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**DESTINO, EXORTAÇÕES EFICAZES
E PUNIÇÕES JUSTAS EM CRISIPO**

VERSÃO CORRIGIDA/REVISED VERSION

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2017**

PAULO FERNANDO TADEU FERREIRA

**CHRYSIPPUS ON FATE, EFFECTIVE
EXHORTATION, AND DESERT**

VERSÃO CORRIGIDA/REVISED VERSION

A Thesis submitted to the Graduate School in Philosophy of the Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy, Languages, and Human Sciences of the University of São Paulo, in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano.

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SÃO PAULO
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To Joaquim and Celina, *in memoriam*.

To Celeste and Noemia.

To Georgia.

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Resumo

FERREIRA, P. F. T. *Destino, exortações eficazes e punições justas em Crisipo*. Versão corrigida. 2017. 138 pp. Tese de Doutorado. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras, e Ciências Humanas. Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade de São Paulo, 2017.

Crisipo responde a duas objeções sobre se o Destino pode acomodar louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições: de acordo com a primeira, se tudo ocorre por Destino, louvores e reprimendas não fazem diferença no curso dos eventos e, por conseguinte, não podem exortar à virtude ou dissuadir do vício de modo efetivo; de acordo com a segunda, se tudo ocorre por Destino, ninguém é a origem última de suas ações e, por conseguinte, louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições por suas ações não são merecidas. A primeira (preservada no testemunho de Diogeniano *apud* Eusébio, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8) é distinta do Argumento Preguiçoso em Cícero (*De Fato* 28-30) e Orígenes (*Contra Celsum* II 20) por ser atinente à responsabilidade moral, e deriva da digressão no livro XXV do tratado de Epicuro *Sobre a natureza*. A segunda (preservada em Cícero, *De Fato* 39-45 e Gélíio, *Noctes Atticae* VII 2) não tem relação com a questão das possibilidades alternativas, a qual pertence a uma apreciação posterior da discussão original com a qual vem mesclada no testemunho de Cícero. A resposta de Crisipo à segunda objeção, na medida em que é capaz de estabelecer, para além da mera ausência de força exterior, que as causas perfeitas de nossos impulsos são os nossos assentimentos e que os nossos assentimentos não ocorrem a despeito de nós, é capaz de cumprir os requisitos para o merecimento de louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições enquanto instrumentos terapêuticos que visam à cura de nossas paixões, a qual é a única noção de louvores, reprimendas, honras ou punições que pode aspirar a merecimento nos fragmentos supérstites de Crisipo.

Palavras-chave: Crisipo; destino; exortações; punições.

Abstract

FERREIRA, P.F.T. *Chrysippus on Fate, Effective Exhortation, and Desert*. Revised Version. 2017. 138 pp. PhD Thesis. Faculty of Philosophy, Languages, and Human Sciences. Department of Philosophy, University of São Paulo, 2017.

Chrysippus faces two different objections as to whether Fate can accommodate praise, blame, honor or punishment: one, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then praise and blame do not make a difference in the course of events, and therefore cannot effectively exhort one to virtue or dissuade one from vice; the other, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then one is not the ultimate origin of one's actions, and therefore praise, blame, honor, or punishment for one's actions are not deserved. The first (preserved in Diogenianus' testimony *apud* Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8) is distinct from the Idle Argument in Origen (*Contra Celsum* II 20) and Cicero (*De Fato* 28-30) in that it pertains to the issue of moral responsibility, and derives instead from the digression in Book XXV of Epicurus' treatise *On Nature*. The second (preserved in Cicero's *De Fato* 39-45 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2) is not related to the issue of alternate possibilities, which belongs rather in a later appraisal of the original discussion, with which it is conflated in Cicero's testimony. Chrysippus' reply to the latter, in that it is capable of establishing, beyond mere absence from external compulsion, that the perfect causes of our impulses are our assents and that our assents do not take place all by themselves, is capable of meeting conditions for desert of praise, blame, honor, or punishment *qua* therapeutic devices aimed at extirpating our passions, which is the sole notion of praise, blame, honor or punishment to have a claim on desert in the extant fragments of Chrysippus.

Keywords: Chrysippus; Fate; Exhortation; Punishment.

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Introduction

In this dissertation, I argue that Chrysippus faces two different objections as to whether Fate can accommodate praise, blame, honor or punishment: *one*, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then praise and blame do not make a difference in the course of events, and therefore are not able to effectively exhort one to virtue or effectively dissuade one from vice; *the other*, to the effect that if everything takes place by Fate, then one is not the ultimate origin of one's actions, and therefore praise, blame, honor, or punishment for one's actions are undeserved. As I see the point, the first objection involves a *forward*-looking concern (it is a necessary condition for the *efficacy* of praise and blame that praise and blame are in fact *capable of exhorting to, or dissuading from*, actions of a given kind), while the second objection involves a *backward*-looking concern (it is a necessary condition for *deserving* praise, blame, honor or punishment that praise, blame, honor or punishment are bestowed on one *for one's having authored* actions of a given kind).

Scholars have assumed the first objection to address the issue of futility of actions in general, taking it both as indistinct from the Idle Argument as Cicero (*De Fato* 28–30) and Origen (*Contra Celsum* II 20) report it and as not pertaining directly to the issue of moral responsibility. Scholars have also assumed the second objection to address the issue of compulsion from externals and alternative possibilities and to have no bearing on the issue of ultimate origination, taking Chrysippus' reply as incapable of addressing worries with respect to the latter.

In Chapter One, I purport to show that the original objection in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 is distinct from the Idle Argument in significant respects, and derives instead from Epicurus' second consideration in the digression in Book XXV of his treatise *On Nature*. As I see the point, Epicurus there advances an argument to the effect that if one takes our actions to be assignable to an all-encompassing and intransgressible power rather than to ourselves, then one is no longer able to dissuade us from acting or even to account for our eagerness to act, since our acting or not is then assumed not to be brought about by us. Epicurus' argument is put forward as dealing with the issue of censure and praise—and it is with regard to eagerness, blame, praise, and exhortation that an argument is set forth in Diogenianus' testimony to the effect that Fate undermines that which is brought about by us. Chrysippus' reply to the latter purports to show both that Fate is compatible with that which is

brought about by us (τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς) as implied in the objection, namely as that of which we are necessary and sufficient conditions, and that effective exhortations require no more than our being necessary and sufficient conditions of the outcomes to which we are exhorted. Notably, the illustrations used by Chrysippus in order to instantiate his claims are especially apposite to address concerns about praise and blame. On all of the above counts, we are a far cry from Chrysippus' reply to the Idle Argument.

As a transition to the following chapter, I show that Chrysippus' reply is intended as having a bearing on the issue how to understand conditional prophecies *qua* exhortations, and that a rejoinder to Chrysippus' stand on conditional prophecies is framed in terms of that which is up to us (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν), taken by the opponent as that whose ultimate origin does not trace back to us.

In Chapter Two, I set out to show, on the basis of Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*, that claims to the effect that one is not deserving of blame or punishment are usually framed in Antiquity in terms not of one's ability to do otherwise, but of one's being the ultimate origin of that for which one is blamed or punished. In the sequence, I argue both that the issue of necessity in Cicero's report of the second objection directed against Chrysippus in *De Fato* 39–45 belongs rather in a later appraisal of the original discussion which is traceable to Carneades' attack on Chrysippus' position as transmitted in Cicero's *De Fato* 31, and that the focus of recent commentators on alternative possibilities in the passage stems rather from Harry Frankfurt's dominance on the debate on moral responsibility. Then I proceed to an appreciation of Chrysippus' stand on desert via an analysis of his attested assertions on blame and punishment in light of Seneca's views on blame and punishment, with the result that both Chrysippus and Seneca only acknowledge the possibility of just blame and punishment within the framework of the therapy of passions. Such a therapeutic perspective implies that conditions on just blame and punishment are less stringent than initially expected, involving not one's not being the ultimate origin of that for which one is praised or blamed but merely the fact that one's assent is not self-sufficiently caused by one's presentation but takes the kind of person one is to come about, and that one's assent is such that once it is given an impulse ensues and once it is withdrawn the impulse gives way. Finally, I purport to show that Chrysippus' reply in Cicero's testimony is able to show just that, with the consequence that Chrysippus is capable of providing an answer to the worry about ultimate origination by shifting our view on the role of blame and punishment and on the consequent requirements on desert.

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Chapter One

Τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς and effective exhortation

In this chapter I discuss Diogenianus' testimony in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* as a source for Chrysippus' reply not to the Idle Argument but to another line of reasoning, whose debt to some of Epicurus' points in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV, shall be made apparent. Despite shared ground between the Idle Argument and the argument in Diogenianus' testimony, which allows for Chrysippus' respective replies to run along much the same lines, the argument in Diogenianus' testimony is unique in addressing “that which is brought about by us” (τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς) and praise and blame as exhortations, questioning whether exhortations to act thus or otherwise make any difference in the course of events if everything is governed by Fate. Thus it is, I believe, that the argument in Diogenianus' testimony pertains to a discussion of whether Fate is compatible with praise and blame taken as effective with a view to reforming one's character.

Epicurus, *On Nature* Book XXV

The first text I discuss comes from the *villa suburbana* built most probably by Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, Julius Caesar's father-in-law, to the northwest of Herculaneum on the Bay of Naples, an impressive architectonic complex entombed by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in August 79 AD and only partially explored up to now.¹

Among the hundreds of papyrus rolls which have been exhumed from the *tablinum* of the property² and were in time held to belong to the library of Philodemus of Gadara, an Epicurean poet and philosopher sheltered under the patronage of the owner of the *villa*, successive efforts of decipherment succeeded in identifying portions of Books II, XI, XIV, XV, XXI, XXV, XXVIII, XXXIV and at least three uncertain (with Books II, XI and XXV in

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- 1 Sedley (1998), ch. 4, offers a panorama of the main aspects of the discovery; Zarmakoupi (ed.) (2010) deepens and updates the information.
 - 2 The today more than 1,800 fragmentary items catalogued in the National Library of Naples are estimated to correspond to approximately 1,100 rolls; cf. Travaglione (1997).

more than one copy) of Epicurus' 37-book work *On Nature*.³

We will here deal with the so-called “digression” in Book XXV, whose opening is graphically signalled in the oldest of the three rolls containing the text⁴ and whose end is marked by the phrase τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων (“these things being so”) in the immediately following sentence, which opens the final summary of the book. In the passage, Epicurus champions our sense of our own agency against an opponent who holds that everything takes place of necessity.⁵

The claim I hold Epicurus' opponent endorses—πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι—is attributed to Democritus in Diogenes Laertius IX 44–5, where ἀνάγκη is equated with δίνη, the vortex that gives motion to the atoms; Epicurus, in turn, claims in a passage from the *Letter to Menoeceus* (Diogenes Laertius X 133–4) that some things take place κατ' ἀνάγκην, some take place ἀπὸ τύχης, and some take place παρ' ἡμᾶς.⁶

Ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρεῖττονα τοῦ ... τὴν ... ὑπὸ τινων δεσπότιν εἰσαγομένην πάντων ἡγᾶλλοντος†, ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὁρᾶν, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν (ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη δουλεύειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην) ... ;

Who do you deem superior to ... one who announces that which some introduce as sovereign over all, that which takes place by chance, and that which is brought about by us, on grounds that necessity is not to be held accountable, one sees chance is not fix, and that which is brought about by us—to which censure and its contrary naturally follow—has no sovereign (since it is better to give heed to the tale of gods than be a slave to the Fate of the natural philosophers, for the former sketches a hope for

3 Recent editions of those texts are: Leone (2012) for Book II; Sedley (1976) and Arrighetti and Gigante (1977) for Book XI; Leone (1984) for Book XIV; Millot (1977) for Book XV; Laursen (1995) and Laursen (1997) for Book XXV; Sedley (1973) for Book XXVIII; Leone (2002) for Book XXXIV; and Cantarella and Arrighetti (1972) for the Book *On Time*. Cf. also Del Mastro (2013) for two recent discoveries.

4 The immediately preceding line in PHerc 1191 is shorter than the others in the same column; cf. Laursen (1997: 66) for the evidence and its interpretation.

5 In Sedley (1983) and Sedley (1988), Epicurus' argument for human self-determination is said to be anti-deterministic and anti-reductionistic. O'Keefe (2002) has in turn claimed that Epicurus' refutation of eliminativism and of fatalism entails neither anti-reductionism nor anti-determinism. Bobzien (2000) has also stressed that Epicurus' argument for agent autonomy in the digression is compatible with determinism. As shall become apparent in what follows, my purposes here do not require me to enter such discussion—nor, for that matter, to take a stand in the convoluted issue of the swerve.

6 I follow the text in Dorandi (2013).

supplication on account of honor paid to the gods, while the latter's necessity is not to be entreated) ... ?

The opposition here underscored between necessity on one hand and censure, praise, and accountability on the other is central in the digression, where chance is swept aside. As for the Fate (εἰμαρμένη) of the natural philosophers, one may be reminded that in Aëtius I 25 4 Leucippus is said to have held that everything takes place of necessity (κατ' ἀνάγκην), there equated with Fate (εἰμαρμένην).

As we shall see, Epicurus' argument in the digression consists in a *reductio ad absurdum* of both options that are left for one who upholds that everything takes place of necessity, namely either merely renaming as brought about by us that which, as one holds, takes place of necessity, or attributing everything to necessity.⁷

I follow (with changes signalled in the footnotes to the translation) the text in Laursen (1997); for ease of reference I divide the extract into 18 units:⁸

⁷ I divide Epicurus' argument into two blocks (units //5//–//8// and //9//–//16//, respectively) corresponding to two hypothetical considerations (opened by εἰ μὲν + optative in //5// and by εἰ δέ + optative in //9//, respectively). My reconstruction is unorthodox: in Long and Sedley (1998, I: 108–9) the argument is divided into three stages: //7//–//9//, //10//–//16//, and //17//–//18//; Bobzien (2000: 198–306) divides the argument into four sections: //3//–//9//, //10//–//11//, //12//–//15//, and //16//–//18//; O'Keefe (2005: 81–93) takes //3//–//9// as Epicurus' central argument and //10//–//16// as a rejoinder to a possible reply; Masi (2006: 124–44) divides the argument into four sections: //3//–//5//, //6//–//9//, //10//–//11//, and //12//–//15//. I argue for my construal below in the text.

⁸ Laursen gives the readings of the three papyri side by side, in three columns of text; I give instead the reading that is unequivocally attested in at least one papyrus, marking as lacunae only the passages where the three papyri have lacunae; as *dubia* the readings that, while not attested unequivocally in any of the papyri, are *dubia* in at least one; and as *illegibilia* all passages where there are but characters scattered among lacunae. In the footnotes I print divergences among editors and discrepancies among the papyri, as long as those amount to more than just different patterns of writing. With respect to that, I should note that certain non-standard forms are consistently adopted in one or the other of the three papyri—as, for instance, in PHerc 1191, where the final nasal is commonly written with the same point of articulation as the following occlusive, as well as ι for ει in stems and, with PHerc 1056, third-person singular subjunctive active in ει. In general, the standard form is attested in at least one of the remaining papyri; where it is not, for the sake of consistency I print the standard form. I do that in eight places, seven of which correspond to the examples listed above (τὸν φυσικὸν χα[ρακ]τήρα for τὸμ φυσικὸγ χα[ρακ]τήρα in //2//, αὐτῶν καλούμενον for αὐτῶγ καλούμενον in //10//, ἐπ[ι]δείξ<α>ι for ἐπ[ι]δείξ<α>ι and αἱ[τι]ον καλ[οῦ]μεν for αἱ[τι]ογ καλ[οῦ]μεν in //11//, [ἀ]π[ο]δείξει and ἔχει for the attested [in PHerc 1056] [ἀ]π[ο]δείξει and ἔχει in //13//, ἐκτιθε[ι] for the attested [in PHerc 1056 and PHerc 1191] ἐκτιθε[ι] in //16//) and one where I follow the standard form in printing the final nasal of a prefix with the same point of articulation as the following occlusive (συγκρού[ο]ντα for the attested [in PHerc. 1056 and PHerc. 697] συγκρού[ο]ντα in //18//). Furthermore, I print γιν- for γινν-, following PHerc. 1056 (PHerc. 1191 and PHerc. 697 prefer, respectively, γινν- and γειν-; for the sake of consistency I print ἐνεγίνετο for the attested [in PHerc. 697] ἐνεγείνετο in //18//); and iota always adscriptum, following PHerc. 1056 and PHerc. 1191 (PHerc. 697 gives it at times adscriptum, at times subscriptum; for the sake of consistency I print τῇ προθυμ[ι]α in //14//).

//1// καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὴν φύσι[ν] *[illegibile]* [συ]στὰ[±3/4] ἐξ ἀ[ρ]χῆ[ς] *[illegibile]*⁹

Lacuna I (c. 206 litterarum)

//2// τα τὸν φυσικὸν χα[ρακ]τῆρα ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς τ[οιοῦτ]οις¹⁰ κ[ενο]ῖς πόροις *[illegibile]*]ων ἰδιοτή¹¹ *[illegibile]* [ἐ]πὶ πάν[τ]ων *[illegibile]* ἐπειδ¹²

Lacuna II (c. 69 litterarum)

//3// εστίκει, ὧν ου' [±2/3] ἀ[πο]λείπει¹³ τὰ πάθη τοῦ γίνε[σθαι] ±3/4¹⁴ νουθε[τ]εῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχε[σ]θαι καὶ μεταρρυθμίζειν ὡς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον συστάσει¹⁵ καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκη. //4// εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖν καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκην [π]ρο[σ]τιθε[ί]ναι καὶ τοῦ πο[θ] ἐαυτῶ[ι] ὑπάρχοντος *[illegibile]* [συ]νιέναι¹⁶ [μεμ]φόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν, //5// ἀλλ' ἐ[ἰ] μὲν τοῦτο πράττοι, τὸ μέ[ν]¹⁷ ἔργ[ο]ν ἂν εἴη [κ]αταλε[ἰ]πων¹⁸ ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῶν. αὐτῶ[ν] κατ[ὰ]¹⁹ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρό[λ]ηψιν ἐννοοῦμεν,²⁰ τὸ δ' ὁ[ν]ο[μ]α μετατε[θει]μέν[ος]²¹ *[illegibile]*²²

Lacuna III (c. 164 litterarum)

//6// *[illegibile]* τοσα[ύ]της²³ πλάνης. //7// περικά[τω] γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται²⁴ καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἔστι τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ'

9 καὶ] εἰ [π]αρὰ τὴν φύσι[ν] αὐτοῦς *[illegibile]* Arrighetti ...]εἰ [π]αρὰ τὴν φύσι[ν] α[...].υς[*[illegibile]* LS

10 τ[.....]οις LS

11 τ[ῶν] αὐ[τ]ῶν ἰδιοτή[των] LS

12 τα τὸν φυσικὸν *ad fin. om.* Arrighetti

13 [μὴν] ἀ[πο]λείπει Arrighetti

14 γίνε[σθαι] τῷ Arrighetti γίνε[σθαι], τὸ LS

15 ἀρχῆς συ[σ]τάσει PHerc. 1056 *lac.* PHerc. 1191

16 [π]ρο[σ]τιθε[ί]ναι καὶ τοῦ πο[θ] ἐαυτῶ[ι] ὑπάρχοντος ±2]ο[ι]πο[±1/2] δυνά[μ]ις — συ[νιέναι] PHerc. 697 προστι[θεῖ]ναι καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ [ὑ]πάρχοντος τῇ [±3/4]η ου [±10/12]ος[.±5/6]..[—]αν PHerc. 1056 *lac.* PHerc. 1191 προσνέμει, οὐκ ἔχ[ει] τοῦ <<ὡσαύτως>> [ὑ]πάρχοντος τῇ[ν] αἰτίαν του Arrighetti προστι[θεῖ]ναι αὐτὸ τοῦ [τό]θ' ἐαυτῶ[ι] ὑπάρχοντος, μὴ οὐ[χ]ί πο[τε] δύν[η]ται ταύτ[η] [συ]νιέναι *[illegibile]* ἡμεῖς *[illegibile]* LS

17 τὸ [αὐτὸ] LS

18 κατα[λεῖ]πον PHerc. 697

19 αὐτῶν [ποιεῖ] LS

20 ἐν ᾧ οὐ μὲν LS

21 τὸ δό[γμα ...] μετατεθε[ι]μέν[ος] LS

22 μεμφόμενος *ad fin. om.* Arrighetti

23 τοι[αύτ]ης LS

24 τρέπεται[ι] καὶ οὐ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται[ι] PHerc. 1056 *lac.* PHerc. 697

ἀνάγκην καλοῦμεν,²⁵ ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περ[ι] αὐτοῦ τούτου ὡς δι' ἑαυτὸν²⁶ ἀβελτερευομένῳ. //8// κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον φῆι²⁷ πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων αἰεί, οὐκ ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτειν τοῦ κατὰ τρόπον λελογίσθαι, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. //9// εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπολήγοι²⁸ [εἰς ἑαυτόν], ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην τ[ι]θεῖν, [ο]ὕδ' ἂν *[illegibile]*²⁹ //10//³⁰ *[illegibile]* [ἐξ]ελέγχειν *[illegibile]*]φ' ἡμῶν³¹ αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῷ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὀνόματι προσαγ[ο]ρεύειν³² ὄνομα μόνον μετατίθεται. //11// δεῖ δ' ἐπ[ι]δεῖξαι³³ ὅτι τοιοῦτό τι ὡς μοχθηρ[±6/7]ποι³⁴ προεληφότες τὸ³⁵ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν αἵ[τι]ον³⁶ καλ[οῦ]μεν, οὐτιδ[³⁷

Lacuna IV (c. 137 litterarum)

//12// γενέσθαι, ἀλ[±4/5]νον [±3/4]το³⁸ δι' ἀνάγκην καλεῖν. πρ[ὸς] ᾧ³⁹ φατε. //13// ἂν δὲ μή τις [τ]οῦ[το] ἀπ[ο]δείξει μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ι συνεργὸν μηδ' ὄρημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ᾧ καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάζοντες⁴⁰ τὴν αἰτίαν πως προ[θ]υμούμεθα⁴¹ πράττειν κατὰ χώραν⁴² ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει, ἔργον δ' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν⁴³ μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμενούς παραβίαν τι πράττειν. //14// ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον οἷον τι δεῖ νομίζε[ι]ν τὸ

25 πάντ' ἀνάγκην καλ[ο]ύμενα PHerc. 1191 lac. PHerc. 697 πάντα οἷ' ἃ τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλούμενα Arrighetti πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλούμενα LS

26 ἑαυτοῦ LS

27 ἦ]ι Arrighetti

28 μὴ [[ᾧ πο[ι]εῖ]] ἀπολήγοι PHerc. 1056 lac. PHerc. 1191 μὴ ᾧ πο[ι]εῖ ἀπολήγοι LS

29 [ο]ὕδ' ἂν ἔ[τερ]α [ποιεῖν] *[illegibile]* Arrighetti

30 The position of block //10//–//11// is established exclusively on the basis of calculation: cf. Laursen (1997: 68).

31 τὸ δι' ἡμῶν Arrighetti εἰ τὸ δι' ἡμῶν LS

32 προσαγ[ο]ρεύων Arrighetti προσαγ[ο]ρεύων LS

33 καὶ οὐκ ἐπ[ι]δ[ί]ξει Arrighetti <μη>δ' ἐπιδίξει LS

34 ᾧ μοχθηρο[ί] εἰσι τύποι LS

35 τοιοῦτο[ι οἷ] μοχθηροί εἰσι τῷ μὴ παθεῖν τα[ύ]τὸν [ὅπερ] Arrighetti

36 αἵ[τι]ολογ[οῦ]ντες Arrighetti

37 οὐτιδ[*om.* Arrighetti οὐτ' ἰδ[ι] LS

38 ἀλ[λὰ] μόνον [τοῦ]το Arrighetti ἀλ[λὰ] κε]νὸν [καὶ] τὸ LS

39 καν[...]πο[.]ειαν Arrighetti

40 δι' ἡμῶν ἀποδοκιμάζοντες Arrighetti

41 [πως διαβ]ε[βα]ιούμεθα Arrighetti [εἶναι διαβ]ε[βα]ιούμεθα LS

42 μῶραν Arrighetti LS

43 δ' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν PHerc. 697 δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν PHerc. 1191 δ' ἡμῶν οὐθὲν PHerc. 1056

ἐξ [ἡμ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν π]ως πραττόμενον τῇ προθυμ[ία] τοῦ πράτ[τειν].⁴⁴ //15// οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λ' οὐθὲν] πρ[άττ]ει[ν] ἢ φάν[α]ι [±12/15]έστ[*[illegibile]* ποῖον⁴⁵ *[illegibile]* μάλιστα ἀδιανοήτων. //16// ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο μὴ παραβιάζεται μηδ' αὖ ὃ ἐξελέγχει⁴⁶ γε⁴⁷ ἢ ὃ εἰσφέρει πρᾶγμα⁴⁸ ἐκτιθῇ[ι], φωνῇ⁴⁹ μόνον ἀμείβεται, καθάπερ πάλαι θρυλῶ. //17// οἱ δ' αἰτιολογήσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐ μόν[ο]ν. τῶν προ' [α]ὐτῶ[ν]⁵⁰ πολὺ διενέγκαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλ[α]σίως ἔλαθον ἑαυτοῖς,⁵¹ καίπερ⁵² ἐν πολλο[ῖς] μεγάλα κουφίσαντες, εντο⁵³ τ[ῇ]ν ἀνάγκην καὶ ταυτομεγ[.]ν⁵⁴ πάντα ἀ[ίτι]ᾶσθαι. //18// ὁ δὲ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανε⁵⁵ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συγκρού[ο]ντα, καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγίνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταράττοντα, ἥι δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης, κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις περιπίπτοντα, ἥ[ι] δὲ μὴ ἐκράτει, στάσεως ἐμπιμπλάμενον δια' τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης.

//1// And if brought about by nature⁵⁶ [ILLEGIBLE] initial constitution [ILLEGIBLE]

LACUNA I

44 αὐτῶ[ν ἢ πρ]αττόμενον ἢ προθυ[μ]ούμενον πράτ[τειν] Arrighetti αὐτῶ[ν π]ως [πρ]αττόμενον [μ]ὴ προθυμ[ου]μένων πράτ[τειν] LS

45 ἄλ[λο τι λέγειν], εἰ μὴ φα[ί]η τὸ ποῖον [κατ' ἀνάγκην] ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ποῖον παρ' ἡμᾶς Arrighetti ἄλ[λο τι οὐθὲν] εἰ μὴ φά[ν]ηαι τὸ ποῖον [κατ' ἀνάγκην] ἐστ[ί] LS

46 ἐξελέγχει (sic) Arrighetti

47 τε LS

48 [π]ρᾶγμα <<ῆ>> Arrighetti

49 φων[ῇ] PHerc 1191 φωνεῖ PHerc 1056 *lac.* PHerc 697 φον[ῇ] (sic) Arrighetti φωνῇ LS

50 προ[τ]έ[ρ]ω[ν] Arrighetti

51 ἑαυτοῦς Arrighetti LS

52 κα<θ>άπερ Arrighetti

53 ἐν τῶ<<ι>> Arrighetti ἐν' τὸ Gigante ε[ἰ]ς τὸ LS

54 ταυτόματον Arrighetti ταυτόματ[ο]ν LS

55 ἐλάμβανε Arrighetti

56 *Contra* Arrighetti, LS, Laursen. For the meaning of the phrase, cf. the use of παρά + accusative in the immediately preceding chunk of text:

ἀπ[ὸ] τῆς πρ[ώ]της ἀρχῆς σπέρμ[α]τα ἡμῖν ἀγ[ω]γά, τὰ μὲν εἰς ταδ[ί], τὰ δ' εἰς ταδί, τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω ταυ[τ]ά [ἐ]στὶν αἰεὶ [κα]ὶ πράξεων κ[αί] διανοήσεων καὶ διαθέ[σε]ων καὶ πλεί[ω] καὶ ἐλάττω. ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ο]θ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἤδη γίνεσθαι τοῖα ἢ τοῖα καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρ]ους [τῶ]ν πό[ρ]ων PHerc 1191] εἰσρέοντα παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ό]τε γ[ί]ν[ε]σθαι καὶ [ῆ] PHerc 1056] παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας [ἐ]ξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξ[ας].

From the first starting point seeds are to us conducive, some to these, some to those, some to both, that is, in each case <seeds are conducive> of actions, thoughts, and dispositions, to a bigger or lesser extent. Consequently, sometimes it is brought about by us *simpliciter* that they become such and such as regards the product, sometimes it is brought about by us and by our opinions that come from ourselves <that they become such and such> as regards that which, coming from the surroundings, of necessity flows within through the pores.

//2// similarly the natural stamp, and by such empty pores [ILLEGIBLE] of the same properties⁵⁷ [ILLEGIBLE] in all cases [ILLEGIBLE] given that

LACUNA II

//3// [?], whose passions do not [ILLEGIBLE] admit of⁵⁸ coming into being [ILLEGIBLE] admonishing, opposing, and reforming one another, assuming that they have responsibility also in themselves, not only in the initial constitution and in the automatic necessity of that which surrounds and falls within. //4// For if someone added to admonishing and being admonished the automatic necessity also of that which is at that time present to oneself [ILLEGIBLE] understand when censuring or praising. //5// On the contrary, if on the one hand he did it, he would be admitting⁵⁹ the same activity whose notion we have, in our own case, on the basis of the preconception of responsibility, having nonetheless changed the name [ILLEGIBLE]

LACUNA III

//6// [ILLEGIBLE] of so large a deviation. //7// For such an argument reverses polarities and turns things upside down, and can never assure that everything is such as we call that which takes place of necessity, instead he opposes another with regard precisely to that, assuming that the other plays the fool by himself. //8// And even if, in an infinite regress, he claims yet another time, on the basis of argument, to do that of necessity every time, he does not effect a comparative appraisal when he assigns responsibility to himself for having reasoned properly and to his opponent for not having reasoned properly. //9// And if, on the other hand, he did not stop at himself, but ascribed it to necessity, he would not [ILLEGIBLE] //10// [ILLEGIBLE] testing⁶⁰

57 Following LS.

58 *Contra* Arrighetti, LS, Laursen. For the meaning of ἀπολείπειν, cf. DL X 87 [I depart from the text in Dorandi (2013) in following Crönert's reading]: πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως [κατὰ] πάντων κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαυρομένων, συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπη· ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπη τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὃν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ ("everything <else> takes place without tribulation once everything is purged, consonantly to the phenomena, on the basis of the mode of the multiplicity <of causes>, if one admits, as one should, that which is plausible in this connection; and if one admits one thing and rejects the other, each being equally consonant to the phenomena, it is evident that one falls completely from the study of nature and rushes down into myth"); also Plut., *Adv. Col.* 8 1111b: καὶ γὰρ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν εὐσέβειαν ἀπολείπειν λέγει, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα τὴν φιλίαν αἰρούμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων τὰς μεγίστας ἀλγηδόνας ἀναδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν πᾶν ἄπειρον ὑποτίθεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μὴ ἀναιρεῖν ("in fact, even though <Epicurus> suppresses providence he claims to admit piety; even though he chooses friendships for the sake of pleasure he claims to yield to the largest sufferings for his friends; and he claims to postulate an infinite universe, but not to suppress up and down").

59 *Contra* Arrighetti, LS, Laursen. Cf. Usener (1977) s.v. καταλείπειν: *paene id quod servare, integrum relinquere* (syn. ἀπολείπειν). Cf. also the preceding footnote for the use of καταλείπειν in DL X 87.

60 Cf. Usener (1977) s.v. ἐξελέγχειν, where only the meaning "to test" (not the meaning "to refute") is attested.

[ILLEGIBLE] address, in our own case, calling by the name of necessity, he only changes the name. //11// However, o ye vicious people,⁶¹ one should show that we call “cause” something of that kind, having the preconception of that which takes place on our own account, not prop[⁶²

LACUNA IV

//12// take place, but call “by necessity” just that,⁶³ in light of what you say. //13// If one does not demonstrate that, nor is able to dissuade any auxiliary or impulse of ours whose causation we—who call it “on our own account”—adduce,⁶⁴ but calling “necessity” everything that we—who, I presume, give to this causation the name “on our own account”—are now eager to do without intervention,⁶⁵ one will merely change the name and will not modify any activity of ours in the way that in some cases the person who sees what kind of thing is of necessity is used to dissuading those who are eager to do something brought about by compulsion. //14// And intelligence will inquire in order to discover of what kind, then, it must deem that which presumably comes from our own selves by our eagerness to do it.⁶⁶ //15// For it has nothing else to do or say [ILLEGIBLE] of what kind [ILLEGIBLE] inconceivable in the highest degree. //16// However, if he does not force the point nor, in turn, exposes at least that which he is testing,⁶⁷ or which he is introducing, he will merely change the designation, as I have long been repeating. //17// Those who first gave a sufficient account of causes, and who were much different not only from their predecessors but also, many times more, from their successors, have not noticed one thing,⁶⁸ even though they brought great relief in many issues: the fact of ascribing to necessity—that is, to that which is automatic⁶⁹—responsibility for everything. //18// In effect, the argument that taught that crumbled, and the man did not notice that he made his activity collide with his doctrine, that is, that he was—unless in his activities his

61 Cf. the conjecture ὁ μοχθηροὶ ἄνθρωποι in Laursen (1997: 69) and the use of second-person plural in //12//.

62 Following LS.

63 Following Arrighetti.

64 I believe “we” in “we adduce” refers to the Epicureans, while “we” in “we are now eager” in the following clause refers to ordinary people—which in turn explains πῶς = “I presume.”

65 For the meaning of the phrase κατὰ χώραν, cf. LSJ s.v. χώρα I 5.

66 “When we are not eager to do it” LS.

67 Cf. n. 60 on the meaning of ἐξελέγχειν.

68 Following Arrighetti’s and LS’s ἑαυτούς and Gigante’s ἐν τῷ. For the construction λανθάνω + accusative of the reflexive pronoun + proleptic ἐν, cf. Plato, *Leg.* V 746b. (In //18// one finds the standard construction λανθάνω + personal accusative + participle.)

69 Following Arrighetti and LS.

doctrine went somehow unnoticed—a continuous nuisance to himself, falling into extremes when his doctrine prevailed, and when it did not prevail, filling himself with intestine conflict because of the contrariety between his activities and his doctrine.

Our thread of Ariadne in what follows will be the use of particles and verbal moods, not explored by the interpreters up to now.⁷⁰ Above all, I think εἰ δέ in //9// responds to εἰ μὲν in //5//, so that ἀλλά in //5// introduces two hypothetical considerations countering *en bloc* that which is stated in //4//. One should note in addition that the parallel arguments beginning in //5// and //9// respectively both have an optative in the protasis (only in the first the apodosis—in optative + ἄν—is preserved); //4//, in turn, is opened by εἰ γάρ and justifies (possibly also hypothetically: the optative is reconstructed by the editor in the protasis) what comes in //3//.

Unfortunately, //1// and //2// are illegible. In //3// it is said that one should not let⁷¹ certain passions come into being, presumably by means of the processes listed in the infinitive (“admonishing, opposing, and reforming one another”), whose aim is character enhancement. According to the text, such processes presuppose (cf. the use of ὥς + participle) that responsibility for what the agent does lies also in the agent herself, not only in the joint operation of two factors that are alien to her, namely her initial constitution (in terms of her earliest propensities to action) and everything surrounding her, falling into her, and operating on her necessarily and automatically. In other words, it is here contended that an adult agent is the full-fledged subject of her actions (which are thus more than the mere necessary and automatic result of the interaction between her first inclinations and that which lights upon her), including actions the agent shall perform in the process of reforming her character.

Epicurus’ pivotal claim in the digression amounts thus to the contention that our everyday practices of character enhancement presuppose that our actions are something we ourselves do rather than something that happens to us or in us—and, as a consequence, that reforming our characters is not a mechanical process taking place in spite of us, rather it is we ourselves who, prompted by another’s exhortations, reform our own characters on our own account.

//4// introduces a (never explicitly argued for) justification for such claim: automatic necessity does not square with censure and praise. Since “necessity” here most probably

70 Cf. n. 7.

71 Cf. n. 58 on the meaning of ἀπολείπειν.

designates not a modal notion but some form of compulsion, the justification appears to rely on the view that automatic necessity consists in some form of mechanical compulsion on the agents, who cannot thus be censured or praised for what they (no more than supposedly) do. Presumably, the use of προστιθέναι in the passage refers to the addition of a comparative appraisal (ἐπιλογισμός) of the notion of automatic necessity to our preexisting conception of admonishing and of being admonished.⁷² In other words, Epicurus here proposes a contrast between the controversial notion of the necessary and automatic operation of factors beyond our control in the field of human action and the conception we pre-philosophically have of everyday practices of ascription of responsibility.

Such a contrast between necessity and accountability, construed as countering (cf. ἀλλά, //5//) the opponent's claims, is put into effect by two considerations *per absurdum*: in //5//–//8// (hypothetical consideration introduced by εἰ μὲν + optative, //5//), the opponent contemplates retaining the practices of censuring and praising, taking them however as governed by necessity, and Epicurus discloses the absurdity of the strategy; in //9//–//16// (hypothetical consideration introduced by εἰ δέ + optative, //9//), the opponent considers altogether giving up accountability, and Epicurus discloses the absurdity of the strategy. If I am right regarding the use of particles and verbal moods in //5// and //9//, Epicurus' own strategy consists in blocking all the ways an opponent might envisage for holding that the whole field of human agency is ruled by necessity.

In the first piece of reasoning (//5//–//8//), Epicurus claims that ascribing responsibility to an agent while asserting that she acts of necessity is tantamount to calling “necessary” that—human action—which one still conceives on the basis of the preconception (πρόληψις, the pre-verbal apprehension of a concept, resulting from repeated exposition to items of sensible experience) of responsibility, and therefore only changing its name (//5//).

In //7//, “reversing polarities and turning things upside down” (περικότω τρέπεσθαι) signals, as has been shown by Burnyeat (1978), a self-refutation (here in the sense of a contradiction in performance).⁷³ In my view, in the comparative appraisal of the opponent's

72 Cf. the use of ἐπιλογισμός in //8// and the use of “adding the comparative appraisal” (τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν προστιθέναι) in Epicurus' *On Nature* XXVIII fr. 13 col. VIII sup. 8 Sedley: εἰς τοῦτον [οὔ]ν δὴ φημι τὸν ὅρον ἀπο[β]λεπέ[τω] πᾶσα δόξα ἢ<ι> τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν [ἐ]τ[ι] μὴ προστεθηκότες ἡμεν (“I say: every opinion to which we have not yet added the comparative appraisal shall observe this rule [*scil.* according to which, it being impossible to submit every opinion to a comparative appraisal immediately, it is enough to effect the comparative appraisal when the occasion allows]”). On the notion of ἐπιλογισμός, cf. Schofield (1996): it is a contrastive assessment of presentations.

73 Masi (2006: 107–12) sees the two images in Burnyeat (1978: 201)—“reversal” and “turning upside down”—as corresponding to operations effecting a change in a formal reasoning: that which should be affirmed as the conclusion of a *modus ponens* turns out to be denied as the second premiss of a *modus tollens*, and that which should be affirmed as the second premiss of a *modus ponens* turns out to be denied as the conclusion

claim with the practices of ascription of responsibility put into effect by him, the sentence “everything takes place of necessity” is contradicted in performance by “not everything takes place of necessity”: according to a notion of necessity subscribed also by Epicurus (cf. καλοῦμεν, //7//)—which does not simply rename what we do as the full-fledged subjects of our actions, but rather designates, presumably on the basis of our preconception, something imposed on us by compulsion—that which should be the consequence of the opponent’s initial claim (“we are not responsible for what we do”) has its polarity reversed (“we are responsible for what we do”) when it is performed by him in the very defense of his initial claim in assigning responsibility to himself for having reasoned correctly and to his opponent for not having reasoned correctly, thus allowing Epicurus to extract from the opponent’s behavior an unwelcome consequence (“not everything takes place of necessity”) which the opponent initially meant to exclude (by claiming, “everything takes place of necessity”). Epicurus’ opponent thus lacks an appreciation of his own claim in contrast with his practices—which is underscored in //8// when Epicurus anticipates the opponent’s attempt to maintain that even his practices of ascribing responsibility are necessary: according to Epicurus, such a rejoinder simply repeats the opponent’s lack of an appreciation of his claim as contrasted with the practices put into effect by him.

Thus, the first consideration underlying the claim that automatic necessity does not square with censure and praise consists in holding that the opponent (who claims agents should be assigned responsibility for what they do) either gives the name “necessity” to that which we in any case do, or rather contradicts himself in performance when he takes the alleged necessity of everything together with the practices of ascribing responsibility that, according to Epicurus, entail the denial of the alleged necessity of everything.

In the second piece of reasoning (//9//–//16//), the opponent considers ascribing the actions not to the agent herself, but to the necessity that allegedly rules everything (//9//). The phrase “to stop at oneself” (ἀπολήγειν εἰς ἑαυτόν), used in opposition to “ascribing to necessity” (εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην τιθέναι), strongly suggests the idea of a necessary chain of causation: the opponent thus claims that accountability traces back beyond the agent herself (whose actions are thus caused necessarily by foregoing factors beyond her control) until it is dissolved into a vague indictment of necessity in light of the fact that everything has necessary causes and therefore no one ever authors any action.

The accusation of “changing the name” in //10// (where the text is too lacunar) recurs

of a *modus tollens*. I try to maintain the spirit of the suggestion, seeing instead in a comparative appraisal of doctrine and practice the sentences’ change of both position and polarity in the argument.

in //13// (where I discuss it in more detail), and is distinct, as we shall see, from the accusation of similar tenor in //5//. One should note for the moment that the notion of “preconception” (πρόληψις) figures in //11// so as to justify the claim that one should not give the name “cause” to the necessary chain allegedly producing our actions. According to DL X 31, preconceptions are a criterion of truth, and from //11// we have the preconception of that which takes place on our own account (δι’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν), that is, with ourselves as the causal power producing it (with διά + genitive expressing such form of causation, as is made explicit in //13//, and with the reduplicative pronoun in δι’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν marking the claim that we ourselves, instead of anything prior to us, produce our actions); as a consequence, there is no justification even for giving the name “cause” to the necessary chain that the opponent introduces. In other words, our preconception of that which takes place on our own account (which grounds the very meaning of “cause”) is denied if one assumes that ascriptions of responsibility always befall necessity.

//12// is incomprehensible in its present state; I hold it prudent not to speculate about it. In //13//, Epicurus notes that the opponent’s claim should have the consequence of dissuading us from acting: if everything takes place of necessity, there is no room for human action. Since, however, the opponent is incapable of undermining the preconception that we are the cause of what we do, he is incapable of dissuading us from acting, and thus restricts himself to calling by the name “necessity” that which, on the basis of our ordinary preconception, we hold to take place on our own account. In fact, we are eager (προθυμούμεθα) to do something among other reasons for thinking that our action makes a difference in the course of events, that is, for thinking that we can on our own account intervene effectively on the world. If so, the person who succeeds in dissuading us from acting when our efforts are in fact idle (in the sense of not having a hand in bringing about that which in any event is going to take place) opposes that which takes place on our own account to that which, contrary to our initial expectations, is in fact brought about by external compulsion (παρὰ βίαν, which I believe contrasts here with παρ’ ἡμᾶς, a phrase used frequently in Epicurean writings to designate that which is brought about by us, taken as its cause⁷⁴). Thus, preserving the preconception that *x* takes place on our own account implies preserving both our eagerness (προθυμία) to do *x*—which in turn implies the lack of relevant intervening external factors (taking the often misunderstood phrase κατὰ χῶραν as meaning

74 More specifically, I believe παρὰ + accusative in παρὰ βίαν has the same meaning as παρὰ + accusative in παρ’ ἡμᾶς in the text immediately preceding the digression (cf., above, n. 56) and in passages such as DL X 133–4 (cf., above, pp. 5–6). Thus, I believe παρὰ βίαν does not stand here for “against compulsion,” and dissuasion correspondingly has the form “Do not make an effort, what you are attempting to do is bound to take place anyway,” not the form “Do not make an effort, what you are attempting to do is bound *not* to take place anyway.”

“without intervention”⁷⁵)—and due attribution of the action to the agent for her having a hand in bringing about the result, while the opponent does nothing but claim that everything is brought about by external compulsion (to which everything must therefore be attributed) without succeeding either in altering our actions or in writing off attribution of actions to agents, since he is incapable of undermining the preconception that our actions are effectively brought about by ourselves. One should also note that the accusation of “changing the name” designates here (as, I surmise, already in //10//) calling by the name of “necessity” the field in which, as the opponent idly claims, we supposedly do not have a hand in bringing things about, while in //5// it referred to calling by the name of “necessity” the field in which, as the opponent self-refutingly claimed, we in fact have a hand in bringing things about—thus assuming different roles according to the general argumentative strategy of sections //5//–//8// and //9//–//16// respectively.

Following the text in Laursen,⁷⁶ //14// adds to the points in //13// the opponent’s burden of explaining that which, according to the opponent himself, takes place of necessity but we suppose to be done by means of our eagerness to do it: one may readily conceive that which takes place of necessity as being imposed in spite of our eagerness to do it, but how should one conceive that which, according to the opponent, takes place of necessity but we suppose comes from ourselves (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πῶς παττόμενον) in virtue of the fact that we do it by means of our eagerness (τῇ προθυμίᾳ) to do it? The objection assumes that the fact that an action is performed by means of our eagerness to do it implies that the action comes from ourselves, the rival claim being utterly incapable (or so Epicurus claims) of making room for a conception of eagerness or of something’s coming from ourselves, thus entailing their suppression.

//15// is incomprehensible in its present state; I hold it prudent not to speculate about it. //16// summarizes the point of the whole second consideration (//9//–//16//) partially grounding the claim in //4//: the opponent who holds that everything takes place of necessity and that one is not responsible for what one does must either force the point or make an exposition (ἐκθεσις) of his claim. I believe “exposition” here denotes the procedure of proving a general claim on the basis of a particular case in which the point should be evident—if it is not evident there, as Epicurus here implies, the opponent merely changes the name (as in //10// and //13//) of that whose preconception he is unable to alter.

75 Cf. n. 65.

76 Following the text in LS, the point remains that, things being such as the opponent claims, there is no difference between what we do of necessity in virtue of our being eager to do it and what we do of necessity without our being eager to do it, but the inquiry now asks for the characteristic feature of the latter, not of the former.

//17//–//18// identify Epicurus’ target: the atomists, whose causal theory, in Epicurus’ view, surpasses any others’ up to then. The accusation in //17// of failing to notice an absurdity is set forth against many (perhaps the same who are called “vicious people” in //11// and who are addressed as a second-person plural in //12//), while in //18// “the man” (presumably Democritus himself) is said to be unaware of the fact that it is necessary for “the doctrine”—atomism—to be set aside in order not to conflict with our preconceptions, since otherwise it would either impose itself regardless of our preconceptions, thus leading to extremes (such as the claims that only necessity is to be held accountable, that there is no margin for human action, and that the very notion of cause is to be done away with), or not impose itself and be supplanted by our preconceptions whenever we act. Note, in addition, that in //17// it is expressly said that the atomists fall prey to the second consideration advanced by Epicurus in the digression: in claiming that everything takes place of necessity, they do not ascribe responsibility to human agents (as Epicurus’ opponent does in //5//–//8//), instead they ascribe responsibility for everything to necessity (as Epicurus’ opponent does in //9//–//16//).

Thus, the second consideration underlying the claim that automatic necessity does not square with censure and praise consists in holding that the opponent (who claims necessity should be assigned responsibility for everything) gives the name “necessity” to that which he is after all unable to dissuade us from doing, and cannot make our eagerness, which he is unable to dismiss, compatible with the alleged necessity of everything.

Diogenianus *apud* Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8

We are now in a position to move to the main text to be analyzed in this chapter, Diogenianus’ testimony in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8.

Commentators generally place the third section of Diogenianus’ testimony in Eusebius’ *Preparatio Evangelica* VI 8 alongside Origen’s *Contra Celsum* II 20 and Cicero’s *De Fato* 28–30 as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to the Idle Argument.⁷⁷ In so doing, I believe the peculiar character of Diogenianus’ testimony is neglected. In what follows, I shall argue that Diogenianus’ testimony bears witness to Chrysippus’ reply to a different argument, namely one deriving from Epicurus’ second consideration against an opponent who claims that everything takes place of necessity, and that Diogenianus’ own rejoinder to Chrysippus’

77 Cf. Bobzien (1998a), ch. 5; Salles (2004); Salles (2005a); Salles (2005b), ch. 1; Brennan (2005), ch. 16; Boeri & Salles (2014), ch. 28.

reply in the excerpt traces back to Epicurus' first consideration in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV.

The whole of Eusebius' *Preparatio Evangelica* VI 8 may be divided into three sections of not significantly unequal length (§§1–7, §§8–24, and §§25–38), separated off from one another by brief interpositions (§8: καὶ μεθ' ἑτερά φησι, “And among other things he says”; §25: τούτοις ἐξῆς ἐπιλέγει, “In the sequence he adds”), to which a transition to the following chapter is appended (§39). As one may gather from the following chapter, where Eusebius excerpts from Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Fato* (chs. 3–6, 8–9, 11–12, and 18–19), Eusebius sometimes jumps or paraphrases portions of text without any explicit indication to that effect, but does not otherwise tamper with his source.⁷⁸

In §§1–7, Diogenianus attempts to show that the Homeric quotations adduced by Chrysippus in *On Fate*, Book I, in order to establish that everything is constrained by necessity and Fate (τὸ ... πάνθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης κατελιγῆσθαι, §1) do not in fact establish such a claim, which in addition (always according to Diogenianus) is directly challenged by other Homeric quotations, including those adduced by Chrysippus himself in *On Fate*, Book II, in order to establish that many things are also brought about by us (τὸ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶς πολλὰ γίνεσθαι, §2). In §§8–24, Diogenianus reports and criticizes Chrysippus' use of etymological elucidations of mythical notions in *On Fate*, Book I, in order to establish that everything takes place by Fate. Finally, in §§25–38 Diogenianus reports and criticizes Chrysippus' reply in *On Fate*, Book II, to an objection leveled against his claim that everything takes place by Fate.

We begin by discussing a significant portion of the third section of the chapter (§§25–34).⁷⁹

[25] Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* βιβλίῳ τοιαύταις τισὶν ἀποδείξεσι κέχρηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ λύειν πειρᾶται τὰ ἀκολουθεῖν δοκοῦντα ἄτοπα τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πάντα κατηναγκάσθαι λέγοντι, ἅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐτίθεμεν· οἷον τὸ ἀναιρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπὰς καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν γιγνόμενα φαίνεται. [26] φησὶν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον

⁷⁸ For example, 331.2–6 Mras-Des Places in Eusebius is a paraphrase of 170.1–9 Bruns in Alexander, and 332.1–9 Mras-Des Places in Eusebius is an assemblage of 172.19–21, 172.25–26, 172.30–173.3, and 173.8–10 Bruns in Alexander. Cf. Inowlocki (2006), ch. 3, for a more nuanced view on Eusebius' citation technique, broadly in line with the one assumed here.

⁷⁹ I follow the text in Mras-Des Places (1982–3).

συγκαθειμάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὄλων διοικήσει. [27] κέχρηταί τε παραδείγμασι τοιούτοις τισί· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι, φησί, θοιμάτιον οὐχ ἀπλῶς καθειμάρτο, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολεμίῳ σωθήσεσθαι τόνδε τινὰ μετὰ τοῦ φεύγειν αὐτὸν τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι παῖδας μετὰ τοῦ βούλεσθαι κοινωνεῖν γυναικί. [28] ὥσπερ γάρ, φησίν, εἰ λέγοντός τινος Ἡγήσαρχον τὸν πύκτην ἐξελεύσεσθαι τοῦ ἀγῶνος πάντως ἄπληκτον ἀτόπως ἂν τις ἡξίου καθιέντα τὰς χεῖρας τὸν Ἡγήσαρχον μάχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἄπληκτον αὐτὸν καθειμάρτο ἀπελθεῖν, τοῦ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιησαμένου διὰ τὴν περιττοτέραν τὰνθρώπου πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλήττεσθαι φυλακὴν τοῦτο εἰπόντος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. [29] πολλὰ γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι χωρὶς τοῦ καὶ ἡμᾶς βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐκτενεστάτην γε περὶ αὐτὰ προθυμίαν τε καὶ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεισθαι, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τούτου, φησίν, αὐτὰ γενέσθαι καθειμάρτο. [30] πάλιν οὖν κἀνταῦθα θαυμάσειέ τις ἂν τὰνθρώπου τὸ ἀθεώρητον καὶ ἀνεπιλόγιστον καὶ τῶν ἐναργειῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν ιδίων λόγων ἀνακολουθίας. οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι καθάπερ τὸ καλούμενον γλυκὺ τῷ καλουμένῳ πικρῷ συμβέβηκεν ἐναντιώτατον εἶναι, τῷ τε λευκῷ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ θερμόν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς τῷ καθ' εἰμαρμένην, εἴ γε καθ' εἰμαρμένην μὲν ἐκεῖνα καλεῖν προεἰληφεν ὅσα καὶ ἐκόντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκόντων πάντως γίνεται, παρ' ἡμᾶς δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔρχεται ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀμελεῖν καὶ ῥαθυμεῖν οὐκ ἐπιτελεῖται. [31] ἐὰν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἐμὲ θοιμάτιον φυλάττειν ἐκεῖνο σῶζεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι τῇ γυναικὶ πλησιάζειν τὰ τέκνα γίνηται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι φεύγειν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀνδρείως φυλάττεσθαι τε αὐτοῦ τὰς τῶν χειρῶν ἐπιβολὰς τὸ ἄπληκτον ἐκ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, πῶς τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην ἐνταῦθα σωθήσεται; [32] εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνην ταῦτα συμβαίνει, παρ' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο συμβαίνειν, εἰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, οὐκ ἂν κατ' ἐκείνην δηλαδή, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνδραμεῖν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις. [33] ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμᾶς μὲν ἔσται, φησί, περιελημμένου μέντοι τοῦ παρ' ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης. καὶ πῶς, εἴποιμ' ἂν, περιελημμένου; εἴ γε καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν θοιμάτιον καὶ τὸ μὴ φυλάττειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγένετο τῆς ἐμῆς. οὕτως γὰρ καὶ τοῦ σῶζεσθαι τοῦτο δηλονότι κύριος ἂν εἴην ἐγώ. [34] καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς διαστολῆς, ἣν ποιεῖται Χρῦσιππος, δῆλον γίνεται τὸ ἀπολελῦσθαι τῆς εἰμαρμένης τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. καθειμάρται γάρ, φησί, σωθῆναι θοιμάτιον, εἰ φυλάττοις αὐτό, καὶ παῖδας ἔσεσθαι, εἰ καὶ σὺ βουλευθείης, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τι τούτων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης προκατειλημμένων οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑποτιμήσει τοιαύταις χρησαίμεθα.

[25] He makes use of such demonstrations⁸⁰ in *On Fate* Book I, but in Book II he tries to solve the absurdities that are taken to follow from the claim that everything takes place necessarily, namely the ones we posed in the beginning, for instance, the suppression, on account of that, of the eagerness that comes from our own selves in the sphere of blame, praise, and exhortation, and of everything that is manifestly brought about by our causation. [26] He says, then, in Book II that it is evident that many things come from us, and those are no less fated along with the administration of the whole. [27] He makes use of examples such as these: the garment's not being destroyed, he says, is not fated without qualification, but along with its being taken care of; this one's being saved from the enemy, along with his fleeing from the enemy; and children's being conceived, along with wanting to have intercourse with a woman. [28] For, he says, if someone had said that Hegesarchus the boxer would in any event come off from the match unscathed, it would be absurd if someone thought that Hegesarchus would wrestle with his arms down since it was fated for him to come off unscathed, because the one who made the assertion said so in virtue of the man's extraordinary guard against the blows; and so it is also in the other cases. [29] For many things cannot take place without our wanting them and bringing into play our utmost eagerness and effort toward them, since it is along with that, he says, that those are fated to take place. [30] Here again one may wonder at the man's lack of consideration, that is, of comparative appraisal both of the clear view of things and of the lack of logical consequence in his own arguments. For, I think, just as that which is called sweet happens to be most opposed to that which is called bitter, and black to white, and hot to cold, so also that which is brought about by us to that which takes place by Fate, if one preconceives that which takes place by Fate in such a way as to call it that which takes place in any event, whether we will it or not, and that which is brought about by us that which comes to its fulfillment from our effort and activity, or whose not coming to its fulfillment is brought about by our carelessness and sluggishness. [31] If, then, the garment's being preserved comes from our effort in taking care of it, and children's being conceived comes from wanting to have intercourse with a woman, and not dying at the hands of the enemy comes from wanting to flee from them, and coming off unscathed from the match comes from wrestling courageously with the opponent and guarding oneself against the blows of his hands, how is that which takes place by Fate preserved in those cases? [32] For, if those things take place by that, it is not possible to say that they are brought about by

80 As have been presented in §§8–24.

us, and if they are brought about by us, evidently they do not take place by Fate, because those cannot square with one another. [33] But those will be brought about by us, he says, as that which is brought about by us is nonetheless encompassed by Fate. And how, I would say, encompassed, if both taking care and not taking care of the garment stem from our ascendancy? For, evidently, it is thus that I control its being preserved. [34] And from this distinction that Chrysippus makes it becomes evident that causation brought about by us dissolves Fate. For, he says, the garment is fated to be preserved if you take care of it, and the children are fated to be conceived if you want, otherwise none of these things will happen. But in the case of that which is liminally constrained by Fate we should never make use of such pleadings.

The objection addressed by Chrysippus is never explicitly formulated in Diogenianus' testimony. Susanne Bobzien has claimed that the difficulty consists simply in the fact that his theory "has been accused of destroying human readiness to act" (1998a: 209). Her claim to that effect depends in part on her seeing readiness to act (as she translates *προθυμία*) simply as the opposite of idleness (as she translates *ἀργία*) and therefore on her seeing Chrysippus' reply in Diogenianus' testimony as "precisely his rebuttal of the Idle Argument" (1998a: 210), which in Cicero's testimony is said to be rightly so called because "if we obeyed it we would do nothing at all in life" (*cui si pareamus nihil omnino agamus in vita*, 28) and "all activity would be removed from life" (*omnis e vita tolletur actio*, 29). But her reduction of the difficulty to the issue of idleness depends also on her previous claim to the effect that

Chrysippus' refutation [of the Idle Argument] was countered, in a standard way, by pointing out that it destroys that which depends on us; but note that that which depends on us does not feature at all in any of the reports of the Idle Argument (1998a: 181).

"That which depends on us" is Bobzien's rendering of *τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν*—and while it is true that Chrysippus' reply to the original objection is thus countered by Diogenianus (cf., for instance, §§30–32), I believe it is not true that *τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν* did not form part of the original objection, nor that the original objection is simply that Chrysippus' view leads to idleness.

An inspection of Diogenianus' testimony shows that two strata should there be

distinguished: Chrysippus' reply to the original objection, clearly demarcated by the use of φησίν ("he [=Chrysippus] says") and similar expressions in places such as §§26, 27, 28, 29, 33, and 34; and Diogenianus' own rejoinder to Chrysippus' reply to the original objection, signalled by such expressions as θαυμάσειέν τις ἄν ("one may wonder") in §30, οἶμαι ("I [=Diogenianus] think") in §30, εἴποιμ' ἄν ("I [=Diogenianus] would say") in §33, and οὐκ ἄν ποτε ... χρῆσάμεθα ("we should never ... make use") in §34.

In §26, Diogenianus reports that Chrysippus says (φησίν) in *On Fate*, Book II, that it is evident that many things come from us, but are no less fated along with the administration of the whole (φησίν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον συγκαθειρμάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὅλων διοικήσει). The phrase διοικήσεις τῶν ὅλων will not sound unfamiliar to a reader acquainted with Chrysippus' accounts of Fate:⁸¹ cf. Stobaeus I 5 15 79.1–8 Wachsmuth-Hense (79.1–2: Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικὴν, "Chrysippus says that the substance of Fate is the power of *pneuma*, which provides orderly administration of all" [79.2–3: "in *On the Cosmos*, Book II"]; 79.5–7: εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ... λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων, "Fate is ... the rationale of that which is administered by Providence in the cosmos" [79.3–4: "in *On Definitions*, Book II, *On Fate*, and other works"]); Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 3: εἰμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικὴν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων κτλ., "Chrysippus says that Fate is some natural organization of the whole, etc." ("in *On Providence*, Book IV").⁸²

In §33, Diogenianus reports that Chrysippus says (φησί) that those "many things" from §26—which include the examples in §§27–8 and 32—are brought about by us, as that which is brought about by us is nonetheless encompassed by Fate (παρ' ἡμᾶς μὲν ἔσται, φησί, περιειλημμένου μέντοι τοῦ παρ' ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης). Such formulation is a close correspondent to the one in §§1–2,⁸³ where Diogenianus reports that Chrysippus wanted to show in *On Fate*, Book I, that everything is constrained by necessity and Fate (τὸ ... πάνθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης κατελιγῆσθαι, §1), while in *On Fate*, Book II, he wanted to establish that many things are also brought about by us (τὸ καὶ παρ' ἡμᾶς πολλὰ γίνεσθαι, §2). Note in addition that the phrase παρ' αὐτούς (in the sense of παρά + accusative we are analyzing in this chapter) is attested—if one follows the text in Hertz-Hosius (1903)—in a direct quotation from Chrysippus in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 12.⁸⁴

81 Cf. also διοικήσεις in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 8 (with φησίν).

82 I discuss the latter passage below, pp. 25–6.

83 I discuss §§1–7 below, pp. 30–3.

84 Cf. pp. 25 and 109–10.

In §§26 and 33, then, τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν and τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς form part not of Diogenianus' rejoinder to Chrysippus' reply but of Chrysippus' reply itself—it seems to me far-fetched to think that Diogenianus simply read τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν and τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς into Chrysippus' own views. If, in addition, one sees τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν and τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς in the context of what may be gathered from Diogenianus' own phrasing of the absurdity to which he says Chrysippus offers a reply in the testimony, one is then drawn much to the vicinity of Epicurus' second consideration against an opponent who claims that everything takes place of necessity in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV.

In effect, Diogenianus states in §25 that Chrysippus (in Book II of his work *On Fate*) addresses the following difficulty: the eagerness (προθυμία) that comes from our own selves (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν) in the sphere of blame, praise, and exhortation (περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπᾶς), and everything that is manifestly brought about by our causation (παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν), is suppressed on account of the claim that everything takes place necessarily (ὁ λόγος ὁ πάντα κατηναγκάσθαι λέγων). As we have seen, in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV, Epicurus addresses, in the sphere of censure and praise (cf. μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν, //4//) and of character reform (cf. νοουθετεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχεσθαι καὶ μεταρρυθμίζειν, //3//), an opponent who holds that everything takes place of necessity, and his second consideration is aimed at reducing to absurdity his opponent's claim to the effect that necessity must be assigned responsibility for everything. Epicurus' point in //13// is that the fact that we remain eager (προθυμεῖσθαι) to do things shows that his opponent is in fact unable to dissuade (ἀποτρέπειν) any factor within us—whose causation (αἰτία) Epicurus acknowledges—in the way one may dissuade (ἀποτρέπειν) others who are eager (προθυμεῖσθαι) to do things brought about by compulsion (παρά βίαν). And in //14// he adds that anyone entertaining his opponent's claim may inquire what kind of thing it is, then, that presumably comes from our own selves (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πῶς) by our eagerness (προθυμία) to do it.

The similarity, I submit, is not merely verbal: the original objection in Diogenianus' testimony in point of fact derives from Epicurus' second consideration in the digression, where Epicurus states that the opponent's view does not square with assuming that something comes from us by means of eagerness (//14//), and that the opponent's view should in principle dissuade us from doing that which, as it supposedly entails, is brought about not by our causation but by compulsion (//13//). Epicurus' argument, I surmise, gives rise to the absurdity in §25 in the following way: the claim that everything takes place of necessity (which is the same claim addressed by Epicurus in the digression) supposedly entails the

suppression of the eagerness (προθυμία) that comes from our own selves (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν)—both elements from //14//—in the sphere of blame, praise, and exhortation (περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπᾶς)—from censuring or praising (μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν) in //4//, and from admonishing, opposing, and reforming one another (νουθετεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχεσθαι καὶ μεταρρυθμίζειν) in //3//, not from the mere presence of dissuading (ἀποτρέπειν), which is the contrary of exhorting (προτρέπειν), in //13//⁸⁵—as well as the suppression of everything that is brought about by (παρά + accusative) our causation (αἰτία)—both elements from //13//.

Note, in addition, that Diogenianus’ reduplication ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν in §25—as opposed to Chrysippus’ simple ἐξ ἡμῶν in §26—corresponds to Epicurus’ reduplication ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν in //14//, and that the absurdities alluded to in §25 are said by Diogenianus to be “the ones we posed in the beginning” (ἅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐτίθεμεν), which may signal either that Diogenianus listed those objections at the beginning of his work, or (which explains the first-person plural much better) that the original objection in Diogenianus’ testimony was one among others posed in Chrysippus’ time by an Epicurean—since, despite what is said of Diogenianus in the chapter heading of Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 (namely, that he is a Peripatetic), Diogenianus discloses his Epicurean allegiance in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* IV 3 6.⁸⁶

But how could an objection advanced by Epicurus against the atomists (cf. above, p. 17, on //17//–//18//) possibly be advanced against Chrysippus? Here I believe one should first note that the claim to the effect that necessity should be assigned responsibility for everything is presented in //9// in language suggesting a necessary chain of causation⁸⁷—in light of which one should then consider further elements from Diogenianus’ testimony.

First, Chrysippus’ claim said to give rise to the original objection is presented at times as “everything takes place by Fate” and similar formulations (§§3, 5, 6, 8, 11, and 19), at times as “everything takes place of necessity” and similar formulations (§§6, 10, 20, and 25). The very first time Chrysippus’ claim is presented in Diogenianus’ testimony includes both expressions: “everything is constrained by necessity and Fate” (§1). There, “necessity” is most probably not a modal notion, and is simply interchangeable with “Fate”—which is exactly what one finds in Epicurus’ attacks on the atomists.⁸⁸

85 In other words, I believe περὶ + accusative (“in the field of”) in §25 picks up the whole issue under discussion in the digression in Epicurus’ *On Nature*, Book XXV.

86 Cf. also below, pp. 29–30, on Diogenianus’ use of Epicurus’ first consideration in the digression.

87 Cf. above, p. 14.

88 Cf. above, pp. 6 and 12–13.

In addition, Diogenianus claims in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 20 that Chrysippus wanted to show “the intransgressibility ... of all causes which necessarily take place thus, that is, which are hindered from being otherwise” (τὸ ἀπαράβατον ... τῶν αἰτιῶν ὅσα οὕτως κατηναγκάσται γενέσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλως ἔχειν κεκώλυται). Here, the language is that of necessary causation in the above sense, and “intransgressibility” (τὸ ἀπαράβατον) will not sound unfamiliar to a reader acquainted with Chrysippus' accounts of Fate.

In Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 4 it is said that “authors of a different persuasion” (*aliorum ... opinionum disciplinarumque auctores*) objected to Chrysippus' definition of Fate in Book IV of his work *On Providence*, attested in *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 3. Despite the fact that the objection discussed in *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5–11 is not the one about τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς and effective exhortation which I discuss in this chapter but the one about τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and desert which I discuss in the following chapter, *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 ends with a direct quotation from Chrysippus where the phrase παρ' αὐτούς (in the sense of παρά + accusative we are here analyzing) is attested (12) and with one Homeric passage (α 32–4) said in Diogenianus' testimony (cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 2) to have been quoted by Chrysippus in order to establish that many things are also brought about by us (14). Since the Pythagorean passage quoted by Chrysippus in the excerpt where παρ' αὐτούς is attested belongs to Chrysippus' reply in 6–11 to the objection in 5, I believe Gellius' testimony gives us Chrysippus' definition of Fate as the origin of the difficulty discussed there, which however derives from it via the difficulty about τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς and effective exhortation in Diogenianus' testimony, to which Chrysippus alludes in concluding.

Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 3 runs,

In libro enim περὶ προνοίας quarto εἰμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικὴν τινὰ σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ αἰδίου τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μεταπολουμένων ἀπαράβατου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς.

In *On Providence*, Book IV, he says that Fate is “some natural organization of the whole from eternity, the items following closely upon, and being ploughed out from, one another, such weaving being intransgressible.”

Note that the items' following one another in an intransgressible manner suggests the image of a necessary chain of causation, in time made explicit in definitions of Fate as an

“intransgressible” (ἀπαράβατος) “chain of causes” (εἰρηὸς αἰτίων) which are attributed to “the Stoics” in Aëtius I 28 4 and Nemesius’ *De natura hominis* 37.⁸⁹ Thus, I believe Chrysippus’ original opponent was prompted by Chrysippus’ account of Fate in *On Providence*, Book IV, or in the very least by one along such lines, to attribute to Chrysippus the view that necessity should be assigned responsibility for everything, as the assertion of a necessary chain of causation implied in such an account seemed to the objector sufficient to pigeonhole Chrysippus as having chosen the alternative discussed in Epicurus’ second consideration in the digression.

But what was the actual content of the original objection advanced against Chrysippus? As we have seen, Epicurus’ claim in //13//–//14// is that the opponent simply gives the name “necessity” to that which we supposedly make no difference in bringing about—that which, in other words, supposedly does not take place παρ’ ἡμᾶς—and that it is puzzling to conceive that which supposedly takes place of necessity and yet comes from us (ἐξ ἡμῶν). That, I think, is the gist of the original objection, which one may gather from Chrysippus’ concern with τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς and τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν in §§26 and 33, and which in turn explains the absence of a structured argument in Diogenianus’ testimony: Chrysippus’ original opponent need only have claimed, on the basis of Epicurus’ points, that Chrysippus’ view of Fate does nothing but rename that which in fact takes place παρ’ ἡμᾶς, and cannot accommodate that which in fact takes place ἐξ ἡμῶν. (In the course of discussing Chrysippus’ reply we shall see how that has a bearing on the issue of (praise and blame *qua*) exhortations.) If so, it is not difficult to see that the examples in §§27–8 and 34 are meant to show how that which comes from us finds its place within an all-encompassing Fate, and that the conditional prophecies I believe underlie α 7 and α 32–4 in §2 are meant to show how a traditional conception of Fate underwrites Chrysippus’ own view—which thus cannot be accused of merely changing a name—that an all-encompassing Fate has room for our bringing things about.

One should here be reminded yet another time of the distinction between two strata in Diogenianus’ testimony, namely Chrysippus’ reply and Diogenianus’ own rejoinder to Chrysippus’ reply.⁹⁰ In §§26–9 and 34, Chrysippus makes use of four examples in order to establish that many things come from us⁹¹—or, more precisely, in order to show that in each

89 Cf. also Chrysippus’ labelling of Fate (εἰμαρμένη) as “strung in a chain” (εἰρομένη) in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 8 (with φησίν).

90 Cf. above, pp. 21–2.

91 Cf. κέχρηται (“he makes use of”) in §27 and φησίν (“he says”) in §§26, 27, 28, 29, and 34. Note, in addition, that Diogenianus paraphrases Chrysippus’ examples in terms of the result’s coming from one’s actions and/or desires in §31.

case the outcome is not fated without qualification (ἀπλῶς, §27) but along with one's actions and/or desires (μετά + infinitive, §§27 (thrice) and 29), which cause the result (cf. διὰ τὴν ... φυλακὴν ["in virtue of the ... guard"] in §28 with Stobaeus I 13 1c 138.23–139.4 Wachsmuth-Hense, where αἴτιον ["cause"] is said to be δι' ὃ ["that in virtue of which"] by Chrysippus). Note also the equivalence between "the garment's not being destroyed, he says, ... is fated ... along with its being taken care of" (τὸ ... μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι, φησί, θοιμάτιον ... καθεύμαρτο ... μετὰ τοῦ φυλάττεσθαι, §27: note the use of φησί) and "the garment, he says, is fated to be preserved if you take care of it, ... otherwise none of these things will happen" (καθεύμαρται ..., φησί, σωθῆναι θοιμάτιον, εἰ φυλάττοις αὐτό ..., ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τι τούτων, §34: note once more the use of φησί). Thus, Chrysippus' four examples are meant to show that if the outcome is fated then the cause of the outcome must be fated along with it in the sense that it must be the case that ((if one does x , then y takes place) and (if one does not do x , then y does not take place))—where (if one does x , then y takes place) is a factual statement to the effect that x is sufficient to bring about the outcome and (if one does not do x , then y does not take place) is a counterfactual statement to the effect that x is necessary in order to bring about the outcome, both of which are compatible with the claim that everything takes place by Fate.⁹² By the same token, Chrysippus accommodates eagerness (note βούλεσθαι, §§27 and 34 [with φησὶν in both passages]) as both necessary and sufficient for an outcome. Note, in addition, that in §33 Chrysippus says (φησί)—presumably as his argument's conclusion (note future tense ἔσται ["will be"])—that "those things" (presumably, both the cause of the outcome and the outcome itself) will be brought about by us (παρ' ἡμᾶς), as that which is brought about by us is encompassed by Fate.

We are now in a position to see how Chrysippus' solution works: since the result obtains if one acts and (hypothetically) does not obtain if one does not act, then (i) it is not the case that the result will obtain anyway, as Epicurus claimed in the digression; (ii) it makes sense to say that the result comes from us and is thereby brought about by us; and (iii) it also makes sense to (praise and blame one so as to) exhort one to act in order for the result to obtain, since one's action is both necessary and sufficient to bring about the result, doing so as its cause.

Note that Chrysippus' examples are meant to show that fated events are not imposed unconditionally, since other (as fated) events are both necessary and sufficient for them. Thus,

⁹² Note, in addition, that x 's and y 's respective non-obtainings are legitimate possibilities according to Chrysippus' view that possibilities require no more than susceptibility to true predication and the absence of external impediments: cf. DL VII 75 and Boethius' *In De Interpretatione* II 234.27–235.1 Meiser with Bobzien (1998a), ch. 3.1.

Chrysippus' view on Fate makes room for effective exhortations in that it allows one to say that praise and blame, indeed exhortations in general, are necessary (and, given the circumstances, sufficient) to change our ways, and that our making efforts on the basis of others' exhortations is likewise necessary (and, given the circumstances, sufficient) to reform our characters: Fate does not entail that outcomes take place on their own.

Two consequences must be drawn:

First, Chrysippus' solution provides an answer to Epicurus' worry in //13// that unless it is not the case that everything takes place of necessity one cannot succeed in dissuading us from acting by means of an appeal to our efforts' not having a hand in bringing about that which in any event is going to take place. According to Chrysippus' solution, that everything takes place by Fate does not entail that our actions do not contribute to making up the future, instead they may well cause future outcomes.

Second, since Chrysippus' reply to the original objection is tailored to counter Epicurus' worry as exposed in the preceding paragraph, one may appreciate the connection between the original objection and the Idle Argument without missing an essential difference between them. In fact, it is one of Epicurus' points that our efforts are idle if (as he claims follows from his opponent's view) they do not contribute to bringing about that which in any event is going to take place, which is one of the premises in the Idle Argument (another being that our efforts are idle also if they do not have a hand in preventing that which in any event is going to take place, which however is not present in the digression in Epicurus' *On Nature*, Book XXV).⁹³ Since, then, Chrysippus has to address shared ground, it is not difficult to see that there may well be a common core to Chrysippus' respective solutions to each difficulty. That, however, should not turn into a pretext for obliterating differences such as the Idle Argument's unconcern with the issue of praise and blame, as opposed to what one finds in //3//–//4// and §25.⁹⁴ Here, it is vital to underscore a lack of parallel between the Milo example in Cicero's *De Fato* 30 and the Hegesarchus example in §28. Robert Sharples has noted that if Milo, on one hand, will not *compete* unless he *has an opponent*—and, one may add, will compete if he has an opponent—Hegesarchus, on the other, will not *win* unless he *keeps his guard*—and, one may add, will win if he keeps his guard—and thus concluded, “Chrysippus must have made the same point in more than one passage with different examples and emphases” (1991: 181). His claim has been dismissed as “unlikely” by Susanne Bobzien, who, assuming that Cicero and Diogenianus report the same reply to the same

93 Cf. below, pp. 42–3.

94 Cf. below, pp. 39–41.

objection and depend ultimately on the same source, emphasizes the similar structure of the examples (despite alterations in the examples in Cicero) and claims that their philosophical points are almost exactly the same (1998a: 214–17). Once one notes, however, that the Idle Argument has no direct connection with the topic of praise and blame and the original objection in Diogenianus’ testimony has, one may explain why Chrysippus makes use of different examples in each reply: it is appropriate to praise Hegesarchus for coming off unscathed from the boxing match due to his extraordinary guard against his opponent’s blows, but it is not appropriate to praise Milo for merely having an opponent and competing.

Before we move to the last point I discuss in Chrysippus’ reply (about τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς and α 7 and α 32–4), let us briefly appreciate Diogenianus’ rejoinder to the use of the four examples in Chrysippus’ reply and its upshots regarding τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν and τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς.

Diogenianus claims in §30 that Chrysippus’ reply discloses his lack of comparative appraisal (τὸ ἀνεπιλόγιστον) both of the clear view of things and of the lack of logical consequence in his arguments (with θαυμάσειέν τις ἄν, “one may wonder”), since one preconceives (προεἶληφεν) that which takes place by Fate and that which is brought about by us as mutually exclusive (with οἶμαι, “I think”). Note that recourse both to comparative appraisal and to preconception forms part of Epicurus’ first consideration in the digression (//5//–//8//), where it is said that Epicurus’ opponent merely changes names when he calls “necessary” that—human action—which he nevertheless still conceives on the basis of the preconception of responsibility (//5//), and lacks an appreciation of his claim that everything takes place of necessity in contrast with his practices of ascription of responsibility when he says that even the latter are necessary (//8//).

Note how apposite Epicurus’ first consideration is against Chrysippus’ reply: the latter consists in showing how it is possible to retain praise and blame while asserting that everything takes place by Fate, which is exactly the claim addressed in //5//–//8// in the digression. Thus, Diogenianus need only recycle Epicurus’ first consideration in order to controvert Chrysippus, claiming that Chrysippus does not really change our preconceptions concerning what we do and respond for (cf. §31: if our actions and their outcomes do indeed come from us, how is Fate preserved in such cases?) nor appreciates the clear view of things in contrast with the lack of consequence in his own arguments. Here, “the clear view of things” is presumably the view that our actions and their outcomes are indeed brought about by us, and “the lack of consequence in <Chrysippus> own arguments” is presumably the fact that Chrysippus fails to notice both that something’s being brought about by us entails its not being fated and that something’s being fated entails its not being brought about by us (cf. §30:

we preconceive that which takes place by Fate as that which takes place whether we will it or not, and we preconceive that which is brought about by us as that which comes to its fulfillment if, and only if, we apply ourselves to it).

Diogenianus' argument may at first blush be perceived as rebarbative in light of Chrysippus' considered discussion of the topics at hand. Nevertheless, he does have a point if he means that Chrysippus' overall view is, at bottom, simply that Fate is whatever we may do: if so, what is the point in calling that "Fate"?⁹⁵ Be that as it may, Diogenianus' rejoinder is a much belated reaction to Chrysippus' reply, and—despite its being in line with Epicurean strict philosophical allegiance⁹⁶—is thus of no consequence in a reconstruction of the history of the debate in Chrysippus' own time.

Let us now move to Chrysippus' use of two passages from Homer's *Odyssey* to establish that many things come from us (§2). The first deals with the fate of Odysseus' companions:

αὐτοὶ γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο.

They were destroyed by their own recklessness.

(α 7, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

The other presents Zeus' reply to Aegisthus' charges that the gods are to be held accountable for men's misfortunes:

ὦ πόποι, οἷον δὴ νῦν θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιώωνται.

ἐξ ἡμέων γὰρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ

σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσι.

Oh for shame! How the mortals accuse us gods,
for they say evils come from us, when it is they, rather,
who by their own recklessness win sorrow beyond what is due!

(α 32–4, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

95 I here disagree with Bobzien (1998a), ch. 5.3.4. I owe the point to Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos.

96 On which, cf. Sedley (1989).

“Recklessness” (ἄτασθαλία) is a common element in the passages, and may surely be seen as (issuing in) the agents’ eagerness (προθυμία) for wrongdoing. But there is more.

In the latter passage, Zeus implies that the gods are not to be held accountable for men’s misfortunes because men’s misfortunes do not come from the gods (cf. ἐξ ἡμέων [“come from us”], α 33); rather, as the immediate sequence of the passage⁹⁷ makes clear, men’s misfortunes come but from themselves, in the sense that ((if one does x , then the outcome ensues) and (if one does not do x , then the outcome does not ensue)):

ὥς καὶ νῦν Αἴγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον Ἀτρεΐδαο
 γῆμ’ ἄλοχον μνηστὴν, τὸν δ’ ἔκτανε νοστήσαντα,
 εἰδὼς αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον, ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἶπομεν ἡμεῖς,
 Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες ἐύσκοπον Ἀργειφόντην,
 μήτ’ αὐτὸν κτείνειν, μήτε μνάσθαι ἄκοιτιν·
 ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέσταιο τίσις ἔσσεται Ἀτρεΐδαο
 ὁππότ’ ἂν ἡβήσῃ τε καὶ ἧς ἰμεῖρεται αἵης.

As now lately, beyond what was due, Aegisthus married
 the wife of Atreides and murdered him on his homecoming
 knowing it was steep ruin, for we had told him beforehand,
 having sent Hermes, the mighty watcher, Argeiphontes,
 not to kill the man, nor court his lady for marriage;
 for vengeance would come on him from Orestes, son of Atreides,
 whenever he came of age and longed for his own country.

(α 35–40, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

Here it is said that if Aegisthus marries Clitemnestra and murders Agamemnon then he will be killed by Orestes, and it is implied that if he does not marry Clitemnestra and murder Agamemnon then he will not be killed by Orestes. The structure ((if q , then p) and (if not- q , then not- p)) with future antecedent becomes however explicit in the following passage,⁹⁸ dealing with Odysseus and his companions (who, as we have seen, are the object of the first passage):

97 Not attested for Chrysippus in Diogenianus.

98 Not attested for Chrysippus in Diogenianus.

τὰς εἰ μὲν κ' ἀσινέας ἐάας, νόστου τε μέδῃαι,
καί κεν ἔτ' εἰς Ἰθάκην, κακὰ περ πάσχοντες, ἵκοισθε·
εἰ δέ κε σῖνῃαι, τότε τοι τεκμαίροιμ' ὄλεθρον
νηϊ τε καὶ ἐταίροις ...

Then, if you leave those unharmed and keep your mind in homecoming
you may all make your way to Ithaca after much suffering;
but if you do harm them, then I testify to the destruction
of your ship and companions ...

(λ 109–12 = μ 137–40,⁹⁹ trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

Both passages use the structure ((if q , then p) and (if not- q , then not- p)) with future antecedent—which, as we have seen, corresponds to the core of Chrysippus' reply—in enunciating conditional prophecies. That, I believe, allows Chrysippus to dispel the claim that his view consists in a mere change of names: since (always according to Chrysippus), as is made explicit from Homer's use of conditional prophecies, the Poet testifies both to the claim (in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 1) that everything is constrained by necessity and Fate and to the claim (in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 2) that many things are brought about by us in the sense that ((if one does x , then y takes place) and (if one does not do x , then y does not take place)), then Chrysippus' view traces back to Homer and is therefore not a mere change of names—instead, it is now the opponent's burden to show against such venerable tradition that it is indeed our preconception that Fate and τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς are mutually exclusive.

Note, in addition, that α 35–40 contains an explicit exhortation to Aegisthus, while λ 109–12 = μ 137–40 contains an implicit exhortation to Odysseus and his companions—and in both passages the exhortations are grounded on the conditional prophecies. Chrysippus may thus admit conditional prophecies *qua* (one's ground for) effective exhortations, in seamless connection with his subsumption of τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς and effective exhortations under Fate.

Diogenianus will in time retort (in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 3–7) that Homer's view is not that everything takes place by Fate but that only some things do (§3), which in turn allows him to read his own professed opposition between Fate and τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς

99 Except for ἦ τ' ἄν (μ 138) in place of καὶ κεν (λ 110).

into Homer's poems (§6). Be that as it may, it is Diogenianus' reasoning in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* IV 3 that proves more relevant to our purposes.

There, Diogenianus disputes Chrysippus' view "in the aforementioned book" (ἐν τῷ προειρημένῳ βιβλίῳ, §1) that soothsayers' predictions could not be true unless everything were encompassed by Fate (μὴ ... τὰς τῶν μάντεων προρρήσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φησιν εἰ μὴ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης περιείχοντο, §1; note the use of φησίν). The truth of soothsayers' predictions is here said to ground Chrysippus' claim that everything takes place by Fate—which, as we have seen, is the claim he makes in *On Fate*, Book I, as attested by Diogenianus in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 1. The connection with the issues under discussion in this chapter will become apparent in Diogenianus' reasoning in §§10–13 to the effect that predictions are useless—which, I believe, reveals a direction assumed in the debate in Chrysippus' own time.¹⁰⁰

[10] εἰ γὰρ φήσει τις σωθήσεσθαι τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς μαντικῆς διὰ τὸ προλέγεσθαι τὸ πάντως ἐσόμενον δυσχερὲς εἰ μὴ προφυλαξαίμεθα, οὐκέτι πάντα δείξει συμβησόμενα καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντος τοῦ φυλάξασθαι τε καὶ μὴ φυλάξασθαι. [11] εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο κατηναγκάσθαι φήσει τις, ὥς εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα διατείνειν τὴν εἰμαρμένην, πάλιν τὸ τῆς μαντικῆς χρήσιμον ἀναιρεῖται· φυλαζόμεθα γὰρ εἰ καθείμαρται, καὶ οὐ φυλαζόμεθα δῆλον ὥς εἰ μὴ καθείμαρται φυλάξασθαι, κἂν πάντες οἱ μάντις τὸ ἐσόμενον προαγορεύσωσιν ἡμῖν. [12] τὸν γοῦν Οἰδίποδα καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν τοῦ Πριάμου καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος φησιν πολλὰ μηχανησαμένων τῶν γονέων ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ἵνα τὸ ἀπ' αὐτῶν προρρηθὲν αὐτοῖς κακὸν φυλάσσονται, μὴ δυνηθῆναι. [13] οὕτως οὐδὲν ὄφελος οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν κακῶν προαγορεύσεως φησιν εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς εἰμαρμένης αἰτίαν.

[10] For if one says that the usefulness of prophecy is preserved in virtue of predicting the hardship that in any event is going to take place unless we guard ourselves against it in advance, one will no longer show that things take place by Fate, since our guarding or not guarding ourselves against it is up to us. [11] For if one says that even that is necessary, so as to extend Fate to everything that there is, once more one suppresses the usefulness of prophecy because we will guard ourselves if it is so fated, and it is evident that we will not guard ourselves if it is not fated that we will guard ourselves, even if all soothsayers predict the future to us. [12] Thus it is that even

¹⁰⁰ I follow the text in Mras-Des Places (1982–3).

Chrysippus himself says of Oedipus and of Alexander son of Priam that despite their parents' many devices to kill them in order to guard themselves against the evil that had been predicted to stem from them, they were unable to. [13] Therefore, he says that prediction of evils was of no avail to them in virtue of causation that comes from Fate.

Note, first, that “the hardship that in any event is going to take place unless we guard ourselves against it in advance” (τὸ πάντως ἐσόμενον δυσχερὲς εἰ μὴ προφυλαξαίμεθα) in §10 is a close correspondent to “the garment, he says, is fated to be preserved if you take care of it, ... otherwise none of these things will happen” (καθείμαρται ..., φησί, σωθῆναι θοιμάτιον, εἰ φυλάττοις αὐτό ..., ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τι τούτων) in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 34 (note φησί, “he [=Chrysippus] says,” in the latter passage). In both cases, the structure ((if we do *x*, then *y* does not take place) and (if we do not do *x*, then *y* takes place))—which, as we have seen, is of the essence of Chrysippus' reply in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8—is present. On such grounds, I believe our current passage belongs together with Chrysippus' view of τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς in terms of its being the case that ((if one does not do *x*, then *y* takes place) and (if one does *x*, then *y* does not take place)) and with what I claim to be Chrysippus' analysis of conditional prophecies in those terms.

Note, in addition, that §12 ascribes to Chrysippus an analysis of the Oedipus example that, despite Diogenianus' protestation, is perfectly in accordance with Chrysippus' take on conditional prophecies: in the structure ((if one does not do *x*, then *y* takes place) and (if one does *x*, then *y* does not take place)), it is always the case (according to Chrysippus) that one side is factual and the other is counterfactual—which entails that conditional prophecies are indeed necessary (and, given the circumstances, sufficient) for us to do whatever it is that we shall do to bring about an outcome. Thus, the Oedipus example in §12 possibly not only traces back to the father example in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 27 and 34 but also signals Chrysippus' use of the following passage from Euripides' *Phoenissae* in the same connection:

μὴ σπεῖρε τέκνων ἄλοκα δαιμόνων βία·
εἰ γὰρ τεκνώσεις παῖδ', ἀποκτενεῖ σ' ὁ φύς,
καὶ πᾶς σὸς οἶκος βήσεται δι' αἵματος.

Do not sow the furrow of children in offense to the gods,

for if you beget a son, that shoot will kill you,
and all your house shall wade through blood.

(ll. 18–20, trans. Coleridge, slightly altered)

Here, it is said that if Laius impregnates Jocasta he will be killed by Oedipus, and it is implied that if he does not impregnate Jocasta he will not be killed by Oedipus—which, as we have seen, is the same one finds in the conditional prophecies I claim underlie Chrysippus’ use of α 7 and α 32–4 in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 2. Note, in addition, that the conditional prophecy in the Euripides passage grounds an exhortation to Laius—which once more coheres with my preceding analysis—and that the Euripides passage itself is attested in Origen’s *Contra Celsum* II 20 150.1–3 Koetschau¹⁰¹ in connection with the Idle Argument.¹⁰²

But I believe the main element in Diogenianus’ argument in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* IV 3 10–13 to the effect that predictions are useless—because they entail either that things are up to us and therefore not everything takes place by Fate, or that everything takes place by Fate and therefore we can do nothing about it—is the presence of ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (“up to us”) in §10, an element which is shared with Sextus’ *Adversus Mathematicos* V 46–8:

[46] ἐπεὶ τῶν γινομένων τὰ μὲν κατ’ ἀνάγκην γίνεται τὰ δὲ κατὰ τύχην τὰ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς, πάντως οἱ Χαλδαῖοι, εἰ δυνατῆς ἐφίενται προρρήσεως, ἥτοι ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἀνάγκην ποιήσονται τὰς προαγορεύσεις ἢ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τύχην ἐκβαίνουσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμᾶς.
[47] καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἀνωφελεῖς εἰσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· τὸ γὰρ κατ’ ἀνάγκην συμβαῖνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκκλῖναι, ἀλλ’ ἐάν τε θέλωμεν ἐάν τε μὴ θέλωμεν, ἐκβῆναι δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο. τότε δ’ ἂν χρειώδης ἐτύγχανεν ἡ πρόρρησις, εἰ πρὸς τὴν ἑκκλισιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐλάμβανεν. εἰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς τυχηροῖς, ἀδύνατόν τι ἐπαγγέλλονται ἄστατα γὰρ τὰ τυχηρῶς γινόμενα, τῶν δὲ ἀστάτων καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐκβαινόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐστῶσαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν προαγόρευσιν. [48] λείπεται οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμᾶς γινομένοις αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς προρρήσεις. ὁ πάλιν ἀμήχανον· τὸ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ κείμενον ἐκβῆναι ἢ μὴ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ἀρχῇθεν προκαταβεβλημένην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τις προλέγειν. οὐκ ἄρα δυνατῆς ἐφίενται προρρήσεως οἱ Χαλδαῖοι.

[46] Since of that which takes place some things take place of necessity, some by chance, and some are brought about by us, in any event the Chaldeans, if they utter

101 With παίδων in place of τέκνων in l. 18.

102 Cf. below, pp. 39–40.

effective predictions, will make their predictions concerning either that which results of necessity, that which results by chance, or that which is brought about by us. [47] If concerning that which results of necessity, those will be of no avail in life, since it is not possible to bend that which results of necessity, rather that must result whether we will it or not, and prediction would only turn out to be useful if it led to bend that. If, in turn, they will make their predictions concerning that which results by chance, it will be impossible to proclaim anything, since that which takes place in a chance way is not fixed, and it is not possible to make a fixed prediction about that which is not fixed, that is, about that which results differently at different times. [48] It remains, then, that they make their predictions concerning that which is brought about by us, which is again unviable, since one cannot predict that whose fulfillment or not is up to me, that is, that which does not have from the beginning a cause set down beforehand. Therefore, the Chaldeans do not utter effective predictions.

Note, first, that the tripartition “of necessity” (κατ’ ἀνάγκην), “by chance” (κατὰ τύχην), and “brought about by us” (παρ’ ἡμᾶς) in the passage is a close correspondent to Epicurus’ tripartition in DL X 133–4,¹⁰³ which indicates its possible Epicurean provenance. Note, moreover, that the argument against prediction is here made somewhat more complex by the introduction of chance (which is never discussed in either of Diogenianus’ testimonies in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica*), but a significant portion of the claim one finds here is a close correspondent to Diogenianus’ claim in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* IV 3 10–13 to the effect that prediction is not δυνατή or “effective” (to be understood presumably in terms of its being unable to interfere in a decisive manner in a given course of action) because it concerns either that which is necessary (in which case it is of no avail, since it states something that cannot be altered) or that which is brought about by us (in which case it is not a prediction, since things may turn out otherwise).

But the most significant common element in both Diogenianus and Sextus is, I surmise, that prophecy’s preclusion of Fate is presented in both in terms of the fact that prophecy’s effectiveness (and its consequent usefulness) is grounded on some things’ being “up to” the agent (ἐπί + dative) to accomplish or not, an idiom paraphrased in the Sextus passage as some things’ “not having a cause set down beforehand from the beginning” (τὸ ... ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ κείμενον ἐκβῆναι ἢ μή, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ἀρχῇθεν προκαταβεβλημένην αἰτίαν, 48).¹⁰⁴

103 With ἀπὸ τύχης in place of κατὰ τύχην in the latter passage. Cf. above, pp. 5–6.

104 Where I take καὶ to be expegetic; cf. τῶν ... ἀστάτων καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐκβαίνοντων (“about that which is

As I shall argue in the following chapter, Chrysippus faces another objection, dealing with the issue of desert and framed in terms of that which is “up to us”—(*situ*) *in nobis, in nostra potestate*—understood as that whose ultimate origin does not reach beyond us. I believe Diogenianus’ argument in Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* IV 3 10–13 and the argument preserved in Sextus’ *Adversus Mathematicos* V 46–8 both indicate that the new objection is a reaction against Chrysippus’ views on Fate and τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς as I attempt to reconstruct them in this chapter.¹⁰⁵

That the common core of meaning of the phrase “up to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) is as I claim it to be may be gathered also from Aristotle’s *Ethica Eudemia* II 6, where Aristotle asserts, “all such principles, from which changes first come into being, are said to be ‘in control’” (τῶν δ’ ἀρχῶν ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, 1222b20–22), and adds, “it is evident that all actions man is principle and in control of admit of both coming into being and not, and that that is up to one to take place and not whose being and not being one is in control of” (ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ’ αὐτῷ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, 1223a4–7). In the first chunk, principles (cf. τῶν ἀρχῶν) from which changes first (πρῶτον) come into being are said to be in control (κύριαι). In the second chunk, that of which man is principle and in control of (ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος) admits of taking place and not, and that whose being and not one is in control of is up to one (ἐφ’ αὐτῷ). Thus, (i) being an ultimate origin implies having control; (ii) having control implies having alternative possibilities; and (iii) having control over alternative possibilities implies that either of the alternatives’ taking place is up to one. From (i) and (ii), alternative possibilities are consequent on ultimate origination; and the addition of (iii) allows one to infer that something’s being up to us is to be understood ultimately in terms of ultimate origination.

The same result may be gathered from still other passages dealing with something’s being up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) such as Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea* III 1113b6–19:

ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ’ εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὃν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. εἰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά,

not fixed, that is, about that which results differently at different times”) in §47.

105 Note, in addition, how the argument preserved in the Sextus passage moves from παρ’ ἡμᾶς to ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, which is the same overall move I here observe in Diogenianus.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια.

Virtue is up to us, and so is vice. For where to act is up to us, so is not to act; and where “no” is, so is “yes.” Therefore, if to act, when it is good, is up to us, so not to act, when it is base, will be up to us; and if not to act, when it is good, is up to us, so to act, when it is base, will be up to us. And if to act well and ill is up to us, and so is not to act, and that was to be good and base, so to be honest and mean will be up to us. And to say that no one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily blessed seems in part false and in part true, for no one is involuntarily blessed, but evil is voluntary. Or should we dispute what has just been said and man should be said not to be principle nor begetter of actions as well as of descendants? But if that is manifest and we cannot refer to other principles aside from those in us, that whose principles are in us is up to us and voluntary.

Note that in 1113b17–19 Aristotle asserts that man is γεννητής (“begetter”) of actions—and in contrast to terms such as γονεύς (“forebear”), which may be used of remote ancestors,¹⁰⁶ γεννητής (“begetter”) and the verb γεννάω (“to beget”), used also in Aristotle’s *Ethica Eudemia* II 6 1222b15–20 to assert that man begets actions as well as descendants, are used exclusively of *parents*. Thus, if A is the γεννητής of B and B is the γεννητής of C, A is *not* the γεννητής of C—in other words, if X is the γεννητής of Y it is not possible that anything preceding X be the γεννητής of Y.

If I am right as to the meaning of γεννητής, in 1113b17–19 man is said to be the principle of his actions in such a way that nothing preceding man can be the principle of his actions in his place. Thus it is, I believe, that one should understand the clause εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν in 1113b19–21, where Aristotle claims his view is evident: when considering the father-son relationship we either *cannot* or *do not have to* refer to other causes aside from the father because either that is all there is to consider and it does not make sense

¹⁰⁶ Herodotus I 91 speaks of Gyges as Croesus’ “fifth forebear” (πέμπτος γονεύς).

to go further, or that is sufficient and there is no need to go further.

Aristotle wants to establish in 1113b6–19 that virtue and vice are symmetrical with regard to their being up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, 1113b6–7), a claim which is justified by means of argument (note γάρ, 1113b7) in 1113b7–14 (ὥστε in 1113b8 introduces the expansion of the general claim in 1113b7–8 in 1113b8–14), and against which the traditional saying in 1113b14–17 is set. Thus, τὰ νῦν εἰρημμένα in 1113b17, which one should deny if one were to accept the traditional saying, corresponds to the whole of 1113b6–14—the claim in 1113b6–7 and its justification in 1113b7–14, including both the general claim in 1113b7–8 (where Bobzien focuses her discussion) and its expansion in 1113b8–14. If so, the claim that virtue and vice are up to us (in 1113b6–7) is to be understood in terms of the fact that our actions have their ultimate origin in us (as may be gathered from 1113b17–19) and are in turn the cause of our states of character (cf. 1113b11–14).¹⁰⁷

However, neither Aristotle’s use of the phrase “up to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) nor Epicurean elements leading up to the introduction of the “up to” (ἐπί + dative) idiom in both Eusebius’ *Praeparatio Evangelica* IV 3 10–13 and Sextus’ *Adversus Mathematicos* V 46–8 should carry any more weight than already suggested here: Chrysippus addresses a rejoinder dealing with desert and framed in terms of ultimate origination as a consequence of his professed views on Fate, τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς, conditional prophecies, and effective exhortations, but one cannot ascertain which thinker or school puts forward such a rejoinder against Chrysippus, nor in which of his works he addresses it.

Origen, *Contra Celsum* II 20 and Cicero, *De Fato* 28–30

Before we move to the next chapter I shall say a few words on the Idle Argument.

Origen invokes the Idle Argument in the context of a discussion on prophecy, both Pagan and Christian. Of the two prophecies quoted by Origen in the chapter the Laius

¹⁰⁷ The father-son illustration is associated with ultimate origination also in Aristotle’s *Metaphysica* Δ 1 1013a7–10 (fourth meaning of ἀρχή [“principle”]: “where movement and change naturally first have their principle, as a child comes from a father and a mother, and altercation comes from abuse,” ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἡ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ τέκνον ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ ἡ μάχη ἐκ τῆς λοιδορίας) and 2 1013a29–32 (third meaning of αἴτιον [“cause”]: “where the first principle of change and rest is, as one who deliberated is a cause, and the father is a cause of the son,” ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμύσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλευσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου). As is obvious, my reading of Aristotle is at variance with that in Bobzien (2014a), Bobzien (2014b), and Bobzien (2014c), and is congruent with that in Echeñique (2012a) and Echeñique (2014).

prophecy¹⁰⁸ (quoted from Euripides' *Phoenissae*, ll. 18–20) aptly connects with the following discussion of the Idle Argument, while the Judas prophecy¹⁰⁹ (quoted from Mt 26:23, ὁ ἐμβάψας μετ' ἐμοῦ τὴν χεῖρα εἰς τὸ τρυβλίον, ἐκεῖνός με παραδώσει [“he will betray me who dipped his hand in the bowl with me”]) is of a different kind: phrased as a conditional, its antecedent states not a future but a past event (note aorist participle ἐμβάψας [“he who dipped”]) which, despite its being sufficient for the outcome, is not a cause but a mere sign of the outcome. Those two features are characteristic of prophecies pertaining not to the Idle Argument—nor, for that matter, to the argument in Diogenianus' testimony—but to the Master Argument,¹¹⁰ a main issue of which Epicurus' digression, Diogenianus' testimony, and the Idle Argument itself pass over in silence, namely whether the connection between a sign and the future event of which it is a sign is such as to entail necessary future truth, or instead a future truth which admits of counterfactual possibilities. Correspondingly, Origen's distinction¹¹¹ between πάντως (“in any event”) as either denoting a modal notion or serving merely to underscore future truth parallels Chrysippus' precision¹¹² (as part of his reply to the Master Argument) that statements to the effect that a sign implies a future event should be put in the form not of strict implications but of material implications, since the presence of a necessary fact in the antecedent of the latter has no bearing on the modal status of its consequent.¹¹³

Origen surely conflates distinct issues in his testimony, but that should not blind us to significant (albeit controversial) elements to be found there. First, in Origen's testimony the Euripides passage is not used to illustrate the reply to the Idle Argument, but the other way round: the reply to the Idle Argument is used to illuminate the Euripides passage. Second, Origen asserts his claims in the chapter to be valid “for all foreknowledge of that which in a sense is up to us” (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινὸς πρόγνωσιν, 149.2–3 Koetschau), which parallels a move we have observed in both Diogenianus and Sextus.¹¹⁴ Finally, Origen states that the Idle Argument is such that it dissuades (ἀποτρέπων, 150.10–12 Koetschau) the sick person from calling in the doctor. Since, as we shall see in the following two paragraphs, Cicero's testimony connects the reply to the Idle Argument with the issue of prophecy only to

108 In 150.1–3 Koetschau.

109 In 151.15–16 Koetschau.

110 On the connection between the Master Argument and the issue of inference from signs, cf. Allen (2001), Study III. Cf. also Bobzien (1998a), ch. 4.

111 In 151.3–9 Koetschau.

112 In Cicero, *De Fato* 15.

113 Origen's distinction between two meanings of πάντως may trace back to the Reaper Argument. Cf. below, pp. 46–8.

114 Cf. above, pp. 33–7.

the extent that the reply to the Idle Argument involves the structure ((if one does *x*, then *y* takes place) and (if one does not do *x*, then *y* does not take place)) with future antecedent, and fails to connect the reply to the Idle Argument with the issue of exhortation (or, for that matter, with the move to that which is up to us), I submit that Origen's testimony is a confluence of distinct elements, with the three points I highlight in this paragraph pertaining rather to the discussion of the argument in Diogenianus' testimony.

Cicero tampers in his own way with the material he reports, but preserves a neat connection between Chrysippus' reply to the Idle Argument and the issue of prophecy. In effect, Cicero's concern with antecedent future truth in his testimony, which leads him to paraphrase the Idle Argument in terms not of Fate but of antecedent future truth in *De Fato* 29, stems but from a tendency (pervasive in his treatise) to connect unrelated discussions¹¹⁵—here, that of the Idle Argument in 28–30 with that of antecedent future truth and the principle of bivalence in 20–8, in turn interrupted by the discussion in 22–5 about the swerve and its alleged consequences as to the issue of antecedent future truth and the principle of bivalence. At the same time, what appears to be a translation of a direct quotation from Chrysippus' reply in Cicero's *De Fato* 30 adduces two examples prominently connected with the issue of prophecy. The Laius example connects therewith merely in virtue of its mentioning the Labdacids, since, phrased as a conditional, its antecedent (Laius' having intercourse with Jocasta) is necessary and sufficient for, and the cause of, its consequent (Oedipus' being born to Laius). The outcome, however, is not Laius' death nor, for that matter, the fall of the house of Labdacus as in the oracle, and accordingly no hint is visible that exhortations are supposed to be at stake. The Socrates example, in turn, has been read by David Sedley (1993) in terms of Socrates' prophetic dream in Plato's *Crito* 44ab (cited in Cicero's *De Divinatione* I 52): “on the third day you will arrive at fertile Phthia” (ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο)—there phrased, as is characteristic of oracles, as a dactylic hexameter, quoted from I 363;¹¹⁶ but while in the Homeric poem the sentence is the consequent of a conditional which is not a prophecy, the omission of the antecedent in Plato's *Crito* is indeed of relevance to Chrysippus' purposes: in order for Socrates' prophetic dream to state a *simplex* it must admit of no condition.¹¹⁷

The absence of exhortations in Cicero's testimony, in much the same spirit as the lack of parallel between the Milo example in Cicero and the Hegesarchus example in Diogenianus

115 To be more precise, surely there is a connection between the *issues* under discussion in the source, but one should not jump from that to a conclusion as to a supposed connection between the respective *discussions* of those issues in the author that the source reports.

116 Except for ἴκοιο in place of ἰκοίμην.

117 Cf. below, pp. 43–5.

regarding praise and blame,¹¹⁸ indicates that Chrysippus makes use of different examples in each reply he offers to different arguments. Thus, the interpretation of the structure ((if one does *x*, then *y* takes place) and (if one does not do *x*, then *y* does not take place)) with future antecedent may be said to have a direct import on the issue of conditional prophecies, and may have been seen in such light by Chrysippus himself, but remains unconnected with the issue of exhortation in the discussion of the Idle Argument.

We are now in a position to move to the discussion of the Idle Argument.

Cicero (*De Fato* 28–29) and Origen (*Contra Celsum* II 20 150.13–17 Koetschau) report the Idle Argument in almost the same way:

εἰ εἴμαρταί σοι ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐάν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τὸν ἱατρὸν ἐάν τε μὴ εἰσαγάγῃς, ἀναστήσῃ· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ εἴμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐάν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τὸν ἱατρὸν ἐάν τε μὴ εἰσαγάγῃς, οὐκ ἀναστήσῃ· ἦτοι δὲ εἴμαρταί σοι ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἢ εἴμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστῆναι· μάτην ἄρα εἰσάγεις τὸν ἱατρὸν.

If it is fated for you to recover from this disease, then you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not; also, if it is fated for you not to recover from this disease, then you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not. But either it is fated for you to recover from this disease or it is fated for you not to recover; so it is idle for you to call in a doctor.

[28] si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, convalesces; [29] item si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, non convalesces; et alterutrum fatum est; medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet.

[28] If it is fated for you to recover from this disease, then you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not; [29] similarly, if it is fated for you not to recover from this disease, then you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not. But one or the other is fated; so there is no point in calling in a doctor (trans. Sharples).

From their respective testimonies it is possible to extract the following schematization:

¹¹⁸ Cf. above, pp. 28–9.

1. If it is fated that y will take place, then y will take place whether or not you x .
2. If it is fated that y will not take place, then y will not take place whether or not you x .
3. Either it is fated that y will take place or it is fated that y will not take place.
4. Therefore, it is idle for you to x .

What is at stake here is the futility of x in the conclusion—which in turn derives from the futility of x in the consequents of both (1) and (2), where it is at stake in very different ways. In (1), the consequent “ y will take place whether or not you x ” means “ y will take place even if you do not x ,” that is, your x -ing is not necessary to bring about y —or, alternatively, “it is not the case that (if you do not x , then y will not take place).” In (2), the consequent “ y will not take place whether or not you x ” means “ y will not take place even if you x ,” that is, your x -ing is not sufficient to bring about y —or, alternatively, “it is not the case that (if you x , then y will take place).” Thus, what is meant by “it is idle for you to x ” in the conclusion must be that “it is not the case that ((if you x , then y will take place) and (if you do not x , then y will not take place)).”

As we have seen, (1)’s “ y will take place even if you do not x ” is an element in common with Epicurus’ second consideration in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV, where (as I read the passage) his opponent attempts to dissuade us from acting by claiming, “Do not make an effort, what you are attempting to do is bound to take place anyway.”¹¹⁹ (2)’s “ y will not take place even if you x ” is, in turn, absent from Epicurus’ second consideration (as I read the passage), and Epicurus’ is certainly not a structured argument as the Idle Argument. Thus, Chrysippus may, in spite of differences, resort to common elements in addressing shared ground between the Idle Argument and the argument in Diogenianus’ testimony.

Both sources state that the Idle Argument is a sophism (note *σόφισμα* in Origen’s *Contra Celsum* II 20 149.4–6 Koetschau with *captiones* and *captiosum* in Cicero’s *De Fato* 30). On the basis of Cicero’s claim that the consequent “you will recover whether you call in a doctor or not” is *captiosum*, I assume their point is, whether y ’s being fated to happen really implies that one’s x -ing is not necessary to bring about y (in (1)), and whether y ’s being fated not to happen really implies that one’s x -ing is not sufficient to bring about y (in (2)).

¹¹⁹ Cf. n. 74.

Chrysippus' distinction between *simplicia* and *copulata* allows one to solve the problem: both implications are true of *simplicia* and are not true of *copulata*.

But what are *simplicia* and *copulata*? Cicero gives us (in *De Fato* 30) what appears to be a translation of a direct quotation from Chrysippus' reply to the Idle Argument (note *inquit*, "he [=Chrysippus] says"):

"quaedam enim sunt," inquit, "in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata; simplex est, 'Moriatur illo die Socrates'; huic, sive quid fecerit sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. at si ita fatum sit, 'Nascetur Oedipus Laio,' non poterit dici 'sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit'; copulata enim res est et confatalis."

"For," he says, "there are some cases in things that are simple, others complex. A case of what is simple is 'Socrates will die on that day'; whether he does anything or not, there is a fixed day for his death. But if it is fated that 'Oedipus will be born to Laius,' one will not be able to say 'whether Laius has slept with a woman or not'; the matter is complex and co-fated" (trans. Sharples).

Many an interpreter has been puzzled by the example of a *simplex*: where one expects "Moriatur Socrates" ("Socrates will die"), one finds instead "Moriatur *illo die* Socrates" ("Socrates will die *on that day*"), and it is in the very least difficult to see how that event could fail to be fated along with the causes leading up to it.

David Sedley has proposed a solution along the following lines: recognizing that "the route to Socrates' death is just as fated as the event itself" and taking into account Socrates' prophetic dream while in prison (in Plato's *Crito* 44ab, cited in Cicero's *De Divinatione* I 52) that he would die on the third day (1993: 316), Sedley states that

there is not just a single-stranded causal chain leading from Socrates' birth to his death as a result of drinking hemlock, but one which repeatedly breaches out into *hypothetical* alternative strands, such as Socrates' escaping from prison but thereafter being re-arrested, or falling ill in flight, or whatever, and thus dying on that very same day on which he in actuality drank the hemlock (1993: 317, his emphasis).

Susanne Bobzien has criticized Sedley's interpretation as follows: in her terms, Sedley takes simple occurrents to be occurrents which obtain in all possible worlds, while there are non-actual possible worlds in which different actions lead to the same outcome. Thus, Bobzien claims,

On this reading of the Cicero passage, there is no criterion that helps to distinguish between what is a simple occurrent, what a conjoined one, apart from the fact that the divine intelligence *determines*—more or less randomly as far as human knowledge is concerned—that some are simple, others conjoined ... Instead of being an argument against idleness, Chrysippus' answer on this interpretation seems rather to open the door for excuses of the naïve fatalist kind: why should I call the doctor, it may well be fated *simply* that I will die from this disease anyway (1998a: 218–19, her emphases).

Bobzien then offers two alternative proposals as to how one should read the passage—neither of which, however, squares with either Socrates' prophetic dream or Cicero's text as it stands. In effect, she claims that either (a) there are no examples whatsoever to be given of simple occurrents, since everything is always fated along with something else in reality (on which assumption Cicero made up the example “from scratch”), or (b) the original example was not “Socrates will die on that day” but rather “Socrates will die” or “you will die” (understood as a necessary consequence of Socrates', or your own, mortal nature), and was modified by either Cicero or his source (1998a: 219–20).

There may be a way out of the difficulty: it may be the case that *simplicia* and *copulata* refer not to events or states of affairs themselves but to more or less precise *descriptions* of events or states of affairs. On such a reading, *simplicia* are more general descriptions of events or states of affairs that admit being coupled—in the sense of, as far as the description goes, not being contradictory—with descriptions of a number of antecedent or concomitant events or states of affairs. That allows for the fact that everything is always fated along with something else—or even everything else—in reality while making room for more general descriptions of events or states of affairs which may sensibly be employed in the case of non-conditional predictions such as Socrates' prophetic dream (which is not meant to present a given course of action as the cause of a given result).

Chrysippus' reply consists thus in using the examples to show that (1) and (2) hold good only of very general descriptions of events or states of affairs, while any account in

more precise terms, such as to entail that ((if one does x , then y takes place) and (if one does not do x , then y does not take place)), allows no room for the addition of “whether or not you x .” Thus, when Cicero says in *De Fato* 30,

si esset dictum, “Luctabitur Olympiis Milon,” et referret aliquis, “Ergo sive habuerit adversarium sive non habuerit, luctabitur,” erraret; est enim copulatum “luctabitur,”

If someone had said, “Milo will wrestle in the Olympic games,” and someone else answered, “So, whether he has an opponent or not, he will wrestle,” he would be wrong, for “he will wrestle” is complex (trans. Sharples),

his point is that, as far as that description goes, “he will wrestle” entails Milo’s having an opponent, which is necessary (and, given the circumstances, sufficient) for the match.

Note that Chrysippus’ distinction between *simplicia* and *copulata* in Cicero’s testimony is absent from Diogenianus’ testimony, where Chrysippus’ distinction is that between an outcome’s being fated either without qualification (ἀπλῶς) or alongside one’s actions and/or desires (μετά + infinitive). That, I submit, is due to a difference in the arguments themselves. In order for Chrysippus to counter a fallacious argument whose premises contain descriptions of events or states of affairs and hold good only of some of the descriptions of events or states of affairs they contain, it is necessary to distinguish between kinds of descriptions of events or states of affairs. In order for Chrysippus to counter the claim that his view of Fate does not square with τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς and τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν and thus cannot make room for (praise and blame *qua*) exhortations, it is not necessary to distinguish between kinds of descriptions of events or states of affairs. Instead, it suffices to show that a given result comes from us and is brought about by us if it is not fated without qualification but alongside our actions and/or desires, in which case we may be (praised or blamed so as to be) effectively exhorted to produce it.

“The so-called ‘<Argument> Brought About by Fate’”

I conclude this chapter with a conjecture as to the name of the argument in Diogenianus’ testimony.

Ps.-Plutarch's *De Fato* 11 contrasts the author's own position (ὁ ... ἡμέτερος λόγος, 574d) with the so-called "opposite" view, which lays down that everything takes place by Fate (ὁ ... τούτων ἐναντίος ... καθ' εἰμαρμένην πάντα τίθεται). In the course of presenting elements of his own position, the author mentions in the same breath "the Idle Argument, the Reaper Argument, and ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος" as sophisms (574e).

Susanne Bobzien has taken the Idle Argument to be a development from the Reaper Argument (1998a: 189–91), and I believe Origen's distinction (in *Contra Celsum* II 20 151.3–9 Koetschau) between two meanings of πάντως ("in any event") traces back to the Reaper Argument: Origen's testimony, as we have seen,¹²⁰ is a confluence of distinct elements, and although the issue of necessary future truth is there raised on the basis of a discussion of conditionals with past antecedents and future consequents (which is characteristic of the Master Argument), the use of πάντως to introduce necessity in the modal sense is characteristic of the Reaper Argument (cf. Ammonius, *In De Interpretatione* 131.25–32 Busse; Stephanus, *In De Interpretatione* 35.1–5 Hayduck).

On this reading, Origen's testimony blends three arguments: the Idle Argument, the Reaper Argument, and the argument in Diogenianus' testimony—and I believe those three correspond to "the Idle Argument, the Reaper Argument, and ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος" in Ps.-Plutarch's *De Fato* 11 574e.

The sole conjecture to ever have been made up to now regarding the latter argument in Ps.-Plutarch's list is that of Eduard Zeller (1923, III.1: 171 n. 1), who takes it (on the basis of Oenomaus' testimony in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 7) as "the argument against Fate" in the sense that one could render Fate vain through one's actions—and, in effect, Oenomaus' rant against Democritus and Chrysippus in the passage assumes that we apprehend our own selves in the same way we apprehend that which, concerning ourselves, is self-chosen or compelled, so that a difference such as the one between walking and being carried along does not escape our notice (§19).

Zeller takes παρὰ + accusative as "against" in ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος—and it is difficult to see why Oenomaus' argument should be said to be "against Fate" any more than any other argument. If, however, one takes παρὰ + accusative as "brought about by" in ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος, a textual parallel emerges. In effect, Diogenianus argues in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 36–7 that the outcome of one's wanting or not wanting to do something is not predetermined "unless even one's very wanting

120 Cf. above, pp. 39–40.

or not wanting to take care of the garment is brought about by some Fate, that is, takes place by an external cause imposing necessity” (εἰ μή τι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ βούλεσθαι φυλάττειν θοιμάτιον ἢ μὴ βούλεσθαι παρὰ τινα εἰμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ αἰτίαν ἔξωθεν ἀναγκαίαν ἐγίνετο).

If I am right, the “brought about by” (παρὰ + accusative) idiom used to express the main claim of the original objection against Chrysippus’ view on Fate in Diogenianus’ testimony—that it suppresses τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς—eventually comes to express, with a hint of irony, that the objection itself, if Chrysippus’ view on Fate is to be upheld, is brought about against him by Fate.

Chapter Two

Τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν and just punishment

In this chapter I discuss Cicero's *De Fato* 39–45 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5–11 as sources for Chrysippus' reply to the objection that Fate undermines just praise, blame, honor, and punishment. On the basis of Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and of Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus* I submit that the most basic intuition of the debate on moral responsibility in Antiquity is that desert requires not alternative possibilities but ultimate origination. What is more, I try to show that the dispute about necessity in Cicero's *De Fato* 39–45 corresponds to a subsequent layer, added by Cicero himself, and that the original piece of reasoning addressed by Chrysippus argues to its conclusion not from the claim that Fate precludes alternative possibilities but from the claim that Fate precludes ultimate origination. Surely Chrysippus' notion of Fate has no room for ultimate origination, but since for Chrysippus praise, blame, honor, and punishment are deserved only within the framework of the therapy of passions (as I submit on the basis of an analysis of Chrysippus' attested views on blame and punishment), praise, blame, honor, and punishment have much less stringent conditions than ultimate origination, which are fully met in his reply.

Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* and Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus*

The first texts I approach have been little appreciated as being of any consequence in philosophical discussions.¹²¹ Both, I submit, have a role to play as *bench marks* in our survey—reference points gauged for the purpose of mapping a field—despite considerations extraneous to philosophical inquiry to be found in each. To be more precise, I shall claim that Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and a passage from Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus* bear witness to the fact that the most basic intuition in the debate on moral responsibility in Antiquity is that one is only deserving of praise, blame, honor, or punishment for one's action if one is the ultimate origin of one's action. My hypothesis in what follows is that it is from such an

121 Barnes (1982), ch. XXIII (c), and Echeñique (2012b) are notable exceptions with regard to Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*.

intuition (which admittedly assumes different contours in different authors) that concerns with compulsion by externals and with alternative possibilities arise.

Since Antiquity, Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* has been seen as rather an apology than an encomium. According to Isocrates' own *Encomium of Helen*, “the one who wrote about Helen” says he has written her encomium, but in reality has made her apology (§§14–15). The anonymous scholiast gives “Polycrates the Sophist” (author of a posthumous *Accusation of Socrates*) as the reference in Isocrates' text, but what Isocrates says applies also to Gorgias. In effect, Gorgias' professed goal in the *Encomium of Helen*¹²² is “to put a stop to the accusation regarding the infamous and prove her censurers wrong, that is, to show the truth or else put a stop to their ignorance” (τὴν μὲν κακῶς ἀκούουσιν παῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μεμφομένους ψευδομένους ἐπιδείξαι, καὶ δεῖξαι τᾷ ἀληθὲς ἢ¹²³ παῦσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας, §2), and after passingly commending her genealogy and beauty in §§3–4 and then reasoning at length for her acquittal from the accusation of leaving Sparta for Troy in §§6–20, as a final summary of his endeavor he says, “I removed by my speech the woman's ill repute; I stood by the standard I set at the beginning of my speech: I attempted to put an end to the injustice of the reproach and to the ignorance of opinion” (ἀφεῖλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκειαν γυναικός, ἐνέμεινα τῷ νόμῳ ὃν ἐθέμην ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου· ἐπειράθην καταλῦσαι μώμου ἀδικίαν καὶ δόξης ἀμαθίαν, §21).

Those statements, and Gorgias' main thrust in the text, certainly square rather with a defense speech than with a eulogy. However, as shall become apparent especially once we appreciate the overwhelming power attributed to speech in §§8–14, Gorgias' aim may arguably be said to consist in composing an encomium not of Helen but of something as beautiful, seductive, deceitful, and ill-reputed as Helen—namely, *rhetoric*¹²⁴—and, in effect, a testimony as early as Socrates' jest in Plato's *Gorgias* 448e (if at all a jest, and one turning on Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*) may be seen as adding to the plausibility of the hypothesis: “When Chaerephon asked of which art Gorgias has knowledge, Polus, you did not answer which it is, instead *you are making an encomium of his art as if there is someone blaming it*” (ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δὲ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω).

A consequence of such a line of interpretation is that severe limitations are to be imposed upon philosophical readings of Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, insofar as it is only possible to ascribe philosophical interest to its *argument* to the extent that its *point* is assumed

¹²² I follow the text in Donadi (2016) except where noted otherwise.

¹²³ Following Aβ.

¹²⁴ My overall approach owes much to the “analogical reading” of Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* championed by Poulakos (1983).

to lie elsewhere,¹²⁵ and its overall point is to impose conditions on possible readings of particular arguments. However, as I shall argue in what follows, such proviso still allows enough space for the claim that the *Encomium of Helen* voices a cogent argument to the effect that blame cannot be just unless the alleged wrongdoer is the ultimate origin of the act for which she is blamed.

Let us now turn to the argument. At the opening of the *Encomium of Helen*, Gorgias says that, “regarding man and woman, word and deed, state and act, one must honor with praise that which is deserving of praise, and pass reproach on that which is undeserving” (ἄνδρα ... καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔργον καὶ πόλιν καὶ πρᾶγμα χρὴ τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἐπαίνοι τιμᾶν, τῷ δὲ ἀναξίῳ μῶμον ἐπιθεῖναι, §1). That, if somewhat crudely expressed, forthrightly conveys a notion of desert—and Gorgias is true to it both when, as we have just seen, he says (§21) that he attempted to put an end to the injustice of the reproach (ἐπειράθην καταλῦσαι μῶμου ἀδικίαν) and when, as a conclusion to his argument, he questions (§20),

πῶς οὖν χρὴ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον, ἥτις εἴτ' ἐρασθεῖσα εἴτε λόγῳ πεισθεῖσα εἴτε βίᾳ ἄρπασθεῖσα εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξε, πάντως διαφεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν;

How, then, shall one deem it just to reproach Helen, who did what she did because she was either in love, persuaded by a speech, seized by force, or compelled by divine necessity, and in any case eludes the accusation?

Gorgias' claim is clear: it is unjust to reproach Helen because what she (no more than supposedly) did is, in effect, due to either of four factors which exempt her from responsibility. Note that it is a claim about just reproach, and establishing that any of the four disjuncts in §20 underlies her deed is in itself sufficient to exculpate her.

The four exculpating factors are here listed in chiasmic resumption: the order of their exposition is exactly the opposite in the text. They are presented in §6 in the same order of their subsequent exposition in §§6–19, with the difference that the first factor (θεία ἀνάγκη [“divine necessity”] in §20) is there specified as threefold: “she did what she did either by Tyche's designs, gods' decisions, and Necessity's decrees; seized by force; or persuaded by

¹²⁵ Which, I believe, forms part of Gorgias' implied meaning when he calls his speech his plaything (ἐμὸν ... παίγνιον) in §21: the encomium reads in more than one level, its object *ex professo* is not its object *de facto*, and the ability to dissimulate its actual object forms part of the very power of rhetoric that is the actual object of the encomium.

speeches” (τύχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλευύμασι καὶ ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν, ἢ βία ἀρπασθεῖσα, ἢ λόγοις πεισθεῖσα, §6).¹²⁶ The four factors are discussed in succession in §§6, 7, 8–14, and 15–19.

I address the second factor first, since a central element which sheds light on the other three is there rendered more evident. In §7, Gorgias entertains the possibility that Helen's leaving Sparta for Troy has been due to violence imposed on her, in which case it is not Helen who is to be blamed but the one who imposed violence on her. Note that “the barbaric man who undertook a barbaric undertaking” (ὁ ... βάρβαρος ἐπιχειρήσας βάρβαρον ἐπιχείρημα) is said to be deserving (ἄξιος) of accusation (αἰτία), loss of civil rights (ἀτιμία), and penalty (ζημία), and Helen is presumably (εἰκότως) rather to be pitied (ἂν ... ἐλεηθεῖη) than vilified (ἂν ... κακολογηθεῖη), since he committed unmentionable acts (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά) while she suffered them (ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε). The language employed (cf. especially ἐβιάσθη, ὑβρίσθη) is suggestive of rape, and Helen is thus pictured as a victim of overpowering force. In accordance with such a claim, aside from Helen's acquittal from the charge the overpowering force itself is held responsible. I gather that the main issue here is whether another originates the outcome without Helen's cooperation, in which case Helen is merely passive and cannot justly be held accountable for a disgrace befalling her, and her aggressor, in whom alone the outcome originates, is instead to blame.

Returning to the first factor, I believe the same reasoning applies, with the difference that Gorgias speaks in §6 not of *human* but of *beyond human* compulsion. Jonathan Barnes takes Tyche in the passage as “chance” (“a fluke or quirk or freak occurrence”) and distinguishes it from divine necessity, which according to him falls under §7 (1982: 416). I believe he is right about divine necessity, which should indeed be assumed to consist in overpowering force, but since nothing in §6 suggests “chance” I submit Tyche in the passage means rather “the course of events”¹²⁷ in that an outcome may be imposed forcefully either because the gods intervene and make it so or simply because the course of events is such. A unified view is thus expressed in §6: gods (as, I surmise, also Necessity and the course of events) may trump our efforts and compel us, “for it is natural not for the more powerful to be impeded by the less powerful, but for the less powerful to be ruled and conducted by the more powerful, and for the more powerful to guide and the less powerful to follow” (πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρείσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἥσσον ἔπεσθαι).

¹²⁶ The fourth factor is absent from §6 in most MSS, and its appearance in La Y Ald is presumably due to emendation. I hereby diverge from the text in Donadi (2016).

¹²⁷ Cf. Dover (1974: 138–41).

Note that it is not a fatalistic argument: the gods (as, I surmise, also Necessity and the course of events) are supposed to exert power and triumph over us. The outcome takes place in spite of us because factors beyond our control supersede our causation. We are not the ultimate origin of what thus merely befalls us, and since “the one bearing responsibility is deserving of being assigned responsibility” (ἄξιος αἰτιᾶσθαι ὁ αἰτιώμενος) and Helen's leaving Sparta for Troy finds its origin in such extraneous forces overriding her, it follows that the gods, Necessity, and the course of events are instead to be held accountable (cf. τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον, which is to be asserted if Gorgias' reasoning in §6 is valid).

Gorgias' overall claim in §§6–7 is thus that we are not to be held accountable if one acts on us and overpowers us, be that something beyond human or a human. Let us now move to the third and fourth factors, which expand his claim beyond physical compulsion and even (as, I argue, pertains to the fourth factor) beyond external compulsion.

Jonathan Barnes discusses the third factor last. According to him, §§8–14 address the issue of “causal determinism,” covering cases in which one is urged on by “any ratiocination,” one's own or another's. Nothing in the text suggests his view; the only reason he adduces is that unless matters were so, Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* would not cover all factors ensuing in action, since Helen might after all have “thought out and decided upon her betrayal by herself” (1982: 419).

Gorgias' text musters an array of examples of speech carried out by someone else, such as poetry (ποίησις, §9; note τοὺς ἀκούοντας, “the listeners”), enchantments (ἐπωδαί, §10), and (in §13) speeches of physical geographers (οἱ τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγοι; cf. τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν, “make that which is incredible and unclear appear before the eyes of opinion”), arresting contests of arguments (οἱ ἀναγκαῖοι διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνες; cf. εἷς λόγος πολλὸν ὄχλον ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε, “one speech pleases and persuades a large multitude”), and the wranglings of philosophical discussions (φιλοσόφων λόγων ἀμίλλας). In the same spirit, the comparison with drugs in §14 suggests an alien element which, once having entered us, produces its effect without regard to acceptance or approval.

The gist of Gorgias' argument in §§8–14, I believe, is that persuasive speech can only exempt us from responsibility if, once it comes into us by such means as listening, there is no longer anything we can do about it, rather it trumps us and imposes the result all by itself. That is surely an overstatement of the powers of rhetoric, since we are not merely passive when faced with a speech; but it also corresponds to an encomium of rhetoric, since ascribing

such formidable power to it makes for an (albeit vastly exaggerated) exaltation of its potencies.

Such reading aligns well with my previous claim to the effect that Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* is foremost an encomium of *rhetoric*, the acceptance of which, as I have anticipated, imposes restrictions on philosophical readings of its argument.¹²⁸ In effect, Gorgias' claim in §§8–14 is thereby made to be no more than the assertion that persuasive speech comes from without and literally carries us along. Such a reading disavows any ambition to find here an argument to the conclusion that nobody is ever to be blamed for anything: after all, one may well author one's action on one's own if it is not the case that alien speech supersedes one, and I believe it is Gorgias' sole contention that Helen's action cannot be explained but by factors beyond her control. Gorgias' line of reasoning is therefore uniform up to this point in that it always assigns responsibility to the ultimate origin of the wrong; note, in effect, §12: the one who persuades, being the one who compels, commits the injustice, while the one who is persuaded, being the one who is compelled by the speech, is vilified to no purpose (ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκάσας ἀδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ πεισθεῖσα ὡς ἀναγκασθεῖσα τῷ λόγῳ μάτην ἀκούει κακῶς). As I shall argue presently, the assumption that one can be justly blamed for an outcome only if one is its ultimate origin is the strength of Gorgias' reasoning to the extent that it corresponds to a basic intuition concerning responsibility.¹²⁹

We move now to the fourth and final factor (§§15–19)—love (ἔρως)—said in §17 to refer to something that already (ἤδη) succeeded to some (τινές), or even many (πολλοί), but not to all (cf. also πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλῶν in §18). Universal generalization to all cases of acting on the basis of emotions is manifestly precluded: exemption from responsibility applies only in cases of strong emotions overpowering us.

Gorgias says in §19 that if a strong emotion such as love (ἔρως) is a god then the same reasoning as in §6 applies: the less powerful (ὁ ἥσσων) is incapable of thwarting it or holding out against it (ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι), while if it is a human sickness and a blind spot in the soul (εἰ ... ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα) it should not be censured as a fault but rather regarded a misfortune (οὐχ ὡς ἀμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον).

I believe Gorgias' claim is that strong emotions are either non-human factors which overpower us or something that happens *to us* or *in us* but whose *authors* we are not. Commentators have argued that strong emotions exempt us from responsibility because,

¹²⁸ Cf. above, pp. 50–1.

¹²⁹ Cf. below, pp. 55–6.

according to Gorgias, external objects trigger mechanical responses of perception, emotion, and action which bypass our control.¹³⁰ Note, however, that only *some* responses to externals—strong, overpowering emotions—are said to be exculpatory: those are said to have already occurred to many but are never said to take place always and in all cases. I believe the issue is not whether always and in all cases externals trigger responses we are not able to control, but whether in a particular given case externals have triggered a response the agent was not able to control. That allows for some responses to be in our control as well as for others to supersede it, in which latter case our action cannot be said to originate in us but in the strong emotion happening to us or in us. Note that Gorgias apparently endorses the claim that love was the one who did everything when he says (in §15) that Helen easily eludes the accusation if love was the one who did everything (εἰ ... ἔρωτες ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πάντα πράξας). Gorgias passes over in silence whether love itself is to be assigned responsibility for the outcome, and I submit that even if it is the case that emotions blow out of control due to the concurrence of externals and our propensities (cf. Helen's eye pleased with Alexander's body in §19) the point is simply that we are not the ones who originate our actions in such cases. Gorgias' concern is not so much with externals (although, as the examples in §§15–19 render apparent, they are surely at stake in the production of strong emotions) as it is with ultimate origination, which Gorgias denies us when emotions are no longer susceptible to our control and instead take hold of our souls.

Gorgias' overall argument in the *Encomium of Helen* is therefore the following. If our deed originates not in us but in something beyond us, then we are not to be held accountable for it; and our deed originates in something beyond us if something acts on us and imposes the outcome, even if it is something within us such as a strong emotion. Gorgias does not have to cover all possible factors ensuing in action since it is not his contention that nobody is ever to incur reproach for any deed; he argues instead for the conclusion that Helen's leaving Sparta for Troy is explained only as originating in something beyond Helen's control.

That, I submit, is why Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* is to have the role of a *bench mark* in our survey.¹³¹ It is on the basis of such framing of the debate on moral responsibility as may be gathered from the text that we are to appreciate later developments. To put it shortly, I believe we should approach the debate on moral responsibility in Antiquity in terms of *ultimate origination* and *desert*.

Despite not having so much as touched the issue of determinism thus far, I believe a

¹³⁰ So Barnes (1982: 418–19) and Echeñique (2012: 43–8).

¹³¹ Cf. above, pp. 49–50.

recent controversy concerning moral responsibility may provide further clarification of my purposes. Harry Frankfurt has famously called into question what he terms “the principle of alternate possibilities” (PAP), namely the claim that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” (1969: 829). His point is encapsulated in what has since come to be known as Frankfurt-cases, in which a person appears to be morally responsible for what she has done despite her lack of alternate possibilities. Assume, for the sake of argument, a sci-fi scenario in which a neuroscientist monitors activity in a voter's brain in such a way that if she is to vote Democrat the neuroscientist does not intervene and allows her to vote Democrat, while if she is to vote Republican the neuroscientist intervenes and forces her to vote Democrat instead. The voter is certainly not responsible for the vote in the latter case, since it is something external that imposes the result; however (always according to Frankfurt), there is no reason to suppose that the voter's responsibility is anyhow impaired in the former case, since the voter's agency is in no wise impaired by the lack of an alternate possibility (1969: 835–6). In light of such result, Frankfurt proposes to substitute a new principle for PAP, namely one to the effect that “a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise”—which, according to Frankfurt, “does not appear to conflict with the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism” (1969: 838–9).

Among the many reactions to Frankfurt's contribution, Derk Pereboom has argued that Frankfurt-cases leave claims about the causal history of one's action untouched: one's unforced vote for Democrat in the sci-fi scenario above may well be the result of a deterministic causal process tracing back to factors beyond one's control (2001: 3). But if our actions have such causal history (always according to Pereboom), then we lack the kind of control required by moral responsibility: “if causal factors existed before a criminal was born that by way of a deterministic process inevitably issue in his act of murder, then he cannot legitimately be blamed for his action” (2001: 6). In opposition to Frankfurt, Pereboom settles for the core claim that “moral responsibility requires actions to have ... causal histories that make agents ultimate sources of their actions” (2001: xv).

That, as I have claimed, is Gorgias' intuition. To be more precise, I believe Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* testifies to the most basic shared presupposition in the debate on moral responsibility in Antiquity, namely that desert requires ultimate origination. My claim shall be made more plain in what follows, but it is essential to state from the outset that despite many a commentator's concern with alternative possibilities in ancient sources,¹³² I opt for a distinct

132 Cf. Bobzien (1998a), Bobzien (1998b), Bobzien (2000), Bobzien (2006), Bobzien (2014a), Bobzien (2014b), Bobzien (2014c); Salles (2000), Salles (2005b), Salles (2007). Echeñique (2012a) is a notable exception

mapping of the issues in Antiquity.

Let us now consider how the issue of desert and ultimate origination is given pride of place in a non-philosophical source such as Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*:

ὅστις φόνους μοι καὶ γάμους καὶ συμφορὰς
τοῦ σοῦ διῆκας στόματος, ἃς ἐγὼ τάλας
ἤνεγκον ἄκων· θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον,
τάχ' ἂν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι.
Ἐπεὶ καθ' αὐτόν γ' οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροις ἐμοὶ
ἀμαρτίας ὄνειδος οὐδὲν ἂνθ' ὅτου
τάδ' εἰς ἐμαυτὸν τοὺς ἐμούς θ' ἡμάρτανον.
Ἐπεὶ δίδαζον, εἴ τι θέσφατον πατρὶ
χρησιμοῖσιν ἰκνεῖθ' ὥστε πρὸς παίδων θανεῖν,
πῶς ἂν δικαίως τοῦτ' ὀνειδίζοις ἐμοί,
ὃς οὔτε βλάστας πω γενεθλίου πατρός,
οὐ μητρὸς εἶχον, ἀλλ' ἀγέννητος τότε ἦ;

Murder, incest, disgrace,
everything that issues from your mouth, which—woe to me—I
bore involuntarily, was in fact dear to the gods,
perhaps long wroth against my lineage,
since in me, taken in isolation, you would not find
reproach for a fault in return for which
I would have committed a fault against myself and kin.
Say, then: if it has been prophesied by oracles to my father
that something was in his wake so that he was going to die by his son's hands,
how could you justly berate *me* for that,
who had not yet burst out, born of a father,
had no mother, rather had not then been begotten?

(ll. 962–73)

The passage departs from the commonly held view that Oedipus is innocent because he ignored that he was killing his own father and marrying his own mother. The claim is rather that Oedipus is innocent because he was not the ultimate origin of what he did (or rather befell him) because that was fated prior to his conception. A notion of causal pre-determination is presumably implied in his taking the oracles to assert that something “was in <Laius> wake so that he was going to die by his son's hands” (ἰκνεῖθ' ὥστε πρὸς παίδων θανεῖν, l. 970). Such causal pre-determination presumably applies only to Oedipus' fulfillment of the prophecy: universal generalization is nowhere said to hold. In addition, Oedipus is said to have borne his own actions “involuntarily” (ἄκων, l. 964). The meaning is clear from the context: Oedipus' actions have their origin not in him but in something long lurking in Laius' wake, which is why Oedipus is supposed to be exculpated. Finally, in ll. 966–8 Oedipus entertains (and rejects) the possibility that his actions are a divine punishment bestowed on him in return for (ἀντί, l. 967) any previous offense of his. I believe it is because he conceives of the justice of a reproach in equally retributive terms in ll. 971–3 that he there takes a reproach to be unjust if one is not the ultimate origin of the actions for which one is reproached.

The most prominent feature of both Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and the lines from Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*, I believe, is their unconcern with alternative possibilities and their exclusive focus on the causal history of the action in dealing with ascriptions of responsibility. I submit that later contributions to the debate observe such a presupposition in pressing the issue further on.

In effect, Aristotle's concern with alternative possibilities in connection with that which is “up to us” (ἐφ' ἡμῶν) is consequent on his most basic commitment to ultimate origination. In *Ethica Eudemia* II 6, being an ultimate origin implies having control; having control implies having alternative possibilities; and having control over alternative possibilities implies that either of the alternatives' taking place is up to one.¹³³ What is more, when in *Ethica Nicomachea* III 1113b6–21 he establishes via ultimate origination that both virtue and vice are up to us¹³⁴ with the overall aim of contriving a notion of the voluntary which may be useful to legislators with regard to honors and punishments, I believe he subscribes to the ground intuition that desert requires ultimate origination.

To be more precise, Aristotle opens his study of the notion of the voluntary in *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book III, by the claim that such a study is necessary for a study of virtue, as well as of use to legislators in regard to honors and punishments (1109b30–35). Surely it is

¹³³ Cf. above, p. 37.

¹³⁴ Cf. above, pp. 37–9.

Aristotle's commonly held view that punishments have moral reform—character correction—as their goal (cf. II 2 1104b16–18; X 9 1179b4–16, 1180a4–14). However, that their *purpose* is therapeutic or rehabilitative does not imply that their *just application* rests solely on those grounds; in effect, if punishments do indeed *repay*, in due proportion, pain for the pleasure taken in wrongdoing (as seems to be implied in X 9 1180a10–14), it seems reasonable to assume that they will only be fair in case they affect but the *author* of the wrong.

Following his opening remarks in *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book III, Aristotle passes on to a discussion of the first case of involuntary action—that whose principle is not in us—examples of which are acts performed, or rather experiences undergone, by a person dragged either by strong winds or by other people in control of her (cf. 1110a1–4). That being the first case of involuntary action, its denial—the principle's being in us—shall be the first condition of voluntary action (cf. 1111a22–24). As regards praise, blame, honors and punishments, the first condition may be taken in two ways: surely it is *pointless* to blame or punish a person in order to prevent her from harming another if she is in fact being pushed by a third, but it is also *unfair* to do so, since she is not the originator of the injury.

Aristotle claims in 1113b6ff. that virtue and vice are on an equal footing as regards their having their principle in us and thus being voluntary, which allows for a common sense view on penal legislation. In so doing, he disputes Plato's view that “voluntary” is tantamount to “what the agent (in fact) wants,” that is, “what is (in fact) good for the agent,” and consequently that only virtue is voluntary and that all vice is involuntary, given which asymmetry either no punishment is deserved (cf. *Apology* 25d–26a) or punishments are to be seen as therapeutic and non-retributive (cf. *Laws* 860–864 *et aliis locis*), both of which options run against shared pre-philosophical intuitions.

We have seen above how Aristotle establishes in 1113b6–19 that virtue and vice are symmetrical with regard to their being up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), which meets the first condition on their being voluntary,¹³⁵ in the immediate sequence, Aristotle states that punishments and chastisements imposed by legislators testify on behalf of his claim (1113b21–1114a3):

τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν·
κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἤ
μὴ αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς
δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται
πράττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ

135 Cf. above, pp. 37–9.

ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἤττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὥς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

Witness seems to be borne thereof by each in private and by legislators themselves, for they punish and chastise those who do evil not by force or by ignorance of which those are not responsible, and they honor those who act well, with a view to exhorting the latter and deterring the former. And further, no one exhorts us to do what is neither up to us nor voluntary, considering that to be persuaded not to get warm, feel pain, be hungry or whatnot contributes nothing, for we will undergo those nonetheless. And in fact they punish the very fact of ignoring if the agent seems to be responsible for the ignorance – for example, penalties are doubled for the drunk person because the principle is in her, since she was in control of not getting drunk and that is the cause of ignorance. And they punish those who ignore a point they should know (and is not difficult) in the law, and similarly in other cases where people seem to ignore for not having taken trouble, considering that it was up to them not to ignore since they were in control of having taken trouble.

Aristotle's concern with ultimate origination in the passage may be *merely* forward-looking or *also* backward-looking, and the solution to the impasse, I believe, hangs on the value to be given to καίτοι (b26)—whether the sentence opened by the particle is to be made to reassert the preceding point or to introduce a new one. In effect, Aristotle claims in b21–6 that both virtuous and vicious actions are voluntary because punishments require voluntary action, and in b26–30 he goes on to say, “καίτοι no one exhorts us to do what is neither up to us nor voluntary, considering that to be persuaded not to get warm, feel pain, be hungry or whatnot contributes nothing, for we will undergo those nonetheless.”

The issue is: is the second point an independent, free-standing consideration (in which case his claim that exhortation requires voluntary action plays a role in the justification of his claim that virtue and vice are alike voluntary but not in the justification of his claim that punishment requires voluntary action), or is the second point some sort of justification of the former (on grounds that punishments require voluntary action because punishments are

exhortations and exhortations require voluntary action)?

I believe we should approach the issue in the following manner. If καίτοι is made simply to reassert the preceding point and not to introduce a new one, Aristotle is made to completely ignore the issue of desert since the only reason adduced for his claim that legislation testifies on behalf of the voluntariness of both virtue and vice would be one related to the *efficacy*, not to the *justice*, of punishments. In other words, are we to make Aristotle's defense of ultimate origination rely exclusively on the point that it is not *we ourselves and our choices* who reform our moral nature in case we ourselves and our choices are not the ultimate origin of what we do (or rather happens in us or to us)—which is already a relevant result—or is his position supposed to be grounded also on a reply to a different problem, which cannot be said to be ignored in his time?

I opt for the latter—in which case, it is possible to acknowledge that Aristotle does not deal directly with the issue of determinism in *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book III, and at the same time assert that his position leads to an outright denial thereof: Aristotle's position excludes universal causal determinism without tackling the issue head on.¹³⁶ But as a consequence, it is now also possible to read *De Interpretatione* 9 as based not merely on a piece of reasoning along the lines of the ἀργὸς λόγος, instead it becomes natural to take the notion of a principle (ἀρχή) of future events located in deliberation and action in 19a7–11 as echoing the first condition of voluntary action in *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book III, and as such introducing indeterminism. Thus, in addressing a question of the time which is fully spelled out in Sophocles' last play,¹³⁷ Aristotle assumes in *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book III, a position which entails a refusal of determinism, but a refusal of determinism figures as such only in the discussion in *De Interpretatione* 9, where the upshot is perfectly apposite.¹³⁸

136 What is more, all successive difficulties in 1113b6ff. are made to proceed in *crescendo* once the issue of ultimate origination is posed as the central axis of the discussion: we are responsible for our actions when we are their ultimate origin (1113b6–30); we are also responsible for our actions when we are the ultimate origin of transient states (such as certain kinds of ignorance, including the one resulting from intoxication) which in turn cause our actions (1113b30–1114a3); we are also responsible for our actions when we are the ultimate origin of stable dispositions which in turn cause our actions (1114a3–31); and we are responsible for our actions when we are the ultimate origin of whatever we do in view of the good, irrespective of whether we are the ultimate origin of how the good appears to us or not (1114a31–b21).

137 Aristotle may not have had contact with Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus* (in fact, all references to Oedipus in the *Poetics* are to Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*), but my point rests rather on the idea that the lines I quoted from the play present a question of the time, or even reflect an all-pervading disquiet, and do not put forward a thesis altogether unheard of.

138 For a full defense of a reading of Aristotle's views along such lines, cf. Echeñique (2012a) and Echeñique (2014).

The objection in Cicero, *De Fato* 40 and Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5

We are now in a position to move to the objection faced by Chrysippus in Cicero's *De Fato* 39–45 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2. The issue in both, I shall claim, is that one is not justly praised, blamed, honored, or punished for one's action if one is not the ultimate origin of one's action, and one is not the ultimate origin of one's action if everything takes place by Fate.

Three points should be clear from the outset:

As we have seen, there are evidences to the effect that a rejoinder to Chrysippus' reply to the argument in Diogenianus' testimony in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 centered on the notion of that which is up to us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν), whose semantic core is that whose ultimate origin does not reach beyond us.¹³⁹ The objection we are about to address, I surmise, is precisely the rejoinder we have been expecting, and the phrases *esse (situ) in nobis* and *esse in nostra potestate* in Cicero and Gellius, which give voice to the claim that our actions do not originate in us if everything takes place by Fate, presumably correspond to ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.

Second, it is noteworthy that Epicurus' second consideration in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV—which, as we have seen, gives rise to the objection in Diogenianus' testimony—is advanced against one who does not stop at oneself but instead ascribes responsibility to necessity (cf. εἰ ... μὴ ἀπολήγοι εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην τιθεῖν, //9//). As I have claimed, such language is suggestive of a chain of causation, which allows for Epicurus' argument to be adapted into the argument in Diogenianus' testimony.¹⁴⁰ Thus, it is not difficult to see the objection in Cicero's *De Fato* 40 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5 as a further extension of Epicurus' original worry: if causation traces back beyond us, objections may be raised not only to the effect that we ourselves make no difference in bringing things about (as in Epicurus' second consideration in the digression and in Diogenianus' testimony) but also to the effect that since we are not the ultimate origin of what we do, we do not deserve praise, blame, honor, or punishment for what we do. That, however, does not tell us anything about its author—not even whether he is an Epicurean.

Third and most important, a close inspection of Cicero's testimony shows that two strata should there be distinguished: the objection and Chrysippus' reply on one side, and Cicero's own perspective on two factions supposedly in dispute on the other. In some chunks of text we have what appears to be translations of direct quotations: in §40 from *si omnia fato*

¹³⁹ Cf. above, pp. 33–9.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. above, pp. 23–6.

fiunt to *nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia (ita disserebant* [“they argued as follows”] in the immediately preceding sentence introduces direct speech, and *probabiliter concludi putant* [“they think one may reasonably conclude”] in the immediately following sentence shifts back to the third-person perspective); in §41 from *causarum enim* to *causis adiuvantibus antecedentibus et proximis (inquit* [“he (=Chrysippus) says”] introduces direct speech, and *itaque illi rationi quam paullo ante conclusi sic occurrit* [“and so he meets as follows the argument I delivered a little before”] in the immediately following sentence shifts back to the third-person perspective); and in §43 from *ut igitur* to the end of the paragraph (*inquit* [“he (=Chrysippus) says”] introduces direct speech, and *haec cum ita sint a Chrysippo explicata* [“since those things are thus explained by Chrysippus”] in the following paragraph shifts back to the third-person perspective). In other chunks of text we have Cicero's own perspective on two factions supposedly in dispute: a view from a vantage point on rival camps is marked as such in §§39–40 (until *ita disserebant*) and in §§44–5, where Cicero pigeonholes the objection and Chrysippus' stand as siding each with opposing parties. The remaining portions of text are in Cicero's own voice, and it is not always easy to see whether they present the objection and Chrysippus' stand in themselves or as siding with opposing parties.

When one sets side by side what appears to be translations of direct quotations and Cicero's own perspective on the two factions allegedly in dispute, the issue of modalities comes to the fore as completely absent from the former and present only in the latter. I shall have more to say on this,¹⁴¹ but I believe the concern with necessity and possibility does not belong in the objection or in Chrysippus' reply, but comes from Carneades' concern with necessity and possibility in connection with antecedent causes and that which is up to us in Cicero's *De Fato* §§31.

That squares well with Gellius' testimony, where necessity is indeed present throughout, though not as a modal concept but rather as the compulsion of Fate (as it figures in Epicurus and in the argument in Diogenianus' testimony).¹⁴² Thus, I believe Cicero's statements in §§41 (from *Chrysippus autem* to *et retineat fatum*: note *necessitatem* (twice)) and 42 (from *quam ob rem* to *nihil valebit*: note *necessitatem*) show signs of going beyond the mere report of Chrysippus' reply and belong rather with Cicero's own view of its significance.

141 Cf. below, pp. 110–18.

142 For the one exception, cf. below, pp. 69–72.

In what follows, I do not translate portions of text going beyond the objection; those passages are given in full in the last section of this chapter.¹⁴³ Below is the objection in Cicero's *De Fato* §40:¹⁴⁴

“Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente, et, si adpetitus, illa etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate. Ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia.” Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri, quaecumque fiant.

“If everything takes place by Fate, everything takes place by an antecedent cause. And if impulses do, also do those things that follow upon impulse, so also assents. But if the cause of impulse is not up to us, neither is impulse itself up to us. And if that is so, neither are those things that are brought about by impulse up to us. Therefore, neither assents nor actions are up to us. From that it is brought about that praise, blame, honors, and punishments are not just.” Since that is false, they think one may reasonably conclude that it is not the case that everything that takes place does so by Fate.

Note, first, that the following sequence of causes is implied,

The first premise of the argument is,

¹⁴³ Cf. below, pp. 110–18.

¹⁴⁴ I follow the text in Sharples (1991).

si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente

[F] if everything takes place by Fate, everything takes place by an antecedent cause,

which follows from Stoic view of Fate as the chain of causes. That premise, I submit, is supposed to be instantiated in the following way: “if assent takes place by Fate, then assent takes place by an antecedent cause,” “if impulse takes place by Fate, then impulse takes place by an antecedent cause,” and so on.

Another premise (*causal transitivity*) is, I believe, implied in,

si adpetitus, illa etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones

if impulses do [=take place by an antecedent cause], also do those things that follow upon impulse, so also assents,

which I read as,

if q takes place by an antecedent cause, those things that follow upon q take place by the antecedent cause of q ,

or, alternatively,

[T] if p is the antecedent cause of q , and q is the antecedent cause of r , then p is the antecedent cause of r .

A further premise, I believe, is implied in the transition from talk of antecedent causes (cf. *omnia fiunt causa antecedente*, “everything takes place by Fate”) to talk of something's being up to us (cf. *sita in nobis/in nostra potestate*), and corresponds to the meaning I attribute above to the phrase “up to us,”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Cf. above, pp. 33–9.

[U] if the antecedent cause of r reaches past beyond us, then r is not up to us.

From which, I propose to reconstruct the piece of reasoning leading up to *igitur* (“therefore”) in the text as follows,

1. if everything takes place by Fate, everything takes place by an antecedent cause [F]
2. everything takes place by Fate
3. everything takes place by an antecedent cause /1,2
4. assent and action take place by an antecedent cause /3
5. impulse takes place by an antecedent cause /3
6. if p is the antecedent cause of q , and q is the antecedent cause of r , then p is the antecedent cause of r [T]
7. if the cause of impulse is the antecedent cause of impulse, and impulse is the antecedent cause of assent and action, then the cause of impulse is the antecedent cause of assent and action /6
8. the cause of impulse is the antecedent cause of impulse
9. impulse is the antecedent cause of assent and action
10. the cause of impulse is the antecedent cause of assent and action /7,8,9
11. if the antecedent cause of r reaches past beyond us, then r is not up to us [U]
12. if the antecedent cause of assent and action reaches past beyond us, then assent and action are not up to us /11
13. the cause of impulse reaches past beyond us
14. assent and action are not up to us /10, 12, 13

We should note the following points before proceeding. (2) is the Stoic claim that everything takes place by Fate, under attack also in the argument in Diogenianus' testimony. (8) and (9)

derive from the sequence of causes I claim to be implied in the passage.¹⁴⁶ And in particular, (13) is never justified in the passage, but may follow either from the fact that the cause of one's impulse is the external item that is the object of one's impulse (say, food or drink if one's impulse is for food or drink) or, more generally, from the fact that the cause of one's impulse is anything in the causal history of one's impulse which makes one's impulse be such as it is (say, food or drink and anything in the causal history of one's being such and such an agent if one has such and such an impulse for food or drink). The latter claim makes for a more robust argument, and so far we have no reason to assume only the former claim to be present in the passage. In what follows, I shall argue that Chrysippus' reply is tailored to counter the latter claim.¹⁴⁷

Let us proceed. I believe it is further to be assumed that,

15. praise, blame, honor, and punishment are not just if assent and action are not up to us,
[D]

which follows from what I have called the ground intuition in the debate on moral responsibility in Antiquity (namely, that desert requires ultimate origination)¹⁴⁸ and the core meaning of “up to us” (namely, that that is up to us whose ultimate origin does not trace back beyond us).¹⁴⁹ From (14) and (15) it follows that,

16. praise, blame, honor, and punishment are not just,

which is the conclusion of the argument in the portion of text corresponding to the translation of a direct quotation (cf. *ex quo efficitur ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia*, “from that it is brought about that neither praise, blame, honors, nor punishments are just”). Cicero adds in his own voice that since the conclusion is false, the objectors take one of the premises to be false, namely (2).

146 Cf. above, p. 64.

147 Cf. below, pp. 100–2.

148 Cf. above, pp. 49–61.

149 Cf. above, pp. 33–9.

The objection in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5 is of a similar tenor.¹⁵⁰

“Si Chrysippus,” inquiunt, “fato putat omnia moueri et regi nec declinari transcendique posse agmina fati et uolumina, peccata quoque hominum et delicta non suscensenda neque inducenda sunt ipsis uoluntatibusque eorum, sed necessitati cuidam et instantiae, quae oritur ex fato,” omnium quae sit rerum domina et arbitra, per quam necesse sit fieri, quicquid futurum est; et propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte ueniunt, sed fato trahuntur.

“If Chrysippus,” they say, “thinks that everything is moved and ruled by Fate, and that the marches and rollings of Fate cannot be swerved or transgressed, the wrongs and faults of men should not even cause indignation, nor be attributed to themselves and their wills but to some necessity and urging which arises from Fate,” which is sovereign and arbiter over all things, through which it is necessary that everything take place which will take place. And therefore penalties for criminals have been unfairly established by law, if men do not come to evil on their own account but are dragged by Fate.

The argument here, I believe, is that if everything takes place by Fate, then men's faults should not be attributed to themselves but to the necessity of Fate; and if men's faults should not be attributed to themselves but to the necessity of Fate, then it is unfair to punish criminals.

As in Cicero's testimony, the argument goes from the claim that everything takes place by Fate to the conclusion that desert is ruled out. However, the sequence of causes in the psychology of action and claims about antecedent causes and that which is up to us are nowhere to be found. Instead, one finds the claim that men's actions are not to be attributed to themselves but to the necessity of Fate, which, as we have seen, is the claim under attack in Epicurus' second consideration against an opponent who holds that everything takes place of necessity.¹⁵¹ Moreover, while in Cicero's testimony the whole array of praise, blame, honor, and punishment is mustered, what is here at stake are but legal penalties and the feeling of indignation. Such discrepancies should, I believe, be minimized: the objector makes the same point about desert in both texts, and even if the argument in Gellius' testimony is unlike the

¹⁵⁰ I follow the text in Hertz-Hosius (1903).

¹⁵¹ Cf. above, pp. 14–16.

argument in Cicero's testimony in that only in the latter the notion of “that which is up to us” comes into play in order to counter Chrysippus' view on Fate, the ground intuition that desert requires ultimate origination figures in Gellius' testimony as it does in Cicero's testimony in order to launch an offensive against Chrysippus on the basis of the claim that Chrysippus' view on Fate entails not attributing to the agents what the agents (supposedly) do. Thus, even if we do not find in Gellius (as we did in Cicero) the move outlined in Sextus and Diogenianus against views on prophecy such as the one defended by Chrysippus in his reply to the argument in Diogenianus' testimony,¹⁵² we do find in Gellius (as we did in Cicero) the claim underlying both Epicurus' second consideration in *On Nature*, Book XXV, and the argument in Diogenianus' testimony.¹⁵³

Other peculiar features of the passage should be stressed. “Be transgressed” (*transcendi*) may well be an allusion to “intransgressible” (ἀπαράβατος) in Chrysippus' definition of Fate in *On Providence*, Book IV, as attested in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 3. As we have seen, one's attribution to Chrysippus of the view that Fate is an intransgressible chain of causation may prompt one's attribution to Chrysippus of the view under attack in Epicurus' second consideration in the digression in *On Nature*, Book XXV, to the effect that necessity should be assigned responsibility for everything,¹⁵⁴ which is the same view one finds here attributed to Chrysippus. As in Epicurus' digression, the “necessity which arises from Fate” in the passage (cf. *necessitati cuidam ... quae oritur ex fato*) is presumably not a modal notion but some form of compulsion (cf. *fato trahuntur*, “are dragged by Fate”). Moreover, “be swerved” (*declinari*) and “the rollings of Fate” (*fati ... uolumina*) apparently echo the account of Fate attributed to Chrysippus in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 1 as “an unswervable series and chain of things, rolling itself by itself” (*indeclinabilis series rerum et catena uoluens semetipsa sese*), and might be present in the argument as it is exposed in the passage only so as to connect it with Chrysippus' precedingly attested account. I shall decline to speculate whether “be swerved” (*declinari*) alludes to the doctrine of the “swerve” as it is attributed to Epicurus in Cicero's *De Fato* (where it is called *declinatio* in §§22–3 and 46–8): the passage offers no secure ground for such approximation.

With regard to the claim that the necessity of Fate is that “through which it is necessary that everything take place which will take place” (*per quam necesse sit fieri quicquid futurum est*), which apparently contradicts my claim that the necessity of Fate does not correspond to a modal concept, note that the modal claim is merely a side remark, with no

152 Cf. above, pp. 33–7.

153 Cf. above, pp. 14–16 and 23–6.

154 Cf. above, pp. 24–6.

role whatsoever to play in the argument, and that the passage from future truth to necessary future truth is characteristic of the Reaper Argument, which, as we have seen, is found intertwined with other arguments in Origen's *Contra Celsum* II 20.¹⁵⁵ I submit that we should not deem it any more noteworthy to find it intertwined with the argument in Gellius' testimony in a side remark. The intrusion of such notion of necessity (which, as we have seen, is expressed in terms of something's coming about πάντως or “in any event” in both Origen and the Reaper Argument as the latter is attested in Ammonius and Stephanus) may be due to the presence of πάντως ἀναγκάζεσθαι (“to be in any event compelled”) in the dog and cart simile as attested in Hippolytus—if indeed the latter is implied in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5.

In effect, the antecedent of a conditional statement whose consequent is the overall conclusion of the argument in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5 reads, “men do not come to evil spontaneously but are dragged by Fate” (*homines ad maleficia non sponte ueniunt, sed fato trahuntur*). Gellius' phrasing in the sentence is akin to the wording of the line *ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt* (“the Fates lead the willing, and drag the unwilling”) in Seneca's *Epistula* 107 §10, in turn associated with the dog and cart simile in Hippolytus' *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* I 21 2.¹⁵⁶

καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβεβαιώσαντο, παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ· ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ἢ ἐξηρημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ ἔπεται, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης οἷον τῆς εἰμαρμένης· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται. τὸ αὐτὸ δῆπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.

And they sustained that everything is in accordance with Fate using an example of the following kind. As if a dog were tied to a cart, if he wants to follow he is both pulled and follows, doing that which is in his own power alongside necessity, namely Fate; while if he does not want to follow he shall in any event be compelled. And the same holds for men: even if they do not want to follow they shall in any event be compelled to fall in with Destiny.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. above, pp. 39–40 and 46–8.

¹⁵⁶ I follow the text in Wendland (1916).

The line in Seneca's epistle is the fifth and last in Seneca's translation of Cleanthes' *Prayer to Zeus and Fate*, and is not attested in Epictetus' *Enchiridion* 53, where the other four lines are attested in the original Greek. Susanne Bobzien has taken the dog and cart simile as a late illustration of a reading of Cleanthes' prayer, not to be traced back to Chrysippus.¹⁵⁷ Taking, however, αὐτοί (“they”) in Hippolytus' passage as Chrysippus and Zeno (cf. ὁ τε Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων in *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* I 21 1), Robert Sharples (2005) has read the dog and cart simile in connection with the doctrine of reservation (ὑπεξαίρεσις/*exceptio*: cf. Seneca's *De Beneficiis* IV 34 and Stobaeus II 7 11–12 115.5–10 Wachsmuth-Hense), to the effect that every wise man's impulse includes a reservation such as “if nothing happens that may impede it” (cf. *si nihil inciderit quod impediat* in Seneca's *De Beneficiis* IV 34). In such a reading, the dog who both is led and follows in the simile is a likeness of the wise man, who is always in full compliance with Fate *as such* in that his impulses are always for that which is fated him *as that which is fated him and not otherwise*: that which he pursues or avoids he pursues or avoids *as his Fate*. That is why he pursues or avoids everything that he pursues or avoids with such a reservation as “if indeed this is so fated”: pursuit or avoidance in terms, for instance, of that which is more or less natural is no more than a second best which only comes into play because his Fate is unclear to him.

Sharples follows Tad Brennan (2000) in ascribing the substance of the doctrine of reservation to Chrysippus on the basis of what appears to be a direct quotation in Epictetus' *Dissertationes* II 6 9–10:

[9] διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος λέγει ὅτι “μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾗ τὰ ἐξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφροστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν. [10] εἰ δέ γε ᾔδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι.”

[9] That is why Chrysippus correctly says that, “So long as what follows is unclear to me, I always cling to the more natural for attaining that which is in accordance with nature. For god himself made me selective of those. [10] But if I knew that being ill was fated for me now, then I would have an impulse for it. For the foot, too, if it had wits, would have an impulse to get muddy” (trans. Brennan, slightly altered).

157 Cf. Bobzien (1998a), ch. 7.3.

The foot analogy draws the core distinction of the doctrine of reservation: I may perform Fate in full compliance with Fate's decrees as such, knowing full well my part in the drama and playing it as such; or I may perform Fate in mere outward conformity with Fate's decrees, just acting out my part from less than a reasoned acknowledgment thereof. I follow Sharples in assuming such a distinction to be at stake in the dog and cart simile: we follow our Fate whether we want it *as such* or not, but we follow our Fate *in utterly different ways* in case we want it as such or not. Thus read, Hippolytus' testimony does not suggest that “to be in any event compelled” (πάντως ἀναγκάζεσθαι) describes an overpowering force trumping us, much less corresponds to necessity in the modal sense, instead it merely expresses something's coming about as part of the chain of causes irrespective of our compliance to it *as such*.

But what exactly is it to be dragged by Fate as the non-complying dog? Here I believe Chrysippus' views on passions may provide some clarification. In effect, Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 2 13–18 testifies that Chrysippus used the following illustration in order to explain his definition of passion (πάθος) as “excessive impulse” (πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή):

[13] τὴν δ' ὑπόλοιπον ἐν ἣ τὸν ἕτερον ὅρον ἐξηγεῖται γεγραμμένην ἐφεξῆς τῇδε κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σύγγραμμα περὶ παθῶν ἥδη σοι παραθήσομαι· [14] “κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ὁ πλεονασμὸς τῆς ὁρμῆς εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν. [15] γένοιτο δ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ τούτων γνωριμώτερον, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ' ὁρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὁρμῇ ὥστε καὶ στήναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. [16] ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ' ὁρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξάμενων. [17] αἷς οἶμαί τι παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρμῶν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ὑπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ὥσθ' ὅταν ὁρμᾷ μὴ εὐπειθῶς ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δρόμου τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ λεγομένου παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὁρμῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον. [18] συμμετρία γάρ ἐστι φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἕως τοσούτου, [καὶ] ἕως αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς ὑπερβάσεως κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτως γινομένης πλεονάζουσά τε ὁρμὴ λέγεται εἶναι καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄλογος κίνησις ψυχῆς.”

[13] I shall now present to you his [=Chrysippus'] remaining statement, in which he explains the second definition, and which is written in the immediate sequence in *On*

Passions, Book I: [14] “Also the excess of impulse is said in this way, because it surpasses the natural commensurateness with things themselves. [15] My meaning is made clearer by the following. When a man walks in accordance with impulse, the motion of his members is not excessive but is in agreement with his impulse, in such a way that he both stops and changes when he wishes. [16] But when people run in accordance with impulse that sort of thing no longer happens, instead the movement of the members exceeds the impulse in such a way that they are carried away and do not change as obediently as in the early stages. [17] I think something similar takes place in impulse due to excess beyond commensurateness to reason, in such a way that when one has the impulse it is not obedient to reason. But whereas in running the excess is said to be beyond impulse, in impulse the excess is said to be beyond reason, [18] for commensurateness of rational impulse is commensurateness with reason, that is, it goes up to the point which reason deems right. Therefore, when excess arises in this way, it is said to be an excessive impulse and an unnatural and irrational movement of soul” (trans. De Lacy, slightly altered).

Here the contrast is that between impulses that remain within the limits which right reason deems appropriate, which are likened to a movement allowing for change at wish, and impulses that go beyond the limits which right reason deems appropriate, which are likened to a movement no longer allowing for change at wish. Excess consists in going beyond set limits in such a way that it is no longer possible to respond to the commands of reason immediately—and Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 34–35 expresses the point in a way that is directly relevant to our purposes:

[34] κάπειδὰν ἐξηγούμενος τὸ μὴ παρ' ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι μηδ' ἐν ἑαυτοῖς λέγει ταυτί· [35] “οἰκείως δὲ καὶ ἐκφέρεσθαι λέγονται οἱ οὕτως ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν δρόμων προεκφερομένοις παραπλησίως κατὰ τὸ πλεονάζον τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ τρέχειν ὁρμήν, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως <ὡς> οἱ γε κρατοῦντες τῆς κινήσεως καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἂν κινεῖσθαι λέγοιντο, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ βίαν ἐξωθεν αὐτῶν.”

[34] In his [=Chrysippus'] explanation of “being beside oneself” and of “being out of one's mind” he says the following: [35] “People thus angered are appropriately said to be carried away in a way that is similar to those who are carried away headlong in

running with respect to excess, in one case beyond their impulse in running, in the other beyond their own reason. For they cannot be said to move by themselves as ones who master their movements, but instead by some compulsion external to them” (trans. De Lacy, slightly altered).

According to Chrysippus, as a runner is said to move by some external force if her movement goes beyond impulse in such a way that she is no longer able to master it, so angered people are said in their excess to be “beside themselves” (μὴ παρ' ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι) and “out of their minds” (μὴ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι), both of which phrases suggest that they are no longer in charge of their responses. Chrysippus’ legitimation of such common parlance is also observed in Galen’s *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 2 12, where he is attested to claim (with approval) that in ordinary usage (ἐν τῷ ἔθει) it is said that people are pushed (ὠθεῖσθαι) because their impulse is disobedient to, and relinquishing of, reason (ἀπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ ἀπεστραμμένον τὸν λόγον). Note that expressions such as being moved “by some compulsion external to them” (κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ βίαν ἔξωθεν αὐτῶν, IV 6 35) and “being pushed” (ὠθεῖσθαι, IV 2 12) may indeed suggest external compulsion, but such language is here to be understood instead in terms of an excess which no longer obeys its principle.

I submit that the non-complying dog’s being dragged by the cart in Hippolytus’ testimony is to be read in the same light: the simile is supposed to picture Fate not as external compulsion but instead as acting through the non-wise via excessive impulses. By the same token, the wording of the objection in Gellius’ *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5 may be intended to suggest that the dog and cart simile (which, as we have seen, may trace back to Zeno) takes Fate to overpower and trump us, and thus to exculpate us of whatever may happen (as does the first factor in Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen*)—and it is Chrysippus’ contribution to set the record straight, allowing for the correct reading of the simile.

Let us now pass on to a discussion of Chrysippus’ views on blame and punishment in an attempt to shed light on what I take to be Chrysippus’ main presupposition in his reply.

Chrysippus (and Seneca) on blame and punishment

In order for us to appreciate Chrysippus’ reply to the argument in Cicero’s *De Fato* 40 and Gellius’ *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5 to the effect that praise, blame, honor, and punishment are not

deserved if everything takes place by Fate, I believe it is essential to consider Chrysippus' views on praise, blame, honor, and punishment.

The evidence is visibly sparse, and it is difficult to draw a comprehensive picture of what may have been Chrysippus' stand on the matter. The interpreter is faced with nugatory data gathered from widely differing contexts, and many an impasse arises as to how (and even whether) one should read such slender bits as cohering in a unified whole.

My attitude shall be to approach the issue in terms of what I take to be a deliberate distinction on Chrysippus' part in the vocabulary of blame and punishment. I shall then take such observed discrepancy in terminology as tailored to suit different construals of the notions of blame and punishment according to their respective grounds and goals.

My analysis shall make use of Seneca's views on blame and punishment as a valid interpretive key. Katja Vogt has taken Seneca's views on the passions as in fundamental respects in line with orthodox Stoicism¹⁵⁸—and, as we shall see presently, the issue of blame and punishment hinges in more than one way on Stoic views on the passions. Thus, even though it is not possible to trace all of Seneca's views on blame and punishment back to Chrysippus, Seneca's contribution allows us to confirm hypotheses on how to read Chrysippus and suggests otherwise non-available rationales for *prima facie* inconsistencies present in our scant evidence.

I begin by making a distinction between what I call Groups A, B, and C in the vocabulary of blame and punishment. Group A terms and uses designate punishment as *retaliative*; Group B uses designate punishment as *reflexive*; and Group C terms and uses designate blame and punishment as *therapeutic*.

Those, I submit, are the only meanings and uses associated with blame and punishment vocabulary as attested for Chrysippus and Seneca; and while the particular examples I give in what follows are picked out as being the most illustrative within each group and the most conducive to my goals, other instances of blame and punishment vocabulary shall conform to one of the three basic headings.

Group A is represented in Chrysippus by the family of τιμωρία (“retaliation”), which is seen without exception as the essence and expression of anger. We may observe such association in passages such as Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 45 280.1–6 De Lacy:

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Vogt (2006), esp. pp. 59–60.

καὶ ἐφεξῆς “πολλάκις δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην τυφλότητα τὰς κλεῖς δάκνομεν καὶ τὰς θύρας τύπτομεν οὐ ταχὺ αὐτῶν ἀνοιγομένων πρὸς τε τοὺς λίθους ἐὰν προσπταίσωμεν, τιμωρητικῶς προσφερόμεθα καταγνύντες καὶ ῥίπτοῦντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τινὰς τόπους καὶ ἐπιλέγοντες καθ’ ἕκαστα τούτων ἀτοπώτατα.”

He [=Chrysippus] continues: “Often in this kind of blindness we bite the keys and beat against the doors when they are not quickly opened, and if we stumble on a stone we behave in a retaliative manner shattering it and throwing it somewhere, and in each case we use the most absurd language” (trans. De Lacy, slightly altered).

“This kind of blindness” (cf. also ἀποτυφλούμεθα [“we are blinded”] in two other quotes from Chrysippus in §§44 and 46) is one of the passions under discussion in Chrysippus’ *On Passions*, from which the excerpt is taken (cf. §47). Here, the passion at stake is manifestly rage (cf. τὸν θυμὸν ἢ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον [“rage, desire, pleasure, or some such thing”] in §48). The same association between anger and retaliation may be observed in another direct quotation in Galen’s *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* III 7 25 216.24–28 De Lacy:

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοιάνδε τινὰ γράφει ῥῆσιν· “κατὰ τοιαύτην δέ μοι δοκοῦσι μάλιστα φορὰν καὶ οἱ τιμωρητικώτερον πρὸς τινὰς φερόμενοι ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ ταύτην ἐκσπάσαι, καθ’ ἣν φορὰν ἐπιτείνοντες καὶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν σπλάγχχνων ὁμοειδῶς φέρονται.”

After that, he [=Chrysippus] writes these words: “I think it is especially in keeping with a tendency of this kind that those who are more moved to retaliate against people have an impulse to tear it out, and when they are intensified in this tendency they move in like manner towards the rest of one’s entrails” (trans. De Lacy, slightly altered).

“It” (ταύτην) in “tear it out” (τὸ ταύτην ἐκσπάσαι) is another’s heart (cf. τὴν καρδίαν ἐκσπάσαι [“tear out one’s heart”] in §26). According to Galen, Chrysippus invokes such brutal impulse merely to illustrate his equating of καρδία (“heart”) with ψυχή (“soul”) in §§21 and 22. Anger is not alluded in the passage, but the example (which includes escalating to plucking out one’s innards) makes it seem unnecessary.

The association between anger and retaliation is made explicit in definitions of ὀργή (“anger”) and κότος (“rancor”): DL VII 113 attributes to the Stoics the definition of anger as ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἡδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως (“desire for retaliation against one who is deemed to have done wrong in an unseemly way”); ps.-Andronicus' *On Passions* I 4 defines anger as ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ ἡδικηκέναι δοκοῦντος (“desire for retaliation against one who is deemed to have done wrong”) and rancor as ὀργή καιρὸν ἐπιτηροῦσα εἰς τιμωρίαν (“anger watching for an opportunity for retaliation”); Stobaeus II 7 10c 91.10–15 Wachsmuth-Hense attributes to the Stoics the definitions of anger as ἐπιθυμία τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἡδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσηκόν (“desire to retaliate against one who is deemed to have done wrong beyond seemliness”) and of rancor as ὀργή ἐπιτηροῦσα καιρὸν εἰς τιμωρίαν (“anger watching for an opportunity for retaliation”); and Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV 21 attributes to the Stoics the definitions of *ira* (“anger”) as *libido poeniendi eius qui uideatur laesisse iniuria* (“desire to punish one who is deemed to have done an offense involving injury”) and of *inimicitia* (“rancor”) as *ira ulciscendi tempus observans* (“anger watching for the time to take revenge”).

The association of anger with the families of *poena/punire* (“punishment”/“to punish”) and *ultio/ulcisci* (“revenge”/“to take revenge”), as well as with those of *supplicium* (“chastisement”) and *vindicare* (“to avenge”), is also observed in Seneca's works. Lactantius' *De Ira Dei* 17.13 reads,

Nescisse autem philosophos quae ratio esset irae, apparet ex finitionibus eorum quas Seneca enumeravit in libris quos *De Ira* composuit. “Ira est,” inquit, “cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius a quo te inique putes laesum.”

That the philosophers ignored what the definition of anger is is apparent from their accounts as enumerated in Seneca's *De Ira*. “Anger,” he says, “is the desire to take revenge against an injury, or, as Posidonius says, the desire to punish the one whom you deem to have unfairly done offense to you.”

The association of such terminology with anger may be found all throughout Seneca's *De Ira*. Two passages shall suffice as illustration:

[H]ic <adfectus> totus concitatus et in impetu est, doloris armorum, sanguinis suppliciorum minime humana furens cupiditate, dum alteri noceat sui neglegens, in ipsa inruens tela et ultionis secum ultorem tracturae avidus,

This <passion> is all roused and impulsive, infuriated with the least humane desire for pain in clashes and blood in chastisements, neglectful of itself as long as it harms another, rushing into its own darts and avid for a revenge which will drag the avenger with itself (I 1 1),

and

Nobis placet nihil illam per se audere sed animo adprobante; nam speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec laedi se debuisse et uindicari debere, non est eius impetus qui sine uoluntate nostra concitatur.

We hold that it is not of itself that it ventures anything, but with the mind's approval. For grasping the presentation of an injury received; desiring revenge for it; and joining both, to the effect that another should not have done offense to one and that one should take revenge—no impulse for it is roused without our will (II 1 4).

Seneca's tragedies also provide several examples of such association. So Medea,

Per uiscera ipsa quaere supplicio uiam,
si uiuis, anime, si quid antiqui tibi
remanet uigoris ...
accingere ira teque in exitium para
furore toto.

Through the very guts find a path to chastisement if you are alive, my spirit, if there is any of your old vigor left ... Arm yourself in anger, and prepare to wreak destruction with all rage (ll. 40–2 and 51–2, trans. Fitch, slightly altered).

Also Deianira in *Hercules Oetaeus*,

non ibo inulta: gesseris caelum licet
 totusque pacem debeat mundus tibi,
 est aliquid hydra peius: iratae dolor
 nuptae ...
 o nulla dolor
 contente poena, quaere supplicia horrida,
 incogitata, infanda, Iunonem doce
 quid odia ualeant: nescit irasci satis.

I shall not go unavenged. Though you have borne the heavens and the whole world owes its peace to you, there is something worse than a hydra: the pain of an angered wife ... O pain that no punishment can satisfy, look for horrible, unthought-of, unspeakable chastisements! Teach Juno the power of hate: she is incapable of sufficient anger (ll. 282–5 and 295–8, trans. Fitch, slightly altered).

Group A (*retaliative*) punishment vocabulary, thus, brands punishment as the core and token of a passion; consequently, punishment thus understood cannot *in itself* claim to correspond to anything just.¹⁵⁹ In effect, according to Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 2 8 238.12–16 De Lacy, Chrysippus defines passion (cf. ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὸ πάθος ὁρισμῶν γράφων) both as “irrational and unnatural motion of soul” (ἄλογός τε καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις ψυχῆς) and as “excessive impulse” (πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή),¹⁶⁰ and just following in Galen's testimony (*De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 2 12 238.23–4 De Lacy) we have Chrysippus himself explain “irrational” (τὸ ἄλογον) as “disobedient to, and relinquishing of, reason” (ἀπειθὲς τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπεστραμμένον τὸν λόγον). Moreover, it is a central Stoic tenet that passions are to be extirpated (cf., for example, Seneca's *Epistula* 116 1).¹⁶¹

Group B (*reflexive*) uses of such families as those of *poena/punire* (“punishment”/“to punish”) and of *supplicium* (“chastisement”), in turn, give voice to the claim that the punishment for committing a wrong is the very committing of the wrong. So Seneca's *Epistula* 87 §§24–5,

¹⁵⁹ For one such illegitimate claim, cf. below, pp. 86–7.

¹⁶⁰ According to DL VII 110, both definitions trace back to Zeno.

¹⁶¹ Cf. also Nussbaum (1987).

Atqui maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. Erras, inquam, si illa ad carnificem aut carcerem differs: statim puniuntur cum facta sunt, immo dum fiunt.

The greatest chastisement for crimes is in themselves. You are wrong, I say, if you defer that, waiting for the executioner or prison: crimes are punished on the spot as they have been done, indeed while they are being done.

Also Seneca's *De Ira* III 5 6,

Praeterea ira, ut seponamus quae mox secutura sunt, damna insidias perpetuam ex certaminibus mutuis sollicitudinem, dat poenas dum exigit.

Moreover, to set aside that which is thereupon to follow—damage, guile, perpetual disquiet from mutual dispute—anger pays the penalty while exacting it.

The claim here is that wrongdoing is bad for the wrongdoer himself, in such a way that, according to Seneca's usage, wrongdoing is its own punishment. Such reflexive uses of punishment vocabulary are not attested in Chrysippus' extant fragments, even though the idea of reflexivity in wrongdoing is given expression in a fragment from Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 16 1041c:

αὐθις ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι φησιν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ὅταν ἄλλον ἀδικῇ, γένόμενον ἑαυτῷ τοῦ παρανομεῖν αἴτιον καὶ βλάπτοντα παρ' ἀξίαν ἑαυτόν.

Later in the *Demonstrations concerning Justice* he [=Chrysippus] says that the wrongdoer is wronged by himself and wrongs himself whenever he wrongs another, for he has become a cause of transgression for himself and is injuring himself beyond what is due (trans. Cherniss, slightly altered).

Seneca may be going beyond Chrysippus in using punishment vocabulary to express the idea of reflexivity in wrongdoing. I shall decline to speculate whether Group B uses of punishment

vocabulary are to have a bearing on the issue of desert as it figures in the argument in Cicero's *De Fato* 39–45 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2.

Finally, Group C blame and punishment vocabulary is associated with the *therapy of passions*.¹⁶² In order for us to appreciate the point, let us first consider a testimony on Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' respective approaches to the therapy of grief from Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes* III 76:

sunt qui unum officium consolantis putent malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet ... Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere illam opinionem maerentis, qua se officio fungi putet iusto atque debito.

There are those who think that the one duty of the consoler is <to teach that>¹⁶³ it is not at all an evil, as Cleanthes holds ... Chrysippus, for his part, estimates that the key in consoling is to drag away that opinion of the mourner by which the latter thinks he is performing his just and due duty.

Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' respective approaches are said to address each a different wrong judgment: the former, a judgment to the effect that the passing of a beloved person is an evil; the latter, a judgment to the effect that one has a duty to mourn. Let us call them the good/evil judgment (from ἀγαθόν/κακόν, *bonum/malum*) and the duty judgment (from καθήκον, *officium*). Both judgments are necessary for grief: given Stoic commitment to the extirpation of the passions,¹⁶⁴ Cleanthes' suppression of the good/evil judgment and Chrysippus' suppression of the duty judgment may be seen, each, as sufficient for the extirpation of grief. As we shall observe in what follows, Chrysippus' prescribed method is supposed to apply to other passions as well.¹⁶⁵

Let us now consider Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV 59–60:

[59] si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius ... [60] sed omnis eius

162 For a fine-grained account of Chrysippus' therapy of passions, broadly in line with the one proposed here, cf. Tieleman (2003), ch. 4.

163 Cf. *cum doceas* ("when you teach") in Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV 60.

164 Cf. above, p. 79.

165 Cf. also Donini (1987).

modi perturbatio animi placatione abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas nec bonum illud esse, ex quo laetitia aut libido oriatur, nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut aegritudo; verum tamen haec est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas ipsas perturbaciones per se esse vitiosas nec habere quicquam aut naturale aut necessarium, ut ipsam aegritudinem leniri videmus, cum obicimus maerentibus imbecillitatem animi ecfeminati, cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur.

[59] If one is distressed for being poor, should you argue that poverty is not an evil or that nothing should distress a man? Surely the latter is better ... [60] Surely every such disturbance of the soul could indeed be cleansed by that appeasement—when you teach that neither that is a good from which one's delight or desire arises, nor that is an evil from which one's fear or distress arises. However, this is the right and proper cure, if you teach that disturbances are in themselves vicious and there is nothing either natural or necessary about them. Thus, we see that distress is alleviated when we rebuke the weakness of the mourner's effeminate spirit, and when we praise the seriousness and constancy of those who suffer human things in a non-turbulent manner.

Note that the options in §59 correspond to Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' respective views on the therapy of passions (*oportet* here introduces one's real *officium*). Cicero, whose ratification of Chrysippus' stand on the matter is explicit in *Tusculanae Disputationes* III 79, consistently endorses Chrysippus' view in the passage. In §60, rebuke and praise (cf. *obicimus* and *laudamus*) are taken to admit of being used to teach one (cf. *si doceas*) that one should not give in to distress, in accordance with Chrysippus' proposal to suppress the duty judgment in order to extirpate the passion. Moreover, rebuke and praise are said to address one's psychic weakness and others' resilience respectively.

Surely §60 (where Cicero speaks in his own voice) cannot be said to give us Chrysippus' view on the use of rebuke and praise in the therapy of passions. However, two points are to be noted:

First, Cicero states in §§61–2 that his own prescribed method is applicable by all philosophical schools, since it does not address the vexed question whether something is good, evil, or neither, which is a matter of dispute among them. Accordingly, Origen's *Contra Celsum* VIII 51 266.18–30 Koetschau gives us two direct quotations from Book IV of

Chrysippus' *On Passions* (the so-called *Ethics*, or *Therapeutics*)¹⁶⁶ prescribing such therapy even under the non-shared assumption that the item wrongly taken to be good or evil is indeed good or evil. Note especially Chrysippus' assertions, “for even if there are three genera of goods the passions should be cured in this way” (κἂν γὰρ τρία, φησίν, ἢ γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ οὕτω θεραπευτέον τὰ πάθη), where the claim that there are three genera of goods manifestly is a philosophical tenet, and “even if the good is pleasure and the one who is dominated by the passion thinks so, no less should he be helped and shown that all passion is unacceptable even for those who hold that pleasure is the good and end” (κἂν ἡδονὴ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τοῦτο φρονῇ ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους κρατούμενος, οὐδὲν ἥττον αὐτῷ βοηθητέον καὶ παραδεικτέον ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν καὶ τέλος τιθεμένοις ἀνομολογούμενόν ἐστι πᾶν πάθος).

Second and most important, upbraiding one's psychic weakness with a view to extirpating one's passion is exactly what one finds in a testimony from Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 1–9 270.10–272.8 De Lacy:

[1] ἔνεστιν ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων καταμαθεῖν ἐν οἷς αἰτιᾶται τῶν πραττομένων οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀτονίαν τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὰς ὀνομάζει, καθάπερ γε καὶ τάναντία τὸ μὲν εὐτονίαν τὸ δ' ἰσχύν. [2] ὅσα γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰ μὲν εἰς μοχθηρὰν κρίσιν ἀναφέρει, τὰ δ' εἰς ἀτονίαν καὶ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὧν κατορθοῦσιν ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας, [3] ... ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ὀνομάζει τόνον, ἀφίστασθαι τέ φησιν ἔστιν ὅτε τῶν ὀρθῶς ἐγνωσμένων ἡμῖν ἐνδόντος τοῦ τόνου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ παραμείναντος ἕως παντὸς μηδ' ἐξυπηρετήσαντος τοῖς τοῦ λόγου προστάγμασιν, ἐναργῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐνδεικνύμενος οἷόν τι τὸ πάθος ἐστίν. [4] ἤδη δὲ καὶ ῥῆσιν αὐτοῦ τινα παραγράψω περὶ τούτων ἐκδιδάσκουσιν· ἔστι δ' ἐκ τοῦ περὶ παθῶν ἠθικοῦ. [5] “ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως <ὡς> οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος λέγονται τόνοι ἄστονοι καὶ εὐστονοι εἶναι κατὰ τὸ νευρῶδες τῷ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀδυνατεῖν ἐν τοῖς διὰ τούτων ἐπιτελουμένοις ἔργοις, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγεται τόνος ὡς εὐτονία καὶ ἀτονία.” [6] καὶ ἐφεξῆς, “ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν δρόμῳ καὶ ἀνθέξει τινὸς καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ἤδη, ἃ διὰ τῶν νεύρων ἐνεργεῖται, ἔστι τις ἐπιτελεστικὴ κατάστασις καὶ ἐνδοτικὴ, τῶν νεύρων προεκκλυμένων καὶ ἀνειμένων, ἀναλόγως καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον νευρῶδες, καθὸ καὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀνεύρους τινὰς λέγομεν καὶ νεῦρα ἔχειν.” [7] εἴθ' ἐξῆς ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο τάδε γράφει “ὁ μὲν δειμῶν ἐπιγινόμενος ἀφίσταται, ὁ δὲ κέρδους ἢ ζημίας

166 On the number of books and the name of the last book, cf. Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 1 14 and V 7 52.

φερομένης ἐξελύθη καὶ ἐνέδωκεν, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα οὐκ ὀλίγα. [8] ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τρέπεται τε καὶ δουλοῦται ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐνδιδόντας αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πόλεις προδιδόναι καὶ αὐτοὺς εἰς πολλὰς καὶ ἀσχήμονας πράξεις ἐπιδιδόναι τῆς πρόσθεν φορᾶς ἐκλυθείσης. [9] οἷος εἰσηῖται καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ ὁ Μενέλαος· σπασάμενος γὰρ τὴν μάχαιραν φέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλένην ὡς ἀναιρήσων, ἰδὼν δὲ καὶ καταπλαγεὶς [εἰς] τὸ κάλλος ἐξέβαλε τὴν μάχαιραν, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔτι δυνάμενος κρατεῖν, καθὰ καὶ ἡ ἐπίπληξις αὕτη εἴρηται αὐτῷ·

σὺ δ' ὡς ἐσεῖδες μαστὸν [ἐκείνης] ἐκβαλὼν ξίφος
φύλημ' ἐδέξω προδότιν αἰκάλ<λ>ων κύνα.”

[1] We may see it in such passages wherein he [=Chrysippus] says *softness* and *weakness* of soul are responsible for incorrect actions. Thus he names them, as he names their opposites *firmness* and *strength*. [2] Some of men's incorrect actions he refers to vicious judgment, others to softness and weakness of soul, just as he says right judgment together with firmness of soul is responsible for correct actions. [3] ... This power Chrysippus himself names *tonus*, and he says that there are times when we abandon correct thoughts because the tonus of our soul yields and does not persist to the end or carry out fully the commands of reason. Thus he indicates with clarity of what kind passion is in people of that sort. [4] I shall now quote a passage that teaches about these matters (it is from the *Ethics* of his work *On Passions*): [5] “Moreover, it is also in accord with this that as 'tonuses' in the body are called soft and firm with reference to its sinewy character, insofar as we have power or lack it in actions accomplished on their account, so too the tonus in the soul is called *firmness* and *softness*.” [6] Then he says, “As in running, holding fast to something, and similar actions that are performed on account of the sinews, there is one condition that is able to accomplish what it undertakes, and another that yields, the sinews becoming limp and slack too soon, so in the soul there is a sinewy character of this kind, in terms of which we speak metaphorically of men without sinew, and of having sinew.” [7] He then writes an explanation of that very statement: “One person desists when dangers arise, another became limp and yield when reward or harm was put forth, another upon encountering other such things, not few in number. [8] Each such situation defeats and enslaves us, so that by yielding to it we betray friends and cities and offer ourselves up to many shameful acts after our former tendency has gone slack. [9] Euripides has presented Menelaus as this kind of person. He drew his sword and rushed at Helen to kill her, but on seeing her and being struck by her beauty he let the sword drop, no

longer able even to keep his hold on it. He was accordingly upbraided with these words:

When you caught sight of her breast you dropped your sword
and took her kiss, fawning on the treacherous bitch”

(trans. De Lacy, slightly altered).

The excerpt from Euripides' *Andromache* (ll. 629–30) is part of Peleus' long upbraid of Menelaus (ll. 590–641) when the latter is on the brink of killing Andromache and her son Molossus. Andromache had secretly attempted to send her son away from Neoptolemus' palace in Phthia out of fear for Molossus' life, and Menelaus' weakness in having yielded to desire as Helen bared her chest in Troy is upbraided by Peleus with a view to abating Menelaus' inflamed condition as the latter is about to exact punishment for Andromache's act of defiance. Peleus' stratagem works: Menelaus in time says that he came not for the sake of anger (οὐκ ὀργῆς χάριν, l. 688) and that he defers Andromache's punishment to Neoptolemus (cf. καὶν μὲν κολάζῃ τήνδε [“and if he shall punish this woman”], l. 740).

If my reading of the role assigned to Euripides' excerpt in the passage is correct, what Chrysippus calls Peleus' “upbraid” of Menelaus (cf. ἐπίπληξις, §9) purports to dissuade Menelaus from the idea that he should punish Andromache and thus give free rein to his anger. That, as we have seen, is in line with Chrysippus' view that the therapy of passions (in this case, Menelaus' anger) should address the duty premise of the passion (in this case, Menelaus' idea that he should punish Andromache) and may resort to blame in order to effect its goal. Thus, the use of “upbraid” in Chrysippus' *On Passions* as quoted in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 7–9 is in line with the use of “rebuke” in Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV 60: both forms of blaming one's weakness are acknowledged as having a role to play in the therapy of one's passion.

The same bond between the families of ἐπιπλήττω (“to upbraid”) and *obicere* (“to rebuke”) and the therapy of passions is observed for the families of *obiurgare* (“to chide”), *castigare* (“to berate”), and *conuicium* (“reprimand”) in Seneca. So, for example, *Epistula* 99 §§1–2,

[1] Epistulam quam scripsi Marullo cum filium parvulum amisisset et diceretur molliter ferre misi tibi, in qua non sum solitum morem secutus nec putavi leniter illum

debere tractari, cum obiurgatione esset quam solacio dignior. Adflicto enim et magnum vulnus male ferenti paulisper cedendum est; exsati et se aut certe primum impetum effundat: [2] hi qui sibi lugere sumpserunt protinus castigentur et discant quasdam etiam lacrimarum ineptias esse. 'Solacia expectas? convicia accipe ...'

[1] I send you the letter I wrote to Marullus when his small son died and he said that he had been weak to cope. I did not follow my usual habit in it, nor did I think I should treat him with leniency, since he was more worthy of chiding than of consolation. In effect, one must give way for a short while to a person who is cast down and is barely able to withstand a great blow: she will have her fill, or else give up her first impulse. [2] But those who presume to mourn continuously should be berated and taught that some tears are improper. [The letter to Marullus begins:] "Do you expect consolation? Accept reprimands instead ..."

Seneca employs "chiding" (*obiurgatio*), "to berate" (*castigare*), and "reprimand" (*conuicium*) to designate his attitude of blaming Marullus' weakness in coping with the death of his son. Note that one's presumption to mourn continuously is precisely what I have been calling the duty premise of the passion of grief, the suppression of which is the aim of Seneca's attitude of blaming Marullus' weakness. Seneca's use of the families of *castigare*, *obiurgare*, and *conuicium* in the passage is thus associated with the same overall purpose of blame in Chrysippus' therapy of passions. But here a significant element first comes to the fore in our analysis: Seneca implies that he is *justified* in chiding Marullus when he says that Marullus is more worthy of chiding than of consolation (*cum obiurgatione esset quam solacio dignior*). Seneca means that Marullus *deserves* chiding for having given in to passion, and saying so means that a therapeutic measure such as chiding is both needed and apposite in Marullus' case, since it is the case both that Marullus has to be cured of his passion and that chiding Marullus is the appropriate means for him to be cured of his passion. For a contrast, let us note that claims about desert may figure also in connection with Group A (*retaliative*) terms and uses, but at the very heart of one's anger. So Medea in Seneca's play,

placuit hoc poenae genus,
meritoque placuit: ultimum magno scelus
animo parandum est: liberi quondam mei,
uos pro paternis sceleribus poenas date.

This sort of punishment is decided on, and deservedly decided on. My great spirit must prepare for its ultimate crime. Children once mine, you shall pay the penalty for your father's crimes (ll. 922–5, trans. Fitch, slightly altered).

The issue here, I believe, is that in her anger (cf. *ira* [“anger”], l. 916) Medea assumes Jason to deserve punishment for what he has done her (cf. the retaliative overtone in *pro paternis sceleribus* [“for your father's crimes”], l. 925), and to deserve such punishment as only having offspring birthed by Creusa from then on (cf. *quidquid ex illo tuum est, Creusa peperit* [“from this time, Creusa has birthed whichever is yours”], ll. 921–2), which is why Medea is resolved to kill her own children.

Claims about desert in Seneca's writings may thus correspond either to *retaliative* claims (as Medea's claim) or to *therapeutic* claims (as Seneca's own claim concerning Marullus). But while in the former case considerations about desert form part of the substance and display of a passion, in the latter case considerations about desert have a bearing on whether a given practice is needed and apposite in order to effect a cure. Let us now follow Seneca's *De Ira* II 1 3–2 1 (quoted in part in what precedes)¹⁶⁷ in order to observe two fundamental requirements of the therapy of passions:

[1.3] Iram quin species oblata iniuriae moueat non est dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsam statim sequatur et non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsentiente moueatur quaerimus. [1.4] Nobis placet nihil illam per se audere sed animo adprobante; nam speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec laedi se debuisse et uindicari debere, non est eius impetus qui sine uoluntate nostra concitatur ... [2.1] “Quorsus” inquis “haec quaestio pertinet?” Vt sciamus quid sit ira; nam si inuitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet.

[1.3] There is no doubt that anger moves when the presentation of an injury appears. But we ask whether it follows immediately on that very presentation, and goes forth without the mind's acquiescence, or moves with the latter's assent. [1.4] We hold that it is not of itself that it ventures anything, but with the mind's approval. For grasping the presentation of an injury received; desiring revenge for it; and joining both, to the effect that another should not have done offense to one and that one should take revenge—no impulse for it is roused without our will ... [2.1] You ask, “What is the

167 Cf. above, p. 78.

purpose of this investigation?” That we know what anger is; for it shall never succumb to reason if it is born without our willing it.

Seneca here states that the passion of anger is consequent on assent: it takes place not on its own but through the mediation of our endorsement of a mental content. (I assume *voluntas* [“will”] names either our faculty of assent or assent itself in 1.4.) The reason, I believe, is that anger is nothing but assent to a mental content: in such a reading, Seneca's account is in line with the claim in Chrysippus' *On Passions* as attested in DL VII 111 to the effect that passions are judgments (cf. δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς [=τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς] τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν), if we may presume judgments to be no more than propositions to which we have given assent.

The proposition to which we assent is a complex entity, and we may devise what I have been calling the duty proposition in “that one should take revenge” (*uindicari debere*, 1.4). Unlike Chrysippus', Seneca's method for extirpating anger is composite, and addresses now the duty judgment, now the good/evil judgment. Be that as it may, Seneca's *De Ira* allows us to see that the therapy of passions cannot be apposite unless anger is consequent on assent (in that assent issues in anger and withdrawing assent issues in extirpating anger) and assent is up to us (in that nothing produces our assent in our place). The latter claim, I believe, underlies Seneca's statement that anger “shall never succumb to reason if it is born without our willing it” (*si inuitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet*, 2.1), and it is a presupposition of the therapy of passions in general that as passion takes place only once one gives assent, passion also gives way once one withdraws assent, and one may shift one's assent on condition that one receives adequate treatment.

I shall have more to say on assent's being both sufficient for passion and up to us once we turn to the next section of this chapter. Before so, let us consider a last term in Chrysippus' punishment vocabulary and stipulate conditions for just blame and punishment according to Stoic therapy of passions.

Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 15 1040bc reads,

ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης τὰ Ἡσιόδεια ταυτὶ προενεγκάμενος

τοῖσιν δ' οὐρανόθεν μέγ' ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων,
 λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί

ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἦττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν.

In *On Justice*, Book I, he [=Chrysippus] quotes Hesiod's lines,

Zeus from the heavens inflicted a grievous sanction on them,
plague and famine at once; and the populace utterly perished,

and then says that the gods do these things in order that from the castigation of the wicked the rest avail themselves of these examples and attempt less such things (trans. Cherniss, slightly altered).

Chrysippus here quotes Hesiod's *Works and Days*, ll. 242–3, which form part of a section (ll. 238–47) where Hesiod speaks about collective punishment: Zeus makes a whole community pay for the transgression of one of its members. At first glance, collective punishment stands out as unfair, but Chrysippus may accept it—and even accept it as the justice of Zeus—on the basis of what is attested in Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 35 1050e:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Θεῶν ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις· “πρῶτον δὲ τῶν κακῶν παραπλησίως ἐστὶν ἀκουστέον τοῖς προειρημένοις· εἴθ' ὅτι ταῦτ' ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἢ τοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν.”

Nevertheless, he [=Chrysippus] says that god castigates vice and does many things with a view to the castigation of the wicked. For instance, in *On Gods*, Book II, he says that inconveniences happen to the good, not as they do to the base for their castigation, but in the course of other arrangements, as happens in cities. Also here: “First, one must understand evils in terms of what has been said before; next, one must understand that these things are dispensed in accordance with the reason of Zeus either with a view to castigation or in accordance with another disposition relating to the whole arrangement.”

Here we find a notion of desert: only the wicked (πονηροί) or base (φαῦλοι) are castigated, the good (ἀγαθοί) suffer mere inconveniences as a byproduct of other arrangements in the cosmos. Surely both perish by god's hands in collective punishment, but for a Stoic life and death are not good or evil in themselves—both are indifferent—hence Chrysippus' precision about evils (cf. τῶν κακῶν παραπλησίως ἐστὶν ἀκουστέον τοῖς προειρημένοις) and talk instead of “inconveniences” (τὰ δύσχρηστα) in the case of the good man. That, however, does not eliminate the following difficulty: what is one to make of the notion of *exemplary* punishment (cf. παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι)—and what is more, of exemplary *capital* punishment (cf. ἀποφθινύθουσι ... λαοί [“the populace utterly perished”] in the quote from Hesiod)—in the former passage from Plutarch? Neither *exemplary* punishment nor, for that matter, exemplary *capital* punishment aim at the moral betterment of the person being punished; could, then, exemplary capital punishment be just if, as we have seen, just blame and punishment are *therapeutic*? What is one to make of κόλασις (“castigation”)—and even of πῆμα (“sanction”) in the quote from Hesiod—in Chrysippus?

I believe we may see the two as cohering with the therapy of passions. Here we should bear in mind that Seneca assumes a gradation of forms of blame and punishment in *De Ira* I 16 2–3, from chiding (*obiurgatio*) to death (*mors*), according to the degree of evil embedded in the wrongdoer. All forms but the last are said to be remedial; death applies to the incurable. *De Clementia* I 22 1 adds to the picture by postulating two purposes for punishment aside from the wicked's amendment: that of others' amendment through exemplary punishment of the wicked, and that of removing the wicked from the company of others so as to allow the latter to lead more secure lives.

Surely Seneca speaks of *man*-inflicted, not *god*-inflicted, punishment, but what he says may be adapted for our purposes. In light of the doctrine that only virtue is good, only vice is evil, and everything else (including life and death) is indifferent (cf., for instance, DL VII 102, where the doctrine is attributed to Chrysippus), the incurable's death is seen as the sole possible cessation of their otherwise ineliminable evil, and as such it is in their own interest (cf. Seneca's *De Ira* I 6 3). Thus, one may see exemplary capital punishment in the following light: just punishment is curative of the punished person's passion when she is curable; and when she is incurable, just punishment is the cessation of her evil, and may be curative of others' passion.

For our purposes, the doctrine that only virtue is good, only vice is evil, and everything else is indifferent also allows for a significant, far-reaching claim—that therapeutic punishment is the sole form of punishment to have a strong claim on desert. Both the injury

inflicted by the wrongdoer in doing the wrong and the injury inflicted to the wrongdoer in righting the wrong are indifferents, and even though indifferents are the full-fledged object of our impulses,¹⁶⁸ for Chrysippus indifferents are of little to no concern (cf. Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 30 1048b, quoting from Chrysippus' *On Nature*, Book III) and contribute nothing to happiness (cf. Plutarch's *De Communibus Notitiis* 5 1060d, quoting from Chrysippus' *On Exhortation*, Book I), in such a way that punishment would be a mere exchange of minor setbacks if it were a matter of retribution. In opposition, for Chrysippus passions are evil (cf. Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 19 1042ef, quoting from Chrysippus' *On the Goal*, Book I), in such a way that punishment is given a proper moral aim only once it is connected with the therapy of passions.

But if the notion of therapeutic punishment is to be taken in all earnest, then punishment does not bear overtones of retribution and does not require one to be the ultimate origin of one's passion in order for one to be deserving of such therapeutic measure. Quite the contrary: it is sufficient that nothing produces our assent in our place and that assent issues in passion and withdrawing assent issues in extirpating passion in order for punishment to deservedly address our psychic tonus as the source and core of the issue and rid us of our passion.

In light of what precedes, it is possible to devise an account of just blame and punishment in Stoic therapy of passions which, I surmise, applies to all forms of just blame and punishment (including exemplary capital punishment) and also to praise and honor (so as to include also *laudamus* ["we praise"] in Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes* IV 60): praise, blame, honor, and punishment are just if, and only if,

- (i) impulse is consequent on assent in that it takes place once assent is given, and ceases once assent is withdrawn;
- (ii) assent is up to one (and others) in that it does not take place on its own, but it is rather one (or others) who give it; and
- (iii) praise, blame, honor, or punishment are both needed and apposite in order to effect a change in one's (or others') assent.

¹⁶⁸ On which, cf. Brennan (2005), ch. 7.

That, I submit, is the account presupposed both in all cases of just blame and punishment above and in Chrysippus' reply to the objection in Cicero's *De Fato* 40 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5.

Chrysippus' reply in Cicero, *De Fato* 41–3 and Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 6–14

We are now in a position to move to Chrysippus' reply to the objection in Cicero's *De Fato* 40 and Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5.

I begin with Cicero's testimony. Since it is my aim here to reconstruct Chrysippus' reply, I do not include what I believe belongs not in Chrysippus' reply but rather in Cicero's own perspective on the significance of Chrysippus' reply.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, I depart from the text in Sharples (1991) in some respects; my choices are signaled in the footnotes to the original Latin text.

Below is Chrysippus' reply in Cicero's *De Fato*:

[41] “Causarum enim,” inquit, “aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuuantes et proximae. Quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus antecedentibus¹⁷⁰ et proximis.” Itaque illi rationi, quam paullo ante conclusi, sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis. Quae si ipsae non sint¹⁷¹ in nostra potestate, non sequitur, ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. At hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus ut cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate.¹⁷² [42] ... Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata

169 Cf. below, pp. 110–18.

170 Following the MSS.

171 Following the oldest MSS.

172 Following ABFMVa. A more recent hand adds *ne ille quidem esset in nostra potestate*, and then *ne appetitus*, at the margin of V.

(necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat. [43] “Ut igitur,” inquit, “qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum inprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem, sed adsensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est, suapte vi et natura movebitur. Quod si aliqua res efficeretur sine causa antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri; sin omnibus, quaecumque fiunt, veri simile est causam antecedere, quid adferri poterit,¹⁷³ cur non omnia fato fieri fatendum sit, modo intellegatur, quae sit causarum distinctio ac dissimilitudo?”

[41] “Some causes,” he says, “are perfect and principal, others are auxiliary and proximate. For that reason, when we say that everything takes place by antecedent causes we do not want this to be understood, 'by perfect and principal causes,' but 'by auxiliary and proximate antecedent causes.’” And so he meets as follows the argument I delivered a little before: If everything takes place by Fate, this much follows, that everything takes place by preceding causes, though not by principal and perfect causes but by auxiliary and proximate causes. If the latter are not up to us, it does not follow that no impulse is up to us; that, however, would follow if we said that everything takes place by perfect and principal causes as though those causes were not up to us. [42] ... He thinks it is easy for him to explain the peculiar quality of the assertion that assents take place by preceding causes. For although assent cannot take place unless moved by a presentation, nevertheless, since assent has the presentation as its proximate, not its principal, cause, that assertion, as Chrysippus wants, has the explanation we have just given: not that assent can take place aroused by no power from without (for it is necessary that assent be set in motion by a presentation), but he turns to his boulder and top, which cannot begin to move unless struck, but, when that has happened, he thinks that it is by their very nature that, for the rest, both the boulder rolls and the top spins. [43] “Therefore,” he says, “as the one who pushed a boulder gave it the principle of its motion but did not give it its rollability, so the thing presented imprints this much, and as it were stamps its aspect, in the soul, but assent will be up to us, and as has been said in the case of the boulder, struck from without

173 Following Vc with Sharples. VaAa's *quod adferri poterit* ("it will be possible to give some reason") and AcBFM's *adferri potest* ("it is possible to give a reason") make Chrysippus say that there is a reason why it is not the case that everything takes place by Fate.

for the rest it shall move by its very power and nature. Wherefore, if a thing were to be effected without an antecedent cause, it would be false that everything takes place by Fate; but if it is plausible that there is an antecedent cause of everything that takes place, what reason shall it be possible to give why it should be granted that it is not the case that everything takes place by Fate, once it is understood what distinction and dissimilarity there is among causes?”

Note, first, that the sequence of causes implied in the objection,¹⁷⁴

is here changed into,

To be more precise, I think that the latter sequence of causes underlies Chrysippus' claim in §42 to the effect that although it is necessary for assent to be set in motion by a presentation, assent is nevertheless up to us, since the presentation is but the proximate cause of assent. My reason for assuming the latter sequence of causes (instead of assuming assent to be set in motion by a presentation through the mediation of impulse, as per the sequence of causes

¹⁷⁴ Cf. above, p. 64.

implied in the objection) is that I take Chrysippus' claim in §42 to the effect that assent may be up to us even though the proximate cause of assent is not up to us to be a justification of his claim in §41 to the effect that it is not sufficient for proximate causes not to be up to us in order for impulse not to be up to us.¹⁷⁵

The change in the sequence has a decisive bearing on the argument. Whereas in the objection it is assumed that impulses follow upon their antecedent causes without the mediation of assent, the gist of Chrysippus' reply, I submit, is that impulse is consequent on assent and assent is up to us. That, as we have seen, is the key element in Seneca's claim in *De Ira* II 1 3–2 1 on the legitimacy of the therapy of anger,¹⁷⁶ and I believe the two issues are connected. The objection in Cicero's *De Fato* 40 purports to establish that praise, blame, honor, and punishment are not just if everything takes place by Fate, and does so on the basis of two basic claims: that we are not justly praised, blamed, honored, or punished if assent and action are not up to us; and that assent and action are not up to us if everything takes place by Fate.¹⁷⁷ But if a Stoic holds that blame and punishment are just only when needed and apposite in the context of the therapy of passions,¹⁷⁸ and when needed and apposite in the context of the therapy of passions blame and punishment are just only if these conditions obtain—that the impulse for which we are blamed or punished is consequent on assent in that assent issues in impulse and withdrawing assent issues in extirpating impulse, and that assent is up to us in that assent does not take place on its own but it is rather we who give or withhold assent¹⁷⁹—then Chrysippus need only establish that those conditions obtain in order to establish that blame and punishment are just.

Chrysippus distinguishes between “perfect and principal causes” (*causae perfectae et principales*) and “auxiliary and proximate causes” (*causae adiuvantes et proximae*) in §42. The distinction has given rise to much controversy among interpreters, and my own stand on the issue is not in full consonance with previous attempts at reconstructing Chrysippus' view; in what follows, I shall comment mostly on Frede (1980) and Bobzien (1999).

I take “*perfect cause*” as the *self-sufficient* cause of a given outcome on the basis of Clement's *Stromata* VIII 9 25.3 and 33.2, where the sustaining cause (συνεκτικὸν αἰτίον) is synonymously called perfect in itself (αὐτοτελέες) because it “self-sufficiently, on its own

¹⁷⁵ Cf. below, p. 100.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. above, pp. 87–8.

¹⁷⁷ The latter claim is the gist of (1)–(14) in my reconstruction (corresponding to the piece of reasoning leading up to *igitur* [“therefore”] in §40), whereas the former claim is the immediately following step (15).

¹⁷⁸ Cf. above, pp. 85–7 and 90–1; the claim corresponds to (iii) on p. 91.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. above, pp. 87–8 and 91; the claims correspond to (i) and (ii) on p. 91.

account produces the outcome” (αὐτάρκως δι’ αὐτοῦ ποιητικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος). Below I shall reject both Michael Frede's claim that the perfect cause of one's acting in a given way is that about one which causes one's acting in a given way¹⁸⁰ and Susanne Bobzien's claim to the effect that for Chrysippus there are no perfect causes at play in Cicero's testimony because Chrysippus is there dealing with causes of change and for Chrysippus there are no perfect causes of change.¹⁸¹ I shall claim that Chrysippus's goal in the passage is to establish neither one's *nature* as the perfect cause of one's *actions*, nor simply that there are no perfect causes of one's *actions*, but rather to establish *assent* as the perfect cause of *impulse*, as well as that *presentations* are not the ultimate origin of *assent*.¹⁸²

I take “*principal cause*” as the *ultimate origin* of a given outcome in the sense that a given outcome traces back to nothing but to it, in which I partly follow Michael Frede's suggestion to the effect that the Greek κύριος underlies the Latin *principalis* in Cicero's testimony.¹⁸³ Note, however, that the meaning I attribute to *principalis* in Cicero's testimony is equivalent to the meaning I attribute to κύριος in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* II 6,¹⁸⁴ and is in line with the worry in the objection (called [U] in my reconstruction)¹⁸⁵ that if the antecedent cause of assent, impulse, and action reaches past beyond us, then assent, impulse, and action are not up to us.

As for auxiliary causes, in Chrysippus' reply it is said only that everything takes place by Fate through auxiliary and proximate causes rather than through perfect and principal causes (§41, twice), and that assent may be up to us even if auxiliary and proximate causes are not up to us (*ibidem*). I shall take “*auxiliary cause*,” as the name suggests, as a cause that does not self-sufficiently bring about a given outcome, nor is such that a given outcome traces back to nothing but that.

Finally, in Chrysippus' reply it is said that presentations are the proximate cause but not the principal cause of assent (§41). I shall take “*proximate cause*,” as the name suggests, as the *immediately preceding* cause of a given outcome.¹⁸⁶

Let us now consider Sextus' *Adversus Mathematicos* IX 211, where the Stoics are said to hold that every cause is a body that is cause *to* a body *of* something incorporeal (Στωϊκοὶ ...

180 Cf. Frede (1987: 139ff.).

181 Cf. Bobzien (1999), esp. sections VI–VII.

182 Cf. below, pp. 97–9.

183 Cf. Frede (1987: 142).

184 Cf. above, p. 37.

185 Cf. above, pp. 65–6.

186 Cf. Bobzien (1999: 233) for a similar view.

πάν αἴτιον σῶμά φασι σώματι ἄσωμάτου τινὸς αἴτιον γίνεσθαι). Here, “something incorporeal” is an attribute holding of the second body in virtue of the activity of the first body.¹⁸⁷ Note that if a cause is a body and an effect is something incorporeal, then that which is an effect in a former causal interplay cannot assume the role of cause in a future causal interplay: the schema only allows for a chain of causes to be construed in which the body to which another body is a cause in a former interplay in turn assumes the role of cause in a future interplay. In such cases, it is expected that something is brought into play by the former interplay in the future interplay, so that the chain of causes issues from no mere accident: a butcher's steel is cause to a *so far blunt* knife of its being sharpened, the *now sharpened* knife is cause to the so far uncut meat of its being cut, and so on.

If the schema in Sextus' *Adversus Mathematicos* IX 211 applies to Chrysippus' distinction of causes in Cicero's testimony, then when a presentation is cause *to* such and such a person *of* her giving assent to a proposition, the presentation is not the principal cause of her giving assent to that proposition because the fact that the outcome is her giving assent to that proposition does not trace back to nothing but the presentation, since it takes *such and such a person* to give assent to that proposition, while other kinds of persons withhold assent to that proposition on the basis of the same presentation. Take the Menelaus example in Chrysippus' *On Passions* as quoted in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 1–9:¹⁸⁸ it is possible to say that the presentation of Helen's bare body is cause *to* a weak person such as Menelaus *of* his giving assent to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss, in which case the presentation of Helen's bare body is not the principal cause of his giving assent to that proposition because the fact that the outcome is his giving assent to that proposition does not trace back to nothing but the presentation of Helen's bare body, since it takes *a weak person such as Menelaus* (which surely may well be many a man) to give assent to that proposition.

The presentation of Helen's bare body does not induce assent all by itself because on the basis of the same presentation a man of strong and firm tonus withholds assent to the proposition that he should practice a shameful act—it takes one's weak and soft tonus to yield and assent to the duty premise of the passion of desire. Thus, even though a presentation always elicits a response on our part (which Chrysippus recognizes when he claims that it is necessary for assent to be set in motion by a presentation in §42), whether we give or withhold assent to a proposition necessarily traces back to our being the kinds of persons we

187 Cf. Sedley (1999: 400).

188 Cf. above, pp. 83–5.

are, and is up to us in the sense that it does not take place on its own but it is rather we who give or withhold assent by being the kinds of persons we are.

Surely that is a much less robust notion of that which is up to us than is to be found in the objection, where “that which is up to us” is that which traces back to nothing but us. However, one should be reminded that just blame and punishment in the context of the therapy of passions require much less than ultimate origination,¹⁸⁹ and Chrysippus' distinction of causes allows for a denial of claim [U] in the objection to the effect that if the antecedent cause of assent, impulse, and action reaches beyond us, then assent, impulse, and action are not up to us: claim [U] holds good for *principal* causes, but not so for mere *proximate* causes. Thus, with respect to assent's being up to us it is sufficient for Chrysippus to establish that nothing produces our assent in our place, instead it takes the kinds of persons we are to either give or withhold assent—and in effect, according to §41 if assent has either a perfect or a principal cause (namely, if either a given cause is self-sufficient for assent or assent traces back to nothing but a given cause) and that cause is not up to us in that it reaches beyond us, then assent is not up to us; but it does not follow that assent is not up to us if it is only the auxiliary or proximate cause of assent that reaches beyond us.

Let us now consider whether any item in the sequence of causes implied in Chrysippus' reply may be a perfect cause. Michael Frede has claimed that there are two kinds of causes at play whenever something does something or other: the auxiliary and proximate cause and the *causa perfecta et principalis*.¹⁹⁰ Susanne Bobzien has criticized views such as Frede's on the grounds that perfect causes do not cooperate with other factors but bring about the outcome completely on their own. She has also claimed that a *causa perfecta et principalis*, being the same as a sustaining cause,¹⁹¹ is cause not of a movement but of a state of affairs in Stoic physics, whereas (according to her) what is at stake in Chrysippus' reply is not a state of affairs but a movement. For her, perfect causes are at stake in Chrysippus' reply only to the extent that no antecedent causes may be such.¹⁹²

I believe it is correct to say that perfect causes do not cooperate with other factors and are indeed causes of states of affairs, but I believe we should admit the possibility that *assent* is the perfect cause of *impulses* such as (being affected by) passions.

Chrysippus' reply is nowhere explicitly said in Cicero's testimony to have dealt with

189 Cf. above, p. 95.

190 Cf. Frede (1987: 139ff.).

191 Cf. above, pp. 95–6, on Clement's *Stromata* VIII 9 25.3 and 33.2.

192 Cf. Bobzien (1998a: 255–71) and Bobzien (1999).

the issue whether *actions* are up to us, only with whether *impulses* are up to us in §41 and with whether *assents* are up to us in §§42–3. If my claim is right that for a Stoic blame and punishment are just only when needed and apposite in the context of the therapy of passions, Chrysippus' reply may be said to *justifiably* have passed in silence the issue whether actions are up to us, since in the context of the therapy of passions it is necessary to establish only the following—that assent issues in impulse and withdrawing assent issues in extirpating impulse, and that assent does not take place on its own but it takes the kinds of persons we are to either give or withhold assent—in order for blame and punishment to be just, as has been called into question in the objection.

In the sequence of causes implied in Chrysippus' reply it is simply assumed that impulse is consequent on assent,¹⁹³ but it is safe to assume so for Chrysippus on the basis of his claim that all passion—which, as we have seen, is a kind of impulse¹⁹⁴—is a judgment,¹⁹⁵ taking his claim to generalize over all kinds of impulse and assuming a judgment to be nothing but a proposition to which we have given assent. Thus, it is possible to claim that for Chrysippus assent issues in impulse and (as the therapy of passions assumes to be the case) withdrawing assent issues in extirpating impulse.

Note that assent does not cooperate with any other factor in order to bring about impulse: in accordance with the claim that something must be brought into play by a former causal interplay in a future causal interplay in order for the chain of causes to issue from no mere accident,¹⁹⁶ the presentation of Helen's bare body is cause to Menelaus of his assenting to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss, and in turn Menelaus *as he has given assent to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss* is cause to Menelaus (as he has given assent to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss) of his being possessed of the passion of desire—but while the presentation of Helen's bare body is but the immediately preceding cause of Menelaus' assenting because assenting rather than withholding assent necessarily traces back to Menelaus' weak and soft tonus, Menelaus' having assented is in turn self-sufficient for his being possessed of the passion of desire, since for Chrysippus a passion is nothing but a judgment. Note, in addition, that in the context of the therapy of passions it is assumed that impulse arises as soon as assent is given and abates as soon as assent is withdrawn—such simultaneity being explicitly said to be a characteristic feature of self-sufficient causes in Clement's *Stromata* VIII 9 33 1.

193 Cf. above, pp. 94–5.

194 Cf. above, p. 79.

195 Cf. above, p. 88.

196 Cf. above, p. 97.

Upon establishing that assent is both the perfect cause of impulse and up to us, Chrysippus is capable of establishing also that impulse is up to us, in accordance with his claim in §41 that “it would follow <that no impulse is up to us> if we said that everything takes place by perfect and principal causes as though those causes were not up to us” (*at hoc [=ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate] sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus ut cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate*): by transposition, if impulse is up to us then not everything takes place by perfect and principal causes as though those causes were not up to us, which in turn allows for the perfect cause of impulse to be up to us if impulse is to be up to us.

But is Chrysippus' reply, to the effect that assent is both the perfect cause of impulse and up to us, sufficient to counter the objection that Fate undermines just blame and punishment? At first blush, Chrysippus is capable of establishing only that whether we give or withhold assent to a proposition is not due to externals such as Helen's bare body—and in effect *extrinsecus* (“from without”) is twice used in Cicero's testimony (once in §42 and once in §43) to refer to assent's being set in motion (cf. *excitata* [“aroused”] in §42 and *pulsa* [“struck”] in §43) by presentations of externals. On such a hypothesis, Chrysippus would have nothing to say on the issue whether we can justly be blamed and punished if our being the kinds of persons we are is completely due to factors reaching beyond us: if everything takes place by Fate and a person assents to a presentation because her psychic tonus is such and such, whatever in the past determines that her psychic tonus is such and such is the ultimate origin of her assent, and it is unfair for her to be blamed or punished for a consequence of her assent if she is blamed or punished in return for a consequence of her assent.

Susanne Bobzien has claimed that in Chrysippus' view since two different bodies *a* and *b* (corresponding each to the second body in a causal interplay) respond differently to the same body *c* (corresponding to the first body in a causal interplay) on the basis of *a*'s and *b*'s respective psychic tension (τόνος),¹⁹⁷ *a* and *b* are responsible for the moral quality of the effect and it is up to each of them to respond thus or otherwise to *c* in the sense that each makes a different contribution to the outcome.¹⁹⁸

Physically, the difference between individual natures of our minds are due to a difference in the tension (τόνος) of the mind-*pneuma*. In every prospective case of

197 The term I translate as “tonus” in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 1–9 (De Lacy gives “tone”).

198 Cf. Bobzien (1998a: 255–71) and Bobzien (1999).

assent, whether the incoming impression results in an act of assent to it will depend on the state of tension of that *pneuma*. Thus, the individual nature of the person's mind is responsible for whether assent is given, as the shape of the pushed object is for whether it will roll ... It is the faculty of assent which makes it possible for adult human beings to become the controlling factor of their actions, in that it enables them to respond to externally induced impressions in accordance with the individual nature of their mind. They are thus not forced in their decisions and actions (1998a: 268–9).

She adds that Chrysippus' solution cannot show that what *a* and *b* do is something for which *a* and *b* are responsible because it cannot show that *a* and *b* themselves, instead of whatever in the past determines *a*'s and *b*'s respective psychic tension, are the authors of their decisions and actions.¹⁹⁹ The problem, I believe, arises from her taking Chrysippus' solution to apply only in the case of externals such as the objects of presentations:²⁰⁰ in her view, Chrysippus' solution is akin to a Frankfurt-case in that it does not offer more than absence from external compulsion and therefore does not address the issue of ultimate origination.²⁰¹

I submit instead that unlike Harry Frankfurt's, Chrysippus' view is able to altogether dismiss the issue of ultimate origination by presupposing that the issue of just blame and punishment arises only in the context of the therapy of passions; what is more, by upholding that assent not only necessarily traces back to us but is also self-sufficient for impulse it offers more than mere absence from external compulsion from presentations for assent and impulse. Take once more the Menelaus example in Chrysippus' *On Passions* as quoted in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 1–9.²⁰² First, Menelaus is as affected by the passion of anger in Phthia as he had been affected by the passion of desire in Troy, and his anger in Phthia is as consequent on his assent to the proposition that he should take revenge on Andromache as his desire in Troy had been consequent on his assent to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss. Moreover, assent is as up to him in Phthia as it had been in Troy: it takes as weak a psychic tonus for him to assent to the proposition that he should take revenge on Andromache as it had taken for him to assent to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss. Finally, Peleus' upbraid in Phthia is both needed and apposite in order to effect a change in his assent to the proposition that he should take revenge on Andromache and thus rid him of his anger.

199 Cf. Bobzien (1998a: 290–301).

200 Cf. Bobzien (1998a: 259–71).

201 Cf. above, p. 56. Cf. also Salles (2000); Salles (2005b), ch. 4.5.

202 Cf. above, pp. 83–5.

Peleus' upbraid meets the three conditions I set forth above for just blame:²⁰³ it is fair to blame Menelaus for his impulse because in each case his assent is self-sufficient for his impulse and in each case his assent necessarily traces back to his being the kind of person he is, thus allowing the therapy of passions to address his weakness as the source and core of the problem. In the context of the therapy of passions it is of no relevance whatsoever whether our being the kinds of persons we are traces back to factors beyond our control, since the issue is simply whether that which is to be extirpated both arises on account of our assenting on the basis of our being such as we are, and abates on account of our withdrawing assent also on the basis of our being such as we are.

Since blame is to be taken *qua* means for effecting a cure, not *qua* retribution for a previous offense, Oedipus' claim (in Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*, ll. 962–73) that Creon reproaches him unjustly because Oedipus is not the ultimate origin of the actions for which Creon reproaches him has no bearing on the issue: the concern with retribution in Oedipus' claim is not at all a concern for therapeutic blame, since it is not necessary for one to be the ultimate origin of one's passion in order for one to be deserving of blame if blame is meant simply to address one's weakness in order to rid one of one's passion. Thus, in accordance with the stronger reading of the objection,²⁰⁴ Chrysippus' solution applies not only in cases where there is an issue regarding the antecedent cause of one's assent understood as the external item that is the object of one's presentation (say, Helen's bare body if one assents to the proposition that one should accept Helen's kiss) but also in cases where there is an issue regarding the antecedent cause of one's assent understood as anything in the causal history of one's assent which makes one's assent such as it is (say, Helen's bare body and anything in the causal history of one's having a weak and soft tonus if one assents to the proposition that one should accept Helen's kiss).

Before we turn to Gellius' testimony, I shall say a few words on the boulder and top analogy as it is presented in Cicero's testimony. I shall have more to say on the subject as we turn to Gellius' testimony, in particular why I take the objects to be a boulder and a top instead of a cylinder and a cone, and how I take Chrysippus' views on passions to come into the picture in the analogy. For the time being, suffice it to say that as it is necessary for both boulder and top to be struck in order to either roll or spin, but whether they roll or spin necessarily traces back to their being either a boulder or a top, so it is necessary for different kinds of persons to have a presentation in order to either give or withhold assent, but whether

203 Cf. above, p. 91.

204 Cf. above, p. 67.

they give or withhold assent necessarily traces back to their having either a weak or a strong psychic tonus. Thus, a boulder and a top “cannot begin to move unless struck” (*moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt*, §42), and “the one who pushed a boulder gave it the principle of its motion” (*qui protrusit cylindrum dedit ei principium motionis*, §43), but the strike or push is not the ultimate origin of whether the boulder rolls and the top spins because whether the boulder rolls and the top spins necessarily traces back to their respective natures (cf. “he [=Chrysippus] thinks that it is by their very nature that, for the rest, both the boulder rolls and the top spins” [*suapte natura quod superest et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat*], where “for the rest” [*quod superest*] presumably anticipates the way each different object is said to move). In a similar way, according to §42 “assent cannot take place unless moved by a presentation” (*adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso*), and “it is necessary that assent be set in motion by a presentation” (*necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri*), but the presentation is not the ultimate origin of whether a person gives or withholds assent (cf. “since <assent> has the presentation as its proximate, not its principal, cause” [*cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem*]) because whether a person gives or withholds assent necessarily traces back to the person's nature (cf. “for the rest it shall move by its very power and nature” [*quod reliquum est suapte vi et natura movebitur*], where “for the rest” [*quod reliquum est*] presumably corresponds to the way each different person responds to a presentation).

Let us now move to Chrysippus' reply in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 6–14:²⁰⁵

[6] Contra ea Chrysippus tenuiter multa et argute disserit; sed omnium fere, quae super ea re scripsit, huiusmodi sententia est. [7] “Quamquam ita sit,” inquit, “ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque conexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. [8] Nam si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam uim, quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt. Sin uero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etiamsi paruo siue nullo fatalis incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua tamen scaeuitate et uoluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt. [9] Idque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et necessaria rerum consequentia efficit, quae fatum uocatur. [10] Est enim genere ipso quasi fatale et consequens, ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non uacent.” [11] Huius deinde fere rei exemplo non hercle nimis alieno neque inlepidio

205 I follow the text in Hertz-Hosius (1903) except where otherwise noted.

utitur. “Sicut,” inquit, “lapidem cylindrum si per spatia terrae prona atque derupta iacias, causam quidem ei et initium praecipitantiae feceris, mox tamen ille praeceps uoluitur, non quia tu id iam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus eius et formae uolubilitas habet: sic ordo et ratio et necessitas fati genera ipsa et principia causarum mouet, impetus uero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum actionesque ipsas uoluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia moderantur.” Infert deinde verba haec his, quae dixi, congruentia: [12] Διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἴρηται·

γνώσει δ’ ἀνθρώπους ἀνθαίρετα πῆματ’ ἔχοντας,

ὥς τῶν βλαβῶν ἐκάστοις παρ’ αὐτοὺς γινομένων καὶ καθ’ ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἀμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ <διά>θεσιν.²⁰⁶

[13] Propterea negat oportere ferri audique homines aut nequam aut ignavos et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et maleficio revincti sunt, perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem, tamquam in aliquod fani asylum et, quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritate, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt. [14] Primus autem hoc sapientissimus ille et antiquissimus poetarum dixit hisce versibus,

ὦ πόποι, οἷον δὴ νῦ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιώωνται.

ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ’ ἔμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ

σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόνον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσι.

[6] Chrysippus much disserts against that, subtly and acutely, but the gist of everything he has written about that matter is of the following sort: [7] “Although it is true,” he says, “that all things are united and connected by a necessary and first reason which is Fate, yet the states of our minds are themselves subject to Fate to the extent that this is their characteristic quality. [8] For if they have been fashioned in a healthy and seemly manner by nature from the start, they will transmit in a most inoffensive and tractable manner all that force which falls upon them from without on account of Fate. But if they are rough, foolish, rude, and without any support from education, then, even if they are urged by the strike of slight or null fated inconvenience, by their own perversity and voluntary impulse they tumble down into continuous faults and mistakes. [9] And that this much should take place by this reason is due to that natural and necessary string of things which is called Fate. [10] For it is as though fatal and strung by their very kind that evil states should not be without trespasses and mistakes.” [11] For which, he then makes use of an example which, by Hercules!, is

²⁰⁶ Following Usener's conjecture.

not in the least alien, nor unelegant: “As,” he says, “if you push a boulder stone over a sloping, steep piece of ground, you will indeed have made for the cause and onset of its plummet, yet it thereupon rolls downwards not because you make it so at this point, but because its shape, that is, the form's rollability is so disposed;²⁰⁷ just so the order, reason, and necessity of Fate sets in motion the kinds themselves and the beginnings of causes, but the impulses of our designs and thoughts, and our actions themselves, are regulated by our own will and the states of our minds.” He then brings forward the following words, which are in agreement with what I said: [12] “Therefore it is said by the Pythagoreans,

You shall learn that men's sanctions are self-chosen,

much to the effect that each one's harms are brought about by oneself, that is, to the effect that one trespasses and is harmed on the basis of one's impulse and of one's mind and state.” [13] For this reason he denies that one should endure, and listen to, men who are either worthless or idle, both damaging and rash, who, when bound fast in crime and evildoing, seek refuge in the necessity of Fate as in the asylum of a shrine and say that their wicked actions are to be attributed not to their recklessness but to Fate. [14] But the first to say so was the wisest and most ancient of the poets in these verses,

Oh for shame! how the mortals accuse us gods,
for they say evils come from us, when it is they, rather,
who by their own recklessness have sorrow beyond what is due!”

While in Cicero's testimony Chrysippus' reply is said to rely on a distinction between kinds of causes (§41), in Gellius' testimony the gist of Chrysippus' reply is said to consist in establishing that we are subject to Fate to the extent that we are persons of a given kind (§7). That, as we have seen, corresponds to the gist of Chrysippus' claim that assent is up to us in Cicero's testimony (§§42–3): it takes a person of weak psychic tonus such as Menelaus' to assent, on the basis of the presentation of Helen's bare body, to the proposition that he should accept Helen's kiss, whereas a person of strong psychic tonus withholds assent to the same proposition on the basis of the same presentation.²⁰⁸ Note that in Gellius' testimony it is expressly not taken into account whether our being persons of a given kind traces back to

²⁰⁷ I take the Latin *ita ... habet* as reminiscent of the Greek πὼς ἔχον.

²⁰⁸ Cf. above, pp. 97–8.

factors such as nature or education (cf. “if they have been fashioned in a healthy and seemly manner by nature from the start” [*si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta*] and “but if they are rough, foolish, rude, and without any support from education” [*sin uero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta*] in §8). That, as we have seen, is not a matter for concern: Chrysippus' reply is able to altogether dismiss the issue of ultimate origination once it is assumed that the issue of desert arises only in the context of the therapy of passions, since it is sufficient to establish that we respond to externals on the basis of the kinds of persons we are in order for the apposite therapeutic measure to address the source and core of the problem and effect a cure.²⁰⁹

As for the analogy, Chrysippus claims in §11 that the push is the cause at the origin of the boulder's fall (cf. *causam quidem ei et initium praecipitantiae feceris*), but the fact that the boulder rolls is due not to any exertion on the part of the pusher (*non quia tu id iam facis*) but to the boulder's own shape (*sed quoniam ita sese modus eius et formae uolubilitas habet*). As in Cicero's testimony, the contrast is that between the push as the origin of the boulder's *moving* and the boulder's moving *in a given way* as necessarily tracing back to the kind of object the boulder is. However, the analogy is here said to illustrate not the claim that *assent* is up to us but the claim that our *impulses* and *actions* (cf. *impetus ... actionesque*, §11) are subject to Fate not as to a force trumping us but to the extent that we are the kinds of persons we are (cf. *genero ipso* in §10 and *genera ipsa* in §11). As we have seen, in Cicero's testimony our impulses are up to us to the extent that assent is both the perfect cause of our impulses and up to us, but nothing is there said of actions.

Note that only the boulder is mentioned in what appears to be a translation of a direct quotation of Chrysippus in §11 of Gellius' testimony, in much the same way as only the boulder is mentioned in what appears to be a translation of a direct quotation of Chrysippus in §43 of Cicero's testimony, whereas both boulder and top are mentioned in §42 of Cicero's testimony, where Cicero speaks in his own voice. The physical object, in Gellius' wording, is a *lapis cylindrus*, in which formula the noun *cylindrus* comes in apposition to the noun *lapis*. On purely grammatical grounds, I surmise that the phrase *lapis cylindrus* designates not a stone cylinder, that is, a cylinder made of stone, but a stone called κύλινδρος, that is, a κύλινδρος stone—or, in a literal translation, a *boulder* stone.

In effect, in a direct quotation in the original Greek in §12 Chrysippus makes use of a quotation from the Pythagorean *Carmen Aureum*. I believe it is no accident that the line forms part of a section of the poem where men are called κύλινδροι:

209 Cf. above, pp. 100–2.

γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πῆματ' ἔχοντας,
 τλήμονας, οἷτ' ἀγαθῶν πέλας ὄντων οὔτ' ἐσορῶσιν
 οὔτε κλύουσι, λύσιν δὲ κακῶν παῦροι συνιᾶσιν.
 τοίη Μοῖρα βροτῶν βλάπτει φρένας· οἱ δὲ κύλινδροι
 ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλα φέρονται ἀπείρονα πῆματ' ἔχοντες.

You shall know that men's sanctions are self-chosen,
 wretched ones!, who, though goods be nigh, neither behold
 nor hearken, and few are aware of the liberation from evils.
 Such Moira harms the spirits of mortals, and they, boulders,
 are at times borne elsewhere, suffering limitless sanctions.

(Il. 54–8)

Pace Hierocles' allegorical reading of the passage (cf. *In Carmen Aureum* 24 §23), nothing suggests that the κύλινδροι associated with πῆματα (“sanctions”) in Il. 57–8 are *cylinders*. The image may instead find its roots in Homeric parlance, where a connection between πῆματα (“sanctions”) and the cognate verb κυλίνδεσθαι (“to be rolled”) is observed: Hector is likened to a boulder rolled upon the Achaeans in the simile in N 136–48 (cf. ὀλοοίτροχος in l. 137 with κυλίνδεται in l. 142), and a sanction (πῆμα) is commonly said in the Homeric poems to be rolled (κυλίνδεσθαι) upon those who are to suffer it: cf. Λ 347 (Hector is a sanction rolled upon Diomedes and Odysseus), P 688 (god rolls a sanction upon the Danaans), β 163 (a sanction is rolled upon the suitors of Penelope), θ 81 (a sanction is to roll upon both Trojans and Danaans by will of great Zeus).

What is more, Chrysippus' analogy apparently underlies the following use of what appears to be a translation of a direct quotation of Chrysippus in the preface to the First Book of Fulgentius' *Mythologiae* (15.15–18 Helm): “the errors of human minds are by no means born unless set in motion by fortuitous strikes, as Chrysippus, writing on Fate, says: ‘onrushes are set rolling by fortuitous strikes’” (*nequaquam aput humanos sensus nisi fortuitis compulsationibus moti nascuntur errores, ut etiam Chrysippus de fato scribens ait: compulsationibus lubricis uoluuntur incursus*). Note that it is in particular “the errors of human minds” (*aput humanos sensus ... errores*) that are here likened to “onrushes” (*incursus*) set rolling, which is in line with the claim that the analogy deals with *assent*—and with assent's being *up to us*—but with it *qua* connected to *passion*, since Chrysippus' reply

presupposes that blame and punishment are at stake only *qua* needed and apposite in order to shift our assent to the duty premise of a passion.

In light of what precedes, I submit that κὺλινδρος designates a boulder in both the Pythagorean *Carmen Aureum* and Chrysippus' analogy, and that in the latter the image is in line with Chrysippus' views on passions, and in particular with the runner analogy in Chrysippus' *On Passions*: since it is in particular one's *errors* in assenting that are likened to a boulder's rolling, and such errors in assenting as are sufficient for one's *passions*, which are in turn likened to a movement no longer allowing for change at wish,²¹⁰ it is plain to see how the boulder's onrush corresponds to the sweeping character of excessive impulses consisting in flawed judgments.

As for the *top* (*turbo*) in §42 of Cicero's testimony, Robert Rabel (1981a) has championed the view that Chrysippus' analogy is the source for the simile in Vergil's *Aeneis* VII 378–84, where Amata is likened to a roving top:

Ceu quondam torto uolitans sub uerbere turbo,
quem pueri magno in gyro uacua atria circum
intenti ludo exercent—ille actus habena
curuatis fertur spatiis; stupet inscia supra
impubesque manus mirata uolubile buxum;
dant animos plagae—non cursu segnior illo
per medias urbes agitur populosque ferocis.

As at times subject to a whirling lash a top flies
which children in a wide circle round the empty courtyard
keep alive when they wish to play—acted on by what sets it in motion
it is carried through curved spaces; the impubescent, overly foolish hand
 marvels, astounded at the rollable wood;
the hits give it life—not slower to it in running
she is led amid cities and ferocious peoples.

That it is a *whipping* top is clear from *torto ... sub uerbere* (“subject to a whirling lash,” l. 378) and *dant animos plagae* (“the hits give it life,” l. 383), and squares with *pulsa* (“struck,”

210 Cf. above, pp. 72–4.

§42) in Cicero's testimony. The top's roving once lashed is a likeness of the onrush of Amata's anger at Lavinia's betrothal to Aeneas (cf. ll. 344–5) once it is made plain that Latinus opposes her wish (cf. ll. 373–4) and the venom of Allecto's viper (cf. ll. 346–53) spreads all throughout her (cf. ll. 374–5). Note that passive voice *agitur* (“is led”) in l. 384 presumably indicates not so much that the venom of Allecto's viper overpowers Amata but that Amata is no longer in charge of her responses, in line with Chrysippus' endorsing of such a parlance as angered persons' being moved “by some compulsion external to them” (κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ βίαν ἔξωθεν αὐτῶν) in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IV 6 35.²¹¹ Thus read, the simile in Vergil's *Aeneis* offers a valid key for reading the image of the top in §42 of Cicero's testimony as bearing overtones of Chrysippus' views on passions, in keeping with my reading of *cylindrus* as a boulder.

Note, finally, that in the direct quotation in the original Greek in §12 Chrysippus states that the harms one suffers are brought about by one (παρά + accusative) in that one is harmed by one's own impulse (ὁρμή) and by the state of one's own mind. On the basis of Plutarch's *De Virtute Morali* 3 441c, I take διάνοια (“mind”) as one's ἡγεμονικόν, and διάθεσις (“state”) as the virtuous or vicious disposition of one's ἡγεμονικόν. Chrysippus' formulation, I believe, encapsulates the following claims: with respect to just punishment, the relevant concern is neither with the injury inflicted by the wrongdoer in doing the wrong nor with the injury inflicted to the wrongdoer in righting the wrong, but with the harm consisting in one's passion;²¹² one's passion is up to one in that it arises on the basis of one's being of a vicious disposition, since assent is both self-sufficient for passion (in that passion arises as assent is given and abates as assent is withdrawn) and up to one (in that it takes the kind of person one is to either give or withhold assent to a proposition on the basis of a presentation);²¹³ and if *x* is up to us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι) to the extent that our being the kinds of persons we are is necessary (and in the circumstances sufficient) for *x*,²¹⁴ whereas *y* is brought about by us (παρ' ἡμᾶς γίγνεσθαι) to the extent that we are necessary (and in the circumstances sufficient) for *y*,²¹⁵ then the harm consisting in our passion is brought about by us to the extent that our passion is up to us. What is more, since the issue about τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and just punishments is raised for the sake of showing that Chrysippus' view on τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς is insufficient to account for just

211 Cf. above, pp. 73–4.

212 Cf. above, pp. 90–1.

213 Cf. above, pp. 97–9.

214 Which is a consequence of the claim that it takes the kinds of persons we are to either give or withhold assent to a proposition on the basis of a presentation.

215 Cf. above, pp. 26–7.

punishment,²¹⁶ it is apposite for Chrysippus at this point to turn once more to his claims about τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς and underscore that just punishments require only that the harm consisting in our passion is brought about by us to the extent that our being the kinds of persons we are is necessary (and in the circumstances sufficient) for our passion. Thus, in facing a more robust version of the objection that Fate precludes the attribution of actions to agents (on the grounds not of Fate's preclusion of effective agency but of Fate's preclusion of ultimate origination) Chrysippus adduces in §14 of Gellius' testimony the same Homeric passage (α 32–4) that he adduces in Diogenianus' testimony (cf. Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI 8 §2) to show that things are brought about by us, but this time to show that punishments are deserved to the extent that punishments address harms (cf. ἄλγε' ἔχουσι in α 34 with τῶν βλαβῶν in §12) which take place on the basis of our being in such and such a state of mind (cf. σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν in α 34 with κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ διάθεσιν in §12).

Necessity as a modal concept in Cicero, *De Fato* 39–45

Let us now observe how a modal notion of necessity finds its way to Cicero's report both of the objection concerning τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and desert and of Chrysippus' reply to it.

In §31 of Cicero's *De Fato*, Carneades is said to have proposed the following argument as a rejoinder to Chrysippus' reply to the Idle Argument:

Si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali conligatione conserte contexteque fiunt; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate; est autem aliquid in nostra potestate; at, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt; non igitur fato fiunt, quaecumque fiunt.

If everything takes place by antecedent causes, everything takes place as if bound in a chain and woven together by a natural connection; if that is so, necessity effects everything; if that is true, nothing is up to us; but something is up to us; however, if everything takes place by Fate, everything takes place by antecedent causes; therefore, it is not the case that everything that takes place, takes place by Fate.

²¹⁶ Cf. above, p. 62.

I propose the following reconstruction:

1. if everything takes place by Fate, then everything takes place by antecedent causes;
2. if everything takes place by antecedent causes, then everything falls under the chain of causes;
3. if everything falls under the chain of causes, then everything takes place of necessity;
4. if everything takes place of necessity, then nothing is up to us;
5. something is up to us;
6. therefore, it is not the case that everything takes place by Fate.

The phrase *naturali conligatione conserte contexteque* (“as if bound in a chain and woven together by a natural connection”) is presumably an echo of such an account of Fate contrived by Chrysippus as *implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines ex quibus apta nexaque est* (“weaving through the ages the chains of consequence from which it is fastened and bound”), as phrased in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 1. There are similarities between Carneades' argument and the objection in §40 of Cicero's *De Fato*: in both an absurd consequence is derived from the claim that everything takes place by Fate via claims about “that which is up to us” and antecedent causes. Their difference, however, is all the more prominent: while the objection in §40 of Cicero's *De Fato* takes the notion of a chain of causation to undermine just blame and punishment on the grounds that it undermines ultimate origination, Carneades' argument takes in turn the notion of a chain of causation to undermine alternative possibilities. Thus, while an account of Fate such as is phrased in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 3 raises a concern with attribution vis-à-vis effective agency in the argument in Diogenianus' testimony, in time expanded into a concern with attribution vis-à-vis desert in the objection in §40 of Cicero's *De Fato*, an account of Fate such as is phrased in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 1 raises a concern with modalities in Carneades' argument.

As we have seen, Chrysippus' account of Fate as an intransgressible chain of causes in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 3 underlies the equation of Fate with a non-modal notion of necessity in Diogenianus' testimony, in time conflated with a modal notion of necessity with its origin in the Mower Argument in Origen's *Contra Celsum* II 20. Also, in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* VII 2 5 the non-modal necessity of Fate underlies the modal necessity of the future

which is there alluded in passing, but with no role to play in the argument. Carneades' argument, in turn, moves in (3) from Chrysippus' account of Fate as the chain of causes to a notion of necessity said in (4) to undermine that which is up to us, presumably insofar as it is taken to undermine alternative possibilities. Seen in the backdrop of the arguments to which Chrysippus replies and not of slips in the sources, it is Carneades' own, original contribution to move from the notion of a chain of causes to a modal notion of necessity in an attack of Chrysippus' views on Fate.

Note that the basic assumption in the debate on moral responsibility in Antiquity is one about ultimate origination and desert, and while alternative possibilities are not at stake in either Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* or Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*, they are indeed connected with “that which is up to us” and the issue of desert in Aristotle's *Ethics*, but only insofar as they are consequent on ultimate origination.²¹⁷ Accordingly, in Cicero's testimony both the objection in §40 and Chrysippus' reply in §§41–3 (as both may be glimpsed beyond a story about two factions supposedly in dispute) address ultimate origination and desert as not touching upon necessity and alternative possibilities, while Carneades' argument in §31 presumably addresses alternative possibilities in connection with ultimate origination (in that it addresses necessity in connection with “that which is up to us” and antecedent causes) but not in connection with desert (in that it does not call into question the justice of blame and punishment). I believe it is Cicero's own contribution in §§39–45 to project the issue of necessity in connection with “that which is up to us” and antecedent causes as raised in Carneades' argument in §31 onto the report both of the objection and of Chrysippus' reply, thus setting the report within the framework of a story about two factions allegedly in dispute about necessity understood rather as a modal concept than as it is found in Epicurus' digression, Diogenianus' testimony on the dispute about τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς and effective exhortation, and Gellius' testimony on the dispute about τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and just punishment.

Below is the whole of Cicero's *De Fato* 39–45, with that which presumably corresponds to either direct speech quotations in translation or Cicero's indirect speech paraphrasing of either the objection or Chrysippus' reply in smaller font size, and Cicero's own third-person perspective on the alleged two factions in dispute in normal font size.²¹⁸

[39] Ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum, qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in

217 Cf. above, p. 37.

218 I follow the text in Sharples (1991) except where otherwise noted.

qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, altera eorum, quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animos²¹⁹ liberatos volunt; dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabatur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus. [40] Atque hoc, si placet, quale sit videamus in adsensionibus, quas prima oratione tractavi. Eas enim veteres illi, quibus omnia fato fieri videbantur, vi effici et necessitate dicebant. Qui autem ab iis dissentiebant, fato adsensiones liberabant negabantque fato adsensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab his posse removeri, iique ita disserebant: 'Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente, et, si adpetitus, illa etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate. Ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia'. Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri, quaecumque fiant. [41] Chrysippus autem cum et necessitatem inprobaret et nihil vellet sine praepositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut et necessitatem effugiat et retineat fatum. 'Causarum enim', inquit, 'aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae. Quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus antecedentibus et proximis'. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis. Quae si ipsae non sint in nostra potestate, non sequitur, ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. At hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus ut cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate. [42] Quam ob rem, qui ita fatum introducunt, ut necessitatem adiungant, in eos valebit illa conclusio; qui autem causas antecedentis non dicent perfectas neque principalis, in eos nihil valebit. Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat. [43] 'Ut igitur', inquit, 'qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum inprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem, sed adsensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est, suapte vi et natura movebitur. Quodsi aliqua res efficeretur sine causa antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri; sin omnibus, quaecumque fiunt, veri simile est causam antecedere, quid adferri poterit, cur non omnia fato fieri fatendum sit? modo intellegatur, quae sit

219 Following AVB.

causarum distinctio ac dissimilitudo.' [44] Haec cum ita sint a Chrysippo explicata, si illi, qui negant adsensiones fato fieri, fateantur tamen eas non sine viso antecedente fieri, alia ratio est; sed, si concedunt anteire visa, nec tamen fato fieri adsensiones, quod proxima illa et continens causa non moveat adsensionem, vide, ne idem dicant. Neque enim Chrysippus concedens adsensionis proximam et continentem causam esse in viso positam neque eam causam esse ad adsentiendum necessariam concedet ut, si omnia fato fiant, omnia causis fiant antecedentibus et necessariis; itemque illi, qui ab hoc dissentiant confitentes non fieri adsensiones sine praecursione visorum, dicent, si omnia fato fierent eius modi, ut nihil fieret nisi praegressione causae, confitendum esse fato fieri omnia; ex quo facile intellectu est, quoniam utrique patefacta atque explicata sententia sua ad eundem exitum veniant, verbis eos, non re dissidere. [45] Omninoque cum haec sit distinctio, ut quibusdam in rebus vere dici possit, cum hae causae antegressae sint, non esse in nostra potestate, quin illa eveniant, quorum causae fuerint, quibusdam autem in rebus causis antegressis in nostra tamen esse potestate, ut illud aliter eveniat, hanc distinctionem utrique adprobant, sed alteri censent, quibus in rebus, cum causae antecesserint, non sit in nostra potestate, ut aliter illa eveniant, eas fato fieri; quae autem in nostra potestate sint, ab iis fatum abesse.

[39] Indeed I think that, since there have been two views among the philosophers of old—that of those who held that everything takes place by Fate in such a way that Fate imparts the force of necessity (of which view were Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle), and that of those who thought that there are voluntary movements of the mind, without Fate at all—Chrysippus, as an arbiter chosen out of respect by the parties themselves, wanted to follow the middle path, but sides rather with those who want the minds freed from the necessity of movement. However, so long as he uses his terminology he falls into difficulties such that he unwillingly confirms the necessity of Fate. [40] Let us, if you please, see what it is like in the case of assents, of which I treated in the first exposition. Those men of old who thought that everything takes place by Fate said that everything is effected by force and necessity; but those who disagreed with them freed assents from Fate, and denied that it is possible to remove necessity from assents if Fate applied to them. They dissented thus, “If everything takes place by Fate, everything takes place by an antecedent cause. And if impulses do, also do those things that follow upon impulse, so also assents. But if the cause of impulse is not up to us, neither is impulse itself up to us. And if that is so, neither are those things that are brought about by impulse up to us. Therefore, neither assents nor actions are up to us. From that it is brought about that praise, blame, honors, and punishments are not just.” Since that is false, they think one may reasonably

conclude that it is not the case that everything that takes place does so by Fate. [41] But Chrysippus, since he both disapproved of necessity and wanted nothing to come about without preceding causes, distinguished kinds of causes so that he both escaped necessity and retained Fate: “Some causes,” he says, “are perfect and principal, others are auxiliary and proximate. For that reason, when we say that everything takes place by antecedent causes we do not want this to be understood, 'by perfect and principal causes,' but 'by auxiliary and proximate antecedent causes.’” And so he meets as follows the argument I delivered a little before: If everything takes place by Fate, this much follows, that everything takes place by preceding causes, though not by principal and perfect causes but by auxiliary and proximate causes. If the latter are not up to us, it does not follow that no impulse is up to us; that, however, would follow if we said that everything takes place by perfect and principal causes as though those causes were not up to us. [42] For which reason, the conclusion shall follow for those who introduce Fate in such a way as to join necessity to it; but nothing shall follow for those who say that antecedent causes are not perfect, nor principal. For he thinks it is easy for him to explain the peculiar quality of the assertion that assents take place by preceding causes. For although assent cannot take place unless moved by a presentation, nevertheless, since assent has the presentation as its proximate, not its principal, cause, that assertion, as Chrysippus wants, has the explanation we have just given: not that assent can take place aroused by no power from without (for it is necessary that assent be set in motion by a presentation), but he turns to his boulder and top, which cannot begin to move unless struck, but, when that has happened, he thinks that it is by their very nature that, for the rest, both the boulder rolls and the top spins. [43] “Therefore,” he says, “as the one who pushed a boulder gave it the principle of its motion but did not give it its rollability, so the thing presented imprints this much, and as it were stamps its aspect, in the soul, but assent will be up to us, and as has been said in the case of the boulder, struck from without for the rest it shall move by its very power and nature. Wherefore, if a thing were to be effected without an antecedent cause, it would be false that everything takes place by Fate; but if it is plausible that there is an antecedent cause of everything that takes place, what reason shall it be possible to give why it should be granted that it is not the case that everything takes place by Fate, once it is understood what distinction and dissimilarity there is among causes?” [44] Since the matter is thus explained by Chrysippus, it is another argument if those who deny that assents take place by Fate nevertheless grant that those do not take place without an antecedent presentation; if, however, they concede that presentations antecede, and nevertheless assents do not take place by Fate because the proximate and containing cause does not move assent, see whether they do not mean the same. For Chrysippus, who concedes neither that the proximate and containing cause of assent is located in the presentation nor that that cause necessitates assent, shall concede that if everything takes place by Fate, then everything takes place by antecedent and necessitating causes.²²⁰ And

220 *Contra* Sharples, LS, Boeri-Salles. I take *neque ... neque ...* with the infinitives, and falling under *concedens*.

similarly, when those who disagree acknowledge that assents do not take place without presentations preceding them, they say that, if everything takes place by Fate in such a way that nothing takes place unless causes precede, then it must be acknowledged that everything takes place by Fate. From which it is easy to understand that once their respective views are made plain and explained, they come to the same result—they disagree about words, not the thing. [45] In general, both parties approve of the distinction since the distinction is—that in some cases it is possible to say with truth that since *these* causes anteceded it is not up to us that that comes about of which there have been causes, but in other cases even though causes anteceded it is nevertheless up to us that it come about otherwise. However, the others think that those things take place by Fate which, since causes anteceded, it is not up to us that they come about otherwise, and that Fate is absent from that which is up to us.

My comments shall be brief. Cicero underlines in §39 that the passage gives his own view on the significance of Chrysippus' reply (cf. *mihi quidem uidetur* ["indeed I think"]): both the story about two factions in dispute and Chrysippus' place against such a background are thus explicitly marked as Cicero's own making. Chrysippus is seen as intent on disavowing the claim that assents take place of necessity, but "unwillingly" (*inuitus*) subscribing to the necessity of Fate on grounds of expression (cf. *dum ... verbis utitur suis* ["so long as he uses his terminology"]). I submit that in Cicero's view Chrysippus' reply is meant to cohere with his view on modalities as set forth in the dispute about the Master Argument (as attested in §§11–15), but entails that everything is necessary.

In the first sentence of §41, *cum* ("since") and *ut* ("so that") cannot safely be ascribed to Chrysippus himself, and I believe pertain instead to Cicero's perspective, as expressing that Chrysippus' reply is meant to cohere with his view on modalities. Note that what in §§41–3 presumably corresponds either to translated direct speech quotations or to Cicero's indirect speech paraphrasing of Chrysippus' reply is as silent about necessity as what in §40 presumably corresponds either to a translated direct speech quotation or to Cicero's indirect speech paraphrasing of the objection, and the move from the necessity of Fate to the denial of assent's being up to us—which corresponds to (4) in Carneades' argument²²¹—is explicitly marked as an inference in the first sentence of §42 (cf. *quam ob rem* ["for which reason"]), which cannot safely be ascribed to Chrysippus, and I believe pertains instead to Cicero's perspective).

221 Cf. above, p. 111.

Note that while in the first sentence of §42 Chrysippus' distinction between kinds of causes is explicitly said to block the inference to the denial of assent's being up to us (which is well attested in what presumably corresponds either to translated direct speech quotations or to Cicero's indirect speech paraphrasing of Chrysippus' reply in §§41–3), it is there implied that claiming that antecedent causes are neither perfect nor principal is tantamount to asserting Fate without asserting the necessity of Fate. However, it is said in §44 that even though Chrysippus concedes that presentation is not both proximate and containing cause of assent, nor necessitating of assent, he shall concede that everything takes place by necessitating causes. I take his claim that presentation is not both proximate and containing cause of assent to mean that presentation is not such that it both immediately precedes assent and contains assent all in itself, in line with Chrysippus' claim in §42 that presentation is the proximate cause but not the principal cause of assent, where I take a cause to be principal whose outcome traces back to nothing but to it. Thus, since presentation is also not self-sufficient for assent because it takes the kinds of persons we are to either give or withhold assent on the basis of a presentation, it follows that presentation is also not the perfect cause of assent—which, in line with what is implied in the first sentence of §42, allows Chrysippus to assert that presentation is not necessitating of assent. However, it is possible to claim that Chrysippus cannot in point of fact both assert that everything takes place by Fate and not accept the consequence that everything takes place of necessity understood as a modal notion, since according to Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 47 1056ad he has to claim that Fate is a self-sufficient cause—which entails the suppression of that which is up to us (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν)—if he wishes to retain that Fate is unimpedible (ἀκώλυτος). In both Plutarch (cf. ὁ ... λέγων [“the one who says”], 1056b) and Cicero (cf. future tense *concedet* [“he shall concede”], §44) the difficulty about the necessity of Fate is raised as a consequence of Chrysippus' claims about causes. And, I submit, the difficulty is most fully appreciated in light of Carneades' argument in §31: Chrysippus' distinction between kinds of causes may in principle be seen as blocking the inference from the antecedent of (1) to the consequent of (3) by backing the claim that presentation is not necessitating of assent on the grounds that presentation is neither the perfect cause nor the principal cause of assent; nevertheless, so long as Chrysippus does not relinquish talk of Fate as, for instance, invincible, unimpedible, and inflexible (cf. ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἄτρεπτον in Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 47 1056c), he cannot (or so goes the objection) take the antecedent causes making up the chain of causes which is Fate to be anything less than perfect causes. That, in turn, warrants the inference from the antecedent of (1) to the consequent of (3) in Carneades' objection. But if matters are such, “necessity” understood as a modal notion in §§39–45 is not an original element in either

the objection or Chrysippus' reply, but an element brought into the picture with a view to forcing Chrysippus into the denial of that which is up to us by drawing consequences from Chrysippus' reply on the basis of an argument concocted by Carneades.

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