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**International Assistance and Security Sector Reform in
Latin America and Caribbean**

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Latin America and Caribbean**

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To Cecília and Tomás.

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International Assistance and Security Sector Reform in Latin America and Caribbean

The present work seeks to understand the security sector demands of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), in the context of reforms promoted by international aid agencies in the region. The initial hypothesis of this study is that international aid programs focused on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the region have been generic, and have overlooked recipient countries' own reform agendas. LAC perspectives on SSR have been inferred from documents of the Organization of American States (OAS), UNASUR, MERCOSUR, CARICOM and Andean Community documents. Information on international assistance for SSR programs was gathered from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database for the years 2004-2014. The analysis shows that assistance programs are not generic and that the profile of projects, resources allocated and countries targeted differ greatly according to donors. However, international offers do not account for the overall set of demands, and some of the more expensive programs funded by international assistance are not even mentioned in regional agendas, which suggests that SSR aid responds to funder's guidelines rather than to local needs. The study also reveals differences between programs funded by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies in the region, showing that, in general, programs funded by multilateral agencies are more attentive to local demands than those promoted by bilateral agencies, which are less demand-driven and more guided by donor interests.

Keywords: International Assistance; Foreign Aid; Development Cooperation; Development Assistance; Security Sector Reform, Latin American and Caribbean.

Assistência Internacional e Reforma do Setor de Segurança na América Latina e Caribe

Este trabalho busca entender as demandas do setor de segurança na América Latina e Caribe (ALC), no contexto das reformas promovidas pelas agências internacionais de cooperação para o desenvolvimento na região. A hipótese inicial deste estudo é que os programas de assistência internacional voltados à Reforma do Setor de Segurança (RSS) na região são genéricos e negligenciam as agendas de reforma dos países receptores. As perspectivas da ALC sobre RSS foram inferidas a partir de documentos da OEA, UNASUL, MERCOSUL, CARICOM e Comunidade Andina. Informações sobre assistência internacional para programas de RSS na região foram coletadas da base de dados do Comitê de Assistência ao Desenvolvimento (CAD) da OCDE para o período 2004-2014. A análise mostra que os programas de assistência não são genéricos e que o perfil dos projetos, recursos alocados e países-alvo difere muito de acordo com os doadores. No entanto, a oferta internacional não contempla o conjunto de demandas locais e alguns programas dispendiosos financiados pela comunidade de doadores sequer são mencionados nas agendas regionais, o que sugere que a assistência para programas de RSS responde às diretrizes do financiador e não às necessidades locais. O estudo também revela diferenças entre programas financiados por agências de ajuda bilateral e multilateral na região, mostrando que, em geral, programas financiados por agências multilaterais têm maior aderência às necessidades locais do que aqueles promovidos por agências bilaterais, que são menos orientadas pela demanda e mais guiadas pelos interesses dos doadores.

Palavras-chave: Assistência Internacional; Ajuda Externa; Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento; Assistência para o Desenvolvimento; Reforma do Setor de Segurança, América Latina e Caribe.

Asistencia Internacional y Reforma del Sector de Seguridad en América Latina y el Caribe

Este trabajo busca entender las demandas del sector de seguridad en América Latina y el Caribe (ALC), en el contexto de las reformas promovidas por las agencias internacionales de cooperación para el desarrollo en la región. La hipótesis inicial de este estudio es que los programas de asistencia internacional orientados a la Reforma del Sector de Seguridad (RSS) en la región son genéricos y descuidan las agendas de reforma de los países receptores. Las perspectivas de ALC sobre RSS fueron inferidas a partir de documentos de la OEA, UNASUR, MERCOSUR, CARICOM y Comunidad Andina. La información sobre asistencia internacional para programas de RSS en la región fue recogida de la base de datos del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo (DAC) de la OCDE para el período 2004-2014. El análisis muestra que los programas de asistencia no son genéricos y que el perfil de los proyectos, los recursos asignados y los países de destino difieren mucho de acuerdo con los donantes. Sin embargo, la oferta internacional no contempla el conjunto de demandas locales y algunos programas costosos financiados por la comunidad de donantes ni siquiera se mencionan en las agendas regionales, lo que sugiere que la asistencia para programas de RSS responde a las directrices del financiador y no a las necesidades locales. El estudio también revela diferencias entre programas financiados por agencias de ayuda bilateral y multilateral en la región, mostrando que, en general, programas financiados por agencias multilaterales tienen mayor adherencia a las necesidades locales que aquellos promovidos por agencias bilaterales, que son menos orientadas por la demanda y más guiadas por los intereses de los donantes.

Palabras clave: Asistencia Internacional; Ayuda externa; Cooperación para el Desarrollo; Asistencia al desarrollo; Reforma del Sector de Seguridad, América Latina y el Caribe.

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List of Acronyms

ACS - The Association of Caribbean States

AFD - The French Development Agency

ALADI - Latin American Integration Association

AMERIPOL - American Police Community

CARICOM - Caribbean Common Market

CARIFTA - Caribbean Free Trade Association

CCHIII - CARICOM Caribbean Cooperation in Health Phase II

CCSS - CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy

CIDA - The Canadian International Development Agency

COFAP - The CARICOM Council for Finance and Planning

COFCOR - The CARICOM Council for Foreign and Community Relations

COHSOD - The CARICOM Council for Human and Social Development

CON - A national organizing committee of CONSEG

CONASP - National Council of Public Security

CONSLE - The CARICOM Council for National Security and Law Enforcement

COT - Coordination of Action against Transnationally Organized Crimes

COTED - The CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development

CRS - Creditor Reporting System

CSDP - The CARICOM Caribbean Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention

CSN - South American Community of Nations

CSSCJDOT - Council for Strengthening Cooperation in Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime

DAC - Development Assistance Committee

DED - The German Development Service

DIFD - UK Department For International Development

EU - European Union

GDP - Gross National Product

GGI - Integrated Action Offices

GPPC - Global Police Policy Community

GTRI - The Global Threat Reduction Initiative

HDI - Human Development Index

I CONSEG - The First National Conference on Public Security

IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency

IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICD - International Cooperation for Development

ICITAP - International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

IPPDH - Institute of Public Policies in Human Rights

ISM - The Social Institute of Mercosur

JICA - The Japan International Cooperation Agency

LAC - Latin America and the Caribbean

MCCA - The Central American Common Market

MDG - Millennium Development Goals

MEC-USAID - A series of twelve agreements signed between the Brazilian Ministry of Education and the North American cooperation agency

MERCOSUR - Common Market of the South

MISPA - Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas

MJ - Ministry of Justice

MPACS - Implementation Agency for Crime and Security

NAM - Non-Aligned Movement

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

NNSA - The National Nuclear Security Administration

NPT - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OAS - Organization of American States

ODA - Official Development Aid

ODECA - The Organization of Central American States

OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OECS - The Organization of Central American States

OEEC - Organization for European Economic Cooperation

PRONASCI - National Public Security with Citizenship Program

QWIDS - Query Wizard for International Development Statistics

RAPC - UNFPA/CARICOM Integrated Strategic Framework for the reduction of Adolescent Pregnancy in the Caribbean

RFAC - The CARICOM Regional Framework of Action for Children

RSDDR - CARICOM Regional Strategy for Drug Demand Reduction

SENASP - National Secretariat of Public Security
SICA - The Central American Integration System
SIECA - The Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration
SMS - Secretariat for Multidimensional Security
SSR - Security Sector Reform
UK - The United Kingdom
UN - The United Nations
UNASUR - Union of South American States
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNESCO - The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR - The United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF - The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPP - Pacifying Police Unit
UPS - The Social Participation Support Unit
USA - The United States of America
USAID - The United States Agency for International Development
WB - The World Bank
WHO - World Health Organization
WOLA - Washington Office on Latin America

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Introduction

The beginning

Before dealing with the matter in the centre of this research, I would like to introduce my reader to the events that guided me in the development of my research questions, and resulted in the sections that make up the PhD thesis you have in your hands. During my Upgrade Exam, one of the members of the panel (Prof. Fábio Bechara) encouraged me to tell the story that led to my research project - he said that if my reader knew my trajectory, it would be easier to understand my motivations as well as make my investigation more interesting and attractive. At the start I resisted this idea a little as I was afraid to write something that could possibly be considered non-academic. So, I wrote this Introduction before deciding whether or not it would figure in the final document. I left this decision to the end of the whole process and I would discard it if it did not help. Yet, when all sections were ready and revised, I read the text again and really thought it would be a nice “teaser” for the rest to come. And this means that in the end I had to give in to Professor Bechara.

Well, then. Let us start from the beginning.

For some years, I worked at an NGO (Brazilian Forum on Public Safety – BFPS) that brought together scholars, public safety managers and police officers. I was the institutional coordinator of the organization and was responsible for communication with international funders, a position that required me to write projects and reports to attract their attention (and their funds). The organization developed activities related to the enhancement of police capacity-building, such as national meetings to bring universities closer to law enforcement corporations, courses, fellowships for police officers, a Journal that encouraged police officers to write articles on their experiences, and the production of a Yearbook with national-level public safety data.

When I started working for the BFPS, the main funders were international foundations and Brazilian state public departments. The foundations fed the “militant”

vein of the organization and made activities such as the courses, meetings and fellowships for police officers possible. The national and sub-national public departments paid for specific studies and diagnoses to help them formulate their policies. These studies were not always at the centre of the organization's core mission, but they helped to remunerate staff. Nothing new so far; NGOs generally work this way. During this period, I wrote and submitted several projects to international foundations, agencies of international cooperation for development, development banks, and UN offices. And over the years, I noticed how difficult it was to obtain funds to develop projects related to any kind or level of policing. No matter the type of project I was writing about, I soon realised that mentioning the word "police" in the project reduced its chances of being approved and funded by international donors.

I didn't understand why this was. I thought – naively, perhaps - that all these organizations would be interested in the development of recipient countries and their organizations. (At that point, I was not able to clearly distinguish the interests of a private foundation from the interests of an official development agency – for me they composed what I usually vaguely called the "international community"). Police corporations are central to developing countries, not only because of their perverse value to repressive governments but also because of their important role in restoring order and keeping peace in communities devastated by violence. Reforming and controlling police organizations in order to democratize them internally, make them accountable for citizens and governments, and improve their adherence to human rights standards should be at the centre of the concerns of development aid agendas. At least, this was the way I saw things.

Over the years, the NGO gradually abandoned the idea of placing police officers at the centre of its mission. The Fellowship program ended, the Journal became more and more academic, the participation of police members in the writing of the articles decreased sharply, and the annual meetings also become more of a space for experts. Dialogue with law enforcement organizations thus occupied a very reduced part of the organization's activities. After a while, management came to accept that producing data was better received by international funders than other activities. It was more interesting to gather information on the police and public safety

in general (such as police budgets, police lethality, homicides, robberies, rapes, etc) than to work directly with police activities.

Indeed, data is important. And the federal government did not have the institutional force and qualified human resources to produce it. Thus, an institution that produced security data in that context was very welcome. The BFPS had then become a think tank. I do not see this as a necessarily good or bad thing; it is just how things are. NGOs struggle every day for their survival and compete aggressively for national and international resources. Sometimes, they are forced to put their missions aside and adapt their activities to the international agenda if they want to count. It happens here in Brazil with small local organizations and it also happens with great humanitarian international NGOs working in war-torn countries like Syria, as Peter Gill noted in his book *Today we Drop Bombs, Tomorrow we build bridges* (Gill 2016).

Working with data rather than with policing was an alternative. However, “public safety” was still part of the institution’s name, and the organization’s statute required that part of its management was composed of police officers. International funding was always difficult to conquer. Nonetheless, it seemed that it was a little less difficult with some organizations than with others. International foundations were more generous. UN offices and development banks could also support some activities. International state agencies for cooperation and development were the most resistant ones.

Just as an illustration, we received the USAID representative in Brazil at the headquarters of the organization in 2010. We presented its mission and objectives to initiate a dialogue on forms of support that the US agency could grant us. The proposal of the then representative had nothing to do with the ordinary activities of the organization: he suggested we design a project for the pacification of *borders* in the spaces marked as indigenous lands. The idea did not interest us, as it far outweighed the scope of our work at the time, but it was clear that the representative was looking for ways to fit the kind of work we did with the current *Conflict Prevention and Security* programs of the agency, which worked tangentially with the issue of public safety and did not directly involve police. I remember this episode as something bizarre. What the USAID agent was saying was something

along the lines of: “if you want our money, forget your mission and just do what we want you to do”.

By the way, *borders*. It took me a long time, and required a lot of investigation and data crossing to understand the fixation USAID has with this word. Borders. (My reader will certainly understand what I am talking about by the end of the upcoming sections).

For now, let us get back to 2010. The BFPS was in a campaign to attract (national, international, private and public) resources for its maintenance, as its original round of institutional grants were coming to an end. Attempts were made to attract Norwegian and Canadian development agencies. A lot of sympathy, but zero money. All that was received were compliments to the work of the organization and recommendations to work with armed violence prevention. At the time I remember performing a quick search on the websites of other Latin American NGOs working on public safety issues to check their funders. Most of them were supported by private international foundations - usually the same ones (a small group of recurring funders in the region) -, some were supported by multilateral agencies (emphasis on the IADB and UNDP) and very few were funded by bilateral cooperation agencies - when this was the case, it was usually the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and the IDRC (International Development Research Centre, one of Canada’s official development agencies). I kept wondering why official cooperation development agencies were so slippery when the subject was “improving police services”. This question would keep me company for a couple of years.

From vague questions to a PhD project

In 2012 I was driving Professor Christopher Stone from Porto Alegre’s airport to the University of Rio Grande do Sul where the annual meeting of the BFPS was taking place. At the time, Stone had just left the position of Professor at Harvard University to take on the management of the Open Society Foundation, one of the private foundations that funded the NGO I worked for. I did not know much about him at the time. I was not a researcher then. I was an Executive Coordinator (upgraded from Institutional Coordinator) trying to learn how to keep an NGO alive, and was

simply driving one of our funders to our annual meeting. So, my attention was on being polite and finding agreeable subjects to talk about, whilst simultaneously exhibiting my concerns about the future of the organization. After some quick introductions, and questions about the trip and weather, I told him I found it difficult to attract resources to activities related to police reform and asked him if, with all his experience on the subject, he knew what the reason might be.

Mr. Stone clarified that several organizations had already financed projects in the area of public security in the 1960s and 1970s, not only in Latin America, but also in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The point was that these resources ended up being used to devise authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, financing torture and the disappearance of citizens that at the time were considered subversive. For this reason the donor community began to see investment in public safety projects in developing countries as risky in institutional terms. In Stone's words, "If you invest in a developing country's educational program and it does not yield results, the biggest risk you can run is that the program is a failure. Well, it happens. But if you invest in a security project in a developing country and then find out that your assets are serving to torture and kill people, you get terrified because you financed a catastrophe".

That unpretentious car journey conversation with Mr. Stone turned on several lights in my mind. It sounded like a very good explanation for my difficulties in raising international funds for the activities in the organization. Later, in 2012, I had the opportunity to join a mission of the Inter-American Development Bank to Minas Gerais to evaluate the conditions of the state government and determine its eligibility for a bank loan for security investment for the 2014 World Cup. One of the points of conflict in the Bank's negotiation with the State was precisely in regard to the training of police officers to use *Taser* (trademark) weapons. *Tasers* operate through electric discharge, aiming to immobilize the affected person, and are considered non-lethal weapons. The Bank made it clear that it could not fund any type of police training involving weapons, lethal or not. This fact demonstrates the bank's concern with certain types of police-related funding, which would support the information provided during my conversation with Professor Stone.

I could understand donors' preoccupation with the way resources destined to police reform might be spent. Really. But there were several other ways to contribute to police reform such as stressing the dialogue between police

corporations and universities, building courses on the prevention of violence or conflict mediation, external control, helping build police intelligence centers and even lobbying for the disarmament of civilians. Everything committed to human rights. Police reform was more than training for the use of weapons. And even in this case, I could not see a problem in training police to work with less lethal weapons or for reducing the use of force. Repression is part of police work. And the more qualified and less violent that repression is, the better. At least this is what I thought. But training police to be preventive and to intelligently use its repressive prerogative requires resources and time. Despite our lethal violence rates (partially committed by the police), and despite the international community of donors pointing out that violence is factor that prevents development and may even revert recent developmental achievements, international resources were not available for police reform. At least that was how I pictured the situation.

The mission of the Inter-American Development Bank to Minas Gerais was part of a larger loan plan for security investment in the states where games were scheduled to take place during the 2014 World Cup. I also took part in a mission to Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná in the same period. Although the IADB took the time to listen to local demands and managers' presentations of data, and pay visits to local police and justice departments to evaluate their conditions (something that bilateral agencies, for example, do not prioritize), I noticed that the bank tried to design a very similar loan plan for each of the three states and convince local actors to adapt to the bank's directives. I remember, for example, that the state of Paraná asked for resources to improve the conditions of prisons and facilities for adolescents in conflict with the law in order to close detention rooms in police stations, which were already prohibited by Brazilian law. They feared that rebellions could happen during the World Cup games if nothing was done. We visited a police station with a prison cell at the back. The experience heavily impacted us all. The cell was designed for five, maybe six people. However it held more than twenty, both youngsters and adults, most of which had not yet been convicted, and who collectively were accused of all kinds of crimes (from theft to homicide). The cell was unsanitary and inmates complained about scabies and tuberculosis. Despite this, the IADB representative of the mission stressed that working on *preventive policies* was the priority of the loan

plan. Although it was not stated in so many words, it was clear that the reform or construction of new facilities for prisons were not going to be part of the loan plan.

I understood that prisoners and adolescents in conflict with the law were not the IADB's main concern at the time. Nor was encouraging less lethal forms of repression. The focus then was to prevent crimes - mainly violent crimes - during the World Cup – and there is nothing wrong with that. The IADB listened to the states' demands, but at the end of the day they influenced the design of the program to be implemented according to their own priorities, defined by the bank's experts. The loan being negotiated had its scope. Thus, not all of security system demands could be taken on, which I can understand. I wondered, however, in what scenario they might be. Would there be a moment when those states' demands could be heard and contemplated in a loan or grant plan? Were international donors open to listening to recipients' demands before defining their loan or grant programs? Was there a space for this in the agenda-setting process of donors? Could local actors somehow influence the guidelines of programs in which they were the supposed beneficiaries? Or are priorities defined and formulated exclusively by the experts of those agencies? I then remembered the suggestion that came from the USAID agent who visited the BFPS two years earlier: a project on the pacification of indigenous borders. What would USAID's interests be in such a program? Was it a Brazilian demand? Who sets the priorities of programs developed by these agencies? Recipients or donors?

Some months later, in 2012, I became pregnant and had to slow down a little on work trips and events. During my maternity leave I continued to think about all those questions concerning the international community of donors' resistance to funding activities related to police reform and the priority-settings of donors' agendas. And while my newborn napped, I started to look for articles and papers that could help me understand and answer those questions.

At that point I had already spoken to many people, practitioners and scholars, who could not say much on the topic. While they agreed with me, they had no ideas as to the reasons for the phenomena that was intriguing me. I found some texts and articles that corroborated Mr. Stone's ideas, which pointed to the long time that police reform policies took to produce results as a reason for avoiding the theme in the development agenda. I also found works which looked critically at the formulation process of donors' programs concerning public safety in Latin America,

revealing the generalization of programs assigned to regions composed of very different institutional, political and cultural backgrounds.

Clues for how to answer my questions began to appear. The few works I found were very interesting, but were too essayistic and presented almost no data. I asked myself whether what I had found was based on reality or whether I had just found materials that supported – and comforted - me in my concerns. Well, too many questions. I realized I was more interested in answering them than in going back to my tiresome work of fundraising and struggling for the survival of NGOs. By the end of my maternity leave, I was writing a PhD research proposal on the subject.

Hypothesis and Method


As I said, the very few works I found on the subject corroborated my concerns, at least on some levels. But there were many and huge gaps to be filled. The subject was certainly unexplored (or underexplored) by academic research. In any case the combination of the works I found and my professional trajectory helped me elaborate some general questions and keep designing my research project. It was a difficult task as certain terms were not very precise at the beginning. Should I work with the term “police reform”? “citizen security”? “public safety”? Above all, I was interested in understanding *why* international donors seemed hesitant to fund projects that involved police forces. My experience and the literature had provided me with some clues. However, other questions emerged in the process, which is perfectly normal during an investigation. This led me to ask how programs related to security issues in Latin America were formulated by international donors. It was important to know if local demands counted and if local actors had any participation in these processes.

I found that my questions were still too vague and crude. But they would be a starting point which I could specify and redesign along the way, as and when was necessary. Thus, in my research project I intended to *test the hypothesis that there were significant differences between the demands voiced by the police forces of Latin America and Caribbean and the current agenda of police reform carried out by the international community of donors in the region.* The intention was to

investigate *if* and *to what extent* these agendas converged / diverged and *why*, as literature on the subject suggested that donors resisted addressing the core problems of the police. To answer this question, I needed to map Latin-American and Caribbean police demands and confront them with the public safety programs carried out by the international cooperation agencies in the region. In the absence of convergence of police demands and international programs, it would be clear that the international agenda is not guided by local needs. And if this was the case, I would try to understand what the actual determinants of this international agenda were.

All this explanation is important to show my reader that the process that led to my PhD project was not a *deductive* process, but an *inductive* one. According to Chevrier (2010) these two research methods start from different points and have different objectives. The deductive-verifiable approach begins with a theory and ends up with either the confirmation or negation of the hypothesis. The inductive-generative model starts with an observation and emerges with a theory. In a very simple way, the deductive process (also called top-down) and the inductive approach (also called bottom-up) may be illustrated like this:

Figure 1 - The PhD process: deductive and inductive process.



Source: my elaboration based on Chevrier (2010).

Summarizing, the deductive method goes from theory to empirical validation. The inductive method goes from the empirical data to the construction of conceptual and relational categories (Chevrier 2010). Evidently, it happened by chance - I did not choose this path. When I started writing my PhD project I read research methodology books and noticed that my “case” could not be classified in the traditional field of deductive research. However, it fitted perfectly with inductive research design. I observed, I tried to detect patterns, I drafted a hypothesis and I would look for a theory to understand the results of my tests and be able to infer generalized conclusions – the ultimate purpose of the scientific method (King, Keohane & Verba 1994).

So far, so good. I would not realize, at that moment, how this inductive method would take me back and forth. The literature and data I had collected would require me to redesign my research questions several times. The original title of the project, *A Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento e a Segurança Pública na América Latina* – in English, The International Cooperation for Development and Public Safety in Latin America -, would also suffer many changes. Later, I replaced International Cooperation for Development with Foreign Aid, and then changed it back to International Cooperation for Development before finally settling with International Assistance. I replaced Public Safety with Citizen Security and, much later, to Security Sector Reform. I published articles and presented papers with partial conclusions of my research in which I used terms and concepts that I would later replace with others. I used to see this as a problem and I thought that if I published using a particular term, I should stick to it for the duration of my PhD research. Fortunately, I changed my mind. Now I understand that, actually, these movements back and forth are part of a rich process of constructing knowledge.

Collection of Data

Donors

When I first started searching for data, I did not have a very clear idea of the size of my sample, nor the size of the period I would be working with. I knew I wanted to check international programs implemented in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. For that, I needed to define what international programs I would work with and how I would define the regional demands with which to cross this information.

I initially understood “international programs” as the whole range of possible funders – international cooperation agencies, private foundations, development banks and UN agencies. The period being investigated would depend on the amount of information there was to systematize and analyse. Maybe 10-15 years. I searched for sources that could provide me with the broadest information I desired, so that I would not need to separately collect information from each funder organism involved. I then found that the Credit Report System (CRS) from the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) could provide me with information of all funders cited above, except the private foundations.

The CRS/OECD collects information of resource fluxes from some private foundations, but not all of them. Besides, international organizations and cooperation agencies had their policies scrutinized by their countries and member states in a way that private foundations did not, which guaranteed the latter much more autonomy in the management of their money and programs, and which also meant a very different pattern of expenditure. I then decided to discard these private foundations from my sample of donors (the complete explanation for this decision is developed in Sections I and II).

The OECD’s database is not perfect, but it is organized and standardized, allowing comparisons between donors and data crossing by several variables. This was how I finally arrived at the term “security sector reform”, which I preferred to use instead of police reform or citizen security. In the CRS/OECD database, all the data concerning police reform, in a very broad perspective, was stored under the label of

“security sector management and reform” – or simply security sector reform (SSR). Much later I noticed that there were several works on SSR in the literature of peacekeeping operations. SSR is not a precise term and there is much confusion as to what the term actually means (which I discuss more fully in Section I). I stuck to the definition of the OECD:

Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control; technical co-operation provided to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme; assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. [Other than in the context of an international peacekeeping operation (OECD)]¹.

There is a special label for fluxes addressed to peacekeeping operations in the CRS/OECD database, what reassures us that the data we are working with does not encompass peace interventions. Also, it is important to say that official development assistance (ODA) declared by the countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to OECD may not include military/defense expenditures (see Sections I and II).

The timeframe was not difficult to define – the CRS/OECD had only collected data related to north-south ODA addressed to recipient domestic security since 2004. I then established 2004 as the first year of our series. At the beginning of the research, OECD had data available up until 2014. I then established 2014 as the limit, and started collecting, systematizing and analysing data.

During the collection of data concerning donors, many problems emerged. CRS/OECD data is available online, but their database, known as Qwids (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics), is not exactly easy or inductive to deal with. I read the manuals and exchanged information with Qwids managers to get to the information I needed. Still, the table 2 provided by the system were too long

¹http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2015%20CRS%20purpose%20codes%20EN_update%20April%202016.pdf

and contained several unnecessary codes and information concerning our objective. They were transposed to Excel tables and “cleaned” in order to include only the necessary information for our purpose – donors, recipients, year of influx, amount (in US\$), name of the funded project, channel of the money, and a description. I then had a large table dataset of all country and institutional donors and recipient countries concerning security programs in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2004 and 2014. For analysis, this same table dataset has been unfolded into several smaller ones with the application of filters and the construction of categories to group similar programs. Besides working with a large N, a statistical program was not necessary. We worked exclusively with Excel tables and performed descriptive statistics only.

Another problem that emerged was related to the vague description of programs presented on the OECD platform. The OECD data centre circulates a questionnaire for international donors to fill out with their information on a quarterly basis. Nonetheless, some information was left blank by donors or was only vaguely filled out. The OECD team seems more concerned on the complete answers of questions related to the amounts of ODA than with the ones related to the description of programs implemented. In the later stages of the research, these descriptions were of fundamental importance to understanding the nature of security programs addressed to Latin America and Caribbean. Details on the programs were necessary for placing them in certain categories. This work was very hard and felt like a 10,000 piece puzzle with no image on the box to guide my actions.

I used all the information I had, but even so, I must acknowledge that I may have made some mistakes, such as grouping donations under a certain category when they would be better placed under another. This could have happened due to lack of good and detailed information available on the OECD platform, or for misunderstandings on my part and, in case of the latter, I assume all responsibility for the categories created. I decided not to include the tables of raw information in the appendix of this document because they are too long and too many and I guess it would result in several formatting problems. But I can make them available to other researchers interested in reproducing the experiment or those in need in any specific information.

The only “option” available to solve this problem was actually not an option. It would have required asking the agencies for program descriptions directly. However with 685 programs, 28 donors and 36 recipient countries it would have been far too time-consuming to write, read and process so much information and, in any case, there was no guarantee that I would even receive a reply. In brief, this plan was not viable. I actually wrote to some of the agencies to check some information I doubted, but received no satisfactory reply. When working with large N research, it is fundamental to have reliable database sources - the OECD data revealed itself to be not very reliable for qualitative information, but we tried to do our best with what we had, as there was no other source for quantitative information of such a nature.

Another very important piece of information that was absent from the OECD database was the path of the resources. In order to be eligible for ODA, resources may be channelled into recipient development countries either through governments or NGOs. There is a field for this information in the questionnaire agencies must complete about their influxes to recipient countries. And it seems that the filling of these fields is “optional”, as countries systematically left this field blank. Empty. It would have been interesting to have this information in order to check whether international donors have preferences when addressing their resources to governments and NGOs. With this information it would also have been possible to check which NGOs are involved and why, and/or what level of government usually benefits from donations (federal, provincial, municipalities) which could also be related to the parties in office at the time of donation, for instance. I could list a good number of research questions that might have been verified had this information been available and in good quality in the OECD platform.

After analysing the data, I also wondered what portion of the amounts transferred from donors to recipients were really direct transfers. I noticed that many of the programs were actually ‘funded’ through the purchase of things like tickets for participation in international events, workshops organized by donor countries, local inspections carried out by donors, reports paid for by donor countries to international firms and “given” as a gift to recipient countries – all of this was declared as ODA to OECD. In other words, the amounts declared may never have reached the recipient countries “in cash”. And I think that some recipient countries may not even know they

figure as “recipients” in the OECD database, as they do not get to know that some “gifts” they did not ask for might be considered as “ODA”.

After finishing this research, I wrote to OECD to ask them to ensure more care when filling out the fields cited above. I explained the importance of such data to carrying out research projects involving ODA, emphasizing that amounts are not the only thing that matter, but also the path of the resources and the nature of the programs funded, which means that it is crucial to keep qualified descriptions. I also explained that it would be beneficial to include a field to explain the way the resources were presented to allow researchers to check whether resources were directed to receiving governments or NGOs, or whether they were indirectly benefitted through donors’ actions.

Regional Agenda on SSR

If I wanted to test the hypothesis that donors do not consider local demands in the formulation of SSR programs to LAC countries, I needed to check if there was really a regional agenda in the sector and, if so, whether this agenda matched donors’ priorities. Collecting information on the SSR recipient’s demands was not easier than collecting information from donors. First I needed to define what I understood by “local demands”. “Local”, for the sake of this research design, means regional – LAC countries. And by local demands I understand *agreed local needs* or *consensual fragilities* that may be addressed when formulating plans for the LAC region. I searched for articulated demands and collective plans on the subject. And I concluded that the best indicators to work with were the documents produced by regional organizations.

I then started collecting information on SSR departments and SSR documents produced within MERCOSUR, UNASUR and OAS. This choice has eliminated non-state actors as agenda-setters in the field, but only for methodological purposes – regional NGOs discuss the theme domestically and across LAC, but they usually represent particular groups and may not always be as representative as state actors. Besides, it is more difficult to trace all of these organizations and their actions as they are dispersed, and information on their activities is not always available. This

is why we preferred to work with the above organizations than with regional and domestic NGOs.

Within these organizations, we prioritized units created to deal with security issues and their implementation in the field – departments, councils, workgroups, committees. The documents collected consisted of treaties, protocols, plans and recommendations delivered in the field of domestic security in the region. As we worked with different organizations, with distinct objectives and internal policies, the documents collected were not comparable in terms of nature. Thus it was necessary to systematize and analyse the material in order for it to be comparable across organizations – which was not at all easy. After the systematization, I needed to regroup the subjects dealt with in the organizations' documents as “clouds of themes”, so that I could verify themes that were present and absent, and check the existence of a major LAC agenda in this sector – which was indeed confirmed.

I decided to include two other organizations in the study after receiving a peer review of an article I submitted to the Brazilian Political Science Review. The article was accepted on the condition that I reviewed the choice of my regional organizations, as there were many others I could have chosen in the LAC region and, according to the reviewer, I should justify the reason I chose these three organizations. He/She was correct. There was no good reason for selecting only UNASUR, MERCOSUR and OAS to represent a Latin American and Caribbean Agenda on SSR.

In order to contemplate this gap and have the article published, I scanned all regional organizations in LAC during the revision of the article. Then I searched for internal departments that dealt with security issues inside these organizations and documents produced by them. The next step was to exclude the organizations with no SSR departments and/or no operation in the field, as well as those with no information available. I finally ended up with two more organizations to increase the panel of SSR regional material in the LAC region - these were the CARICOM and the Andean Community. This exercise delayed the publication of the article by at least six months, but it was very gratifying. Indeed, the five organizations together were much

more representative of an SSR agenda for the LAC region and, besides, it allowed me to recognize specific local agendas within the greater regional one.

The last section was a suggestion that came from my supervisor, Leandro Piquet. After reading the three first sections, he advised me that the work thus far was too descriptive and general. A case study focused on a specific state would help to deepen the verification of my hypothesis and could shed new light on the problem, as it would amplify my lens. Besides, some of the people I had presented with previous sections criticized the fact that I have worked with aggregated data at the regional level only, and that I could have overlooked some national specificities that might perhaps be supplied by international assistance, which could provide further insight. A case study could contribute to checking whether the results observed at the regional level could be also confirmed for a sublevel – the level of a given country.

Brazil was chosen for the case study - for convenience, as this is a scenario I know well and a way of testing information that was not new to me. Besides, we made the decision to include this case study late in the thesis process (and was the reason I requested postponing the thesis submission by four months), which left too little time to search for the best sources of information in a country other than my own. I selected two organizations that could provide representative information (in terms of national regionalisms and also in terms for professional/civil society segments involved in the construction of a public security policy) on the national agenda in the field – the National Conference on Public Security (I CONSEG) and the CONASP (National Public Security Council).

I had the opportunity to participate at the I CONSEG and also in the first years of the CONASP. In 2014 I was contracted as a UNDP consultant to write a book on the institutional trajectory of the CONASP. I therefore already had part of the necessary data and contacts I needed to mobilize for other missing information. It took me two intensive months to raise and systematize documentation – the principals and guidelines presented in the Final Report of the National Conference and the reported acts of the CONASP. The main topics (the ones that appeared repeatedly) in the documents analysed were listed. These topics were then confronted with SSR programs funded by international donors in Brazil. A further two months were necessary for analysing the material and writing the results.

Indeed, the idea to include a case study at the end of the research was quite right. Although observations at the sublevel of the country did not change the answers to our original questions (as the results were mostly the same for regional and local observations, with respectively aggregated and disaggregated data), some doubts emerged that the previous sections had not picked up on. It actually evoked new questions - and I am not sure if I was able to answer all of them.

The case study permitted me to revisit the confrontation between donors' supply and recipients' demands concerning SSR programs already observed at the regional level – but this time with magnifying glasses. And this experiment was crucial to enable the comprehension that the OECD definition of “program”, “resources” and “donation” could be put into question. The concept of ODA is vague enough to conceive alms as development aid. This very important and unexpected finding was possible only because this last section was written.

Supporting References

While systematizing data, I started reading texts on the regime of foreign aid and development assistance that could supposedly help me understand more general patterns in the performance of donors and recipient countries. I intended to verify whether this literature could offer me a model for understanding development aid addressed to the security sector reform of Latin American and Caribbean countries. As I said earlier, I found a body of literature that helped me elaborate my research questions, sustain my hypothesis and write my PhD project, but I also needed to find a theory to explain the results that started to show up. This was part of the inductive method. At that point I was sure that this literature on foreign aid should be cited in my work, but not that it could provide the best model to interpret my results. During my Upgrade Exam, Prof. Feliciano Guimarães convinced me to dive more deeply into this literature by explaining it could be interesting to help answer my research questions. Indeed, it was. This literature fascinated me. And yes, it offered me good tools to analyse the results of my research.

A deeper review of the complex and contradictory literature of foreign aid and international cooperation for development was absolutely necessary. In order to investigate security sector reform programs in LAC funded by international donors, I had to get acquainted with the debate in the field of official foreign assistance. I noticed that whenever I went to present papers at congresses I needed to better define the terms I used because those who read my work did not understand exactly what I meant by "official foreign aid", and I needed to cite many examples to be understood. Nor did they understand why I did not treat USAID or Ford Foundation resources in the same way. For an unwary audience, all these flows could be vaguely translated into "international cooperation". That is why I had to seek a theoretical basis to explain the distinctions of treatment I give to these differently natured resources.

Along my academic trajectory I guess it is fundamental to mention the PCECS – Rede de Pesquisa em Paz, Conflitos e Estudos Críticos de Segurança – in English, Peace, Conflict and Critical Security Studies Research Network. I was invited to take part in the Network by Camila Braga, after meeting her in the ISA 2015, in New Orleans. Camila was a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at USP – thus, a colleague from across the street but that I only met accidentally in an international congress. We later became very close friends. The participation in the virtual discussions of the PCECS and later in the EBEP – Encontro Brasileiro de Estudos da Paz, was a very important part of my PhD experience as I learnt and exchanged a lot with the other researchers of the Network. Through discussions with them and reading texts they recommended I came to understand how important it was to clearly define what I meant by SSR in my investigation, as part of the literature understands SSR as a step in peacekeeping missions – for some peace scholars, when you talk about SSR programs you are necessarily speaking about a peacekeeping context.

In order to differentiate SSR applied to prevent and deal with ordinary crime (the case that interests us) from SSR in the context of peace interventions I read several texts on peacekeeping operations. Through reading these texts I noticed that this literature could also help me explain the results of my observations. These texts led me to stumble upon the concept of "local ownership", which in turn I found very useful to understand the distance between local actors' demands and

international donors, which finally linked my observations with my first research questions. It helped me locate a link to the literature on which my hypothesis was based when I first wrote my research project: the OECD guides abundantly use the term and subtly blame locals for their “lack of ownership” – blaming locals for the failure of implemented programs by international donors. According to Donais (2012), local ownership is discussed by donors as if locals should take “ownership” on something they actually did not plan or chose. It also convinced me that the peacekeeping literature represented a meaningful contribution to my project.

I also realized that the literature on police reform in developing countries that I used to plan my project, as well as the literature on foreign aid and the critical literature on peacekeeping interventions, pointed in the same direction: SSR programs funded by international assistance in Latin America do not adapt donors’ priorities/goals to local institutional conditions, bureaucracy and material needs. However, these fields of knowledge and respective literatures seemed closed in their own boundaries. If we made a network study about their authors, I imagine a map with three rounds for each field and only a few connections between them. I humbly tried to forge a dialogue and connect these fields, as the three of them were very important for the development of my research.

The organization of the work

The thesis will be organized as follows: an introduction, where I explain my interest in the topic at hand and how it led me to return to academia; a theoretical section, three empirical sections and a conclusion. Concerning the four sections, three of them were already partially published in national and international publications. The fourth and last of them will be presented in written format at the 1st International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies, Lisbon, late November 2018, and is also awaiting the peer review of a Brazilian journal, Qualis A1². It means that most of the texts presented in this document were published as

² In the Qualis platform, journals are classified into strata indicative of quality - A1, the highest; A2; B1; B2; B3; B4; B5; C - with zero weight.

articles and I am trying to publish the last section as an article too. All of them have already been submitted to peer review and/or congress audiences and have been reformed/reformulated to be perfected.

My supervisor and I thought for a long time about presenting this thesis in article format – an Introduction, three or four articles, and a Conclusion. For that, I would make use of articles I have already published. The development of this research project resulted in five articles and two book chapters, and I chose three of these works to compose the thesis (the fourth section was decided later). Nevertheless, when I read the articles in a sequence, I was not sure about the comprehension my reader would have at the end of his/her reading. The absence of links between the articles jeopardized the fluidity of the text in my opinion. And I am not sure if a good Introduction could fill all the gaps in the rest of the material. Besides, the article structure implies the repetition of literature reviews and methodologies in every text, as each article must be a complete piece, which makes the reading more tiring.

I do not discourage the presentation of the thesis in the format of a pool of articles, I simply could not adapt to it. I then needed to rush in order to change and structure my thesis in the traditional format of sections. To this end it was necessary to dismember parts of the articles I had written (and published) to turn them into sections. For this reason some sections are actually the fusion of two or even three articles I have already published. In the beginning of every section I inserted a footnote to explain what articles were partially used in that section. It means that the sections are now linked and sequential according to the development of the research, which provides a better sense of unity for the document as a whole. Which I much prefer.

The first section is where I present the literature review. It is where I try to connect the three fields of knowledge that helped me design my questions and comprehend the phenomena I intended to investigate, offering some possible answers. The second section is a mapping of donors and LAC recipients concerning SSR ODA in the 2004-2014 period. There I stressed the greatest donors and the most benefitted recipients of this type of ODA. In the third section I analyse the programs funded by international donors, regroup them according to their nature and cross this information with the LAC Agenda in the field. In the fourth section I repeat

this experiment, but this time only for the case of Brazil, with disaggregated data. In the Conclusion I resume my experiments and findings and draft the new questions that emerge from this research project. It is a relatively short piece compared to the Introduction and four Sections, as a partial conclusion will be presented at the end of each individual section.

I am quite aware of the limitations of this work. I would really like to have carried out a less descriptive and more analytical piece of work. Nonetheless, it is hard to chartering unknown territory. There are no works dedicated to analysing SSR programs funded by international donors in the LAC region from a quantitative large N and comparative perspective. It is too specific as subject and too broad in terms of cases. Raising and systematizing information took up great portion of this research project, as well as organizing, reading and connecting references from different fields of knowledge. I would like to have had the energy to go a little further. But I am confident enough to state that what I was able to do, was done to the best of my ability.

1. Foreign Aid: Definitions, History, and Implications for Security Sector Reform³

*Foreign aid as we know it began as an instrument of Cold War
diplomacy (...)
Aid is, in short, a child of heartheaded, diplomatic realism
(Lancaster 2008, 25)*

1.1 Introduction

The following review presents the main historical and current debates on Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform. When I started drafting the structure of this section, my first objective was to contextualize the reader in terms of ongoing debates within the international community of donors, allowing him/her to participate in the history of foreign assistance and the main organizations in the field. Simultaneously, I set out to clarify the theoretical references employed to guide data collection and analysis throughout the research process. With this, the reader would be able to situate the discussions and findings I present across the coming sections within the greater umbrella of foreign aid debate.

Nevertheless, while structuring the section I realised that I was working with areas of literature that were not necessarily connected by the theme of Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform. Generally speaking, literature on foreign aid is reasonably well connected to the literature on peacekeeping operations, which also deals with security sector reform – authors of the second are aware of the terms, concepts and key debates of the first. Such literature helps them understand and formulate arguments for the failures and successes (far less common) in peacekeeping operations, as they are familiar with the reach and limitations of donors.

The same cannot be said of authors who work with international programs for police reform in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. Their works are insulated from the broader literature on international assistance, a literature that

³ Part of this chapter was already published in an article that may be identified in the references as Tomesani (2017a).

would help them connect their empirical findings on such programs against the main discussions taking place in the donor's community. In brief, locating the works on police reform and international cooperation inside the broader foreign aid field is very helpful, as it offers a plurality of lenses with which one can analyse problems pointed by the literature on international assistance for police reform.

This in mind, I attempted to connect these works and compare their conclusions in order to demonstrate that they are complementary. The findings have not emerged on a linear basis – first, I located the literature on international cooperation and police reform in LAC region, which served as the basis for the construction of my research project. This led me to the foreign aid regime literature which, in turn, brought me to the literature on peacekeeping operations. We simply present these works in a linear way to facilitate comprehension.

By the end of this section, I expect my reader to be able to proceed with a theoretical repertoire that will enable him/her to interpret the empirical results of this research, and connect them to the set of theoretical references presented and analysed. Sections two, three and four are basically empirical, but the literature is briefly resumed in the Conclusion of this PhD thesis in order to locate our findings within the appropriate discussions of the field.

The following sections (2, 3 and 4) present a brief history of official foreign aid, moving through pre-World War II experiences, Bretton Woods institutions, the Marshall Plan, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the creation of development cooperation agencies, and finally, the current debates of the international foreign aid agenda. Sections 5 and 6 will briefly present the literature on foreign aid and peacekeeping operations, as well as the incipient literature on international assistance and police reform in the LAC region. In the section entitled 'Final Considerations', I connect the main findings and statements of these literatures and demonstrate their complementary nature.

1.2 Definitions

The term 'international cooperation for development' is not exactly defined by consensus⁴. Several authors working with the theme – keeping in mind that most of the literature is in English - prefer the term “foreign aid”. One reason for this might be that when official international development cooperation agencies began to emerge in countries of the northern hemisphere in the 1950s and 1960s, only what was in their scope came to be called international cooperation for development (hereafter referred to as ICD) and was assessed as such. Yet the full extent of resources that one country donates to another does not necessarily pass through these agencies despite constituting foreign aid, and is therefore not being evaluated by the relevant bodies in the same way as ICD. In other words, everything that can be considered ICD is foreign aid, but not everything that is foreign aid may have been "stamped" as ICD by donor countries. One example of this would be spending aid for military purposes, which is not covered by the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA⁵).

Another reason some authors prefer the term "foreign aid" is the fact that the term "international cooperation for development" (or “development cooperation”; or even “development assistance”), as understood by the OECD, necessarily implies the flows of resources transferred from developed to developing countries, which would characterize North-South cooperation only, disregarding South-South cooperation or even the transfer of resources between northern countries. Lancaster (2008, 9-10) explains that the definition of ODA also excludes transfers of public funds occurring between countries that are not part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. There are also those who understand that the term cooperation implies mutual benefits and horizontal exchange (be it of goods, resources or knowledge), which means that the term would apply well to South-South cooperation, whereas for traditional North-South cooperation the ideal term would be assistance (Souza 2014).

⁴ It is worth clarifying that the term "international cooperation" is much broader than "international cooperation for development", and can be used to designate various agreements signed between specific countries or within multilateral organizations.

⁵ The term was created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to designate the flows of resources transferred from developed to developing countries.

Due to this confusion surrounding the definition of the term, it is important to clarify that what I refer to in this section is *the transfer of public funds from one country to another* (north-south, within a bilateral agreement⁶) *or to an international organization* (part of a country's agreement with intermediary multilateral assistance⁷) *with the aim of improving the social and economic conditions of another country or group of countries*. This is a comprehensive definition of official foreign aid, adapted from Lancaster (2008) and Riddell (1987), two major scholars in the field. It covers international cooperation for development (ICD) programs as well as other programs designed to transfer public funds to foreign countries that are not officially characterized as ICD. It is with this definition that I will work in the literature review that follows.

It is worth noting that there are other authors who categorize privately funded resources as international cooperation. In doing so, the importance of private institutions in the formation of scientific communities in a number of developing countries is acknowledged. When dealing with the differences between the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in fostering scientific communities in developing countries, Faria and Costa (2006) use the term "international scientific cooperation". However, donations coming from private sources are not subject to the foreign policy guidelines of their countries of origin, therefore more suitable perhaps is the label of "scientific philanthropy", as proposed by Marinho (2001), to categorize this type of financing. Thus, the topics to be discussed in this section, and the whole thesis for that matter, will not address private multinational foundations but only official foreign aid in which donors constitute nations acting both with and without the intermediary of an international organization.

⁶ For example, the Japanese funding of community police programs in Sao Paulo between 1990 and 2000 through JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) (Loche 1993).

⁷ For example, the financial contribution to an office linked to the UN (such as UNESCO, UNICEF and PNUD) to finance programmes in various countries. The OECD also considers loans given by development banks (such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) a type of "international cooperation for development" if at least 25% of the transferred funds are considered non-reimbursable or a grant.

1.3 History

The beginning of what can be called foreign aid dates back to the end of World War II. Prior to this, there are records of resources transferred to humanitarian aid (especially after the First World War) and assistance provided by European powers to their colonies. However, the transfer of such resources at the time was neither institutionalized nor particularly permanent, since "charity" was not understood as an adequate use of public funds, and even less so when resources were directed towards people beyond national borders. Aid was always considered temporary, and often aimed for the recovery of the beneficiary population's previous condition, that is, the restoration of original order, even when this original order was also precarious (Lancaster 2008).

The post-war scenario and the interwar absence of common cooperation agreements left several states in a situation of poverty which took a long time to reverse, and even affected the economies of countries least devastated by the war. Because of this, several mutual aid agreements were sealed both during and after World War II to prevent a similar catastrophe. The first international cooperation agencies were created in this environment, with the aim of supporting the reconstruction of the countries affected by the War (Lancaster 2008; Moyo 2009). Many of the international financial cooperation bodies in operation today would have been created during this time: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were created in 1944 during a meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, with the objective of rebuilding the countries devastated by World War II and recovering their Economies⁸. In 1947 the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was set up to administer and distribute the Marshall Plan funds, which injected American capital into countries whose economy had been devastated by the war. OEEC's success in managing the resources of the Marshall Plan ultimately attracted the United States and Canada to the then 14-member

⁸ Source: Virtual Archives of the World Bank, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history>, last visited on 06/06/2016.

organization, which became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1960⁹.

The character of foreign aid changed significantly over this period, both in terms of the quantity and nature of donations. The Marshall Plan, initially created as a plan for the recovery and re-establishment of countries devastated after World War II, can also be understood as an anti-communist plan. The injection of resources prevented recipient countries from being absorbed into the Soviet Bloc, since the Soviet Union was simultaneously promoting foreign aid programs for recovering countries in Eastern Europe. Barder (2005) offers a good illustration of this fact:

Though it is popular today, it is worth recalling that it took some time and a considerable effort by President Truman and his colleagues to secure US public support for the Marshall Plan. The State Department organized a large-scale and well-funded public education program, including providing trips to Europe for many members of Congress to see for themselves the need for U.S.-sponsored reconstruction. In the end, it was increasing Soviet intransigence and the communist take-over of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 that eventually persuaded Congress to approve the original Marshall Plan appropriation. (Barder 2005, 5)

As soon as they were reasonably recovered, between the late 1950s and early 1960s, Western countries funded by the Marshall Plan began to be pressured by the United States to develop their own foreign aid programs aimed at curbing communist advancement in poor and/or industrialized countries (Lancaster 2008). It is in this context that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was created in 1959 during a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), in which Brazil has played a fundamental role. With a somewhat different purpose from that of the World Bank - strongly marked by the idea of reconstruction and emergency aid - the IDB emerged as a platform of mutual aid between the American countries for development in various sectors¹⁰. Other regional development banks also emerged in subsequent

⁹ Today, the institution is made up of 35 members (Brazil is considered a “strategic partner” alongside India, China, South Africa and Indonesia. Russia is currently negotiating its membership). Source: virtual archives of the OECD, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/about/history/>, last visited on 03/03/2017.

¹⁰ Source: virtual archives of the Inter-American Development Bank, available at: <http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-inter-american-development-bank,5999.html>, last visited on 03/06/2016.

years, such as the African Development Bank (1964) and the Asian Development Bank (1966)¹¹.

Until the early 1960s, most Western European countries, as well as Japan, had set up foreign aid programs – in some cases establishing permanent foreign aid – to assist foreign countries. Countries that had colonies in the south (such as the United Kingdom and France) who already used state bodies to send resources abroad, were simply structurally expanded to cater to the new demand. The French Development Agency (AFD) had existed since 1941 as "a vast device of cooperation between the metropolis and its overseas territories"¹². The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DIFD), although only officially established in 1964, was developed within the framework of the then Ministry of Overseas Development, which replaced the former Colonial Development Advisory Committee that had been active since 1929 (Barder 2005).

In any case, most national agencies for official foreign aid, which in this time began to adopt terms such as "international cooperation", "international development" or "international assistance" in their titles, emerged in the 1960s. Some examples of this are: USAID, the United States Agency for International Development (1961); DED, the German Development Service (1963) and, CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency (1968). It is worth pointing out that some countries, despite already having well-established official foreign aid programs at the time, took a little longer to set up their own agencies. Japan, for example, already had overseas technical cooperation programs since 1954, although JICA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, was only established in 1974¹³.

These agencies met regularly at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a committee of aid donors created within the framework of the OECD in 1960. Initially functioning as a forum for consultation among donor countries and their

¹¹ Source: virtual archives of Gpeari (Gabinete de Planeamento, Estratégia, Avaliação e Relações Internacionais do Ministério das Finanças de Portugal). Available at: <http://www.gpeari.min-financas.pt/relacoes-internacionais/relacoes-multilaterais/instituicoes-financeiras-internacionais/bancos-regionais-de-desenvolvimento>, last visited on 03/06/2016.

¹² Source: virtual archives of the AFD. Available at <http://www.afd.fr/home/AFD/presentation-afd/GouvernanceAFD/Historique-et-statuts>, last visited on 06/06/2016.

¹³ Source: JICA virtual archives. Available at: <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/history/>, last visited on 06/06/2016.

institutionalization, its objective in 1961 was to create a space to monitor the flow of its members' official foreign aid resources. The group's initial understanding was that if foreign aid to developing countries was to become permanent and effective, it was necessary for donors to act cooperatively in order to avoid overlapping or lacking resources in specific strategic sectors or countries. Consistent data on transferred resources, sectors, recipient countries and partnerships was required. As early as 1962, the DAC launched its first publications compiling data on ODA, and began the systematic production of statistics on foreign aid¹⁴. Since then, data generated by the committee's statistics industry has guided decision-making by the DAC. DAC resolutions then determine the direction and volume of resources allocated to "development cooperation" around the world, pointing to important sectoral and regional trends that have been also picked up by scholars.

It should be noted that the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), the foreign aid data centre compiled by the DAC, and the official source of development assistance statistics for all DAC countries, works only with partner countries - members of the OECD and the DAC. The centre does not cover the volume donated, for example, by countries of the Global South, countries of the Middle East or Asia (with the exception of Japan and Korea, who are part of the OECD), or certain Eastern European countries. This not only means that we have a statistical blackout of Soviet bloc donations throughout the Cold War, but that data compiled by the OECD does not account for the recent phenomenon of increased donations from non-Western authoritarian countries, Such as China and Iran (Wright and Winters, 2010).

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also emerged during this period (1965), resulting from a merger between the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, or EPTA (created in 1949 and made up of six United Nations agencies), and the United Nations Special Fund (1958). The UNDP manages the voluntary contributions from UN signatories to implement programs in developing countries. Curiously, there are no publications dealing with UNDP activities during the Cold War. It is possible that the role of the United States as the largest donor country to the United Nations might have influenced UNDP programs to configure them as anti-communist shields in peripheral capitalist countries, even though the Soviet Union

¹⁴ Source: *DAC in Dates: The History of OECD's Development Assistance Committee*. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/1896808.pdf>, last visited on 16/06/2016.

was also a signatory to the UN. The arms race that characterized this period was reflected in another race to provide financial assistance to opposing western and eastern countries, a dispute in which the neutrality of the UNDP was difficult to ensure. In any case, this is a hypothesis to be tested under scientific investigation.

The 1960s and 1970s are also strongly marked by the emergence of a number of humanitarian NGOs that expanded the reach of church and charity organizations aiming to reduce human suffering and provide relief in countries devastated by natural disaster, famine or civil war. These organizations began to advocate increasing aid from developed countries to poor countries (Valentin 2005; Lancaster 2008). In the late 1950s, the World Council of Churches recommended that developed governments should devote at least 1 percent of their GDP to helping poor countries (Lancaster 2008). During the 1960s, DAC members accepted these terms, but withdrew a few years later on the grounds that they could not control private flows. Thus, they set a less optimistic target for official numbers: 0.7% of the GDP of each member country would thereby be devoted to foreign assistance¹⁵.

The debate on foreign aid targets also took place within the Pearson Commission on International Development. In 1968, the then World Bank President, Robert McNamara, formed a commission chaired by former Canadian Prime Minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner Lester Pearson. The purpose of the commission was to investigate the actions of the World Bank over the past 20 years and to check whether development assistance provided by the Bank was positive. In addition, the commission would also make recommendations for future World Bank operations, which would certainly be reflect in further similar organizations. In September 1969, Pearson and the seven other colleagues forming the commission delivered a report entitled "Partners in Development". The paper mainly explored economic issues related to poor countries, such as the need to set targets for economic growth, the issue of indebtedness to rich countries, and the need for population control. Some of the recommendations in the report pointed to the need to reduce interest rates on loans to poor countries and to set longer deadlines for debt settlement. The report reinforced the idea that rich countries should channel a minimum of 0.7% of their respective GDPs into poor countries, although maintaining that the 1% donation

¹⁵ Virtual archives of the OCDE: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm>, site last accessed 08/03/2017.

target was more ideal. Pearson and his colleagues also suggested that rich countries allocate 50 percent of their official foreign aid budgets to multilateral agencies (rather than the 10 percent usually set aside at the time) (Pearson 1969).

During this period, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), or the "Movement of the Non-Aligned", also gained strength. It was a group of countries made up mostly of former colonies and who were identified as "southern" - as opposed to the developed countries of the north. These countries formed blocks in which to autonomously discuss their political and economic destinies, as well as technical cooperation agreements, without the interference of their former metropolis, for example the Organization of African Unity and the G-77 (Modi 2011). NAM activism was strong in the 1970s and culminated in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Plan of Action for South-South Cooperation, held in Buenos Aires in 1978 (Modi 2011; Burges 2012).

Long-term development was also included on the agenda of international aid agencies in the 1970s. And by no coincidence: at the time, most countries in the world were already donors or recipients of foreign aid, which by then had become an almost naturalized common element of bilateral relations, especially between rich and poor countries. In addition, the professionalization of international assistance agencies was taking place, meaning that strategic planning as an aid intervention tool was being introduced and disseminated between agencies (Lancaster 2008). The specific historical context greatly contributed to this phenomenon - in addition to the 1970s economic crisis that worsened poverty and inequality in underdeveloped countries throughout the mid-1970s (as well as famine in Africa and South Asia), these governmental and multilateral agencies were heavily influenced by international conferences that took place during the second half of the twentieth century, as well as the growing number of prominent and influential NGOs advocating development cooperation (Valentin 2005).

Two major views on foreign aid for development were in vogue at the time: one that advocated the reduction of basic needs (poverty, hunger, housing), and one that saw structural economic adjustments (economic reform, trade liberalization, currency devaluation, etc.) fundamental to the promotion of economic growth (Valentin 2005; Lancaster 2008). The first was aligned with NGOs trending at the

time, and the second was associated with the World Bank's more bureaucratic approach (Lancaster 2008). Interestingly, the debate did not prevent foreign aid from increasing tenfold over the next twenty years, from US\$8 billion in 1970 to almost US\$80 billion in 1990 (ibidem).

1.4 Contemporary Debates

The end of the Cold War represented major changes in foreign aid and the concept of development that guided official aid flows. Issues such as democratization, supporting old socialist countries, global problems (related to global public goods), and peace-building in post-conflict territories are just some that gained ground. The decade was marked by several United Nations summits focusing on issues such as the environment, population, sex, food, global climate change, and racism¹⁶ (Valentin 2005; Lancaster 2008).

The 1990s also marked the beginning of a broad and in-depth review of the contemporary model of foreign aid, with input from both scholars and bureaucrats from governmental and multilateral aid agencies (Easterly 2005; Lancaster 2008; Moyo 2009). Amongst agencies, doubts being raised created the sense that conditions needed to be employed to improve the effectiveness of aid. The effectiveness of aid, volatility of funds, criticisms of financial aid given to countries run by corrupt and violent regimes, lack of selectivity, misinterpretation of expected results of the financial assistance provided, and tensions between donors and recipients are just some of the issues raised during this period. Besides these general debates, the fall of the Berlin Wall also enhanced the terms of cross-compliance in international donations. The claim that transfers made during the Cold War era were totally unconditional is problematic – in the case of multilateral aid especially, conditionality (provided by the donor/creditor to be strictly followed by the

¹⁶ United Nations Summit on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 1992; United Nations Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 1994; United Nations Summit on Women in Beijing, 1995; World Food Summit, Rome, 1996; Global Climate Conference, Kyoto, 1997; The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Durban, 2001.

recipient country) had always existed. However, during the Cold War period, foreign aid sought more specifically to secure areas of influence, and donors understood that non-donation by the capitalist bloc could open a loophole for donations from the Soviet bloc, and vice versa. Therefore, donations carried relatively little conditionality, as donors were already incentivised. In the 1980s and 1990s, competition between recipient countries increased, and conditionality emerged as a strong brand of foreign aid, whether bilateral or multilateral (Wright and Winters 2010).

The United Nations Development Goals (or Millennium Goals) established in 2000 also influenced the aid programs of developed countries around the world, and as a result the DAC even created special indicators to measure aid effectiveness against the MDGs. Three United Nations conferences on Foreign Aid for Development have taken place over the past fifteen years (Monterrey, Mexico in 2002; Doha, Qatar in 2008 and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2015). All three took place with the support of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization¹⁷.

The "non-aligned movement" went through a critical period in the 1980s because of the crisis that hit African and Latin American countries, which accumulated debt and, in some cases, grew negative. Without alternatives, these countries had to surrender to the top-down programs of structural adjustment set by the World Bank and the IMF, whose rigid prescriptions relegated them very little political-administrative and economic autonomy (Modi 2009). But co-operation among developing countries (south-south cooperation) re-emerged in the 1990s and

¹⁷ The "Monterrey Consensus" adopted at the first conference embodies the principle of a "holistic and integrated approach to the multidimensional nature of the global development challenge". The Consensus launched the monitoring process for Financing for Development that continues to this day and implies an increase in financial and technical cooperation for development, the creation of incentives for international trade and the prevention of external debt. The second conference examined the performance of countries in implementing the Monterrey Consensus and also issued the "Doha Declaration", reaffirming the commitments of the Monterrey Consensus and maintaining its ODA targets regardless of the current financial crisis. The third conference reinvigorates and strengthens the monitoring process of Financing for Development, which includes the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration. The innovation was the inclusion of the need to support the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015, which means that Financing for Development would finance sustainable development that aligns all funding flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities, in order to support the mobilization of the means for a global transformation towards sustainable development and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

2000s, when countries considered to be 'middle-income', such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa, began to exchange know-how for successful social programs in their respective territories (Sá and Silva 2009; Burges 2012).

At the same time, China has financially contributed to sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the millennium (Moyo 2009). The managed resources appear in the form of "assistance" or "help" (Guérin 2008; Bräutigam 2011), investment (Moyo 2009), or "economic assistance" (Lum 2009). Indeed, as Burger (2012) explains, the Chinese case is among those where it is difficult to draw the line between foreign aid and investment, since China's Africa program is complex and involves not only the setting up of mining industries and goods disposal infrastructure, but also small grants for social spending and loans with favorable interest rates (Guérin 2008). Although it is seen by Moyo (2008) as a promising program in terms of forging both economic growth in African countries and a non-paternalistic form of foreign aid, there seems to be a consensus among authors that these resources do not fit into the OECD definition of ODA. While in some ways this program might qualify as development-oriented, one reason for its exclusion as ODA is the fact that the program is not transparent (Guérin 2008; Lum 2009; Bräutigam 2011).

In the scientific community, the debate on foreign aid has been unfolding on two fronts: on the one hand, those who seek the *motivations* to donate, and on the other, those who measure the *impact* of donations. In the first case, authors of the most diverse theoretical nuances of international relations seek to understand what leads a country to donate public resources to another country. Within this approach, there is an important discussion on the issue of selectivity, which works to check the factors that attract and/or drive donors towards specific countries or sectors. The object, in this case, is the donor. In the second case, researchers measure the impact of foreign aid in recipient countries across a variety of issues, such as fighting corruption, democratization, poverty reduction, economic growth, institutional reform, and so on. The object, here, is the target country. In both cases, we encounter everything from quantitative studies with a large number of case studies, to more descriptive and very specific cases.

A reading of these works may give the impression that many of these researchers' findings are paradoxical and contradictory. However, it is necessary consider the variety of different research designs used - samples, temporal and spatial approaches, indicators and methodologies. Generalizing conclusions on foreign aid risks reducing the quality of debate on the subject, as we are dealing with a multitude of cases on a literally global scale. For this reason, very well-defined snippet views are necessary. We offer a glimpse of these debates in the two sub-topics to follow.

1.4.1 The Debate on Foreign Aid Motivations

Motives behind the emergence of foreign aid were mainly addressed in the 1960s and 1970s, at the height of the Cold War. Realists understood foreign aid as an instrument to increase donor nation's security - indeed, this was the main goal of the first Western aid programs: to reduce the temptations of communism. Recent foreign assistance programs aiming to prevent terrorism can also be read through this realistic lens. Morgenthau (1962), in a classic article, explains that foreign aid is an instrument of political power and should be used to ensure areas of influence. However, it maintains a critical eye on the results that this aid could trigger. The author understands foreign aid as "purchasing power", as resources with which to buy allies and concessions - and even considers bribes a type of aid. Morgenthau claims that aid is not always effective (efficacy in terms of "getting what you paid for") and so should always be very carefully calculated.

In fact, until the mid-1970s there was no other possible debate regarding the motivations for official foreign aid, other than that dominated by Realism. As Lancaster (2008) states, foreign aid was born as a strategic instrument of the Cold War and diplomatic realism. Although realist work on foreign aid no longer dominates, realists still hold a considerable position in this field of study. With the movements of the mid-1970s onwards, already introduced above, debates on other possible – what I call “non-realist” - motives for a given country to transfer public funds to another, began to emerge. However, these discussions were restricted to the circle of people working in cooperation agencies and multilateral organizations attending events in

the field. The issue was only more carefully revisited in the scholarly literature of the post-Cold War period, with the exception of a few non-realist texts published in the 1980s.

Marxist scholars have published various works interpreting foreign aid as an instrument of intervention and domination for capitalist means, such as the exploitation of poor countries for private material. Such claims generally depart from dependency theory, which sees foreign aid as a form of neocolonialism (Ghosh 1981, Ghosh 1985, Murray 2005) and which, according to several studies, is currently prevalent both in Africa – as the large sums that China sends to Africa can be understood in this light (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011) – as well as in the South Pacific (Campbell 1992).

Beginning in the 1990s, liberal internationalists began writing about foreign aid as the result of contemporary interdependence and a necessary tool to solving the problems of "public goods" or "global goods", the mismanagement of which could lead to catastrophic results crossing national-political boundaries and oceans alike. There are several studies that consider the greatest challenge of foreign aid today is how to deal with transnational problems (Kanbur et al., 1999; Jayaraman et al, 1999).

In the field of constructivism, Lumsdaine (1993) sees the objectives that guide a given donor country's foreign aid as a reflection of the current norms and values of that country. Although somewhat naive, Lumsdaine's thesis makes sense if we look at the literature on foreign aid provided by countries with a well-developed welfare state such as the Nordic countries. Noel and Thérien (1995), for example, seek to demonstrate how the donor country's current vision of justice, materialized in its domestic institutions, influences its potential donation.

There are also authors who understand the construction of foreign aid policies as a two-level game (Putnam 1988), in which national institutions - such as Congress, internal civil society organizations, public opinion and even the bureaucracy of their own ICD agencies - play a key role in defining aid purposes, budgets, target countries and program outreach, without disregarding the international scenario. Riddell (1987), for example, argues that the location of government in the left-right spectrum influences the quantity and nature of aid. He

points out that in Britain, both Labour and Conservatives have a pro-development view of foreign aid. Yet, the former advocate aid to the poorest people in the least developed countries, while the second understands development aid as assistance in creating an environment for open markets. Riddell explains that the same considerations about development aid apply to the United States when comparing Democrats and Republicans.

It is worth mentioning that these approaches are not necessarily exclusive. Neo-colonialist objectives can work perfectly alongside more realist objectives, just as the approach according to which parties play an important role in defining donations can be well worked out from a constructivist perspective. In addition to the discussion about what leads countries to donate, or which factors weigh more heavily on the decision, there are further layers of debate regarding what causes donors to donate to one country over another, towards certain areas over others, or towards communities and NGOs over governments. This issue has led to a growing literature which compares types of donors, and crosses this information with characteristics of the recipient countries - such as corruption, quality of institutions, governance, type of political regime, respect for human rights, etc.

Indeed, some very interesting articles point to differences in the development of bilateral and multilateral aid agency activity. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) investigate whether donations are guided by donor interests or recipient needs. They find evidence that bilateral aid is more strongly driven by donor interests while multilateral aid rests more on the needs of the recipient. Dollar and Levin (2006) examine whether bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance is "selective" in terms of democracy and the rule of law - that is, to what extent respect for these values is taken into account by donor agencies. They conclude that multilateral assistance is more selective than bilateral aid – this is to say, respect for democracy and the rule of law on the part of recipient countries weighs more heavily on the decisions of multilateral agencies than on bilateral agencies. Neumayer (2003, 2003b, 2003c) endorses this conclusion. He argues that a country's human rights record is often statistically insignificant in determining aid grants, but that there are differences between aid allocations from bilateral and multilateral agencies. Only for the latter is respect for human rights relevant.

There is also debate concerning supplier agencies that provide "reimbursable credits" and "non-reimbursable credits" (Hammergren 2003). Reimbursable credits refer to loans, and non-reimbursable ones to grants. According to Hammergren, there is a difference in the way these two types of agencies operate. Those who provide reimbursable credits - such as the World Bank and other regional development banks - are more sensitive to local demands than agencies providing non-reimbursable credits - such as bilateral cooperation agencies -, who tend to condition donations to generic prescriptions and are less open to dialogue with the governments or organizations of recipient countries. Hammergren's text corroborates the claims of authors above, as the classification it makes between agencies providing repayable and non-repayable credits can be converted without prejudice to a classification between multilateral and bilateral agencies, respectively.

Although some authors point out that we are currently experiencing recipient-driven development (Wright and Winters, 2010), forged at the Monterrey Consensus (2002) and the Paris Declaration of Effective Aid (2005)¹⁸, there are no recent texts assessing whether these agreements have actually had any effect on the way agencies define recipients, or the nature of funded projects' implementation.

There is also a respectable amount of work denouncing the World Bank and UNESCO literacy projects targeting Africa and the South Pacific as an attempt at cultural and symbolic domination with the goal of facilitating economic strongholds over these peoples (Biraimah 2005, Wickens and Sandlin 2007). The same criticism can be extended to the World Bank's project to finance African universities in the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted in the dismantling of public higher education and consequent labour shortages in the countries receiving the funds (Collins and Rhoads 2010, Caffentzis 2000).

On the same topic, we can cite USAID's investment in the training of Latin American police during the 1960s and 1970s, a period marked by several dictatorial and violent governments on the continent (Motta 2010). Also on USAID, the MEC-USAID agreements - a series of twelve agreements signed between the Brazilian

¹⁸ The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) is a document agreed between developed and developing countries, donors and/or recipients, which provides a guide to improve the quality and effectiveness of foreign aid.

Ministry of Education and the North American cooperation agency between the 1960s and 1970s –, which dealt with issues from the adequacy of Brazilian public education to the creation of labour to encourage economic development, were intensely criticized by the student movement and intellectuals at the time (Cunha and De Góes 1986, Pina 2011). It is important to remember that these agreements were signed during the Cold War, when USAID worked hard to contain communist advances on the globe, which means that a more technical, professional and market-oriented education was a good argument for reducing more humanistic, critical and reflexive disciplines.

In the face of further perverse and sometimes corrupt motives, a recently published book by journalist Peter Gill (2016) calls our attention to the political take-over of international NGOs and United Nations bodies - such as UNICEF and UNHCR - by the UN Security Council, in the context of the war on terror. The author explains that certain organizations, historically respected for their humanitarian work, have been under pressure from funding agencies - official agencies of the same countries financing the war on terror - to follow an agenda that is not in line with the one proclaimed by the organizations themselves, nor with the principles of humanitarian work.

1.4.2 Debates on the impact of foreign aid in recipient countries

Research on the impact of foreign aid is much more abundant than that which explores the motivations for it to occur. Some authors analyse the impact of foreign aid under the realist perspective of donor countries' "purchasing power" towards beneficiary countries in UN ballots, associating beneficiary countries with specific concessions (Wang 1999, Kegley and Hook 1991). Most of these studies analyse the capacity of US investments to control the votes of beneficiary countries at the Conferences, General Assemblies, and Councils of the United Nations. And most of them point to the positive correlation between aid and vote alignment with the US, which demonstrates the effectiveness of foreign aid in "buying" votes from developing countries.

Easterly (2002), a former World Bank executive, says foreign aid agencies are too demanding of recipient countries, disregarding the fact that many of these countries, especially the poorest, have weak institutions and inadequate human resources. According to the author, this formula leads to certain failure. Easterly understands that it is important to listen to actors from the benefiting countries in order to avoid disappointment. This view is shared with Berg (2000), for whom failure to reform political institutions in recipient countries can be considered a shortcoming on the part of donors, who have failed to adapt programs and practices to the circumstances of low-income countries with weak administrative institutions. Birdsall (2004), who coordinated the Center for Global Development, wrote a paper in which she underlines and describes the seven deadly sins in donor failings. One of them is “ignorance” – failure to rigorously evaluate a country’s situation prior to the implementation of an international program. The absence of a good diagnosis also prevents donors from systematic evaluation of results, as it is necessary to recognize a “ground zero” before establishing indicators of success and failures.

In a more recent publication, Easterly (2013) poses the same question in what he calls the “blank slate” vs “learning from history”. The author explains that when formulating programs for developing countries, organs of developed countries have two options: first, they can actively familiarize themselves with the history, politics and cultural and socio-economic context of the recipient country, as well as evaluate the results of previously implemented programs. The other option would be to completely ignore this context, as if there were a historical void in that space of the recipient country, and create programs according to what works in the developed countries where these organs and their technocrats are based. Easterly explains that the second option has been guiding development cooperation for most of its 80-year history, and that this option has been collecting failures. This is why, for decades, a number of the programs being implemented by the international donor community in developing countries have produced poor long-term results - something the author calls “authoritarian development”.

The relationship between foreign aid and corruption is explored by Tavares (2003). This author calculates geographic and cultural distances between donor and recipient countries, and concludes that foreign aid reduces corruption in recipient countries, but that this effect is greater when countries are geographically and

culturally closer. A quantitative study with several donor and recipient countries was also carried out by Okada and Samreth (2012), concluding that foreign aid generally reduces corruption, but that this reduction effect is greater in countries that are already less corrupt and may vary according to the donor countries. This optimistic view is not shared by Alesina and Weder (1999), who document that, according to some indicators of corruption, corrupt governments receive more aid than non-corrupt ones and there is no evidence that increased foreign aid reduces corruption.

Regarding the relationship between foreign aid and democracy, Kosack (2003) compares the effects of foreign aid on the quality of life of people in democracies and autocracies. The author concludes that aid is more effective when applied to democracies, suggesting that foreign aid should focus on the democratization of non-democratic countries. However by producing a multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization across a large sample of beneficiary countries during the period between 1975-2000, Knack (2004) finds no evidence that foreign aid is capable of promoting democracy. Finkel et al. (2007) study donations from the USA towards foreign aid programs which aimed to increase levels of democracy in 165 beneficiary countries between 1990-2003. The authors conclude that democracy-led assistance has had a significant positive impact on the democratization of recipient countries.

It is worth emphasizing the role of donor conditionality in the impact of this type of aid on recipient countries. Some critics understand that conditionality is simply inefficient when it comes to inducing economic growth (Easterly 2005). There are others who see funding agencies' proposed prescriptions as an attack on the recipient country's sovereignty and a form of paternalistic neocolonialism (Murray 2005), although there is research that demonstrates its effectiveness. Dunning (2004) notes that the small positive effect Western foreign aid had on the democratization of sub-Saharan African countries was limited to the post-Cold War period. This indicates that the effect of foreign aid is conditioned by geopolitical context: with the absence of the Soviet bloc in the race for areas of influence, the threat of disrupting aid flows by Western donors led recipient countries to follow the donor agency's conditions. Bearce and Tirone (2010) reach a similar conclusion regarding economic growth. They show that aid provided by Western countries only promoted economic

growth in the post-1990s, as the end of the Cold War enabled donor countries to condition donations to reforms they saw as necessary for the recipient countries.

Of all the effects allegedly brought on by foreign aid, those appearing most often in the literature are by far the ones related to economic growth and poverty reduction. With regard to economic growth, some papers are very pessimistic in demonstrating that over the past sixty years, donations have been massive while the result, economic growth, is merely incremental (Wright and Winters 2010). On the other hand, separating data by aid type, donor type, sector and destination country can help to obtain more accurate data. Burnside and Dollar (1997) argue that official foreign aid only takes effect when the recipient country has certain preconditions such as good monetary and fiscal policies. Some researchers note that the effect on economic growth may be related to the type and timing of aid in the short or long term (Clemens et al. 2004, Rajan and Subramanian's 2008). Knack (1999) also notes that the amount of aid has an effect on economic growth, where the higher the amount of aid, the lower the impact on economic growth. According to the author, injecting large sums of money into a country has a deleterious effect on governance, as it reduces the transparency of government action and generates pockets of corruption and aid dependency. Still on the topic of economic growth, Easterly (2003) points out that aid is not capable of promoting large-scale change, and so agencies should set more modest goals rather than seeking to catalyse the transformation of whole societies.

When it comes to the impact of official foreign aid on poverty reduction, there is a distinction between authors working with an economic definition of poverty (such as per capita income) and those working with human development indicators, such as child mortality and illiteracy. In the first case, we highlight authors who have created models to demonstrate the effect of foreign aid on poverty reduction. This is based on the argument that the current model of resources destined to fight poverty is inefficient, either because it does not benefit the poorest (Collier and Dollar, 2002), it does not reward countries with good initiatives (Burnside and Dollar 1998, Collier and Dollar 2001), or it does not consider promoting income equality and the equal distribution of resources (Cogneau and Naudet, 2007).

In the second case, an interesting piece of research from the 1990s concluded that while foreign aid does not significantly increase economic growth, or benefit the poor, it does increase government size - which cannot be considered a particularly good or bad indicator, per se (Boone 1996). Besides this, the author concluded that the impact of aid is not significantly affected by whether the recipient country is democratic or repressive, although liberal and democratic governments receiving aid have reduced their infant mortality rates by 30% more than repressive regimes. Yontcheva and Masud (2005) work with the impact of foreign aid from bilateral donors and international NGOs on child mortality and illiteracy. They note that projects funded by international NGOs have a more positive impact on child mortality rates than those found in projects funded by bilateral agencies, but that there is little difference in the impact on illiteracy. They confirm that the income of resources through bilateral aid may lead countries to replace their own government programs with projects under the bilateral agreement, which is not the case in projects funded by international NGOs. Research from McGillivray and Farhad (2007) seeks to cross-check information on foreign aid with development indicators in conflict countries to verify whether the resources received are able to minimize the effect of conflicts on the well-being of these countries' populations. They conclude that aid is negatively associated with HDIs, meaning that it can neither reduce nor neutralize the impact of conflicts.

In addition to the macro-discussions above, which are generally based on quantitative studies using large samples, numerous case studies have also emerged over the last 25 years. There is plenty of literature dealing with recipient countries in general, as well as specific cases, where particular programs or agencies are the subject of research. Generally we find this type of research being published in a variety of languages, as case studies are usually carried out locally. This type of research is particularly interesting because it introduces the analysis of foreign aid from the perspective of recipients, something that does not compete with mainstream academic production in the field.

By way of example we might cite the work of Nipassa (2009), a Mozambican researcher who analyses the effects of foreign aid on the African country since its independence in 1975. The author discusses the perverse effects of foreign aid grants to Mozambique in the long term, explaining that although the

volume of resources has increased since 1975, the aid has not been able to reduce poverty or increase development indicators. On the contrary, the result observed is an increase in the country's economic dependence on external resources, rendering the Mozambican people subservient and disempowered. The author uses dependency theories to explain that donor countries use sophisticated mechanisms to produce underdevelopment and that foreign aid is an instrument corresponding to this objective, as it eventually becomes the currency of exchange for donor countries to receive political, military or commercial favours. The idea that foreign aid generates economic dependence and limits the progress of recipient countries is present across several works, most of which are locally produced, especially in African countries (Moyo 2009) and the South Pacific islands (Cornel 1991, Cornel 2006).

1.5 Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform

By the end of Cold War, several aid programs supported by the capitalist and socialist blocs were interrupted. With the fall of Berlin Wall, these blocs were melted to give place to a new order. Thus, supporting influence zones to create anti-socialists or anti-capitalist shields in the globe was no longer necessary. As a consequence, many countries that depended on either of the economic bloc's resources – mainly in Eastern Europe and Africa – have collapsed. Several conflicts started to pop-up around the globe, such as ex-Yugoslavia, Ruanda, Zaire, Liberia, and Somalia (Aguilar 2014, Lancaster 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

Throughout the following decade, the UN, the OECD and the European Union published documents and resolutions to provide the legal basis and institutional conditions towards peacekeeping interventions in these countries. This was also the period when safety started to appear in the development agenda, as a key requirement for economic growth and democratization (Aguilar 2014). These interventions were considered “necessary” not only because human rights abuses were taking place in these areas, abuses that violated the UN's and regional human rights Treaties, but also because these conflicts were considered by some actors –

including the UN Security Council - a potential threat to their neighbors and, ultimately, the rest of the globe.

The term “security sector reform” arises for the first time in the mid-1990s, alongside other related terms such as "security sector transition" and "security sector transformation". Initially, these expressions were restricted to discussions taking place within the international donor community (Brzoska 2003), more precisely, the meetings of OECD members and academics working with international development cooperation. At the time there was an ongoing debate regarding the process of political and economic transition of Eastern European and African countries, and about what the format of the new security and justice institutions of these countries would be. Until then, interventions in the field of security were limited to military assistance in areas of conflict and protection of the state. The provision of a safe domestic environment was regarded by the international donor community as the primary responsibility of recipient countries (OECD 2008, 16).

It is important to say that the definition of “security sector” has aroused many debates over the last 30 years and varies greatly among actors who dispute the concept. Some researchers have suggested the term should be restricted to organizations responsible for internal and external security (which includes the army, law enforcement organizations, and their administrative organs), while others identified more with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces’ amplified term, which encompassed justice and prison systems, as well as civil society organizations (Aguilar 2014). And there are numerous other organizations in the “in-between” – some attributing more weight and protagonism to the forces responsible for the defense and maintenance of order, while others stress the importance of many other actors in the security sector reform process. Since 2009, the OECD has defined SSR programs as support for “law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist, review and reform the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control”¹⁹. According to this definition, military organizations are out of the scope of SSR programs funded by OECD members.

¹⁹ See: <https://goo.gl/wXPYtS>. (Mars 22, 2017).

It is not easy to find material on “security sector reform” that is not automatically linked to peace operations, for the reasons explained above. When searching for evidence of international aid’s ability to increase internal capacity-building and reduce crime, for example, using “security sector reform” as a search term does not help, despite the fact that such policies may be categorized as SSR programs by the international community of donors. At the beginning of the current investigation, this particular paradigm appeared problematic, as the literature which best explored our subject would be very restricted. However, the literature on SSR programs and their donors in contexts of peace operations, and the literature linked to police reform funded by the international community in Latin America offer important similarities.

In peace operations, researchers criticize SSR programs for their top-down approach based on donors’ views, which generates an abysm between policy and practice. Blair (2014) explains that since 1998 the challenge for SSR programs has been to implement ideas from the North in local environments of the South, which creates difficulties for the development community. According to the author, SSR programs require a lot more resources in terms of institutional development than what is found on the ground when peacekeeping missions arrive in Fragile States (generally the target state of these operations). This means that financial and even technical assistance to local police and armed forces tend to fail in situations where there is a critical lack of legal, constitutional and administrative resources (Backer Scheye 2007, 509, *apud* Blair 2014, 103).

Since the end of Cold War, SSR programs have been so expensive that they are comparable to the military structure run by metropolises in colonial countries (Brzoska 2009, *apud* Blair 2014). Moreover, SSR programs have a sustainability problem – it is expensive for donors to reconstruct the security sector in post-conflict countries and, once SSR is considered complete, the recipient countries are not able to upkeep the structure left behind by donors. Iraq and Afghanistan have been able to continue running even unsustainable security forces because of the constant support of western donors involved. However, countries such as the Republic Democratic of Congo and Sierra Leone do not have the resources to preserve heavy security structures funded by donors, and thus risk revering entire reconstruction processes (Blair 2014).

According to Paris (2002), peacebuilding operations are formulated based on Western-liberal values to be implemented in failed states where a behaviour standard is imposed. For this author, these operations may be compared to the *mission civilisatrice* of the colonial era, which was the idea that Europeans had to “civilise” wild populations from the recently discovered territories. Blair (2014) does not use the same terms, but she explains that the protocols of SSR programs can be likened to the application of a “recipe” developed by rational-legal modern states over neopatrimonial, non-westphalian states, which imposes several difficulties. What is evident in this reasoning is that there is flagrant inadequacy in what the donors expect from the recipient states, especially considering changes in terms of institutional structure and political culture that are required to “adapt” to the SSR programs.

In a way, Richmond's concept of "liberal peace" (2007) summarizes several of the criticisms brought forward by the scholars discussed so far. According to this author, the international donor community seeks to export Western liberal institutions to be deployed in conflict zones, creating an artificial and ineffective apparatus for local communities receiving aid. It is a concept of peace that translates better as governance for donor countries than as security for recipient countries (Richmond, 2010). This idea is also shared by Donais (2012) and Maschietto (2016), who have been working with the concept of local ownership, which is currently very common in the discourse of donors, especially when it comes to security sector reform.

Maschietto (2016) does not exactly work with security sector reform but with the post-conflict scenario and post-peace agreements in Mozambique. Donais (2012) works more specifically with SSR in peacekeeping contexts like Bosnia and Haiti. Both come to similar conclusions: the international community seeks to forge local participation from an idea of appropriation or empowerment that ignores arrangements and dynamics of local power. And, in general, they invest in actions that serve more to formalize and legitimize practices related to the imposition of a liberal peace than as a form of constructive and genuine dialogue, emancipation and

real redistribution of power and wealth among citizens in post-conflict scenarios²⁰. According to Maschietto, the concept of local ownership that permeates the discourse of organizations such as the OECD, for example, can be understood as "promoting bottom-up empowerment from the top-down" (Maschietto 2016, 16).

Criticism related to the top-down approach and the interventionism of donors is very frequent in foreign aid literature. Easterly (2002, 2003, 2005, 2013), Berg (2000) and Birdsall (2004) alert to the lack of knowledge and interest of donors in meeting recipient's contexts, history and institutional conditions. The same criticism is fed by the authors who work specifically with peace operations, as seen above (Blair 2014, Richmond 2007, 2010, Maschietto 2016, Donais 2012). Unsurprisingly, the authors who study the relation between donors and police reform in Latin America will also raise this point.

1.6 Foreign Aid and Police Reform in Latin America

The literature that provided the foundation for this research project, which in turn preceded this PhD thesis, is much narrower and focuses on the relationship between donors and security sector reform – notably in police reform. It deals not with countries that have received peace operation interventions, but rather those that have needed to reform sectors in order to deal with high rates of violence, especially those linked to organized crime. This would be the case of the Latin American and Caribbean countries which I deal with throughout this research. During the 1980s and 1990s, countries of Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a notable increase in violent crime rates, especially homicides, as well as the development of criminal

²⁰ Several of the recommended actions suggest social engineering techniques to increase the participation of local actors in the reorganization of territories and policies. Maschietto (2016) reports that one of these actions consisted in the organization of councils and the creation of administrative positions in provinces where the local power structure had always been regulated by ethnic groups, who selected leaders according to their beliefs. The interaction between this traditional local power structure and the bureaucratic architecture sought by the international community generated a series of frictions. Likewise, Donais (2012) mentions the importance of choosing which local actors should be empowered, at the risk of international organizations empowering a local elite that will continue to exploit disadvantaged groups.

organizations based on drug trafficking. The first international interventions attempting to contain violence and reform police in the region took place in the late-80's, led by private foundations and some bilateral agencies. The majority of the research analyzing these programs, to be discussed below, would appear a decade later.

Part of the literature that deals with police reform programs in LAC insinuates a resistance, on the part of SSR agencies, in dealing with issues that involve local law enforcement organizations. Some authors suggest that programs aiming for institutional reform, despite not being very costly, are only effective in the long term and require constant monitoring (Leeds 2007). Hammergren (2003), a former executive agent from USAID and the World Bank, explains that in the early 1980s USAID initiated a justice systems reform program in Latin America, but that results were lagging behind. The program officers responsible for the program ended up concluding that structural and organizational changes in these countries' justice systems were too slow and needed to be monitored for too long, exceeding the time period of a political mandate or an administrative management term. For this reason, the program was abandoned by the agency in the late 1990s.

Leeds (2007), who works specifically with police reform, seems to support the idea that donors avoid programs in this area because they require too long a commitment in order to generate tangible results. The most part of support for this type of program takes place between governments, is based on technical assistance, and agreements usually last no more than two years. Such a timeframe may be enough to trigger changes, but is insufficient in achieving the expected results of restructuring police institutions' organizational culture. This issue is recognized by the DAC-OECD in its 2009 publication, "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?"²¹.

Hammergren (2003) also criticizes the formulation of programs by donors, which occurs without appropriate knowledge on the recipients and is based on subsidies that come from external consultants contracted in the donor country:

²¹ "Security System Report: What Have We Learned?", OECD, 2009, p.7. Available at: <https://goo.gl/vYnjeL>, visited on 07/03/2016.

Still, so long as donors continue to determine the areas in which they work in accord with their own ideological agendas and preferences, as well as those of their institutional constituency, then any room for immediate improvement remains at the other levels, defining the objectives of that work and devising the most effective and efficient means of achieving them. (Hammergren 2003, 317-318).

Peake and Marenin (2008) explain that despite the number of police reform studies in developing countries, undertaken by what they call "the GPPC" (Global Police Policy Community) and funded by the international donor community, these studies show no positive impact. The authors demonstrate that these studies or reports are not considered by the police "beneficiaries" that they try to explain. In their essay, the authors try to prove the existence of an "informational bleeding", a product of the huge amount of information produced by the GPPC that is simply not read. Throughout the text, the authors list why these works are not read by the beneficiary community: studies take time to read; authors are more focused on their academic recognition in the area of police reform; language is not directed at a general audience and lacks objectivity; articles are published in journals and conferences that are not accessible; and, academics lack the knowledge on contextual micro nuances of policies.

The authors conclude that the work produced by the GPPC ignores an older literature that addresses the challenges of implementing structural changes in very traditional institutions (Peake and Marenin, 2008). In addition, their recommendations are biased by the context of the policy of their original countries ("if it works here, it can work anywhere"). They claim it is necessary to better understand the context of recipient policing system and offer simpler and long-term reforms, a method that does not please donors. The authors suggest that the recruitment of specialists, from the same country as donor agencies, to process and provide recommendations on topics elsewhere does not lead to good results, since the researcher is always biased by his/her local context. They recommend that the local community is understood in detail before the advisor begins to propose reforms and make recommendations. This study reinforces some of the conclusions that Marenin (1999) had already outlined some years earlier, in which he stated that assistance to police reform, like all sorts of foreign assistance, reflects donor/advisor orientations: *"aid and advice – even when desired by the recipient country, as is generally the case – does not come for free, nor is it silent"* (ibidem, 108).

Bayley (2005) shares the same view as the authors cited above. In an article on police reform as foreign aid, he evaluates the successes and failures of programs implemented and funded mostly by the US. He lists what works, what does not work, and what must be taken into consideration for a program on democratizing police worldwide to achieve success. The author stated that the guidelines of projects in this field still reflected the experience of the donor rather than the specific context of recipients:

International assistance relies on generic packages that are assumed to be able to work anywhere rather than on programs that take advantage of local strengths, address local impediments, and have been adapted to local understandings and sensibilities. Assistance programs learn by doing, the lessons from which occasionally shape future efforts. One reason for this is that police assistance programs, and justice assistance programs more largely, are constructed by criminal justice practitioners and almost never with the help of area experts conversant in local languages. Foreign advisors generally recommend what they are familiar with at home rather than what fits local practice that could achieve desired normative objectives. (Bayley, 2005, p.210).

The author also addressed the absence of evaluations on these programs. According to him, there are numerous case studies, but very few of these are generic and broad enough to permit comparative studies and the production of a balance sheet on the sector as a whole. This prevents program officers and advisors – who have a tendency of oversimplifying complex problems and imposing agendas – from learning from past mistakes, as there is no systematized and comparable information on these programs. Furthermore, this jeopardizes the opportunity to plan strategically in the sector. It is impossible to know what needs to take place if what has already been done is not taken into consideration. The author also criticizes the fact that agencies do not share experiences with one another, which renders the scenario even more opaque. Bayley defends that as part of Human Rights agendas, police reform abroad must be evidence-based and rely on information systems.

This idea would appear again a year later in another article by the same author (Bayley 2006a), where he analyzes US efforts to reform or rebuild law enforcement organizations and justice systems. The author focuses on the US' failure to restructure police and justice institutions in Iraq and reinforces the difficulty in formulating good strategies for intervention on foreign ground without information

on previous trials, successes and failures, drawing attention to the need to collect information, map these experiences, and highlight best practices.

It is important to mention that Bayley (2005, 2006a) wrote the above articles when the OECD was starting to collect and systematize data in the security sector reform. This does not mean that programs for reforming and democratizing policing worldwide did not exist until then – the articles by Leeds (2007) and Hammergren (2003) provide brief descriptions of former justice and security programs implemented in developing countries and funded by developed donors years earlier. Also, Marenin (1999) describes several actions developed by the ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance), an agency under the US Department of Justice, in Latin American countries in the 1990's. However, systematized information on these programs has only been available since 2004 and the OECD was the only organization compiling it.

In a later work, Bayley (2006b) states that legal and political constraints may restrict donations to police reform programs. According to the author, all kinds of investment to fund US policing programs were banned in 1974 as a US Congressional reaction to how resources for training and equipment were used between 1962 and 1974. In this period, repressive and cruel policing strategies were used by authoritarian governments in Latin America and Vietnam on the account of the fight against communism. Once the "ghost" of communism was gone, the 1974 ban was amended with a series of exceptions to allow this type of assistance, with the main argument of neutralizing threats to American sovereignty (organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.).

With this, police assistance provided by the United States is diluted across various countries and many different government agencies, with names that are not always directly related to the funded programs. This hides a great deal about resources, which, if transparent, could be questioned not only by the US Congress, but also by the many human rights organizations concerned with the destination and end use of these resources. It seems that both the United States (represented by Congress, in this case) and several other donors fear the way their resources may be implied in security sector reform. A passage in Leeds' (2007) article makes this clear:

All categories of funders are understandably cautious about involvement in public safety reform. Those promoting strengthened capacity for criminal justice institutions and personnel are concerned about the unintended adverse consequences of, for example, training programs for more effective crime-reduction techniques that could be used for undemocratic intelligence-gathering rather than improving public safety (Leeds 2007, apud Ziegler and Nield 2002, 15-16).

Funding a security apparatus, according to this view, is a risk, and this may be a reason for donors to avoid the involvement of law enforcement organizations when formulating development projects, as the imposition of disconnected agendas with local organizational, institutional and cultural specificities may even have the opposite effect to what is expected. In this regard, there is an interesting report by Mesa (2008) on the support of Spanish and European Union cooperation for police reform in Guatemala in the late 1990s. The program provided for the Spanish Civil Guard to train the Guatemalan National Civil Police. However, the transfer of the militarized and hierarchical model of the Spanish Civil Guard to the Guatemalan context actually undermined the idea of implementing democratic reforms in the country's police, and increased impunity for cases of police abuses (Mesa, 2008, p.108). Yet, as Leeds states, *"it is with the police that most citizens have their first encounter with the state, and more often than not those encounters are tainted by corrupt or repressive behavior"* (ibid. p.26). In other words, safety is more than policing. But law enforcement organizations are not only a detail in the provision of a safe environment.

Marenin (1999), who endorsed the above statement, also explains that there was a change of heart amongst US human rights groups in the second half of the last century. He states that in the 1960's, these groups focused on military and political leaders as solutions for human rights violations. Police were hardly mentioned and, when they were, were strongly condemned. Nowadays, human rights groups support police reform as they understand that violations of human and civil rights are frequently perpetrated by the police and there is no way to revert this picture without reforming law enforcement organizations: *"Gradually there has come the realization that the police are more important and more autonomous – as violators of rights, but also as potential protectors"* (ibidem, 102).

It is interesting to note that multilateral bodies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank seem a little more permeable to issues that relate more directly to law enforcement organizations. These organisms have a history of actions in LAC and are more open to this type of financing (Hammergren 2007). For multilateral aid agencies, the idea of "resistance" to police reform may not be as applicable - and it would be interesting to investigate the reasons for this apparently greater openness. However, there is still significant criticism of their operations in the region because resources are provided based on an agenda that generalizes security problems.

Tulchin and Golding (2003) attribute this to the widespread adoption of community policing on the continent, which they say is one of the conditions imposed by donor bodies before police democratization loans could be arranged. The same criticism is reinforced in the work of Ziegler and Nield (2002), who summarized the findings of a conference entitled "Police Reform and the International Community: From Peace Processes to Democratic Governance", promoted by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). According to the authors, discussions that took place during the conference demonstrated that there is no universal model of police democratization being applied uniformly in Latin American countries. Equally, a large part of project resources and investments appears disconnected from local demands due to donors' (funding organizations) lack of knowledge about the countries in which they operate. The conference also stressed the importance of including the beneficiary country's own wishes as contributions to policing models, as when actions are imposed by a foreign agenda, local empowerment is very weak.

1.7 Final Considerations

The initial objective of this literature review was to bring the reader into dialogue with the broader debate on foreign aid – be it the one taking place within the practitioners' circles, or the one that occurs in more academic contexts. Familiarity with these debates is important, as the main findings of this PhD thesis will be connected to and inserted in among them. Moreover, the section aimed to draw links

between this broader literature and the much narrower one that deals specifically with donors and police reform in Latin America (and which constitutes the first literature base I dealt with at the beginning of my PhD journey). The overview also led the reader through literature on peacekeeping, an area I consider an intermediary link between these two theoretical fields.

The works cited in section 6 do not link the performance of security programs funded by foreign assistance agencies to a broader scenario of foreign aid and the literature on development cooperation. Despite this lack of communication, the literature on police reform has interestingly led to discussions and findings similar to those verified in the works cited across previous sections, the keynote of which is the criticism of generalized programs implemented in different contexts, and of imposing projects that are not connected to local institutional conditions and needs.

Studies on the foreign aid regime, particularly those functioning in the interface between foreign aid and peacekeeping operations, provide important explanations for the prevalence of generalized solutions and gaps between donors and local actors, as pointed out by texts on foreign assistance and police reform in LAC. Evidence of this can be found across all authors, in the omnipresence of concerns regarding the imposition of agendas (Richmond 2007, 2010, Maschietto 2016, Donais 2012, Bayley 2005, Marenin 1999), absence of knowledge on recipients' contexts (Easterly 2013, Berg 2000, Birdsall 2004, Bayley, Ziegler and Nield 2002), and the lack of evaluation and impatience of donors for quick results (Bayley 2005, 2006, Birdsall 2004, Leeds 2010, Hammergren 2003). In other words, these are not exclusive problems that only affect police reform programs funded by international donors in LAC countries. These are common complaints about international assistance to developing countries that have been pointed out by practitioners and scholars generally and globally.

Thus it is possible that the reasons for failures and successes in the LAC region's police reform may not be circumstantial or inherent to the dynamics of police reform itself, but may also be subject to the broader factors which explain the failures and successes of human rights, environment, and health programs funded by development agencies. The debates presented here on the motives and impact of foreign aid may apply for several kinds of programs. And, indeed, the debate on

motives that explain international assistance will help us understand both the nature of the SSR programs and the profile of donors who direct ODA to the LAC region in the forthcoming sections.

In the sections that follow, data collected on security sector reform programs funded by international donors in Latin America, as well as demands on the security sector raised with regional organizations, will be presented, confronted and analysed under the light of these literatures.

2. Foreign Aid and Security Sector Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: mapping donors and recipient countries²²

...aid and advice – even when desired by the recipient country, as is generally the case – does not come for free, nor is it silent.
(Marenin 1999, 108)

2.1 Introduction

In recent years the issue of violence in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries has attracted the attention of numerous transnational agencies. Most countries in the region are in the critical categories of 10 to 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC 2013). Considering the World Health Organization (WHO) understands 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as the epidemic threshold level of violence, this means that most of the continent is deep in a homicide epidemic²³. According to data from UNICEF's report *Hidden in Plain Sight* (UNICEF 2014), homicides are the main cause of death for boys between 10 and 19 years old in seven countries of Latin America and the Caribbean – Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.

In 2008, research carried out by Latinobarometro demonstrated that for the first time since the beginning of data collection, concerns with crime and with violence overtook the Latin American population's concern with unemployment (LATINOBAROMETRO 2008). The report *State of Cities in Latin America and the Caribbean*, released by UN-Habitat in 2012, reinforces the fact that violence in Latin America and the Caribbean is the first and foremost concern of its inhabitants. The report further informs that of the sixteen thousand municipalities studied, violence is found to be amongst the top three concerns of local governments.

²²This chapter brings together material I published in three different articles that may be identified in the references as Tomesani (2016), Tomesani (2017b) and Tomesani (2018).

²³The Global Study Report on Homicides (UNODC, 2013) states that Honduras has the highest rate of homicides in the world (90.4 per 100 000 inhabitants). The WHO report on violence prevention in the World (2014) sets Brazil in the top of the ranking of absolute number of homicides – 64,000 murders in 2012).

For their part, police forces have more often been viewed as the perpetrators of this violence than citizen protectors. Since entering post-dictatorship periods, few Latin American police corporations have undergone adequate reform in their organizational culture, meaning they still carry traces of authoritarianism. The state of Latin American violence seems to suggest the need for substantial structural reform within police forces, so that they can satisfactorily fulfil their roles by adapting to the democratic standards of police action and developing skills to deal with urban violence (which includes reducing the violence committed by police themselves). This means rethinking the processes of police selection and training, internal and external checks on police conduct, external evaluation on police management, the strengthening of community relations (Fruhling 2009, Fruhling et al 2006), the reformulation of career plans and salaries, and the redefinition of police mandates (Muniz and Proença 2007).

Governments have faced enormous difficulty in dealing with this issue (Dammert and Bailei 2005, Dammert 2007, Adorno 1999). While crime is on the rise, the implementation of democratizing reforms in police institutions is not necessarily able to count on popular support, which then contributes to their delay. The situation is thus one of a vicious circle: police are unable to provide a satisfactory service to the population under democratic standards, and these conditions favor their cooptation by organized criminal groups. In short, although there is an agenda of change recommended by recent democratization processes across the continent, it has not been fully implemented by Latin American and Caribbean law enforcement institutions thanks to a scenario that hinders change and a structure that favors the permanence of the *status quo*.

Aid agencies have developed specific programs and funded several projects in the region. Studies examining the role and performance of these agencies in the field of security sector reform, and more specifically in police reform, point to a tendency of importing generalized solutions to the recipient countries, of imposing an agenda that is removed from local organizational, institutional and cultural arrangements (Tuchin and Golding 2003, Ziegler and Neild 2002, Bayley 2005, Peake and Marenin 2008, Richmond 2007, 2010, Blair 2014, Maschietto 2016, Donais 2012). Some studies also point to the existence of a certain resistance, on the part of aid agencies, in dealing with issues related directly to law enforcement

organizations (Hammergren 2003, Leeds 2007, Bayley 2006, Brzoska 2003), which are the institutions legally responsible for the prevention and suppression of crime.

Some authors assume that foreign aid agencies are vehicles for the practice of soft power (Kroening et al 2010). From this perspective, agencies' programs are seen to reflect the crystallization of domestic concerns and conceal an agenda that may not necessarily be committed to the development of recipient countries. Therefore, understanding why an agency concentrates donations in one area over another can reveal interests (and disinterests) that constrain or limit the development of less privileged sectors. Moreover, such data would provide recipient countries with information concerning programs and resources implied in their domestic territory as well as neighboring countries. This would make them both less vulnerable to decisions that appear at random, and able to create international pressure mechanisms on the topics that interest them.

From a scientific point of view the present research is justified by a lack of academic papers that map out the longitudinal profile and comparative performance of these agencies and analyze them in light of the appropriate literature. There are several case studies (Brown et al 2008), emphasizing trends in this or that direction - what we do not know, however, is what guides those trends, be it donors' interests or recipient's needs. What is being proposed here is an analysis of the performance of these agencies based on the literature of Security Sector Reform and Foreign Aid. We hope this work will contribute to understanding the factors that explain aid - or lack thereof - and determine the design of programs promoted by these agencies, the interests involved, and the guidelines that are hidden in the construction of these agendas' process.

2.2 The international community of donors and Security Sector Reform in LAC

The turn of the current century was the moment bilateral and multilateral agencies officially recognized that domestic security was an important factor for development. Until then, interventions in the security field concerned only military assistance in conflict areas and the protection of the state. The provision of a safe domestic environment was considered by development actors as "a primary

responsibility of their defense, intelligence and police counterparts” (OECD 2005, 16). An important publication from the World Bank in 2000, however, recognized the link between security and development²⁴ and, since then, many supporting articles and reports have been produced²⁵.

Private foundations were the first to promote projects in this area in the early 1990s, through development programs under the category of human rights (Leeds 2007). At the World Bank, the subject of security has been increasingly popular since 2004 when it was first raised at the Bank’s Urban Development Sector, before being passed onto the Social Development Sector in 2010 and even earning its own Citizen Security Team²⁶. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank has been investing in the sector since 1998, and until 2014 17 loans representing US\$ 481 million were approved for the Americas (IDB 2014). During this time, the topic also gained popularity amongst bodies of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

According to an interviewed program officer of the World Bank (Ibidem), what motivated these organizations to mobilize and create an agenda around the issue of security was learning that crime and violence were destabilizing a number of recent advances in the progress of developing countries – sometimes even resulting from programs they had financed. Certain indicators began to regress, and it became clear that it was necessary to break the cycle of violence so that these countries could get back on track with development.

In the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a review of the approaches employed to deal with military issues has been in course since 1997. The Committee developed a conceptual framework for security assistance, the “*Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy*

24 Voices of the Poor, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2000.

25 The Geneva Declaration (2007, 2008 and 2010) also published reports showing that insecurity negatively affects development indicators. In 2013, the Inter-American Development Bank launched a study that evaluated the negative impact that violence has on the cost of housing in metropolitan areas, and found that people in Brazil pay 13 billion dollars in order to enjoy the feeling of security. In Uruguay, the negative impact of the problem reaches 3% of GDP. The study may be accessed here: <https://goo.gl/4i6ZsJ>, visited in 19th March, 2018.

26 Information provided by Flávia Carbonari, who worked for the bank and was part of the its Citizen Security Team, June 2012.

*Coherence*²⁷.” Debates around the elaboration of this framework led to the incorporation of key security concepts into important DAC documents, such as *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (2001)* and *The DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction (2001)*. Up until that point however, domestic security had not yet been considered a central item of ODA (Official Development Assistance)²⁸.

In the 2002–2003 annual survey conducted by the DAC on its members, donors appeared to be unsatisfied with programs in the field of security, demonstrating that “less progress has been made in translating the new security concepts into policies and programs”²⁹. The DAC then elaborated and released a reference publication in 2005 entitled “DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance”. The publication is part of the DAC Guidelines and Reference Series collection. This guide aimed at helping donors to: i) improve their understanding of the security challenges facing developing and transition countries today; ii) link security and development; iii) mainstream Security Sector Reform in development work; and iv) establish improved policy frameworks and more effective programming. The work was framed as a component of the UN “human security” agenda and a complement to the DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. The document provided information on key actors in the field, the multisectoral character of security in development countries, and ways to enhance domestic ownership³⁰.

27 OECD/DAC, 2001, 'Security issues and development co-operation: a conceptual framework for enhancing policy coherence', *The DAC Journal*, vol.2, no.3, pp. 33-68. Visited on 5th september, 2016.

28 According to the OECD, “Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channeled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes grants, "soft" loans and the provision of technical assistance. Soft loans are those where the grant element is at least 25% of the total. The OECD maintains a list of developing countries and territories; only aid to these countries counts as ODA.” See: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm> (accessed on 7/03/16).

29 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, OECD, 2005, pag. 16. Available at: <https://goo.gl/ftsztf>, visited on 29th February, 2016.

30 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, OECD, 2005, pag. 3. Available at: <https://goo.gl/2NgQDq>, visited in 29th February, 2016.

In 2005, the definition of official development assistance (ODA) was re-elaborated to include several elements of Security Sector Reform³¹. A year earlier, these elements had appeared in the DAC Statistics database within the thematic area of “Conflict, Peace and Security”³². In 2007, the OECD published the “DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice” (OECD 2007). The Handbook provided instructions for operationalizing the 2005 guidelines, offering step-by-step guidance on the design, implementation and assessment of programs in the field. The Handbook also provided guidance on monitoring, reviewing and evaluating Security Sector Reform. Finally, it exposed some case studies as examples of best practice to encourage donors to immerse themselves in real experiences. A publication of the Handbook was followed by a two-year dissemination campaign.

Between 2007 and early 2009 the DAC collected and systematized donor views on the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. In late 2009, the DAC released the report “Security System Report: What Have We Learned?”, including donors’ experiences and an analysis of successes and failures, based on the programs’ implementation and following the guidelines provided by the DAC publications. Interestingly, according to the document, the most persistent complaints regarding the process of SSR program implementation amongst donors were the “lack of ownership” on the part of recipient countries, and the several time-consuming steps it involved:

Establishing local ownership requires the development of skills and an approach by the international community that have not been a priority in the past, as well as the inclusion of national capacity building at the heart of the SSR agenda. Furthermore, in the drive to realise demonstrable outputs, donors can diminish domestic legitimacy – a cornerstone of successful SSR (...). Instead, an ongoing domestic reform process should itself be seen as a result by

31“Security System Report: What Have We Learned?”, OECD 2009, p. 2. Available at: <https://goo.gl/kMDy6w>, visited on 29th February, 2016.

32The ODA thematic area “Conflict, Peace and Security” (code 152) was made available on the OECD Database for the first time in 1995, storing information to assist with ‘Participation in international peacekeeping operations’. Several years later, additional sub-sectors were created to make them eligible for ODA. In 2002, ‘Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war’ and ‘Reintegration and SALW (small arms and light weapons) control’ started to figure as sub-sectors. In 2004, three further sub-sectors were included in the database: ‘Child soldiers (Prevention and demobilisation)’, ‘Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution’ and ‘Security system management and reform’. See: <https://goo.gl/y27HMC> (assessed on 22/03/2017).

donor country oversight bodies. Donors need to be more patient and spend more time supporting domestic processes rather than outputs. Evidence across a range of different contexts suggests that a home-grown SSR process, no matter how imperfect or slow, will be more useful than an imposed process³³ (OECD 2009, 15).

The document stressed the need for participation by domestic stakeholders, but did not explore the nature of this participation, such as whether local actors might take part in the decision-making process of programs, or who would coordinate this. It also explained that programs must be context-specific, adequate to the capacities and budget limitations of national authorities; that agencies should communicate and share competencies and responsibilities to avoid overlapping resources and programs; and, that when SSR programs are not harmonized with other development programs, they fail to meet narrow timeframes and function effectively, highlighting the holistic and multisectoral character of the field.

Since 2009, the OECD has defined SSR programs as support for “law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist, review and reform the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control”³⁴. Funding military organizations, for example, is not eligible for ODA (see footnote 12), whereas supporting civilian oversight and democratic control of military forces is³⁵. The sector thus applies to some situations faced in peacekeeping operations (as SSR is one of the steps of the UN peacekeeping operations protocol), meaning that countries receiving this type of intervention may receive larger amounts of funding towards SSR programs. In the absence of peacekeeping interventions, SSR resources can also be directed towards developing security services’ capacity to respond to the challenges of urban crime and violence³⁶.

33 “Security System Report: What Have We Learned?”, OECD, 2009, p. 15/16. Available at: <https://goo.gl/5HJX6C>, visited on 7th march, 2016.

34 See: <https://goo.gl/wXPYtS> (accessed on 22/03/17).

35 The DAC Database is supplemented, on a quarterly basis, with information provided by DAC countries collected via questionnaires they must complete according to OECD requirements.

36 It is important to clarify that the definition of “security sector” is contested. Some authors, such as Chuter (2006 *apud* Aguilar 2014), argue the term should only apply to those organizations responsible for providing internal and external security (including the army, law enforcement agencies, and related administrative bodies). The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces broadened the concept to encompass criminal justice and prison system, as well as civil society organizations (Aguilar 2014). Meanwhile, other organizations gravitate towards one or another of these positions,

It is interesting to note that these documents were elaborated based on consultations with donor countries (DAC members) and not the recipient (developing) countries. The publications provide basic information on the security systems of target continents, but the guidelines are based on the experience of donors' countries in dealing with security programs in developing countries. Even if donors are advised to consider local contexts and involve local actors, guidelines are elaborated and disseminated in a top-down model.

It is important to clarify that a reliance on OECD data has limited the donors we are able to work with. Although the organization's database is the main source of information on ODA flows from countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and multilateral organizations towards developing countries, the data is also limited by these criteria. The data does not cover the volume donated, for example, by countries of the Global South, countries of the Middle East and Asia (with the exception of Japan and Korea, which are part of the DAC), or some Eastern European countries. And while the OECD monitors flows from some private foundations and loans from development banks, it is important to note that we rely exclusively on official north-south donations that take place through the transfer of public funds from a developed country to a developing country, either directly or through a multilateral organization.

At this stage one might ask why private foundations were not included in the analysis. Here it is worth mentioning that there are indeed authors who categorize private donations as international cooperation. However these donations are not subject to the foreign policy guidelines of their countries of origin, meaning they are better characterized as straightforward "philanthropy", than as international cooperation for development (Marinho 2001). As such, this study does not include private multinational foundations and limits itself to official external aid, in which donors are states or international organizations, funded by and acting in the name of states.

At this point it is important to clarify that the definition of Security Sector Reform this research will employ over the coming sections is that of the OECD – for a very pragmatic reason: the data collected and analyzed in this PhD thesis comes

with some placing greater weight on the forces responsible for defense and maintenance of order, and others stressing the importance of other actors in the Security Sector Reform process.

from their database. Besides, foreign aid is not the best term to employ henceforth, as the definition of ODA by the OECD is more restrictive, and only takes north-south development cooperation into consideration. The first section of this thesis allowed the reader to develop a much broader overview of the terms and definitions surrounding foreign aid debates and literature. However, from now on, whenever the terms “international cooperation”, “development cooperation”, “international assistance” or “development assistance” are mentioned, it is done so in allusion to the OECD definition of official development assistance (see footnote 8).

2.3 Programs developed in the region: mapping the resources and donors involved


2.3.1 The size of SSR ODA³⁷ in LAC and Main Country Donors

As already explained, information on SSR programs in the OECD database is only available from 2004 onwards. The database gathers information on ODA fluxes from DAC Donors and also from some institutional donors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The presence of these institutional donors and their role in funding SSR Programs in the LAC region will be analyzed more closely in subsection 2.3 and section 4, as the picture changes greatly with their introduction. However, for the time being we will deal with donor countries. I therefore selected the total ODA from all DAC donors dispatched to LAC since 2004, and compared it to the ODA addressed specifically to SSR programs in LAC. This gave us an idea of the magnitude of the difference in amounts. We have also ranked recipient countries and donors for SSR programs in LAC region.

³⁷ A point that deserves to be clarified is that ODA might be referred to in the text as "assistance", "help", "aid" or simply "donation". However, it is important to say that the fact that it is a "donation" does not mean that resources are not conditioned by a series of rules of use by donor countries. Not least, these donations do not necessarily entail the entry of financial resources into the recipient country. Although these resources are necessarily channeled to governments or NGOs in the recipient country, "donations" can occur in the form of human resources or technical assistance. Thus, a German-funded workshop for police training in Brazil can be declared by Germany to the OECD as a "donation", although there has been no direct transfer of monetary resources from Germany to the Brazilian government or to a local NGO.

Between 2004 and 2014 donor countries appointed \$85.3 billion to LAC in the shape of numerous types of ODA. Of this amount, only \$446 million – or, 0.5% - were addressed to “Security System Management and Reform”. Although OECD documents cited in previous sections affirm that SSR programs have become a priority for the DAC, the numbers do not seem to agree. The graphs below show, respectively, total ODA fluxes to LAC countries, donors and amounts; the “Security System Management and Reform” ODA fluxes to LAC countries, donors and amounts; and, finally, a superposition of Total ODA fluxes with SSR ODA fluxes:

Figure 2 - Total ODA from donor countries to LAC countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD dollars.




Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database³⁸ – DAC/OECD.

The figure shows that disbursements to the continent are not uniform and stable, the reasons for which are unknown. One could argue that figures might be affected by the world economy, yet the outgoing expenditures to LAC actually increased after the 2008 crisis and dropped sharply in 2011, precisely when top donors were recovering from the crisis. The figure could on the other hand suggest that disbursements are less affected by global economy fluctuations than by other factors, such as donor countries’ strategic interests in the region, although of course a much deeper investigation would be required for such a categorical statement to be

³⁸ Available at: <https://goo.gl/gesKZh>. Visited on 4th november, 2016.

made. The figure below shows the amount ODA for the same period, but this time separated according to donor country.


Figure 3 - Total ODA from all donors to LAC countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Dollars, by donor country.



Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

The United States is by far the greatest donor, standing almost \$10 billion ahead of the second greatest donor to LAC countries of the covered period, Germany. In the next graph, we turn to ODA fluxes specifically to SSR programs in LAC countries:

Figure 4 - Total ODA from donor countries to SSR programs LAC countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Dollars.




Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

It is interesting to note that although the magnitude of unspecified resources addressed to the LAC region (figure 2) and resources addressed to SSR programs (figure 3) is completely different, the amounts of ODA in the second case seem just as unstable as the Total ODA in the first case, even if the curves do not correspond. We witness an upward trend from 2004 to 2011 (despite a minor downward turn in 2009, followed by a fast recuperation the following year) and, curiously, a peak in 2011, exactly when total ODA to LAC sees an abrupt drop. The abrupt drop for SSR ODA, on the other hand, would appear in following years 2012 and 2013, when Total ODA to LAC had started to draft some recuperation.

The figure below ranks donor countries according to the amount of resources they addressed to SSR programs in LAC.

Figure 5 - ODA from donor countries to SSR programs in LAC countries, 2004 – 2014, in USD Dollars, by donors.



Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

When analyzing general donors and SSR program donors to LAC side by side, some donors remain. Others were relatively insignificant as generic donors, but play an important role as SSR donors, such as Korea, for example. If we consider only the six top donors in both cases, we have:

Table 1 - Top donor countries to LAC (1st to 6th) vs. Top donor countries to SSR Programs in LAC (1st to 6th).

TOP DONOR COUNTRIES TO LAC	TOP DONOR COUNTRIES TO <u>SSR PROGRAMS</u> IN LAC
1 ST United States	1 st United States
2 nd Germany	2 nd Canada
3 rd Spain	3 rd Spain
4 th Japan	4 th United Kingdom
5 th France	5 th Korea
6 th Canada	6 th Netherlands

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

The United States is the top donor to LAC countries and is also the country that has dedicated the greatest amount of resources towards SSR programs in the region. Focusing on ODA to SSR programs, the USA is followed by Canada, which is just in 6th position in the top donors for total ODA to LAC. United Kingdom and Netherlands are already great donors of total ODA, thus it is not surprising that they also appear in the top list of SSR ODA. Korea's presence comes as something of a surprise – despite the fact that it is not close to the region geographically, has never had colonies or even significant immigrant descendant populations in LAC, and is not a great donor of total ODA to the continent, the country not only funds SSR programs in the LAC region but is a top donor in this ODA category.


It is important to state that the amount of resources implied in SSR programs in LAC countries varies greatly, even among top donors. The difference between SSR ODA flows to LAC from the United States and Canada is small – little more than \$4 million. However, the difference between these countries and other donors is very pronounced, as we can see in figure 5. Canada, the second largest donor, spends six times more than Spain, which is in third place.

2.2. Main SSR ODA Recipients and Resources

Our database on SSR programs implemented by DAC donor countries in LAC between 2004 - 2014 has information on 597 programs, fomented by 20 donors

in 33 recipient countries or regions. Recipient countries were ranked according to the total resources they received towards SSR programs from donor countries. A list of recipient countries and the amount of resources they received from DAC donors between 2004 and 2014 can be found in the figure and table below:

Figure 6: DAC Donors SSR ODA Resources destined to LAC Countries, by recipient country, in USD Millions, 2004 – 2014



Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

Haiti is by far the top SSR ODA recipient country in LAC, far ahead of its runner-up, El Salvador, which received less than a third of the amount destined to Haiti. At least 21 countries each received around \$1 million (US Dollars) in resources during the 2004-2014 period. The remaining 12 countries ranked between Bolivia and Cuba received less than that - Bolivia received \$403,000 USD dollars and Cuba received \$2,400 USD dollars.

When compared to other countries, the amount received by Cuba appears so irrelevant that we cannot help asking what kind of SSR program could have cost so little. After checking the OECD database, I found that the \$2,400 concerned a single program funded by the United Kingdom, named the “Panama Conference on Financial Crimes”. Judging by the amount, the money was most likely a resource to fund the participation of a Cuban government member in the Conference. This has led us to reflect on the nature of SSR donor-funded programs – does paying a

member of government in a developing country to participate in an event overseas qualify as ODA to the OECD? This question has aroused doubts on the quality and profile of these registered “programs” – are these programs really worthy of the title? I try to answer this question in sections 3 and 4, where I present and analyze the content of programs funded by international donors.

In some situations, funders may not specify recipient countries, preferring to identify their “receivers” by group instead. This mainly takes place when one program is implemented across several countries at the same time, and explains the existence of recipient categories such as “America (generic)”, “South America”, “North and Central America” or “West Indies (regional)”, which do not specify the receiving country. The table below lists the top ten recipient countries or regions, with the exact amount of resources received:

Table 2 - Top Recipient Countries of DAC Donors SSR ODA in LAC, 2004 – 2014, in USD Dollars

Position	Recipient Country or region
1 st	Haiti
2 nd	El Salvador
3 rd	Guatemala
4 th	North and Central America
5 th	Colombia
6 th	Jamaica
7 th	México
8 th	Argentina
9 th	America, regional
10 th	Honduras

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

During this period, Haiti was under the intervention of peacekeeping operations, which may justify the large sum of resources implied. The other countries that appear on this list coincide with the most violent countries in the world according the UNODC (2013), such as Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, México. The presence of Argentina, however, draws attention. Argentina has one of the lowest rates of homicides in the region – 5.5 per 100 thousand inhabitants (UNODC 2013) –, and is not exactly considered a violent country in the region, at least not if

we only take lethal violence into consideration. Just for comparison, Brazil has a homicide rate of 25.5 per 100 thousand inhabitants and received only \$2 million (USD dollars) during the same period.

Briefly looking over the list of funders and programs implemented in Argentina, I noticed some very expensive programs. The most expensive of them was a program funded by the United States, priced at \$16 million (USD dollars), and was concerned with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other programs funded by France or the United Kingdom dealt with police training for border security. It sounds awkward, but we may consider the possibility that these “items” figure among local demands and, in this case, the programs would fit the national and/or regional security agenda – and this is what will be explored in the next sections.

2.3 Multilateral Aid in SSR ODA

The scenario changes when multilateral aid is introduced to the picture. If data from the OECD Database is filtered by “all donors” (and not by DAC donors only) then it presents a different map of donors which includes institutional contributors, which actually demonstrates the importance of multilateral aid in SSR ODA. Between 2004 and 2014, all donors (bilateral and multilateral aid) spent a total of nearly US\$97 billion on ODA in LAC. Of this amount, only US\$673 million³⁹, or 0.7%, was targeted towards “Security System Management and Reform”. In total, 685 SSR programs funded by international agencies for development cooperation were implemented in LAC between 2004 and 2014, involving 20 donor countries, four institutional donors – the United Nations (UN), the Inter-American Development (IADB) Special Fund, the World Bank and the European Union (EU) – and 36 recipient countries.

If we reclassify the table presented above (Table 2) to include information of programs funded by multilateral assistance, then we have the table below (Table 3). We can see that the most targeted countries do not change much when we introduce multilateral ODA to the account – although we note that Argentina has disappeared from the Top Ten, alongside “Americas, regional”, while Panama and

³⁹ Constant price against 2013 baseline.

Guyana join the list. We also observe that some countries change their position on the list significantly, such as Honduras, which moved from 10th to 2nd position. Haiti remains sovereignly in its 1st position among the top recipient SSR ODA countries in LAC region, with or without multilateral assistance.

Table 3 - Top Recipient Countries of SSR ODA in LAC, 2004 – 2014, in USD Dollars (including multilateral assistance)

Position	Recipient Country or region
1 st	Haiti
2 nd	Honduras
3 rd	<u>North and Central America</u>
4 th	Guatemala
5 th	El Salvador
6 th	Panama
7 th	Jamaica
8 th	Colômbia
9 th	México
10 th	Guyana

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

It is worth mentioning that not all donors funded consistently over the 2004-2014 period. Additionally, some countries stand out for their high level of involvement as donors, notably the United States and Canada, as said in the previous section. For this reason, coupled with the fact that they were regular donors throughout the period studied, I decided to analyse the United States' and Canada's SSR programs to Latin America in full. This allowed me to analyse how their SSR ODA flows are distributed across LAC countries in terms of the target countries, the resources allocated, and the nature of the SSR programs. Multilateral organizations also spend large amounts relative to most country donors. Besides, part of the literature on international assistance point these institutions as more attentive and selective concerning recipient's needs and local conditions (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, Dollar and Levin 2006, Neumayer 2003). So I also included their flows in the analysis.

For this reason, I looked at the IADB Special Fund, EU and UN ODA flows to SSR programs in Latin America, to assess the profile of multilateral programs. It is important to note that loans are not considered ODA unless at least 25% comes in the form of grants (see footnote 8). I also considered analyzing World Bank ODA flows. However, in the entire series of SSR ODA flows to LAC in the OECD Database, the World Bank appeared only once, in 2012. This means that the institution is not a regular donor to SSR programs in the region, and can therefore be excluded from the analysis.

It is important to clarify that I am not overlooking the importance of loans provided by the World Bank or regional development banks to SSR in LAC. Rather, it is that the dynamics of loans are different to those of donations. According to Hammergren (2003), banks have a history of activity in the region and are more attentive to local demands precisely because the type of resources – “reimbursable credits”, to use Hammergren’s term – are demand-driven in the sense that banks have a stake in their negotiation. “Non-reimbursable credits” (or grants), by contrast, are guided by other factors, such as the domestic politics of donor countries and the internal bureaucratic and political dynamics of donor organizations. As such, loans are not useful indicators for the purposes of this study: of examining whether and to what extent donors are really concerned with recipient countries’ needs when formulating their programs.


In the following sections, I analyse ODA flows to SSR programs in the LAC region between the years 2004-14 for the five cases selected. These are the two largest donor countries: the USA and Canada; and three international organizations: the IADB Special Fund, the EU and the UN.

2.4 Largest SSR Country Donors to LAC: The USA and Canada

The USA and Canada are, together, responsible for 303 out of 685, or 44%, of the programs foreign donors implemented in LAC during the years 2004-2014. They account for 74% of the total amount spent by DAC donors (\$456.8

million), and 49% of the total spent by all donors (\$673 million – which includes institutional donors) over the same period. As stated above, the total amount spent by the USA and Canada during these years was similar. However, expenditure by the two countries varied significantly over the period, as shown in figure 7.

Figure 7 – US and Canadian aid to SSR programs in LAC for the period 2004-2014 (in US dollars)



Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

The United States and the United Nations were the only donors to begin funding SSR programs in LAC in 2004, with the number of donors increasing over subsequent years. Canada began to donate to SSR programs in 2006. Since then it has donated consistently, with not one year passing without an SSR ODA flow being registered. It is important to note that not all countries that have registered SSR ODA flows at some point in the past have continued to do so. Austria only registered SSR ODA flows in 2007 and 2009; Denmark only in 2012; and Switzerland only in 2010 and 2012. The amounts are also subject to fluctuations of various kinds. Some countries have made regular donations over time, but in relatively small quantities (e.g. Japan), while others have made large but sporadic contributions (e.g. Sweden and Switzerland). It is far from clear what makes a donor country decide whether, when, where and how much to donate to SSR programs. In the cases of our selected countries, Canada and the United States, there are significant fluctuations. Both countries increased flows between 2007 and 2012 and reduced them between 2010

and 2012. However, Canada registered a sharp increase in donations in 2008, while in the same year flows from the US fell.

We might also speculate that Canada and the US have different motivations in making SSR donations, since their respective portfolios of recipient countries and the amounts they donate to each differ significantly. As we can see from Tables 4 and Table 5 (below), the USA distributes its SSR budget to LAC more evenly:

Table 4 – Canadian aid to SSR Programs in LAC countries 2004-2014, by recipient country

Recipient Country	Amount \$
Haiti	\$ 147.467.972,38
Colombia	\$ 8.257.916,86
Guatemala	\$ 4.733.551,07
South American (region)	\$ 1.451.532,62
America, regional	\$ 1.244.612,56
El Salvador	\$ 855.647,57
West Indies (region)	\$ 830.795,59
Trinidad & Tobago	\$ 294.441,30
Ecuador	\$ 268.083,80
Dominican Republic	\$ 165.824,06
Honduras	\$ 165.824,06
Mexico	\$ 141.278,16
Brazil	\$ 105.958,62
North & South America	\$ 79.285,58
Peru	\$ 5.567,97
TOTAL	\$ 166.068.292,19

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

Table 5 – United States aid to SSR Programs in LAC 2004-2014, by recipient country

Recipient Country	Amount \$
El Salvador	\$ 42.053.665,48
Guatemala	\$ 28.207.142,58
México	\$ 2.015.138,36
Argentina	\$17.684.535,35
Americas, Regional	\$12.186.724,15
Jamaica	\$11.336.193,91
North and Central America	\$ 10.498.653,58
Panama	\$ 9.456.503,58
Dominican Republic	\$ 3.345.183,67
Colombia	\$ 3.121.400,68
Nicaragua	\$ 2.370.578,20
Haiti	\$ 2.193.216,86
Honduras	\$ 1.446.250,52
Paraguay	\$ 1.246.864,62
Guyana	\$ 997.913,67
Brazil	\$ 911.753,75
Peru	\$ 883.238,43
Chile	\$ 712.807,16
Venezuela	\$ 41.500,00
TOTAL	\$170.709.264,54

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

Canada worked with 12 recipient countries over the period, while the USA worked with 17. Canada has concentrated almost 90% of its donations to Haiti while the USA's preferred recipient countries were El Salvador (25%), Guatemala (17%), Mexico (13%) and Argentina (10%). Although these two countries demonstrate similar total disbursement to SSR ODA in the LAC region in the period 2004-2014, the data above shows that the distribution patterns of these resources is completely different, which may tell us something about each country's interests. In section three, the nature of these programs will be explored.

2.5 The European Union, United Nations, And Inter-American Development Bank Special Fund

The UN (via the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Peacebuilding Fund), IADB Special Fund and the EU are, between them, responsible for 87 SSR programs in Latin America. This accounts for 33% of all donor expenditure in the sector (including both DAC donors and institutions), although there are significant differences beneath this headline figure⁴⁰ as we can see in table 6, below.

Table 6 - SSR Programs funded by Multilateral Donors in LAC, 2004-2014

Institutions	Programs
European Union	8
IADB Special Fund	29
UN	50
TOTAL	87

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

The UN funds many more SSR programs in LAC countries than the EU and the IADB, but the EU and IADB spend much more money. In other words, the

40 In 2012, the World Bank donated around US\$ 6 million (constant prices, from 2015 baseline) towards SSR Programs in Latin America. This was the only ODA from the World Bank for SSR in Latin America registered in the OECD Database.

UN prefers to spread its ODA budget between numerous small donations, while the EU and the IADB concentrate their ODA flows in a smaller number of larger projects in a few countries. This can be seen in Tables 7, 8 and 9 (below), which show the distribution of these donations across recipient countries.

Table 7 – European Union aid for SSR Programs in LAC 2004-2014, by recipient country

Country	Amount
Panama	\$ 37.174.721,19
North & Central America, regional	\$ 26.356.553,50
Costa Rica	\$ 17.708.444,03
Jamaica	\$ 16.728.624,54
Honduras	\$ 12.850.830,22
Saint Kitts and Nevis	\$ 7.739.704,51
Total	\$ 18.558.877,99

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

Table 8 – Inter-American Development Bank Special Fund aid for SSR Programs in LAC 2004-2014, by recipient country

Country	Amount
Honduras	\$ 60.115.931,46
Guyana	\$ 21.291.693,95
North and Central America	\$ 9.845.700,95
Brazil	\$ 552.905,72
Bolivia	\$ 550.000,00
Mexico	\$ 497.057,57
Chile	\$ 310.000,00
Nicaragua	\$ 150.792,47
Colombia	\$ 4.624,84
TOTAL	\$ 93.318.706,97

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

Table 9 – United Nations aid for SSR Programs in LAC 2004-2014, by recipient country

Country	Amount
Guatemala	\$ 5.782.401,80
Colombia	\$ 703.188,35
Haiti	\$ 550.656,34
Bolivia	\$ 503.849,59
West Indies, regional	\$ 317.263,64
Nicaragua	\$ 245.397,45
South America, regional	\$ 100.526,47
El Salvador	\$ 78.395,34
Argentina	\$ 44.874,23
Venezuela	\$ 32.945,53
Honduras	\$ 15.597,32
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	\$ 10.502,25
Trinidad and Tobago	\$ 5.897,79
Uruguay	\$ 2.044,89
Saint Lucia	\$1.269,98
Antigua and Barbuda	\$ 786,70
Dominica	\$ 628,23
Total	\$8.396.225,91

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

As we can see, the three organizations concentrate their resources on Central America, and to some recipient countries in particular. This may relate to the fact that according to UN data on homicide rate (UNODC 2013), this region contains the most violent countries in the world. Even the UN, which distributes its donations between a large number of recipient countries, sends the majority (almost 70%) of its SSR flows to Guatemala. SSR ODA flows from the IADB are also quite concentrated,

with around 34% going to Honduras. The donations made by the EU, the largest institutional donor to SSR programs in Latin America, are more equally distributed – Panama receives the largest portion of this funding (31%), but this is not much different from the amounts received by other recipient countries.

2.6 Final Considerations

This section presents the mapping of countries (donors and recipients) and resources involved in SSR in the LAC region. The nature of the SSR programs funded by international aid region will be explored in the forthcoming sections, however some partial conclusions may be drafted here. What the above data shows is, firstly, that SSR programs constitute a very reduced portion of total ODA from all OECD donors to LAC countries, despite the violence rates found on the continent and the discourse of OECD recognizing this problem. The amounts analyzed allow us to state that SSR programs are still far from becoming a priority among donors. This said, our focus is concentrated precisely in this very small portion of ODA – and the aid agencies that decide to address resources to this field.

Another interesting finding so far is that, based on our sample composed by the two largest SSR ODA donor countries and three multilateral aid agencies, the process of targeting countries to receive aid seems to be very strategic. The institutional donors showed a very strong pattern of concentration of resources in Central America, and some of them concentrate resources in specific countries in the region. Canada and the USA both present very different models of distribution of their disbursements – Canada concentrates 90% of its resources in one single country, while the USA has a larger portfolio of recipients and spreads its resources more evenly among LAC countries. Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to state whether these results are linked to donor's agendas and particular interests in the region, or to the fact that they are responding to national demands from recipient countries.

In the next section, we present the SSR agenda as vocalized by regional organizations themselves and compare them with the programs financed by bilateral and multilateral agencies in the field. This will permit us not only to analyze

convergences and divergences between donors and recipients' agendas on the topic of SSR programs in LAC, but also to understand the nature of these interventions, generate patterns by donor and recipient countries, and subsidize further investigations in the field.

It is important to clarify that this investigation is limited in its ability to determine whether the formulation of SSR programs by aid agencies is at any level affected by local demands and, if not, map the possibilities of what composes and constrains their agenda in the field. The present research does not analyze whether the existence of these programs is positive or negative for the recipient countries, as this would require developing metrics of negative and positive impact. While this is currently beyond our scope, we strongly encourage further investigations in this direction. Along similar lines, the next sections will not judge whether local agendas are good or bad, but whether they are legitimate and representative enough to be collated against the international agenda in the sector.

3. Security Sector Reform: The Construction of a LAC Agenda vs donors' programs in the field⁴¹

*More important than how to build a machine
is where and when and for what group of people a machine will really pay off,
where the "right" answer keeps changing
and is known only to those on the scene
(EASTERLY 2013, 38)*

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding section, I presented a map of north-south resource flows to SSR programs in LAC – this included donor and recipient countries, the role of multilateral donors, and amounts. In this section I intend to analyze the nature of these resources by looking at what kind of programs are being funded and implemented by international donors in the LAC region, and confronting these with Latin American and Caribbean demands in the field of security. To this end, I now present these demands systematically. I will then present the SSR programs being funded by international donors alongside the demands, and analyze convergences and divergences between the two.

To map the challenges for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Latin America, I began by considering regional organizations that would be most representative in their proposals for the sector. After a preliminary analysis of active regional organizations, I selected five based on the availability of data and the degree to which they were engaged in the issue. This includes: the Union of South American States (UNASUR), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Andean Community (CAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)⁴². UNASUR, CAN, CARICOM and OAS have

41 This chapter brings together material I published in two different articles that may be identified in the references as Tomesani (2018) and Tomesani (2018b).

42 To ensure the mapping of Latin American regional organizations was comprehensive, the initial search included the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), the Central American Common Market (MCCA), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). I excluded these organizations from the analysis, either because I could not find sufficient

specific departments that deal with security issues, and have produced a high level of documentation that can help us to identify the weaknesses of Latin American and Caribbean security. Close analysis of these documents allowed us to map, in fine-grained detail, member states' weaknesses in the field. Although MERCOSUR does not have a specific body for security matters, it offers several commitments and recommendations on public safety signed by member states that could also contribute to painting a full picture of security issues in the region.

At this point it is important to mention that regional political and economic organizations were prioritized over civil society organizations. Indeed, there are numerous other initiatives working to build a regional agenda on citizen security in the LAC region organized by NGOs and universities⁴³. However, these are harder to map as they are more geographically dispersed, and information on them is not easy to find or access. It is for these reasons that I opted for regional organizations instead of civil society initiatives. Nonetheless, I believe further investigation of the latter would be highly productive, as such initiatives provide alternative forums of local dialogue on the subject, which may also be ignored by the international community of donors.

The survey and systematization of Latin American and Caribbean demands in the field of security did not leave any doubts as to the existence of a regional (or several) agenda(s) in the sector. There is an accumulation of knowledge on the subject, qualified state interlocutors, and plans being elaborated and implemented collectively in the region. Confronting this agenda with the programs offered by the international donor community seems to demonstrate that demands are infinitely greater and more diverse than the supply, and that what is offered is neither generic nor disinterested. Also, the international community does not seem concerned with familiarizing itself with and meeting said demands.

documentation related to security issues on their websites, or because they did not have specific departments dealing with security issues and had not signed commitments in this area.

43 Several Latin American organizations have organized events and produced publications on the subject. As an example, we could cite Dialogues of Citizen Security, organized by Brazilian NGO Igarapé between 2013 and 2015, which brings together leaders and scholars from Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and South Africa (for more information, see: <https://goo.gl/jnt1Ey>, accessed on 17/08/2017). More recently, in 2017, the launch of the Latin American "Instinto de Vida" campaign brought together various civil society organizations and academics from across the region with the aim of developing policy proposals for reducing crime, particularly homicide rates. For more information, see: <https://goo.gl/ytCSoM> (accessed on 17/08/17).

The section is divided as follows: following this introduction, a section to present the organizations and documents dedicated to security sector reform in the LAC region and a section that comparatively analyzes these regional agendas. Next, I present a session with the programs offered by the international donor community under the rubric of SSR for LAC, which will be confronted with the demands raised in previous sessions. In conclusion, I return to the data mapped and present the result of their comparison in light of the literature elaborated in the first section.

3.2 UNASUR, OAS, Mercosur, CARICOM and the Andean Community (CAN)

In order to locate the regional demands organized around security sector reform in Latin America (and subsequently compare them with the programs offered by international donors in the sector), five regional organizations have been selected. These organizations, already cited in the introduction, are: UNASUR, the OAS, CARICOM, CAN and Mercosur.

It is important to consider that the particular nature of the documents analyzed required specific forms of systematization. First, we tried to locate dedicated departments within the organizations that dealt with the issue of security. OAS, UNASUR, CARICOM and CAN met this requirement. In the case of UNASUR, this department was the South American Council on Public Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime (CSSCJDOT), which has been in operation since 2012. The OAS makes use of the Multidimensional Security Secretariat, which is divided into four parts: The Executive Secretariat of the Interamerican Drug Abuse Control Commission, the Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, the Department of Public Security, and the Department Against Transnational Organized Crime. The Andean Community has the High-Level Group on Security and Confidence-Building, created in 2003, and finally CARICOM has the Council for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE). The next step was to select which documents, produced by these departments, would be used for analysis.

Mercosur did not meet the requirement of housing a department dedicated exclusively to the issue of security. In this case, we analyzed the issues addressed in the organization's regulations. This allowed us to question whether security issues were in fact being dealt with, and if so, how this was weighted across the organization's member states. It was possible to conclude that the issue of security did indeed constitute a legitimate and recurring concern among political actors in the bloc, which is reflected in Mercosur's regulations. For this reason, we decided to keep Mercosur among the regional organizations to be analyzed.

A meticulous analysis of these materials allowed a detailed mapping of the security issues that concern member countries. Across the five organizations, we sought collectively produced documents that would help produce a list of the weaknesses and challenges for public security in the region, those that can be understood as the points which member countries agreed were in need of reforms and improvements. These would then be used as a proxy for Latin American demands and priorities in the field.

3.2.1 UNASUR

UNASUR was created during the 2004 South American Summit in Cuzco, Peru, to integrate the regional processes initiated with Mercosur and the Andean Community. It also aimed to consider an agenda for the region, inspired by the European Community model. Originally entitled the South American Community of Nations (CSN), in 2007 it eventually became known as UNASUR (The Union of South American Nations) and held its Constitutive Treaty in 2008. Made up of 12 countries⁴⁴, UNASUR is led by three directing councils, as well as the General Secretariat, and also relies on a further 12 sectoral advisory councils that hold regular meetings.

The CSSCJDOT is one of these sectoral advisory councils. It was first created as a workgroup, a result of the Declaration of Cartagena signed during the

⁴⁴ The following countries are part of Unasur: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. Panama and Mexico participate as observer members.

Meeting of Defense, Justice, Security and Foreign Affairs Ministries from UNASUR, and Resolution 19/2012 from the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs⁴⁵. The “workgroup of the Council for Strengthening Cooperation in Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime” met four times in 2012 before the Council was officially created. During these meetings, the statute of the future council, its mandate, and a Plan of Action were established. These were to be implemented and monitored by its members, whose coordination would be integrated into the coordination of the South American Council of the World Drug Problem, also linked to UNASUR. The founding document of CSSCJDOT was finally released on the 1st March 2013⁴⁶.

CSSCJDOT/UNASUR is formed of representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Security and Defense of each of the member countries and to date has held 11 regular meetings⁴⁷. However we can add to these sectoral meetings of the council working group. The council is divided into three working groups (the workgroup on Citizens Security, on Justice, and on Transnational Organized Crime) which also meet periodically. There are also meetings held by the Ministers of the Council – to date they have held four meetings, which bring together the Ministers responsible for justice and security in the council's member states.

These meetings produced a large number of documents aimed at collective action, including the creation of a police network, transnational campaigns against human trafficking, seminars for information exchange, publications on best practices, workshops on alternative rehabilitation for ex-convicts, and discussions on the possibility of a Regional Criminal Tribunal for transnational crimes. Unfortunately none of these documents clarified whether the decisions made were actually implemented, or whether they were only ever intended to exist on paper. In this

45 The Declaration of Cartagena (May, 2012) which underlines the need to strengthen cooperation between member states against transnationally organized crime, recommends the creation of a council to lead on the matter. Prior to a council however, they recommend a workgroup to consider a Plan of Action for the future Council, as well as its bureaucracy and regulations. Resolution 19/2012 (of June 2012) created the workgroup and proposed the creation of the Council to the Council of Heads of State.

46 It is important to mention that UNASUR relies on two further councils working on issues related to security – the South American Council on the Global Drug Problem and the South American Council of Defense.

47 The latest was registered in March, 2017.

sense we had no understanding of the completion of the signed agreements. In any case, our focus was not on the efficacy of the council – in fact we are more interested in the council's capacity to promote discussions and organize common rulings on security between the member states. For the research at hand, it does not matter if the plans that were put together were actually carried out, but rather whether they conform to an agenda for the sector.

Of the various documents studied, the 2012-2017 Plan of Action was without a doubt the most important, as it most clearly listed challenges to and solutions for security problems of South American countries. It was produced by the working group which preceded the creation of CSSCJDOT/UNASUR and relied on the participation of representatives from all member states in the fields of security and justice. The document guides the reader through a series of council discussions and activities, as well as the division of members into the three working groups mentioned earlier, due to the Plan of Action being divided into three areas – Citizens' Security, Justice, and the Coordination of Action against Transnationally Organized Crimes (COT).

For each one of these areas of the Plan of Action, four thematic axes were created and for each axis, various strategic challenges. The strategic challenges were further divided into actions to be developed. Below are three tables which arrange the four areas alongside their respective thematic axes, and attempt to summarize the strategic challenges and actions defined by the council. As the Plan of Action was elaborated some of the fields were left blank, as they were to be completed by the members over the course of their discussions and implementations. It is likely that these spaces were filled out informally during meetings, but the official Plan of Action found in the UNASUR digital archive was never updated – and for this reason continues with blank spaces, as can be seen below. The Plan covered the period between 2012 and 2017, which means that it is possible they are considering an update soon.

Table 10 - CSSCJDOT/UNASUR Plan of Action 2012-2017 (Citizens' Security)

Institutional Capacity Building and Strategic Policies of Citizen Security	Strengthening of Civil Participation	Citizen Security with Respect to Human Rights	Citizen Security Management in border regions
<p>Professionalization and specialization of police officers (development of specific skills according to type of police work); technological modernization to prevent violence and facilitate the exchange of technologies, knowledge on criminology, best practices and successful management models; and the strengthening of internal accountability and transparency.</p>	<p>Promotion of citizen participation and collaboration in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of crime and violence prevention policies; organization of South American competitions for the population to present proposals; encouraging the exchange of best practices regarding social participation in security; and the organization of seminars to disseminate knowledge about how civil society can contribute to the planning of security policies.</p>	<p>Strengthening the institutions responsible for the development of public security policies, with a focus on human rights and gender equality; the promotion of policies to prevent violence against vulnerable groups; strengthening police knowledge on human rights and rational use of force; incentivizing gender equality within corporations; development of a culture of peace through discouraging the possession and use of arms.</p>	<p>Institutional capacity building of local governments in border communities for issues related to citizen security, strengthening of cooperation and exchange of information between police officers and security departments in border areas.</p>

Source: Elaborated by the author using data from the CSSCJDOT/UNASUR Plan of Action⁴⁸

48 Available through the digital archive retrieved from: (<https://goo.gl/J327WP>). Accessed 16/08/2017

Table 11 – CSSCJDOT/UNASUR Plan of Action 2012 – 2017 (Justice)

Strengthening of the Justice System	Strengthening of the Justice Access	Formulation and Implementation of Justice and Human Rights Policies	Strengthening of Policies dealing with Prisons and Social Rehabilitation
Development and expansion of the capacity of public services and free legal services; improving the management of information systems; strengthening judicial cooperation between countries; promoting the improvement of the imprisonment system/prison for youths and adolescents in conflict with the law, with a human rights focus.	Creation of mechanism to accelerate court proceedings; training for mediators to act locally and increase access to justice, especially among more vulnerable people; promoting the exchange of successful experiences in the reduction of bureaucracy; and alternative methods of conflict resolution.	Development of a culture of peace; organization off campaigns to discourage the possession and use of arms; strengthening the struggle against impunity in crimes against humanity; support for the implementation of policies that protect vulnerable groups and combat sexual and domestic violence.	Development of peni-tentiary policies with a human rights perspec-tive and strengthen existing ones.

Source: Elaborated by the author using data from the CSSCJDOT/UNASUR Plan of Action⁴⁹

Table 12 - CSSCJDOT/UNASUR Plan of Action 2012 – 2017 (COT)

COORDINATION OF ACTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONALLY ORGANIZED CRIME (TOC)			
Strengthening of Policies to Combat TOC	Border Cooperation	Cooperation Against TOC	Institutional Capacity Building to fight TOC
Reinforcing prevention; creation of mechanisms for the exchange of information on transnational crimes, such as money laundering, human trafficking, and arms/ammunition/explosives trafficking; elaboration of a diagnosis of the current situation and new forms of transnational crime; and the mapping of the routes and modus operandi of COT.	Elaboration of operational protocols, training, and methods of investigation standardized by border security agents, with the objective of facilitating the exchange of information and improving the efficacy of integrated activity; creation of monographs on Border Security Policy to involve civil society, academics, and the security forces of border towns.	Blank	Blank

Source: Elaborated by the author using data from the CSSCJDOT/UNASUR Plan of Action⁵⁰

As we can see, actions are concentrated in the first two areas – citizens' security and justice, and some overlapping actions can be found in both areas. Summarizing substantially, the main focus points of the document are 1) transparency and social participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of public policies, 2) collaboration between countries towards the exchange of information, technologies and references of best practice, 3) joint training between security and justice agencies towards dealing with vulnerable groups and prisoners with a human rights focus, 4) preventing violence and discouraging the possession and use of firearms by the population.

⁵⁰<<https://goo.gl/Ww2Xxc>>, available through the digital archive retrieved from: (<https://goo.gl/J327WP>). Accessed 16/08/2017

The third area, COT, is less developed in the Plan of Action. In fact, two axes of the original document appear blank (cooperation against COT and institutional training to counter COT). Some of the discussions appearing in the workgroup's files demonstrate that in order to formulate effective policies, research and solid diagnoses on transnational crimes in the region are necessary. It is probably the area with the least information available, so the actions planned are limited. In any case, the information available until now indicates that it is necessary to create means of sharing criminal information between police of the member countries. What it also tells us is that the elaboration of regional protocols and training and investigation methods led by police from border regions will facilitate these integrated activities.

3.2.2 OAS

The OAS was created in 1948, when 21 countries in the Americas signed the OAS Charter in Bogota, Colombia. Since then, other 14 countries joined gradually the organization, that counts now on 35 independent countries as member states⁵¹. Since 2008, the OAS has hosted the Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas (MISPA), which produces documents on the challenges faced by member states, and promotes the cooperation and exchange of knowledge and technical assistance between them. These meetings are organized by the Department of Public Security of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (SMS) of the OAS, which is also responsible for the creation of AMERIPOL⁵². In 2014, it also led the formation of a 'Diagnostic of Police Knowledge Development for Curricular Planning', for the Inter-American Network for Police Development and Professionalization.

The MISPA's and the Diagnostic are interesting because they identify areas that Latin American countries understand they need to strengthen their

⁵¹The complete list of the states may be found here: http://www.oas.org/en/about/member_states.asp, visited in 11th October, 2018.

⁵² AMERIPOL is an organization that was founded in 2007 with the support of the OAS, headquartered in Bogotá, Colombia. AMERIPOL's mandate is to promote technical and scientific cooperation among police forces. Member countries finance the organization, with all financial contributions and technical assistance provided voluntarily.

institutional and technical capacity. That is to say, member countries identify these areas and monitor their performance against specific objectives with the aim of improving their ability to offer public security to their populations. Between them, the agreements of the MISPAs and the Diagnostic provided reliable information on local security priorities, that can then be compared with SSR programs funded by international agencies. The key points of the MISPAs and the Diagnostic are analyzed below.

a) The MISPAs

The first Meeting of MISPA took place in Mexico City between the 7th and 8th October 2008, and concluded with the adoption of the Commitment to Public Security in the Americas. The Commitment sets out five pillars for the design and implementation of a comprehensive response to public security challenges in the region, within a democratic framework. The document represents a synthesis of the actions proposed by each country for improving security conditions in the region. The main points covered in the 2008 Commitment (OAS, 2008) are arranged in the chart below:

Table 13 – Summary of the five axes agreed upon in the Commitment to Public Security in the Americas, 2008

Management of Public Security	Crime Prevention	Police Management	Social Participation	International Cooperation
Create and strengthen long-term public policies, with full respect for human rights; strengthen border security; create standards for the regulation of private security; modernize prison systems and create sustainable models of social reintegration for former prisoners, especially young people; create standardized management tools, and strengthen the technical and material capabilities of security operators.	Create cross-cutting actions for the prevention of crime; promote programs in schools to raise awareness about crime and violence prevention.	Generate mechanisms to provide transparency and accountability for police actions, professionalize the police; improve living and work conditions of police; create government-led crime and violence research observatories to support operational security plans.	Encourage and strengthen social participation and responsibility in public security; create policies to increase confidence in security institutions.	Create mechanisms for the exchange of information between member countries; develop common and comparable operating data to improve cooperation; consolidate the American Police Community (AMERIPOL); promote the exchange of experiences between civil society organizations in signatory countries.

Source: elaborated by the author using information on MISPA in (OAS 2008).

The second meeting, held in the Dominican Republic in late 2009, resulted in the Consensus of Santo Domingo on Public Security in the Americas. This document reinforces the parties' commitment to addressing issues of public security in a collaborative manner, whilst remaining attentive to human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as incorporating other thematic areas such as health, culture and education. The document makes several references to solidarity and the sharing of experiences and information between member states (OAS 2009). The Consensus seems to have been created to ensure that the signatory states would not resort to violent and authoritarian strategies in order to deal with crime. In the meetings that have followed⁵³, signatory countries have reported on their activities in relation to the agreements reached.

MISPAs remain active and meetings take place every two years, with the most recent being held in Honduras in October 2017. The Commitment to Public Security in the Americas, agreed upon at MISPA I in 2008, is still regularly updated in line with the discussions taking place at these meetings. The document provides information on the strategic areas that governments need to strengthen in order to improve public security in the region. These points are identified *by members states themselves*, as represented by their security ministers.

b) The “Diagnostico”

The Public Security Department of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (SMS) at the OAS was responsible for establishing the Inter-American Network for Police Development and Professionalization. The Network aims to create a space for knowledge exchange between, and professionalization of, police forces in the Americas, via AMERIPOL (see footnote 10). AMERIPOL was created on November 14, 2007 in Bogota, Colombia, with an original membership of 18 police forces. Fifteen national, regional, and international police bodies also participate in

53 MISPA I was held in Mexico City, Mexico, October 7-8, 2008; MISPA II was held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, November 4-5, 2009; MISPA III was held in Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago, November 17-18, 2011; MISPA IV was held in Medellin, Colombia, November 21-22, 2013; MISPA V was held in Lima, Peru, November 19-20, 2015; MISPA VI was held in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, October 10-11, 2017.

AMERIPOL as observers, including representatives from Germany, Canada, Italy, Spain and INTERPOL.

In 2014, AMERIPOL conducted a survey with various police institutions and experts regarding the challenges faced by police forces in the Americas, with the aim of developing new strategies for reforming police training. The project resulted in the production of the 'Diagnostic of Police Knowledge Development for Curricular Planning'⁵⁴. The document draws on a survey which considered four dimensions: a social dimension (how police forces respond to social diversity in the region); a geopolitical dimension (how to understand police forces in the geopolitical context of the Americas); an institutional dimension (how to understand police forces in relation to community, society, and nation); and a security dimension (how to understand police forces in contexts of high criminality and emerging threats).

Based on interviews with experts, documentary research, and systematic analysis of the survey conducted with police officers, a list was drawn up to identify deficiencies within police forces in the Americas. These deficiencies were grouped into the four dimensions detailed in Table 14:

⁵⁴I was given access to a paper copy of the Diagnostic, which was not published by the OAS. It appears in the references as OAS, 2014 and I included the paper copies in the Annexes of this document.

Table 14 – The four dimensions of policing challenges in the Americas, based on the Diagnostic (2014)

Social Dimension	Geopolitical Dimension	Institutional Dimension	Security Dimension
Training on social mobilization and social change; training on gender violence; leadership; methods of citizen interaction; techniques for managing and negotiating conflict and crises; data collection; systematization and analysis of police information; communication management; intelligence associated with social networks; methods and techniques of social investigation; basic sociology; human rights; understanding social phenomena.	Mechanisms through which to identify risks and global threats; transnationally organized crime; designing joint strategies in border regions; cybercrime and cyber terrorism; mechanisms of environmental protection and sustainability; international norms on transnational crime; migration.	Modern management tools and police directives; administration of human talent; human resources management; designing management systems for police intelligence; crime prevention; establishment of crime research observatories; instruments and indicators for measuring police effectiveness and performance; techniques for internal control and evaluation; innovation and technological development applied to police performance; organization reform; police standardization and management norms; methods for improving accountability, integrity and transparency; modernization and reform of police education and training systems; police ethics.	Consolidation of strategic partnerships with social and governmental actors; design and evaluation of public policies and police strategies; skills for the study of insecurity; new approaches to security; crime prevention; detection of emerging violence; management of street gangs; designing systems for police intelligence; elaboration of innovative projects.

Source: elaborated by the author using information from AMERIPOL 2014.

As we can see, the Consensus of Santo Domingo on Public Security in the Americas and the Diagnostic reach similar conclusions, even if the former is more general and the latter more specific. Understandably, and given the purpose of the document as well as the events which led to its production, the Consensus places greater emphasis on regional cooperation. The Diagnostic, meanwhile, is more detailed, although some of the points raised are somewhat vague and repetitive. In any case, both documents stress the need for the development of technical and managerial skills in the security sector. These key demands may now be compared

to the objectives of SSR programs funded by international agencies for development cooperation.

3.2.3 Mercosur

Mercosur was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion as a regional commercial bloc made up of Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay. Later this would include Venezuela (2006) and Bolivia (2015), although as of 2017 Venezuela was suspended. Decisions regarding the commercial integration of the bloc are made by three specific councils – the Common Market Council, the Common Market Group, and the Mercosur Trade Commission, in order of relevance. Over the course of its existence, further departments have been created to sustain regional policies implemented by the bloc, such as the Institute of Public Policies in Human Rights (IPPDH), the Social Institute of Mercosur (ISM) and the Social Participation Support Unit (UPS).

The documents that comprise Mercosur regulations, decisions, resolutions and decrees are directly related to the three councils mentioned above. Decisions come under the jurisdiction of the Common Market Council, while resolutions can be issued by the Common Market Group. Finally, the Mercosur Trade Commission is responsible for the discussion and framing of decrees. Further regulations are made possible through “agreements, treaties, and protocols”, as well as “recommendations”. Treaties, agreements and protocols are signed by member countries under the scope of the Common Market Council and can involve non-member countries as well as international organizations. Recommendations are non-binding and can also be issued by the Common Market Council.

Upon studying the above documents we concluded that the regulations of most interest to us – and whose contents were not exclusively related to common trade between the bloc countries – were the **agreements, treaties and protocols** (records of which are organized within a single archive) and the recommendations. Next, we verified all documents made available by Mercosur since its creation in 1991 and selected those dealing with matters related to public security and justice. The organization has signed 143 agreements/treaties/protocols, and issued at least

45 recommendations to date⁵⁵. Of these, 21 agreements and 12 recommendations were selected for analysis. The results can be found in the two tables below:

a) Agreements, Treaties and Protocols of Mercosur in the area of Security and Justice

Table 15 – Summary of Agreements, Treaties and Protocols in the field of Security and Justice signed under Mercosur (1991 – 2017)

Title of Document	Subject
Protocol of Cooperation and Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labor and Administrative Matters	Legal Cooperation
Protocol of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters	Legal Cooperation
Supplementary Agreement to the Protocol on Cooperation and Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labor and Administrative Matters	Legal Cooperation
Agreement on the Benefit of Cost-Free Litigation and Legal Assistance between Mercosur Member States	Legal Cooperation
Agreement on the Benefit of Cost-Free Litigation and Legal Assistance between Mercosur Member States, Bolivia and Chile	Legal Cooperation
Protocol of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between Mercosur Member States, Bolivia and Chile	Legal Cooperation
Protocol of Cooperation and Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labor and Administrative Matters, Bolivia and Chile	Legal Cooperation
Supplement to Protocol of Cooperation and Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labor and Administrative Matters between Mercosur Member States	Legal Cooperation
Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile	Legal Cooperation
Supplementary Agreement to the Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between Member States	Legal Cooperation
Cooperation Agreement on Regional Security Matters between Mercosur Member States	Regional Security
Agreement on Cooperation for Regional Security Matters between Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile	Regional Security

⁵⁵ It's important to clarify that until 29/10/2017, the agreements, treaties and protocols were only set in place until 2017. The same does not take place in the case of recommendations, which were only in place until 2015. In addition, we encountered problems when researching the years 2008 and 2009, for which reason it is not possible to know if there were any recommendations submitted during these years. Therefore we prefer to state "at least 45 recommendations" were submitted during this period.

Title of Document (cont.)	Subject
Agreement Against Illegal Trafficking of Migrants between Mercosur Member States	Human Trafficking
Agreement Against Illegal Trafficking of Migrants between Member States of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile	Human Trafficking
Asuncion Protocol on the Commitment to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Mercosur	Human Rights
Agreement on Cooperation for Regional Security Matters between Mercosur Member States, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela	Regional Security
Agreement for the Implementation of Shared Databases on Vulnerable Children and Adolescents of Mercosur and Associated States	Protection of Children and Adolescents
Agreement between Mercosur and Associated States on Regional Cooperation for the Protection of the Rights of Vulnerable Children and Adolescents	Protection of Children and Adolescents
Cooperation Agreement between Member and Associated States for the Creation of Regional Research Teams	Investigation
Memorandum on the Exchange of Documentation for the Clarification of Serious Human Rights Violations	Human Rights
Agreement between Member and Associated States for the Exchange of Information on the Manufacture and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Related Materials	Firearms

Source: elaborated by the author using information retrieved from the Mercosur digital archive⁵⁶

The above list demonstrates Mercosur's concern with transnationally organized crime, particularly with the trafficking of people and firearms. What stands out is the need for police and legal cooperation between the countries involved, as well as establishing legal frameworks within the scope of Mercosur in matters concerning criminal security, as a way of “advancing the definition of a common security policy, through the establishment of clear goals and efficient tools of implementation”⁵⁷.

56 Retrieved from <<https://goo.gl/kbHYuP>>, Found under “Tratados, Protocolos e Acordos” available at: <<https://goo.gl/4uJbVc>> Accessed 29/10/2017

57 Citation retrieved from the 2004 Cooperation Agreement for Regional Security Matters between Mercosur Member Countries 2004, author's translation. Retrieved from <<https://goo.gl/TC2Yei>> Accessed 29/10/2017

I also note that 10 legal cooperation agreements have so far been signed by the member states as well as between member states and other South American countries, such as Bolivia (before it joined the bloc) and Chile. These agreements form mutual agreements in terms of commercial, civil, labor and administrative order, as well as crime. It is interesting to see that these agreements are concentrated within the first decade of Mercosur's existence, a time in which the countries involved needed to align their legal systems in order to plan their activities jointly.

More interesting still, are the documents signed under the category of human rights (one protocol and one memorandum) and those for the protection of children and adolescents in vulnerable situations (two signed agreements). In the *Asuncion Protocol on the Commitment to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Mercosur*, what stands out is the need for member states to respect international human rights treaties and the Interamerican Democratic Charter, under penalty of suspension from the bloc, as a last resort. Meanwhile, the *Memorandum on the Exchange of Documentation for the Clarification of Serious Human Rights Violations* seeks to facilitate the exchange of documents and information regarding the military dictatorships of the South Cone, especially those involved in Operation Condor, as a way of subsidizing the Truth Commissions of member states.

One of the two agreements signed on the protection of children and adolescents in vulnerable situations required a database to be built between Mercosur countries using their joint data. The other rightfully requested that this database be accessible whenever there is any child or adolescent crossing the border of member countries who is suspected of being in a situation of vulnerability. In the documents, it is assumed that vulnerable children and adolescents are more likely to become victims of human trafficking, which is what fuels this particular concern.

We should point out that any agreements dealing with more bureaucratic issues, relating to solving controversial or omitted cases, were left out of the analysis. This included collaborative procedures to deal with vehicles seized at borders, extraditions, prison orders and cross-border prison transfers between member countries. We understand that these procedures deal with agreements signed to resolve short-term problems, but they do not conform to the sector of interest here – at least not in the way we defined the term in the Introduction to this text.

b) Mercosur Recommendations in the field of Security and Justice

Table 16 – Summary of Mercosur Recommendations in the field of Security and Justice under the scope of Mercosur (1991 – 2017)⁵⁸

Recommendations	Subject
Recommendation to thoroughly address gender violence	Violence Against Women
Recommendation for the creation of TV campaigns aimed at the prevention, awareness and struggle against human trafficking for sexual or commercial exploitation, and forced labor of children and adolescents	Human Trafficking
Recommendation on the need for an official and autonomous public defender's office, to guarantee the access to justice for persons in vulnerable situations	Access to Justice
Recommendation to thoroughly address gender-based violence	Violence Against Women
Recommendation to use the Mercosur Guide to assist female victims of human trafficking for purposes of sexual exploitation	Violence Against Women
Recommendation to address women in situations of restricted freedom as the result of drug offenses	Detained Women
Recommendation on migrant women living with domestic violence	Violence Against Women
Recommendation for the prevention and eradication of child labor and the protection of young domestic workers within Mercosur	Child Labor
Recommendation for the prevention and eradication of child labor for artistic purposes within Mercosur	Child Labor
Recommendation for communication between governments, companies and unions for the prevention of child labor within Mercosur	Child Labor
Recommendation on violent deaths caused by gender - femicide	Violence Against Women
Recommendation for the creation of the South American Day of Voluntary Disarmament	Disarmament

Source: Elaborated by the author based on information retrieved from the Mercosur digital archive⁵⁹

⁵⁸ We inform that this table may be incomplete as at the time of consultation (between August and October 2017) Mercosur's digital archive was experiencing technical problems with data on the recommendations submitted during 2008 and 2009. The missing data was requested from the Mercosur Secretariat, but to date no response has been received.

It is interesting that although Mercosur's digital archive has released recommendations dating back to 2002, it is only from 2010 onward that the issues most clearly related to security begin to appear in this particular category of regulations. In addition, the quantity of recommendations is impressive. There were 12 (or 26% of the recommendations found in the archive) recommendations between 2010 and 2015 alone (as the site has not yet been updated for 2016 and 2017). By comparison, the number of Mercosur recommendations dealing with security is higher than the number of documents in the categories of agreements, treaties, or protocols (21 of 143 – little over 14%). Interestingly, there are no recommendations that can accurately be placed under the category justice.

The concerns that most frequently appear within the agreements, such as transnationally organized crime, or more often, human and arms trafficking, are also present in the recommendations. Furthermore, the concerns with child labor and violence against women are quite evident. This is surprising given Mercosur is essentially an economic bloc, an organization that aims to facilitate commercial trade between member countries. One might assume such issues would not necessarily be at the heart of the bloc's concerns, or at least not one of their priorities. Nevertheless, they are recurring themes.

The emphasis on curbing child labor might be easier to understand in terms of commercial logic. Ultimately, child labor, be it waged or forced, establishes forms of dishonest competition in relation to those who work in legal and taxable conditions, threatening trade in the region. The same can be said of human trafficking for purposes of labor exploitation. However, of the 12 recommendations selected from the area of security, half of these deal with the protection of women and the recommendations make no references to trade – at least not explicitly.

In one of the articles of the *Recommendation to thoroughly address gender-based violence* of 2010⁶⁰, we read:

59 Retrieved from <<https://goo.gl/kbHYuP>>, under “Recomendações”, available at <<https://goo.gl/8p1hoF>>. Accessed 29/10/2017

60 Article 3 of Recommendation 001/2010, available through Mercosur's digital archive. Retrieved from <<https://goo.gl/CPkyUV>>. Accessed 30/10/2017

To promote the progressive elaboration of a regional information system for cases of gender-based violence in all its forms, beginning with the construction of comparable indicators. Such a task could begin with allocating an indicator of 'domestic violence' (MERCOSUR).

Moreover, Mercosur's preoccupation with the construction of shared databases and standardized, comparative indicators is striking. This concern is present across various agreements and recommendations in the area. This is quite understandable, given that the consolidation and strengthening of the bloc depends, among other things, on the capacity to unite the systematization of information on the bloc. This would also help to achieve the diagnoses necessary to proposing joint activities between the member countries. If just one of the member countries lacks transparency when supplying information, then the credibility of the bloc as a whole is at stake.

3.2.4 CARICOM

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the oldest trading bloc in the developing world. It was created in 1973 following two previously existing trade agreements between the Caribbean countries, the West Indies Federation (1958) and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) (1965). These groups were made up of ex-European colonies that had recently become independent. According to the current treaty in force (the original was revised in 2002), CARICOM is made up of 15 member countries⁶¹ and 5 associated countries⁶². It stretches from the Bahamas in the north to Suriname in South America and with the exception of Guiana, Suriname, and Belize, all CARICOM countries are islands states.

This is an economic bloc created by small, developing economies, many of which are based on services and tourism. They are physically very close to the larger economies of the northern hemisphere, but are simultaneously very vulnerable to them. CARICOM is supported by four main pillars: economic integration;

61 Member countries of CARICOM: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

62 Bermuda, The British Virgin Isles, The Caiman Isles, Anguilla, and the Turks and Caicos Islands

coordination of foreign policy; human and social development; and, security. From the government's perspective, the decisive departments of the bloc are the Conference of Heads of Government and Ministerial Councils. The Ministerial Councils are:

- The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP)
- The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR)
- The Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD)
- The Council for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE)
- The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED)

CONSLE is in theory the council of greatest interest to the analysis at hand. However there are a few problems with analyzing its actions in detail. The minutes from meetings, acts and decisions of the council are not available on the CARICOM digital archive. Additionally, CONSLE is directly responsible for the elaboration and supervision of the "Crime and Security" section of the CARICOM Strategic Plan of 2015-2019. We could have used of this part of the plan to gather information on the challenges faced by the organization in the field of security, however sadly it was also unavailable to download from the website⁶³. For this reason, we decided to use the demands of CARICOM countries – in the area of security – as a proxy. These materials are easily accessible through the organization's website, including: the attributes of the second CONSLE, the CARICOM Revised Treaty of 2002, and the 8 priorities underlined by CONSLE for the Strategic Plan of 2015-2019.

According to the Revised Treaty of 2002, CONSLE, the council that interests this research, presents the following characteristics:

63 There is a link on the website that does not work. I requested the material in PDF form via e-mail, but have not received a response from the organization.

Table 17 – Attributes of the second CONSLE and the CARICOM Revised Treaty of 2002

1	Promote the development and implementation of a common regional security strategy to complement the national security strategies of Members of the Community
2	Establish and promote measures designed to – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combat and eliminate threats to national and regional security; • Ensure the expeditious and efficient mobilization and deployment of regional resources in order to manage and defuse national and regional security crises and to combat serious crimes in consultation with the relevant Member States; • Preserve the territorial integrity of the Member States; and <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather, share and manage intelligence
3	Establish measures to increase cooperation in mutual legal assistance in criminal matters among Members of the Community
4	Promote national justice systems in conjunction with Ministers responsible for Legal Affairs or Attorneys-General of Members of the Community or both
5	Provide policy and overall directions concerning the activities and programs of the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)
6	Promote functional cooperation with the Organs of the Community, in the pursuit of the Community's goal for the prevention and elimination of crime and violence and the promotion of a safe and secure environment within the Members of the Community
7	Establish strategic partnerships with third States and regional and international agencies in the furtherance of regional security and the Community as a zone of peace with stable democracies
8	Undertake any additional functions assigned to it by the Conference arising under the Revised Treaty
9	The CONSLE was incorporated into the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas by way of a Protocol which was opened for signature in March 2009

Source: CARICOM Website: <<https://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/our-governance/organs-and-bodies-of-the-community/the-council-for-national-security-and-law-enforcement-consle/>> accessed in 02/04/2018.

IMPACS (Implementation Agency for Crime and Security), cited among the attributes of CONSLE, consists of an agency created in 2006 which aims to facilitate, in a legal and bureaucratic manner, the regional application of the actions determined by CONSLE. It also serves to admit and administrate resources to activities in the field of security. IMPACS is also responsible for coordinating meetings and disseminating information on the following subcommittees, also under CONSLE:

- the Standing Committee of Police Commissioners;
- the Standing Committee of Military Chiefs;
- the Standing Committee of Chiefs of Immigration;
- the Standing Committee of Heads of Customs; and
- the Standing Committee of Heads of Intelligence and Financial

Investigation Units

Related to the CARICOM Strategic Plan in the area of “Crime and Security”, elaborated and monitored by CONSLE, we find the following 8 areas designated as priorities during its mandate:

- Deepening crime prevention initiatives and programs
- Facilitating justice reform
- Pursuing functional cooperative security engagements to tackle and manage shared risks and threats
- Enhancing human resource capabilities
- Strengthening regional security systems
- Strengthening CARICOM borders
- Enhancing maritime and airspace awareness

The documents available online underline that these priorities must run in agreement and function parallel to other collective department plans that came before the Strategic Plan, such as:

- CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS) 2013
- Caribbean Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention (CSDP) 2009-2013
- CARICOM Youth Development Action Plan
- Regional Framework of Action for Children (RFAC)2002-2015
- Regional Strategy for Drug Demand Reduction (RSDDR)
- Caribbean Cooperation in Health Phase III (CCHIII)
- UNFPA/CARICOM Integrated Strategic Framework for the reduction of Adolescent Pregnancy in the Caribbean (RAPC)

The CARICOM website tells us that these documents exist, but are not available for download from the site, which hinders our analysis a little⁶⁴. Given the lack of online materials, CARICOM's demands in the area of security are much more vague than those found for the other organizations analyzed so far. Nevertheless the little material we were able to access allowed us to design a table of the bloc's priorities. One of the issues that appears frequently is the cooperation to solve issues of “shared risks”, creating regional strategies in security as a way of complementing national strategies. Another interesting element was the level of intersectionality required from the guidelines presented. Alongside more specific actions to prevent crime, the priorities must be dealt with in line with actions already taking place in the areas of security, health, and the well-being of children and youth, for example.

There is another issue which captures our attention: as well as CONSLE, CARICOM contains another department under the council, which is IMPACS. IMPACS is responsible for 5 sub-committees linked to the area of security. This indicated the presence of an institutional architecture designed to deal with issues of security, revealing the level of priority the countries in the bloc granted to this issue.

3.2.5 Andean Community

Contrary to Mercosur and CARICOM, the Andean Community is better characterized as a political organization than an economic bloc. It is described, similarly to UNASUR, as the organization of Andean states for the institutional reinforcement of member countries with the aim, among others, of rendering member countries less economically vulnerable to the regional integration of trade in Latin America. It is made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, and is also associated with UNASUR members as well as Spain, which acts as an observing country. The Community was established with the Cartagena Agreement in 1969 and at the time also included Chile, which left in 1977. Venezuela was also incorporated in 1973, but left in 2006.

64 I requested the material via e-mail but have not received a response.

The Andean Community works through the Andean Integration System (SAI), which brings together various departments in a way that allows the community to act like a state: The Presidential Andean Council, The Andean Council of Foreign Affairs, the General Secretariat, and the Andean Justice Tribunal, as well as the Andean Parliament, which involves 20 democratically elected members of parliament (five from each of the member countries). SAI also involves the consultation of units from Civil Society for groups such as workers, business owners, and indigenous peoples. The Simon Bolivar Andean University has a number of headquarters across the region and acts as an educational entity for the community. CAN also involves two financial departments: The Andean Development Corporation and the Latin American Reserve Fund.

The issue of security is dealt with in the “Lima Commitment: Andean Charter for Peace and Security, Limitation and Control of Expenditures for External Defense”. The Commitment was formulated during the meeting between the Andean Council for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Andean Community, which took place in June 2002. The Charter is based on the founding principles of the UN and the OAS and acts as a Treaty that aims to avert the threat of aggression between member countries. The Charter created a High Level Group on Security and Confidence Building to periodically evaluate the implementation of the Charter's Commitments.

In the CAN virtual documents, one can find the following statement: “*the Andean vision of security was also agreed upon: 'the situation in which the State and society are protected against threats or risks that may affect the overall development and well-being of its citizens, as well as the free exercise of their rights and liberties in a context of full democratic validity⁶⁵.'*” Although this statement gives the impression that there are concerns with the domestic security of member countries, the Charter dealing with the Lima Commitment seems more like an attempt to establish a peace zone between neighbors. The aim would then be to create joint policies to resolve domestic security issues that affect all member countries equally.

65 Citation taken from the Andean community website. Retrieved from <<http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=81&tipo=TE&title=se>> Accessed 05/04/2018

The majority of actions proposed relate to the external security of member countries – commitments to not carrying out nuclear tests, to restricting military exercises that might present risks to neighboring countries, as well as to assuring that the Community's air space is free of missiles, and that its territory is free of land-mines. The Charter reinforces the need to follow international protocols, of which member countries are signatories, such as the Treaty of Tlaltelolco. It also proposes that member countries ratify further agreements, such as the Interamerican Convention on Transparency in the Acquisition of Conventional Arms, approved by the OAS in 2003.

Other than these, there are two Andean plans that were elaborated and agreed upon under the Andean Council of Foreign Affairs whose progression is monitored by the High Level Group. These consist of agreements between the countries to cover common risks to domestic security: the Andean Plan of Cooperation for the Struggle against Illegal Drugs and Related Offenses (2001) and the Andean Plan to Prevent, Fight and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects (2003). I now turn to these⁶⁶.

3.2.6 The Andean Plan of Cooperation for the Struggle against Illegal Drugs and Related Offenses (2001)

The Andean Plan of Cooperation for the Struggle against Illegal Drugs and Related Offenses was elaborated during the meeting of the Andean Council on Foreign Affairs on the 22nd June 2001. The Plan is based on three axes of action – Strengthening National Strategies, Bi-National Strategies, and Communal Strategies. Each of these three axes unfold into a series of actions, which are summarized in the table below. I take full responsibility for the summary and editing of the Plan's original text, which was carried out for the reader's visual and comprehensive benefit.

⁶⁶ It is perhaps worth mentioning that there exists an Andean Committee for the Prevention of and Attention to Disasters and an Andean Strategy for Disaster Prevention. Although this does not fit under the definition of SSR in the OCDE, but rather humanitarian aid, it is interesting to see that these countries created a series of common protocols by which to overcome natural disasters, particularly earthquakes in the region. The region of CARICOM experiences similar risks with earthquakes and hurricanes and yet has not made plans to this effect, perhaps because the organization is more concerned with business matters.

Table 18 – Axes and Actions of The Andean Plan of Cooperation for the Struggle against Illegal Drugs and Related Offenses (2001)

Strengthening National Strategies	Strengthening Bi-National Strategies	Strengthening Communal Strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen the means of control over the production and banning of controlled chemical substances - Identify and eradicate the cultivation of crops for illegal purposes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Create alternative development options for those previously dependent on the cultivation of crops for illegal purposes - Reinforce means for detecting secret laboratories, with the aim of dismantling organizations of production and the transport of illegal substances - Strengthening intelligence unites to investigate money laundering <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop preventative campaigns to reduce the domestic demand for illegal drugs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluate and modernize existing bilateral agreements on the matter - Promote and strengthen bi-national mechanisms, such as merged commissions and offices which bring together various authorities of border regions, to produce joint actions - Incorporate alternative development projects in border regions toward the Andean Policy of Border Integration and Development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop actions of information exchange and the joint projects between police intelligence authorities in Andean countries - Create protocols for coordinated action, as well as agreements on legal assistance in criminal matters (to facilitate extradition and trial procedures) - Harmonization the criminal legislation between member countries - design strategies of funding and technical cooperation in support of the actions of this plan, especially with regard to: a) reducing the environmental impact in areas where cultivation of illicit substances was detected; b) to promote alternative development for those families previously dependent on this crop, with actions to generate employment and alleviate poverty.

Source: Decision 505: Andean Plan of Cooperation for the Struggle Against Illegal Drugs and Related Offenses (2001). Retrieved from <http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=81&tipo=TE&title=seguridad> Accessed 04/04/2018.

What calls our attention here is a concern with the possibility of offering alternative forms of development for families previously cultivating crops for illegal purposes. This is a concern that appears across the three axes, which means that those formulating the plan are aware of the fact that they must focus on alternative

ways of economically occupying ex-crop growers. In the third axis, of Communal Strategies, the issue is raised as a matter to be dealt with through agreements of international cooperation. This is presented both in relation to technical capabilities as well as to the collection of resources for programs of reintegration for farmers and the recovery of soil. This point is interesting as it demonstrates that not only is there a security agenda within the Andean Community, but that it involves specific demands related to international cooperation.

3.2.7 Andean Plan to Prevent, Fight and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2003)

The Andean Plan to Prevent, Fight and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small and Light Arms was elaborated during the meeting of the Andean Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers between the 24th and 25th of June 2003. The Plan is summarized and reduced to six actions, each of which opens into sub-actions under the territorial scope of the plan. The six actions detailed in the plan are:

Table 19 – Planned Actions of The Andean Plan to Prevent, Fight and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons

1	Comprehensively address the problem of the illegal proliferation of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects
2	Exchange information and cooperate on all matters relating to illegal small arms and light weapons in all its aspects
3	Promote the research, development and collection of data and statistics in the Andean sub-region, as well as dialogue and cooperation between interests and civil society
4	Promote the development of a specific and integrated Coordinated Agenda for Action on security in the Andean sub-region
5	Exchange experiences and organize courses with a view to improving the level of scope of officials from Andean Community member countries
6	Promote awareness-raising campaigns on the dangers and negative effects of the indiscriminate use and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

Source: Decision 552: The Andean Plan to Prevent, Fight and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in all aspects (2003) Retrieved from <<http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=81&tipo=TE&title=seguridad>> Accessed 04/04/2018.

The Plan establishes a method to implement these actions at the national, sub-regional, and international levels with sub-actions assigned to each category. In brief, at the national level, it sets out awareness campaigns, campaigns to voluntarily surrender arms, the creation of transparent mechanisms to control the production, import, and transfer of arms. In the regional plan, alongside the exchange of information and actions coordinated between Andean authorities, we find the harmonization of legislation on arms control. This puts forward a standard procedure for regulating the illegal production, import, export, transfer, commercialization, intermediation, transport, possession and use of small arms and light weapons. At the international level, the Plan also involves neighboring countries that are not part of CAN, but who attend the bi-annual UN meetings as part of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Executing the plan required the implementation of a Coordinated Agenda, as was illustrated in point 4 of Table 19, and an Operational Plan with which to implement the agenda. Both the Agenda and the Operational Plan are presented as additions to the original document of the Andean Plan, which opens to further annexes. And, interestingly, one of the Annexes – Annex IV – speaks of the “International Cooperation and Implementation of the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Aspects”.

The text calls on the international community of donors to pay attention to and effectively support regional agendas, as well as their processes and initiatives as they relate to arms control. It presents some suggestions of ways in which donors can contribute and support the agenda, be it from a financial or technical standpoint. The suggestions include: financing ministerial offices and meetings; national and regional training programs; contributing funds for the construction of national and regional databases; support programs to destroy arms; and financing awareness campaigns on the risks of possessing and using arms.

What is clear is that CAN did not only have an agenda for security – one marked by the issue of cultivating and transporting drugs and arms – but it also proposed items that are most likely to receive resources from international donors.

3.3 Security in Latin America: An Enforced Agenda?

The previous sections show us that the five organizations being studied are all concerned with security issues within the respective territories being covered and demonstrate their dedication to the various issues, as well as the nature of the security issues that they consider most important. We note that the documents share many common aspects. Concerns with border regions, the underlining of the need for police cooperation, and the exchange of information appear across all of the documents in question. The same can be said for the need to build standardized data and comparative indicators in the field of security, in order to complement the integrated activity of member countries. This is another point that recurs across all documents.

The need to encourage social participation in security policies appears in the documents of UNASUR, the OAS, and to an extent in CARICOM. The first two also present a greater concern with police, regarding their professionalization, modernization of practices, internal and external monitoring of police activity, and the standardization and exchange of criminal data. The documents of Mercosur, CARICOM and CAN do not demonstrate specific concerns with improving the quality of police services, despite understanding that police and legal cooperation is vital to regional security. The question of mutual legal assistance between member countries appears frequently within CARICOM and CAN documents – the latter even discussed the 'harmonization' of laws between member countries as a means for facilitating legal paperwork relative to communal problems.

The concern with human and arms trafficking appears in both UNASUR and Mercosur documents – and, particularly in the case of the latter, what stands out is a focus on the trafficking of women and children. CAN demonstrates great concern with the traffic of arms and the cultivation and traffic of drugs. In the same way, the question of access to justice is prominent in the UNASUR document, though appears more shyly (through a recommendation) within Mercosur. The same issue does not appear clearly in either the OAS, CARICOM or CAN documents discussed. One interesting point from the CARICOM agenda, which was not particularly apparent

given the lack of available documentation, was an emphasis on the intersectionality of activity. This highlighted the need to coordinate security activity with other ongoing agendas of the organization, especially those involving children and adolescents. It is worth repeating that respect for human rights is cited across all five organizations analyzed – which cannot be said of gender equality, which was present in the files on UNASUR, Mercosur and the OAS, but absent under CARICOM and CAN.

One point that merited particular attention in the case of the Andean community was the existence of a sort of 'parallel agenda', a collection of items aimed at international cooperation. The organization dedicated much to this agenda, marked, as stated earlier, by a preoccupation with the control and traffic of arms, and the cultivation and traffic of narcotics. Furthermore, it appears that within this agenda CAN zoomed in on items that could be financed by international cooperation, thus advancing upon an eventual consultation with the international community of donors. We must keep in mind that this information is public and that the documents discussed – in this case of CAN – are all available online.

Despite the differences in demands between these organizations, what is clear is that security is without a doubt an integral and relevant part of the wider regional agenda they lead. Departments have been created to deal with issues directly related to security, underlining the problem, and monitoring the development of activity. Mercosur was the only organization that had not created a specific department to deal with issues of security. However it is clear that the topic has gained much ground, particularly over the past decade, during which it has become the foundation of agreements signed and recommendations submitted by the organization.

The analyzed documents demonstrate that Latin American countries have been capable of locating their weaknesses and priorities in the field. This has made it possible to map and diagnose said weaknesses. Solutions have been formed collectively (be it through plans of action, commitments, or agreements) and are being implemented and monitored. There is a large accumulation of information on the topic within the five organizations discussed, even though each has their own distinct interests and focuses. The material produced under the scope of these five organizations reveals that there does indeed exist an agenda for security sector reform, one that is being administrated and guided by the member states of these

organizations. This leads us to the question of whether or not these agendas are being taken into consideration by the international community of donors.

3.4 Confronting the LAC Agenda on SSR with Donor's Programs

The material that follows presents another classification of the programs mapped over the previous section, this time according to the nature of their funding. More precisely, we now seek to understand the nature of SSR programs being funded by international donors in the LAC region. The same donors explored in Section two – the greatest DAC donors (USA and Canada) and the three multilateral organizations (IADB, UN and EU) – will have their programs analyzed here. These will then be confronted with the security sector demands coming from the LAC region.

Regarding the nature of the SSR grants made, there are intriguing differences between Canada and the USA. To make this comparison, I divided the programs into sub-sectors using the 'short descriptions' of programs that donor countries submitted to the OECD (available on the DAC/OECD Database). I then classified them by grouping together projects that were thematically similar, even though the two countries often used different terminology⁶⁷ (Tables 20 and 21).

⁶⁷ The short and long description field of the OECD database is open, leaving it to be filled as donors chose. This means the terms employed to declare their programs can vary greatly. Here, I tried to create a classification that complied with a certain standard to facilitate comparability, without losing the original terms used by each country / institution.

Table 20 – Canadian aid to SSR Programs in Latin America, by nature (or sub-sector), 2004-2014

Sub-sector	Amount
Citizen Security/Community/Youth Safety/Prevention of Violence	\$3.418.389,88
Border Security and Migration	\$4.595.033,64
Construction/Reconstruction/ Renovation/Reparations of Public Facilities	\$75.553.857,32
Human Trafficking	\$703.037,83
Education/Events/Courses/Training	\$21.531.906,60
Deployment of Canadian services and Professionals	\$11.702.752,11
Institutional Strengthening, Capacity-building and Governance	\$29.946.321,03
Peace Processes in Colombia and Haiti	\$18.500.511,55
Other	\$116.482,24
TOTAL	\$166.068.292,19

Source: elaborated by the author with data from DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

Table 21 – United States aid to SSR Programs in Latin America, by nature (or sub-sector), 2004-2014

Sub-sector	Total Amount
Anti-Corruption Reforms	\$9.857.833,11
International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation/Global Threat Reduction (Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)	\$58.833.660,25
Border Security	\$4.270.237,99
Events, Studies, Courses	\$131.869,25
Governance of the Security Sector	\$93.145.233,70
National Endowment for Democracy Grant	\$845.890,78
US Army Corps Engineers Services	\$259.987,74
Other	\$3.364.551,73
TOTAL	\$170.709.264,54

Source: elaborated by the author with data from DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

This classification demonstrates that the two countries allocate their SSR grants to specific areas. Canada concentrates its donations in “Construction /Reconstruction/Renovation/Reparations of Facilities” (45%) and “Institutional Strengthening, Capacity-building and Governance” (18%), while the USA focuses its assistance on “Governance for the Security Service” (55%) and “International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation/Global Threat Reduction (Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)” (34%).

Security sector governance appears to be a common concern for both countries. In fact, this area is also acknowledged as a weakness of recipient countries by LAC regional organizations, notably the OAS and UNASUR. The Canadian programs, with the exception of “Construction /Reconstruction/Renovation/Reparations of Facilities” and “Deployment of Canadian services and Professionals” seem to meet LAC countries' demands concerning security issues. In the case of American programs implemented in the LAC region, all

programs appear to have adapted to SSR LAC demands, with the exception of “International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation/Global Threat Reduction (Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) Program”.

However, “Construction/Reconstruction/Renovation/Reparations” (Canada) and “International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation/Global Threat Reduction (Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)” (USA), which factor among the two countries' highest funded programs, do not appear in the SSR agenda of the region. This suggests, at least in the case of these two examples, that SSR programs reflect the priorities of donor countries, and are related to their own domestic politics.

Moreover, the set of demands publicized by the LAC organizations go far beyond the themes proposed by the programs offered. The situation of prisoners, for example, which appears across OEA, UNASUR and Mercosur documents, is given no attention. Specific policies and training for organized crime related to drugs also appears frequently in the LAC agenda, yet there are no specific SSR programs addressing the issue. The need for arms control and disarmament measures are also underlined by Mercosur and CAN, but there are no special programs funded by the two major donor countries proposing to tackle this problem in the region. Some organizations stress the importance of research, data collection, data standardization and the creation of comparable indicators (notably OAS and CAN), but once again these are not contemplated by the programs offered. Also, the exchange of information among member countries, as well as the preparation of joint operations involving the intelligence of member states, are listed by all five organizations as key mechanisms to help combat common security threats in the region. And these items are not contemplated by the international programs offered either.

It is also interesting to observe that SSR donations by institutional donors are far more homogeneous than those of the country donors. In the three cases referring to the IADB, UN and EU, programs related to Citizen Security (youth violence, crime prevention, community policing) received a vast majority of institutional resources – 93% in the case of the IADB, 76% for the UN and 79% for EU, as we show in Tables 22, 23 and 24.

Table 22 – European Union aid to SSR Programs in Latin America 2004-2014, by sub-sector

Sub-sector	Amount
Citizen Security (Youth Violence/Crime Prevention/Community Policing)	\$94.208.652,25
Governance and Management	\$16.728.624,54
Border Security	\$7.621.601,21
Total	\$118.558.877,99

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics)

Table 23 – IADB Special Fund aid to SSR Programs in Latin America 2004-2014, by sub-sector

Sub-sector	Amount
Citizen Security (Youth Violence/Crime Prevention/Community Policing)	\$86.702.509,08
Governance and Management	\$1.783.234,54
Studies and Events for the dissemination of knowledge	\$2.220.861,43
Networks and platforms for sharing information	\$886.977,28
Others	\$1.725.124,64
Total	\$93.318.706,97

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

Table 24 – UN aid to SSR Programs in Latin America 2004-2014, by sub-sector

Sub-sector	Amount
Citizen Security (Youth Violence/Crime Prevention/Community Policing)	\$6.375.541,66
Governance and Management	\$847.333,36
Disarmament and Peace Process	\$547.569,17
Technical Assistance and Studies	\$519.446,90
Others	\$106.334,82
Total	\$8.396.225,91

Source: elaborated by the author using data from the DAC/OECD Database via QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics).

This data suggests that multilateral organizations are perhaps more sensitive to local agendas than country donors. Challenges related to citizen security and governance, which were common themes highlighted by the LAC region SSR documents explored in section two, are also the major concerns of these three organizations, judging by how they distributed their donations thematically. Additionally, multilateral programs seem to pick up on LAC agenda issues that were not at all contemplated by the USA and Canada. This includes: “Studies and Events for the dissemination of knowledge” (IADB) or “Technical Assistance and Studies” (UN) which are present mainly in the OAS, UNASUR and CAN agendas; “Networks and platforms for sharing information” (IADB), that appeared under various guises across all SSR LAC agendas; or, the “Disarmament and Peace Process”, notably listed in MERCOSUR and CAN agendas.

However even if we agree that multilateral programs seem to more comprehensively meet LAC region SSR demands, filling in the gaps left by country donors in the region, the question of organized crime related to drugs is still not considered. Nor the issue of prison system and social rehabilitation. Although we find programs related to border security which might vaguely address the issue, there are no programs in place to specifically combat drug-related organized crime and prisons, which are clearly featured on the LAC agenda.

3.5 Final Considerations

One of the objectives of this section was to find out if there is, in fact, a regional agenda for security sector reform in Latin America and the Caribbean. I selected five regional organizations, and sought documentation to identify the sources of fragility and plans for public security reform they outlined for the LAC region. The organizations have published documents highlighting security challenges across the region and have signed commitments to address them. They regularly meet to formulate and monitor collective action plans on this issue. In these documents, member states' weaknesses and priorities are made clear, revealing that an agenda for reforming the security sector in the region has already existed for at least 15 years.

Agencies for international cooperation in developed countries have been funding Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs in the LAC region since at least 2004, but have they been aware of local agendas? Do these agencies focus on priorities identified by recipient countries themselves when formulating their programs? With these questions in mind, I arranged the SSR programs funded by international development agencies in LAC countries. This allowed me to assess whether SSR programs funded by international agencies in the region would respond to the weaknesses they had highlighted.

I then presented an analysis of these programs and compared them with documents from the five organizations surveyed, for which I had identified the SSR needs as voiced by local political actors themselves. In the preceding section I extensively mapped donor and recipient countries, but this time my objective was to identify patterns of SSR interventions in the region from selected Northern donors and analyze the convergences and divergences between donors' and recipients' agendas.

At the outset of this thesis, I presented two hypotheses: 1) that SSR programs don't match local agendas; 2) that programs are generic both in their content and in the selection of recipient countries. The first hypothesis appears to hold partially, as most of donors' programs are reasonably aligned with recipients' agendas in the field – the problem is that the demands are more numerous and diverse than what is offered. Thus, the programs only cater for a restricted portion of

demands, while some programs only seem to meet donors' interests. The second hypothesis definitely does not hold up. Donor programs vary significantly in their thematic focus and the resources they allocate, as well as the recipient countries they select. Multilateral organizations fund programs of similar profiles, some of which may be interpreted as generic. This said, there is considerable variation in terms of resources allocated and countries targeted.

At least in the case of country donors, this study appears to support the argument made previously by Marenin (1999, 8), that foreign assistance reflects donor and advisory priorities. The main investments made by Northern countries failed to reflect significant themes within the SSR agenda from the region, which led us to conclude that these countries are pursuing other interests. Examples include Canadian expenditures towards construction and infrastructure in recipient countries, concentrated in Haiti, and US funding for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in countries such as Argentina. By contrast, multilateral organizations seem rather more attentive to local demands, supporting the argument of Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Dollar and Levin (2006) and Neumayer (2003). At the same time, however, they may be more generic in content, which agrees with the findings of Tuchin and Golding (2003), Ziegler and Nield (2002), Bayley (2005).

Although focused specifically on the activities of agencies for international cooperation in the funding and implementation of SSR programs in LAC countries, this research fits in with the wider literature on international assistance and cooperation. My aim was to provide evidence that could contribute to broader discussions on the activities of Northern donors in Latin America and the Caribbean, beyond the field of SSR. As was mentioned in the introduction, the idea that donors make decisions that do not effectively respond to recipients' needs or institutional conditions is not new in the literature. Neither is it new to argue that multilateral assistance is more attentive than bilateral assistance to recipient countries' needs. Rather, this study provides further evidence to support these conclusions.

Besides, mapping regional organizations and their demands in the field highlights that this information exists, and furthermore that it is available and public. This means that there is no reason for international donors to ignore pre-existing accumulated knowledge and collective efforts to diagnose and formulate solutions for the region. In a way, what becomes clear is that donors could take these regional

efforts into consideration when formulating programs for the countries in the region. For example, this research draws attention to the fact exchanging information and standardizing indicators for joint operations, which has appeared across all regional agendas, only sees one donor (IADB) funding a project to meet the demand. Likewise, one of the organizations surveyed in this research project (CAN) has even listed contributions that international donors could offer to their regional agenda for security. None of the actions they list appear in donors' projects.

Mesa (2008) explains that donor policies are usually strategically based on countries and not on regions. But these regional organizations face enormous challenges when it comes to building integrative strategies to meet their common problems and threats. It seems that there is no (or little) dialogue between donors and regional agendas. Implementing local programs that disregard these integrative efforts is obviously a choice. But, why? In order to test Mesa's claim, let us consider that donors prefer to meet national agendas rather than regional ones, and that they feel more comfortable dealing with countries than with organizations. In the next section I present a case study which places a single country as the units of analysis, entertaining the possibility outlined above.

4. International Assistance and Security Sector Reform: Brazil, a case study

"In this respect, a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation"
(Morgenthau, 1962, p.309)

4.1 Contextualization

Since the mid-1980s, Latin American violence has attracted the attention of several international organizations. International cooperation agencies from developed countries and multilateral organizations alike have been funding security sector reform programs (hereafter SSR) in the region since the late 1990s. Are they aware of local agendas in the sector? To what extent do these institutions take the priorities expressed by beneficiary countries into account when formulating SSR programs for them?

With these questions in mind, I decided to map and analyze internationally funded SSR programs in Latin America and the Caribbean (hereafter LAC) using the OECD's database on overseas development. I wanted to check the activity profile of funding agencies in the field of SSR - the countries they usually select to send resources to, how much they donate, and the type of program they fund. Although there exists an extensive literature analyzing the impact of international development cooperation, especially in the fields of poverty and economic growth, there are very few studies that examine the role and performance of international assistance in the specific area of domestic security. In any case, the literature as a whole seems to point in a similar direction – to a disconnect between the nature of programs offered by the international community of donors, and the local agendas and constraints of the countries receiving them.

Next, research was carried out on Latin American demands that could constitute a regional agenda for the sector. To this end, I analyzed the profile of five regional organizations for matters pertaining to security – these were the

Organization of American States (OAS), UNASUR (Union of South American States), the Andean Community, CARICOM (Caribbean Common Market) and MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South). I analyzed collectively produced documents that listed challenges and priorities in the field of public security for the region in order to build a proxy for Latin American fragilities in the area. It was found that this documentation reflected a series of discussions and actions that have been undertaken by the member countries of these organizations and which in fact conformed to what can be understood as a regional agenda for the sector.

I then confronted the SSR programs financed through international cooperation in LAC with the agenda set by Latin American and Caribbean countries regarding the area of security. I concluded that these programs were not generic, as was suggested by the literature - their nature and the amounts involved varied significantly according to the country or multilateral donor body. In addition, donors have obvious preferences for specific recipients, concentrating resources in a few countries or groups of countries in the same region. Additionally, they only partially meet local demands and in this regard an interesting distinction was noted in the pattern of programs financed through bilateral cooperation and those offered by multilateral organizations. The latter, in this case, have shown greater adherence to local demands than programs funded by bilateral agencies, endorsing part of the literature on the issue.

However, comparing aggregate data from SSR programs in LAC with a collectively constructed Latin American and Caribbean agenda could fail to recognize national specificities. When earlier formats of this research was presented at conferences and seminars, it came to our attention that while observed programs might not meet the Latin American agenda, they could meet the more specific national agenda of a given recipient country. The dynamics of power within collective regional organizations can easily negate excessively localized demands. The result is a regional agenda that only represents the most common and generic problems detected by the leadership of the member countries.

For this reason it was decided to carry out a case study, taking one country as a unit of analysis - in this case, Brazil. From the data previously collected by the OECD, SSR programs financed in Brazil were extracted. Next, I searched for

entities and documents that could form a Brazilian agenda in the field of public security. We found that documents dealing with the First National Conference on Public Security (I CONSEG) and the activity of the National Council of Public Security (CONASP, reactivated after I CONSEG) were sufficient to meet this task. The documents met several requirements of legitimacy and representativeness in the sector, besides resulting from previous national policies. The agenda drawn up from these national public entities was then confronted with the programs offered by international donors in the country.

In the end, we find that 1) the supply of programs meets the demand minimally, but the agenda of international donors is rather limited compared to the huge diversity of issues making up national concerns with security; 2) programs are not generic - the nature, quantity and amount dedicated to Brazil vary widely according to the donor; 3) some donors offer clearly self-interested programs without any adherence to the national agenda, taking advantage of gaps in OECD rules to offer programs of which they themselves will be the biggest beneficiaries.

This section is divided into six sections: A Contextualization section; a section devoted to data collection and methodology; a section dealing with the history of CONSEG as well as the documents and actions of CONASP; the fourth section will try to expose and analyze the SSR programs financed by international resources in Brazil; and the fifth section analyzes the convergences and divergences between what is offered by international programs and what is demanded from Brazil, which becomes a reference to the final and concluding section.

4.2 Data Collection

The programs in question have been drawn up with the OECD, which since 2004 has been nourishing the rubric of “security sector management and reform” and monitoring the official aid flows of OECD member countries as well as some international organizations and development banks. Initially, for an earlier phase of the research, we filtered the programs offered to the region of Latin America

and the Caribbean (experience detailed previous sections). Subsequently, we used the same data to filter out programs that were directed exclusively to Brazil.

As for the public security agenda, we sought documents that could shape a national agenda for the sector, understood as a set of demands and challenges and/or plans of action. These demands were collectively constructed and representative from both a territorial point of view (since Brazil is a large and very diverse country in both socio-economic and cultural terms) and a sectorial one, as they brought together the various sectors working on the theme of security. According to Fuks (2000), there are a number of movements that can shape a public agenda. In general, these agendas emerge from disputes between organized groups and take place in the public sphere, where they can reach the media and lobby political actors. However governments can also forge agendas, particularly when they create new bodies or policies to deal with issues that respond to and/or catalyze demands that were latent and/or diffuse. In the Brazilian case, these two movements seem to have occurred in parallel - there was media pressure for more attention to the topic, and organs were created to deal with those issues (see section 4).

I understand that there may be many further parallel agendas being discussed between nongovernmental organizations and/or between multilevel governments⁶⁸, but here I do not wish to run the risk of privileging some entities to the detriment of others (since these initiatives are diffuse and their data not always accessible, systematizable and comparable). Nor do we aim to carry out a study that is not representative from a regional and sectorial point of view, thus I consider using the documents resulting from I CONSEG and CONASP to be the most appropriate and interesting solution. There is a lot of documentation on I CONSEG, detailing the preparatory stages, main actors involved, and the negotiations articulated towards the accomplishment of the Conference. Likewise, the creation of CONASP is well

68 Various Brazilian organizations organize events and publications on the topic. By way of example we might cite: the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, which organizes annual meetings with police, researchers and managers in the area, and publishes the Brazilian Yearbook on Public Security; Security data is also disclosed and analyzed by the Sangari Institute; 'Sou da Paz' publishes and analyses security statistics from the state of Sao Paulo three times a year; 'Conectas Direitos Humanos' publishes news reports on imprisonments in Brazil; and the Igarapé Institute holds important publications on child and teen homicides in Brazil. Like these, many other organizations could be cited with similar publications, however this does not necessarily mean that they undertake publicly produced commitments nor that they represent national demands conforming to an agenda. For this reason we prefer to use the data from I CONSEG and CONASP.

documented and the council's activity is all available online. These official documents, of national representativity, are published and accessible, and consolidate agreements signed by sectorial leaders making up the public safety framework in Brazil. In addition, both I CONSEG and CONASP have consolidated and even expanded discussions that were already posed by the National Public Security Plan (PNSP) of 2001, as well as the National Program of Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI) of 2004. I CONSEG and CONASP's contribution resulted from the accumulation of these same debates, but differed in the fact that they invited social participation to the formulation of their guidelines.

We have now underlined, if briefly, the history of the first National Conference on Public Security and CONASP, in a way that should contextualize the reader as to the debates that will guide this work (or our independent variable, if the term is preferred). Next, we synthesize and list the most voted principles and guidelines of I CONSEG, as well as the most relevant activity of CONASP since 2010 until the present. This material will comprise a nationally agreed set of priorities to be addressed in the field of public security. Its contents will be analyzed and compared to the SSR programs financed by international donors and taking place in Brazil. In other words, we are comparing agendas: the international donor's agenda for security sector reform in Brazil, and the Brazilian agenda in the field of public security. This comparison will take place within a timeframe of about ten years.

4.3 Brazil and demands for security sector reform

4.3.1 A Brief History of CONSEG

In 2007 an idea emerged from the National Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP). The idea, although still vague and imprecise, was to reactivate CONASP. The documents involved pointed to the existence of an earlier National Public Security Council, created in 1989 and deactivated since 2002. The council was advisory, it was appointed by the Executive, it contained eminently technical attributions, and its members were mostly made up of the police (Tomesani 2015). It was an opportune moment to be considering the reactivation of the council, but this

time it would function with elected members and social participation. Since the first term of the Lula Government⁶⁹, the provisional measure to establish the National Public Security with Citizenship Program (Pronasci)⁷⁰ had just been re-edited, and several other councils has also been created and/or reactivated, which together suggested that this was a politically favorable moment for the initiative.

The idea of a possible reactivation of CONASP gained grounds within SENASP and was taken to the Office of the Ministry of Justice, sparking debates on the best way to encourage social participation in the council and defining the format of this participation. It was concluded that the best option for the council's reformulation would be to summon a national conference to establish its basis and functions. The conference would also generate the necessary mobilization of actors in the field to verify the legitimacy of the council's restructuring process.

I CONSEG – the first National Conference of Public Security – began its preparations towards the end of 2007. Preparatory forums and consultations pointed to the need to form a tripartite model of participation, including managers, security operators (police and guards), and civil society⁷¹. A national organizing committee was formed based on this model, a model that would also serve for participation in the Conference itself. This committee – CON – was sworn in in September 2008 and was in place until August 2009 when the National Conference took place.

The I CONSEG, which took place in Brasilia, brought together 2000 participants from regional subgroups, as well as 1000 observers. The whole process, including all the smaller procedures leading up to the National Conference itself, relied on the participation of about 500,000 individuals distributed across approximately 500 municipalities from all regions of the country. The debates that took place during the whole process resulted in 10 guiding principles and 40 guidelines for public security in Brazil, which will be discussed below.

69 The greatest boosts to the national conferences came after 2003, with the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – of the 115 national conferences to take place before 2012, 74 would occur during the Lula government (Avritzer 2012).

70 The National Public Security with Citizenship Program with Citizenship, created in 2004, consists of a collection of 94 articulated acts and involves 19 ministries, states, and municipalities.

71 The tripartite model required 40% of participants to be members of civil society, 30% from the public sector (managers in the area of security) and the other 30% from security services.

4.3.2 Principles and Guidelines of CONSEG

The principles that emerged during the conference are quite generic, but equally capable of granting an overview of the state of public security at the time of the I CONSEG conference, almost ten years ago. Following below are the 10 most voted principles of the conference, synthesized (as only the central argument of each item has been highlighted)⁷² and ordered by number of votes:

Table 25 – Most voted principles of I CONSEG 2009, in order of highest votes

1	Creation of a state policy in the area of security / consolidation of SUSP ⁷³ and PRONASCI
2	Maintenance of the current constitutional provisions to the area of security, according to article 144 of the federal Constitution
3	Defense of Human Dignity and reinforcement of a culture of peace
4	Conceptualization of public security as a fundamental right / organizational restructuring of security institutions at the three levels of government / strengthening of SUSP, PRONASCI and CONASP
5	Recognition of the importance of municipalities in the social prevention of crime and violence
6	To be guided by intersectionality, transversality, and integration with social policy
7	Restructuring the prison system to become more humane and respectful of identities / effective capacity to resocialize / prioritize alternatives to deprivation of freedom
8	Strengthening families and education with a view to encourage ethical and emancipatory values
9	Establishment of a national system of autonomous security councils across the three levels of government
10	Valuing workers in public security in terms of their physical, familial, working and social wellbeing

Source: elaborated by the author based on the Final Report of the 1st National Conference on Public Security (Ministry of Justice 2009).

⁷² To find out more about the full wording of the principles voted for during the I CONSEG, please consult the Final Report of the 1st National Conference of Public Security, Ministry of Justice (2009).

⁷³ The Central Public Security System is a system created to articulate the actions of public security and criminal justice at the three levels of government. SUSP's original project dates back to 2008 (PL 3461/2008) and the most recently approved (2016) in the Chamber of Deputies is from 2012 (PL 3734/2012). The latter attaches the original project from 2008 to a further three on the same topic. (PL 7258/2010, PL 2161/2011, PL 2723/2011). Source: Federal Chamber of Deputies website: (<https://goo.gl/uhux91>). Accessed fev/2018.

It is important to clarify that participating sectors of the CONSEG held contradictory positions on certain issues (civil society groups and security workers had particularly heated discussions), which resulted in some contradictory guidelines, such as those regarding the scope of police duties (guiding principles 4 and 15). Many discussions that took place during CON meetings, as well as the process of the conference, were capable of settling the more excessively radical positions and constructing at least minimal consensus (Tomesani 2015). Even so, guidelines that were not exactly contradictory, but certainly conflicted, were still registered. This would be the case of guidelines 29 and 30. Guideline 40, for example, could allow for the criminalization of social movements, which sharply diverges from the content of several other approved guidelines that suggest the need for greater social participation in security policies.

The voting method also allowed for multiple similar guidelines to be voted in – however this is not exactly detrimental to the effect of our research, as the appearance of recurring themes between guidelines could illustrate the level of priority and relevance they were given by the public that participated in the event. Another point to make is that some guidelines carry extensive information, which can render the central idea more fluid and less evident, making it difficult to summarize the main argument⁷⁴.

Below follow the 40 summarized guidelines (only the central argument was extracted) according to the order in which they were voted:

Table 26 – Highest voted guidelines of I CONSEG 2009, in order of highest votes

Summarized Guideline (1 to 20)		Summarized Guideline (21 to 40)	
1	Improving the working conditions of prison system workers	21	Revision of military disciplinary processes
2	Promote the autonomy of expert bodies	22	Structuring a National System of Punishment and Alternative Measures, valuing restorative justice and conflict resolution

⁷⁴ The author assumes full responsibility for the summaries of guideline texts and notes that the task was not simple, as there will always be a risk of leaving out relevant information.

Summarized Guideline (1 to 20) cont.		Summarized Guideline (21 to 40) cont.	
3	Maintain autonomy and improve the quality and working conditions of firefighters	23	Structuring and strengthening GGIs at the three levels of government / collective and coordinated action of security bodies
4	Structure federal and state police bodies to integrate their respective duties and powers ⁷⁵	24	Strengthen police intelligence units, integrate information networks, promote national and international exchanges with other intelligence agencies
5	Encourage the creation of municipal councils and autonomous communities / structure GGIs ⁷⁶ at state and municipal levels	25	Define democratic guidelines for prison management, together with penitentiary councils, authorities and the magistrate / management shared with society-led regulations
6	Review criteria for retirement of police staff	26	Establish policies of bio psychosocial evaluation of security workers
7	Prioritize policies to prevent violence using intersectorial action, studies and planning, working more closely to social movements, and community policing	27	Increase the number of police stations specialized in vulnerable groups / develop continuous action to sensitize the police towards dealing with such groups
8	Regulate the municipal guard, defining assignments and guaranteeing statutory rights	28	Increase the territory covered by Pronasci
9	Create preventative mechanisms for crimes of prejudice / combat impunity for crimes motivated by prejudice	29	Grant judiciary power to professionals in public security
10	Insert first aid and themes dealing with Civil Defense into school curriculums	30	Detach the custody of prisoners (provisional and condemned) from security secretaries

⁷⁵ Here we refer to a police system that integrates the responsibilities of patrols and investigation. Currently in Brazil, Military Police is responsible for the former whilst Civil Police take duty of the latter, working on these two police processes independently of one another.

⁷⁶ Integrated Action Offices (Gabinetes de Ação Integrada, GGI) work to integrate the various security agencies present in a municipality or state. GGIs are required for states' and municipalities' participation in PRONASCI activities.

Summarized Guideline (1 to 20) cont.		Summarized Guideline (21 to 40) cont.	
11	Define and regulate the role of the municipality in public security	31	Promote networks of interdisciplinary attendance for vulnerable groups, philosophy of community policing, combatting slave labor, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, homophobia, racism, and domestic violence
12	Demilitarize the police, separating police and firemen from the Armed Forces	32	Construct a system to prevent accidents in all municipalities, prioritizing those with known risks of accidents or disasters
13	Create an Executive Secretary of Civil Defense / include firemen in the PNSP (National Plan of Public Security) / guarantee that civil defense bodies will come under the coordination of firemen	33	Maintain criminal responsibility at 18 years of age, and introduce legislation to limit the time to comply with socio-educational measures
14	Create career plans with periodical revisions of salaries for police at all levels	34	Create a National Policy of Action against Organized Crime integrated with intelligence bodies / reinforce police staff rotation / create special defensive weapons for Organized Crime
15	Reject the proposal of integrated police duties.	35	Improve the health of inmates and workers, tending to age and gender. Build prison hospitals and CAPs (Center for Psychosocial Care) on site
16	Modernize police inquests	36	Strengthen and expand the reach of public defenders
17	Guarantee access to justice for people in conflict with the law / strengthen public defenders	37	Reaffirm the Statute of Disarmament as State Policy
18	Create a single and demilitarized career path for professionals in public security	38	Strengthen security councils at all levels and integrate them into GGIs
19	Create budget allocation for the adoption of accident prevention policies	39	Develop preventative programs based on the intersectorality of social policies and of security in community policing
20	Reconstruct CONASP and reorganize state and municipal security councils	40	Categorize crimes committed against security professionals and law enforcers as heinous crime

Source: elaborated by the author based on the Final Report of the 1st National Conference on Public Security (Ministry of Justice, 2009)

4.3.3 Action of CONASP

CONASP underwent a transitional period between August 2009 and December 2010, when members of CON, at the time labeled transitional councilors, elaborated the internal regulations of the future Definitive CONASP. The Definitive CONASP has seen two mandates, one from 2010 to 2012, and the current, which should only have lasted from 2012 to 2014, but which was extended three times as no new elections were summoned since 2012⁷⁷. The 2nd CONSEG, initially planned for 2012, was delayed until 2015, then until 2016, and until today has not yet taken place.

In Section II of its internal regulations⁷⁸, the Transitional CONASP defines motions that may be raised by the council, in the following order of importance:

- 1) Resolutions (Res.): action of a normative nature that is subject to ministerial ratification and will be published in the Official Journal
- 2) Opinions (Par.): action of a technical nature which express the council's position within its scope
- 3) Recommendations (Rec.): action of a normative nature with content addressed to the interested bodies
- 4) Motions (Mç.): Instruments of complaint for the Plenary council
- 5) Collegiate Decisions (D.C): actions of a non-normative nature that do not fit into the above categories

As the Transitional CONASP held the very specific roles of defining internal regulations for the Definitive CONASP and calling elections for the first definitive mandate of the council, we do not consider actions of this period in order to focus on the two definitive mandates of the council. Besides, during this period, only 1 resolution, 21 recommendations, 16 motions and 14 collegiate decisions were issued.

All these actions are at least partially concerned with the internal and bureaucratic functioning of the board (amendments to regulations, altering text in the

⁷⁷ Elections should have taken place at the end of 2014 for the 2015 mandate, but this did not occur. Therefore the mandate of entities elected in 2012 was extended. The electronic address of CONASP registered the minutes until the 33rd Common Meeting, which took place in August, 2015.

⁷⁸ See CONASP Internal Regulations: <https://www.legisweb.com.br/legislacao/?id=229017>.

decrees related to the functioning of the board, requests regarding the logistics for convening board members), corporate issues (such as retirement of security operators) or issues that are too specific (such as the request to release specific members of the military police who would have participated in strikes). For this reason we only selected actions that really reflected the demands and challenges in the field of public security in Brazil as a whole. These would be:

Table 27 – Selected and summarized CONASP acts, 2010-2012 mandate

Act	Content
Rec. nº 1	Dealing with weapons collected at voluntary delivery stations and producing an official disarmament advertising campaign
Rec. nº 2	Collaboration of CONASP with the MJ in the elaboration of policies to combat lethal violence amongst black youth
Rec. nº 4	November 2012 to be selected for the second CONSEG
Rec. nº 6	Effective promotion of the autonomy of expert bodies in the area of crime
Rec. nº 8	Social participation in the training sites of public security staff
Rec. nº 9	Carrying out the 20 steps to implement Plan “Crack, é possível vencer” (“Crack, we can beat it”)
Rec. nº 10	Create a section in police reports for homophobic, racist, misogynist and religiously intolerant crime and; a field for the identification of gender, social class, and street population.
Rec. nº 13	Wider social participation in councils regarding application of the law / regulatory framework for penitentiary professionals / granting of healthcare in the prison system for the national police / creation of a board for alternative punishments at DEPEN (Federal Prison Department)
Rec. nº 14	Carrying out the 9 actions to promote the human rights of prisoners / autonomy for prison management / creation of a career for penitentiary agents.
Mç. 4	Support the ‘Juventude Viva’ (‘Youth Lives’) Plan
DC nº 3	Contribute towards the ‘Safer Brazil’ Program (Programa Brasil Mais Seguro) in a way that reshifts the focus on reasonable force above prevention
DC nº 6	Request MJ participation in CONASP through group research into the problems of the prison system
DC nº 7	Make a stance against the PEC proposal to reduce the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16

Source: elaborated by the author based on the ‘CONASP Acts’, which can be found via the CONASP/Ministry of Justice page: <https://goo.gl/xByuFq>.

Table 28 – Selected and summarized CONASP acts, 2012-2014 (current mandate)

Act	Content
Rec. n ^o 17	Carry out the 4 actions concerning city hall and the State of Rio de Janeiro regarding the observation of human rights during police processes and social control in police activity.
Rec. n ^o 19	Prioritize RIC – the unified Civil Identity Register (Registro de Identidade Civil) as a matter of security
Rec. n ^a 20	Maintenance of prison administration as the indelible responsibility of the state. Rejection of public-private partnerships or outsourcing within the prison system
Rec. n ^o 21	Approve Bill 4.471/2012 regarding specialist intervention in cases of police abuse / create State Councils of Public Security / more rigorous oversight of security staff conduct / creation of financial incentives for states with low violence rates
Mç. n ^o 6	Support the approval of the Replacement of Bill 1332/2003, which establishes the Regulatory Framework of Municipal Guards
Mç. n ^o 7	Support the Presidency in its repudiation and denunciation of US and Canadian conducts of espionage and violations of Brazilian government and citizen data
Mç. n ^o 8	Renounce acts of religious intolerance that have taken place in Rio de Janeiro
Mç. n ^o 10	Renounce the 4 racist acts that have recently taken place (these acts are detailed in the original text)
Mç. n ^o 11	Support the institution of National Policy for Social Participation
Act	Content (cont.)
Mç. n ^o 12	Support the Proposal of Constitutional Amendment n ^o 325/2009, which concerns the autonomy of the Brazilian Criminal Expertise
Mç. n ^o 13	Support Bill 5057/2013, which discusses the prohibition of producing and commercializing toy guns
Mç. n ^o 14	Commend the creation of state secretaries for prison administration, with administrative autonomy over budgets, to the same degree as other state secretaries.
Mç. n ^o 15	Publicize the plenary desires to contribute to debates on the reduction of the criminal age of responsibility, reaffirming its position contrary to the measure
Mç. n ^o 16	Support the creation of a workgroup installed by SENASP to work with the theme of Moral and Sexual Harassment of Public Security Professionals.
Carta Aberta	Renounce the violence carried out by civilians against public security professionals during and in relation to protests
DC n ^o 11	Request higher participation from the collegiate in decision making related to public security policies
DC n ^o 14	Reinforce the position taken against the legislative proposal to reduce the criminal age of (Proposal of Constitutional Amendment n ^o 171/1993)

Source: Elaborated by the author based on “CONASP Acts”, which can be found via the CONASP/Ministry of Justice page: <https://goo.gl/xByuFq>.

4.4 Programs financed by the international community of donors in Brazil (2004-2014)

Brazil does not represent a significant recipient country of SSR programs in LAC – it occupies the 15th position amongst the Latin American and Caribbean countries that received the most bilateral resources (coming from the DAC) for SSR programs between 2004 and 2014. If we also consider programs financed by multilateral agencies, Brazil comes in at 17th place, having received 20 programs (18 financed by bilateral agencies, and 2 by multilateral ones) over the same period. In terms of value, only 0.5 % (US\$ 2.4 million) of the total amount used for SSR programs in the region from 2004-2014 was destined for Brazil. Countries such as Haiti, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and El Salvador received the majority of verified programs, and consequently the most resources, as was noted in Section 2. Brazil received international resources from six countries during this period, as well as the IADB Special Fund. The below table presents, in descending order, the amounts Brazil received.

Table 29 – Largest donors to SSR programs in Brazil, 2004-2014

Ranking	Donor Country	Amount (in US\$)	%
1º	United States	911,753.75	36%
2º	Special IADB Fund	552,906.28	22%
3º	France	333,100.24	13%
4º	Germany	225,289.52	9%
5º	Holland	173,433.22	7%
6º	United Kingdom	107,549.75	4%
7º	Canada	105,958.62	4%
8º	Belgium	88,754.14	4%

Source: Elaborated by the author based on information available on the OECD database.

Interestingly, the European Union and the UN did not declare SSR programs to Brazil during this period, which means that Brazil's only multilateral donor was the IADB Special Fund, which also happens to be the second largest donor to Brazil. The below table, presented in chronological order, details donor countries, the nature of programs, and values. To briefly explain what is meant by

“nature of program”; I created labels to summarize the main objective for each program according to the description given by its donors to the OECD.

Table 30 – SSR Programs financed by international donors in Brazil, 2004-2014

Year	Donor	Program Description	Amount (in US\$)
2007	Belgium	Violence Prevention	88,754.14
2007	Holland	Human Rights Promotion	35,362.15
2007	United States	Police Training (export controls / border security)	65,80 ⁷⁹
2007	United States	Technical Assistance for the State of Rio de Janeiro in emergency operations	65,796.51
2008	France	Police Training (civil defense)	3,904.57
2008	France	Police Training (civil defense)	9,135.11
2008	Holland	Human Rights Promotion	138,070.90
2008	United States	Police Training (export controls / border security)	145,206.65
2008	United States	Police Training (export controls / border security)	64,536.29
2009	United States	Police Training (export controls / border security)	4,298.94
2010	United States	Assistance Program to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - Global Threat Reduction (GTR)	631,849.56
2011	Canada	Comparative Study: Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil	105,958.62
2012	Germany	Police training, and gear/equipment assistance	21,598.92
2012	Germany	Police training (improving efficiency of border controls)	196,585.36
2012	IDB Special Fund	Redesign and Implementations of Citizens Security Programs	201,056.63
2012	IDB Special Fund	Violence Prevention	351,849.10
2013	Germany	Police training (improving efficiency of border controls)	7,105.02
2013	United Kingdom	Study on cyber security (Cyber Barometer Report Brazil)	78,173.86
2014	France	Inter-police technical cooperation	320,060.56
2014	United Kingdom	Study on cyber security (Cyber Barometer Report Brazil)	29,375.79
TOTAL			2,498,744.47

Source: Elaborated by the author based on information available on the OECD database.

⁷⁹ I believe this value to be incorrect as it is not consistent with other north American totals. I have alerted the OECD and requested a correction in January 2018, but until the time this Chapter was being finalized (March, 2018) we have not received a response.

It is important to note that the descriptions given to programs on the OECD database was not always very clear. Often, I have had to directly contact the donor agency involved to request further clarification, but rarely did I received a satisfactory response. Sadly, information on the origin (regarding which governmental body of the donating country sent the resources) and the channel through which the resources entered the recipient country – whether this be via the government (and, in this case, whether this occurs at the federal, state, or municipal level), via NGOs, or even via multilateral agencies (such as the UNPD) – are vague. At times the space left for these details in the OECD database is filled out, but sometimes they are not. And even when filled out, the available information might only be “government” or “NGO”, without specifying which government or NGO the resources were sent to. For this reason we will not include this information in our analysis.

Belgium only financed one program in Brazil between 2004-2014, which according to the OECD database was addressed to Brazil’s Federal District (Brasilia) and was aimed at preventing violence and containing drug abuse. Belgium does not stand out as a large donor for Latin America, neither in the quantity of programs nor in the amounts sent. It financed one other program, in Colombia, with around US\$15,000, focused at strengthening the justice system. As seen in previous sections, Canada directs 90% of its SSR resources for Latin America to Haiti – a country for which it is by far the largest donor in this category, which puts Canada in second place between donors of SSR programs in LAC. Nevertheless, the only program, which seems to be financed by Canada in Brazil, is a comparative study between Brazil, Mexico and Colombia.

Both France and Germany funded programs aimed at police training. The country each donated towards three programs during the period. In the case of France, there seems to have been a greater concern with civil security, while the programs financed by Germany were more geared towards border security. France and Germany are the largest SSR donors to Brazil after the USA and the IADB, even if they are not the largest donors to the wider LAC region. The profile of programs financed in Brazil is not far from those financed by the same two countries in the rest of LAC, - French and German donations are concentrated in police training for both civil and border security. Holland barely details its programs and the only two financed in Brazil across the same period are simply characterized as “ODA for

Human Rights”. Holland is also not a great donor within LAC, and other financed projects by this country also fall into the categories of human rights and citizen security.

The IADB Special Fund is one of the few donors that details its donations on the OECD platform. It is the second largest donor to Brazil, with two programs that, together, add up to over US\$500,000. Both programs may be classified as violence prevention, being that one of them deals primarily with youth violence, with a focus on raising the human capital of young people as well as their insertion into the market. This program was developed in Rio within the scope of UPPs, and also acted to support it. The other actually consisted in financing the redesign of the Brazilian Citizens’ Security program together with various other actors. Given the period in which this program took place – 2012 – it is possible to imagine that it was part of the reorganization of PRONASCI that had recently taken place. The IDB Special Fund is a significant donor towards SSR programs in LAC, and is focused on citizen’s security and violence prevention.

The United Kingdom stands out amongst SSR donors in Brazil, as well as amongst donors in wider LAC (being the 5th largest donor), thanks mostly to the sums donated to Jamaica, the biggest recipient of donations from the United Kingdom. Of the 104 programs financed by the United Kingdom in Latin American, only two were destined for Brazil. In addition, these programs were both small and cheap, consisting of diagnostic studies on cyber security in Brazil.

Finally, the US constitutes the largest donor of SSR programs for Brazil – involving six programs and just over US\$900,000 between 2004 and 2014. Of the six programs, five are related to police training, more specifically, towards the control of exports and border management. This represents a departure from the character of donations usually offered by this country to LAC, which are mostly destined to governance in the area of security. The most expensive, which involves the most resources (US\$631,800) is the Program of Assistance to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Arms. Unsurprisingly this is the second most applied program from the USA to LAC, having developed in various other Latin American countries. The next section will deal with this particular program.

4.5 Convergences and divergences between local demands and programs financed by the international community of donors in Brazil.

When we compare the Brazilian agenda on public security, represented in the documents of the I CONSEG and CONASP, with the SSR programs financed by international donors, the first thing that calls our attention is that the list of demands is far greater than what is offered. This said, analysis of the programs leads us to believe that there is a convergence on what is offered and demanded: most of the programs offered in Brazil appear in some form on the Brazilian agenda. Below, we present a list of the guidelines dealt with in available programs, the countries responsible, and the CONASP / CONSEG guidelines or acts with which they align:

Table 31 – Convergences between the guidelines of international donors and the Brazilian national agenda for public security (Principles/Guidelines from CONSEG and Acts from CONASP), of the period 2004-2014.

International Donor Guidelines vs. National Agenda for Public Security	
Guideline: Promotion of Human Rights	Donor(s): Holland
<p>CONSEG Principles/Guidelines: Although the promotion of human rights permeates a large part of the principles and guidelines of CONSEG, the term ‘human rights’ only appears within two guidelines: 2 and 12.</p> <p>CONASP Acts: As in the case of CONSEG, a good part of the acts selected by CONASP are guided by the promotion of human rights. The term appears more specifically within acts “Recommendation n.14” (2010-2012 mandate) and “Recommendation n.17” (2012-2014 mandate).</p>	
Guideline: Violence Prevention	Donor(s): Belgium; IDB Special Fund
<p>CONSEG Principles/Guidelines: the prevention of violence is dealt with in principles 5, 6 and 8 and in guidelines 7, 9 and 39.</p> <p>CONASP Acts: amongst CONASP acts, the question of violence prevention appears in the Collegiate Decision n.6 (2010-2012 mandate).</p>	
Guideline: Security with Citizenship	Donor(s): IDB Special Fund
<p>CONSEG Principles/Guidelines: although it does not appear in writing within the final CONSEG documents, if we consider a wider definition of ‘security with citizenship’, understood as an inclusive, democratic and participatory security, the concept is present in at least 4 principles (3, 4, 6 and 9) and 8 guidelines (5, 7, 20, 25, 28, 31, 38 and 39). Also fitting this interpretation: some authors may understand the number of principles and guidelines aligning with the concept of ‘security with citizenship’ to be wider than this,</p>	

<p>given that many of the issues dealt with in CONSEG's final document are indirectly related to it. In any case, this means that local demands are supported by the IDB.</p> <p>CONASP Acts: Taking into account the wide definition used above, the concept is present in 7 acts (Rec. 2, 8, 10, 13 – 1st mandate; Rec. 17, 21 and Mç. 11 – 2nd mandate).</p>	
Guideline: Diagnostic Research	Donor(s): Canada
<p>CONSEG Principles/Guidelines: Diagnostic studies appear in only one guideline, number 7. Even in this case, the guideline aims to create a basis for security policies within studies and planning towards efficacy. The program financed by Canada actually consists of a comparative study between countries.</p> <p>CONASP Acts: There are no CONASP acts dealing with this theme.</p>	
Guideline: Capacitating / Training Police	Donor(s): United States; Germany; France
<p>CONSEG Principles/Guidelines: Although there are various principles and many guidelines that deal with valuing workers within the field of security, only one guideline registers the issue of police qualifications as a demand, which would be guideline 3 (which, in this case, mentions the case of Firefighters). Guideline 24 speaks of integrating information networks and promoting national and international exchange with other intelligence agencies, which could be understood more as a matter of technical cooperation than as training or capacitating.</p> <p>CONASP Acts: There are no CONASP acts dealing with this theme.</p>	

Source: Elaborated by the author based on information available on the OECD database, in the 1st CONSEG Report, and in the CONASP acts.

What we first note is that the international agenda is not totally disconnected from the national agenda. There are, however, certain imbalances between supply and demand. There are programs that are only supported by one CONSEG guideline, and even in these cases it is necessary to widen our gaze generously in order to find a convergence between the agendas. This would be the case of the study financed by Canada, and, more fitting perhaps, the cases of training and capacitating police as financed by the USA, Germany, and France, which make up a majority within internationally offered programs. The latter are justified by only one guideline and, even so, this guideline is focused on the qualification of firefighters, while the program offered concentrates on border security. Border security is not exactly a concern that appears on the Brazilian agenda, only being referred to once within CONSEG guidelines (guideline 34). In this case, we could say that the supply is much larger than the demand and seems to cater to an audience that is not quite the same as the one asking for qualification.

Unsurprisingly, the two programs financed by the IDB mostly adhere to the national agenda, finding support in both the CONSEG documents as well as CONASP acts. They are larger and more generic programs, not unlike ‘umbrella’ programs, within which we can place a series of demands. This finding reinforces a point brought up within the literature, according to which the assistance provided by multilateral agencies would be more geared to the needs of the recipient than to the interests of the donor (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, Dólar and Levin 2006, Neumayer 2003), which was also proven correct when looking at data aggregated to the wider LAC region.

There are, however, two guidelines on the international SSR agenda for Brazil that do not appear at all in the CONSEG guidelines, nor in the CONASP acts: cyber security (two programs financed by the United Kingdom) and the reduction of nuclear arms (the largest program funded by the USA). Cyber security does not constitute any issue on the Brazilian security agenda, but seems to be an important objective of the United Kingdom, which has financed various other programs of the sort in Latin America. The reduction of nuclear arms seems to be even more distant from our immediate concerns, but is evidently central to the concerns of North Americans, having been the most expensive program financed in Brazil and the second in terms of North American resources employed across the entire LAC region.

I carried out a small survey regarding the report on cyber security financed by the UK and executed in Brazil between 2013 and 2014: The Cyber Barometer Report Brazil. I found that the report was produced by a group of private consultants based in South Africa – the Wolfpack Information Risk, created in 2011, with resources from the British High Commission towards surveys on cyber security in various countries. The reports are published (although I am not sure if in full) on the “Cyber security Capacity Portal” of the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, a research center linked to Oxford University.

That a foreign country would be interested in the cybernetic environment of Brazil (or any other developing countries) and financing its own research in the area is no surprise. What is surprising, however, is that this was declared a ‘donation’ to the OECD. On the Department for International Development (DFID) website, the

cooperation agency for the development of the UK, we find the following description of the report:

A substantial technical report on Cybercrime in Brazil. For relevant stakeholders in Brazil to become aware of the true costs of cybercrime to the economy and to implement the proposed model that comprises all the key elements of proper cyber threat prevention and reaction (UKaid Development Tracker).

The United Kingdom declared the cost of this report to the OECD as ODA, under the heading of SSR. Further to the fact that cyber security is not considered a national demand, the program generated a report that apparently involved neither a local government nor a local NGO. This is to say, the recipient of the resources was the donor country itself (and the South-African consultation firm that carried out the report). The resources applied to the research in question did not implicate any type of monetary transfer or human resources to Brazil, neither was it solicited by the receiving country, which leads us to question the very notion of a ‘genuine’ donation. It is as if the United Kingdom believed it was doing Brazil a ‘favor’ by exploring a theme that had barely been touched upon within national surveys, and that this could be considered a donation.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) report, which is by far the most expensive program of all, suggests a similar occurrence, but operates on a much more sophisticated level. The GTRI is a program belonging to the North American Department of Energy, linked to the State Department, and run in partnership with the NNSA – the National Nuclear Security Administration. The program seeks to prevent the acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as lowering the risks in places where these materials are already being processed⁸⁰.

It is worth clarifying that the concern with the non-proliferation of nuclear arms is not new amongst North Americans. Since the 1950s the country has led initiatives in the way of constructing an international institutional architecture with the objective of obliging countries to desist development of nuclear materials for warlike means. Examples of this can be found in the creation of the IAEA (*International Atomic Energy Agency*) in 1957 or the NPT (*Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of*

⁸⁰ Materials available on the US Department of Energy website: <https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/em/GlobalThreatReductionInitiative.pdf>, last accessed 18/02/2018.

Nuclear Weapons or more simply, the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*), a project which was announced by the United States at the General Assembly of the UN in 1965 and was opened for signatures in 1968, after three years of revisions by members of the Assembly⁸¹. At the domestic level, the US has also created a juridical apparatus to support diplomatic offensives against countries that do not adequately adhere to international standards on the matter, such as the *US Non-Proliferation Act* of 1968 (Patti and Mallea 2018). From the 1960s onwards various other agreements were signed under the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A large part of these rested on North-American initiatives or were supported by the USA by way of an overseeing structure, even though the majority of nuclear and radiological material in world circulation is of either North American or Russian origin.

The concern with Brazil is justified by the fact that the country has been working on various projects related to the use of nuclear material since the 1950s, such as the Angra Nuclear Power Plants 1 and 2, the nuclear powered submarine (Martins Filho 2014) and, most recently, the construction of Angra 3, the uranium enrichment plant in Rezende and the Nuclear Multiuse Reactor (Costa and Lessa 2017), developed between Brazil and Argentina⁸². Besides this, Brazil has a history of 'bad behavior' with respects to the signing of non-proliferation treaties. Some of the most important and in-depth agreements on the topic were only signed by Brazil recently, such as the Treaty of Tlaltelolco⁸³ and the NPT itself, signed in 1994 and 1998 respectively, after being rejected on numerous occasions by Brazil (Martins Filho 2014, Patti and Mallea 2018).

If the North-American concerns are justified by the facts laid out above, what is not justified is that the cost of overseeing Brazilian installations is being

81 Information available on the IAEA website: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/chronology-of-key-events>.

82 Patti and Mallea (2018) develop a very interesting piece of research on the relationship between Brazil and Argentina regarding nuclear weapons. According to the authors, the 1970s saw the two countries headlining a nuclear arms race, which particularly disturbed the USA, who unofficially sent an American deputy (Paul Findley, of the republican party) to come up with a waiver agreement for atomic explosives and install mutual monitoring of nuclear activity between the two countries. The agreement never took hold at the time, but it was credited as the root of the agreement signed in 1990, which led to the formation of the ABACC – The Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials.

83 Agreement signed in the City of Mexico in 1967 which established the prohibition of nuclear weapons development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

declared as foreign aid, especially when this seems to be an exclusively North-American concern – that is to say, a concern of the donor. There does not exist a single national document amongst those referred during this research that mentions the risks of handling nuclear and/or radiological materials for civilians, requesting greater care of protection of these materials.

Nonetheless, Brazil is a signatory of the most important treaties of the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in a way ‘justifies’ North-American intervention (as they have the prerogative of monitoring the compliance of signatories). In this case the USA has the freedom to undertake oversight under the title of ‘aid’, ‘assistance’, as many developing countries will not have the conditions to ‘honor the commitments’ with their own resources. This is to say, a situation has been created in which the USA are capable of tending to internal demands (monitoring countries that work with nuclear materials) and declaring the costs of this activity to the OECD as ODA to the countries that are targeted by this type of intervention.

4.6 Final Considerations

What led me begin this case study was the unease I felt at working with data aggregated for the LAC region – in cases of data on both programs and demands – which could easily mask the relationship between donors and recipients at the domestic level. In the end, regional documentation in a way reflected the concerns of the strongest countries in the bloc, who managed to impose their own demands upon regionally discussed guidelines. More specific demands therefore became sidelined during the voting processes and building of consensus within the involved organizations.

If in the case of Latin American and the Caribbean I could state that international cooperation agencies offer little consideration for existing regional agendas, I had yet to determine the same in the case of national agendas. For this reason an analysis at the country level (i.e., not the regional level) could surprise us with the discovery that there exists a series of local demands that are indeed being

catered for by what is on offer from programs financed by international assistance. Or not.

To this end we chose national documents that would together correspond to an agenda in the security sector (principles and guidelines of CONSEG and acts from CONASP), and confronted this with data on SSR programs financed by international donors in Brazil. We noted that there is in fact a series of issues which appear on the Brazilian agenda and do not appear on the wider Latin American and Caribbean one – for example, issues related to racism, religious intolerance, the creation and strengthening of advisory and deliberative councils at all levels of government, or independence from criminal expertise – which demonstrates that the national agenda actually contains specifications that are not dealt with on the Latin American agenda. This does not guarantee, however, that these specific demands are being fully considered.

The research confirmed certain points that had already been made during research on LAC data, but it also taught us a few new things. Once again, it found that donations are not generic (which contradicts part of the literature on the topic) and that donors have quite specific interests and profiles when it comes to their donations. Some demonstrate little interest in Brazil as a recipient of SSR programs and therefore dedicate very few resources to the cause (such as was the case for Holland, Belgium, and Canada). Others have played a more significant role by offering various programs and/or an injection of more significant ODA flows (France, Germany, USA and the IDB Special Fund).

Whilst analyzing the data above we noted that specific demands in the Brazilian context, as well as a series of other demands from the national agenda, were left out of the SSR programs offered by international cooperation agencies to Brazil. Although they dealt with a small portion of the demands, there is a wide spectrum of issues that are not met. Even in cases where demand is minimally met *grosso modo*, a more thorough analysis will verify that these provisions are only partial, as is the case of the provision of police training. In this instance, demands for police training do appear within documents of the national agenda, but not exactly in the form of training for "border management", as is offered. Moreover, it is not possible to say that the few convergences found are the result of dialogue and

consultations between donor and recipient – it is possible that these alignments between donor interests and recipient agendas are merely coincidental.

If on the one hand this reinforces the thesis that there is a disconnect between supply and demand, it is not yet possible to state that this disconnect is merely the result of negligence or little receptivity of the national agenda, as some of the literature suggests. It could be the result of calculated decisions functioning in the interest of donors. This became evident with the rise of programs that appear far removed from the Brazilian agenda, which actually better serve the unilateral interests of donors, as was the case of reports on cyber security financed by the UK, and the program of non-proliferation offered by the USA, the GTRI. This phenomenon is detailed by realist literature on foreign aid, which understands international cooperation for development as a form of control over foreign territories in order to guarantee the security of donating countries (Morgenthau 1962).

An interesting fact that confirms this hypothesis – at least in the two cases cited – was the reaction of North-American armed forces in the face of President Trump's cuts to foreign aid at the beginning of 2017. Military members of the Department of Defense publically announced their opposition to the move. They confirmed the importance of continuing with these donations, especially in the Middle East, could risk losing control and influence over these territories, which could endanger US security⁸⁴.

It is important to clarify that while the definition of ODA by the OECD specifies the areas in which is it possible to declare ODA flows, it omits defining exactly what can be considered a donation. It does not specify, for example, if technical assistance without a monetary transfer is still considered ODA. Or, if a report carried out by a donor country and presented to the recipient country can be considered a donation, even if the 'beneficiary' has not solicited it. Nor does it specify whether the cost of overseeing national installations by external agencies can be included within the classification of assistance for development. The only impositions put in place by the OECD are that the flows come from governmental agencies in the

84 This situation is described in materials from Devex, a media platform focusing on the "global development community", or, the global community of peoples working directly or indirectly on development policies financed by foreign aid. The item in question is from the 23 March 2017 and can be found via the following link: <https://goo.gl/8kCvSK>, last accessed 05/03/2018.

donating country and aim for the economic development and well being of the receiving country.

The vague contents of this definition guarantees enormous liberties under which donor countries can carry out unsolicited and even undesired interventions in receiving countries, and declare these activities as donations – in the end, they are ‘gifts’, like ‘favors’. The issue is that giving an unwanted ‘gift’ is like giving an ashtray to a non-smoker. That is to say, part of recipient’s demands are ignored and the programs offered are disconnected from local agendas, which could be the root of the disconnect found between supply and demand. In other words, international cooperation for development within the OECD model ends up serving as a vehicle through which donors can carry out their own interests and can declare the costs of these self-interested acts as ‘donations’.

Conclusion

This research arose from certain questions I had regarding international assistance to public safety programs in Brazil, from a time when I was working as the coordinator of an NGO dealing with the issue. At first, my inquiries were not particularly academic. They were in fact very practical. I was trying to understand what would attract funds to programs that dealt mainly with police reform, and more generally with citizen security. Once these concerns had been turned into research questions for a PhD project, my curiosities on the subject guided me through an investigation that indeed confirmed my initial hypothesis. This demonstrated that there was in fact evidence of resistance, on the part of international donors, to working with projects related to policing. Not only has the literature made it clear (Leeds (2007), Hammergreen (2003), Bayley (2005), Bzorska (2003), but OECD data shows that only 0.7% of the international resources addressed to Latin America between 2004-2014 is registered as Security Sector Reform ODA, despite OECD claims that this sort of aid needs to be prioritized.

The focus then changed a little. Once it was confirmed that LAC security reform was far from being a priority for international donors, I investigated existing resources and programs – those making up the 0.7% - to map donors and recipients, amounts, and the nature of programs. While these programs were clearly not a priority, I was curious to find out whether those that were taking place were at least being formulated based on local demands. Literature on the subject pointed to international donors' generalization of LAC problems, which has resulted in generic programs for the region that do not match recipients' specific needs (Bayley 2006a, 2006b, Tuchin and Golding (2003), Ziegler and Nield (2002). To investigate this I sought 1) information on SSR programs funded in the LAC region by international donors (2004-2014), based on OECD data; 2) LAC security demands, based on regional organizations' documents and advocacy. I found that not only were LAC security demands being only partially heard by international assistance, but that a great deal of demands were being ignored altogether. Besides, there were many offers that did not meet any regional demands at all. Also, the programs analyzed were not generic: different countries and types of donors (i.e., countries or

institutions) had completely different patterns of funding, which contradicts the authors cited above. And multilateral donors - the institutional ones – seemed to be more sensitive to regional demands than country donors, reinforcing certain claims in the literature (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, Dollar and Levin 2006, Neumayer 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, Hammergren 2003).

Some criticism emerged regarding the use of aggregated data for the LAC region, so it was decided that the experiment should be repeated using data from a single country - Brazil. In addition to the data already gathered, I then sought 3) data on national demands on the security sector, extracted from documents of the I CONSEG and the CONASP; 4) SSR programs funded by international assistance in Brazil. Results were no different than the ones obtained in the previous experiments: programs were not generic, only part of the demands were met by international aid offers, lots of demands were ignored and, once more, the only institutional donor involved (IADB) showed greater adherence to local demands in its portfolio of funded programs than DAC donors. Nonetheless, the case study permitted a more accurate analysis of the programs funded by the international donors, as the number of programs was much fewer than when working with aggregate data for the LAC. Additionally, I was able to see that some of the programs that did not meet local demands were closely aligned with the interests of donors – the case of the GTRI in Brazil and Latin America is evidently the most extreme example. I also concluded that the OECD's definition of ODA is vague enough to allow for aid flows that represent questionable understandings of how to benefit recipient countries.

Speaking of demands being ignored, I was surprised by the consistent presence of issues related to the prison system (facilities, welfare of prisoners and workers, policies for market rehabilitation of ex-prisoners, etc.) in the documents of both regional organizations and the case study of Brazil. Perhaps even more surprising was the fact that no donors demonstrated any acknowledgement of the issue. In the SSR LAC agenda, as well as in the Brazilian agenda, the prison system appeared as important as crime prevention. However it simply does not exist in donors' agendas. This led me to believe that this particular concern is not among the core interests of donors. Why would it be? How would they be affected by a qualified and respectful prison system in a recipient country?

The above question reminds me of an article I recently read in the Núcleo de Pesquisas em Relações Internacionais – NUPRI's (Research Center on International Relations) blog, entitled "The UK is planning to build jails in Nigeria to repatriate foreign prisoners". The short article was written by my colleague Francesca Mercúrio, a PhD candidate at IRI-USP (International Relations Institute – University of São Paulo) like myself, and it reminded me of the Easterly's concept of "authoritarian development" (2013). I present the first paragraph of the article below:

The British Government proposed to the Nigerian counterpart a plan of building a 112 bed-wing in the maximum-security prison of Kiri Kiri in Lagos, after almost 4 years from a former deal stipulated between the United Kingdom and its former colony. The deal was concerning prison system and repatriation of foreign prisoners accused and sentenced in the UK. The project received the green light of the United Nations as they believe it will contribute to an improvement in prison system and prisoners' conditions in Nigeria. "The provision of this assistance is in line with the government's security and stability objectives in West Africa," said the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson in a written statement to Parliament. In fact, the UK Government will cover the costs of the restructuring of prisons, an amount of £700.000, and implement systems and policies that should be more concerned of human rights as well as the security and safety of prisoners (NUPRI 2018).

When I read this article I understood that there are ways in which prisons might be considered an interesting contribution for international funders to make to recipient countries. The condition being that they solve donors' own problems. In this case, the problem is too many Nigerian prisoners filling British prisons. I will not even go into the details of this discussion, which certainly involves human rights and international law violations, and most likley unspoken colonial impulses. What I am quite sure of is that once the project leaves paper, there is nothing preventing the UK from declaring this as SSR ODA benefitting Nigeria. It is very good business indeed: the UK gets rid of an annoying problem on their own territory and transfers it to an ex-colony. Further to this, the country can now declare the expenses used as ODA, bringing figures closer to the 0.7% of their GDP that is spent on foreign aid, and allowing them to play the role of a responsible and benevolent donor in the DAC.

The same can be said of the various programs on border security that appeared in the OECD database. Border security is a matter that attracts donor countries because it is a way to control the entrance of goods (and also drugs and

weapons) into territories that represent possible routes to the donor's own. Although border security appears as a demand in the LAC SSR agenda represented by UNASUR, not a single sentence on the subject could be found within Brazilian documents that expressed local concerns and agendas. Yet, the majority of programs funded by international assistance in Brazil were focused on border security. In other words, donor countries are spending money to solve their own problems and declaring it as ODA.

Of course, this is only a hypothesis, but I risk saying that the great amounts of resources that Canada addressed to Haiti in order to reconstruct security and justice facilities and systems may be covering up similar self-interested agendas, such as refraining a migratory outbreak from Haiti to Canada – they are both francophone countries and Canada has been the favored escape route for haitians during times of conflict for years. Of course this can also be analyzed under a more constructive lense – Canada may be motivated by a culture that understands welfare and peace as important values or “global goods” to be pursued when formulating aid programs. Or, in realistic terms, they may simply be worried about their own safety. For the time being these hypotheses cannot be advanced, but I strongly encourage that the Canada-Haiti SSR aid case be closely studied.

At times I thought that if a single statement should be made to summarize the findings of this research inquiry, it would be: Morgenthau was right. Foreign aid is about power to purchase influence in order to guarantee donors' security. Nonetheless, it would not be responsible to state such a thing at this stage of the investigation, although some of the findings of this research point in that direction. I unfortunately dedicated too much time to literature and data (systematization and analysis) – as I said, this is the price paid for entering such underexplored territory – and I was not able to advance in the classification of donors according to their performance in the SSR foreign aid regime. More time and research dedication (perhaps deeper case studies with donors) would be necessary to make such a statement without negligence.

At the end of this project I should recognize that some mistakes may have been made, and for this reason I should undergo some self criticism. The comparison I made between the regional and national agenda in the field of public security has made me reflect on the definition of "local", since it was clear that there are obvious

differences between what can be considered LAC demands and Brazilian demands in the sector. The problematization of what can be called "local" when confronting localized demands with the supply of international resources has already been dealt with by Maschietto (2016) and Donais (2012) when analyzing peacekeeping programs implemented in Mozambique and Haiti, respectively.

After all, what is the "local"? It can be the village, the county, the country or the continent depending on the perspective. However, it must be kept in mind that each of these "levels of local" contains specificities and one must be aware of the risk of exaggerated generalizations. Demands change as one deepens the level of analysis - new issues emerge, and those emerging at the macro level disappear at the micro level. I questioned the tendency of donors' generalized solutions to recipient countries pointed by the literature. However, I myself was not very careful when it came to generalizing LAC demands. The Brazilian study case, in a certain way, opened my eyes to this problem and made me reflect on the concept of the "local" in the field of international assistance.

Perhaps there is a statement I can make without incurring the risk of negligence: the international community should take both regional and local agendas into consideration when funding security sector reform programs in Latin American and Caribbean countries: if it is fundamental to know and strengthen pre-existing regional movements and arrangements before any intervention, it is also important not to accept that the "regional" automatically represents the "local", as this risks creating generalizations that disregard important specificities. And by "local", I guess that it is important to be permeable to different levels of local demands – from the closest ground level of the community to the greatest level of the country and region. I understand that pre-program diagnosis should be able to capture these demands and identify main local actors in the field.

I would like to end this thesis by questioning the parameters of aid accountability in SSR programs: How are these programs evaluated by donors? Who sets the goals and indicators? Based on what? Who are they accountable to? My intention in this conclusion was to briefly summarize the thesis, but also to draft some questions and hypotheses pointed out by the research. I assume that, at least for me, this investigation brought about more questions than I was able to answer. I guess I was successful in answering the very first questions that guided me along this

journey, but many other emerged along the way and remained unanswered – I hope to have the opportunity (or more directly, a job!) to be able to answer them in the near future, as this subject continues to fascinate me.

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