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ALESSANDRA BEBER CASTILHO

Brazilian diplomacy and the legitimization of the Brazilian military dictatorship in the international arena (1964-1974)

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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Felipe Pereira Loureiro (USP)
Co-supervisor: Prof. Dr. Anthony Wynne Pereira (KCL)

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Fue por esa época que se le oyó decir: “La única diferencia actual entre liberales y conservadores es que los liberales van a misa de cinco y los conservadores van a misa de ocho”

(Gabriel García Marquez – Cien años de soledad)

RESUMO

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o papel da diplomacia brasileira na legitimação da Ditadura Militar brasileira (1964 – 1985) no exterior. Partimos da hipótese de que a autonomia do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE), também conhecido como Itamaraty, no período da ditadura se deu pelo conservadorismo inerente às suas estruturas e que houve uma colaboração entre setores do corpo diplomático com o projeto autoritário da ditadura militar. Desta forma, buscamos mostrar não apenas como o aparato diplomático fora utilizado para fins de relações públicas e propaganda no exterior, mas também a extensão da colaboração de setores do corpo diplomático na elaboração da estratégia de comunicação externa da ditadura. Através de uma extensa pesquisa documental, este trabalho terá como foco as estratégias utilizadas para contornar a imagem do Brasil após a promulgação do Ato Institucional no. 2, em 1965, e do Ato Institucional no. 5, em 1968. Acreditamos que esta tese, ao analisar o papel do corpo diplomático na defesa da imagem da ditadura militar durante seu período mais autoritário, governado pela chamada linha-dura, contribuirá para entender a profundidade do relacionamento do Itamaraty com as Forças Armadas e a influência de determinadas ideologias na formulação da política externa, especialmente no período da Guerra Fria.

Palavras-chave: Política Externa Brasileira; Ditadura Militar; História Diplomática; Guerra Fria

ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to analyze the role of Brazilian diplomacy in legitimizing the Brazilian Military Dictatorship (1964 – 1985) abroad. We hypothesise that the autonomy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), also known as Itamaraty, during the dictatorship period was due to the inherent conservatism of its structures and that there was a collaboration between sectors of the diplomatic corps with the authoritarian project of the military dictatorship. In this way, we seek to show not only how the diplomatic apparatus was used for purposes of public relations and propaganda abroad, but also the extent of the collaboration of sectors of the diplomatic corps in the elaboration of the dictatorship's external communication strategy. Through extensive documentary research, this work will focus on the strategies used to circumvent the image of Brazil after the promulgation of Institutional Act no. 2, in 1965, and Institutional Act no. 5, in 1968. We believe that this thesis, by analyzing the role of the diplomatic corps in defending the image of the military dictatorship during its most authoritarian period, governed by the so-called hard-line, will contribute to understanding the depth of the relationship between Itamaraty and the Armed Forces and the influence of certain ideologies in the formulation of foreign policy, especially during the Cold War period.

Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy; Military dictatorship; Diplomatic History; Cold War

Covid-19 impact statement

Covid-19 impacted the archival research necessary for this dissertation. When the virus outbreak occurred, I was researching at the U.S National Archives at College Park, Maryland. I was supposed to do research there from March 2, 2020, to March 20, 2020. Due to the Coronavirus outbreak, the archives closed on March 13, 2020, until further notice. Thus, my fieldwork in the United States was cut short in one week. I had planned to visit the American archives before doing archival research at the British National Archives in London. The British Archives were closed upon the first lockdown in the United Kingdom (March 23, 2020) and remained closed until it reopened with restrictions on July 21, 2020. The restrictions included previous booking, one visit per week and the researchers were able to look only at six folders per visit. Therefore, the research at the British National Archives, conducted in the last two months of my stay in London, was limited. The closure of the archives generated delays in the proposed research schedule; therefore, I am aware that Covid-19 might have impacted the outcome of this work.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AERP – Assessoria Especial de Relações Públicas

AI-2 – Ato Institucional no. 2 (Institutional Act no. 2)

AI-5 – Ato Institucional no. 5 (Institutional Act no. 5)

AIB – Ação Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action)

CIEX – Centro de Informação do Exterior (Foreign Information Center)

CNV – Comissão Nacional da Verdade (National Truth Commission)

CSN – Conselho de Segurança Nacional (National Security Council)

DPo – Divisão Política (Itamaraty's Political Division)

DPCP – Departamento político e cultural (Cultural and Political Department)

DSN – Doutrina de Segurança Nacional (National Security Doctrine)

ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ESG – Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College)

FBI – Frente Brasileira de Informações

IAHRC - Inter-American Human Rights Commission

IPES - Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais

IRBr – Instituto Rio Branco (Rio Branco Institute)

IRD – Information Research Department

IRO – International refugee organization

JCI – Junta Coordenadora de Informações (Information Coordinating Board)

MCI – Movimento comunista internacional (International Communist Movement)

NSS – National Security Section (Seção de Segurança Nacional)

PCB – Partido Comunista do Brasil (Brazilian Communist Party)

PEI – Política Externa Independente (Indepentent Foreign Policy)

SEI – Serviços de Estudos e Informações (Studies and Information Service)

SFICI – Serviço Nacional de Informações e Contra-Informações (National Information and Counter-Information Service)

SNI – Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Information Service)

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

In 1970 the military dictatorship elaborated a plan for a "governmental social communication policy in the external field". Concerned with how Brazil's image was being portrayed abroad, the government under President Emílio Médici developed strategies to overcome what it believed to be a "campaign against Brazil" orchestrated by the "international communist movement." This public communications policy involved a network of different government bodies, from the ministry of justice to the military command, going through a special public relations office[1] and the dictatorship's intelligence agency.[2] Ultimately, however, this operation for rescuing the country's reputation abroad would be carried out by Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - commonly known as Itamaraty.

The ministry concentrated its main efforts on developed countries – the United States, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and West Germany (FRG). This public communications policy abroad and was the international arm of a heavy propaganda strategy in the Médici government, known for its nationalist slogans, such as *Pra Frente, Brasil* (Forward, Brazil) and *Ninguém segura este país* (No one will hold this country back). In the international arena, the government used the period of economic growth known as *milagre econômico* (economic miracle) to counterbalance the allegations of human rights violations, forced disappearances and tortures committed by the Brazilian State. Concomitantly to the "economic miracle," Brazil was going through a period that is now known as *os anos de chumbo*, or the lead years, the most repressive period of the dictatorship, comprehended by the governments of the hard-liners General Arthur da Costa e Silva (1966 – 1969) and General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969 – 1974). Those allegations came into light thanks to the activism of Brazilian exiles and solidarity committees that were organized by social movements and NGOs, such as Amnesty International, and were covered by several media outlets, from newspaper to television.

This PhD dissertation focuses on how Brazilian diplomacy worked towards the legitimization of the country's military dictatorship (1964 - 1985) abroad, especially after the promulgation of the Institutional Act no. 2 (AI-2) in 1965 and the Institutional

[1] Special Advisory Office for Public Relations (AERP – *Assessoria Especial de Relações Públicas*).
[2] National Information Service (SNI – *Serviço Nacional de Informações).*

Act no. 5 (AI-5) in 1968. AI-2, promulgated in October 1965, at the end of General Castello Branco's government (1964 – 1966), is considered the first step into the consolidation of the *linha-dura*, the military hardliners. Among other authoritarian measures, it suspended direct elections for President and Vice-President in Brazil. In December 1968, Castello Branco's successor, Costa e Silva, decreed AI-5, which, among other things, shut down Congress and suspended the right to habeas corpus in Brazil.

The AI-2, and more importantly, AI-5, caused great damage to Brazil's image abroad. Whereas the 1964 Coup D'état, which deposed President João Goulart through a civilian-military coalition, had counted with the support of western powers towards its legitimization in the international arena, the circumstances of the late 1960s showed a different scenario for the dictatorship. The second half of the 1960s was marked by the emergence of a human rights transnational movement, which in turn inherited the agenda of anti-war and civil rights movements that had erupted around the world. Solidarity committees led by Brazilian exiles and the work of international NGOs like Amnesty International helped shed light on what was happening in Brazil (Green 2010; Marques 2011). As Stites-Mor (2013) puts it, transnational activism made it possible for the opposition to act against the military dictatorships during the context of the Cold War in Latin America, leading to more pressure on policymakers, especially in the Global North. In the United States, for example, the Vietnam War incited congressional representatives to inquire about the consequences of U.S interventions in the Third World, triggering a domino effect that would eventually corner the US backing of right-wing military regimes in Latin America including Brazil, Chile and Argentina (Sikkink 2004).

This research expects to answer why and how some Brazilian diplomats engaged with the dictatorship's authoritarian project. For a long time now, scholars have believed that the low level of military intervention in Itamaraty during the 1964 – 1985 period, resulting in an alleged institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the regime, was due to its "insulated characteristic" and to Itamaraty's "institutional similarities" with the Armed Forces. The idea of Itamaraty as an insulated governmental body is to this day perpetrated by intellectuals and diplomats: since the ministry rises above governmental and/or ideological, partisan interests, it could focus solely on supposedly doing State Policy and on the so-called "national interest". The fact that both the Armed Forces and

Itamaraty shared institutional similarities was enough to portray diplomats as “military in plain clothes” (Vizentini 2008, p. 43), even though no comparative study of the two institutions has been published up to this date.

The arguments for autonomy, insulation institutional likeness, outlined above, are found in many works of the literature on Brazilian Foreign Policy, for example Cheibub (1984, p. 13; 1985, p. 120); Barros (1986, p. 31-32); Vizentini (2004; 2008, p. 43); Mello e Silva (1995, p. 113) and others. Most of the time, the scholarly work replicates the official diplomatic narrative reproduced by career diplomats such as Vasco Leitão da Cunha (1994, p. 172) and, more recently, Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Gobo, 2016, p. 191), to name a few.

The facts, however, sometimes contradict the narrative. The foreign policy under Castello Branco, for example, was deeply linked to the theoretical assumptions elaborated by Golbery do Couto e Silva. His “concentric circles theory”, which will be addressed in chapter three, conditioned Brazil’s relations through the geopolitical and ideological approximations of the Cold War; but the literature tends to consider it a “step out of cadence” (Cervo and Bueno, 2012, p. 934), an “anomaly” compared to other periods of Brazilian diplomacy. According to the academic and diplomatic canon, with the exceptions of Castello Branco and Bolsonaro, ideology does not play a role in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.

The influence of the Cold War in the foreign policy of the Brazilian military regime is nonetheless present in all administrations throughout the dictatorship. But when facing these arguments, the primacy of Itamaraty in the implementation of the “ideological side” of the Brazilian foreign policy is downplayed. The “ideological” foreign policy responsible for Brazil’s involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende or *Operação Condor* was, for a long time, considered a matter of Brazil’s National Security Council and/or related exclusively with Armed Forces, which Itamaraty had little involvement with (Gonçalves and Miyamoto 1992, 2000, Vizentini 2004). [3]

[3] Operation Condor was a transnational repressive alliance officially founded in 1974 by the Chilean Manuel Contreras, head of Pinochet’s political police, *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (DINA), with the participation of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay. The operation condor was responsible for the hunt and mass disappearances of political opponents of the regime not only in the Southern Cone but also in Europe and the United States. One of its most famous cases was the assassination of Salvador Allende’s minister Orlando Letelier in 1976 in Washington (for more information see Quadrat, 2002). However, the repressive collaboration in the continent can be traced to years prior 1974.

However, state-of-the-art research, especially in the History field, is showing that diplomats also played a significant role in the formulation and implementation of this “ideological side” of the dictatorship’s foreign policy. Pio Penna’s groundbreaking article on the Foreign Information Center (CIEX – *Centro de Informação do Exterior)* published in 2009 opened new possibilities for research (Penna Filho 2009). However, documental research on the matter became more concrete following the Brazil’s Truth Commission Report (CNV – *Comissão Nacional da Verdade*) in 2014 (Brasil 2014).

Established in 2012, the Truth Commission unveiled Itamaraty’s actions regarding the monitoring of exiles abroad through CIEX and Brazil’s role at Operação Condor. This enabled the publication of numerous research works in the last seven years, especially on Brazil’s participation in the Chilean coup of 1973 and its support to the Pinochet government (Harmer, 2012; Castilho, 2015; Burns, 2016; Simon, 2021). More recently, documental research has been able to unveil the action of diplomats seeking to avoid that Brazil became charged with human rights violations at the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations (Bernardi, 2017; Roriz, 2021), as well as the relationship between Itamaraty and the Amnesty International in the 1970s (Roriz, 2017).

However, despite these latest academic developments, the “official narrative” still prevails. Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, for example, in his 2017 book on the history of Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1750 to 2016 dedicates one single paragraph of his chapter on the Foreign Policy of the military regime to the Brazil’s involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Another career diplomat, Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008), argues that the AI-5, for example, was rejected by most of the diplomatic body, except for a few partisans of the regime and that Itamaraty’s professionalism helped to avoid interference in the ministry’s protagonism on foreign policy decision making.

Again, the diplomatic narrative portrays the ideal of Itamaraty as an instrument for the pursuit of abstract national interests. However, the national interest is not a given, and it is not a monolith – as Pinheiro puts it (2013), while there was a national interest being pursued during the dictatorship, it is important to ask who defines the national interest. How is it possible for diplomats to pursue a “national interest” with no influence of political preferences whatsoever? Torres (2013) and Setemy (2013) show,

for instance, that anti-communism played an important role in Brazil's foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century, a time where women were prohibited to enter the diplomatic career (Tomas, 2020).[4] Even if the National Security Council and the Armed Forces were the most important policy-makers regarding the "ideological foreign policy" of the regime, documental research shows that diplomats played an important role in the elaboration of the National Security Doctrine, as chapter two of this dissertation will show.

This dissertation argues that the supposed autonomy of Itamaraty during the 1964 – 1985 period is not due to its professionalism or institutional similarities towards the military. Rather, the participation of some diplomats in the authoritarian engine of the military regime can be traced back to the inherent conservatism of the diplomatic career and its structure. In a way to corroborate with my hypothesis, I am going to look at how Brazilian diplomacy was mobilized to clean up the image of the military dictatorship after the international repercussions of Institutional Acts two and five.

Methodological considerations

By analysing the actions of Brazilian diplomacy in legitimizing the dictatorship abroad after the promulgation of institutional acts 2 and 5 – a specific set of events that happened in a specific timeframe – this research seeks to look further into the functioning of Itamaraty as a structure: how is it possible for an institution to control a narrative even if evidence shows otherwise?

We have adopted a sociological perspective - a bourdiesian lens through which Itamaraty can be analysed as an institution - to clarify the actions of diplomats, which we discuss in chapter one. This sociology literature focuses on how the structure of the diplomatic field perpetrates a habitus that some will call a "diplomatic habitus." That habitus, once embedded at Itamaraty, produces shared identities that enable those who enter the diplomatic career to act in a somewhat corporativist manner to protect the image of the institution. It is not a surprise, then, that career diplomats tend to tenderly refer to their workplace as "home" (Batista, 2010; Moura, 2012; Gobo, 2016; Targa, 2017). Every action and every word are carefully chosen, and being a diplomat is more than just a profession; it is almost a prerequisite that your career becomes the

[4] From 1938 to 1954 women were not allowed to join the diplomatic career. However, as we shall se in chapter one, some women joined the Brazilian diplomatic corps before the prohibition took place.

most dominant part of your identity. We ask ourselves, therefore: What is the meaning of such a level of corporatisation and adhesion to institutional values for the researcher that deals with the history of Brazilian foreign policy?

As Santos and Uziel (2019, 189) say, this field, as much as ancient history, depends on scarce and fragmentary sources. Moreover, they point out the tendency of taking "the official discourse on foreign policy not only as a mould or a guide but also as an adequate reflection of its underlying reality" (Santos and Uziel 2019, 194). One reason for this is the access to archives – in Itamaraty's case, many historical documents remain classified, since there is an interpretation inside the ministry that they deal with sensitive matters that can compromise Brazil's security (Penna Filho 1999). However, it must be pointed out that the intricate relationship between diplomats and the production of knowledge of International Relations in Brazil may also contribute to the tendency Santos and Uziel identified.[5]

Bearing that in mind, this research looked carefully into what was being said in the documents found in the archives – most of which had been classified at their time– and what the main protagonists of that story, the diplomats, were saying in interviews, memoirs, or writing in scientific articles and academic books. These first-hand accounts were then compared them with other sources – mainly the archives of other governments. The main challenge, however, was to avoid the "historical fetichism of the document" (Fico 2008b, 76). To avoid that, we tried to compare the documents found at Itamaraty's historical archives with other sources, such as documents from foreign governments and biographies of the diplomats of the period.

The memoirs of former diplomats often tell us more than what they intend to do, especially through its gaps and silences. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, for example, mentions in his testimony to CPDOC that he visited the Superior War College on March 31st, the day of the Coup; he claims "a coincidence" that the soon after the instauration of the military dictatorship he was appointed Foreign Minister in 1964 (Cunha 1994). Or Mario Gibson Barboza (2020), who dedicates only a few paragraphs to his time serving as Ambassador in Washington, right before being appointed Foreign Minister of the Medici government (1969 – 1974). As we see in chapter three, this is not a

[5] On that subject, see Felipe Estre's (2022) upcoming dissertation.

coincidence – Barboza was responsible for cleaning up the image of Brazil towards American society.

The documents of the Brazilian military dictatorship tell only a partial truth – many documents were destroyed, leaving us with mere fragments of that reality (Fico 2008b). Working with Itamaraty documents produced during the military dictatorship brings on a bigger challenge, since the diplomatic language is purposefully evasive. Therefore, we must pay attention to the constraints of the structure while narrating the events that happened within the structure. The experience that is narrated in this dissertation is only possible due to the structure temporal constrain, which transcends the chronological facts (Koselleck, 2004).

By contemplating the fragments of the past this research attempts to shed light on an untold part of Brazil's diplomatic history. Knowing that a precise reconstruction of the past is impossible, what is seen here is a narrative that is only possible by the crossing of various sources, always attentive to Koselleck's remarks on the limits and constraints presented by primary sources, which is:

> The facticity of events established ex-post is never identical with a totality of past circumstances thought of as formerly real. Every event historically established and presented lives on the fiction of actuality; reality itself is past and gone. This does not mean, however, that a historical event can be arbitrarily set up in this or that manner. The sources provide control over what might not be stated. They do not, however, prescribe what may be said (Koselleck, 2004, p. 111).

At the same time, this dissertation may seem one-sided; afterall, although part of the Brazilian foreign policy was embedded in anti-communism, anti-communism was not the totality of Brazilian strategy in the international system. In fact, we are aware that the anti-communism in foreign policy coexisted with different national projects, even with left-wing nationalism. However, by focusing mostly on the diplomatic action that was concerned with legitimizing the dictatorship abroad, we are trying to look into hidden places and practices that have been erased for not fitting into the expected narrative of Brazilian diplomatic history.

Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco published a recent article about the need for nuance in anthropological studies, especially when approaching what they call the "repugnant Other, who has a different political stance from the researcher" (Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco 2021, 329). In their case, they were talking about their research object: low-income individuals in Brazil who lived in the periphery supported Bolsonaro.

However, I believe that their reflection fits into this object of study, even if the research objects may seem distant from one another.The diplomatic carreer in Brazil is up to this date permeated by gender and racial gaps. As much as other elite-state careers in Brazil, Itamaraty's demographics is largely composed by cisgender white males from privileged backgrounds. This is true today, and it was even truer in the first half of the 20th century, as we mention in chapter one.

Itamaraty's complex relations with the dictatorship, therefore, "do not exist in a vacuum, but in entanglements of relationships and adversities in a wider structural context and dynamic changing process" (Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco, 2021, p. 330). Through my position as a young, female researcher, the decision to focus on the anti-communist practices and how Cold War rhetoric helped shape Itamaraty's role during the military dictatorship brings nuance to a story that has been controlled with a firm hand by an institution whose tradition is based on myths that rely on kinship ties.

Structure of the thesis

The dissertation is based primarily on documents found at Itamaraty's Historical Archives in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília. Those documents are mainly in Portuguese, and I took the liberty to translate to English to provide greater comprehension. Portuguese-written literature was also translated. Aware of the limitations of consulting a single archive, I visited the American and British National Archives located in Washington, D.C and London, respectively. They helped me fill the gaps founded in the Brazilian archives and to reconstruct the events which are the focus of this research. The archival research was hindered due to the COVID-19 pandemic, so I am aware that I was not able to look every document available, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom.

The thesis is structured in four chapters. The first chapter aims to explain the conservative origins of the Brazilian diplomatic service, with a focus on Brazil and the roots of Itamaraty's anti-communism before the Cold War. Chapter two investigates the collaboration of Brazilian diplomacy with anti-communist practices of the Brazilian government in the initial stages of the Cold War until the 1964 Coup D'état. It shows how the Cold War rhetoric reframed diplomatic anti-communism and how diplomats contributed to the theoretical framework of the National Security Doctrine, the theoretical apparatus that guided the military throughout the 1964 – 1985 dictatorship.

Chapter three looks into how Brazilian diplomacy was summoned to guarantee the recognition of the dictatorship abroad. In a first stage, the role of Brazilian diplomacy was minor, and Brazil counted on Western powers who were interested in promoting the regime abroad, namely the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the foreign support waned after the promulgation of Institutional Act number two (AI-2) in 1965 and the consequent increase of international criticism about the authoritarian practices of the regime. Brazilian diplomacy was then summoned to defend the regime's choices abroad.

Chapter four focuses on how the promulgation of the fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) in 1968 led to a coordinated action between Itamaraty, the Armed Forces, the Special Advisory Office for Public Relations, and the Ministry of Justice to elaborate a counteroffensive aimed at restoring Brazilian image abroad. The Conclusion brings a parallel with the present, showing the importance of knowing past structures to comprehend how they unfold into the present and how can we act upon them.

CHAPTER ONE - CONSERVATISM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM: BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATS BEFORE THE COLD WAR

In the aftermath of the military coup d'état that overthrew President João Goulart on March 31st, 1964, members of the diplomatic circles in Brazil were relieved. Lincoln Gordon, the United States ambassador to Brazil, and Sir Leslie Fry, the United Kingdom ambassador to the country are better known for praising the outcome, but members of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (commonly known as Itamaraty) were also pleased when Jango fled to his home state, Rio Grande do Sul, and then to Montevideo (Uruguay), where he sought asylum (Setemy, 2013).

Manoel Pio Corrêa Junior believed that the *Política Externa Independente (*PEI - independent foreign policy), in place during Jango's administration and abandoned after the coup, had opened the gateway to a leftist ideology into Itamaraty (Pio Corrêa, 1995). He and other diplomats - such as Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto, known for being the Brazilian ambassador in Chile and a supporter of the coup that ousted Salvador Allende in 1973 - received the 1964 coup with satisfaction, as they overtly opposed what he believed was a "leftist foreign policy" (Pio Corrêa, 1995). After the coup, Pio Corrêa was appointed the Brazilian ambassador to Uruguay. In 1966, he became Itamaraty's Secretary-General and founded the *Centro de Informações do Exterior* (CIEX - Foreign Information Center), the foreign arm of the regime's newly installed security apparatus.

The future foreign ministers of the dictatorship - Leitão da Cunha, Gibson Barboza and Antônio Azeredo da Silveira - unlike Pio Corrêa and Câmara Canto, were not critical of PEI's foundational principles[6]. Nonetheless, they believed that foreign policy to be used politically by João Goulart's leftist support base (Spektor, 2010; Barboza, 2020; Cunha, 1994). Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha, the first foreign minister of the dictatorship, considered the "1964 Revolution" - as he called it - necessary and crucial (Cunha, 1994). Ambassador Mário Gibson Barboza, on the other hand, acknowledged that 1964 was a political-military coup – not a revolution -,

[6] Brazilian military dictatorship had five miltary presidents: Castello Branco (1964-1966); Costa e Silva (1966-1968); Emilio G. Medici (1969-1974); Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) and João Figueiredo (1979-1985)

but one necessary to avoid the greatest of evils - that is, the possibility of a communist upheaval (Barboza, 2020) [7].

The PEI's core principle was the abandonment of an automatic alignment with the United States and the West, focusing on Brazil's pursuit of autonomy and self-determination in the international system through the diversification of partnerships, guided by ideological pragmatism. The policy explicitly aimed at the country's development and the reduction of social and economic inequalities. Unlike those diplomats believed, PEI never denied Brazil's identity as a member of the West, nor was it inherently "leftist" (Pinheiro, 2000; Dantas, 2011).

The current literature on Brazilian Foreign Policy considers Castello Branco's foreign policy (1964 - 1966) to be a "step out of cadence", which subjugated Brazil's national interest to a Cold War rhetoric (Cervo and Bueno, 2012, p. 934). Nevertheless, the aforementioned diplomats believed that the 1964 coup d'état put Brazilian diplomacy back on track. Coincidently, they all ended up assuming prominent positions at Itamaraty: Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Mário Gibson Barboza and Azeredo da Silveira became foreign ministers, and Pio Corrêa, secretary-general.

Itamaraty remained unscathed throughout the Military Dictatorship - it managed to keep most of its staff, while other ministries suffered from greater intervention by the Armed Forces: during the Medici (1969-1974) government, for example, the military occupied 28,5% of the posts in the Ministry of Education and 68,7% in the Ministry of Communications (Matias, 2004, p. 71). The literature usually ascribes this low intervention to the general, long-lasting perception of Itamaraty as an autonomous body inside the Brazilian bureaucracy.

Accordingly, since the time of the Baron of Rio Branco[8], Itamaraty is said to pursue Brazil's national interest, thus hovering above political and ideological disputes. However, as Lima (2000) and Pinheiro (2013) argue, the meaning of "national interest" is never fully developed by the diplomatic corps. In that sense, Brazilian diplomacy tend to use the term "national interest" as a synonym for the interest of the Brazilian State (M. R. Lima, Instituições democráticas e política exterior 2000). That being said, "national interest" is a polysemic term with different meanings for different people.

[7] Foreign Minister to Emilio Medici (1969-1973), the third military president, whose administration became known as the *anos de chumbo* (the lead years).
[8] José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, known as the Baron of Rio Branco, was Brazil foreign minister from 1902 until his death in 1912. He is known as the patron of modern Brazilian diplomacy.

During the military regime, for example, the concept of national interest developed by the National Security Doctrine was employed loosely to justify any action taken by the military, including authoritarian measures (Pinheiro, Foreign Policy decision-making under the Geisel government 2013).

Another argument for the autonomy of Itamaraty during the military dictatorship points towards its internal structure, often compared to the armed forces. Zairo Cheibub, for example, states that apart from the Itamaraty, the only institutions in the Brazilian state with such a high degree of institutionalization and complexity are the Armed Forces (1984, p. 3).

According to Cheibub, these institutions show a high degree of complexity - which he describes as a subspecialization of the bureaucracy into different smaller units; hierarchization; and autonomy vis-à-vis the Executive power. Moura (2012) states that the foreign ministry is a combination of a bureaucratic institution organized around positions and functions, on the one hand, and a hierarchical institution organized around ranks, such as the Armed Forces, on the other.

This kind of comparison is evidenced throughout the official diplomatic discourse. Vasco Leitão da Cunha compares Itamaraty with the former Ministry of War in his memoirs (1994, p. 172). Pio Corrêa, who served the Brazilian army before joining Itamaraty, considers himself "olive green" at heart, alluding to the colour worn by the Brazilian army (Corrêa, 1995, p. 184). This approximation reverberates to the present day. For ambassador Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Itamaraty is a feudal house whose hierarchical structure resembles the Armed Forces (Gobo, 2016, p. 191). Some authors even state that diplomats are “military men in plainclothes” (Vizentini 2008, p. 43). The diplomatic corps' autonomy was not something usually seen throughout the military dictatorships that took over South America (more precisely Southern Cone) in the 1960s and the 1970s. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Argentina suffered from purges and a military takeover after the 1973 and 1976 Coup D’état, for example (Sikkink, 2004; Barros, 1983).[9]

[9] The perpetuated idea of diplomats as “military men in plainclothes” is something that is perceived through the specialized IR literature. Raymond Aron (2002), for example, uses the metaphor of the Soldier and the Diplomat to show that diplomacy and war are complementary modalities of interstate dialogue.

This particular and somewhat intuitive perception of similarity between the Foreign Ministry and the Armed Forces, although based solely on the diplomats' experiences and conceptions rather than on scholarly research, echoes throughout the specialized literature. Up to this date, no comparative study between the two institutions has been published.

Still, this perceived similarity helped justify the alleged absence of a military intervention in Itamaraty: Just like the Armed Forces, the Itamaraty served the State and the National Interest, beyond the partisan interests of transitory governments. According to the widely accepted justification, since Itamaraty dealt exclusively with the promotion of Brazil's national interest abroad, it could have preserved its autonomy; meanwhile, other civilian ministries suffered with censorship and purges. Additionally, the mere fact that the foreign ministry was perceived as institutionally and structurally similar to the Armed Forces was enough to credit is as being capable of autonomy.

Whereas Itamaraty's autonomy is highlighted in the literature, when we come across the debate of Brazilian involvement in the overthrow of governments in neighbouring countries, such as Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay, for example, or Brazilian participation in Operation Condor (*Operação Condor)* and Brazil's position regarding human rights violations in international forums, Itamaraty's role is severely downplayed. The literature usually states that the "ideological foreign policy" towards South America was the responsibility of Brazil's National Security Council (CSN, Conselho de Segurança Nacional), and the Armed Forces were in charge of its formulation (Gonçalves and Miyamoto, 2000; Vizentini, 2004; Ricupero, 2017).

Regardless of whether Itamaraty has kept its autonomy, or why it has, we believe that the ministry played a significant role in the formulation and enforcement of the regime's "ideological foreign policy". Not only did a considerable number of diplomats support the coup but also they helped design an authoritarian foreign policy that was marked by an anti-communist discourse.

Before we analyse the foreign policy of the military regime, we must understand how Itamaraty became organized. We believe that the diplomatic ethos within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was shaped by a conservative anti-communism sentiment developed in the early 20th century, and that this ethos influenced Itamaraty's behaviour vis-à-vis the military dictatorship.

This chapter will examine the social origins of some members of the Brazilian diplomatic corps who would later play important roles at the foreign policy making of the military dictatorship. By looking into their biographies, we believe that it is possible to understand the internal organization of the ministry and its ramifications in the second half of the 20th century.

1.1 The conservative origins of the diplomatic career

Based on the concept drawn by Pierre Bourdieu, some authors state that Itamaraty is permeated by a "diplomatic habitus" (Moura, 2012; Batista 2010; Gobo, 2016; Targa 2017). In the bourdiesian analysis, habitus can be defined as "(…) social acts performed under structural necessities, under the constraint of the products of the previous history, under structural necessities that are embodied in the form of permanent dispositions" (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 93), and "(…) a generative principle of systematic behaviours", which tries to

> account for the fact that, in order to understand a certain number of fundamental human behaviours that are oriented towards the preservation or elevation of the position in social space occupied by a family or an individual, you have to take into account a certain number of strategies that are seemingly unrelated, strategies without a palpable connection (Bourdieu 2014,p. 237).

Through the habitus, an individual transforms their personal and collective history into principles and dispositions that affect their future practices (Mérand and Pouliout, 2013, p. 29). It is only possible for the habitus to exist within the field, a "kind of relatively autonomous microcosm within the great social world and which obeys its own laws" (Castro, 2014, Kindle edition). To Pouliout and Mérand (2013, p. 30), the fields are

> A social space structured along three principal dimensions: power relations, objects of struggle, and the rules taken for granted within the field (…) each field is composed of unequal positions which become woven together to create a hierarchy of domination. It is the control of a variety of historically constructed and determined forms of capital.

The concept of habitus allows us to see how agents and structures work dialectically: social acts incorporated into the structure of a field not only shape the agents but are shaped by the subjects who are subsequently inserted therein:

> One of the functions of the notion of habitus is to remind us that first experiences orient second ones, which orient third ones: we perceive what happens to us by way of structures that have been put into our minds by what

> has happened to us - this is commonplace, but it needs to be borne in mind all the same. We do not recommence our history at each moment, and neither does a country (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 80).

The "diplomatic habitus" inside the Brazilian diplomatic field embraces the perception that the diplomatic career is one of the most prestigious state careers. Permeated by an aura of glamour and sophistication, the diplomat is perceived not as a bureaucrat, but as something else, whose job is unlike any other civil servant. Partly due to its nature of representing the interests of a Nation-State abroad, partly because of what this representation entails, such as fancy dinners and receptions.

For centuries the pursuit of a diplomatic career was a privilege of the nobility. The creation of the modern diplomatic institution has its genesis in the establishment of the first posts and embassies in the Italian city-states at the end of the 15th century. The ambassadors were sent directly by the sovereigns of each city-state, "a development of the need to keep liaisons and sources of information with other political units considered to be unreliable" (Lopes, 2013, p. 100).[10] At the end of the 17th century, diplomacy was already considered a "distinct and honourable" career (idem). In his essay "Politics as a Vocation", Max Weber also briefly points out how the diplomatic career distinguishes itself from others:

> In the West diplomacy first became a consciously cultivated art during the reign of Charles V, the age of Machiavelli. This took place above all under the influence of the Venetian ambassadors, whose reports were studied with passionate zeal in diplomatic circles. The adepts of this diplomacy had mostly received a humanist education and regarded one another as a trained class of initiates. In this respect, they resembled the humanist Chinese statesmen of the last phase of the period of the Warring States (Weber, 2004, p. 45).

The diplomatic activity, thus, was considered something that only could be carried on by connoisseurs, individuals that were versed and trained in the arts and humanities, who possessed an intrinsic *je ne sais quoi* that could only appear naturally in the nobility.[11]

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[10] Although I chose to keep the traditional understanding that modern diplomacy has its origins during the Italian Renaissance period, it is important to point out that this interpretation has started to change, with more recent studies showing that this story was told to "establish continuity and legitimise a realist worldview" **Fonte bibliográfica inválida especificada.** that legitimised an Eurocentric primacy in the discipline International Relations. As Leira (2021, p. 305) shows, those new works on Diplomatic History shows us that the diplomatic activity is "a lot less distinctive and novel" throughout world's history. For further criticism see Neumann, chapter one (2012).

[11] The works of Döscher (1987) and Sabrow and Mantel (2014) about the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Auswärtiges Amt*) during the Third Reich, for example, argue that most German diplomats at the time were heirs to the nobility of the old Germanic kingdoms and supported the ascension of the regime.

In the Brazilian case, Itamaraty is perceived as an aristocratic institution that maintains an imperial trait. The air of nobility persisted even after the professionalization and reformulation of the career in 1945, when the Rio Branco Institute was founded and the career admission was standardised through a public tender (Barros, 1983, 1986; Cheibub, 1984, 1985; Moura, 2006, 2012; Lopes, 2013; Gobo, 2016). The imperial influence on Brazilian diplomacy is a crucial element to understanding the diplomatic habitus, as it forms not only as a consequence of the ministry's monarchic roots, but also because of the social origins of the diplomats in the early 20th century.

When Brazil became independent in 1822, it faced the need for international recognition at the same time the country was consolidating its territory. Thus, the first two ministries created by Dom Pedro I were the Ministry of War (*Ministério da Guerra*) and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (*Secretaria de Negócios Estrangeiros),* Itamaraty's predecessor.

At the time, diplomacy was exercised by members of the imperial elite. The first representatives of Brazil abroad had to provide for their subsistence overseas by their own means. For some authors, this meant that during the 19th century the foreign service in Brazil was marked by patrimonialism. Because it was not a state career, progressing in the diplomatic path took a great deal of social capital (Gobo 2016; Cheibub 1984).

Given that diplomacy was not exercised by professional diplomats, but by members of that same ruling elite (Lima, 2005; Cheibub, 1984 and 1985), it was within those fairly homogenous circles that a common conception of national interest took shape. Thus, the consensus on national interest within the diplomatic corps was an intra-elite consensus.

When the Baron of Rio Branco became Brazil's Foreign Minister in 1902 – a position he held for ten years until his death in 1912 –, he left his mark on the consolidation of Brazilian diplomacy. For some, he was responsible for breaking away from the Brazilian Empire's foreign policy and setting the tone for the modern-day Brazilian foreign policy (Ricupero, 2017). At the same time, he consolidated the aristocratic ethos that still pervades the ministry. His administration was marked by a personalist and centralizing management style. His political and personal preferences

utterly shaped the institution (Barros, 1983; Cheibub, 1984; Moura, 2012; Gobo, 2016). A staunch monarchist, he kept his nobility title even though Brazil had been made a republic in 1889. Rio Branco had a clear preference when hiring diplomats, favouring the employment of young, white, "well-born" men descending from the old aristocratic families of Brazil. He also had a specific type of diplomatic consort in mind, expecting that the wives of those diplomats were "girls who played the piano and spoke French" (Moura 2012, Kindle edition). For Gilberto Freyre (apud Gobo, 2016, p. 71), it was as if Rio Branco wanted to

> [...] give the impression to the foreigner that the Republic among us continued to be the same aristocracy of whites as the Second Reign[12]. Not only of whites, but polished, elegant, French whites, without the bad Portuguese customs of publicly picking their teeth, and of spitting loudly on the floor [...] the baron of Rio Branco understood that no one should represent Brazil abroad but white or white-looking Brazilians, having been the Republic, under this aspect and the influence of the powerful foreign minister, more papist than the Pope, that is, more rigorous in ethnic considerations in the selection of its diplomatic personnel, than the Empire itself.

The Baron's vision of the "ideal diplomat" was based on a bias towards a particular race, class, and gender. Although unjustifiable, Rio Branco's stance was that of a man of his time. It had been 24 years since slavery was abolished in Brazil (1888) - and Brazil was the last country in the Americas and one of the last countries in the world to do so. Then, former enslaved persons were denied basic citizenship, and this deeply impacted Brazilian diplomacy. Many diplomats of the First Republic were monarchists - something other institutions ridiculed (Barros, 1986). Therefore, the so-called diplomatic habitus was, at first, linked to the origins of the diplomatic career *per se* and also to its members backgrounds. The Baron himself was the son of the Viscount of Rio Branco, former Foreign Minister (*Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros*), Finance Minister, Senator, and head of the council of ministers during the reign of Dom Pedro II. He – the Baron - spent most of his childhood in Rio de Janeiro, with a brief period in Montevideo, where his father served as secretary to the Brazilian mission. In Rio, he studied in the prestigious Pedro II School, and then studied law at the prestigious Largo de S. Francisco, in São Paulo (Santos, 2018, p.50).

Looking into the backgrounds of career diplomats who had prominent positions during the military dictatorship, in spite of having entered the profession long after Rio Branco was gone, the aristocratic background and the imperial family ties was rather

[12] The Second Reign comprises the period of Pedro II's reign as emperor of Brazil (1840-1889)

the rule than the exception. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, for example, born in 1903, said that the first memory of his childhood was a vacation trip to Rome and Venice. His maternal grandfather was a British engineer who had gone to Brazil to work with submarine telegraphic cables. His father came from a prominent family from the times of the empire. His great-grandfather was the Baron of Mamoré, head of the prestigious mission to study the viability of the Madeira-Mamoré railroad - an eventually unsuccessful link between the Brazilian state of Amazonas to Bolivia.

Leitão da Cunha spent his childhood in Petropolis, where his father befriended the Baron of Rio Branco and other diplomats and politicians, such as Joaquim Nabuco. As a child, he made occasional trips to England, to visit his maternal relatives. Before becoming a diplomat, he studied in England and went to the National Law School in Rio de Janeiro (Cunha, 1994). When talking about his childhood in Petropolis, Leitão da Cunha affirmed it was “aristocratic in the distinction, but of great modesty” (Cunha, 1994, p.5).

Manoel Pio Corrêa, who became Secretary-General of Itamaraty in 1966 during the presidency of Castello Branco, was one of the responsible for structuring the CIEX, the repressive arm of Itamaraty during the military regime. He was the son of a famous Portuguese botanist, Manuel Pio Corrêa. Born in 1918, he spent most of his childhood in Paris, due to his father’s work, and then studied Law at the National Law School in Rio de Janeiro (Pio Corrêa, 1995). Not only fiercely anti-communist, but he also sympathized with the monarchist regime. When talking about his maternal grandfather, Glycerio Velloso, he states:

> In 1870 he was **(may God forgive him)** one of the founders of the Republican Party; participated in the abolitionist campaign (…). It impressed me to think that my grandfather lived and became a man when D. Pedro II, Caxias, Osório, Tamandaré, the Viscount of Rio Branco and all statesmen of the end of the Empire, **afterwards the Baron of Rio Branco and the great presidents that were educated under the Empire** (Pio Correa, 1994, p. 55, emphasis added).

Besides being a monarchist, Pio Corrêa was a supporter of the British Empire, which he saw as the high peak of Western civilization. He was not afraid of showing his views on matters of race. A critic of the decolonisation movement of the 20th century, he referred to the diplomatic representations of newly independent countries with scorn:

> The cohesion of the Diplomatic Corps was enabled by its relative homogeneity. Indeed, the European Colonial Empires, although already weakened, had not yet disintegrated themselves in the whirlwind of the independence of former colonies, independence that would distribute around the world a picturesque cloud of exotic "diplomats" who came down directly from the highest canopy of equatorial forests (...) These newcomers, who would soon submerge almost completely in the premises of the United Nations, giving it a sui-generis colouration, would revolutionize the once uniform appearance of the diplomatic corps (...) disrespecting the most established traditions (...) [like] for example, conforming to the formality of the dress code (...). Thus, they rejected western formal attire in favour of folkloric capes or *Pai-de-Santo* gowns, worn with slippers without socks even on the greatest solemnities (Pio Correa, 1995, p. 377)

Azeredo da Silveira, Geisel's Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1979, also descended from a family with ties to the Brazilian Empire of the 19th century. His great-grandfather, senator Manuel Francisco Correia, was a minster in the cabinet of then Foreign Minister, the Viscount of Rio Branco (Rio Branco's father), and was responsible for the peace treaty with Paraguay after the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) (CPDOC, online; Spektor, 2010).

Pio Corrêa, Azeredo da Silveira and Leitão da Cunha all had ties with the Brazilian Empire - two of them were connected to Rio Branco himself. The exception was Mario Gibson Barboza. Born in Olinda, Pernambuco, in 1918, he descended from Henry Gibson on his maternal side, an English man who came to Brazil in the XIX century and became wealthy with sugar plantations and exporting goods. His father was a Portuguese merchant who emigrated to Brazil. While his family was a family of means, it did not appear to have any ties with the imperial elite (Barboza 2020; Familia Gibson, online). However, it is curious to notice that he was referred to as *Marquês de Olinda*, or the Marquis of Olinda, by his peers.

Although not all were outspoken monarchists, the aristocratic background helped shape the actions of those career diplomats. Moreover, Gibson Barboza, Pio Corrêa and Azeredo da Silveira were part of a generation of diplomats that joined the Foreign Ministry in the Vargas era (1930-1945), which will be addressed later in the chapter. Pio Corrêa was admitted in the career in 1936; Gibson Barboza in 1939 and Silveira in 1941 (Pio Correa, 1994; CPDOC, online; Spektor, 2010), – the exception was Vasco Leitão da Cunha, who belonged to an earlier generation of diplomats, having joined Itamaraty in 1927.

Those courteous practices of nobility that permeated Brazilian diplomacy in the beginning of the 20th century persisted even after the creation of the Rio Branco

Institute (IRBr) and the reformulation of the admission exam in 1945, landmarks that show the supposed professionalization and rationalization of Itamaraty's rites in a Weberian sense (Cheibub, 1984). For some, the admission exam was fundamental for democratising the access to the diplomatic career, thus leading to a greater professionalization and rationalization of the diplomatic corps, which in turn culminated in the consolidation of Itamaraty's autonomy in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy vis-à-vis the influence of any government's ideological preferences. Others claim that the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr) has been a fundamental piece for the instilling of the diplomatic habitus and the construction of an *esprit de corps* based on the tradition founded by the "myth" of the Baron of Rio Branco (Barros, 1986; Moura, 2006, 2012; Lopes, 2013; Gobo, 2016). Accordingly, the Rio Branco Institute would have the purpose of socializing and indoctrinating the *esprit de corps* among the young diplomats, based on a way of life closer to aristocratic courts than to modern bureaucracies.

To understand how the diplomatic *esprit de corps* is internalized by the new diplomats, we must talk about kinship. Kinship and diplomatic practices were intrinsically related throughout history, with the Brazilian case being no exception. From Norway (Neumann, At home with the Diplomats - inside a European Foreign Ministry 2012) to Syria (Anderson 2021), "all known diplomatic systems seem to have rested on shared myths of kinship" (Neumann, At home with the Diplomats - inside a European Foreign Ministry 2012, 15). Kinship can be described as a "mutuality of being" (Sahlins 2013, 3)

> any relationship constituted in terms of procreation, filiation, or descent can also be made postnatally or performatively by culturally appropriate action. Whatever is construed genealogically may also be constructed socially: an affirmation that can be demonstrated across the known range of societies and not infrequently within a given society (idem).

For Sahlins (2013, p. 62), "kinfolk are members of one another, intrinsic to each other's identity and existence". Although many separate "biological" (blood, consanguineal) kinship from "metaphorical" (socially constructed) kinship, we can argue that kinship, even when marked by consanguinity, "like all social relations, [are] confirmed and strengthened by being exercised" (Neumann, Haugevik and Lie 2019, 5).

The literature commonly states that during Rio Branco's administration, "biological" kinship relationships were important for one to succeed in the diplomatic career. After the modernization and rationalization of Itamaraty, this was replaced by a "metaphorical" kinship tie (Moura 2006; Lopes 2013; Gobo 2016). As Wilson (apud Neumann, Haugevik and Lie, p. 6) points out, "to claim kinship is to proclaim trustworthiness". It is therefore unsurprising that the Brazilian diplomat tends to designate the physical workplace, Itamaraty Palace, as the "House", with the diplomatic corps being designated as a large extended "family" (Moura, 2006).

For Lopes (2013, p. 189), "these symbolic resources have also served to present Brazilian and international society with the image of a diplomatic service with strong links between its members". This drew the attention of foreign delegations, as shown in this telegram from 1971 of the US Embassy in Brasilia to the Department of State regarding Itamaraty's role in the formulation of Brazilian Foreign Policy:

> Since the days of Foreign Minister Rio Branco at the turn of the century, Brazilian diplomats have been drawn from a narrow, aristocratic base of European, catholic background. **Theirs is an ingrown group closely related by blood and marriage, competent in education and language ability which, however, is somewhat divorced from life in Brazil except as it had been known in Rio society. As a result, Brazilian diplomats have often lacked a thorough understanding of their own society and strong personal ties to their political leadership**[13]

Therefore, although the ministry was "rationalized" and imposed a "meritocratic" way of entering the career through public tender, especially after 1945, the requirement of prior knowledge in foreign languages, privileged those who have a specific social, cultural and/or economic capital. Throughout the timeframe covered in this study, the final phase of the admission exam was a face-to-face interview. As a result, the choice of future diplomats was quite subjective, and some say that it was biased toward candidates within a specific gender, race, and class orientation, the same delimited by the Baron of Rio Branco at the beginning of the 20th century (Moura, 2006; Lopes, 2013; Gobo, 2016).

Consequently, the hierarchical structure of the ministry alongside biased selection criteria granted a homogenized way of thinking inside Itamaraty for many years, guaranteeing the ministry's autonomy before civil society. The creation of habitus is not static, and dispute for influence inside the field allows individuals to force

[13] "Itamaraty's Role in Formulation of Brazilian Foreign Policy" (1971). Opening the Archives: Documenting U.S.-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository (emphasis added)

a change within this same field, shaping and framing even the most divergent ideals inside the foreign ministry, mainly through socialization patterns. Knowing that the diplomats that undertook relevant positions during the military regime came from a similar background, it is interesting to see how they perceived the “communist and subversive threats” against the military dictatorship. To understand that, however, first, we must look at how anticommunism was disseminated inside the Brazilian society and the ministry of foreign affairs.

1.2 ‘Prices that cannot be paid’: Brazilian diplomats and anticommunism before the Cold War

In a interview given to CPDOC in 1983, Vasco Leitão da Cunha is asked about the failure of multilateral diplomacy during the time of the League of Nations. When commenting on the fact that the United Kingdom and France did not stop Hitler from invading the Rhineland, he says: “There are prices that cannot be paid. Unless you want to do it like Bertrand Russel, who says it is better to be red than dead” (Cunha, 1994, p. 69).[14]

It seems that for Leitão da Cunha, approximation with the communist world was a price that could not be paid at any hypothesis. It is true that Itamaraty supported initiatives against individuals that were considered subversive, especially immigrant workers, in the beginning of the 20th century, a topic to be discussed throughout this chapter and further along this dissertation. Torres (2013, p. 59), for example, states that already in 1903, the Baron of Rio Branco had written to the Chief of Police from the state of São Paulo saying that the government should repress foreign agitators, and the police should not be tolerant toward foreigners.

Yet, scholars agree that while workers, especially the immigrant, were targeted and repressed already in the first decade of the 20th century, anti-communism[15] as an ideology would only gain traction in Brazil after the Russian Revolution in 1917. In Brazil, the year of 1917 was marked by general strikes in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Pernambuco that were called due to the poor labour condition of urban

[14] According to Safire (2008), this quote attributed to Russell means that, in the case the humanity shall choose between communism domination or the demise of the human race, it should choose the first.
[15] Anticommunism can be characterized as “individuals and groups dedicated towards the fight against communism”, with communism being understood as “the Marxist-leninist synthesis that originated bolshevism and the soviet model” (Sá Motta, 2000, p.4)

workers, many of whom worked 12 to 16 hours a day at the time (Bandeira, 2017). Although the Brazilian government welcomed the February Revolution and recognized the regime of Alexandr Kerensky, Brazilian diplomacy did not pay much attention to the October Revolution. The Brazilian press and members of the Brazilian elite publicly referred to the October Revolution as a distant event that did not resonate in Brazilian society. They argued that the foreign ideology of communism would not be able to flourish in Brazil (Sá Motta, 2000; Torres, 2013). Notwithstanding their stance – which soon became pervasive among the public, a silent warning agains the threat of communism was triggered – contradictorily - among the country's elite. On that matter, Sá Motta asks (2000, p. 22), "since the proposals of Marx and Lenin had no chance of succeeding in Brazil, as many peremptorily stated, why waste time abominating them?".

In 1918, the Brazilian government broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, but the newly-deposed Russian representative remained in the country until 1920. For Tôrres (2013), this was a sign that the Brazilian government assumed the Communist Revolution was going to be short-lived. However, concomitantly with the foundation of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB – *Partido Comunista do Brasil*), anti-communist pamphlets translated into Portuguese began circulating in Brazil (Sá Motta, 2000). Until the end of the so-called *República Velha*, the organized left was suppressed. In 1927, the government of Washington Luís promulgated the Celerada Law, which criminalized PCB. It was only in the 1930s, during the Vargas era that anti-communism indeed became a major force in Brazil (Sá Motta, 2000).

1.2.1 Raul do Rio Branco and the International Anti-communist Entente

Raul do Rio Branco - son of the Baron of Rio Branco - is better known for being the first Brazilian delegate to join the International Olympic Committee in 1913. He started his career by working as assistant to his father in Paris; afterwards he was appointed to serve as an attaché in Bern, Switzerland, in 1899. From 1905 to 1911 he worked at his father's cabinet in Rio de Janeiro. In 1912, he was assigned as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Brazilian government in Switzerland.[16]

[16] Ministério das Relações exteriores. Anuário (1928). Available at <https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/images/Anuario_Funcionarios_MRE/Anuario1928A.pdf >. Access: 17/05/2022

There, he initiated in 1925 a partnership with the *Entente Internationale Contre la Troisième Internationale* - also known as *Entente Internationale Anticommuniste (EIA),* or International Anticommunist Entente (Brasil 2014).

Founded in 1924 in Geneva by Theodore Aubert, a Swiss Lawyer, and Georges Lodygensky, a Russian Red Cross delegate, the EIA was created in opposition to the Third Socialist International to defend the "principles of order, family, property and nationality" in "all countries'', prioritizing "religious and spiritual dimensions and the defence of the free market system" (Ruotsila 2010, p. 26). Although the EIA was not the most prominent organization of the pre-Cold War anti-communist right, it was an important arm of the anti-communist movement in Europe before World War II and the Cold War:

> Most of the IAE's work took place behind the scenes, and it was coordinated by a permanent central office in Geneva with a staff of fourteen and sustained by an international network of informants and correspondents. The central office organized international conferences, published books and information bulletins for a range of periodicals and key political and business leaders, produced anti-communist films, and conducted research into communist activities (Ruotsila 2010, p. 27)

One of EIA's founders, Theodore Aubert, was supposedly a close friend of Raul do Rio Branco and other Brazilian diplomats, and the International Anti-communist Entente had an important presence in several Latin American countries (Ruotsila 2010; Brasil, 2014). The anticommunism fostered by Aubert and Lodygensky was grounded on religious and moral aspects, with the EIA seeing communism as a form of degeneration resulting from modernity, the profanation of the sacred hierarchy and the natural order of things. One of its most famous supporters, for example, was General Francisco Franco (Ruotsila, 2010).

EIA's take on communism was quite like the vision that became more significant in Brazilian anti-communism. EIA preached an anti-communism rooted in Catholicism, Nationalism and Liberalism. Whereas in the United States a sort of "market-oriented" anti-communism became preponderant, through the defence of the principles of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism, Brazilian anti-communism was religious and nationalistic. Communism was considered a foreign menace created to destroy the grounds of society, a "moral perversion" that would destroy the natural order of things (Sá Motta, 2000). Anti-communist groups, consequently, took advantage of the moral

panic in Brazilian society to depict any progressive view of society as a communist menace, even if it was not true.

Taking advantage of Raul do Rio Branco's position within the EIA, Itamataty began to correspond with the anti-communist organization regularly. In 1927, President Washington Luis started to collaborate with the organization, paying ten thousand Swiss francs annually (Torres, 2013, p. 62) - and the exchange between the EIA and Itamaraty soon had practical effects on the fight against communism in Brazil. For instance, the approval of the Celerada Law, in 1927 relied strongly on the argument that in 1924 the British Government had found evidence of a communist conspiracy in Brazil. The Brazilian police only took notice of the fact after being warned by Raul do Rio Branco, who was then working in Switzerland (Pinheiro apud Tôrres, 2013).

It was also during the Washington Luis administration that the National Security Council (*Conselho de Segurança Nacional* – CSN) was founded, in 1927, by the decree n. 17.999 (Setemy, 2013, p. 47):

> The Council's purpose would be, only in an advisory capacity, to study and coordinate information on all financial, economic, military, and moral issues related to the defence of the nation. The permanent members of the Council were the President, who would be responsible for presiding over the meetings, the seven Ministers of State (War, Navy, Finance, Transportation, Agriculture, Interior and Exterior) and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy. The Council should meet twice a year, allowing for the possibility of extraordinary calls

One of the reasons for the collaboration between the Brazilian government and the EIA was the internationalist aspect of Marxism-Leninism and the idea that class solidarity should suppress nationalism. The internationalism of the III International justified the need for coordinated anti-communist activities in the realm of international politics. The diplomatic corps in Brazil believed that the III International received money from the Soviet government to forge communist propaganda in South America (Torres, 2013; Setemy, 2013). In 1927, diplomat Lucillio Bueno wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Otavio Mangabeira, commenting on the Celerada Law:

> [...] I see that the predictions made by me have been taking place since 1922 when I started to see the danger of communism in Brazil with my eyes enlightened by patriotism. Since there is no middle class in our country, as in Western Europe, we are exposed, like Russia, deprived also of this barrier to the ferocious appetites of the uncultured masses, to the rapid contamination of the social virus in the populace guided by foreign agents. Propaganda, thanks to the wise law recently voted, is restricted, but not jugulated, and the authorities must not give barracks to those who, under the pretext of freedom

> of ideas, try to upset the constitutional order (Bueno apud Torres, 2013, p. 61).

In 1930 Brazil's *República Velha* ended with a Coup that brought Getúlio Vargas to the presidential seat, where he stayed until 1945. In the period known as "the Vargas Era", we witness the consolidation and institutionalization of anti-communist practices inside Itamaraty. Curiously enough, the anti-communist ethos of the ministry during the Vargas' government, albeit its gendered practices, was also rooted in the first female career diplomat to have ever achieved the position of Ambassador in Brazil: Odette de Carvalho e Souza, affectionately nicknamed "Dona Ó" by her male counterparts.

1.2.2 "Dona Ó" and the Vargas Era (1930-1945)

Getúlio Vargas' Provisional Government (1930 – 1934) reorganized Brazil's information community. Through the decree 28.873 of February 1934, Vargas created the *Comissão de Estudos de Defesa* (Commission for Defence Studies); the *Secretaria Geral da Defesa Nacional* (National Defence General Secretary), and national defence sections at the civilian ministries (Setemy, 2013). Afrânio de Melo Franco, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1930 to 1933, took up measures to suppress communist activities in Brazil: during his administration, Itamaraty started a collaboration with the Federal District police in Rio de Janeiro and made agreements with the police forces of Argentina and Uruguay in order to restrain Soviet immigration and communist activities at the countries' borders. Melo Franco firmly believed that the Komintern was fomenting revolutionary and subversive movements in South America (Hilton, 2013).

Until the *Estado Novo* Coup d'état in 1937, when president Getúlio Vargas imposed a new Constitution inspired by the authoritarian regimes in force in Europe at the time, Brazilian people lived a period of political agitation. In 1932, the country saw the birth of the *Ação Integralista Brasileira* (Brazilian Integralist Action - AIB), led by Plinio Salgado de Oliveira. The AIB was a fascist movement that successfully echoed the fears of the Brazilian middle-class, afraid of Communism and social upheaving with the banner "God, Country and Family" (Hilton, 1972; Sá Motta, 2000). Since the focus of the integralist movement was the heart and minds of the Brazilian upper and middle classes, it is not a surprise to find out that some young diplomats during the 1930s flirted with fascism, something that Azeredo da Silveira recalls:

> I can say that the Germans had a lot of sympathizers in the class who were trying to get into the ministry. Jayme himself had been head of the Integralist Youth (then he turned to the left). (...) Some colleagues attended school

> wearing green shirts, like Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, who was an integralist. Lauro Escorel, a São Paulo native and Jayme's favourite student, was also a sympathizer (...) there were a lot of nice people in integralism, but I was never able to find the doctrine sympathetic nor had I ever had this kind of inclination (Spektor, 2010, p. 26)

Some diplomats that were *integralistas* during the youth took later in life a leftist (or national-developmental) turn, as Azeredo da Silveira points out. Jayme de Azevedo Rodrigues, who became a career diplomat in 1937, was expelled after the 1964 Coup D'etat for sending a telegram to minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha stating that he would not work for *gorillas* (Abreu and Lamarão, 2007). San Tiago Dantas, João Goulart's Foreign Minister and one of the ideologues of Jango's Independent Foreign Policy had flirted with fascism and integralism during his college years – however, he disowned *integralismo* in 1942 and became one of the better-known names of national developmentalism and ultimately, of the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) (Ribeiro 2021). In the opposite direction, Sergio Corrêa da Costa and Lauro Escorel ended up serving in prominent diplomatic posts during the dictatorship. Escorel, for example, served as Ambassador in Bolívia (1965-1967) and Paraguai (1970-1972). Sergio Corrêa da Costa served as Ambassador in London (1968-1974) and the United Nations (1975-1983).

Integralism gained force as a political movement especially after the episode known as *Intentona Comunista*[17] in 1935. The *Intentona* was maybe the most significant attempt of communist sympathizers to seize power in Brazil, but it was unsuccessful. Anti-communist groups took advantage of the fear provoked by the uprising to spread anti-communist propaganda and increase xenophobic sentiment against immigrants; and there was a rumour that the upheaval was fostered by the Komintern (Sá Motta, 2000). The failure of the 1935 uprising opened paths for the crystallization of repressive measures that would eventually culminate in the promulgation of the *Estado Novo* dictatorship in 1937:

> The government's response to the intentona was the enactment of a series of repressive measures, including state of siege powers, a new law of national security, and the power to fire military officers, civil servants, and even private employees suspected of being Communists (Pereira, 2005, p. 42).

At the time, Pio Corrêa was serving the Army – he would only become a diplomat three years later, in 1938 – and was one of the soldiers that defended the fort at Praia Vermelha in Rio de Janeiro against the upheaval. He tells that the failed

[17] Although the most known name of the 1935 communist upheaval, this is a pejorative term.

communist uprising solidified his anti-communist beliefs, and that after the episode he became Salgado Filho's right arm (Pio Corrêa 1995).[18]

After the Intentona, Itamaraty started to refine its actions against foreign subversive threats. The ministry created an agency called *Serviços de Estudos e Informações* (SEI, Studies and Information Service) in 1936 which, one year later, changed its name to *Serviços Especiais de Informações* (Special Information Service). SEI was conceived by Foreign Minister José Carlos Macedo Soares (1934-1936) and career diplomat Odette de Carvalho e Souza. Its purpose was "to deal with the repression of communism through the specialized study of Marxist doctrine, the methods of Bolshevik propaganda, its infiltration into the country and the means to fight it practically and efficiently" (Setemy, 2013, p. 111)

Dona Odette, as Carvalho e Souza was known, was the first woman to receive the title of consul and the first woman to become a career Ambassador (Friaça 2018). She joined Itamaraty in 1936, two years before the Oswaldo Aranha reform, which prohibited women to take the admission test to the diplomatic career – a prohibition that lasted until 1954.[19] According to Vasco Leitão da Cunha (1994, p. 175), "Dona Ó [as he calls her] was our first female Ambassador. *(She)* Had a real fear of communism, so she did a lot of work on it." Pio Corrêa (1995, p. 581), describes her as follow:

> Under an extremely unconvincing wig it was said she was as bald as a knee, and, regarding her face, it did not have eyebrows and eyelashes, which gave her a disturbingly inexpressive aspect. Under that ungrateful aspect (…) there was a clear intelligence, a great professional culture, a great kindness, and an enviable sense of humour.

The way Pio Corrêa and Leitão da Cunha describe *Dona* Odette is interesting in many ways. Despite talking about her in a very sexist way, both diplomats remember her with affection and respect, showing the kinship ties that bonded them. Nevertheless, this woman, the first Brazilian woman to achieve the Ambassador post and probably the first female career diplomat in the world to be given such a title, was responsible for structuring the information apparatus that would culminate, 30 years later, into CIEX. For Setemy (2013, p. 203), Carvalho e Souza genuinely believed that Itamaraty was the "*Estado Maior Civil"*, paraphrasing Oswaldo Aranha, Vargas'

[18] Salgado Filho was a Brazilian politician and ally of Getúlio Vargas. He appointed Chief of Police after the ascension of Vargas into power in 1930 and, in 1932, became minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce. In 1934 he was elected congressman and supported the Estado Novo Coup D'état in 1937, becoming a Military Supreme Court minister in 1938 (CPDOC, online).
[19] Regarding this topic, see Tomas (2020)

Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1944. In Pio Corrêa's case, he was her subordinate and inherited her files on communist and subversive activities. Those files would later become crucial for the elaboration of CIEX policies during the military dictatorship.

For Carvalho e Souza, it was only natural that Itamaraty took the lead in the fight against communism. Therefore,

> Brazilian diplomatic missions constituted 'great observation posts'. Its 'precious' information would help to better know the enemy, its tactics and slogans. Brazilian consulates, on the other hand, should exercise permanent vigilance, to avoid the infiltration of weapons or extremist elements of foreign nationality. In parallel, diplomatic missions and consulates from other countries in Brazil would be called upon to collaborate in the process of expelling unwanted foreigners. By maintaining 'a constant and close connection with the international institutions charged with combating communism' - that is to say, with the EIA -, the MRE had information from all over the world, which, through the then projected SEI, could be transmitted 'to authorities most directly concerned, notably the police and military ministries'. Finally, he concluded that the same should be done, by the SEI, with the information that the MRE received from the network of diplomatic and consular posts abroad, as well as from diplomatic missions and foreign consulates in Brazil. (Brasil, 2014, p. 181)

Carvalho e Souza and Macedo Soares were deeply influenced by the consequences of *intentona* when they established SEI. Due to the supposed involvement of Komintern in the failed communist insurgency, Itamaraty revitalized its relationship with the International Anti-Communist Entente. Dona Odette served in Geneva in the 1930s, and apparently acted as a contact between Itamaraty and the EIA. When Macedo Soares became minister of Foreign Affairs in 1934, he transferred her back to Rio de Janeiro – the official reason for such a move was for her to work as his secretary at the general secretariat. However, there might be a possibility that she was transferred back to Brazil to establish SEI, since in the same year of its creation, 1936, Macedo Soares authorized the transfer of 3.082 Swiss francs to EIA (Torres, 2013; Brasil, 2014; Friaça, 2018).

Itamaraty closely collaborated with the police in the states' level, helping them find communist agents who infiltrated Brazil. One of the best-known cases was the case of Arthur Ernst Ewert, also known by the pseudonym Harry Berger. Member of the German Communist Party and elected member of the Reichstag in 1928, he flew away from Germany in 1933, after Hitler's victory, to the Soviet Union. In 1934 he was sent to Brazil to help the Brazilian Communist Party, arriving in the country in 1935 via Buenos Aires, under the alias Harry Berger. Ewert and his wife were arrested following the Intentona, in December 1935, after he and other foreigners involved with the failed

revolt had been closely monitored by the police in collaboration with Itamaraty (Cpdoc, online; Setemy, 2013). Because of that collaboration, Itamaraty suggested in 1936 that the IV Interamerican Police Conference took place in Brazil, and the fight against communism should be discussed (Setemy, 2013).

Vargas also paid close attention to what was happening near the Brazilian border in the Southern Cone. Since many “subversives” were arriving in Brazil via Argentina and Uruguay, he tried to condition bilateral relations to the fight against communism. The Brazilian government believed that the Soviet Embassy in Montevideo was the official Komintern headquarter in the Southern Cone.

Brazil pushed Uruguay to sever diplomatic ties with the USSR, which happened in December 1935. Lucílio Bueno was the Brazilian Ambassador to Uruguay at that time. He was the one to defend the Celerada Law on the argument that Brazil, due to the lack of a strong middle class, was doomed to follow the steps of Russia, where an “uncultured mass” ferociously took power (Torres, 2018). As ambassador, he tried to push the Uruguayan government to censor Uruguayan journalists who took a critical stance against Brazil. According to Setemy (2013, p. 120)

> (...) in parallel with the execution of Brazilian foreign policy, Brazilian diplomatic representatives acted in those countries [Uruguay and Argentina] as "licensed spies" or recruited their own secret agents to carry out covert data collection actions related to the development of communist activities in foreign territory.

Another member of the Brazilian delegation in Montevideo was Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto, who was the embassy’s commercial attaché. Câmara Canto was born in Montevideo in 1910 and officially entered the diplomatic career in 1938, but worked at the Brazilian embassy in Uruguay since 1935 (CPDOC, online; Setemy, 2013). Over 30 years later, while serving as Brazilian Ambassador to Chile, he would become known as one of the backbones of the military coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende and installed Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship on September 11, 1973. Furthermore, he was one of the chairs of the Inquire Commission that happened in Itamaraty in January 1969, in the wake of the promulgation of the Institutional Act no. 5 of December 1968 (Carmo, 2018; Brasil, 2014). Pio Corrêa considered him one

of the few that "bravely" opposed the "*esquerdizante* foreign policy" of João Goulart (1994, p. 641).[20]

Following the beginning of World War II in 1939, Itamaraty's National Security Section was founded - the National Security Council (*Conselho de Segurança Nacional - CSN)* sent general guidelines to each ministry regarding the 'state of war in Europe'. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CSN recommended, among other things, to

> e) To supervise the arrival of foreigners to the country, in order to prevent the use of political propaganda agents and recruitment of volunteers for the formation of expeditionary bodies;
>
> f) to unravel the activities of espionage agents and saboteurs capable of entering the country and provoking attacks, to impute them to one of the parties to the European hostilities, in order to create an environment favourable to the end of our neutrality;
>
> g) organize a 'special investigative service,' with the collaboration of 'intelligence sections' from military ministries

While this statement can be read as a simple guideline to maintain neutrality towards the war in Europe, it advises the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior to take "preventive, educational and repressive measures" to protect the political order. There, National Security Council also tells the Ministry of Health and Education to "propagate the virtues and the goals of the social, economic, and political regime installed with the constitution of November 10, 1937". The War Ministry, in turn, was supposed to centralize the secret service (*Serviço Secreto de Informações*) and help organize the "censorship service" (*serviço de censura*).[21]

Regarding the "arrival of foreigners into the country", the CSN recommends the Itamaraty focus on immigrants who had past involvement with "subversive activities". Since Brazil was still neutral in the conflict between the Allies and the Axis at that time, Brazilian diplomacy believed that if the government accepted Jewish refugees, it could harm Brazil's neutrality. Setemy (2013) points out how the concern with foreigners and refugees had not only an anti-communist but also an antisemitic bias – sometimes, both were intertwined. After the war, decree 23.944 from October 28, 1947,

[20] In his memoirs Pio Corrêa uses the term esquerdizante, that can be translated as leftist, or more precisely, that has the power to convince or spread leftist ideology, in a derogatory way.
[21] Diretrizes gerais aos Ministérios tendo em vista a situação criada pelo estado de guerra na Europa. Pasta 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. Seção da Correspondência Especial (SCE). Maços temáticos secretos. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty – Brasília (AHI-BSB).

restructured Itamaraty's national security section, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

1.3 Concluding remarks

This chapter intends to give an overview of the origins of anti-communism in Itamaraty – when analysing the sources, anti-communism appears as an institutionalized force inside the Brazilian diplomatic corps. By taking into account the kinship ties that bounded the diplomats in the early 20th century and the social origins of those diplomats through their memoirs, we were able to reconstruct the diplomatic habitus and the diplomatic field of that period.

The diplomatic habitus and kinship ties reinforced the conservative esprit de corps of Itamaraty, marked by gender and race bias. Indeed, there were exceptions – Odette de Carvalho e Souza being one of them. She was a career diplomat, and a woman. However, she was also responsible for creating the structure that enabled Itamaraty to act as part of the dictatorship's security apparatus – in her case, ideology came first, and maybe this was fundamental for her growth inside the ministry.

At the same time, we realize that not every diplomat at the time was conservative or anti-communist, nor that they have remained so for the rest of their careers – the examples of San Tiago Dantas and Jayme de Azevedo Rodrigues contradict this assumption, as do others still to be mentioned in the following chapters. However, it is also true that the young diplomats who joined Itamaraty's ranks during the 1930s leaned towards a more conservative ideology, and some of them openly supported *integralismo*. Those diplomats are going to play important roles 30 years later in the formulation of the military dictatorship's "ideological foreign policy", with the loudest examples being Câmara Canto and Pio Corrêa.

The beginning of the Cold War will lead to a change in the tone used in the fight against the communist threat. Until the end of World War II, the anti-communist struggle was based on the view of communism as a moral threat, and treated as a problem of social order. At the end of the 1940s, the "communist threat" started to be perceived as a threat to national security, a geopolitical matter, therefore provoking a change in the means used to fight communism. Hence, the next chapter will focus on the construction of Itamaraty's *cold warriors* inside the ministry's National Security

Section, as well as the ministry's collaboration with the Superior War College and the subsequent formulation of the National Security Doctrine, which dictated the anti-communist and anti-subversive agenda of the democratic period of 1945-1964.

CHAPTER TWO - ITAMARATY'S *COLD WARRIORS* (1947-1964)

The year 1945 marked a new era in international politics. With the defeat of Nazi-fascism during World War II, the world saw the emergence of two Allied countries as superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries fostered two distinct ideological systems, and their opposition would determine the world's faith for the next 40 years. The binary division between the capitalist West and the socialist world and the rivalry between the two superpowers – known as the Cold War – would have long-lasting effects in the politics of peripheral countries in the international system.[22]

Between 1945 and 1947, the Third World remained under the radar of strategic and security concerns for the United States (McMahon, 2017). As baffling as it might seem, the United States assisted Latin American countries to establish or normalize relations with the Soviet Union the immediate post-war years. In the Brazilian case, the U.S had been trying to bring Brazil and the Soviet Union together since World War II (Caterina 2019, 46). In the aftermath of the War, Joseph Grew, the undersecretary of State to President Harry Truman (1945 – 1953), facilitated contact between Soviet and Brazilian diplomats (Rabe, The Killing Zone - the United States wages Cold War in Latin America 2016, 30), and in April 1945 Soviet-Brazilian relations were reestablished, although at frail grounds (Caterina 2019).

This "honeymoon phase" would be brief, though. By 1947, President Truman would initiate his politics of containment of Soviet expansion and enforece the Truman Doctrine, whose main focus was the European continent, at the time devastated by war. Since it was not considered a centrepiece of the Cold War strategic puzzle, Latin America was left aside to the dismay of many Latin American leaders.

In truth, both the United States and the Soviet Union perceived the region's problems as a local, hemispheric questions (Brevins, 2020). In 1947, the United States and Latin American countries signed the Rio Treaty (TIAR – *Tratado Interamericano de Assistência Recíproca*), which provided the terms for hemispheric defence, tying Latin-American countries up in case of a Soviet offensive against the United States.

[22] Although there is some discussion in the literature regarding the meaning of the word "periphery", many used it as a synonym of the "Third Word" during the Cold War era (McMahon 2017). Thus, I will use both terms interchangeably.

Truman's staff were aware that anti-communist policies in Latin America could endorse the rise of authoritarian figures, yet US policymakers would rather support a pro-American authoritarian regime than deal with nationalist governments critical of US policy towards the region – leftist or not (Rabe, 2016).

Notwithstanding, after World War II, Latin America witnessed a period of democratic bloom, with the fall of many authoritarian regimes and the rise of social movements and leftist parties (Bethell and Roxborough, 1988). In the Brazilian case, the country witnessed a period of political effervescence and democratic development. Between 1945 and 1964, Brazil saw the rise of social movements and the strengthening of new political ideas from left to right. The country's modernization also led to debates regarding the best economic model across the political spectrum. Discussions envolved from partisans of the modernization theory to the national-developmental thought – the latter were inspired by the ideas born at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Ribeiro 2021). Brazil, like many other Third World countries, was in search for its own path towards development.

In 1945, communist leader Luís Carlos Prestes was granted amnesty by the government of Getúlio Vargas, along with other *Estado Novo* political prisoners, and the Brazilian Communist Party was once again legalized, soon becaming an important political force – between 130 to 220 thousand Brazilians were affiliated to PCB between 1946 and 1947 (Schwarcz and Starling 2015, Caterina 2019). This, however, led to a strong anti-communist backlash from many sectors of Brazilian society.

As discussed in the previous chapter, anti-communism was not new to Brazil and had existed since long before the beginning of the Cold War. Moreover, Brazil developed an anti-communism of its own kind, different from the anti-communist doctrine developed in the United States. However, the Cold War helped change the perception of what the subversive, communist menace was. Whereas until 1945 Communism was seen as a matter of social order, after 1945 Communism replaced Nazi-Fascism as the biggest foreign threat to national security (Brevins, 2020; Setemy, 2013).

In 1945 the Armed Forces forced Getúlio Vargas to step down from office, thus ending the *Estado Novo* (Schwarcz and Starling 2015). New elections were called, and

General Eurico Gaspar Dutra – Vargas' former War Minister - was elected. He took office in 1946, serving until 1951. His government was responsible for outlawing PCB for the second time in its history, and for breaking diplomatic relations with the with the Soviet Union – all of it in 1947.[23] In 1949, the Superior War College (ESG - *Escola Superior de Guerra),* was founded. Inspired by the School of the Americas, ESG was established as the place to discuss matters of strategy, defence, and development; and to determine what would then be the national interest. For Schwarcz and Starling (2015, p. 387), 1945 marked a shift on how the Armed Forces perceived themselves:

> From 1945 onwards, the Army was not just a modern institution (...); it had become a qualitatively different and, in political terms, far more lethal institution: an autonomous, interventionist force, convinced of being the only one capable of forming a well-trained elite, with a national vision and prepared to act in the public arena.

Within that context, the information community was reorganized: in 1946 the National Security Council was restructured, and each of the National Security Sections in the civilian ministries were reshaped. This chapter will address, in particular, how Itamaraty's National Security Section was structured during the first decades of the Cold War. It will also look into the role played by career diplomats collaborating with ESG in the formulation of the National Security Doctrine. A deeper exam of this cooperation will help us understand how and why Itamaraty's collaboration with the military dictatorship in 1964 happened, shedding light at the ministry's pretense neutrality and autonomy in comparison to other civilian ministries.

2.1 Itamaraty's National Security Section

In September 1946, the Brazilian Congress sanctioned the Decree-Law 9.775 and 9.775-A, which determined the assignments of the National Security Council. The Decree-Law stated that the National Security Council would be responsible for "studying matters related to national security."[24] The CSN would be under the direct responsibility of the President and would be constituted of the Ministers of State, the presidential Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Decree-Law also demanded each civilian ministry had a National Security Section. Itamaraty had had its own National Security section since 1939. Now, following the

[23] For a more detailed account of Brazilian-Soviet relations during the Cold War see Gianfranco Caterina's PhD dissertation (2019).
[24] Decreto-Lei nº 9.775, de 6 de Setembro de 1946 < https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/declei/1940-1949/decreto-lei-9775-6-setembro-1946-417547-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html >. Access: 05.05.2021

Decree-Law and through the decree 23.944 of 28 October, 1947, the ministry would restructure it.[25]

The decree 23.944 was signed by Dutra's foreign minister, Raul Fernandes (1946-1951). It stipulated how the National Security section should be organized: it was going to be directly subordinated to the Foreign Minister and was supposed to work with CSN's secretary-general. Its focus was the analysis of any matter related to national security.[26] Beyond the monitoring of any person of interest and the exchange of information, Itamaraty's National Security Section should also 'organize propaganda and counterpropaganda abroad, in common agreement with the Federal Information Service'[27] and

> Art. 9 – d) ensure the defence of the interests and the good name of Brazil in the international arena, suggesting the following measures to the Foreign Minister:
>
> 1) The solution of economic and political problems linked towards international activity.
> 2) Adopt procedures in order to keep the perfect coordination between the political-military and political-international levels unaltered;
> **3) Guidance towards foreign propaganda and ways to increase the country's prestige abroad**[28]

Five career diplomats composed the newly restructured Security Section: they were necessarily the heads of Itamaraty's Border, Economic and Political divisions, in which the latter would be appointed head of the NSS. The security section would be under the responsibility of Itamaraty's Secretary-General, the second-highest position in the ministry's hierarchy, after the Foreign Minister itself.[29]

The promulgation of the decree-law 9.775 and the decree 23.944 only came to institutionalise a common practice that within the ministry: documents from the Political Division (D.Po), which was then subordinated to the Political and Cultural Department, show that Itamaraty was already in the business of monitoring subversive activities in Brazil and abroad. In a memo from August 7, 1946, the interim head of the DPCP

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[25] Ofício S/N. Reorganização da Seção de Segurança Nacional. Jan 02,1959. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB.

[26] Aviso from Hildebrando Accioly to General Alcio Souto. Regulamento Interno da Seção de Segurança Nacional do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Jul 10, 1947. Presidência da República 9/3/9 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional – Ofícios – 1943-58. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty – Rio de Janeiro (AHI-RJ). and Regimento Interno da Seção de Segurança Nacional do Ministério das relações Exteriores. Oct 25, 1947. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

[27] idem, p.2. Emphasis added.

[28] Idem, p.4.

[29] Idem, p. 2

asked with urgency for copies of any information that the diplomatic and consular missions may have had regarding communism[30]. In February 1947, Antonio Camillo de Oliveira, then head of DPCP, sent a memorandum to Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly, Itamaraty's Secretary-General, regarding Brazil joining the International Refugee Organization (IRO) - the predecessor of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), founded in 1952. In this memo, Camillo de Oliveira reflects whether Brazil should be a part of the IRO, and argues:

> 3. Should Brazil be a member of the Organization?
>
> 4. It seems to me that it will not suit. It is known that among the thousands of refugees and displaced people whose future depends on I.R.O, there are a considerable number of Jews, of sick people, of outlaws and nationless people, which we will be obliged to receive, in tow of an extremely limited number of immigrants of real use to us
>
> 5. Would not be better to allocate this respectable amount of money to bring to Brazil immigrants from our traditional sources of immigration, selected by us for the population of the Brazilian hinterland?[31]

Camillo de Oliveira claimed it would be better for Brazil, instead of disbursing the annual quota of £ 51,000 to the IRO, to use this amount to foment the entrance of immigrants better suited to the national project, referring to immigrants of European origin. Interestingly, he puts the admittance of Jewish refugees on the same plate as the entrance of sick, outlaws and nationless people – *"gente sem lei nem grei,"* as he states in the document. From the beginning of the 20th century until World War II, antisemitism was an essential part of the anti-communist discourse - in the 1930s, communism was depicted by the Brazilian media as an alien ideology brought to the country by foreigners; many times, it was personified in the figure of the Jewish immigrant. Not only the media outlets, but the catholic church and conservative movements used to equalize communism with the "Semitic issue" (Sá Motta, 2000; Setemy, 2013).

The Cold War rivalry replaced antisemitism in the Brazilian anti-communist imaginary, especially after World War II. However, the "semitic question" was still a concern. Anti-communist militants spoke of a "Russian-Jewish" conspiracy (Sá Motta,

[30] Memorandum para os Srs. Chefes das Divisões subordinadas ao Departamento Político e Cultural. Comunicação sobre comunismo. Aug 7, 1946. 135/3/2. Departamento Político e Cultural. Informações e relatórios. Março 1946-1954. AHI-RJ.
[31] Memorandum para o sr. Secretário Geral. Organização Internacional de Refugiados. Feb 14, 1947. 135/3/2. Departamento Político e Cultural. Informações e relatórios. Março 1946-1954. AHI-RJ.

2000) and the diplomatic discourse, as seen above, persistently saw the immigration from people of Jewish background to Brazil with suspicion.

During his time as head of DPCP, Camillo de Oliveira became professionally close to Câmara Canto and Pio Corrêa. In August 1948 he designated Câmara Canto to work at his cabinet, and in that same year, he appointed Manoel Pio Corrêa as one of his advisors during the third UN General Assembly. Pio Corrêa described Camillo de Oliveira as 'an excellent professional, a fine expert in International Law and a historian of merit' (Pio Corrêa 1995, p. 314). Twelve years later, in 1960, Pio Corrêa would become chief of the Cultural and Political Department, replacing Odette de Carvalho e Souza.

Camillo de Oliveira remained in charge of DPCP until 1949; after which he became Secretary-General to Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes from 1955 to 1956. From 1956 to 1966 he was appointed director of the Rio Branco Institute. While acting as its director, he was assigned to preside the investigation committee held at Itamaraty in the aftermath of the 1964 Coup D'état, which removed from office many diplomats involved with João Goulart's PEI. Five years later, his protégé Câmara Canto would preside, in January 1969, the investigation committee held a month after the promulgation of the Institutional Act no. 5 in December 1968 (Carmo 2018).

2.1.1 The NSS during the second Vargas government (1950 – 1954)

Getúlio Vargas returned as President after being democratically elected in 1950; he took office in January 1951 and remained in office until his death by suicide in 1954. During his term, Vargas had two foreign ministers: João Neves da Fontoura, who acted as Foreign Minister from January 1951 to June 1953, and Vicente Rao, from July 1953 to his suicide in August 1954.

The activities of the National Security Section of Itamaraty during the early years of the Vargas administration are poorly documented. Although the extent of NSS' activities from 1950 to 1952 cannot be measured, we can assume that the cabinet of the Foreign Minister still worked closely with the military at the National Security Council. Cyro de Freitas Valle,[32] Itamaraty's Secretary-General, sent official notes to

[32] Cyro de Freitas Valle is known for participating in the conference that wrote the United Nations Charter in 1945 and was designated Brazil's plenipotentiary delegate to the 1st UN General Assembly (CPDOC, online). Less mentioned in his biography, however, are his sympathies towards the Axis and his

the National Security Council regarding Communist activities in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Japan and the Soviet Union as well as anti-communist activities in the United States.

In 1951, the ministry's NSS was under the responsibility of Henrique de Souza Gomes, who at the time was head of the DPo. He had already worked for the security section before – in 1943 he was appointed secretary of the NSS. Cyro de Freitas Valle had appointed Souza Gomes to represent Itamaraty before the CSN in 1950.[33]

In 1952 Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura invited Vasco Leitão da Cunha, who at the time was working at the Brazilian embassy in Helsinki, Finland, to take over the Cultural and Political Department. In his memoirs, Leitão da Cunha claims that he accepted since it was a personal request from Neves da Fontoura (Cunha, 1994). He took office on August 1st, 1952[34]. As he was head of the DPCP, he was also the head of the ministry's NSS. However, when asked about it in his memoirs, Leitão da Cunha is dismissive, stating that he oversaw the section *ex officio*, briefly justifying that every civilian ministry ought to have a security section (Cunha, 1994, p. 167).

Concurring with Leitão da Cunha's appointment as head of the Cultural and Political Department, General Aguinaldo Caiado de Castro wrote a note on August 7, 1952, addressed to Neves da Fontoura claiming that:

> 1. Subversive propaganda has gradually intensified inside the Armed Forces, the Public Administration, and other activities in the country, as is of common knowledge. This kind of propaganda takes several forms, mainly aiming at:
>
> - the disorganization of services;
>
> - the demoralization of authorities;
>
> - the split of the Armed Forces;
>
> - the weakening of international relations;
>
> - general restlessness.

antisemitic views while serving as Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin from 1939 to 1942, where he supported Vargas' politics of denying visa for jewish refugees (Lesser 1994; 1995). Notwithstanding, Dávila (2010) claims that later in life Freitas Valle grew away from the antisemitism to embrace the thesis of racial democracy, supporting Jânio Quadros and João Goulart's Independent Foreign Policy towards the African continent, for example.

[33] Souza Gomes was promoted to head of the Cultural and Political Division in 1955, commanding the DPCP until 1956.

[34]Vasco Leitão da Cunha to General Aguinaldo Caiado de Castro. Sep 18, 1952. Presidência da República. 9/3/9. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Ofícios. 1943-58. AHI RJ.

> Agitators have been trying to infiltrate all of the nation's key activities, with the aim of growing a favourable climate to disturb our international relations, especially with the United States, preventing the fulfilment of military agreements and subverting the democratic regime.
>
> 2. The security of the Nation's internal life and the commitments assumed for the defence of the American Continent require urgent measures, in order to keep the Government permanently informed of the action of subversive elements and the influence that foreign States may exert in international situations that are of interest to Brazil.
>
> 3. As the forgoing, the President entrusted me to request Your Excellency to organize an Information Service under the responsibility of the National Security Section, with the following attributions within the scope of that Ministry:
>
> - establish the search for information;
>
> - organize counter-propaganda;
>
> - fight against sabotage;
>
> - identify suspicious elements placed in different offices;
>
> - propose measures to neutralize subversive action.
>
> 4. It is my duty to inform your Excellency that the above measure results from the decision of the PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC to organize the Federal Information Service, in charge of this Secretariat, which will coordinate all the Information Services created in the country.[35]

At the time, Caiado de Castro was Vargas' head of the Military Cabinet and acted as Secretary-General for the National Security Council. He is mentioned in Pio Corrêa's memoir as an ESG fellow, both being part of the class of 1950 (the first class graduated from ESG). After Caiado de Castro was elected Senator in 1954, he became a member of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee and was part of the Committee hearing that approved Pio Corrêa to serve as Ambassador in Mexico in 1960 (Pio Corrêa, 1995; CPDOC, online).

2.1.2 The National Security Law and the Célula Bolívar episode

In 1953, the Brazilian government sanctioned the new National Security Law (Law 1.802 from January 5, 1953), which defined 'crimes against the State and the Political and Social Order'[36]. According to Plastino, Barreto e Sarmanho (2020), it replaced the National Security Law that had been in force during the Estado Novo, and limited the competence of the Military Justice to rule on crimes against national security. However, it criminalized any kind of association, affiliation with and

[35] General Caiado de Castro to Minister João Neves da Fontoura. Aug 7, 1952. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[36] Presidência da República. Casa Civil. Subchefia para assuntos jurídicos. Lei no. 1802 de 5 de Janeiro de 1953 <L1802 (planalto.gov.br)>

reorganization of 'political parties and associations dissolved by force of legal provision'[37], creating a loophole for the criminalization of activities that may be considered "subversive", "leftist" and/or "communist". Marques (2020) claims that 'the initiative was framed within a context of international polarization and anti-communist repression".

While acting as the head of the National Security Council, General Caiado de Castro drafted a bill that was presented by President Vargas' to Congress on August 5, 1953: Bill 3.453 of 1953, which "defines crimes of infidelity to the homeland and hostility to the form of Government and other measures."[38]. According to the bill:

> Art. 3o - Constitutes, for the Brazilian citizen, a crime of infidelity to the country, and for the foreigner who is in the country or resides there, of hostility to the form of Government, any activity, ostensible or clandestine (...) in favour of a political party not legalized or to which registration was denied or cancelled by the Superior Electoral Court (...) or even of an international or foreign organization whose program or action contravenes the democratic regime.

Moreover,

> Art. 5o. If the activity provided for in this law is performed by a tenured civil servant or an officer of the armed forces (...) the indicted person will be inactive, without the right to any benefits or remuneration (...).[39]

The explanatory memorandum of the National Security Council argued that the bill should be approved, among other things, due to

> Your Excellency's recent decisions, **in the case of Itamaraty employees involved in subversive activities** and of the retired military who have been giving personal support to the aforementioned campaigns with a communist background, had extraordinary repercussions in public opinion, deserving general applause.
>
> These expressions of valuable support for Your Excellency's actions have the greatest reach: they represent the desire of the Nation, expressed by the voice of its Congressmen, the press, and people of great responsibility, to put an end to these anti-democratic campaigns that grow day by day, mainly by those who should be more committed to defending the regime.[40]

The bill did not pass (Marques, 2020), but the CSN's explanatory memorandum to Congress referred to the episode known as *Célula Bolívar*, or "Bolívar Cell" to arguue in its favor. In June 1952, Carlos Lacerda – Getúlio Vargas' greatest political adversary - published an article in his newspaper *Tribuna da Imprensa*, where he accused a

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[37] Idem.
[38] Diário do Congresso Nacional, Seção I, 6.08.1953 p. 152 <imagem.camara.gov.br/Imagem/d/pdf/DCD06AGO1953.pdf#page=1>
[39] Idem.
[40] Diário do Congresso Nacional, Seção I, 6.08.1953 p. 152 (emphasis added) (imagem.camara.gov.br/Imagem/d/pdf/DCD06AGO1953.pdf#page=1)

group of diplomats of organizing a communist cell inside Itamaraty. This was not the first accusation of that sort: in the 1920s, Raul Paranhos do Rio Branco – Baron of Rio Branco's son - claimed that there were communist sympathizers who were organizing a communist cell inside the ministry, although he had no supporting evidence whatsoever (Torres, 2013).

The case was triggered by the interception of personal correspondence between the diplomat and poet João Cabral de Melo Neto, who was serving in London at the time, and Paulo Augusto Cotrim Rodrigues Pereira, then the Brazilian vice-consul in Hamburg, Germany. In this letter, Melo Neto invited Cotrim to write an article, anonymously, to a magazine published by the British Labour Party regarding Brazil's economic problems. The letter was intercepted by fellow diplomat Mário Calábria, at the time serving in Damascus[41]. According to Vasconcelos (apud Galve, 2016), Calábria reported the letter to minister João Neves da Fontoura, who shelved the case. The government's dismissal prompted Calábria to get in touch with Vargas' biggest opponent, Carlos Lacerda.

In June 1952, Lacerda published an article in his newspaper *Tribuna da Impresa*, accusing a group of diplomats of organizing a communist cell inside Itamaraty – which he branded *Célula Bolívar*. Besides João Cabral de Melo Neto and Paulo Augusto Cotrim, also integrated the communist cell Antonio Houaiss, Jatyr de Almeida Rodrigues, and Amaury Banhos Porto de Oliveira, all career diplomats. The accusation later resonated in an article written at newspaper *O Globo*. Because of the content of the charges, an internal investigation committee was set up at Itamaraty, presided by secretary-general Hildebrando Accioly.

Houaiss, Almeida Rodrigues, Porto de Oliveira and Cotrim were put on forced leave without compensation by Getúlio Vargas and João Neves da Fontoura in 1953, whereas João Cabral de Melo Neto, in addition to being put on forced leave, was indicted at the *Departamento de Ordem Política e Social* (DOPS). In 1954, the Brazilian Supreme Court annulled the internal investigation committee's ruling and reinstated the diplomats (Almeida, 2008; Brasil, 2014; Galve, 2016; Carmo 2018; Marques, 2020).

[41] FUNAG. Anuário 1953.

This happened while Vasco Leitão da Cunha was head of Itamaraty's National Security Section, albeit no documents that may link Leitão da Cunha to the *Célular Bolívar* case were found. Nevertheless, ten years later, the internal investigation committee set in motion by Camillo de Oliveira after the 1964 Coup D'état, while Leitão da Cunha was foreign minister, re-investigated all the names involved in the Célula Bolívar case, once again accused of establishing a communist cell inside the ministry. In the end, Antonio Houaiss and Jatyr de Almeida Rodrigues were exonerated (Almeida, 2008; Carmo, 2018;). Allegedly, João Cabral de Melo Neto was spared from the investigation committee because president Castelo Branco was an admirer of Melo Neto's most prominent work, *Morte e Vida Severina* (Galve, 2016).

Also in 1954, General Caiado de Castro, on behalf of the National Security Council, asked Foreign Minister Vicente Rao to reorganize the ministry's National Security Section, since

> 5. (...) the infiltration of agitators in public activities continue to affect the security of the nation's internal life and its commitments to the defence of the American continent.
>
> (...)
>
> 7. Everything suggests that these subversive activities follow a general plan devised by Soviet Russia which, under the guise of ideologies with predictable ends, intervenes, more or less effectively, in the public life of American countries (...) putting in danger the constitutional processes, discrediting the authority and the law, until the implantation of the despotic political system reigning in the peoples under its domain.[42]

On February 19, 1954, Leitão da Cunha sent a note to Caiado de Castro, in which he saw to Castro's request to send someone from inside Itamaraty to assist with the CNS (National Security Council) work. He then put the second secretary Arthur Gouveia Portella at the National Security Council disposal.[43] Leitão da Cunha's time as chief of the ministry's NSS was considered by diplomats a period when "little by little it [the council] ceased to exist", in diplomat Meira Penna's words.[44] However, while

[42] Ofício 247. Apr 2, 1954. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB, p.2.
[43] Vasco Leitão da Cunha to General Caiado de Castro. Feb 19, 1954. Presidência da República. 9/3/9. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Ofícios (expedidos). 1943-1958. AHI-RJ.
[44] Ofício S/N. Reorganização da Seção de Segurança Nacional. Jan 02,1959. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB. P 2 and Seção de Segurança Nacional. Relatório Mensal. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB. Meira Penna (1917 – 2017) entered Itamaraty in 1938, the same year as Pio Corrêa and Câmara Canto, and worked as a diplomat until his retirement in 1981. He is, to this day, well known in Brazilian conservative circles as an exponent of the so called liberal-conservative thought with affiliations with the Austrian Economic School. His works equal Nazism with Marxism and

NSS' activities might have diminished during Leitão da Cunha's tenure, the documents show that it did not cease to exist.

After Vargas' death by suicide on August 24, 1954, vice-president Café Filho took office, governing until 1955. That same year, the National Security Council began to discuss the creation of a *Serviço Nacional de Informações* (SNI), a national information service to integrate Brazil's information community. SNI would only be created ten years later, in 1964, and would become the main institution of the Military Dictatorship; it is worth noticing, though, that not only ten years before the coup the creation of a SNI was being discussed, but also that Itamaraty played an important role in this debate.

In 1955, Raul Fernandes, President Café Filho's foreign minister, sent a note to General Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes Távora, CSN secretary general, where he designaated diplomat Jorge de Sá Almeida to act as Itamaraty representative in the working group created to discuss SNI's implementation.[45] Sá Almeida was also working for the ministry's National Security Section at the time.[46] In a document dated from June 1st, 1955 and marked as secret, he wrote to the head of the NSS, Henrique de Souza Gomes, regarding the working group; he explained that the objective of the creation of a centralized information service was to "oversee, throughout the national territory, information activities of interest to national security".[47]

The idea of creating the SNI was part of a reformulation of the National Security Council, which had been sent to Congress under the bill 176 of 1955.[48] According to Sá de Almeida's report, the working group was composed of four members of the military - namely Colonel Bettânio Guimarães, the chief of staff of the National Security

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is a call for action against the "intelligentsia" that dominates the intellectual and mediatic circles in Brazil. He embraced the neoliberal critique of the state, at the same time he supported the authoritarian developmentalism of the military regime (Meira Penna, 1991; 1994; 1973). He was a supporter of the 1964 Coup and served as Ambassador in Nigeria until 1965. Regarding Meira Penna's time in Nigeria see Davila (2010). African-brazilian actor Antonio Pitanga, which was invited by Itamaraty to Nigeria to promote the film Ganga Zumba, where he played the main role, stated that "Meira Penna was totally racist" (Davila, 2010, p. 86). For reasons unknown, he was also assigned by Itamaraty to work with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1958. Meira Penna studied at ESG in 1965.

[45] Aviso from Minister Raul Fernandes to General Juarez Távora. Designação do Secretário Jorge de Sá Almeida. Presidência da República. 9/3/9. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Ofícios (expedidos). 1943-1958. AHI-RJ.

[46] FUNAG. Anuário 1983.

[47] Ofício secreto S/N. Serviço Nacional de Informações. Jun 1, 1955. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

[48] *DCD20ABR1955 (camara.gov.br)

Council's Secretary-General; Colonel Haroldo Azambuja, head of CSN's 2nd section; an ESG representative, Colonel Heitor Almeida Herrera, and the representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel Daltro Santos – and three civilians.

Besides Sá de Almeida, other civilians were Olavo de Lima Rangel, a police chief, representing the Federal Department of Public Safety, and a public officer from *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)*, Alceu Wightman de Carvalho.[49] Coincidently or not, the three civilians had been colleagues at ESG, all of them graduating from the class of 1954.[50]

Jorge Sá de Almeida, states in the report that the meetings focused on discussing 'doctrinal aspects' of information that could be of national security interest. The definition of the terms used by the Armed Foreces were, according to Sá de Almeida, inspired by the "American experience"; hence the prevalence of terminology used in the U.S.[51] Furthermore, the committee discussed the need for developing a Foreign Information Division inside the SNI, which would be responsible for

> Keeping the head of the SNI properly informed about the potential of countries or groups of countries of interest to the national security policy
>
> (…)
>
> Develop the strategic information plan from abroad, in accordance with the guidelines issued by the head of the national information service
>
> b) Collect reports, prepare and disseminate information from abroad
>
> c) guide, coordinate and control information activities from abroad
>
> d) carry out a survey and strategic assessment of the potential of countries or groups of countries of interest to the National Security Policy

[49] While there is little information of Alceu Wightman de Carvalho - Dreifus (1987) mentions that Carvalho lectured at the IPES/IBAD complex in 1963 on "Economic- and social implications of the demographic explosion" - Olavo de Lima Rangel is an interesting character. During his years active, he produced a considerable number of leaflets, pamphlets, and handouts regarding foreign subversive activity in Brazil. In a report presumably from the 1950s entitled *Extremismo e Espionagem* (Extremism and Espionage), where he analyses "clandestine information operations, practiced by nations or groups with a totalitarian ideology" (Arquivo Nacional, p.3). In the report, he describes German espionage methods and network in Brazil during World War II and compares it with the strategies he claimed were used by the Soviet Union in Brazil, showing how subversive activities took place in the country. For Lima Rangel, the difference between the Soviet Union and the Axis was that, while Nazi-fascism had one state as a leader – whereas Japan, Italy or Germany – USSR is an "organism put at the service of an internationalist social revolution" (Arquivo Nacional, p.18). See Extremismos e Espionagem. Arquivo Nacional. BR.AN.RIO.X9.0.TAI.1/10, p.3. Available at: http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br_rjanrio_x9/0/tai/0001/0010/br_rjanrio_x9_0_tai_0001_0010_d0001de0001.pdf. Access: 05 may 2022

[50] Escola Superior de Guerra. Diplomados. Available at https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/esg/a-esg/diplomados/arquivos/caepe/caepe1954.pdf. Access: 05 May 2022

[51] Ofício secreto S/N. Serviço Nacional de Informações. Jun 1, 1955. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB p.2

> 2) Carry out any other surveys relating to abroad, which are determined by the head of the National Information Service.[52]

The attributions of the SNI's international division, as we can see, were similar to CIEX's, the dictatorship's foreign information centre, which would be established 11 years later, in 1966, by Manoel Pio Corrêa. Moreover, the use of American terminology by the Brazilian Armed Forces regarding the definition of information, national security, and threat, as noted by Sá de Almeida, is flagrant.

This shows the influence of Cold War rhetoric in the military discourse, evidently influenced by the military exchange between the United States and Latin America, as well as third world countries elsewhere, after the beginning of the Cold War. This exchange flourished as soldiers and other military personnel were sent from Third World countries to study at US military academies, such as the School of the Americas, Fort Gulick and Fort Lavensworth. The geopolitical thought of the Cold War would deeply influence the formulation of military doctrines in Brazil in the coming years - especially the National Security Doctrine, as we will see in the following section of this chapter.

There is a tendency to see a dualism or a dispute between Itamaraty and other institutions concerning the formulation of foreign policy. Usually, the more ideological formulation of Brazilian foreign policy during the Cold War is attributed to the military, especially to officials linked to the Superior War College. However, there was more collaboration between diplomats and the military than meets the eye. Diplomats were conscious that the structure that already existed inside the ministry could help the military monitor communist activities in Brazil and abroad. In that same report, Sá de Almeida states that the ministry's National Security Section can perform the functions assigned by the SNI. A few months prior to the establishment of the working group, minister Raul Fernandes wrote a note to Gen. Juarez Távora regarding the alterations that should be made in each civilian security section to meet National Security Council's guidelines. For Raul Fernandes,

> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not be equated with other non-military ministries, as it exercises, within its sphere of competence, functions that make it more sensitive to the interests and requirements of national security. It is therefore unnecessary to provide it with a Security Section with a broader

[52] Idem, p.4

> structure than the current one, to carry out tasks that are normally the responsibility of bodies already operating in the House.[53]

Itamaraty's exceptionality, evoked by both diplomats and academics, was brought up by the minister, corroborating both the idea that the diplomatic career focused mostly on information gathering (Setemy, 2013), and the self-perception of uniqueness: a diplomat stands one level above all other civil servants, having their thoughts and actions reflect on state matters, like military officials do. During Raul Fernandes' tenure, several official notes from the minister's cabinet were directed to the national security council regarding possible communist activities in other countries, especially in Europe and Latin America, and supposed infiltration of communist propaganda in Brazil[54]. Those notes seemed to fit the report template proposed by the national security council, which recommended that each report should describe "subversive activities" such as sabotage, political doctrines contrary to the regime - Communism, *integralismo*, and Peronism for instance -, and subversive activities inside governmental bodies, the armed forces and the press.[55]

At times, however, the level of demand from the national security council towards Itamaraty seemed to overwhelm the ministry. In a document from March 8th, 1956, ambassador Jayme Sloan Chermont, who was acting as NSS interim director at the time, wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Luiz de França Oliveira, head of the second section of the National Security Council. The National Security Council, apparently, had asked the NSS to provide a report for every foreign country, which Ambassador Chermont claimed to be impossible. The National Security Section would undergo reform during Juscelino Kubitschek's administration.

2.1.3 Kubitschek and the reformulation of the information community (1956-1960)

When Juscelino Kubistchek became president of Brazil in 1956, the country and the world were changing. The 1950s were an effervescent period for Brazil, culturally and intellectually. Think tanks such as the *Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros* (ISEB) and the line of thought developed by economists such as Celso Furtado at

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[53] Minister Raul Fernandes to General Juarez Tavora. Seção de Segurança Nacional do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. May 24, 1955. Presidência da República. 9/3/9. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Ofícios (expedidos). 1943-1958. AHI-RJ.

[54] Ofício S/N. Propaganda ideológica estrangeira no Brasil. Presidência da República. 9/3/9. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Ofícios (expedidos). 1943-1958. AHI RJ.

[55] Modelo de relatório. Ofício S/N. Seção de segurança nacional. Mar 8, 1956. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB.

ECLAC addressed the question of Brazil's underdevelopment. In the 1950s Brazil saw the birth of the rural social movement known as *Ligas Camponesas* (peasant leagues) in the Northeast, fighting for "radical agrarian reform (…) [and] to end coercive rural labour systems" (Sarzynski 2018, 8).[56] The cultural landscape of Brazil saw the birth of *Bossa Nova* and *Cinema Novo,* and the rise of an urban middle class (Schwarcz and Starling 2015, Ribeiro 2021).

Kubitschek's government became known for his developmentalist urge, then embedded in his presidential slogan *"50 anos em 5"*, which meant that he wanted Brazil to take a leap into the developed world, and that his government would deliver the equivalent to 50 years of progress in only five years. He summarized his plan into what he called *Plano de metas,* or a set of goals to industrialize and modernize Brazil in record time; this plan would culminate in the creation and transfer of the new capital, Brasília.

With regard to Kubitschek's foreign policy, it is important to realize that the world was going through important changes in the 1950s – the decolonization movement in the Asian and African continents, the Bandung conference in 1955 and the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and, most importantly for hemispheric relations, the Cuban Revolution (1959). Kubitschek, albeit pro-West, was also a pragmatic man; therefore, his term would be known for the restoration of trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union in 1958 (Caterina 2019).

Kubitschek's foreign policy understood that underdevelopment was a great force that could ignite popular upheavals. In 1959, he founded SUDENE (Superintendência de desenvolvimento do Nordeste), the Northeast development superintendency, which was led by former ECLAC-economist Celso Furtado. In the hemispheric context, he attempted to create *Operação Pan Americana (OPA)*, or Pan-American Operation, inspired by the Marshall Plan in Europe in 1958.

Although OPA was mostly ignored by the United States as a viable development plan to Latin America, the Cuban Revolution in 1959 turned on the alert in the American government that underdevelopment could be a shortcut for a social unrest that could

[56] Especially after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the *Ligas Camponesas* movement became a focus of concern of the United States in the realm of the Cold War. For more information see Sarzynski (2018); Schwarcz and Starling (2015)

eventually be capitalized by the communist movement. Therefore, when John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he launched the Alliance for Progress initiative, which expected to provide 20 billion dollars throughout ten years to foster development in Latin America (Loureiro, 2020).

Despite his pragmatism and his developmental policies, Kubitschek was also fiercely anti-communist, and his government strenghtened the information community. Kubitschek was responsible for restructuring the SFICI – *Serviço Nacional de Infromações e Contra-Informações* (National Information and Counter-Information Service), first created by the decree-law 9.775 from 1946, the same that installed the National Security Council. SIFICI was remodelled by Kubitschek to become more autonomous, following a mission to the United States to visit the country's information agencies – the CIA and the FBI. The SFICI was active until 1964, when it was replaced by the SNI (Brasil 2014).

Along with the SFICI, Kubitschek created the *Junta Coordenadora de Informações* (JCI) through the decrees 44.489 A of September, 15th and 45.040, of December 6th, 1958. The JCI was responsible for coordinating the services provided by the public administration to SFICI, and it had objectives concerning the fields of internal and external security. Concerning external security, the focus of the Joint Information Coordinator was to

> Get to know the potential and even the intentions of nations or groups of nations, whether members of strategic areas or not, whose actions may influence the achievement and safeguard of national interests[57].

During the first years of his administration, Kubitschek appointed José Carlos Macedo Soares as Foreign Minister, from 1956 to 1958. Throughout Macedo Soares' tenure, DPCP and the NSS were directed by Odette de Carvalho e Souza. *Dona Ó,* as mentioned in the previous chapter, had already worked closely with Macedo Soares during his first term as Foreign Minister, helping him institutionalize SEI in 1937, the division that preceded the national security section. Then, Carvalho e Souza became the first female diplomat to become head of division inside Itamaraty – after that, she became the first woman to become Ambassador, leading the Brazilian embassy in Tel-Aviv, Israel, from 1959 to 1961 and, later, the Brazilian embassy in San José, Costa

[57] Decreto no. 46.508-A de 20 de Julho de 1959. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB p. 2

Rica from 1961 to 1964 (Friaça, 2018). During her time as head of the DPCP, Carvalho e Souza kept the National Security Council informed about communist and subversive activities abroad[58] In 1959 she was replaced as head of the DPCP by João Augusto de Araújo Castro.[59]

Araújo Castro commanded the DPCP for a few months, from January to October 1959. Nevertheless, he was responsible for authorizing the restructuring of Itamaraty's National Security Section. In a memorandum from diplomat Amaral de Sampaio to the head of the Political Division, Luís Bastian Pinto, it is argued that, since Kubitschek reformulated the SIFICI and many diplomats were overwhelmed with their own work, it would be of Itamaraty's interest to restructure its security section, as

> 6. At the moment, the National Security Council and the General Staff of the Armed Forces are highly committed to the creation and operational improvement of the "National Information and Counter-Information Service" and the Strategic Information Course of the Superior War College, both very linked with the functions that the law assigned to Itamaraty's National Security Section.[60]

In a follow-up memorandum written to Araújo Castro, Bastian Pinto argues that the information given by Sampaio was aligned with previous conversations he and Castro had on the subject; notwithstanding the inability of structuring an autonomous Security Section, the ministry could "at least reorganize it accordingly with the suggestions mentioned above, provisionally keeping it within the DPo. With time we can give it the scope it shall have", to which Araújo Castro agreed.[61]

After SFICI's restructuration and the creation of JCI, Manoel Pio Corrêa became head of Itamaraty's Cultural and Political Department and of its Security Section, replacing Araújo Castro in October 1959. In his memoir, Pio Corrêa states that his time as head of DPCP was aligned with the political views – i.e anti-communism - of Kubitschek and new foreign minister Horácio Lafer (1959 – 1961). At the national security section, he was able to

> […] strongly keep Brazilian foreign policy within its traditional patterns, fostering relationships with serious and civilized countries, the Great Western Democracies [sic] which Brazil was allied in both World Wars, and keep in

[58] O. de Carvalho e Souza to Colonel Humberto de Souza Mello. Ante-projeto de lei sobre o SFICI. Nov 21, 1957. Presidência da República. 9/3/9. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Ofícios (expedidos). 1943-1958. AHI-RJ.
[59]FUNAG. Anuário 1959.
[60] Ofício S/N. Reorganização da Seção de Segurança Nacional. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[61] Idem

> close contact with neighbouring countries, especially those from the Río de La Plata Basin. In short, we prefigured the policy of concentric circles masterfully defined by President Castello Branco (Pio Corrêa, 1995 p.602)

Looking at Pio Corrêa's account with caution, it is interesting to notice that he compares Kubitschek's foreign policy to the one applied by Castello Branco. He diminishes the OPA initiative as a "gullible mistake" and maximizes the role of SIFICI, describing his activities as a crusade against soviet infiltration in Brazil, and depicts the country as one of the greatest pawns in the chessboard of the Cold War (Pio Corrêa, 1995). Contrasting with the available documents, what can be said is that while he was leading the National Security Section, Itamaraty contributed to the draft of the General Guidelines for Internal Security, written by the NSC in 1960.[62] The main purpose of those general guidelines was to "enable, in the different spheres of government action, the coordination of internal security planning, in particular the maintenance of public order, its preventive and repressive actions"[63]. One of the current national objectives (*objetivos nacionais atuais)* was to "neutralize communist action in Brazil".

For example, Itamaraty's secretary-general, ambassador Fernando Ramos de Alencar, wrote to General Nelson de Mello, NSC's secretary-general and suggested that after item 5.1.2 - which aimed to 'maintain a cautious attitude towards the member states of the Soviet Bloc'[64] – the following be added:

> Follow the principle, with regard to cultural relations with countries of the Soviet Bloc or under strong communist influence, that cultural relations are the result and instrument of political relations, which they tend to develop and complement and, as a result:
>
> a) do not maintain cultural relations with countries with which Brazil does not maintain diplomatic relations;
>
> b) do not allow the entry of people from such countries, under the pretext of artistic or intellectual manifestations;
>
> c) surround the cultural relations with those countries of the Soviet Bloc or under strong communist influence, with which Brazil maintains diplomatic relations with all the precautions required for the internal security[65].

In this document, Ramos de Alencar also suggests that in those same General Guidelines for Internal Security, guideline 5.2.3 ("To block soviet expansionism"[66]),

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[62] Ofício DPC 48. Planejamento de Segurança Interna. Jul 15, 1960. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[63] Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Secretaria-geral. Grupo de Estudos e Planejamentos. Secreto – Diretriz Geral para o planejamento da segurança interna. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. AHI BSB.
[64] Idem.
[65] Idem.
[66] Idem.

should be followed by the recommendation to "take the necessary measures to prevent the entry and circulation in Brazil of foreign financial resources intended to finance activities contrary to the interests of Internal Security". Ramos de Alencar also suggests a ban on conferences held in Brazil held by entities without UN and OAS recognition, with the exception of religious events; as well as banning the operation of foreign news agencies linked to communist countries or "under predominantly communist influence".[67]

2.1.4 Itamaraty's National Security Section under the Independent Foreign Policy

Jânio Quadros was elected in October 1960, to the surprise of many. He was considered an outsider, who gained prominence with an anti-corruption discourse that caught the attention of the traditional middle class. At the time, the Brazilian political system provided for the election of President and vice-president in separate tickets; and the winner of the vice-presidential ballot was João Goulart. He was on the slate alongside Henrique Teixeira Lott as the presidential candidate (Reis, 2014). In August 25, 1961, Jânio resigned and João Goulart became president. His political powers were limited, however. He was regarded with suspicion by the Armed Forces, foreign governments and Brazil's political and economic elite, and was only able to take over the Presidential chair after the establishment of a Parliamentary regime.

During Jânio Quadro's term, CSN's secretary-general, major-general Pedro Geraldo de Almeida sent to foreign minister Affonso Arinos de Mello Franco a top secret copy of the "regulation for the safeguarding of information of interest to national security"[68], which was followed by a memo from the foreign minister to then Itamaraty's secretary-general, Vasco Leitão da Cunha. It suggested that the Political Department did the following:

> a) the Political Department, every day, will select news referent to the international situation, which is capable of being explored to motivate mass unrest and also conspiratorial movements, in case such traces appear in the telegrams or other daily information;
>
> b) every Friday a summary of the weekly information, with slight explanation, must be sent, by air mail, to the Secretary-General of the Security Council in Brasilia.

[67] Idem.
[68] Ofício no. 245. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. May 18, 1961. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB.

> c) A copy of this secret memorandum must be sent to the same Secretary-General, so that His Excellency may find out about the measures we have taken and suggest others that he may find convenient[69].

Moreover, on March 13th, 1962, already during João Goulart's government, the secretary-general of the National Security Council, general Amaury Kruel - who would later play an important role during the military dictatorship - wrote to the then foreign minister, San Tiago Dantas, requesting Itamaraty to provide subsistence allowance for four SFICI members who were going to visit its counterparts in France, [West] Germany and England, "looking, particularly, to improve the possibilities of that service [SFICI]". Kruel highlighted that the trip was highly confidential and requested that Itamaraty provided the entourage with the same allowance amount usually paid for the ministry's staff in missions abroad.[70] On another note, from August 21st, 1962, NSS' secretary, diplomat Celso Diniz wrote to the interim foreign minister, Jayme Sloan Chermont, complaining about the dismantling of the security section. For Diniz, this has led to inconveniences such as the lack of coordination between Itamaraty's NSS and the other governmental information agencies.[71]

Itamaraty's National Security Section was still operating during Jango's government, albeit in a lower pace. Whether this reduction was influenced by the Independent Foreign Policy, it is still unclear. João Goulart's foreign policy, however, was criticised by some career diplomats and former Brazilian foreign ministers. Brazil's position at the OAS' VIII Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, standing against Cuba's expulsion from the organization and therefore disagreeing with the U.S., led to a critical note from former foreign ministers (Bandeira, 2009; Dantas 2011). In 1962, Macedo Soares, João Neves da Fontoura, Vicente Rao and Horacio Lafer rebuked San Tiago Dantas for standing idly by while

> Cuba, under Fidel Castro, repudiated democracy and founded a communist state on the island, articulated with the Soviet Union and Communist China. (…) (*and)* It intends to extend the communist network to all of Latin America (apud Dantas, 2011, p. 109).

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[69] Memorandum para o Sr. Secretário Geral. May 25, 1961. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB.
[70]Ofício no. 430 do Conselho de Segurança Nacional. March 13, 1962. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB.
[71] Ofício S/N. Aug 21, 1962. 502.35 – Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Caixa 188. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI BSB.

It is interesting to see how San Tiago Dantas was reprimanded by the former foreign ministries by taking a stand against the American position - a criticism that implied Goulart's government turn towards communism. Dantas' political views, despite what the former chancellors believed, was much more nuanced. As Ribeiro (2021) points out, Dantas' approximation with *trabalhismo (labour movement)* and his alignment with João Goulart only appeared later in life. In fact, as mentioned in chapter one, in his early years he flirted with *integralismo* and aftwerwords, between 1945 and 1955, he became an intellectual of developmentalism. He moved towards the left but was still an anti-communist liberal. When Eisenhower won in 1952, he wrote to Neves da Fontoura: "I am convinced that this election will be a historic milestone, from which the West will begin a courageous anti-left definition, reinforcing its liberal structure" (apud Ribeiro, 2021, p. 111). San Tiago Dantas even gave lectures at the Superior War College during the 1950s.

Beyond the institutional collaboration between Itamaraty and the National Security Councils, diplomats and politicians concerned with Brazil's international affairs played an important role at the Superior War College and at the implementation of the National Security Doctrine (DSN – Doutrina de Segurança Nacional).

The National Security Council may have fomented a closer relationship between the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be built, but it was the creation of the Superior War College that really strengthened the ties between the two institutions. The ultimate result of this collaboration, the DSN would become the backbone of the military regime installed in 1964, as shown in the next section.

2.2 Brazilian diplomats at the Superior War College (1950-1964)

ESG was founded under the Decree-Law 785 of August 20 1949, signed by President Eurico Gaspar Dutra. Its main goal was to 'develop and consolidate the knowledge necessary to the exercise of management functions and to the planning of national security'. According to article 5

> Officials of proven experience and aptitude belonging to the Armed Forces and civilians of notable competence and relevant performance in guiding and executing national policy will be admitted to the School.[72]

[72] Arquivo Nacional. Regulamento da Escola Superior de Guerra. BR_RJANRIO_RR_0_EAF_0021_d0001de0002

The creation of a War College in Brazil was inspired by the military training centres in the United States, especially Fort Lavenworth, in the state of Kansas, Fort Benning, in the state of Georgia and Fort Gulick, located in Panama and known as the School of the Americas, founded in 1946. With the beginning of the Cold War, the United States started an exchange program in which members of Third World military forces allied with the United States would go to the US to study “operations, intelligence, and logistics” (Brevins, 2020, p. 80).

Many members of Latin-American armies, such as Castello Branco, the first president of the military regime, and the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, attended those courses. The influence of the American military academies was enormous not only in the Brazilian army but also in the Chilean and Argentinian armies and, going beyond the Americas, the Indonesian army. The mindset taught in those training centres was based on a binary friend/foe lens, infusing an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, pro-US, and pro-market view in the military doctrines of those countries (Oliveira, 1987; Fico, 2008; Green, 2010; Castilho, 2015; Brevins, 2020). For some, the military cooperation, as well as the political and economic assistance of the United Stated during the 1940s and the 1950s helped build the authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes that took over Latin America from the 1960s onward (Green, 2010).

The main product of the Superior War College - the ESG – was the National Security Doctrine (DSN), which played a leading role in the policy formulation of the military dictatorship. In general terms, the DSN focuses on the role of the Armed Forces to guarantee stability and internal security (Skidmore 1988). The concepts of the DSN, notwithstanding, are quite malleable, thus allowing a wide range of interpretations, even their use to justify authoritarian measures (Dreifuss, 1987; Pinheiro, 2013). The idea of national security in the DSN creates the perception of a total ideology – according to Oliveira (1987, p. 47), a “global politics of the State”, where every aspect of life ‘must be safeguarded and protected’. During the Cold War, Brazil was facing a “Total War” against a powerful enemy, Communism. Hence the need to blurry the boundaries between the external and the internal dimensions of that threat – or differentiate internal and external enemies for that matter.

The National Security Doctrine also played a significant part in the formulation of the dictatorship’s foreign policy, especially during the Castello Branco government (1964 -1966). Castello Branco’s foreign policy was labelled the “Concentric Circles

policy" – in a world marked by the division between capitalism and communism, it was Brazil's responsibility to help the United States to defend the western civilization. Brazil should therefore act within its spheres of influence – primarily, the Americas, Western Africa, and Antarctica, "the decisive frontiers of south-American security" (Couto e Silva, 1981, p.82). Next, Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. The greatest menaces of the free world were at the outermost circle, what Golbery do Couto e Silva (1981) called the "Moscow-Beijing axis".

Since the establishment of the ESG, career diplomats have attended its training courses: 111 career diplomats studied at and graduated from ESG from 1950 to 1979. Most of those diplomats – 67 of them – were there from 1950 to 1964. In his memoirs, Pio Corrêa (1995, p. 338) explains that Itamaraty went further than just sending diplomats to attend ESG's courses. According to the former diplomat, Itamaraty was part of ESG's administration board alongside the Army, the Navy and the Airforce, with the post of Vice-Director of the school reserved to a career diplomat. Moreover, Itamaraty was part of the internship board, in accordance with ESG's statute from 1949:

> - Officials with proven experience and aptitude, belonging to the Armed Forces of the Country, and
> - Civilians of remarkable competence and outstanding performance in the formulation or execution of national policy, **especially the foreign policy**[73].

Pio Corrêa claimed that, as such, 'the Superior War College, being a common site of the three Forces, became the centre of an intense confabulation, which I attended as a silent observer' (Pio Corrêa, 1995, p. 351).

Diplomats who attended the war college were sent on the Foreign Ministry's recommendation, as article 26 of the regulation admitted civilian specialists to work as collaborators.[74] In February 1956, foreign minister José Carlos de Macedo Soares designated the diplomats Fernando Ramos de Alencar, Luiz de Souza Bandeira, Paulo Henrique de Paranaguá, and Luiz Octavio de Morin Parente de Mello to attend ESG on the grounds of that same article.[75] The names of the four diplomats appear on

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[73] Arquivo Nacional. Regulamento da Escola Superior de Guerra. BR_RJANRIO_RR_0_EAF_0021_d0001de0002. emphasis added.

[74] Arquivo Nacional. Regulamento da Escola Superior de Guerra. BR_RJANRIO_RR_0_EAF_0021_d0001de0002

[75] Ofício no. 1. Curso Superior de Guerra. Indicação de Candidatos. Feb 9, 1956. 103/4/6. Ministério da Guerra. Estado Maior das Forças Armadas. Escola Superior de Guerra. Ofícios. 1956-1958. AHI-RJ.

ESG's graduate list from 1956, along with two other diplomats, ambassador Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs and Helio de Burgos Cabral. In the memo sent by Macedo Soares to General Santos, Ambassador Briggs was nominated in the rules of article 52 of the ESG statute. However, since the original statute does not include an article 52, Macedo Soares may be referring to Article 42 of the statute, which states that

> Art. 42 - The current officers of posts corresponding to General of Army and Division and those who are promoted to these posts until December 31, 1952, as well as civilians of recognized value, will be able to follow the work of ESG without prejudice to their functions, by invitation of the Head of EMFA.[76]

Besides having preferential status among the civilians to attend ESG's classes, diplomats were made available to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to serve as assistants to the command of the Superior War College. In August 1956, minister Macedo Soares wrote to General Teixeira dos Santos, asking him to replace diplomat Luís Leiva Bastian Pinto. The latter diplomat, who was studying at ESG at the time and was serving as a representative of Itamaraty at the College, was summoned back by Fernando Ramos de Alencar to work at Itamaraty's general secretariat.[77]

Based on the documents available, it can be inferred that most diplomats sent to the War College were beginner to mid-career diplomats, although high-rank diplomats (ambassadors) also attended their courses. Some diplomats who were present at ESG would have prominent roles inside the ministry after the 1964 Coup D'état: Vasco Leitão da Cunha attended the Superior War College while the head of the National Security Section in 1953. Pio Corrêa, the architect of CIEX, was part of ESG's first class, graduating in 1950. Mário Gibson Barboza, foreign minister during the Medici government (1969-1973), in the period known as *anos de chumbo,* was a member of the class of 1951.

Besides that, diplomats, especially the foreign ministers, also attended the school as panellists and lecturers. According to Moreira Lima (2018: 21), the Foreign Minister's speeches at ESG were of equal importance to the ministry as those made for the class of new diplomats of the Rio Branco Institute - the minister's inauguration speech - showing the degree of importance of the exchange between diplomats and

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[76] Arquivo Nacional. Regulamento da Escola Superior de Guerra. BR_RJANRIO_RR_0_EAF_0021_d0001de0002

[77] Ofício no. 14. Designação do ministro Bastian Pinto para função na Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores. Aug 24, 1956. 103/4/6. Ministério da Guerra. Estado Maior das Forças Armadas. Escola Superior de Guerra. Ofícios. 1956-1958. AHI RJ.

members of the Armed Forces (Lima 2018). In those discourses, some ministers were armed with a Cold War rhetoric. For instance, João Neves da Fontoura, Getúlio Vargas' foreign minister from 1951-1953, stated in his speech at ESG in 1952:

> The Brazilian position in the face of international current events[78] and the prospect of a bloody outcome is not yet to be defined. It is fixed and fixed irremediably against the victory of communism. If we could consult the Brazilian people, through a plebiscite, about the direction they want to take in the face of the universal situation, I am sure that the vast majority of our country - due to its formation, the geographical position of Brazil, our moral and political background - would align overwhelmingly alongside the Western powers. That is because - another reason above all - communism destroys the dearest and most grateful prerogative to the heart of our people: all freedom, civil, spiritual and political (Fontoura, 2018[1952], p. 104).

Many other Foreign Ministers gave speeches at ESG at the time, from Raul Fernandes to San Tiago Dantas. Among them, Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco's 1958 speech on "contemporary political doctrines and its relationship with national security" (p. 123) stands out. In this speech, Mello Franco compared communism and fascism as equally totalitarian doctrines, and he warned that due to the lack of 'democratic education', the nationalist movements that were arising throughout the Third World would be captured by communism (Mello Franco, 2018[1958]: 135-136).

Araújo Castro, who acted as João Goulart's last foreign minister, from 1963 until the Coup D'état of 31 March, 1964, gave a speech at the Superior War College in 1962 entitled "World and regional security systems". At the time, Araújo Castro argued that while the biggest result of the Cold War was the polarization between the West and the East, 'democracy and communism', the country should also consider the asymmetries between North and South, the developed and the underdeveloped (Araújo Castro, 2018[1962], p. 200).

For Araújo Castro, asymmetries between the North and the South should be considered in Brazil's strategic thought because of the Cold War. According to Araújo Castro, Communist ideology was in decline in European countries where it had once been strong; for this reason, the Communist world started aiming its weapons at Africa, Asia, and Latin America. For Araújo Castro, the communists' project of power followed a Hobbesian, realist notion of the word, and made use of Western values in their rhetoric to win the hearts and minds of the Third Word:

[78] Neves da Fontoura was probably refering to the Korean War (1950-1953)

> The Chinese believe that time works in their favour and the new Middle Kingdom sees Southeast Asia as its natural sphere of influence. Asia only understands the language of the Revolution, and that language would never be convincing on the lips of white people, which is, in the eyes of Asians, the dark colour of imperialism. (…)
>
> (…) The West allowed the communists to take possession, with highly debatable sincerity, of all the dynamic ideas of our time: peace, social justice, revolution, disarmament, coexistence, etc. (Araújo Castro, 2018, p. 205)

According to Araújo Castro, the problem lied on the fact that while the communists appealed to the Third World with Western values, the Western democracies were at a clear disadvantage, due to their checks and balances and the importance of public opinion:

> The foreign policy of Western countries is dependent on emotional factors latent in public opinion which, if it contributes to correcting abuses and to imposing certain ethical and humanitarian norms, does not seem to be a safe adviser for the strategy and tactics of a power policy. In countries like the United States of America, any significant change in the field of foreign policy must be preceded by long elucidation campaigns and a long exploratory period, in order to determine the exact reaction that will provoke this or that change of course (Araújo Castro, 2018, p. 206).

In the ministry's official narrative, Araújo Castro comes across as a kind of hero. He was Goulart's last foreign minister and was responsible for controlling damage and sustaining Itamaraty's neutrality and autonomy in the face of Jango's apparent political use of the Independent Foreign Policy. He was one of the few ministers who did not make an appearance at Jango's *Central do Brasil* rally on 13 March, 1964. To Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Araújo Castro's refusal to show up at the rally helped save many Itamaraty employees (Cunha, 1994, p. 266). Azeredo da Silveira, Ernesto Geisel's foreign minister, states that he helped Araújo Castro by creating a 'barricade' between him and the military. The move allowed Castro to pass the baton to Leitão da Cunha following the coup - after all, "it was important that there was continuity at Itamaraty... Itamaraty could not be dismantled..." (Spektor, 2010, p. 51).

An Airgram from the US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro directed to the Department of State, entitled "João Augusto de Araújo Castro – ex-Brazilian Foreign Minister" from 6 May, 1964, describes Araújo Castro's actions as foreign minister, highlighting his aforementioned absence from the *Central do Brasil* rally; his opposition to Brazil's recognition of communist China and its admission into the UN; a veto against a Communist Chinese Commercial and Industrial Exposition; and "Brazil's vote in the

OAS in favour of an investigation of Venezuela's complaint against Cuba".[79] Furthermore, the American Embassy considered Araújo Castro

> among those apparently decent Brazilians who were called upon to serve in every one of the various Goulart cabinets, lending them an aura of respectability. […] He will probably be long and best remembered by Brazilians, particularly his present and future colleagues in the Foreign Office, as one who protected and upheld the good name of Itamaraty at a time when other highly-cherished Brazilian institutions, including the armed forces, were being sullied and subverted by the Goulart regime. […] **there can be no doubt that he was to a certain extent useful to Goulart and his entourage; but he evidently did not succumb to them.**[80]

It is unclear whether Araújo Castro was part of the gear that led to what happened in 1964. Pio Corrêa is the only diplomat openly vocal about his support of the 1964 Coup D'état is. Others, like Azeredo da Silveira, Mário Gibson Barboza and Vasco Leitão da Cunha, for example, only hinted in their memoirs at their disagreement with Jango's use of the foreign policy. But there are some odd coincidences here and there. On March 31st, 1964, Vasco Leitão da Cunha gave a lecture at ESG about a diplomatic mission he led in Russia. When confronted about it, he stated the following:

> *Q: You mean that you at any time put your services in favour of the revolution before it happened?*
>
> A: Never. The only thing I did was to predict the probable. On the morning of March 31st, I spoke at the War College about my mission in Russia. And Bebeto Sampaio, who was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, my schoolmate, came to tell me that they were very worried about what was happening, and that very serious things were still going to happen. He was the only one who told me this at the War College (Cunha, 1994, p. 266).

2.3 Concluding Remarks

Between 1945 and 1964, Brazil witnessed a period of political and cultural effervescence. In the immediate post-war years, the country reestablished political relations with the USSR, and PCB was once again legalized. However, in 1947, the Cold War rhetoric led to an anti-communist backlash that culminated with PCB becoming once again illegal and the Brazilian-Soviet relations severed.

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[79] Airgram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to Department of State. João Augusto de Araújo Castro – ex-Brazilian Foreign Minister. Record Group 59 (RG 59). Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966. Political & Defense. Pol 2-2 political summ braz 64 to pol 7 braz 1/1/66. Box 1933. General Records of the Department of State. National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP)

[80] Idem, p. 2, emphasis added

Notwithstanding, social movements became stronger and Brazilian society, from left to right, started discussing paths towards the development of the country.

The anti-communist discourse and backlash persisted, and the country also witnessed the growth of ESG. It became the place where the conservative ideas of the National Security Doctrine flourished so as to later become the ideological support of the Military Dictatorship. The security system that would lead to the repressive apparatus of the dictatorship was remodeled during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek.

The foreign policy of the period was marked by the reestablishment of economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union in 1958 and diplomatic relations with that country in 1961, during the government of João Goulart, and initiatives such as the Pan-American Operation and the Independent Foreign Policy of Jânio and Jango.

Yet, there is also an untold foreign policy history that for years lay hidden: the anti-communist foreign policy of Itamaraty's National Security Section and Itamaraty collaboration in the formulation of the National Security Doctrine. As we will see in the next chapter, this untold story reveals that the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs was not as neutral or autonomous as they like to believe. There were high-ranking diplomats who not only supported the authoritarian diplomacy of the military dictatorship, but helped build the theoretical frame it relied upon.

CHAPTER THREE – *"*BRAZIL WILL THEN HAVE THE RECOGNITION OF DEMOCRATS AROUND THE WORLD*"* – THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND THE SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA (1964 – 1966)

In the end of 1965, the then-minister of Justice Juracy Magalhães gave an interview to Brazilian magazine *Manchete,* soon after the promulgation of the Institutional Act no. 2 (AI-2). Magalhães said he believed that AI-2 – an act which, among other authoritarian measures, cancelled the general elections for President – would promote the return of Brazilian democracy. When the world finally understood what was happening in Brazil, he thought, it would recognize the efforts of the "revolutionaries".[81] The title of this chapter is an excerpt from this interview: Magalhães was certain that an authoritarian measure would be eventually recognized and supported by the military world. Embedded in a Cold War rhetoric, the 1964 Coup D'état in Brazil was, according to its supporters, a "bloodless revolution". For them, President João Goulart's overthrow was necessary, because a Communist revolution was on the verge eruption in Brazil. However, João Goulart, who took office in 1961 after Jânio Quadros' resignation, was far from being a communist. Still, neither was he an anti-communist - unlike other Latin-American presidents, such as Venezuela's Romulo Bettancourt, a key figure in the period, as we will discuss ahead.

Jango was considered the main heir of Getúlio Vargas' legacy and acted as Vargas' labour minister during his second term (1951 – 1954). In 1955, he was elected vice-president of Brazil in the same election that made Juscelino Kubitschek president; and later, in 1960, he was elected vice-president to Jânio Quadros.[82] As mentioned in chapter one, Jânio Quadros' strategy regarding foreign policy was to create the *Política Externa Independente* (PEI), the "independent foreign policy". When Jango took over after Jânio's resignation in August 1961, he carried the PEI forward, and this policy was embodied in the figure of San Tiago Dantas, Jango's foreign minister from 1961 to 1962.

While the PEI was clear about Brazil's identification with western principles and values, it also advocated for the conduction of Brazilian foreign policy according to the national interest instead of ideological affiliations - therefore, Brazil should not refrain

[81] Juracy Magalhães interview to Manchete magazine. RG 59. NACP. Box 1937
[82] At that time the vice-president in Brazil was also elected.

from maintaining relations with any country, including communist ones (Dantas, 2011).[83] Among other measures, Jango was responsible for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR in 23 November, 1961, an initiative highly opposed by conservative groups and leaderships in Brazil (Caterina 2019). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Independent Foreign Policy suffered criticism from former Ministers of Foreign Affairs and members of the diplomatic corps, and it was used by the opposition to legitimize the need for a military intervention vis-à-vis the public opinion.

The Coup of the 31st of March 1964, counted with the support of foreign powers – although the United States is better known for its involvement, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, France, also participated in the campaign that led to Goulart's overthrow. Those countries believed that the Military would act as a moderating power, cleaning the house and ridding the country's economy of João Goulart's statist policies, to make room for a market-oriented anti-communist government. Internally, the Brazilian military believed that the Coup was a big victory for the West because it prevented Brazil from following Cuba's path.

This chapter will focus on the role played by Brazilian diplomacy in legitimizing the Brazilian military dictatorship in the international arena. Although the need for legitimization became stronger after the implementation of the so-called *anos de chumbo* ('Lead Years', 1968-1974), gaining an institutional design, diplomacy was already being used to change the minds of international actors regarding the coup. At first, Brazil relied on the help of the United Kingdom and the United States to gain sympathy towards the "revolution", but the winds really began to change in October 1965, with the promulgation of AI-2 and the rising allegations of power abuse and human rights violations by the Brazilian regime.

The AI-2 drew attention and sparked criticism especially in the United States, from the US press to Democratic congressmen such as Robert Kennedy. Even inside the Lyndon Johnson administration – which had supported the 1964 Coup D'état in Brazil -, the AI-2 was received with a sense of unease. The expected "moderate authoritarianism" to which the American government had given the green light was

[83] On the specificities of Goulart government and the political crisis that led to the 1964 coup, see Loureiro (2017 and 2020).

being replaced by a hard-line authoritarianism that, considering the changes that were happening internally in that country, could put the US government in trouble.

The first part of this chapter will briefly discuss the aftermath of the Coup and the legitimization of the new government internationally, while the second will focus on the strategies employed by the Brazilian government after the AI-2. Finally, we will look into how these strategies culminated in a project to undermine the so-called "The Campaign Against Brazil Abroad", which the military recocgnized after the promulgation of AI-5 on December 13th, 1968, to be discussed in the next chapter.

3.1 The first steps towards international recognition in the aftermath of the Coup – 1964-1965

Soon after João Goulart left the presidential palace in Brasília and the leader of Congress Ranieri Mazzilli declared the presidential seat vacant on April 1st, 1964, the military started working towards the international recognition of the new regime. For the ideologues of the Coup, both military and civilian, their "revolution" was one of the biggest western victories against the communist movement, especially after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. For them, it was impossible that the most important country in Latin America, the biggest catholic country in the world, fell into the hands of the Soviet Union like a small island in the Caribbean. As Vasco Leitão da Cunha stated in an interview to *Manchete* magazine on June 13, 1964:

> the March 31 revolution was the first major defeat suffered by communism since the adoption of the Marxist-Leninist regime by Cuba. It is a defeat imposed by the Brazilian people, who reacted thus against the communization of the country at the top government levels.[84]

For Leitão da Cunha, chosen by military president Castello Branco to be the first Foreign Minister of the regime, the "post-revolutionary" government was "a democratic government, legalistic and truly reformist. A government that is really going to carry out the reforms hitherto so much preached, but which had only served the flag of subversion"[85].

Leitão da Cunha's statement meets the perception that the military intervention was necessary to prevent the country from falling into the hands of subversion. It also

[84] Free Translation from Manchete Magazine. In Airgram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. June 15, 1964. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-66. Political & Defense. Box 1938. NACP.
[85] Idem.

meets the Armed Forces' self-assigned task to act as a kind of 'moderating power' to the Brazilian political system. In the minds of Coup supporters, the intervention was supposed to "clean the house", purging the members of congress and the public administration who may have had ties with either the Goulart government or social movements perceived as leftist, thus opening the path for new elections in 1965.

Indeed, some players in the international arena welcomed the coup. Most notoriously, the United States, having almost immediately recognized the new government thanks to the efforts of Lincoln Gordon and Vernon Walters, respectively the United States ambassador to Brazil and the military attaché in the country. They had participated in the plotting of the coup and were known as hard-line cold warriors. Walters, for example, was a close friend to President Castello Branco, whom he met in Italy during World War II. The US did play a key role in the conspiracy that culminated in Goulart's overthrow and was ready to back the "revolution" if it went sour, as Operation Brother Sam shows. After Fidel Castro claimed the Marxist-Leninist character of the Cuban Revolution in 1961, to gather USSR support, the Kennedy administration could not let another Latin-American country "fall".

Like in many other cases throughout the Cold War, it was in the United States' interest to prevent the rise of any nationalist, third world independent government, regardless of whether it was a government with socialist tendencies or not. João Goulart, an *estancieiro*, was far from being a communist – however, under the eyes of the United States and prominent members of Brazilian civil society, his government was nesting the conditions for a communist revolution. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that, despite its support, the United States were not responsible for what happened in 1964; rather, the Brazilian civilian and military elites, with their own version of anticommunism and their own perceptions of the Cold War, set the engines for the dictatorship that followed.[86]

The United States government praised Castello Branco's cabinet: for the American embassy in Brazil, Castello Branco had made a sensible choice by not following the nationalist playbook that many Latin American military governments usually followed, looking instead for a technical cabinet – one that was able to conduct

[86] For especific works that focus on US Role in the Brazilian coup see Skidmore (1988); Rabe (2017); Fico (2008); Green (2010); Brevins (2020)

the much-needed economic reforms after Goulart's "populism". The regime proclaimed the cabinet "strongly democratic in philosophy and pro-western in orientation (which does not preclude a degree of healthy nationalism)", specifically naming the civilian ministers Arnaldo Süssekind (Labor), Octávio Gouveia Bulhões (Finance), Roberto Campos (Planning), Vasco Leitão da Cunha and the military ministers General Arthur da Costa e Silva; Admiral Augusto Rademaker and Brigadier Francisco Correia de Melo, "staunchly anti-communist, considered to be strong leaders who will tolerate no indiscipline".[87]

At first, the United States helped the Brazilian government legitimize the coup abroad by setting up interviews of Brazilian officials to the American press – Roberto Campos, for example. The American government used conservative magazines and newspapers to spread the idea that what happened in Brazil was a bloodless revolution, met with almost no resistance (Green, 2010). Carlos Fico (2008, p. 129) argues that US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was one of the first to get involved, lobbying for the recognition of the new Brazilian government among the US Congress and pressing the Uruguayan government to deny political asylum to president João Goulart.

However, there was another country also deeply concerned that the newly founded military regime was granted recognition elsewhere: the United Kingdom. Although it may seem that Brazil was too far of a concern for British politics, the documents found at Kew Gardens show that British anti-communist propaganda was used to undermine the government of João Goulart in the years before the Coup. The British government used the country's media to gather support around the coup through a branch of the Information and Research Department (IRD) that functioned inside the British embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

The IRD was a secret section of the British Foreign Office whose objectives were to "gather confidential information about Communism and produce factually based anti-Communist propaganda (or "publicity", to use the term preferred at the time) for dissemination both abroad and at home", and "the first major Western initiative in anti-Communist propaganda" (Wilford 1998 p. 353 and 354). The department in Brazil

[87] Incoming telegram from Amembassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. April 15, 1964. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. NACP. Box 1933

worked closely with the Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais (IPES) during João Goulart's administration. IPES was a conservative think tank led by General Golbery do Couto e Silva - the man later considered to be the hidden hand of the military dictatorship. The institute's role was paramount to cement the alliance between the civilian elites and the Military who deposed Goulart. The IRD had also worked closely with conservative newspapers such as *Jornal do Brasil* and *O Estado de S. Paulo*. It is worth mentioning that Jornal do Brasil had a library filled with titles about communism and pieces of anti-communist propaganda, among which most of IRD's publications.

The Information Research Department saw the coup as an opportunity to "brazilianize" the departments' publicity efforts. Therefore, it sponsored articles from British journalists promote the new regime. In 1964, the IRD sponsored journalist Brian Crozier's visit to Brazil, and the British embassy introduced him to Golbery do Couto e Silva – a connection which eventually led him to Brasília to interview President Castello Branco. This interview was published in the Sunday Times on September 27, 1964, under the title "The quiet men planning an upheaval" and described the Brazilian military as such:[88]

> They have little taste for speeches or pronunciamentos and none for demagogy. They sit in their offices and plan *[the]* revolution as good staff officers plan a military campaign. They are British in their pragmatical scorn of ideology, French in their intellectual processes and very Brazilian in their abhorrence of bloodshed.[89]

Crozier's article also highlighted the economic pro-market reforms that were expected to happen under Roberto Campos as Minister of Planning. The IRD also lobbied against negative press comments regarding Goulart's overthrow, thanks to the pressure of British companies operating in Brazil. The first articles from the BBC and The Economist regarding the Coup were somewhat critical, but after British companies got in touch with the British government, "infuriated", the IRD called out the outlets and asked them to change the tone of the coverage.

Michael Feld, the Latin American correspondent of the Daily Telegraph also worked with the IRD and wrote an article published on April 24, 1964, in which, among other things, he wrote the following:

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[88]Account of Brian Crozier visit to Brazil. Information Research Department. FO 1110/1747. The National Archives (TNA)

[89]Brian Crozier. The quiet man planning an upheaval. The Sunday Times Sep 27, 1964. Annex to letter from R.J Evans. Sep 30, 1964. FO 1110/1747. TNA.

> President João Goulart, the ambitious would-be dictator, and his camarilla of Communist, near-Communist, Left-wing nationalist and plain adventurer politicians, labour leaders and soldiers have, in the Khruschevian phrase, been swept on the rubbish-pile of history.
>
> Before native British distaste for military coups blurs our vision of what happened, we should be as relieved as most Brazilians are to-day: contrary to the apparent world-wide trend, this country has, at the eleventh hour, turned to the West.[90]

With regards to the influence of British companies, the Bank of London and South America (BOLSA), which had offices in Brazil, wrote a memorandum to the British Foreign Office analysing the recent regime change. In line with US perception, BOLSA argued that Goulart's administration was a

> financial and administrative chaos and political knife-sharpening and, while they agreed that the idea that Goulart was leading the country towards communism was only speculation, they affirmed that the 'ultra-nationalist Left had effectively infiltrated itself not only into unions, Petrobras […] but also into a far greater number of key positions […] such […] as the Bank of Brazil.[91]

Therefore, the Coup 'was a move which was almost forced upon the rational elements in the country and on the Armed Forces, to end what was, in fact, an "un-Administration''. Further in the analysis, much like the US government, BOLSA praised the cabinet composed by Castello Branco as "encouraging", applauding the nominations of Octavio Bulhões and Roberto Campos and their intent to "abolish the long-existing subsidies on petroleum and wheat import […] and a whole series of rational proposals concerning cutting Federal expenditure".[92]

The British and American governments helped legitimize the Brazilian regime by using press propaganda with the consent of the Brazilian government. The adopted narrative conveyed that it was unclear whether João Goulart was leading Brazil towards "communization", but his nationalist economic agenda was bringing chaos into the country; hence the importance of the "March 31st Revolution" to carry out the economic reforms the country needed so much. The first authoritarian measure of the regime, the promulgation of Institutional Act number one (AI-1), allowed the President to recall the mandates of Congress representatives and revoke the stability of public officers. The British government appeared to be cautious about the AI-1 , but accepted it nonetheless, under the justification that Goulart had allowed the infiltration of

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[90] Michael Field. Opening to the Right in Brazil. Daily Telegraph. Apr 24, 1964. FO 371/173763. TNA.
[91] Confidential Memorandum on Brazil prepared by Bank of London and South America (BOLSA). May 29, 1964. FO 371/173763. TNA.
[92] Confidential Memorandum on Brazil prepared by Bank of London and South America (BOLSA). May 29, 1964. FO 371/173763. TNA.

communist and far-left nationalists into the public administration. Some cases, however, drew the attention of the British and American public opinion, such as the revoke Juscelino Kubitschek's mandate and the revoke of Celso Furtado's political rights and the episode of the nine Chinese (to be discussed futher in this chapter).

Besides working to sway their domestic publics' perception of what had happened in Brazil, framing the coup as natural, if not positive, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States also tried to influence other Western European countries, such as Italy and France. In a letter from April 15th, 1964, British diplomat Peter Ramsbotham wrote to his fellow R.M.K Slater, describing a conversation he had had with Jean-Daniel Jurguensen, *Director d'Amerique* at the Quai d'Orsay. The French official had criticised the hastiness with which the United States had recognized the new regime and pointed out that the French press harshly denounced what had happened in Brazil.[93] In Ramsbotham's view, President Charles De Gaulle believed that his "Third Word Policy" would find more acceptance in former president João Goulart than in Castello Branco. Slater replied to the letter saying that at the last NATO meeting, in which Jurgensen also participated, he felt that the French were "more censorious and pessimistic about the new regime than anybody else and by the same token less inclined to criticise Goulart."[94]

In Italy, the press received the Coup with even more scepticism, as a telegram sent by the American embassy in Rome to the Department of State on 22nd April 1964, shows. Many Italian media outlets, from those traditionally linked to the Italian left-wing and Communist organizations, to those ideologically aligned with the centrist Christian Democracy, the party ruling Italy at the time, had a positive view of João Goulart, and described him as a "centre-left reformer *[who was]* done in by rightist generals, financiers and aristocrats, who – some even suspect – were encouraged if not actually assisted by the US".[95] The American embassy at Rome asked for clearance to publish in Italy a favourable version of what had happened in Brazil written by the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro in a "respectable widely-spread publication".[96] According to the American embassy, it appeared that they were the only ones trying to promote the

[93] Letter from P. E. Ramsbothan to R.M.K Slater. April 15, 1964. FO 371/173810. TNA
[94] Leter from R.M.K Slater to P.E. Ramsbotham. April 23, 1964. FO 371/173810. TNA
[95] Incoming telegram from Rome to the Department of State. April 22, 1964. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966. NACP. Box 1938
[96] Idem.

regime change in Brazil as a positive thing, while the Brazilian embassy in Rome remained “apparently silent”[97].

Meanwhile, the Brazilian government was using its own weapons to legitimize the Coup abroad. Castello Branco designated the governor of the State of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda as the regime’s spokesperson to counter the press (Gomes 2015). According to a telegram from the American embassy in Athens, “he was to proceed to several European capitals and subsequently to the US on an official mission to set forth principles of the Brazilian revolution to respective governments”.[98] Throughout April and June 1964, he toured around Europe, travelling around France, Italy,Greece, and the United Kingdom. In Italy Lacerda met with the Foreign Ministry’s Director General of Foreign Affairs, Giovanni Fornari, and was interviewed by centre-right newspapers like *Corriere della Sera*. He also tried to request an audience with the pope – albeit unsuccessful, the Pope did receive Itamaraty’s Chief of Cabinet on May 19th.[99]

After Italy, Lacerda went to Greece, where the Greek government offered him a luncheon, and to the United Kingdom, where he had a series of meetings and luncheons with members of the Parliament, eventually meeting Prime Minister Douglas-Home at Downing Street. [100] He also attended a reception at the Brazilian embassy in London and met with private bankers, including BOLSA executives. According to a telegram from the American embassy in London to the Department of State from June 12, 1964,

> Lacerda explained Goulart *[was]* overthrown because he *[was]* leading Brazil into economic chaos and communism. New govt *[government is]* dedicated to reform program to restore economic and political stability and democracy. While methods used may not appear democratic, they *[were]* necessary in light of serious extent economic disorder and political subversion. Democracy would nevertheless remain *[the]* guiding principle.[101]

France had been Lacerda’s first destination, him having arrived on April 23rd. The French press was critical of the newly instated regime, which generated concerns

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[97] Idem.
[98] Incoming telegram from Athens to the Department of State. May 15, 1964. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. Political & Defense. Political affairs and relations. Pol 7 Braz 1/1/65 to Pol 12. NACP. Box 1934
[99] Incoming telegram from Rome to the Department of State. May 19, 1964. Ibidem.
[100] Incoming telegram from Athens to the Department of State. May 15, 1964. Ibidem.
[101] Incoming telegram from Amembassy London to the Department of State. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. NACP. Box 1934.

on both Leitão da Cunha and Raul de Vicenzi, Brazil's ambassador in Paris (Gomes, 2015; 2019) - but not only them. The reaction in the French press drew a visceral response from Ruy Mesquita, editor of the conservative newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo*. On June 15, 1964, he wrote a letter to his French correspondent Gilles Lapouge complaining about "the attitudes of your colleagues in the French press in relation to us".[102] He justifies the coup and the revoked mandates from Brazilian congressmen on the grounds that "it is absolutely necessary to liberate Brazil from the sinister alliance of communism and national gangsterism".[103]

The Department of State and the Foreign Office had similar perceptions. Both believed that France was reluctant to recognize the new regime and that the Quai D'Orsay criticized the "hastiness" with which the United States had recognized the new regime. In a telegram from May 15, 1964, the embassy in Athens wrote the following:

> […] Lacerda had been in touch *[with the]* French Embassy *[in]* Rome. Lacerda had made it clear he would expect to be received by De Gaulle, that he proposed explain to De Gaulle that GOB would welcome De Gaulle's visit to Rio in September as scheduled, but that the new GOB does not subscribe to thesis of third force which De Gaulle endeavouring to encourage as a counter-weight to US influence in Latin America[104].

However, Paulo César Gomes (2019) shows a more intricate scenario. Whilst the French newspaper and media were deeply critical of the process that happened in Brazil, the government was much more lenient. Despite their concerns regarding the legitimacy of Goulart's ousting, the French embassy in Brazil believed that the former president presented a greater risk to Brazilian democracy and believed that the military would withdraw from power in the coming year of 1965. Leitão da Cunha sent a telegram to the Quai D'Orsay to reassure Brazil's commitment to its alliances. It was also not in France's interest to challenge American predominance in Latin America; so, when Mazzili passed the presidential sash to Castello Branco, the French Government recognized the new regime.

The complex relations between France and the military regime are also shown in the work of Araújo (2016), who mentions the relationship of Pierre Lallart, France's

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[102] Letter from Ruy Mesquita to Gilles Lapouge. Airgram from AmConGen São Paulo to the Department of State. Subject: A hard-liner explain revolution and its goals. July 31, 1964. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. Political & Defense. Political Affairs & Relations Pol 15 govenrment Braz 1/165 to Pol 15-1 Braz 5/1/65. NACP. Box 1937

[103] Idem.

[104] Incoming telegram from Rome to the Department of State. May 15, 1964. RG 59. NACP. Box 1934.

military attaché in Brazil from 1962 and 1964 (Vigna, 2014), with the far-right circles of the IPES complex before the coup. Representatives of French companies in Brazil, such as Valisières and Rhodia for example, were also a part of the conservative think tank that plotted against João Goulart. Lallart acted autonomously vis-à-vis the French embassy in Brazil, networking and meeting members of the Brazilian military and having meetings with members of the Brazilian military and members of the IPES/IBAD complex before the Coup (Araújo, 2016).

Obtaining global powers' recognition, as we can see, was of great concern to the Brazilian regime, especially by Western European countries and the United States. Those countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom were vocal about it and lobbied in Brazil's favour to other countries such as Italy and France – albeit the latter also had its interests in welcoming the newly instated dictatorship. Notwithstanding this effort, Latin-American and other Third World countries received what happened in Brazil with scepticism, which caught the attention of those global powers. In a memo from April 22nd, 1964, British diplomat R.M.K Slater wrote:

> In Inter-American terms the change of government in Brazil is not working out as well as the United States Government must have expected. Welcome for the new regime is not unanimous.
>
> 2. Venezuela and Costa Rica are the two main proponents of the doctrine that illegitimate governments should not be recognized. Costa Rica has adhered to this for some years; the 'Betancourt doctrine' is more recent. Both governments have for some months been working for a meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers to consider the whole question of representative democracy in Latin America (somewhat to the embarrassment of the United States). But on the specific issue of Brazil they have parted company. The Costa Rican Government have recognised the new regime; we may presume that, perhaps under some pressure from the Americans, they persuaded themselves that the change-over was constitutional and that recognition would not violate their principles. The Venezuelan Government on the other hand have broken relations with Brazil. This will have been a hard decision for them since they must now be banking on Brazilian support for more drastic OAS action against Cuba (…)
>
> 3. The Mexican Government have still to show their hand. There is evidence that they contemplate breaking with Brazil in the near future. This makes very little sense. (…) apart from giving vent to their annoyance, asserting their independence of the United States and throwing a sop to the extreme left, a break with Brazil will do them no good at all.
>
> 4. The net result of all this is the moral issues in Latin America are more hopelessly confused than ever before[105]

[105] F.O Submission from Mr. Slater. Attitude of Other Latin American Countries to new regime in Brazil. Apr 22, 1964. FO 371/173772. TNA.

Since 1958 Venezuela had been holding a two-party political system with competitive elections. President Rómulo Betancourt, who ruled the country from 1958 to 1964, was considered by American presidents Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy an example to the hemisphere – opposed to João Goulart, Betancourt, albeit a progressive reformist, was fiercely anti-communist, and considered the most prominent rival of Fidel Castro in Latin America, thus granting him American support (and money) (Rabe 2016; 2020). Betancourt formulated what became known as the "Betancourt Doctrine": Venezuela should not maintain any kind of diplomatic relations with regimes that came into power through undemocratic means (Hurrell, 2013). The doctrine, initially, was used to validate the position of Venezuela regarding Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of the American States in 1962; however, two years later it was used against Brazil, much to the surprise of the Brazilian government. In the interview given to Manchete, Vasco Leitão da Cunha claimed that

> This *(the Bettancourt Doctrine),* even though Brazil did not have a coup d'état, was applied to the period of President Mazzili. But it is incomprehensible that this should be applied following the election of President Castello Branco, which was in accordance with the Constitution of 1946, which continues in force. Venezuela seems to be judging the legitimacy of an act of the Brazilian Congress.[106]

In his testimonial to CPDOC, Leitão da Cunha says that the Brazilian government had not done any effort with regards to the recognition of the new regime because 'everyone accepted the explanation that once the president was deposed, Congress chair Mazzilli, in accordance with the constitution, assumed power; the new administration called an election, in which Castelo Branco was elected president' (Cunha 1994, p. 278). According to him, nearly every country - even Mexico and Uruguay - had recognized the new regime. All but Venezuela, 'which, after thirty-odd years of dictatorship, decided to be more democratic than the great democracies' (Cunha, 1994, p. 278), ranting that Venezuela nevertheless asked for Brazil's support against Cuba in the IX Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in Washington in July 1964.

Venezuela was not ranked first in Brazil's hemispheric priorities, nor was Mexico, although the Brazilian Ambassador there at the time of the Coup was Manoel Pio Corrêa. Allegedly, while working in Mexico he successfully persuaded the Mexican

[106] Free Translation from Manchete Magazine. In Airgram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. June 15, 1964. RG 59. NACP. Box 1938

Government to reduce the airspace for “Cuban-communist air travel”.[107] However, Mexico was seen by Castello Branco as a country that, along with Venezuela and Chile, might oppose Brazil in the OAS due to its criticism of Brazil position towards OAS reform (Hurrell, 2013, p. 128).

In September 1964, Pio Corrêa was transferred to Montevideo, Uruguay. This was not a coincidence. Albeit Uruguay had recognized the new regime, it was also the country that received the first wave of Brazilian exiles. Former President Goulart crossed the border of his home state Rio Grande do Sul and fled to Uruguay after the Coup, followed by other politicians like his brother-in-law and former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, and Goulart’s former Chief of Staff, Darcy Ribeiro. This naturally became a concern to Brazilian authorities (Marques, 2011). Pio Corrêa made sure that the Brazilian exiles in Uruguay could not operate any kind of political activity, and pushed the Uruguayan government to forbid exiles to live near the Brazilian border (Fico, 2008; Fernandes, 2018).

At the time, Brazil’s Foreign Policy was guided by what became later known as the “Doctrine of the Concentric Circles”. Elaborated by Golbery do Couto e Silva, it was conceived inside the Superior War College in the 1950s. In his book *Conjuntura Política Nacional: o poder executivo e a geopolítica do Brasil* (National Political Conjuncture: the executive power and geopolitics of Brazil), which comprised articles published from 1952 to 1959, Couto e Silva distinguishes the main concerns of Brazilian foreign policy into different *hemiciclos* (hemicycles) – the first *hemiciclo* comprised the Americas, West Africa and the South Atlantic, the most important and strategic places regarding Brazilian security purposes. The second *hemiciclo* comprehended the rest of the Western world and non-communist third-word countries. Lastly, there was the *hemiciclo perigoso* (dangerous hemicycle), comprised of what he called the “Moscow-Beijing axis”, the Communist world, the greatest threat to Western civilization. Brazil’s main external role was, therefore, to help the United States in defending the American hemisphere (Couto e Silva 1981; Castilho 2015).

Castello Branco’s interests in foreign policy, though, should be seen in terms of a geopolitical approximation with the West ruled by the ideological guidelines of the Cold War. Latin America, more specifically the Southern Cone, should be Brazil’s main

[107] Outgoing Telegram Department of State. Jun 23, 1964. RG 59. NACP. Box 1933

foreign concern, followed by Brazil's Western alliances. This policy also instated the concept of "ideological frontiers", by which the principles of non-intervention and self-determination were replaced by a notion of collective security and the idea that Brazil should help its biggest ally, the United States, in the continental defence against Communism.[108] Thus, it was important for Brazil to keep an eye on how the regime was perceived abroad, since the members of the government justified their authoritarian measures with Cold War rationale. During the first two years of the military regime, Brazil had the backing of Western powers, who understood and justified the first authoritarian actions as necessary to purge the Communist menace from the country – however, some measures were difficult to defend.

3.1.1 Castello Branco defies moderation: AI-1 and Juscelino Kubitschek and Celso Furtado's political rights revocation

As previously mentioned, the first Institutional Act (AI-1) was promulgated by Castello Branco shortly after the Coup, on April 9, 1964. The United States and the United Kingdom looked closely to its unfolding; although they had concerns regarding the future of freedom of association and speech in Brazil, they believed that it was necessary to halt Goulart's influence in Brazilian politics. On April 10, 1964, the dictatorship made its first move into revoking the political rights of personalities associated with the former government of Quadros and Goulart.[109]

Among the 102 names whose rights were revoked, one name reverberated somewhat negatively among the foreign press: Celso Furtado. Furtado was a world-known economist and academic who worked at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago de Chile through many periods during the 1940s and the 1950s. He worked as head of the newly created Northeast Development Superintendence (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste – SUDENE) during Juscelino Kubitschek's administration and acted as Minister of Planning during the João Goulart presidency (CPDOC, online). After losing political rights, he flew to Chile, where he started working

[108] About the Concentric Circles doctrine and the idea of Ideological Frontiers see: Vizentini (2004); Cervo and Bueno (2012); Ricupero (2017); Hurrell (2013); Pinheiro (2013); Martins (1975); Gonçalves and Miyamoto (1992; 2000)

[109] The military dictatorship revoked the political rights of 102 personalities, among them former presidents João Goulart and Jânio Quadros, Leonel Brizola, Darcy Ribeiro, Luis Carlos Prestes, Rubens Paiva and Miguel Arraes.

again at ECLAC and received invitations to work as a guest lecturer at many universities, especially in North America and Europe.

On April 20, 1964, Lincoln Gordon - United States ambassador to Brazil – wrote a telegram to the Department of State in Washington narrating a private meeting he had with President Castello Branco a few days before. Gordon mentioned to Castello that even though the American press agreed with the "Revolution's" basic principles, they were concerned with repressive measures that could seem "arbitrary or extreme, and some judicial or other procedure review would have an important favorable effect on free world opinion". Gordon specifically told Castello that American media was baffled with Furtado's political rights being revoked, as he was a well-known academic who had since the Coup received many offers to teach at American universities, to which Castello Branco answered: "Furtado had appointed many communists to Sudene".[110]

The British government was also quite bewildered by Furtado's case. In a confidential letter to the Foreign Office from April 17, 1964, regarding the names that were deprived of political rights after AI-1's promulgation, British diplomat John Morgan wrote:

> Most of these names *(we)* would have expected to see listed in any comprehensive purge of leftwing elements. Some, however, do not appear strictly necessary. The inclusion of Sr. Quadros, who had a good chance of becoming Prefect of São Paulo, seems to have been due to spite. As you know, Sr. Furtado is a leading economist whose appointment had little political content. He was not a member of any political party and paradoxically wrote one of the best criticisms of Marxism in Portuguese.[111]

Morgan also commented that some of the names drew criticism to the newly instated government from the Brazilian press, especially Correio da Manhã and Jornal do Brasil,. Regardless, the British government found the Institutional Act to be a good measure, deemed "the mechanism necessary to get rid of undesirable elements in public service and curtail the powers of left-wing members of Congress".[112] British ambassador Leslie Fry considered that AI-1 had been

> designed and is being used to quash Left-wing leaders and those thought to be in sympathy with them. How far that process will go, remains to be seen;

[110] Incoming telegram from American Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State. April 20, 1964. RG 59. NACP. Box 1938
[111] Letter from J. A. L Morgan to Miss P. M Hutchinson. April 17, 1964. FO 371/173763. TNA
[112] Institutional Act revises powers of President and political powers of members of Congress. FO 371/173763.TNA

> and to what extent it will be successful in stifling the Left will clearly depend on the ability of the new regime to remove the causes of social unrest.[113]

On May 10, 1964, the New York Times wrote a piece on Furtado[114] putting him as one of the "casualties" of Castello Branco's anti-communist witch-hunt. The article interviewed Furtado – who was described as a democrat left-wing who opposed Communism - and talked about him leaving the country the next month and the invitation he had received from many Universities abroad and his plans for the next five years – Furtado said that he almost accepted an offer to teach at Yale's Economic Growth Center.

This interview caught the attention of Brazilian diplomacy. On his Manchete interview in June 1964, Foreign Minister Leitão da Cunha was inquired about Brazil's image abroad, in respect to the latest events, to which he said:

> The Foreign Office furnished our representatives abroad with materials necessary for the clarification of public opinion in the countries in which they are accredited […] In Brazil, however, there is complete freedom of the press, which, among other things, indicates the functioning of our democracy, and these criticisms are transmitted abroad […]. However, the clippings from the world press reveal many champions of our cause […] many of the letters sent to the press abroad originated with the chiefs of mission in the countries of their respective accreditation […] more than words, there will be acts of the Brazilian government which will convince world public opinion of the true democratic feeling and progressiveness of our revolution.[115]

Following Leitão da Cunha's answer, Manchete asked him about the aforementioned New York Times article on Celso Furtado, to which Leitão da Cunha declined to answer. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs closely watched Celso Furtado's trip to the United States - he did end up working as a guest lecturer at Yale's Economic Growth Center. In October 1964, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington Juracy Magalhães informed the Itamaraty that Celso Furtado was going to participate in a conference at Stanford University, where he should replace former president Juscelino Kubitschek in a lecture called "What is next in Brazil". Itamaraty's secretary, then, urged the embassy in Washington that a member of the Brazilian consulate in Los Angeles should attend Furtado's speech at Stanford.[116]

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[113] Rio de Janeiro Despatch no. 25 dated April 14, 1964, p. 4. FO 371/173763. TNA

[114] The New York Times. "Purged Brazilian Economist Will Teach in U. S." 11 May 1964.

[115] Free Translation from Manchete Magazine. In Airgram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. June 15, 1964. RG 59. NACP. Box 1938.

[116] Telegrama no. 1753 from Brazilian embassy in Washington to the Secretary of State. Oct 13 1964. 591.7(00) – Imprensa. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

However, the Brazilian consul in Los Angeles, Raul Corrêa de Smandek apparently tried to dodge this task by saying that Stanford was under the jurisdiction of the Brazilian consulate of San Francisco and so Itamaraty should ask that consulate instead. In the end, since he got no response, he ended up asking the Brazilian Chargé D'affairs in San Francisco to attend the conference. This shows that the Brazilian diplomacy was monitoring Brazilian exiles and members of the opposition since day one of the military dictatorship.

On June 8, 1964, former President Juscelino Kubitschek had his political rights revoked by the Military Dictatorship. This probably turned on the alert in foreign governments who had supported the Coup: perhaps the "Revolution" was not as democratic as it should be. Initially, most of the Coup supporters at home and abroad were betting that the military would sweep in, clean the house and open the space for the 1965 presidential elections, to which Kubitschek was considered the favourite contender by foreign powers.

Kubitschek's rights were revoked on the grounds that he had made a pact with the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) in order to win the presidential elections of 1966. Both the American and British representations in Brazil believed that Kubitschek's suspension of political rights was a mistake, one that drew the attention of the Brazilian media and the Foreign Press. Even among supporters of the coup, many thought that the government had crossed a line. If they had not crossed it then, they definitely did it with Institutional Act number two (AI-2).

3.2 AI-2 and the rise of "linha dura" (1965 – 1966)

For many years, it was almost a consensus among the literature that the Brazilian military was divided into two groups during the dictatorship: the "Sorbonne" and the *"linha-dura"* - the hardliners. The Sorbonne group, whose members were, among others, President Castello Branco, SNI founder Golbery do Couto e Silva and future president Ernesto Geisel, was seen as "moderate" (Skidmore, 1988). They were named Sorbonne because of their ties with the Superior War College and were considered the "intellectual wing" of the military; during the first years of the regime, the Sorbonne group was economically oriented towards a pro-market and pro-liberalization worldview.

The hardliners, whose most famous members were presidents Arthur da Costa e Silva and Emílio Garrastazu Médici were, on the other hand, linked to a more nationalist-authoritarian economic and political worldview. Since the most repressive period of the Brazilian dictatorship happened under their rule, it is commonplace to say that the hardliners were responsible for the authoritarian turn of the regime; or that the Sorbonne group was committed to restore democracy at some point.

Some authors, like Fico (2004), claim that the history of the dictatorship is the story of the rise, consolidation, and further decadence of the hardliners. However, especially after the declassification of documents and the publishing of Brazil's Truth Commission report (2014), it is safe to say that this authoritarian turn happened while Castello Branco was still in power; moreover, that the "moderates" were responsible for the institutionalization of the repressive apparatus. Torture, in fact, was used by the Military Dictatorship since its dawn; the dictatorship paid visits to a number of secret services, from the CIA to the Mossad (Skidmore, 1988; Gaspari, 2014; Reis 2014).

The first few days into the new regime would witness the use of torture against foreign officials. On April 3, 1964, the Brazilian government arrested and tortured nine Chinese diplomats who had been on a commercial mission in Brazil since the government of João Goulart (Brasil 2014). This led to a political and diplomatic crisis with communist China, whose government and press were very vocal; in fact, they turned to the British government for help, who in turn decided not to become involved in the matter.[117] The British Chargé D'Affairs in Peking, Terrence Gravey, reacted with the following:

> While I do not suppose that any action is open to Her Majesty's Government and though the arrests may be regarded merely as part of the cold war game, I cannot believe that they do the "free word's" image any good.[118]

In contrast with the British, the Americans did not give the matter much attention. They only reported the trial and later expulsion of the Chinese diplomats in December 1964 and April 1965, respectively.[119] The case of the nine Chinese was not the only attack on foreigners at the beginning of the dictatorship. On April 6, 1964, the New York Times branch in Rio de Janeiro was invaded by the military. The United States

[117] Brazilian-Chinese Relations. FO 371/173773. TNA.
[118] Telegram no. 384 from Peking to Foreign Office. Confidential. FO/173773. TNA.
[119] Airgram from Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Dec 26, 1964 and Airgram fom Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Apr 24, 1965. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. Political & Defense. Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Braz 1966 to Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Braz 9/1/64. NACP. Box 1931

government said this would only serve to "provoke unfriendly press" and that "developments such as these give poor image of Brazil and not encouraging for the future".[120]

The invasion of the New York Times' office in Rio de Janeiro and the arrest of Chinese diplomats were signs that the "Revolution" was not only targeting Brazilian nationals. The British and American governments had overlooked the case of the nine Chinese because they saw it as a part of the Cold War game. However, in 1965 things would start to change, and the United States and the United Kingdom would perceive that openly supporting the Brazilian regime could draw criticism from their local public opinion. As a consequence, this setback would put Brazilian diplomacy in charge of dealing with the country's image abroad.

3.2.1 The crusade of Juracy Magalhães

The year 1965 would have consequences for the rest of the dictatorship. The October state elections were unfavourable for the military – the opposition won the elections for governor in at least two important states, Minas Gerais and Guanabara. By the time the state elections were held, Castello Branco had already postponed to 1967 the presidential elections that would have taken place in 1965. After the October election, however, he took a step further and decreed the Institutional Act no. 2 (AI-2) on October 27, 1965.

The AI-2 suspended direct elections for President and Vice-President indefinitely; it allowed the president to install a state of siege on the grounds of fighting 'internal subversion', and allowed the military courts to prosecute civilians involved with 'crimes against national security', among other authoritarian measures.[121] The government advocated for the emergence of a new institutional act by arguing that

> The revolution is alive and does not recede. It has promoted reforms and will continue to undertake them, patriotically insisting on its intentions for the economic, financial, political and moral recovery of Brazil. For that, you need tranquillity. Agitators of various shades and members of the defeated situation […] already threaten and challenge the revolutionary order itself, precisely at the moment in that the latter, attentive to administrative problems, seeks to place the people in the practice and discipline of democratic exercise.

[120] Outgoing telegram Department of State. Apr 6, 1964. RG 59. NACP. Box 1938

[121] Ato Institucional no. 2, de 27 de outubro de 1965. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ait/ait-02-65.htm>

> Democracy presupposes freedom, but it does not exclude responsibility, nor does it imply a license to contradict the Nation's own political vocation[122].

For a long time, the AI-2 was perceived as a concession from the Sorbonne group to the hardliners: Skidmore (1988) argues that the second Institutional Act was an attempt from the moderates to delay the rise of the hardliners into power by institutionalizing authoritarianism. However, recent interpretations see AI-2 as the consolidation of a project of power, and the institutionalization of an "authoritarian legality" (Fico 2004; Pereira 2005, p. 70).

The second institutional act became an "Achilles' heel" for the image of the country abroad. The clear authoritarian turn made Brazil's western allies take a step back and be less open about their support for the regime. If in the prior year British and American governments had been open to promote the Coup as a positive regime change, that was no longer the case. Therefore, Brazilian diplomacy had to take the lead in defending the country's image abroad. The main architect of this project was Juracy Magalhães.

Magalhães was a military official and politician born in Fortaleza, Ceará. He governed the state of Bahia for two terms and worked as a military attaché in the Brazilian embassy in Washington from 1953 to 1954 (Magalhães, 1971). As a supporter of the 1964 "Revolution", he was awarded the post of Ambassador of Brazil to the United States, where he stayed until October 1965. On October 19, 1965, he became Justice Minister. He replaced Vasco Leitão da Cunha as Foreign Minister in January 1966 – Cunha, in turn, would then be transferred to work as Ambassador to the United States until 1968. Juracy Magalhães developed a remarkably close relationship with the American government and became the focal point between the two governments – Magalhães is infamously known for stating that "what is good for the United States is good for Brazil" (Fico, 2008, p. 151). Thus, he became responsible for justifying the measures taken by the government after October 25, 1965.

The American government saw the institutional act with concern, as if Brazil was walking towards a point of no return. On November 6, 1965, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack Vaughn wrote a cable to Dean Rusk and Lyndon Johnson about the latest political events:

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[122] Idem

> I believe we must set forth our serious concern about recent developments and make it quite clear that we want to do whatever we can to avoid the emergence in Brazil of a repressive authoritarian regime.
>
> The relative calm with which the Second Institutional Act was received can be most misleading. I am convinced that other crises may develop in which the Brazilian military will be tempted to become even more dominant and repressive, and I am concerned that perhaps some of our own U.S. officials, particularly in the military services, may not fully appreciate the serious damage to our interests which could result from such a development[123]

Before the promulgation of AI-2, the American government was in touch with then-Ambassador Juracy Magalhães, who tried to assure the U.S. government that the moderate wing of the Brazilian military was doing its best on trying to prevent the ascension of the hard-line group. On a telegram, the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro wrote to the Secretary of State about a mission Juracy Magalhães was going to do in the United States. Accordingly,

> […] Juracy said summary description of his objective is to avoid installation of a dictatorship in Brazil. […] This week is limited to preliminary contacts, since serious work can start only after October gubernatorial elections, whose results will substantially affect the nature of effort. Basically it will be attempt to regroup all forces of revolution behind a single candidate, with assurance that he could defeat in a direct election any revanchist candidate of the anti-revolution, or if this cannot be done to alter regime so as to assure continuity of revolution's policies by means of indirect elections.[124]

In the same telegram, it is said that Magalhães' political mission was the "consolidation of revolution in presidential succession next year. According to the document, Magalhães was working towards a way of "carrying on the revolution" in case Carlos Lacerda was defeated (until the imposition of AI-2, Carlos Lacerda had plans to run for president in the 1965 elections). However, it is unclear whether Magalhães was referring to the October gubernatorial elections or the presidential elections that should have happened in 1965, but probably the latter since the telegram argues that

> Lacerda had been convinced that Juracy's purpose was to liquidate *[his]* candidacy; general Costa e Silva had been convinced that Juracy wanted to run himself and thus to displace a possible Costa e Silva candidacy.[125]

Although the conversations between Juracy Magalhães and the American embassy to Brazil do not indicate that the continuation of the "Revolution" would take

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[123] Cable from Jack Vaugh to Secretary of State. Brazil Policy Cable – Action Memorandum. Nov 6, 1965. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. Political & Defense. Pol 14 Braz 7/1/65 to Pol 15 Braz 7/1/65. NACP. Box 1936

[124] Incoming telegram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Sep 15, 1965. Ibidem.

[125] Idem.

the form of an institutional act, they appear to contradict the idea that Castello Branco was trying to avoid its implementation. After its promulgation, the Justice Minister started reaching out to his contacts in the American government to gather support towards the need for a second institutional act.

On November 30, 1965, Magalhães wrote a personal letter to Secretary Thomas Mann. In that letter, Magalhães argued that Brazil was "experiencing very difficult times, with grave dangers to the future of democracy in our country"; therefore, the government was "compelled to adopt Institutional Act no. 2, which, being an act of force, as it is, is at the same time intended to hasten the process of a return to full democratic normalcy".[126]

The context of Magalhães' letter to Mann was marked by a tour of US Senator Robert F. Kennedy around Latin America. Soon after the AI-2, Kennedy arrived in Brazil: He played football with Pelé in Maracanã, sailed down the Amazon River and met with peasants in Recife. Kennedy's visit and his comments towards the Brazilian situation seemed to have bothered Magalhães to a great extent

> I am very well aware that it is hard to convince men such as Senator Robert Kennedy that the Castelo Branco government has armed itself with extraordinary powers, not to protect its own supporters but, on the contrary, to permit governors elected by the opposition to take office […] It was my impression that Senator Kennedy came to obtain his information concerning the situation in Brazil from our opponents, and debate with us in a manner that was generally not well received.
>
> I was particularly annoyed when he said that the imprisonment of eight leftists who attempted to threaten President Castelo Branco […] was going to affect our relations with the United States. […] When we restore public administration in Brazil to the popular sovereignty, under the best democratic system, then many people who are now accusing us unjustly will perhaps have a better understanding of the imperious action we had to take[127]

Magalhães went further and even sent Mann a copy of an interview he gave to the *Manchete* magazine where he repeated the same arguments used in the letter to Thomas Mann, that AI-2 was 'crucial' for Brazil's path towards democracy. When asked about the image of the country abroad and the repercussions of the Institutional Act, Magalhães said that he had no concern about the assumptions of the foreign press regarding the second institutional act. He believed that

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[126] Letter from Juracy Magalhães to Thomas Mann. Nov 30, 1965. RG 59. NACP. Box 1933
[127] Idem.

> Brazil's image will always improve, as the government shows through its acts that what it said when establishing the Act, about its intentions, is true. Brazil will then have the recognition of democrats around the world[128].

When the magazine asked him about the role of the press in the construction of the country's image, especially abroad, Magalhães argued that Brazil was a victim of the propaganda against the West. This propaganda was carried out mainly by the press: according to the Justice Minister, there was a communist infiltration in media outlets worldwide; therefore, while the Communist world was losing the Cold War in economic and political terms, it was winning the propaganda warfare[129]. This reasoning will accompany the government's efforts to clean up the Brazil's image abroad throughout the rest of the dictatorship.

Juracy Magalhães became one of the AI-2 most vocal supporters and the voice of the dictatorship vis-à-vis the United States government. It is not surprising, though, that he was appointed Foreign Minister in 1966. But beyond his personal defence of the second institutional act, there was institutional mobilization towards that end: Brazilian embassies abroad were monitoring how the institutional act was being received.

The Brazilian ambassador in Lima, Peru, Walder Lima Sarmanho wrote a telegram to the Secretary of State where he claims that while some liberal and conservative newspapers wrote editorials attacking the second institutional act, the conservative newspaper "La Prensa" celebrated it.[130] Hélio Burgos Cabral, the Brazilian ambassador in Tunisia, sent a telegram on October 13, 1965 – ten days before the promulgation of the AI-2 – in which he says that the local newspaper La Presse published a piece entitled "Brazil threatened by new coup", arguing that it was a piece of "communist propaganda" and asked for clearance for approaching the newspaper.[131]

The Brazilian Chargé d'Affairs in Washington, DC, Jorge de Carvalho e Silva wrote a telegram to Rio de Janeiro about a declaration made by an American high-rank government official that was published by the news agency United Press

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[128] Juracy Magalhães interview to Manchete magazine. RG 59. NACP. Box 1937
[129] Idem.
[130] Secret-urgent telegram no. 242 from Brazilian embassy in Lima to the Secretary of State. Nov 3, 1965. 500 – Política Interna. Caixa 251. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[131] Secret-urgent telegram no. 61 from Brazilian Embassy in Tunis to the Secretary of State. 591.7(00) – Imprensa. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

International. This official, according to United Press, claimed that the Castello Branco's government was the best Brazil ever had. Later, the Brazilian diplomat asked American diplomat Jack Kubisch, who at the time was Director for Brazilian Affairs at the Department of State the name of this official. Kubisch replied to Carvalho e Silva asking what Brazil's reaction would be if someone in the U.S government publicly showed dissatisfaction with the latest political events that happened in Brazil. With that, Kubisch hinted that the U.S government was under pressure regarding its support towards military regimes in Latin America.[132] In the mid-to-late sixties the political landscape started to change in the United States – the American congress would become more vocal regarding U.S. support towards right-wing dictatorships in the region. In 1964, Western powers helped Brazil and, in some cases, took the lead in creating an atmosphere for the legitimization of the Brazilian dictatorship abroad. In the second half of the decade, however, those same countries were going to take a step back in the open defence of the Brazilian regime. This would therefore lead to a much greater protagonism from Brazilian diplomacy in defending the country's image abroad.

3.3 1966: Top-level changes at the Itamaraty and the election of Costa e Silva

In January 1966, Juracy Magalhães was designated Foreign Minister, replacing Vasco Leitão da Cunha who, in turn, replaced Magalhães as the Brazilian ambassador to the United States. In his acceptance speech, Magalhães praises Leitão da Cunha for his efforts in the decisive phase of implementing the "foreign policy of the Revolution", but states that his administration will take a new course of action resulting from the considerations made while serving in Washington. Brazil was part of the "Free World" and, as such, recognized the United States as its leader (Magalhães 1971).

Magalhães' nomination to be in charge of Itamaraty was definitely a political decision, and it can be said that it helped crystallize – and turn into policy - the foreign minister's role in improving Brazil's image abroad. As said before, he was a politician, with close ties to Washington and one of the most vocal interlocutors between the two governments. His term, following the authoritarian turn that came with the AI-2, further deepened the authoritarian course taken by Leitão da Cunha.

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[132] Secret telegram no. 1958 from the Brazilian embassy in Washington to the Secretary of State. Nov 2, 1965. 500 – Política Interna. Caixa 251. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.

The previous administration had been responsible for conducting an internal investigation committee that expelled career diplomats who had been involved with João Goulart's independent foreign policy and were accused of subversion or of being communists, as mentioned in chapter two[133]. Also under Leitão da Cunha's administration, Brazilian troops were dispatched to the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (Marson, 2021). Magalhães' tenure, on the other hand, was responsible for the consolidation of Itamaraty's role in the information community.

Juracy Magalhães made top-level changes within Itamaraty, appointing diplomats that were linked to the National Security Section and had open conservative views. José Oswaldo de Meira Penna was appointed as Assistant Secretary-General for Eastern Europe and Asia, and Sergio Correa da Costa was chosen to assume as Assistant Secretary-General for International Organizations and Assistant Secretary-General for Planning.[134] Most important, though, was the appointment of Manoel Pio Corrêa for Secretary-General, the second in command at Itamaraty's hierarchy. Pio Corrêa was considered a hardliner, even by the US government. Lincoln Gordon wrote to the Department of State that

> Pio Correa's appointment is reported to have surprised Itamaraty circles and is attributed by *(the)* press to military influence. His reputation for strongly held opinions on hardline side […] and tenor his remarks on taking office have led to press speculation *(that)* he will bring new 'vibrancy' (i.e shaking up) to foreign office, *(a)* substantial reshuffling of and some cleaning out diplomatic personnel at home and abroad confirmed by *(president)* Castello Branco last week[135].

In his memoirs, Pio Corrêa considers his appointment as Secretary-General as the highlight of his career. Accordingly, his inaugural speech was a

> declaration of war on the tortuous, shady and indecorous foreign policy practiced by Brazil under the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart governments, and whose traces were still not entirely erased: a fraction, or rather, faction among the House employees continued to profess the ideas of "non-alignment", of a foreign policy, in short, neutralist and covertly left-wing (Pio Corrêa, 1995, p. 901)

Moreover, Pio Corrêa also claimed that he did not like diplomats who were "pederasts"; "vagabonds"; and "drunks" and that "anyone who does not fit into any of

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[133] For more information on the subject see Gessica Carmo master dissertation (2018)

[134] Airgram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Top Level Changes in Foreign Office. June 2, 1966. RG 59. NACP. Box 1937

[135] Incoming telegram from amembassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Jan 27, 1966. RG 59. NACP. Box 1937

these three categories has nothing to fear from me, even for their political opinions" (Pio Corrêa, 1995, p. 901). While acting as Secretary-General, Pio Corrêa was responsible for the creation of Itamaraty's Foreign Information Center (CIEX).

CIEX became the eyes and ears of the Brazilian dictatorship abroad along with the Information and Security Division of the Foreign Ministry (DSI/MRE), created in 1967. Both divisions were responsible for monitoring the activities of Brazilian exiles, possible "subversive threats", and information gathering. It operated directly under the rules of SNI and had the same status as the information centres of the Navy, the Army and the Airforce. It is important to notice that its operation was only possible because it relied on a structure that already existed inside Itamaraty, inheriting the archives of the Studies and Information Service (SEI) and the National Security Section.[136]

Under Magalhães' tenure, Itamaraty, at least on its higher rankings, became more conservative and more aligned with the hardliners, almost as if the ministry knew what was coming, and had to prepare. On October 3, 1966, in an indirect election to which he was the sole candidate, general Arthur da Costa e Silva, Castello Branco's war minister, was chosen to be the new president of Brazil, taking office on March 15, 1967.

Costa e Silva's "election" was a victory for the hardliners. In April 1965 Costa e Silva had said that 'at least ten years of revolutionary government' would be necessary for "the normalization of the Brazilian nation", in a note that the American government deemed "strange".[137]

Costa e Silva's election was received with criticism. He complained to American diplomat Phillip Raine about editorials on the foreign press criticizing Brazil's electoral process, more specifically two editorials published at the Washington Post and the London Times respectively. The Post's editorial, from June 16, 1966, entitled *Sure Thing in Brazil,* albeit considering Castello Branco's administration with "some creditable accomplishments", said that "it is absurd to regard Brazil's presidential election campaign as a democratic test of opinion" and that "recent actions of the

[136] For more information on how CIEX was operationalized see Penna Filho (2009); Brasil (2014); Castilho (2015); Fernandes (2018); Setemy (2018)
[137] Airgram from the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the department of State. April 8, 1965. RG 59. NACP. Box 1938

government have shown more the iron hand then the velvet glove".[138] According to Raine, Costa e Silva believed that "US press should abstain from criticism since it so ardently defends *(the)* principle *(of)* self-determination".[139]

The criticism did not come from the United States alone. From 1966 on it can be seen a lot of negative press regarding Costa e Silva's election in the European press, with examples in England, France, Italy and Spain. This critical coverage was closely monitored by the Brazilian embassies in those countries, also because clandestine solidarity bulletins written by Brazilian exiles and sympathizers started being distributed in France that same year[140].

The biggest concern, however, was the United States. The US Congress started taking a more critical stance towards the US position in Latin America. After his tour at the end of 1965, Robert Kennedy became more critical of the Brazilian regime, which he considered 'far from a constitutional democracy'[141]. His visit had struck a nerve on Brazilian authorities due to the criticism he drew on the government. In May 1966, then President Castello Branco addressed the criticism made by senator Kennedy and senator Fulbright, saying that calling Brazil a dictatorship was either "irresponsibility" or "bad faith" and argued whether Brazil could be considered a dictatorship since it had "free press" and a legislative and judiciary powers fully functioning, saying that Brazil's underdevelopment made the country an "easy prey to international demagoguery".[142]

3.4 Concluding remarks

The Cold War consensus towards Latin America in the US congress was starting to fall apart, for several reasons. The Dominican Republic invasion in 1965 was received with criticism by several Latin-Americanists and suffered to obtain congressional approval (Green, 2010). Senator Wayne Morse publicly criticized Brazil's AI-2 and the American support for the Brazilian regime in 1965 (idem). The

[138]Sure thing in Brazil. The Washington Post, Jun 16, 1966. P. A24 Sure Thing in Brazil - ProQuest Access 27.10.2021

[139] Incoming telegram from Amembassy Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State. Jun 18, 1966. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. Political & Defense. Pol 12-1 Policy Braz 1/1/64 to Pol 14 Braz 1/1/66. Box 1935. NACP.

[140] Estado Maior do Exército 2ª seção. Relatório Especial de Informações. Campanha difamatória contra o Brasil no Exterior. Secreto. 591.7(00) – Maço especial – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. AHI-BSB. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

[141] Kurzman, Dan. Discourage Coups, RFK advises US. The Washington Post, May 11, 1966 Discourage Coups, RFK Advises U.S. - ProQuest

[142] Incoming Telegram. May 23, 1966. RG 59. Box 1937. NACP.

turning point, however, might have been the War in Vietnam. In 1966 the war was starting to prove itself a mistake. Early that year, senator Fulbright led some hearings on the subject, which started to change the representative's and general public's attitudes with regards to U.S. intervention in other countries.

In 1966 the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings to nominate the American ambassador in Brazil Lincoln Gordon as assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. While some senators such as Morse and Albert Gore raised questions about the role played by the United States in the 1964 Coup, Gordon's nomination was approved nonetheless (Green 2010). The seed of criticism had been planted, however. The American embassy in Rio started contacting the non-communist opposition to the dictatorship[143].

After Costa e Silva's election, Lincoln Gordon reached out to Vasco Leitão da Cunha and warned him that the U.S government was concerned with Brazil's latest developments, especially the revoke of political rights with the absence of judicial proceedings. Gordon said to Leitão da Cunha that this was leaving a bad impression on Congress. Leitão da Cunha tried to argue by saying that the revocations "reflected continued pressures from hard-liners". However, Gordon states that the "reservoir sympathy and goodwill in U.S toward Brazil and *[the]* general convergence of interest*[s] [are]* by no means exhausted but *[they are being]* serious depleted by this kind of political development"[144].

As foreign criticism against Brazil grew, the country increasingly closed itself, and the hardliners gained territory within. They believed, like did Pio Corrêa, that the Cold War was moving to Latin America and that the government should 'tighten up further' due to the 'increasingly dangerous threat' of Communism[145]. And they also believed - Juracy Magalhães included - that the international public opinion was dominated by Communists, and that the Communists were winning the propaganda war. If during the first year of the dictatorship the Brazilian government had the help of foreign governments mobilize the international public opinion favourably to Brazil, with

[143] Airgram from AmEmbassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. April 19, 1966. Record Group 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66. Political & Defense. Pol 1 Gen Bol-US 1/1/64 to Pol 1 Braz.General Records of the Department of State. Box 1925. NACP.
[144] Outgoing telegram from the Department of State. Oct 27, 1966. RG 59. Box 1933. NACP.
[145] Incoming telegrama from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Aug 4, 1966. RG 59. Box 1925. NACP.

the rise of the *linha dura* the Dictatorship would have to engage its own diplomacy to respond to the criticisms that the regime began to face.

CHAPTER FOUR – "WITH THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP A COLORFUL FASCISM TINGED WITH TROPICALISM HAS SETTLED LITTLE BY LITTLE IN BRAZIL" – BRAZILIAN DIPLOMACY VERSUS THE "CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRAZIL ABROAD" (1967 – 1974)

On May 19th, 1970, the Minister-Counselor of the Brazilian embassy in Paris, Paulo Henrique de Paranaguá sent a secret-urgent telegram to Itamaraty. He commented on an article by journalist Edouard Bailby that was published at *Le Monde Diplomatique.* The piece was intitled *Un fascism teinté de tropicalisme s'est installé depuis au Brésil,* or, in English, "A fascism tinged with tropicalism has since settled in Brazil".

Bailby begins his article by numbering how many Brazilians have lost their political rights since the beginning of the dictatorship and how many political prisoners there were in Brazil – two thousand and twenty thousand, respectively. He juxtaposes the numbers with a quote from President Emílio Garrastazu Médici in which he claims he "intended to take the necessary measures to 'maintain and perfect democracy" (Bailby, 1970). Baliby, then, goes on:

> Along with Greece and Cambodia, Brazil is currently one of the countries in the world where human rights and democratic freedoms are violated with cynicism and bad faith that is hard to find elsewhere (Bailby 1970).

Paranaguá translated the article to be sent to Brasilia, and commented that it was a "new inflexion of the campaign against the current Brazilian regime, thus, ultimately, it intends to articulate a multinational movement of opinion tending to censor Brazil in areas of real importance".[146]

The present chapter will show how Brazil's diplomatic apparatus was called into action to restore the country's reputation in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and how the Cold War narrative was employed to deny the escalating political violence that had taken over Brazil. After the promulgation of the Institutional Act number 5 (AI-5) in 1968, the military regime, through the SNI, the Itamaraty, the Ministry of Justice, and also by the hands of members of the civil society who supported the dictatorship,

[146] Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores. Telegrama Recebido Secreto Urgentíssimo, May 19, 1970. 591.71(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

worked on a plan to recover Brazil's image abroad by denouncing what they had identified as "The Campaign Against Brazil".

They believed that the "International Communist Movement" (*Movimento Comunista Internacional* – MCI), through the tactics of ideological indoctrination, was taking advantage of the cornerstones of liberal democracy, such as freedom of the press and freedom of association, to foster a defamation campaign against Brazil in the West, especially in the United States and Western Europe. The MCI, according to the Brazilian government, would use its façades in the West, from NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Solidarity Committees, to international organizations, such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to taint the country's image vis-à-vis its allies on the West. The communist goal, the military assumed, was to undermine one of the greatest defeats that the Communist world suffered during the Cold War: the 1964 "Revolution" in Brazil. This chapter will discuss on the reception of the AI-5 abroad and the escalation of repressive measures during the governments of Costa e Silva (1967 - 1969) and Médici (1969 – 1974), focusing on the campaign orchestrated by the Brazilian diplomacy to counterbalance the bad image of the country abroad.

4.1 The government of Costa e Silva and the Institutional Act no. 5

Costa e Silva took office on March 15, 1967. The successful political maneuver that brought him to power was considered a victory for the *linha dura,* and is understood as the consolidation of the authoritarian regime. The hardliners took over the *castelistas* – those who supported former president Castello Branco - and the members of the "Sorbonne wing". Even though these were not so moderate, as their promulgation of the AI-2 makes evident, the choice of Costa e Silva to assume the presidential seat was the consolidation of the "authoritarian utopia" of the military and the crystallization of a coherent repressive project (Fico, 2004). He was responsible for the definitive militarization of politics, which would meet its height during the following government of Emílio Garrastazu Médici: except for the civillian "super ministers" Delfim Netto (Finance), Magalhães Pinto (Foreign Affairs), Gama e Silva (Justice), and Hélio Beltrão (Planning), the whole cabinet of Costa e Silva was composed of members of the military (Skidmore, 1988, p. 67). The fact that some of the most important ministries were in civilian hands is an indication of the extent to which some civil society

interest groups were deeply entangled in the authoritarian project of the military regime.

During its first year, Costa e Silva faced the population's dissatisfaction with the economic measures taken by the Castello Branco administration. The liberal, market-oriented economic policy of the previous government did not have the expected effects, especially regarding inflation, causing discontent (Prado and Earp, 2007; Reis, 2014). Politically, the dictatorship faced the organization of *Frente Ampla*, an oppositionist movement led by former political adversaries and long-time antagonists Carlos Lacerda, Juscelino Kubitischek and João Goulart – at the time exiled in Uruguay – demanding the return of democracy and the call for direct elections.[147]

With regards to the internal politics, Costa e Silva took a more nationalist stance if compared to Castello Branco. His economy project, led by Finance minister Delfim Netto, was based on greater interventionism, enabled through foreign loans, to guarantee economic growth. Thus, the country started to walk towards what became later known as the "economic miracle", which will be employed to counterbalance the negative image of the country abroad.

Costa e Silva took office already wary about the image that Brazil had been projecting to the world. He welcomed comments about his election in the foreign press with distress and tried to show at first that he was concerned with moderation. Foreign policy took a more nationalist turn, which would be known in the diplomatic literature as *diplomacia da prosperidade* ("diplomacy of prosperity"). At first sight, the government's foreign policy replaced Castello Branco's idea of collective security with a diplomacy based on the need of overcoming North-South asymmetries and the pursuit of development. Some authors even consider that the *diplomacia da prosperidade* cleared the path for the Brazilian diplomacy to participate in Third World solidarity (Hurrell, 2013; Martins, 1975).

Notwithstanding, the documents here analyzed show a diplomacy as oriented towards the fight against subversion as was Castello Branco's concentric circles policy. Aside from the opposition led by the *Frente Ampla,* the organization of social movements was bringing the pretence moderation of the hardline to a test. The years of 1967 and 1968 were marked by worker's strikes in Minas Gerais and São Paulo;

[147] Lacerda joined the opposition with the annulment of the Presidential elections with AI-2

sectors of the Catholic Church, which at first supported the Coup, started to criticise the regime (Skidmore 1988; Serbin 2000; Reis 2014).[148] Most important, though, were the student opposition and the birth of the armed guerrillas.

It is important to notice that the same day Costa e Silva took office a new constitution was imposed. The constitution of 1967, elaborated at the end of Castello Branco's term consolidated the institutionalization of the military dictatorship from a transitional to a permanent regime and institutionalized the state of exception:

> By writing a new Constitution and a New National Security Law, Castello and his colleagues hoped to create a political system that would reconcile the military and constitutionalist ideas of the nation, the society and the individual. Most important and most paradoxical, the *castelistas* believed these laws - almost all in conflict with pre-1964 constitutional principles - were the only way to preserve democracy (Skidmore, 1988, p. 57)

It can be said that 1967 was also the birth year of the armed struggle, which emerged in a context of radicalization and regime enclosure introduced by *castelistas* with the AI-2. That year, the urban guerrilla organization *Ação Libertadora Nacional* (ALN – National Liberating Action) was created – its most prominent member was former PCB congressman Carlos Marighella (Green, 2010; Reis, 2014; Gaspari, 2014). Foreign governments, such as the United Kingdom and the United States were observant of the armed struggle in Brazil, and its rise was used by the Brazilian government to justify the implementation of Institutional Act number 5 in December 1968.

However, in terms of public image, especially abroad, what disturbed the Brazilian government the most were the protests triggered by the murder of secondary student Edson Luís in Rio de Janeiro on March 28, 1968 by the police. Killed after a demonstration that asked for better food at Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ) students' cafeteria, Edson Luis' death triggered protests throughout Brazil, and was reported by many media outlets in the United States (Green, 2010).

The new American ambassador in Brasília, John W. Tuthill considered that "the death of the Rio student provided the catalyst for wide-ranging student dissatisfactions with their situation and the administration";[149] and George C. Denney, who worked at

[148] On the relations between the Catholic Church and the Brazilian State during the military dictatorship see Serbin (2000)

[149] Student demonstrations wrap up. Airgram from Brasília to the Department of State. April 19, 1968. RG 59. General Records of the Department of State. Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969. Political & Defense. Pol 23 Braz to Pol 23-8 Braz. Box 1909. NACP

the Intelligence and Research Department at the Secretary of State stated that Edson Luis' death sparked a strong reaction from "politically motivated agitators […] in an effort to exploit the student's death to the detriment of Costa e Silva government and the US"; while the students gained mixed support, especially from the Church and the MDB, the military hardliners were in favour of more repressive measures, which could lead towards "harsher controls"[150].

The repression against student demonstrations affected the whole country. In a dinner with Vernon Walters, after a clash between students and the police at the University of Brasília on April 21, 1968, Costa e Silva argued that "student leaders had been warned *[the]* night before that no *desacato [contempt of authority/court order]* would be tolerated. As Brazilian, he felt *[that]* this kind of behaviour in front of *[a]* foreign ambassador *[was]* humiliating to Brazil, and students had to be taught a lesson". Tuthill's comment on what Costa e Silva had said was that he "did not appear shocked at the fact that several students had been injured. He felt that *[the]* matter *[was a]* direct challenge to governments authority".[151]

The spark of 1968, felt globally, was aggravated in Brazil because of the dictatorship. Besides the student movement, members of the accepted – or legalised - opposition, such as congressman Márcio Moreira Alves, criticized the invasion of the University of Brasília by the police in August 1968. During a speech in Congress, Moreira Alves said the regime was a "nest of torturers" and suggested that Brazilian people should not celebrate Independence Day that year (Green, 2010, p. 91; Brasil, 2014). In October 1968, the police raided the National Students Union (UNE) convention, held secretly in the city of Ibiúna in the state of São Paulo. As a result of that operation, almost 700 people were arrested and/or indicted (Brasil, 2014).

All in all, those events culminated in the promulgation of the fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) on December 13, 1968. The AI-5 begins with the statement that "the revolutionary process in progress cannot be stopped" and "all these facts disturbing the order are contrary to the ideals and consolidation of the March 1964 movement, forcing those who took responsibility for it and swore to defend it, to adopt the

[150] Intelligence note no. 681 written by George C. Denney. U.S Department of State. Director of Intelligence and Research. April 4, 1967. RG 59. Box 1909. NACP
[151] Incoming telegram from AmEmbassy Brasília to the Department of State. Apr 21, 1967. RG 59. Box 1909. NACP

necessary measures to prevent its destruction".[152] The fifth institutional act allowed the president to indefinitely shut down the federal, state and municipal legislative representation - Congress included. The act allowed the executive branch to legislate in every measure, and to intervene in every state and municipality of the federation. It could suspend the political rights of any citizen and their right to the habeas corpus.

Considered a "coup within the coup", the AI-5 materialized the ultimate victory of the hardliners and institutionalised the arbitrariness and the political violence commited by the State; it allowed the definite institutionalization of torture, which started being used as the police's modus operandi. It dismantled the "veneer of democratic governance" that the dictatorship tried to sell at first (Green 2010), and marked the definitive shift in support from foreign governments and organizations, forcing the military government to take action in restablishing alliances and restoring its reputation.

4.2 AI-5 reception abroad and the Brazilian government's reaction

> The issue of torture would eventually become an important focal point of international condemnation of the military regime. Thus, December 1968 not only became a symbolic dividing line for student activists and other opponents of the regime […] but it also marked the moment after which many voices in the United States began to register their opposition to the Brazilian military regime (Green, 2010, p. 89)

On May 28, 1968, months before the promulgation of AI-5, British and American governments were discussing how the emergence of guerrilla movements could trigger a more oppressive response from the Brazilian government. There were conversations between the British ambassador in Brasília, John Russell, a British diplomat in Washington, R. E. L Johnstone and Jack Kubisch, director of Brazil Affairs at the U.S State Department. They believed that the "military regime might have to become more and more oppressive and this might in due course lead to a split in the army of which the Communists might in some way be able to take advantage".[153] However, they also believed that it was almost impossible to turn "apathetic workers and peasants" into "militant revolutionaries", doubting the efficacy of the armed struggle in Brazil.[154] Thus, for the U.K government, it was unlikely that the armed struggle could lead Brazil

[152] Ato Institucional no. 5, de 13 de dezembro de 1968. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ait/ait-05-68.htm>
[153] British Embassy,Washington D.C. May 28, 1968. FCO 7/1889. TNA.
[154] Letter from Miss E. R. Allott to Mr. Atkinson, American Dept. June 14, 1968. FCO 7/1889. TNA

towards communism; most likely, it would give the Brazilian government the excuse to enclose the regime even further.

For Ambassador John Russel, AI-5 was an overreaction of the Brazilian military "over a silly point of prestige in Congress".[155] In a dispatch to the Foreign Office entitled "Brazil: a revolution within a revolution", Russel states that "the hard-line military are now in effective charge and will be as repressive as necessary to secure their aims. But if they can keep discipline without controls they are likely to relax" and that "the damage to Brazil abroad is serious. Relations with the United States will be tricky but with the United Kingdom should not be affected".[156] On this matter he wrote:

> 16. One of the saddest features about this "Revolution within a revolution" is the damage which Brazil's image will suffer abroad. The closure of Congress and the institution of press censorship are acts which will stick hard in many throats. The first problem to which the Brazilian Government must give attention is their relations with the United States, particularly in regard to investment and aid. […]
>
> 17. So far as the interests of Her Majesty's Government are concerned, while we must deplore in almost all its aspects the retrograde step which has just been taken here, I see no reason why our direct relations with Brazil should be materially affected[157].

Although the United Kingdom considered the AI-5 somewhat regrettable, the act had not affected – and was not expected to affect - the commercial relations between the two countries. Simultaneously with the *anos de chumbo*, Brazil was entering the phase of its "economic miracle", growing 10% a year at the expense of income concentration. Nonetheless, the Bank of London and South America (BOLSA) considered that while "the political situation is distinctly unpleasant (…) the economic situation is encouraging", and that the "political picture stands in sharp contrast to the economic; for there is absolutely no questioning the fact of surging infrastructural growth".[158] This is in line with Russell consideration that businessmen were pleased with the AI-5.[159]

Whereas the British government found AI-5 deplorable but something that could be overlooked, the American government showed a greater deal of concern. The American conjuncture had changed since 1964. The decade's final years in the United

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[155] Letter from John Russell to Leopold de Rotschild Esq. 20 Dec 1968 FCO 7/1106. TNA.
[156] Summary of Rio Despatch 1/3 of the 20th of December 1968. FCO 7/1106. TNA
[157] Idem.
[158] Report on Brazil – March 1969. FCO 7/1106. TNA.
[159] Summary of Rio Despatch 1/3 of the 20th of December 1968. FCO 7/1106. TNA.

States were marked by the anti-war and the civil rights movement, and the American congress was less willing to support U.S intervention in other countries, especially Latin America. At the same time, Richard Nixon was elected president, taking office in 1969, and his foreign policy doctrine empowered Brazil to take more drastic measures on the repression field. At the end of 1968, however, the American government was trying to figure out what to do about Brazil.

The American press lambasted the Brazilian regime hard, and the fifth institutional act was a turning point on the coverage of Brazilian affairs in the country. Green (2010, p. 92) considers that the AI-5 marked a "sharp shift in journalistic discourse" about Brazil, and the Secretary of State was aware of that, monitoring U.S press reaction: the institutional act was reported by many media outlets such as the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor, which claimed that Costa e Silva had installed an "outright military dictatorship".[160]

The criticism by U.S press did not seat well with the Brazilian regime. Orlando Geisel, head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, told the US embassy that those editorials were distorted and written by journalists with no familiarity with Brazilian reality whatsoever. Geisel claimed that "the institutional act was necessary because democracy cannot stand by idly while its enemies use every weapon at their command to destroy it"; moreover, he said that journalists were "dreaming if they believe that most of our population even suspects of what democracy in the US sense is".[161] For foreign correspondents in Brazil, the government appeared to treat every foreign criticism on recent developments as "communist inspired or absurdly farfetched".[162]

The United States believed that the increase of the repression in Brazil could erode bilateral relations, especially due to criticism of US public opinion and, therefore, measures should be taken so that Brazil "pull back from rigidities". The Department of State believed that

> There is still time and a good opportunity to avoid the congealing of public opinion in the U.S.A. along lines that would make it very difficult for any administration in this country to continue those degrees of cooperation and

[160] US Press Reaction. Outgoing telegram from the Department of State to AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro and Brasília. 20 Dec. 68 RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969. Pol 23-9 Braz to Pol 29 Braz. Box 1910. NACP.
[161] Brazilian military views of US press reactions to Institutional Act no. 5. Telegram Department of State. Dec 68. RG 59. Box 1910. NACP.
[162] Subject: Press. Telegram Department of State. Dec 68. RG 59. Box 1910. NACP.

> mutual assistance that the needs of the Brazilian people and our own deep friendship for them make desirable.[163]

Since Brazil believed in the special nature of the bilateral relationship with the United States, members of the Brazilian government initially assumed that AI-5 would not hinder the influx of economic foreign aid from the United States. Delfim Netto and Helio Beltrão reportedly advised Costa e Silva that the US government would find the institutional act "tolerable on stabilization and development grounds", something that displeased U.S authorities.[164]

*4.2.1 "*The increasingly pronounced leftism of the liberal press in this country*" – Mario Gibson Barboza's relationship with the American press*

1969 was marked by the beginning of Brazil's counteroffensive in the international arena. In January 1969, Mario Gibson Barboza was appointed Ambassador to the United States (he would become Foreign Minister later that year). In his autobiography, Gibson Barboza briefly describes his time in the U.S as a time of "intense activity in defending, first, our interests, not only commercial but also political" (Barboza, 2020, p. 137). In the United States, he was able to build a relationship with the newly elected government of Richard Nixon, especially his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. His nomination also aimed, however, to help explain to the American press the need for the fifth institutional act, to and make sure that money from American foreign aid reached Brazil (Fico, 2008).

Concomitantly, Brazilian diplomats were working hard to appease the spirits of foreign delegations in Brazil. The head of Itamaraty's Security and Information Division (DSI), career diplomat João Luiz Areias Neto, tried to assure the Canadian Chargé d'Affairs in Rio, Clive Edward, that communism was not a viable threat in Brazil. For Areias Netto, orthodox Marxists were "tamed" and the "terrorist attacks" of radicals "under Cuban and Chinese influence" were under control by the security forces. The real subversive threat nowadays was coming from the catholic left, according to the diplomat. Although "they *[the Catholic left]* were not Communists in the formal sense

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[163] "American Embassy Suggestion for US-Brazil Relations in Response to IA-5" (1968). *Opening the Archives: Documenting U.S.-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s.* Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:336809/

[164] Outgoing telegram from the Department of State. 19 Dec 68. RG 59. Box 1910. NACP.

(…) the government could not permit the disruptive effects in public order which their activities caused."[165]

With regard to the fifth institutional act, he told Edward that President Costa e Silva had a liberal mindset and was "entirely sincere in his opposition to repressive proposals" and that stronger anti-communist attitudes should be attributed to influential military men and members of the Superior War College.[166] Ironically, Areias Netto himself graduated from ESG in 1967, just a year before he was promoted head of the DSI. His relationship with Costa e Silva went a long way: his first post overseas was at the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires from 1950 to 1952, the period when Costa e Silva served as a military attaché in Argentina.[167]

Some diplomats, however, were concerned with the damage AI-5 could cause to the country's image. On May 2, 1969, American diplomat William Belton wrote to the Department of State about how some Itamaraty officials were worried about the country's international reputation since the promulgation of the fifth institutional act. His source was a high-level career diplomat in Brazil who supported the 1964 Coup D'état and came from a military family. According to that diplomat,

> Career diplomats are frustrated that no one at the foreign Ministry can do anything to prevent harm *[from]* being done to Brazil's international position. Officers at Itamarati are convinced that the military leaders running Brazil are absolutely uninterested in foreign opinion and unconcerned about the repercussions their policies might be having. Foreign Ministry reports about negative foreign reactions are *[being]* totally ignored. The foreign office is no longer a factor in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.[168]

The diplomat goes on and claims that "for the first time the Revolution is doing something completely inhuman and unacceptable" regarding the persecution of academics, journalists, and students. His concern was that "many are important members of Brazil's economic and intellectual elite and have numerous and important family connections". Besides that, those people were "being forced to join the communists in opposition" to the dictatorship.[169]

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[165] Letter from the Canadian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Under-secretary of state for external affairs, Ottawa. April 9, 1969. FCO 7/1106. TNA.
[166] Idem.
[167] FUNAG. Anuário 1971
[168] Foreign office official on IA-5 and its impact on foreign affairs. Airgram from AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. May 2, 1969. RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969. Pol 2-1 Braz to Pol 6 Braz. Box 1902. NACP.
[169] Idem.

The fifth institutional act also had effects inside Itamaraty. In January 1969, a second investigation committee was installed in the ministry. The committee was presided by Câmara Canto (the Brazil's Ambassador to Chile), Carlos Sette Gomes Pereira, Manoel Emilio Pereira Guilhon and Fernando Antonio de Oliveira Santos Fontoura. The investigation committee recommended the early retirement of 29 members of the foreign office, between diplomats and other officials on the grounds of subversive conduct, drunkenness, and homosexuality (Brasil 2014; Carmo 2018). The members of the commission, on the other hand, were rewarded with prestigious posts. Fontoura, just like Câmara Canto, was part of the Brazilian delegation in Chile; Pereira Guilhon became the Brazilian ambassador in Spain in May 1969; and Gomes Pereira would later serve as Ambassador in the Hague in 1971.

The Brazilian image abroad was deteriorating quickly. According to SNI, since 1966 there had been an outright campaign against Brazil on foreign media; however, the number of editorials critical to the dictatorship had grown from 1968 onwards. Thus, the Brazilian government, through its diplomatic posts, started monitoring what was being published about Brazil. The government's counteroffensive focused on Italy, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States. However, the diplomatic missions in other countries, such as Norway were also being monitored.

In a telegram from June 26, 1969, the Brazilian ambassador in Oslo, Jayme de Souza Gomes informed the Secretary-General that he was working on promotional material to be broadcast on Norwegian television as a response to the way Brazil was being portrayed in Norwegian media. For Souza Gomes, the media outlets in the country were painting a picture that looked "far from reality, demonstrating, in many cases, partiality and evident bad faith".[170] Norwegian television, however, decided not to broadcast the propaganda elaborated by the Brazilian embassy. Souza Gomes then wrote a complain to the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK):

> As you know, our intention was to counteract the harmful effects of previous films of a biased nature that you have shown on television before with no positive aspects or purposes. In case you should decide to change your regrettable attitude, this Embassy would gladly provide you with all the material available.[171]

[170] Telegram n. 171 from the Brazilian embassy in Oslo. Difusão de notícias tendenciosas sobre o Brasil. Telegrama secreto. June 26, 1969. 591.71(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil (00) a (77). Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

[171] Telegram 129/500. June 25, 1969. 591.71(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil (00) a (77). Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

In August 1969, the Brazilian embassy in Bonn, West Germany, received a petition from the German chapter of the Young Christian Workers against the prison and torture of catholic workers, peasants, and students, and demanding information about an alleged death list including the name of the Archbishop of Recife D. Helder Câmara.[172] The petition was directly addressed to Ambassador Fernando Ramos de Alencar and counted with 1400 signatures.

At the time, the German press had already published articles about political persecutions in Brazil. In a telegram from August 28, Paulo Nogueira Batista, minister counsellor of Brazil in Bonn, wrote to Itamaraty's Secretary-General saying that Hermann Görgen, a German professor that fled to Brazil in 1938 to escape the Third Reich,[173] was willing to give interviews to the German press to counteract the news about Brazil. Batista then instructed Görgen to talk in a strictly personal manner; thus, following Itamaraty's instructions to avoid debates on the foreign press regarding internal politics.[174]

After the kidnapping of American ambassador Charles Elbrick by the ALN and another urban guerrilla movement, MR8 (*Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro* – Revolutionary Movement 8 of October) in September 1969, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs started to use the help of supporters of the dictatorship abroad to balance the wave of critical news.[175]

Given the high-profile case, Elbrick's kidnapping was extensively covered by the international press. In Germany, the *magazine Die Welt* and newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine* covered the case.[176] In Argentina, the newspaper *La Nacion* published a

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[172] Ofício n. 273. Manifestação da JOC alemã contra o governo brasileiro. Aug 25, 1969. 500 – Política Interna Agosto de 1969. Caixa 183. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

[173] GÖRGEN, Hermann Mathias. **Vozes do Holocausto.** ArqShoah. Available at <https://arqshoah.com/images/imagens/sobreviventes-testemunhos/G%C3%96RGEN_Hermann_Mathias.pdf. > . Access at 05/11/2021

[174] Secret Telegram. August 28, 1969. 500 – Política Interna Agosto de 1969. Caixa 183. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

[175] Elbrick was kidnapped on September 4, 1969, by two armed organizations, ALN and MR-8. They used the kidnapping to demand the release of political prisoners (Green 2010; Fico 2008; Skidmore 1988).

[176] Telegram n. 287. Acontecimentos políticos no Brasil. Repercussão na República federal da Alemanha. 500 – Política Interna agosto de 1969. Caixa 183. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

critical editorial regarding the Brazilian situation.[177] The Consulate-General in Barcelona sent to Brazil an article from the newspaper *Diario de Barcelona* that said that Elbrick's kidnapping would lead to a more repressive response from the Brazilian government, mentioning the use of death squads by the police.[178]

In the United States, the mystery over Costa e Silva's health (the President had suffered a stroke a few weeks before) and Elbrick's kidnapping had put Brazil once again on the news front cover - to Ambassador Gibson Barboza's dismay. He hoped that Elbrick's kidnapping would lead to a more sympathetic perception of the Brazilian regime. Nonetheless, the New York Times not only published the kidnappers' manifesto in full but also referred to the regime as a repressive military dictatorship. The Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor also had followed similar editorial lines, to which Gibson Barboza complained:

> I am not just referring to the increasingly pronounced leftism of the liberal press in this country, which is the most influential. I am also referring to the well-known and deep-rooted American characteristic of wanting to build the world in its image and likeness and not recognized as valid anything that deviates from its ways.[179]

Gibson Barboza decided to act then among prominent journalists and opinion-makers to "clarify" some of the information published in the U.S press. According to Barboza he had faced resistance from US media outlets and attributed this to the ideological and editorial position of those newspapers. He also believed that even if President Nixon seemed "grateful" for the regime's efforts to rescue Elbrick and repress the kidnappers,[180] representatives in the American congress, senator Frank Church in particular, took advantage of the episode to criticize the nature of the Brazilian regime. Some congressmen believed that Elbrick's kidnapping was "understandable" considering Brazil's atmosphere of political repression. Leading that group, Church

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[177] Telegram n. 1093 from the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires. September 5, 1969. Alemanha. 500 – Política Interna agosto de 1969 Caixa 183. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

[178] Dispatch n. 138. Brazilian consulate in Barcelona. September 12, 1969. 591.7(00) – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB.

[179] Telegram n. 1634 from the Brazilian embassy in Washington. September 10, 1969. 500 – Política Interna agosto de 1969. Caixa 183. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB. It is important to notice that since the mid-1960s a group of liberal democrats became concerned with human rights violations by right-wing regimes in Latin America sponsored by the U.S government. According to Sikkink (2004) the leaders of this group were senators Edward Kennedy and Frank Church and congressmen Donald Fraser and Tom Harkin.

[180] Idem

became more and more critical of US aid to Brazil due to the undemocratic nature of the regime.[181]

Elbrick was released on September 7, 1969, and the political prisoners that were released in exchange were granted asylum in the Mexican embassy. Itamaraty increasingly reinforced their monitoring, especially because the ministry was concerned with what the former prisoners might say to the foreign press. This led to the formulation of a public relations strategy that was going to take off during the government of Emilio Garrastazu Médici.

4.3 Médici and the Campaign against Brazil (1970-1974)

In August 1969, President Costa e Silva suffered a stroke that left him incapacitated and unable to finish his term. A case like this, in a constitutional context, would require the President of the Chamber of Deputies to assume until a new president was chosen. But Congress had been shut down since December 1968, and the military did not let the president of Congress, Pedro Aleixo, a civilian, take office. Instead, a military junta took power. On October 30, 1969, this military junta appointed Emílio Garrastazu Médici as the country's president; in a farcical act, the military reopened the Congress so it could ratify Médici's "election".

Head of SNI during the government of Costa e Silva and military attaché in Washington, DC during Castello Branco's term, Médici is until this day considered the epitome of the *linha-dura*; his government was the pinnacle of the so-called lead years. His cabinet had the highest proportion of military men in key posts than any other previous government – some civilian ministries, such as Communications, faced a military occupation of 68,7% - the military occupation rate of Itamaraty was around 7,5%, in comparison (Matias, 2004).

With the AI-5 and the subsequent reaction by the armed left opposition, torture and repression were banalized – for Skidmore (1988), torture became a sort of "unofficial" public policy. From 1969 onwards, the dwellers of the *porão da ditadura* (the dictatorship's basement) - low-ranking military officials or members of state police that were directly involved with human rights violations such as torture and forced disappearances - felt empowered to take their actions to ne next level. Human rights

[181] Letter from A.R. Thomas to J.C Peterson. September 27, 1969. FCO 7/1107. TNA.

violations committed by the State were supported by prominent civilians.[182] The government thus started a manhunt against the opposition, armed or not, for the sake of internal security (Skidmore, 1988; Reis, 2014).

Side by side with the aggravation of the human rights situation in Brazil, the period between 1969 and 1974 was marked with economic thrive. The *anos de chumbo* were also the years of the *milagre econômico* (economic miracle), which gave Médici astounding popularity despite the regime's ruthlessness. From 1969 to 1974 Brazil's GDP growth ranged from 10 to 14% per year – this came nevertheless at the expense of acquiring large foreign debt and the deepening of income concentration. The economic situation of the middle classes improved, and the Military dictatorship started a program of modernization of the country (Skidmore 1988; Prado and Earp 2007; Reis 2014).[183]

Medici's project marked a definitive shift from Castello Branco's economic liberalism to the military's authoritarian national-developmentalism. The presence of the state became increasingly visible, and the government strengthened the partnership between the military and technocrats (Martins 1975; Skidmore 1988). Accordingly, Brazil's foreign policy was elaborated to foster the authoritarian project abroad – unsurprisingly, Medici's foreign policy is usually called *Diplomacia do Interesse Nacional* – national interest diplomacy.

To carry on his foreign policy project, Médici chose Mário Gibson Barboza as foreign minister. Alongside Delfim Netto, who continued ahead of the Ministry of Finance, and Alfredo Buzaid, minister of Justice, Gibson Barboza was one of Medici's civilian "super ministers". The "National Interest Diplomacy" was deeply linked to promoting the concept of *Brasil Potência* – the idea that Brazil had the potential to become a global power in the future. To that end, foreign policy ought to aim at attracting the foreign investments necessary to help Brazil overcome its underdevelopment – and therefore be conditioned to a conservative and authoritarian modernization project. In part, the foreign policy strategy of the Médici regime was enabled by favouring external conditions, especially regarding the United States.

[182] For example, *Operação Bandeirante* (OBAN). OBAN was created in 1969 as a joint action between state and federal security apparatus to "identify, locate and capture elements that are part of subversive groups" (Brasil, 2014, p. 127), and had the financial support of companies such as Ultra, Ford and General Motors (idem, p. 126).

[183] On the years of the "milagre" more specifically, see Prado and Earp (2007)

Richard Nixon's delegation foreign policy, which consisted in "outsourcing" the U.S Cold War policy in the periphery, delegating to its closest allies the responsibility to fight over the "communist threat" fitted Brazil's ambitions like a glove. In South America, Brazil would be the one responsible for the containment of subversion in the continent (Hurrell 2013; Spektor 2009). Still, while Nixon favoured Brazil, the American congress was becoming more aware of the human rights violation committed by the Brazilian State. As Sikkink (2004, p. 59) puts it, "by 1970 Americans were becoming aware of the extent of repression in Brazil".

Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the Médici government did not need the United States' backing, nor did it need US express delegation, to claim its own responsibility for the fight against subversion. As mentioned in chapter two, Brazil had a long-standing native anti-communist tradition and, due to the geopolitical challenge that left-wing or left-nationalist governments could impose to the military dictatorship, the country was willing to prevent the rise of such governments in the Southern Cone. The case of Chile during the Allende government (1970 – 1973), for example, was aggravated by the fact that there was a growing community of Brazilian exiles who were organized, outspoken and part of the daily life of Chilean politics.[184] At the same time Brazil was promoting a heavily interventionist policy in the Southern Cone, it was also creating strategies to improve its image abroad, especially in the United States and Western Europe.

4.3.1 The Campaign against Brasil Abroad and the government's social communications policy in the external arena (1970)

The *Assessoria Especial de Relações Públicas* (AERP – Special Advisory Office for Public Relations) was created during the government of Costa e Silva. Nevertheless, it was during Médici's term that it became a pillar of the dictatorship's public relations strategy, at home and abroad.[185] AERP was responsible for the

[184] Brazil's role in destabilization campaigns and coups throughout the Southern Cone during the early 1970s, especially its role in the Chilean coup of 1973 has been addressed in many works, for example (Harmer, 2012; Burns, 2016a; 2016b; Castilho, 2015; Simon, 2021). Brazil also had a prominent role in the overthrow of Juan José Torres in Bolivia in 1971, which gave place to the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer (1971 – 1978), and in 1973 Brazil was ready to invade Uruguay in case the left-wing coalition Frente Amplio had won the elections, in an operation known as *Operação Trinta Horas,* which was suspended due to the victory of right-wing candidate José Maria Bordaberry. For more information about those episodes see Gonçalves and Miyamoto (2000) and Padrós (Padrós 2005).

[185] Here I am using James Green's translation (2010, 211)

nationalist propaganda that permeated politics from 1969 to 1974. The idea of *Brasil Potência* was followed by slogans like *"Brasil: ame-o ou deixe-o"* (Brazil: love it or leave it), *"ninguém segura este país"* (no one will hold this country back), and *"Pra Frente Brasil"* (Forward Brazil). During Médici's government, the office was commanded by Colonel Octávio Pereira da Costa, chief public relations advisor of the regime at the time. AERP's goal was to consolidate the consensus in acceptance of the dictatorship's authoritarian project; its main tactics was the use of Brazil's economic performance to legitimize it. More importantly, Brazil's *milagre econômico* was used to legitimize the regime internally vis-à-vis foreign criticism (Skidmore, 1988; Green, 2010).

In 1970 AERP was supposedly concerned with launching a campaign abroad to neutralize "unfavourable propaganda" carried out by foreign papers.[186] In a luncheon with the American Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo in November 1970, Colonel Costa said that the government was elaborating a campaign called "Operation Perspective", which would provide "movies, tv programs and sundry material for dissemination abroad", and that an office at Itamaraty would be created to coordinate the PR effort.[187]

In April 1970, SNI published a report called *Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior* (Campaign against Brazil Abroad). In this report, SNI says that European public opinion had been "intoxicated" by their media's inaccurate depiction of Brazilian reality. According to the report, everyone in Europe, from waiters to intellectuals and businessmen, was repeating "platitudes" about "indigenous massacre (…) torture of prisoners, and persecution against religious people" promoted by the Brazilian "military government" (sic).[188]

The report analyzed the press coverage in Italy, France, England, Germany, Canada, the United States and Chile, scanning the biggest newspapers of each country[189] and listing every critical article written against the regime from 1965 to 1970.

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[186] Airgram from Amembassy Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. Aug 24, 1970. RG 59. General Records of the Department of State. Subject Numeric Files 1970-73. Pol 17-5 Braz to Pol 23-8 Braz. Box 2132. NACP.

[187] "Brazil's Image Abroad" (1970). Opening the Archives: Documenting U.S.-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:374106/

[188] Campanha Contra o Brasil no Exterior. 591.7(00) – Maço Especial – publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB. The quotation marks are present in the document.

[189] Idem.

The report highlighted Italy and France as major concerns, then considered epicentres of the defamation campaign.[190]

With regards to Italy, the SNI believed that most of the belittling news about Brazil were being spread by catholic clerics through the Vatican in a movement led by the Archbishop of Recife D. Helder Câmara. The defamation campaign, according to the report, reached Europe through members of the clergy, who would then spread it to the dictatorship's opponents in the continent.

In Italy, the supporters of D. Helder Câmara were, in the SNI's words, "low-class intellectuals, musicians and former students, losers and marginalized;" in France, however, intellectuals and businessmen were the ones willing to tarnish Brazil's image abroad. Without any empirical basis, the government believed that besides D. Helder Câmara, some of the detractors of the regime living in Paris were former *Correio da Manhã* owner Niomar Moniz Sodré and her brother, journalist Edmundo Moniz; singer Geraldo Vandré; former diplomat Hugo Gouthier and his wife, Laís. Gouthier was one of the victims of the investigation committee installed at Itamaraty right after the 1964 Coup D'etat.[191] The SNI suggested that Gouthier had received money from Juscelino Kubitschek and Oscar Niemeyer. According to the report, there was an unproven suspicion that Kubitschek and Niemeyer were sponsoring the defamation campaign against the Brazilian government.[192]

An annex to the report, dating from September 1970, blamed the bad press the government was receiving on the articulation of Brazilian "elements" that opposed the 1964 "Revolution", who were mostly

> banished from national soil; *[those who]* fled the country after the Revolution (…) and those who chose overseas as the stage for their "outbursts" against the government, with the aim of promoting themselves on the international arena.

[190] It is interesting to see the importance of Chile, the only country from the periphery on the list, though. Since the 1964 Coup D'état the country was the main hub for political exiles coming from Brazil. The importance of Chile increased after the kidnapping of the Swiss ambassador in Brazil, Giovanni Enrico Bucher in December 1970 by an armed left group. In exchange for his liberation Brazil released 70 political prisoners that were banished from the country and were received by President Allende in Chile. Bucher was freed in January 1971.
[191] Campanha Contra o Brasil no Exterior. 591.7(00) – Maço Especial – publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB
[192] Idem

For the SNI, the "world-communist press" (sic), along with political parties and international organizations took advantage of the work of "bad Brazilians" (sic) to unleash a worldwide campaign against Brazil.[193] For the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, the main articulators of this campaign were D. Helder Câmara; former governor of Pernambuco, Miguel Arraes; economist Celso Furtado; geographer Josué de Castro; the ousted congressman Márcio Moreira Alves and former President Juscelino Kubitschek, all of them willing to misrepresent Brazilian reality with the help of communist newspapers or "useful idiots" (sic).[194]

Therefore, the counteroffensive of the Brazilian government should be very well coordinated. In November 1970, general João Baptista Figueiredo, Secretary-General of the National Security Council wrote an explanatory statement for President Médici about the need for a "government-led social communications policy in the external field" (*política governamental de comunicação social no campo externo).*[195]

After a study elaborated by a working group composed of SNI, AERP, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Itamaraty, it was decided that the foreign ministry should coordinate and oversee the elaboration of the communication policy in the external field. This resulted in the creation of a Special Group led by Itamaraty with members of the SNI, AERP, the ministry of Justice and the General Staff of the Armed Forces.[196] This group's main objective was to fight the "psychological warfare" of which Brazil was a victim, according to the government, and boost the country's international prestige. Therefore, the group would act in two different fronts: first, in an emergency fashion, to "minimize, in the short term, the effects of the derogatory campaigns against Brazil"; second, and more permanently, "increase Brazil's international prestige".[197] The Special Group should prioritize FGR, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States, and should act along with military and justice ministries. Cooperation with the private sector was incentivized:

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[193] Idem
[194] Estado Maior do Exército 2ª Seção. Relatório especial de informações. Campanha sobre o Brasil no Exterior. 591.7(00) – Maço Especial – publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB, p. 40
[195] Exposição de motivos no. 090/70 (Secreto), 20 Nov 70. Secretaria Geral do Conselho de Segurança Nacional. 591.7(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB.
[196] Idem, p.3
[197] Idem, p. 4

> (1) Act with foreign companies with interests in the country so that they exert pressure on the information vehicles of the countries of their headquarters to improve the treatment given to Brazil. Show that the defamation campaign (...) entails losses that can affect the interests of the companies that invested in the country.[198]

With regards to the press, the action plan suggested that the government should act together with foreign correspondents and news agencies. This included better treatment of foreign journalists by governmental officials through building more access channels and the organization of tours around the country; the production of advertisement pieces in several languages to be broadcast on foreign television. The diplomatic missions were advised to increase their contacts with local prestigious editors and journalists and invite members of the press to visit Brazil. The government should also use organizations like Rotary International and Lions Club and the Chambers of Commerce to promote Brazil abroad.[199]

Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza nominated his chief of staff, minister Dário Moreira de Castro Alves, to preside the Special Group, which was supposed to meet at Itamaraty's headquarters in Brasília.[200] The head of Itamaraty's press office, minister Alarico Silveira Junior was also designated to be part of the Special Group.[201] In the next sections, we will see that some embassies put a lot of effort into elaborating plans to improve Brazil's image abroad.

4.3.2 The use of PR firms and the colligation with the private sector: the Debraskom initiative in the FRG (1971 – 1972)

In June 1971 a professional PR firm based in Frankfurt called RCS Public Relations elaborated a report entitled "Public Relations Work for Brazil". This report was made upon the request of a registered association called *Kollegium für Deutsch-Brasilianische Kommunikation e.V* (Debraskom)[202]. Debraskom was founded by Finn Larsen, director of the Frankfurt branch of the Brazilian airline company Varig, Rolf

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[198] Exposição de motivos no. 090/70 (Secreto), 20 Nov 70. Secretaria Geral do Conselho de Segurança Nacional. 591.7(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB p. 4.
[199] Idem, p.6
[200] Dispatch n. 26. February 24, 1971. 591.7(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB
[201] Dispatch n. 52. September 28, 1970. 591.7(00) – Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas sobre o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB
[202]Kollegium für Deutsch-Brasilianische Kommunikation - Trabalho de relações públicas para o Brasil. 591.7(00) – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

Stockmann, a member of RCS Public Relations, and Brazilian journalist Geraldo Moser, with the knowledge of the Brazilian embassy in Bonn[203].

In its overview of the situation, the report concluded that the image that FRG citizens had about Brazil was “deficient” due to the lack of “objective information”, especially since the public opinion was formed by “social-liberal press members” and that “over-politicized democratic convictions of authors and editors in these media lead to misjudgments about the social and economic development process in Brazil”.[204] The main objective, therefore, was to neutralize the negative attitude towards Brazil and turn it into positive reactions, leading to an “objective judgement of Brazil”.[205] Further in the text RCD writes about the “goal image” of Brazil to be achieved in West Germany:

> Brazil is a great progressive country that strives to regularize its life according to South American standards, to achieve the transformation of the social structure and to modernize the infrastructure of a vast country. Brazil is in a positive phase of economic development, progressing in the arts and science sectors and aspiring to expand its industry and commerce through the most advanced technology.
>
> The population of Brazil does not experience racial discrimination. It combines characteristics of its European countries of origin and indigenous population with the extraordinary possibilities offered by such a large territory.[206]

The report suggested cooperation between different media (radio, press, television, cinema) and the use of quality material to be distributed. It was a sophisticated tactics that entailed the building of a network with indirect/off the record sources, providing economic bulletins about Brazil to the German press and German industries interested in investing or with business in Brazil. It also included the production of press coverage of sport and artistic and cultural events in Brazil to be sent to the German press; focus on audio-visual and photographic materials, especially regarding economic matters; using the support of German companies such as Volkswagen and civil society clubs like Rotary International and the Lions Club to sponsor conferences about Brazil; inviting German personalities to Brazil and promoting friendly matches between Brazil and the FGR in different sports, among other suggestions.

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[203] Telegram n. 720 from the Brazilian embassy in Bonn. December 20, 1971. 591.7(00) – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB
[204] Kollegium für Deutsch-Brasilianische Kommunikation - Trabalho de relações públicas para o Brasil. 591.7(00) – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB
[205] Idem, p. 2
[206] Idem, p. 4

The overall cost of the operation would vary from DM 568.720,38 to DM 189.573,46, depending on the activities chosen: the monthly issue *Nachriten aus Brasilien* would cost US$ 130 for 300 prints every month; freelance services, DM 8.000 for 20 days per year, and general "public relations expenses" would cost US$ 4.000.

The Debraskom initiative met all the requirements and guidelines of the Special Group for the communication policy in the external field. However, the Brazilian embassy in Bonn faced difficulties in finding financial support to meet all the suggestions. In March 1972 João Baptista Pinheiro, Brazil's ambassador for West Germany, wrote a note to Itamaraty's headquarters explaining that Debraskom had failed in raising the necessary funds to the whole action plan. According to the ambassador, Moser and Stockmann went to Brazil and met with the secretary of state and AERP but failed to raise funds from German companies with business in Brazil, apart from Varig's German branch.[207]

According to Pinheiro, Debraskom suffered criticism from other businessmen with interests in Brazil. The representative of Mercedes-Benz in Brazil, Mr. Jenssen, asked why RCS Public Relations, in particular, had been chosen to delineate the PR campaign in Germany, and whether should not the embassy and the Brazilian government directly have lead the efforts instead of Debraskom. Pinheiro, then, suggested that the Embassy personally invited executives from companies such as the Deutsche Bank and Volkswagen to be a part of the board of the Debraskom and that the Brazilian government should subsidize the initial activities of the organization[208]. Apart from financing the Debraskom initiative, Pinheiro said:

> (…) if the Secretary of State considers it necessary to undertake an organic effort to promote the image of Brazil in the BRD, the only way to do this would be to intensify the direct action of the Embassy.[209]

Pinheiro then said that Erich Steinberg, Metro-Goldwin Mayer manager, offered MGM facilities to distribute documentaries about Brazil in German-speaking countries. Pinheiro argued that the Embassy should also contact freelancers and private producing companies to produce material for German television:

> 21. We may contact companies and cinematographers who are not ideologically committed and propose reporting on positive aspects of the

[207] Dispatch s/n. Imagem do Brasil. Debraskom. March 23, 1972 591.7(00) – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB
[208] Idem.
[209] Idem p.4

> Brazilian reality, to be presented under the exclusive responsibility of the author and without the overt involvement of the Brazilian government.
>
> 22. In addition to the facilities that may be granted to them, we would necessarily have to finance the filming[210]

Regarding the press, Pinheiro suggested an increase in the circulation of the monthly bulletin *Nachrichten aus Brasilien* from 300 to 500 copies and the use of freelancers to write and plant press releases that were of interest to the Brazilian government.[211]

The Brazilian embassy in Bonn had a well-delineated and documented course of action that shows the formation of an alliance between government officials, the private sector that was led by diplomats. While such detailed plans were not found in other missions abroad, the documents in Brasília show that from Paris to Bogota, Brazilian embassies followed the course of action elaborated in 1970.[212] Mostly, they started monitoring what was being said in each country's press against Brazil and contacting the respective authorities. Overall, the Brazilian government was concerned with torture and censorship allegations in the foreign press. Among other things, the Itamaraty asked embassies to lobby foreign governments to impede the entrance of Brazilian exiles and to censor bad press about Brazil; Brazil also denied visas to filmmakers and intellectuals accused of contributing to the "campaign against Brazil abroad".

4.3.3 Brazilian diplomacy and the foreign press: Brazil's lobby in the United Kingdom (1971 – 1973)

In 1971, Itamaraty wrote to the Brazilian ambassador in the United Kingdom, Sergio Corrêa da Costa, regarding negative comments about Brazil that were made by BBC, regarding torture in Brazil. The Secretary of State then asked whether it was possible to make a formal protest against the British government and requested a copy

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[210] Dispatch s/n. Imagem do Brasil. Debraskom. 23.3.72. 591.7(00) – Publicações sobre o Brasil no Universo Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB p.6, emphasis from author.
[211] Idem. The documents found do not confirm that the MGM and the *Nachrichten aus Brasilien* initiatives were pursued, leaving room for further research.
[212] 591.71(00) Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas contra o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

of the show.[213] Corrêa da Costa replied that he would wait for the Head of BBC's Latin American Service, Albert Palaos, to return from vacation, since he did not trust his substitute.[214]

Upon his return, Sergio Costa met with him on October 14. They discussed two BBC segments that talked about a book by João Quartrim on armed guerrillas and a "hostile piece" written by Norman Lewis on the Sunday Times. Palaos, according to Corrêa da Costa, endorsed the Brazilian government's concern: he insisted that BBC publicized the letter Corrêa da Costa wrote to the Sunday Times responding to Lewis' article, and that he and his assistants were closely watching the BBC so that some if its commentators, particularly those who were "ideologically compromised", did not use the broadcasting company to speak up their points of view on the Brazilian government.[215]

The British government, despite the criticism of the British press and the increase in censorship practices and human rights violations by the Brazilian government, tended to side with Brazil on press matters. In a letter from June 1973 on censorship of Brazilian press to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, ambassador David Hunt wrote that the "strengthening of the Government information machine may present us with a good outlet for our information material", probably referring to IRD-produced material. And that while he understood the reasons the Brazilian dictatorship was unpopular in Britain, he believed that British journalists "could take a more balanced view of what is going on" since Brazil had become a "valuable trading partner".[216]

With the acquiescence and knowledge of the British government, Brazil used the "economic miracle" agenda to promote the interests of the country in the United Kingdom. Finance minister Delfim Netto wrote to the president of Brazil's Central Bank disclosing the list of firms that would be a part of a special supplement on the Brazilian

[213] Dispatch n. 591. Comentários da BBC sobre o Brasil. S/N. Anistia Internacional (Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior) 1974. Caixa 515 – CAMP contra o Brasil no exterior. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[214] Telegram n. 962. Comentários das BBC sobre o Brasil. S/N. Anistia Internacional (Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior) 1974. Caixa 515 – CAMP contra o Brasil no exterior. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[215] Telegram n. 1107. Caixa 515 – CAMP contra o Brasil no exterior. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB.
[216] David Hunt to Alec Douglas-Home. 12th June 1973. FCO 7/2407. TNA.

economy to be published in The Guardian newspaper. Among private Brazilian firms such as Varig and Itaú Bank to state-owned giants such as Embratur, Petrobrás and Banco do Brasil (Brazil's state-owned bank), the companies would spend a total of £ 16,716.00.[217]

The Latin American Department of the Foreign Office was also inclined to work with the Brazilian embassy to organize a "British press visit to Brazil." According to a diplomat at the British Consulate-General in Rio, Robert J. Chase, they were "still unhappy about the partiality of general British press coverage of Brazil" and suggested that the British government along with the Brazilian embassy organized a tour for economic journalists ("not Latin American specialists", he emphasizes) "to do an on-the-spot appraisal of Brazil's current economic progress" no longer than late 1973. He argues that the Americans and the Germans had already done such visits.[218] Miss C. S. Rycroft responded to Chase's letter saying that

> (…) Brazilians are fairly fully occupied with making arrangements for the series of lectures which are due to take place in July. Arrangements for these are proceeding well, managed mainly by the Brazilians in conjunction with Canning House and the Institute for Latin American Studies, and a good and influential attendance seems assured. In these circumstances we feel that it would be best to see what results come from the lectures and then consider an approach to the Brazilians about a possible tour in the opposite direction.[219]

Beyond hiring PR firms, lobbying with local governments, and trying to influence press content that was produced about Brazil, another tactics to fight this so-called "campaign against Brazil abroad" was to censor Brazilian exiles, to which Jean Marc von der Weid's case is the best example.

4.3.4 Censorship attempts on Brazilian exiles: Jean Marc von der Weid's tour around Europe and North America (1971 - 1972)

Jean Marc von der Weid was a Swiss-Brazilian with dual nationality, who had acted as president of the National Student Union (UNE). Arrested after the UNE congress in Ibiúna, he was one of the seventy political prisoners that were released in exchange for the Swiss ambassador Giovanni Enrico Bucher in 1970, being banished from Brazilian soil. After his exile, to the dismay of Itamaraty and the Brazilian government, he travelled around North America and Europe to report the atrocities that

[217] Aviso GB no. 91. 22 de março de 1973. FCO 7/2407. TNA.
[218] Letter from R.J. Chase to J. Robson. 12 March 1973. FCO 7/2407. TNA.
[219] Letter from Miss C S Rycroft to R.J. Chase. 23 March 1973. FCO 7/2407. TNA.

were happening in Brazil. Like D. Helder Câmara, the documents at Itamaraty show that von der Weid was a persona non grata and that his steps were being closely followed by Brazil's diplomatic representations in the countries he visited.

In Canada, he was accused of "anti-Brazilian proselytism" by the Brazilian Consul-general in Montreal.[220] Itamaraty's Secretary of State recommended then to the Brazilian Embassy in Ottawa to verbally express the discontent of the Brazilian government towards the Canadian chancellery, following Weid's "free acting" in the country[221]. Von der Weid's visit to his father homeland, Switzerland, deeply annoyed minister Gibson Barboza. The Brazilian embassy in Bern accused the Swiss government of negligence towards a "terrorist" that was released because of the kidnapping of the country's ambassador in Brazil. Ambassador Aguinaldo Boulitreau Fragoso was concerned with "the repercussion that this series of conferences organized by the banned terrorist [sic] van der Weyden could have all over Europe, abusing his rights of dual Brazilian and Swiss nationality under the protection of the laws of this country."[222] This urged Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza to orient Fragoso to protest against the Swiss government about the permissive treatment Switzerland was giving von der Weid.[223]

Switzerland was not attentive to Brazil's complaints on the treatment given to von der Weid; but the British government, on the other hand, seemed willing to collaborate once again. On April 13, 1971, Gibson Barboza informed the head of SNI, General Carlos Alberto da Fontoura that the Brazilian embassy in London was in contact with Foreign Office officials to prevent the entrance of von der Weid on British territory. He believed that the British government was keen to "restrict the entry into

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[220] Dispatch s/n. Brazilian consulate-general in Montreal to the Secretary of State. May 5, 1972. 591.71(00) Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas contra o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB.

[221]Telegram n. 228 from the Brazilian Embassy in Ottawa to the Secretary of State. October, 1971 591.71(00) Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas contra o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

[222] Telegram n. 29. Brazilian embassy in Bern to the Secretary of State. February 25, 1971. 591.71(00) Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas contra o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

[223] Telegram n. 36. Brazilian embassy in Bern to the Secretary of State. February 25, 1971. 591.71(00) Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas contra o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

that country of undesirable Brazilians who intend to influence English public opinion against Brazil and harm our bilateral relations."[224]

Indeed, the British government agreed to the conditions imposed by the Brazilian. British ambassador David Hunt wrote to Henry Hankey from the Foreign Office claiming that von der Weid was an "intelligent and embittered" man who was expected to do "directed propaganda against Brazil."[225] Von der Weid had given interviews to The Times and the Morning Star telling the tortures he had suffered while in prison. Hunt then writes that

> There have been a good many instances when prisoners released by the Brazilian government (…) have on their release borne no physical signs of torture and have made no instant charges of maltreatment against the Brazilian Government but have subsequently developed vivid and detailed memories for torture to which they tell the press they were subjected.[226]

Hunt then finishes the letter by saying that the British government should not be complacent over guerrilla activities and that von der Weid statements needed to be repudiated.[227] On this account, H. A. A. Hankey replied to David Hunt on June 10, 1971, that the Home Office had refused his entry in the country, "following an approach from the Brazilian Embassy". Moreover, he says:

> I agree that in recent years Brazil may well have received more than its fair share of gratuitous censure from outside on its domestic affairs. (…) We are frequently asked by a variety of private and charitable bodies to lend official support to protests against alleged atrocities in Brazil. Our line has been to maintain that such allegations are for the Brazilian Government to answer.[228]

These "private and charitable bodies" that were pressuring the British government to "lend official support to protests against alleged atrocities in Brazil" were considered by the Brazilian government products of the infiltration of the international communist movement into western liberal democracies[229]. Those groups were, in the mind of Brazilian officials, collaborating along with the communists and the Brazilian

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[224] Dispatch n. 25 from Minister Mário Gibson Barboza to General Carlos Alberto da Fontoura. April 13, 1971. 591.71(00) Publicações pejorativas ou tendenciosas contra o Brasil. Caixa 210. SCE. Maços Temáticos Secretos. AHI-BSB

[225] Letter from David Hunt to H. A. A Hankey. 31st May 71. FCO 7/1889. TNA.

[226] Idem.

[227] Idem.

[228] Letter from H.A.A Hankey to David Hunt. 10 June 71. FCO 7/1889. TNA.

[229] A campanha contra o Brasil no exterior – "Amnesty International", outubro 1974. S/N. Anistia Internacional (Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior) 1974. Caixa 515 – CAMP contra o Brasil no exterior. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB

opposition to tarnish Brazil's image abroad. One group in particular: Amnesty International.

4.3.5 "The most dangerous and successful defamation agent of Brazil's image abroad": Amnesty International (1972-1974)

In 1972, the organization Amnesty International published a detailed report entitled *Report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil*, which was carried out in April and May of 1972 and encompassed the period from the promulgation of AI-5 to July 1972. In the report, Amnesty International claims that the Brazilian government did not allow AI's independent body of observers to enter the country to investigate torture allegations, and that already in 1970 the organization visited the Brazilian embassy in London to "express concern at reported torture". Also, it suggests that "an independent mission to Brazil could serve to improve Brazil's image abroad if the charges were proved to be inaccurate" (Amnesty International 1972, 2). According to the report, the Brazilian ambassador Corrêa da Costa replied to Amnesty International stating that any enquiry about Brazil's internal jurisdiction should be processed through the United Nations or the IAHRC (idem).

The 1972 document listed the names of 1081 people that had reported being tortured, and claimed to have received the names of 472 perpetrators - not disclosed therein, but sent to the Brazilian government in confidence (Meirelles 2016). While it is not the intention of this dissertation to discuss the full nature of the report or Amnesty International's work related to Brazil, it is important to look at the impact the report had on Brazil's image abroad and how it was perceived by the Brazilian government.[230] The report was launched in August 1972, and beyond torture allegations, it gave a detailed account of the regime's structure, explaining the National Security Doctrine, the institutional act no. 5 and the 1967 constitution (Amnesty International 1972).

The report caused a commotion in the United Kingdom, especially among members of Parliament. Ambassador David Hunt wrote to H. A. A. Hankey describing Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza's reaction. According to Hunt, Gibson Barboza said that he had begun to read Amnesty International's report but "found it such a lot of nonsense that I gave up halfway through the first chapter". Hunt told H. A. A Hankey

[230] On the relations between Amnesty International and Brazil during the military regime see Meirelles (2016) and Roriz (2017)

that he agreed with Gibson Barboza. For the British ambassador in Brazil, the report was full of “deliberate falsifications” and that he was quite “startled”, because he “always thought Amnesty International, though thoroughly establishment-mined in the left-wing internationalist sense, tried to stick fairly close to facts”.[231] The British government had invited Gibson Barboza to visit London, but, because of the report, Hunt recommended him to avoid any publicity of the visit.[232]

Before the release of the report, Sérgio Corrêa da Costa suggested that the Brazilian minister of justice, Alfredo Buzaid was inclined to informally visit Britain, “with as little publicity as possible”.[233] The author of the letter, M.I Goulding, believed that this was due to the British press’ growing interest in the treatment of political prisoners in Brazil, to which Goulding advises that “at present, it would probably be better if he did not come”.[234]

For the Brazilian government, the 1972 Amnesty report represented the peak of the “campaign against Brazil”. This led SNI to launch a report called *Apreciação especial – a Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior – Amnesty International* (Special appreciation – The campaign against Brazil abroad – Amnesty International) in October 1974, during the beginning of the Geisel government (1974 - 1979). Full of conspiracy theories, the report starts by saying that most humanitarian organizations, that had been created from the 1940s onwards, had converted to “communist front” and become instruments of Soviet propaganda, Amnesty International included.[235]

In the view of the National Information Service, soon after its inauguration in 1961, Amnesty became “a front organization of the MCI and started to serve the purposes of communist propaganda”[236]. In the Brazilian case, the government accused Amnesty International of colluding with the *Frente Brasileira de Informações* (FBI), or Brazilian Information Front, created by Miguel Arraes in exile with the support of other Brazilians and opponents of the regime. The Brazilian government believed that the

[231] Letter from David Hunt to H. A. A. Hankey. December 6, 1972. FCO 7/2205. TNA.
[232] Idem.
[233] Letter from M.I Goulding to J.M Hunter. 11th September 1972. FCO 7/2205. TNA.
[234] Idem.
[235] A campanha contra o Brasil no exterior – “Amnesty International” Outubro 1974. S/N. Anistia Internacional (Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior) 1974. Caixa 515 – CAMP contra o Brasil no exterior. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB, p. 1
[236] Idem, p. 9

FBI was created with the objective of defaming Brazil abroad and counted with the help of the Catholic Church and the intellectual and financial support of the MCI: [237]

> the main objective of propaganda abroad (...) was Brazil's political isolation (...) through the presentation of an image that demonstrated the existence of a dictatorial, repressive, and disrespectful regime towards the human person, which tortures and kills.[238]

Thus, Amnesty International, aligning with "Brazilian terrorists and subversives," engaged in a campaign against Brazil by overflowing Brazilian representation abroad with letters of appeal and letters of protest regarding the situation of political prisoners. For the SNI,

> such correspondence always reveals the existence of good sources of information as it contains details such as (...) time and place of the prison and data relating to the cases to which they responded, or which are still in progress in the Military Justice[239]

For this reason, the government considered Amnesty International one of the "most dangerous and successful defamation agents of the image of Brazil abroad"[240]. The Amnesty committees had, according to the report, communist sympathizers, or communist orientation. Some chapters of the 1972 report, in the government's opinion, used "communist propaganda techniques" to mislead the reader and the issue of human rights to create a hostile environment against Brazil.

Amnesty International was the most dangerous and the most successful according to the report because of its influence among international organizations such as the United Nations and the IAHRC. The report considered that those organizations were victims of a communist infiltration that aimed to "turn those entities into useful means for communist purposes".[241] For the cases presented at the IAHRC, for example, the government orientation was to: deny that the practice of torture existed in Brazil; affirm that there are no political prisoners, and assure that those arrested were "professional terrorists with orientation from abroad" and that no clergy had their

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[237] Idem, p. 5-6
[238] Idem, p. 4
[239] A campanha contra o Brasil no exterior – "Amnesty International" Outubro 1974. S/N. Anistia Internacional (Campanha contra o Brasil no Exterior) 1974. Caixa 515 – CAMP contra o Brasil no exterior. SCE. Maços temáticos secretos. AHI-BSB, p. 9
[240] Idem, p. 10
[241] Idem p. 19

political liberties curtailed. They should stand firmly that 1964 was a “Democratic Revolution” open to constructive criticism since respected the legislation.[242]

The report concludes by stating that the campaign against Brazil is part of the psychological warfare undertaken by the communist movement on the grounds of the Cold War. Groups like Amnesty International would, then, enjoy the receptivity they have among international organizations and “liberal governments” especially from Western Europe to lead the defamation campaign against the country, and suggests that the guidelines elaborated in the early 1970s continued to be followed: a joint action plan that combined propaganda and diplomatic action and the pursue of opinion-makers that could advocate in favour of Brazil.

4.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter focused on the strategies developed by the Brazilian government to foster the image of Brazil abroad after the institutionalization of the Institutional Act number 5. Brazil’s image was already hindered by the second institutional act, but the brutality of the State violence that met the country after 1968 was unprecedented. The crimes committed by the Brazilian state draw the attention in the international arena, in a time that the international human rights movement was becoming strong.

At the same time, the reception of AI-5 by foreign powers was mixed. The United Kingdom found the fifth institutional act deplorable, however, it should not hinder UK-Brazilian relations. On the other hand, in the United States, while Nixon empowered Brazil through its delegation doctrine, the congress started to become more vocal regarding the abuses committed by the military dictatorship.

Although some diplomats knew that the AI-5 would damage considerable the image of Brazil within the international community, Itamaraty was the main actor implementing the “governmental social communication policy in the external field” abroad. As seen in this chapter, the tactics varied from country to country, but consisted mostly in monitoring newspapers and journalists, paying freelance writers to produce favorable content on Brazil to be distributed among the international press. In

[242] On specific cases see Bernardi (2017).

some countries, even professional public relation firms were hired. More serious, however, was the attempt on censoring Brazilian exiles abroad that tried to speak out.

If the Médici government was somewhat successful in promoting the economic miracle as a mean of counterbalancing the allegations of human rights violations in Brazil – with the help of foreign governments included –, his successor, Ernesto Geisel (1974 – 1979), which was considered a member of the "Sorbonne wing", faced difficulties. The second half of the decade would bring more attention to human rights abuse by U.S backed right-wing dictatorships. In 1971, Senator Frank Church's congressional hearings on Brazil were not enough for suspending U.S foreign aid to the country (Sikkink, 2004), partially due to the successful strategy of the Brazilian government. However, the violence employed by the national security dictatorships that came to power in Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976 were paramount to the shift in public perception, especially in the United States. There, transnational human rights activism was gaining traction and the trend culminated in the election of Jimmy Carter, with his human rights foreign policy (Schmidli, 2013).

Carter's foreign policy towards Latin America is considered a low point of U.S-Brazilian relations, and his Human Rights foreign policy became a thorn on Geisel's side, especially because of the continuous reports published by Amnesty International and the pressure made at the IAHRC and the UN Human Rights commission (Spektor 2009; Reis 2014; Meirelles 2016; Bernardi 2017; Roriz 2017, 2021). This chapter showed, nothwithstanding, that contrarily of what the literature usually states, diplomatic concern with the image of the country regarding those allegations did not start with Carter's election; rather, it had begun much earlier as relevant part of Brazil's foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

CONCLUSION

On his book “The Historian’s Craft,” Marc Bloch argues that the ignorance about the past not only hinders our comprehension of the present, but also compromises present action (Bloch 1997, 63). The problem with the knowledge of the past according to Bloch, however, is that the past is in itself tyrannical. It only reveals to us what it wants to be revealed.

Dealing with Itamaraty’s past is dealing with silences and omissions. Throughout the years we have learned that Itamaraty’s autonomy shielded diplomats from being subject to the authoritarian practices of the military dictatorship, as if foreign policy making was something else, separated from ideology and governmental preferences. This, in part, was due to the fact that, for a long time, diplomats functioned as gatekeepers of the knowledge produced about the history of Brazilian foreign policy. To put it in Koselleck’s terms, until recently, this history was mostly depicted in terms of events – and events, set in a chronological time, can only be “narrated”, not described (Koselleck 2004). The narrated events tell us a story of a diplomatic tradition that has begun with the Baron of Rio Branco and was constant during time, and no government – democratic or authoritarian – could steer Brazilian diplomacy away from its objective of pursuing the ultimate “national interest”: the search for autonomy and development.

However, the declassified documents that became available for researchers in the last decades help us tell another story: the story of an institution embedded in a hierarchical and conservative structure that enables the ascension of those who were able to play within the structures. Most members of the Brazilian diplomatic corps, at least those who entered the career in the early 20th century, came from an extremely specific upbringing, many of whom had historical family ties with the Brazilian aristocracy of the 19th century. It is therefore hard to believe that the social origins of Brazilian diplomats did not influence foreign policy decision making.

Therefore, we must ask ourselves: when we talk about Itamaraty’s pursuit of Brazil’s “national interest,” whose are the interests we talk about? If Itamaraty remained autonomous throughout the dictatorship, for example, was it because of its skilled tradition? Or because the diplomatic field is so intrinsically conservative as to influence the diplomatic sprit de corps and the diplomatic habitus?

The documents show us that the Brazilian military regime used its diplomatic structure around the world for propaganda purposes. Moreover, some diplomats did participate in the decision-making process of the regime. From the courses at the Superior War College to the coordination of the strategy to supress what they have called “the campaign against Brazil abroad”, high-ranking diplomats were at the decision table. They had a close relationship with the military and helped trace the “ideological foreign policy” of the regime. The endeavor encompassed the support for ousting democratic governments in the Southern Cone - which has been analysed by the most recent literature - and the elaboration of a PR strategy in the developed countries to clean up the image of Brazil. We believe that those two threads are intertwined.

The declassified documents present an opportunity for the researcher on Brazilian diplomatic history to revisit the common narratives that comprehend the history of Itamaraty. This dissertation represents a beginning rather than an ending: It shows new research paths for future inquiry, for example, Itamaraty’s influence in the formulation of the National Security Doctrine, its relationship with human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorship and specific country-oriented actions to improve Brazil’s image abroad.

The present is showing that the deconstruction of old narratives is important because it allow us to act in the present, as Bloch (1997) says. I first wrote the research project that culminated in this dissertation in 2016. The Brazilian congress had impeached the first woman to ever become President in the country, Ms. Dilma Rousseff – a former *guerrilheira* who was arrested and tortured during the military dictatorship. However, in 2018 we were confronted with the election of Jair Bolsonaro - the former congressperson who dedicated his vote in favour of Rousseff’s impeachment to her torturer, Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ulstra.

In 2016, this research project seemed like a matter of history only. In 2019, when I went to Brasília to do research at Itamaraty’s historical archives, I realised that history was repeating itself. The rhetoric of Jair Bolsonaro and his former Foreign Minister, Ernesto Araújo, who resigned in early 2021, was very similar to the conspiratorial anti-communist discourse that the Brazilian dictatorship used to counterbalance the image of the country abroad. In his first inaugural speech at the United Nations General

Assembly (UNGA) on September 24, 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro opened with the following remark:

> I present to you a new Brazil, which reappears after being on the brink of socialism.
>
> A Brazil that is being rebuilt based on the desires and ideals of its people. In my government, Brazil has been working to regain the world's trust, reducing unemployment, violence, and business risk, through less bureaucracy, deregulation and, in particular, by example.
>
> My country was very close to socialism, which has placed us in a situation of widespread corruption, severe economic recession, high crime rates and continual attacks on the family and religious values that shape our traditions.[243]

Ernesto Araújo, a career diplomat that openly embraced Bolsonaro's far-right ideology, just like his predecessors Juracy Magalhães and Mário Gibson Barboza, blamed the decay of Brazil's image abroad on a deliberate attempt by political opponents to damage Brazil's reputation, and claimed Bolsonaro was commited to changing the "system of corruption, of backwardness, to which these people *[the opposition]* are linked."[244] Just like the military claimed that human rights violations and state-based violence were distortions the "communist movement" employed to deliberately tarnish Brazil's image abroad during the military dictatiorship, Bolsonaro's administration claims that the environmental question and the way his government has been dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic are the foci of a "new campaign against Brazil abroad". However, there is a notable change: if in the 1960s and the 1970s diplomats and the military used confidential cables, nowadays those comments are made publicly on Twitter (Mello, 2019).

There is a movement to consider Bolsonaro's foreign policy an "anomaly", a new "step out of cadence". Celso Amorim, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's Foreign Minister from 2003 to 2010, claimed that Brazil's credibility has never been so low, and compares Bolsonaro and Araújo with the military dictatorship:

> Even at the time of the military governments, especially at that terrible time of (Emílio Garrastazu) Médici (1969 – 1974), with the tortures and murders, there was still a separation between the internal events and the practices of the

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[243] Verdelho, Andreia. **Veja a íntegra do discurso de Bolsonaro na Assembléia Geral da ONU.** Política. Agência Brasil. 24/09/2019. Available at <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2019-09/presidente-jair-bolsonaro-discursa-na-assembleia-geral-da-onu>. Access: 26/11/2021.

[244] Teófilo, Sarah. **Há esforço para prejudicar a imagem do Brasil no exterior, diz Ernesto Araújo.** Política. Estado de Minas. 02/03/2021. Available at <https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2021/03/02/interna_politica,1242535/ha-esforco-para-prejudicar-imagem-do-brasil-no-exterior-diz-ernesto-araujo.shtml> Access: 26/11/2021

> Brazilian Foreign Policy. In this way, this is the first time that I have seen all the traditions of Brazilian diplomacy thrown away.[245]

Amorim, a career diplomat himself, believes that there was a separation from the crimes committed by the State during the lead years and Brazil's diplomatic practices. As this research shows, this is not true: Brazilian diplomacy worked closely with the military. The ministry might not be directly involved with the repression, but the diplomatic apparatus was used to spy on Brazilian exiles and tried to censor what was being said about the country abroad.

Itamaraty, as an institution, has failed to face its past – but as shown in this dissertation, this is not a prerogative of Brazil. For a long time, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs also tried to hide its involvement with the country's past. Itamaraty, when confronted with its responsibilities towards the preservation of the dictatorship, it tends to overestimate the role of resistance inside the ministry. Indeed, there were diplomats who paid a high price for voicing allegations of human rights violations by the Brazilian government abroad, such as the cases of Jom Tob Azulay[246] and Miguel Darcy de Oliveira,[247] or the diplomats who had their positions revoked thanks to the investigation committees of 1964 and 1969. However, the number of diplomats who overtly opposed the dictatorship seems lower than the number of diplomats who supported it.

Consequently, looking at Itamaraty's past will help us understand that Bolsonaro's diplomacy may not be the rule, but it is not the exception either. Should we ever seek to build a more transparent and democratic foreign policy, new narratives based on solid research must be written.

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[245]Calejon, César. **Celso Amorim: "Nem na ditadura a política externa foi tão desastrosa".** Entendendo Bolsonaro. UOL Notícias. 20/07/2020. Available at < https://entendendobolsonaro.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2020/07/20/celso-amorim-nem-na-ditadura-a-politica-externa-foi-tao-desastrosa/ >. Access: 26/11/2021

[246] Éboli, Evandro. **Diplomata Jom Tob Azulay é reintegrado ao Itamaraty.** Política. O Globo. 07.02.2011. Available at < https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/diplomata-jom-tob-azulay-reintegrado-ao-itamaraty-2827553> Access 17/05/2022

[247] Gianini, Alessandro. **Documentário conta história de engajamento e luta de Rosiska Darcy de Oliveira.** Cultura. O Globo. 31.03.2019. Available at < https://oglobo.globo.com/cultura/revista-da-tv/documentario-conta-historia-de-engajamento-luta-de-rosiska-darcy-de-oliveira-23562943 >. Access 17/05/2022

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