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Doctoral Thesis
DOI
https://doi.org/10.11606/T.2.2014.tde-20012015-162731
Document
Author
Full name
Fernando César Nimer Moreira da Silva
E-mail
Institute/School/College
Knowledge Area
Date of Defense
Published
São Paulo, 2014
Supervisor
Committee
Sztajn, Rachel (President)
Furtado, Claudio Vilar
Lazzarini, Sérgio Giovanetti
Pela, Juliana Krueger
Vercosa, Haroldo Malheiros Duclerc
Title in Portuguese
Venture capital: valor da informação, riscos e instrumentos para sua mitigação
Keywords in Portuguese
Capital de risco
Direito comercial
Investimentos
Mercado de capitais
Abstract in Portuguese
Venture capital é espécie de empreendimento que vincula dois agentes econômicos, empreendedor e investidor, visando ao desenvolvimento de uma ideia inovadora para posterior comercialização no mercado. O empreendedor é detentor de conhecimento sobre a ideia e o investidor possui os recursos para desenvolver o projeto. O negócio se diferencia dos demais pelo alto grau de incerteza e risco do empreendimento e requer o uso de tipos contratuais adequados para sua limitação. O projeto se inicia com a etapa de contratação, na qual as partes negociam a divisão de riscos e retorno do negócio, seguindo-se a etapa de monitoramento do desenvolvimento das atividades. Ao final ocorre o desinvestimento, com a saída do investidor e venda do negócio. Do ponto de vista da Economia, utilizamos a Teoria dos Jogos e apresentamos os problemas informacionais, riscos e incertezas do negócio, e os incentivos para organizar a cooperação entre as partes. Do ponto de vista de Finanças, debatemos a decisão de financiamento do negócio e as alternativas para diversificação dos riscos do investimento, isto é, a possibilidade de limitação dos riscos pela adoção de estratégias de contenção, que aumentam o interesse em contratar o negócio. Do ponto de vista do Direito, avaliamos qual a estrutura contratual ideal para organizar esse tipo de empreendimento. Analisamos as principais formas usadas para organização do negócio, em especial as sociedades limitadas e as sociedades anônimas fechadas. Avaliamos o suporte normativo aplicável, com destaque para a possibilidade de limitação dos riscos do projeto pela aplicação das normas de Direito Societário a esses empreendimentos. Os principais riscos aplicáveis são os riscos de contratação do negócio, os riscos de alocação do poder de decisão entre os sócios e os riscos de interrupção prematura do projeto. Devido à natureza e características do negócio de venture capital, concluímos que esse tipo de projeto é mais bem organizado como um contrato plurilateral e que não há tipo contratual ideal para alinhar os interesses. Dos tipos existentes, a sociedade anônima fechada é o mais adequado, mas incapaz de limitar todos os riscos do negócio. A conclusão é confirmada, parcialmente, pelas evidências empíricas apresentadas.
Title in English
Venture capital: value of information, risks and instruments for its mitigation
Keywords in English
Closed company
Closed corporation
Contract
Corporate finance
Game theory
Investment fund
Law and economics
Limited liability company
Risk
Uncertainty
Venture capital
Abstract in English
Venture capital is a business that links two economic agents, entrepreneur and investor, aiming to develop an innovative idea for future sale on the market. The entrepreneur holds knowledge about the idea and the investor has the resources to develop the project. It is distinguished from others by the high degree of uncertainty and risk of the project and requires the use of appropriate contract types for its restriction. The project begins with the contracting stage, in which the parties negotiate the division of risks and return business, followed by the monitoring of the development of the business activities. At the end occurs the divestment, in which the finished business is sold by the investor. From the point of view of Economics, we use Game Theory to present the informational problems, business risks and uncertainties, and the incentives to organize the cooperation between the parties. From the standpoint of Finance, we discuss the decision to finance the business, and alternatives for risk diversification, that is, the possibility of limiting the risks by adopting containment strategies that may increase the interest in contracting. From the point of view of Law, we evaluate the ideal contractual structure for organizing this kind of project. We analyze the main existing contract types, in particular, the limited liability companies and the closed corporations. We present our concerns about the normative support applicable to that type of business, emphasizing the Corporate Law problems. We evaluate the normative support applicable, emphasizing the possibility of limiting the project risks by applying the Corporate Law rules to such ventures. The main risks are the risks applicable to the contracting phase, the risk of incorrect allocation of decision rights between the partners and the risk of premature termination of the project. Due to the nature and characteristics of the venture capital business, we conclude that this type of design is best organized as a plurilateral agreement and that there is no contract type that can be considered ideal to align the interests. Considering all the existing types, the private corporation contract is the most appropriate form, but also unable to limit all the business risks. The conclusion is partially supported by the empirical evidence presented.
 
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Publishing Date
2015-01-23
 
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