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Doctoral Thesis
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/T.2.2015.tde-16102015-121052
Document
Author
Full name
Rubens Eduardo Glezer
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2015
Supervisor
Committee
Lopes, Jose Reinaldo de Lima (President)
Costa, Carlos Eduardo Batalha da Silva e
Macedo Júnior, Ronaldo Porto
Pessôa, Leonel Cesarino
Queiroz, Rafael Mafei Rabelo
Title in Portuguese
O positivismo de Joseph Raz: autoridade e razão prática sem prática social
Keywords in Portuguese
Positivismo Jurídico; Razão Prática; Autoridade; Joseph Raz; Ronald Dworkin; Epistemologia; Ontologia.
Abstract in Portuguese
Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a identificação de divergências inconciliáveis. Joseph Raz é um dos principais expositores contemporâneos do positivismo jurídico, porém sua tese não apenas é controversa, como também mal compreendida. Nesta pesquisa, defendo o argumento de que a má compreensão deve-se ao fato de ser ignorada uma premissa ontológica adotada por Raz. O filósofo supõe que práticas sociais não se referem a nada mais do que fatos socialmente praticados e, portanto, não as reconhece como fonte de normatividade. Com base nesse pressuposto, a natureza do direito não poderia ser investigada do mesmo modo como se investigaria a natureza de um jogo lúdico: aos olhos de Raz, ambos possuem estruturas lógicas e normativas completamente distintas. Com isso em vista, sustento que a divergência a respeito dessa questão de ordem ontológica gera um impasse insolúvel no debate a respeito da normatividade do direito. Para testar o argumento, examino as críticas que Dennis Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin e Stephen Perry fazem à teoria do direito de Joseph Raz.
Title in English
Jospeh Raz's Positivism: Authority and Practical Reason without Social Practice
Keywords in English
Legal Positivism; Practical Reason; Authority; Joseph Raz; Ronald Dworkin; Epistemology; Ontology.
Abstract in English
This is a research on the grounds of irreconcilable disagreements. Joseph Raz is one of the leading authors of legal positivism, whose theory generated a lot of controversy, matched only by the same degree of misapprehension. This research argues that this is due to the fact that an ontological premise held by Raz has been largely ignored. The philosopher considers that social practices are nothing more than socially practiced facts and, therefore, do not acknowledge them as a source of normativity. Furthermore, on that token, laws nature cannot be known and investigated in the same way games are known: according to Raz, both have completely different logical and normative structures. I sustain that there cannot be any fruitful debate regarding the normativity of law, until this ontological matter is not approached. This thesis was tested on the criticism made to the razian theory by Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin and Stephen Perry.
 
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Publishing Date
2015-11-13
 
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