differentiate it from any other area, like it occurred when reporting the ABI initiative of the NATO and the response of Brazilian Minister to define the distinction between the Northern side of the Atlantic from the Southern part. Furthermore, the spatial delimitation also contributes to define the cognitive or social notion of the regional boundary (ADLER; GREVE, 2009) that, by responding to a more constructivist logic attempts to answers to the identity question of who is part of the region and who is not.

Hence, going back in time and to the strengthening of the Brazil-Africa relationships and further cooperation, the region is made of countries of the South, sharing a common past of dependence, underdevelopment, and cultural affinities, among others. At the same time, they converge into the creation of a Southern identity in alternative to the Northern one and to strengthen the ties among the members. This identity perception comes from Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement and is reproduced in the more recent political discourses of Brazil aimed to advance in the bilateral and multilateral projects of cooperation with the African continent. The South American country focuses its cooperative motivations on the same principles of the South-South cooperation that, despite the new role that the country as assumed at the turn of the millennium, continue

to define the Brazilian relations with Africa, at least in its rhetoric, and contribute to give the country the necessary ideological support and legitimacy to achieve further global goals.

Adler and Greve (2009) include another boundary in the understanding and the making of a region, defining it through the practices that the members of the region use to apply. The practical notion in the context of a security region in the South Atlantic, between Brazil and the African countries aims to respond to how security is achieved and what states make to establish such a security region. By focusing exclusively on two mechanisms of security practice that respectively respond to the realist concept of balance of power and the more constructivist one of security community, they refuse to address them as opposite. Rather they prefer a simultaneous and complementary understanding of them as systemic outcomes of the states' interaction and analytical units for describing the role of states in the security governance. They claim that actors can and do act based on security practices and performances coming from different security mechanisms and that respond to the state security discourse and to the systemic conditionalities impacting upon them (ibid. p.66).

Based on the previous analysis of the forms and examples how Brazilian foreign policy towards the African continent and over the South Atlantic is realized, the regional process built by Brazil over this space seems to respond to the overlapping of security practices that can be highlighted in the analysis of the bilateral and multilateral mechanism of security engagement within the South Atlantic. The building of a security region over the South Atlantic has required an overlapping of security mechanisms, and therefore of the simultaneous existence and implementation of “[...] two distinct systems of rule, two different ways of conceiving power, two sets of practices [...] and two different ways of conceiving power” (ibid. p. 62-63). The reasons for that can be found in the Brazilian need to gain more power and prestige in the international system, while recognizing its structural limitations, as well as the within the historical preference for soft power strategies and diplomatic and multilateral actions, that limit the country in assuming a more aggressive attitude regarding issues of high politics, like in the case of security field.

As the international power competition and the national interests are determining factor in the definition of which actors are going to assume a predominant role in the

region, Brazil is proactively engaging in security practices and issues, assuming the control in the building of regional mechanisms to address security and participating in the formulation of the security agenda and regional discourse. At the same time, the participation in these same regional security mechanisms offers to Brazil a kind of protection and an institutionalized excuse to refuse to deal with the responsibilities that should be typical of a regional power. Therefore, by constraining its regional participation within multilateral mechanisms, Brazil is hiding itself from the possibility of being threatened by insecurities and violent actors, importing over its domestic space, problems that are regional, but still not directly mining the national interests and its security. In 2004, Minister Celso Amorim, affirmed that “[the] strengthening of the regional cohesion would allow to our voice to be better listened to, [...] and to have a major weight in the international context” (AMORIM, 2004, p. 42). So, the universalist approach of the Brazilian progressist governments was actively engaging the country at the international level, by “[...] resorting simultaneously to bilateral initiatives, regionalism, inter-regionalism, ad hoc coalitions and multilateralism” (VAZ, 2014, p. 10)

The induction of region building processes in many cases is driven by power interests, the desire to gain major protagonist role and consequently being able to advance its strategic priorities and in the case of Brazil in the South Atlantic, it was mainly oriented to the protection of the maritime resources discovered offshore and threatened by the growing insecurities (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b, p. 5–6). The strategic role of the South Atlantic and then the need of stronger Brazil-Africa relations is mainly linked to economic, energy and political interests, that would have addressed the development indexes of both sides of the oceanic area (BERNARDINO, 2019). Brazil has aimed to create a “good will belt” under its leadership over the South Atlantic aimed to (unsuccessfully) keep external actors out from what Brasilia considers its sphere of influence and aimed to keep the area safe, secure and free from any threats. However, Brazil has faced with some limitations in projecting its influence over the South Atlantic region and outside its maritime border (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b), dictated by its structural features and its inability and unwillingness to commit to global responsibilities.

Finally, the conceptual and practical evolution of security and the nexus established with development also demanded for a change in the role of the military forces and the kind of cooperation implemented in the military field, looking for a major

coordination of actions and the limitations of national interests in the calculations about whether to participate or not. As actors of the international cooperation for development (connected to security), military forces and capabilities of the state became relevant instruments, makers and promoters of the foreign policy agenda of the state, aimed to guarantee not just the national interests, but also the power projection and the diplomatic prestige of the country (BERNARDINO, 2019). Hence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence have assumed the front line in the project of Brazilian projection in the South Atlantic, by dictating the discourse and transforming it into practices (ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b), so helping to make of the security cooperation “ the new paradigm of foreign policy of a state”, contributing to power projection, stability and development (BERNARDINO, 2019, p. 104).

4.5 Conclusion

The South Atlantic has linked the South America to the rest of the World; it has been involved in the formation of the Brazilian identity and society, through the slave trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, and it is also relevant in geostrategic terms and linked to economic and political power given the role covered in the twentieth century’s episodes. Indeed, during the Cold War- when the bipolar competition transformed the South Atlantic into a space of competition-Brazil started to recognize its relevance and to secure it from external powers and proxy wars. Brazil proposed the creation of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic and therefore with both South American and African states. It was since that moment that the relationship with Africa was being structured as foundation for the implementation of a region building process and the creation of a regional identity around the idea and the presence of the South Atlantic Ocean (Saraiva, 1996 apud. ABDENUR; DE SOUZA NETO, 2014b).

Brazil, as well as its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence in a combined diplomatic military effort, recognize the South Atlantic as a “natural area of national interests” (AMORIM, 2013- translation of the author). Indeed, given the huge extensions of Brazilian coasts, the reaffirmation of seas and oceans is relevant because of their enabling power capability (SILVA, 2017, p. 328), the discoveries of

new underneath mineral and natural resources and their recently growing attracting insecurities and threats, requiring as consequence a major concern and intervention. Within this context the Brazilian security and defence strategy understood the necessity to address the changing nature of security threats and adapt the understanding of security itself, and first to recognize the role played by maritime resources in the economic growth, societal development and in political power of bargain.

During the presidential mandates of the Worker's Party, Brazil engaged into the building of regional projects both within the South American neighbourhood, as well as with African countries (although with a weaker range of influence and action) and therefore through the South Atlantic space, so promoting "high politics" fields, like security and defence among others, in the establishing of regional cooperation and integration (VILLA, 2017, p. 2). By inserting the analysis of the regional security practices of Brazil during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff within the idea of Adler and Greve (2009) about the overlapping of security practices, this chapter has aimed to show how the Brazilian maritime security action in the South Atlantic and regarding to the cooperation with West African states is actually characterized not exclusively by an ambivalent and hybrid discourse of solidarity rhetoric and a more realist strategy driven by its own interests and projections of power, but also by mechanisms of both balance of powers and security community.

To conclude, the relaunched Brazil's African policy has been driven by an overlapping of both soft power (regional projects, multilateral participation, diplomatic skills) and hard power (alliances, balance of power, self-promotion) strategies aimed to achieve its global aspiration of emerging country and reformer of the systemic structure, while at the same time using multilateral security mechanisms to share the responsibilities and obligations that come with the increasing of power and leadership. This hybridism is an attempt to mix the motivations and aspirations of the emerging power with its structural (both domestic and international) limitations in terms of capabilities. Furthermore, in a globalized world, regional integration and regional security mechanisms represent the key for power and development achievement.

Conclusion

The research discussed the Brazilian action in the new millennium regarding its role as an emerging power and its involvement in the SSC towards the African continent. More specifically it analyses the multilevel cooperation in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and the insertion of this cooperation within the model proposed by the Global South as response to the systemic challenges of the new millennium. Indeed, among these many transformations, few of them are going to dictate the relevance of the research.

Firstly, the emergence of international actors from the Global South, interested in creating a Southern identity in opposition to hegemonic rules dictated by the West/North, so questioning the *status quo* of the discipline and expanding its discussion. Secondly, the expanded understanding of security and the influence of globalization in lowering state borders and spreading local threats globally. They have contributed to the growing relevance of the security-development nexus among the discipline of International Relations and the field of Security Studies, and the use of the nexus as a justification of international interventions in the African continent. Third point of relevance is the recognition of Africa as the main protagonist of the new millennium's reconfiguration of power. Indeed, its economic and political weaknesses combined with the great natural and mineral wealth, density of young population and land have made Africa and its waters, the last frontier of exploitation among traditional and emerging actors. The impact of maritime issues over the state and societal development, demands for a major concern over the security perils coming from the sea and affecting both development and peace of states and international community. Lastly, the relevance of the Gulf of Guinea in the current international relations is linked to the previously introduced growing illegal activities occurring in the region and negatively impacting over other states and sectors.

This research aimed to understand how Brazil operationalized its engagement in maritime security over the South Atlantic Ocean within the framework of the South-South Cooperation (SSC) and how this practice engaged its foreign policy agenda towards West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, in the period between 2003 and 2014, when the

domestic political transformations contributed to positively influence the international participation of the country. The study has attempted to demystify the overstated concept of solidarity among Global South countries and the Brazilian assistance to African states for the achievement of development and security. The thesis has questioned whether SSC of the new millennium is a hybrid solution, rather than an alternative to the North-South cooperation (NSC); as well as how Brazil has strategically used the framework of SSC to redefine its African policy towards its national interests and objectives in the South Atlantic, and finally whether the Brazilian engagement in maritime security over the West Africa region has really contributed to the development, peace and stability in the region and all over the SA. It is important to remind that this research pretends to focus more on the theoretical discussion of the operationalization of the Brazilian cooperation in maritime security, rather than presenting a proper and detailed empirical study of it.

The previous chapters presented a rationalist- constructivist synthesis aimed to explain the emerging powers engagement in international cooperation towards the Global South and the African continent. By considering the African continent as the main stage where emerging powers aimed to intervene to augment their international influence and prestige, the dissertation has proposed an analysis based on the postcolonial concept of hybridism to describe the attitude of those countries, among which Brazil, in restructuring the architecture of the international cooperation for development and in engaging in security issues under a new understanding of the security-development nexus. By borrowing the concept of hybridity from Post-colonialism, the work aimed to indicate not a coexistence of different practices and mechanisms (North vs. South), but a simultaneous and mutually constitutive response, of both Brazil and the Global South, to different ways of conceiving power, systemic rules, imagining spaces and their presence in that. The theoretical framework offered us a broader vision and perception of development studies and dependency theory in International Relations.

This work has gradually advanced towards the main question, moving from the general to the specific and so questioning and approaching first the role of emerging powers (to which Brazil belongs) within the international system and in the reformulation of the South-South Cooperation as a hybrid mechanism of international cooperation for development, rather than a proper alternative as claimed by emerging powers themselves. Then, the research has looked at the specificity of the Brazilian case as emerging power,

inserting the analysis of its security cooperation with the African continent within the analytical boundaries of the South-South Cooperation.

The focus over the Gulf of Guinea regional instability and the growing maritime threats emerging in this area and rapidly spreading elsewhere has served to justify the relevance of the multiple engagements of Brazil in maritime security cooperation over the South Atlantic, an area considered strategic for the country and over which Brazil is interested in establishing the regional foundations of its international role. The look at the maritime security field of cooperation over the South Atlantic region contributed to show Brazilian hybrid actorness in this specific field and region, responding to soft and hard power strategies and reasons. On one hand, the country is making an appropriation of the solidarity discourse of the Global South and more specifically of Emerging Powers in Africa to implement in its partners the ideas and perceptions of a common identity and therefore of a community (a security one) in that specific region. Furthermore, the country has also made a strategic use of the international cooperation, its Southern identity and the historical relations with the African partners to gain more power, prestige and support that would have contributed to gain a major weight in the international system.

The understanding of the international cooperation for development as an instrument of foreign policy and international participation seems to be significant for those middle and emerging powers (like Brazil) that aspire to influence the international system, but that lack of material resources and coercive measures of power. Indeed, despite the more prominent role in global affairs and the growing perception of its significant and necessary actorness in the regional context and sphere of action, Brazil seemed to have been strictly linked to, and in some cases limited by, its features of middle power, with great diplomatic skills but lacking sufficient and necessary material capabilities to act more decisively than a “would be” great power. Therefore, the promotion of cooperative mechanisms and the sharing of interests, responsibilities and duties, as well as the preference for smart power practices may favour those countries that otherwise will not be able to raise themselves and their voice within the systemic structure.

On the other hand, it is possible to see that by cooperating in the security field, Brazil has been oriented to also address the main roots of insecurities, and therefore promoting development practices and positive results for the African partners. Brazil is adopting security practices to hold more power (both material and symbolic or normative

resources) that may attract external actors to join the community and strengthen and stabilise it, *vis-à-vis* extra-regional identities and mechanisms. Hence, the South American country is also opting for a mechanism of balance of power, to secure the spatial dimension of its international strategy and the access to material and immaterial resources and to achieve its global goals. Therefore, through the military soft power strategies in the maritime security field, the overseeing of alliances with West African countries and the participation in multilateral mechanisms of intervention in the Gulf of Guinea, Brazil attempted to secure the Ocean and its natural resources from the growing threats to international security and third parties' interests. The analysis of the overlapping of these multiple practices and mechanisms has shaped the Brazilian agency in the field of maritime security over the South Atlantic and create a basis for the evaluation of the Brazilian instrumentalization of the SSC and the achievement of both security and development.

Hence, through a combination of qualitative methods of analysis, the research has traced the evolution of the Global South identity and the changes occurred in the SSC model of international development. Secondly, it has investigated the nexus between security and development, both within the boundaries of the SSC, as well as in the Gulf of Guinea. Moreover, it has discussed how Brazil operated to address this connection, by mapping the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and practices undertaken by the South American country to face with the growing insecurities in the South Atlantic region. Finally, it has also reviewed the existing literature and its theoretical approaches to overcome the Northern and Western domination of knowledge production and practices and give voice to the unheard South.

Moved by the desire to be representatives of the Global South, by demanding for a fairer and more symmetric international development architecture, emerging powers are taking advantage of the cooperative benefits achieved through grouping themselves together, to exert influence and achieve credibility in the international system. From the analysis of the official documents of both the BRICS Summits and the new millennium's agreements and declaration about a reformulation of the SSC, emerging powers are presented as intermediary actors oriented to create a hybrid third space of action, where to insert their ambivalent position of reformers and "want to be part" of the *status quo*. This hybridism is an attempt to match the growing aspirations of these countries, with some structural limitations they present that still make them too weak to assume full

responsibility for any systemic transformation. Furthermore, in a globalized world, regional integration and regional security mechanisms represent the key for power and development achievement.

Within these dual features, we conclude that Brazil is operating within a hybrid theoretical and empirical context of solidarity rhetoric, on one hand, and a more realist strategy driven by its own interests and projections of power, on the other hand. The relaunched Brazil's African policy has been driven by an overlapping of both soft power (regional projects, multilateral participation, diplomatic skills) and hard power (alliances, balance of power, self-promotion) strategies aimed to achieve its global aspiration of emerging country and reformer of the systemic structure, while at the same time using multilateral security mechanisms to share the responsibilities and obligations that come with the increasing of power and leadership. This overlapping, however, has created a hybrid feature and position of Brazil, and more generally of the emerging powers of the new millennium, that have introduced themselves in many cases as an alternative to the Northern and Western hegemony, affecting the dominant rules and institutions, but that have also adapted themselves to the existing mechanisms and practices. The strengthening of South-South relations and the expansion of southern mechanism of international cooperation to high politics fields, responds to strategic interests of countries of the South and their domestic influences, while contributes to feed the power games among international actors, both recipients and donors.

Most of the Brazilian academic production over the South- South cooperation and the Brazil- Africa relations is unilaterally looking at Brazil and Brazilian motivations, interests, practice and responses, largely ignoring the perceptions and reactions of those other actors involved in the cooperation and in many cases looking at Brazil as a different emerging power in the new millennium. Although in this research we have attempted to cover this last topic, by inserting Brazil within the emerging group of countries and by evaluating its international cooperation within the broader framework of the SSC and the Global South, we still recognize that the analysis is lacking a strong African perspective about the perception of Brazil as a security actor in the South Atlantic. However, we have tried to overcome such an absence of African perception by including into this research some African voices and the understanding of the security problems through the impressions and the analysis of African scholars. Despite all, we have maintained our

commitment to the theoretical nature of this research, being aware that a more empirical analysis is also welcomed and required.

We hope that in future, and under better circumstances, a continuation of this research might be able to include great amount of data collected during a field work and realized interviews, so providing the perspective of other actors on the object of this study. Doing research in the African continent requires a different understanding of concepts like time and space, resources, organization, institutionalization, necessary influential contacts working as porters and so on. They all create obstacles in terms of accessibility and transparency of information. At the same time, on the Brazilian side, the changing political context occurred since the beginning of the research has caused obstacles, among which: the fear of political repercussion that has made extremely difficult to realize interviews, the lack of open primary documents that forced us to rely mainly on secondary sources, and the pandemic moment experienced all along the 2020 that has forced the world to stop and lock down and has negatively impacted upon the general academic production.

In conclusion, although this research has focused on a past time, covering the Brazil's African Policy between the period of 2003-2014, we are all aware that the following political events have not given the same relevance to the African continent and the South Atlantic. Since the second election of Dilma, the problematic domestic context has contributed to a more introspective political action of Brazil, oriented to solve the political, economic and social contestation. With the impeachment of Dilma in 2016, the Workers' Party presidential experience came to an end and the following governments, of both Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2018 to present), have taken away from the African continent and the Southern hemisphere the priority of the Brazilian international agenda and the country's insertion in the world politics. However, the African Policy of Brazil and the country engagement in Global South context continue to be fruitful topics for further analyses, and some of the issues addressed along the previous pages may deserve scholars to pay more attention to for future investigations.

First, it might be naïve and a shame to not analyse the role of Africa in the new millennium and its agency in the security field, no longer as an actor dependent on external intervention and receptor of international aid, but as a major protagonist of the new century and relevant agent of its own security, at continental, regional and state level. A lot has always been said and written about other regions of the Global South, but the

African continent has always been kept in the shadow. Hope this might be the moment to make Africa shine in International Relations field.

Second, it seems necessary to advance in the literature about the relevance of the sea and the enabling power of oceans. It might be a relevant field of study if linked to interdisciplinary approaches, and mainly addressing Area Studies. If we look from the perspective of the African Studies, studies over the influence of the sea (and the dynamics occurring in the maritime domain) in the development/underdevelopment and stability/instability of the African continent are still few. This links to the next two suggested topics: the centrality of the Gulf of Guinea and the maritime insecurities in the strategic plans and agendas of states worldwide, that seems to be a topic very in vogue among policy-makers, so being able to give enough material for academic analysis; and also the redefinition of the security-development nexus in the new millennium, that seems to require very cautious analysis to evaluate any eventual instrumentalization that states can make of the principle, without falling into unwanted conspiracy theories.

A fifth topic might look at the role of emerging powers in the security field, attempting also to run from the exclusive focus over the major and most famous emerging powers to start addressing those states that are still low profile, like Turkey, Pakistan and some Arabic countries. And a last suggestion might be to analyse of the voice of the South and the transformation of the international system and its structures, among which also the knowledge ones. This transformation seems to have been accepted more and more also by the North (with Europe establishing international cooperation based on the principle of “partnership among equals”), but mainly in the academic area where Northern/ Western knowledge sees its *status quo* being questioned and deconstructed.

This research attempted to touch in a very general way many of these topics, without pretending to be exhaustive in their discussion, but aware of the many limitations faced during this study, it might be satisfactory just have given the input for further questioning.

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Annex I- List of the Official Documents of BRICS Summits

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Annex II- Content analysis of BRICS’ Summit Agenda

Content analysis of the evolution of the security concern and of the understanding of the security-development nexus in the BRICS’ Agenda discussed at the annual group’s SUMMITS, between 2009 and 2014. (Realized by the Author)

Summit (Year and Location)	Main issues discussed at the Summit	Security related issues and understanding of the security- development nexus
<p>2009- June 16th Yekateringburg Summit (Russia)</p> <p>Participants: <i>Federative Republic of Brazil Russian Federation Republic of India People’s Republic of China</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Finance and economic issues (in the 2008 financial crises’ aftermath), hence stressing the “<i>central role played by the G20 Summits in dealing with the financial crisis</i>” – BRICS, 2009 par. 1). - Reform of economic and financial architecture (more transparency and democracy) (BRIC, 2009 par. 4) and more stable, predictable and diversified international monetary system. - Promotion of sustainable development; cooperation in energy, science and technology, MDGs, defence of multilateralism (par. 5-11). - BRIC countries agreed to hold regular meeting among their finance and foreign affairs ministries, businesspeople and think thank to work and discuss on issues related to security and agriculture (Baumann, 2017: 25) 	<p>The BRIC group:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supports democracy and multipolarity within the international system. - Recognizes the importance of equality, cooperation, mutual respect, international law and collective decisions to support peaceful political and diplomatic efforts in the international disputes’ resolution (BRIC, 2009 par.12). - Condemns any act of terrorism and urge the UN General Assembly to adopt a Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism (BRIC, 2009 par. 13), reaffirming so, the commitment for a comprehensive reform of the UN to be a democratically representative of the multilateral diplomacy and effectively deal with global changes (BRIC, 2009 par. 14).
<p>2010- April 15th Brasilia Summit (Brazil)</p> <p>Participants: <i>See before</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support for multilateralism and democracy, international law, quality, mutual respect, cooperation and collective decision-making (par.2), as well as for dialogue, cooperation, transparency and openness among countries (par. 5). - Recognizing the representativeness, inclusiveness and consequently more efficiency of the G20 in fighting the international financial crisis and in establishing an economic coordination at the international level, compared to other smaller arrangements, and pressing for a 	<p>“<i>a parallel document was disclosed, noting the intensification of security related issues</i>” (Baumann et al., 2017: 26). The document:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - condemns terrorism and any terrorist act and recognizes the need to fight this threat through comprehensive approach defined under the UN Charter principles and the international law and the UNSC resolutions about terrorism, as “terrorism cannot be justified by any reasons” (par. 23-24). - Expresses solidarity towards Haitian people after the earthquake

	<p>major proactivity of the Group to formulate a post-crisis strategy (Par. 3).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support for UN multilateral diplomacy to deal with global challenges and need of reforming the institution to achieve more representativity and efficiency, including Brazil and India in the international affairs' decisional process par. 4). - Reform of the Bretton Woods system (IMF, World Bank and WTO- par. 6-14) to make it "more resilient to future crisis" (par. 10), and to make the international monetary system more stable, diversified (par. 6) as well as to the economic sector to foster social inclusion (par.8). <p><i>New sectors:</i></p> <p>Agriculture, agrarian development and family farming that will contribute to global food security and production (par. 17).</p> <p>Energy: employment of sustainable energy systems, renewable energy sources and biofuels (par. 19-20).</p> <p>Climate change and its implications on society economics, development and stability.</p> <p>Strengthening global support for multilateral diplomacy, transparency, inclusiveness and the respect of the principle of <i>common but differentiated responsibilities</i> (par. 22).</p> <p>Integration of new players like Businessmen and think tanks, as well as civil society; national development banks and senior officials responsible for security issues, Judicial systems and officers, among others (par. 27).</p>	<p>and already suffering from previous events. The BRICS reiterate the commitment and efforts of the international community to assist in the rebuilding of the country and in the establishment of a stable government (par. 26).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reiteration of MDGs relevance and of the importance to sustain poorer countries from setting back in the achievement of the goals because of the international financial crisis (par. 15), by providing development assistance because: "An inclusive process of growth for the world economy is not only a matter of solidarity but also an issue of strategic importance for global political and economic stability" (par. 16). - Calling upon the international community to fight poverty, inequalities, social exclusion, full employment, giving special attention to specific society's groups and to the needs of developing countries, small islands and the African continent (p.18).
<p>2011- April 14th Sanya Summit (China)</p> <p><i>Participants:</i></p> <p><i>Federative Republic of Brazil</i></p> <p><i>Russian Federation</i></p>	<p>Summit Theme: "Broad Vision, Shared prosperity" = cooperation and coordination on common regional and international issues (par. 4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Intra-BRICS cooperation in economic, financial and development issues based on "inclusive and non-confrontational" cooperation, structured upon principles of solidarity, mutual 	<p><i>"It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries [...] contributing significantly to the development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fairer world"</i> (par. 3).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Affirmation of BRICS' relevance in contributing for global peace,

<p><i>Republic of India</i></p> <p><i>People's Republic of China</i></p> <p><i>South Africa</i> (welcomed-Approval as a member country).</p>	<p>assistance and openness. Interest in cooperating with non-BRICS developing countries, international and regional organizations (par.6).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reaffirmation of commitment towards international law, multilateralism, global governance, democracy and recognition of the need to enhance the voice of emerging and developing countries, within the UN (par. 7). - IMF reform through the implementation of a “broad based international reserve currency system” and the regulation of the financial market– par. 15-17). - Reaffirmation of the relevance and significance of the G20 in playing a bigger role in the global governance in areas like economics, trade, finance and development (par. 14). and the Doha Round (Ramos et al. 2018). - Encouragement of cooperation in (and use of) renewable energy to address climate change (par. 18), along with the peaceful use of nuclear energy (par. 19); - Supporting “a strong, open, rule-based multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization and a successful, comprehensive and balanced conclusion of the Doha Development Round” (par. 26). - Promotion of the MDGs to boost the sustainable growth of developing countries, eradicate hunger and poverty, achieve social protection, gender equality, employment, health and fight against HIV/AIDS (par. 20-21 and 24). - Supporting infrastructure development and industrialization in Africa through the NEPAD (par. 25) <p>New areas of cooperation to be explored among BRICS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Science, technology and innovation and the peaceful use of space (par. 28) - health/pharmaceutical industry, culture, education, sport and green economy. 	<p>security, stability, multilateralism, economic growth and democracy (par. 5).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - First talk about a reform of UN and of the UNSC (par.8), happened because for the first time, at that moment, all BRICS countries were sitting in the Security Council, making of 2011 the greatest opportunity for furthering the coordination on peace and security issues, to achieve stability, prosperity, dignity and progress (par. 9). <p><i>Principles supported by BRICS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No coercion nor use of force, but use of peaceful and diplomatic means, respect for independence, self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each nation (par. 9-10). <p><i>Security issues concerning the BRICS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Terrorism and need to condemn it and address it through a coordinated action under UN control and in accordance with international law (par. 11). - Cybercrime and need to strength international information security (par. 11). - Some specific regional crises (in Middle East, North Africa -Libya [par.10]; and West Africa- par. 9). <p><i>Action Plan:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - hold the Third Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues, in China
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<p>2012- March, 29th</p> <p>New Delhi Summit (India)</p> <p>Participants: <i>See before</i></p>	<p>Theme: “<i>BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity</i>”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Looking for a future characterized by world peace, economic and social progress and cooperation among countries (par.4). - Reconfirmation of their commitment towards multilateralism, UN principles, mechanisms and agencies, although recognizing the need for a reform towards more representativeness and democracy, and consequently more efficacy and efficiency in global affairs (par. 26). - Idea about the creation of a joint development bank and mechanisms for pool reserves among BRICS (Baumann, 2017: 26). Assessing the potentiality of the creation of a BRICS Development Bank, committing the finance ministries of the member states to evaluate the feasibility of such a project (par. 13). - Reform of the financial sector and financing of infrastructure projects and sustainable development among BRICS and developing countries in general (par. 5-12). - Expansion of areas of intervention and cooperation among BRICS, including the coordination at the UNCTAD and the common position on fighting against climate change, and on sustainable development and green economy issued during the Rio+20 (2012) (par. 30- 34), as well as in the safe use of nuclear energy and in its recognition as a clean source (par. 39) (Damico, 2017: 62-63). - Focusing on MDGs and stressing over development, growth and stability for African countries, through infrastructure investment, knowledge sharing and access to technology and investment in human capital, within the framework of the NEPAD (Par. 35-36). - Recognition of the good efforts derived by the cooperation in Agriculture among BRICS, so contributing to food security worldwide and to control the prices of products (par. 41). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concern about, and recognition of the importance that security, stability and peace in Middle East and North Africa have for the international community, and for the states and people in these regions (par. 19). - Discussing the situation among Israeli and Palestine (par. 20), the one in Syria (par. 21), in Iran and with its nuclear question (22), in Afghanistan to proceed to the implementation of a pacific, stable and democratic states that would favour the development and the cooperation, the investment and the access to international markets, that will then contribute to the fight against terrorism and extremism in the region and worldwide, looking once again for a UN response against this threat (par. 23 and 25), as well as to the fight against drug trafficking (par. 24). - Need to find solution for these security problems and to address long dated conflicts, under the aegis of the international law and the resolution of the UN- with a growing engagement of the UNSC (p.20) and the regional organizations. - Reaffirmation of the need to reform the UNSC, based on the experience of the previous year, when the 5 countries where members of the Council and recognizing in such a broader coordination, the need to strengthen the multilateralism in international peace and security issues (par. 27). - Focus on sustainable development, to be achieved through the engagement in food and energy security, that will also promote the economic development, eradicate poverty and hunger in developing countries. The sustainable development is seen as a responsibility for future generations (par. 28). - Concern about the humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa (par. 37)
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desire of deepening the cooperation in health sector (par. 42), in Science and technology, focusing of research and innovation (par.43), in renewable energies (par. 45), as well as in the areas of youth, education, culture, tourism and sport (par. 48) 	
<p>2013- March 27th</p> <p>Durban Summit (South Africa)</p> <p>Participants: <i>See before</i></p>	<p>Theme of the Summit: “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation”- Declaration of e-Thekwini</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - General commitments: reaffirmation of the centrality of international law, multilateralism and UN (par. 1). - Negotiations for the establishment of the <i>BRICS Development Bank (NDB)</i> to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects (Ramos et al. 2018). = especially in Africa, within the framework of the NEPAD to advance with the African industrialization and infrastructure investments (par. 5), but also in developing countries more in general (par.9). - Establishment of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with an initial capital of US\$100 million (par.10); of the Business Council (grouping the businessman of the major companies of the five countries) and the Board of Think Tanks, that joined the Business and Academic Forum of previous Summit (par.42). - Supporting the quota reform of IMF and Doha round, that would have given a major role to India, Brazil and South Africa within the UN (Ramos et al, 2018), also contributing to a “more open, transparent and ruled-based multilateral trading system” (par. 15). - BRICS’ Coordination for the WTO General Directory candidacy of Roberto Azevedo (Brazilian), as representative of developing countries (par. 16). - The document welcomes the establishment of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Growing intra-BRICS solidarity and shared goals to “contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation” (par. 1). - Support to the UN multilateral system as entrusted forum to bring peace, order, and sustainable development worldwide, although reiterating the demand for its reform (especially of the UNSC), to make it more democratic, hence more responsive to global challenges (Par. 20). - Commitment towards lasting peace and prosperity, for a century “marked by peace, security, development and cooperation” (par. 22). <p>By being the Summit that addresses the African continent and its issues, the BRICS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognize the centrality of the AU and its Peace and Security Council to work in conflict resolution in Africa and call for a multilateral and collective approach to the security of the continent including the UNSC, the AU and its PSC (p.24). - <i>“We express our deep concern with instability stretching from North Africa, in particular the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea. We also remain concerned about reports of deterioration in humanitarian conditions in some countries”</i> (par. 24) especially in Syria (p.26), Palestine (par. 27), Iranian nuclear issue (par. 28), Afghanistan (par. 29), Mali, Central African Republic and DRC (par. 30-32), supporting multilateral, international or regional efforts for re-establishing

	<p>Development Goals (post- 2015 Development Agenda) (par. 40)</p> <p>After the summit, BRICS heads of state met their African counterparts for the first innovative meeting of this type, hence showing a growing interest for the developing countries in general (par. 2-3) (Damico, 2017:63). Ramos et al. (2018) define this summit as the milestone for BRICS relations with African countries.</p>	<p>peace and security and offer humanitarian assistance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Condemnation of terrorism and belief in the UN central role in coordinating a counter-terrorism action in accordance with the UN charter and the principles of international law (par- 33). - Promoting cyber-security (p.34) and recognizing climate changes as the greatest challenges and threats to achieving sustainable development (par.37). - Importance of the MDGs and need to work collectively for the successful achievement by 2015, focusing mainly on poverty eradication, human development and considering national needs of developing countries (par. 38-39).
<p>2014- July 15th</p> <p>Fortaleza Summit (Brazil)</p> <p>Participants:</p> <p><i>See before</i></p>	<p>Theme of the Summit: “Inclusive Growth: Sustainable solutions” linking the economic, social inclusion and environmental sustainability dimension”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Intense focus on the official creation of the BRICS Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement <p>After the Summit, BRICS heads of state met the South American counterparts of the UNASUR, so bringing a dynamic of regionalism within the group (Baumann, 2017: 28).</p>	<p>The Fortaleza declaration also discussed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reform of the UNSC - Security issues: cyber security, terrorism, transportation security and use of outer space. - Concern for the situation of third-party countries (12 countries) about whom 15 paragraphs were dedicated in the Fortaleza declaration, addressing regional crises: West Africa (Mali, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria); South Sudan and Central African Republic and DRC + Syria, Afghanistan, Israel and Palestine, Iranian nuclear issues and the Ukraine conflict (Damico, 2017: 65).

Annex III- Illicit activities in the South Atlantic and in the Gulf of Guinea Region

Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Gulf of Guinea Region (2002-2020)

Locations	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016-2020
Angola		3			4	1	2			1			1	6
Benin		1						1		20	2			12
Cameroon	5	2	4	2	1		2	3	5		1		1	3
Congo							1		1	3	4	3	7	3
DRC					3	4	1	2	3	4	2		1	4
Eq. Guinea							1							4
Gabon	7											2	1	2
Ghana	5	3	5	3	3	1	7	3		2	2	1	4	9
Guinea	2	4	5	1	4	2		5	6	5	3	1		3
Guinea Bissau	2							1						
Ivory Coast	5	2	4	3	1		3	2	4	1	5	4	3	5
Liberia		1	2			1	1		1				1	1
Nigeria	14	39	28	16	12	42	40	29	19	10	27	31	18	102
Senegal	3	8												
Sierra Leone	1		3		2	2				1	1	2	1	4
STP													1	1
Togo	1	1			1		1	2		6	15	7	2	5
Gulf of Guinea	45	64	56	25	31	53	59	48	39	53	62	51	41	164


Source: The author, based on data collected from the ICC International Maritime Bureau “*Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Reports*” analysed between the period of 2002 to September 2020.

Flows of Cocaine to Africa (UNODC, 2013).



Source: UNODC, 2013. *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa.*


Cocaine trafficking routes in the period of 2014-2018




Source: UNODC. 2019. *World Drug Report*.

Proportion of Women and Children among victims of human trafficking (data of the year of 2017)

Women Trafficked (by country of citizenship)



Children Trafficked.



Source: <https://migrationdataportal.org/>